"Why 'non-efficiency enhancing' labor-side agreements?: global governance and labor markets: the EU, NAFTA, and the ILO"

Gitterman, Daniel P. (2001) "Why 'non-efficiency enhancing' labor-side agreements?: global governance and labor markets: the EU, NAFTA, and the ILO" . In European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 2001 (7th), May 31-June 2, 2001, pages 42, Madison, Wisconsin.

Abstract

This paper offers an explanation of why governments agree to labor side-agreements and how the delegation or transfer of regulatory authority varies across two regional agreements-the European Union (EU/Social Protocol), North America (NAFTA/NAALC), and the international system (ILO/WTO). I argue that nations agree to a social dimension or a labor side-agreement because cooperation presents a solution to domestic political problems in advanced industrialized nations. My argument is that governments must seek ways to maximize the economic efficiency gains from free trade and to minimize domestic political opposition. Thus, they strategically delegate or transfer limited authority to an alternative institution in an effort to respond to domestic differences within countries and managed the anticipated distributional conflict between nations, accepting one set of rules in one agreement and another set of rules in the others.