de Grauwe, Paul. (2010) A mechanism of self-destruction of the eurozone. CEPS Commentary, 9 November 2010. [Policy Paper]
| PDF Download (198Kb) | Preview |
Abstract
Drawing an analogy with the ill-fated Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the pre-eurozone era, Paul De Grauwe argues in a new CEPS Commentary that the creation of a sovereign debt default mechanism is a very bad decision that will make the eurozone more fragile by making financial crises an endemic feature.
Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII (Chicago style) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
Social Networking: |
Item Type: | Policy Paper |
---|---|
Subjects for non-EU documents: | EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > EMU/EMS/euro |
Subjects for EU documents: | UNSPECIFIED |
EU Series and Periodicals: | UNSPECIFIED |
EU Annual Reports: | UNSPECIFIED |
Series: | Series > Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) > CEPS Commentaries |
Depositing User: | Phil Wilkin |
Official EU Document: | No |
Language: | English |
Date Deposited: | 07 Dec 2010 |
Page Range: | p. 3 |
Last Modified: | 15 Feb 2011 18:39 |
URI: | http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15189 |
Actions (login required)
View Item |