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Fiscal policy coordination and competitiveness surveillance: what solutions to what problems? CEPS Policy Brief No. 213/September 2010

Gros, Daniel and Alcidi, Cinzia. (2010) Fiscal policy coordination and competitiveness surveillance: what solutions to what problems? CEPS Policy Brief No. 213/September 2010. [Policy Paper]

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    Abstract

    Close coordination of national fiscal policy and surveillance of competitiveness seem highly desirable within a monetary union. But are they also feasible? This note argues that surveillance of competitiveness risks concentrating on symptoms (rising wages in the non-tradable sector), rather than the underlying causes (credit-financed booms). Moreover, the economic rationale for fiscal policy coordination (beyond the strict enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact – SGP) seems to be weak during normal times. While it makes sense to coordinate the fiscal response of member states to the present crisis, it does not seem appropriate to develop new permanent mechanisms for the coordination of national fiscal policy.

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    Item Type: Policy Paper
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > fiscal policy
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series: UNSPECIFIED
    ["eprint_fieldname_eusries" not defined]: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) > CEPS Policy Briefs
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 21 Sep 2010
    Page Range: p. 6
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 18:37
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14980

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