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The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model. CEPS Report in Finance and Banking No. 35, 1 November 2004

Belke, Ansgar and Styczynska, Barbara. (2004) The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model. CEPS Report in Finance and Banking No. 35, 1 November 2004. UNSPECIFIED.

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    Abstract

    This study analyses the allocation of power in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. For this purpose, classical power indices that have their origin in solutions of cooperative games are applied. First, an assessment is made of the effects of enlargement on the voting power of different subgroups of the Governing Council that arise in the wake of the continuous accession process. Second, a systematic comparison is carried out of the status quo rule (‘one member, one vote’) with respect to the voting power of the ECB Executive Board and to the representativeness of European monetary policy, along with the potential for its re-nationalisation.

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    Item Type: Other
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > EU institutions & developments > European Central Bank
    EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > EMU/EMS/euro
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series: UNSPECIFIED
    ["eprint_fieldname_eusries" not defined]: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) > CEPS Research Reports in Finance and Banking
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 26 Aug 2009
    Page Range: p. 28
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 18:14
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11440

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