Holding the Supervisor to Account: The European Parliament and the European Central Bank in Banking Supervision. Bertelsmann Stiftung Policy Paper 19 November 2018

Maricut-Akbik, Adina (2018) Holding the Supervisor to Account: The European Parliament and the European Central Bank in Banking Supervision. Bertelsmann Stiftung Policy Paper 19 November 2018. [Policy Paper]

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Abstract

In the aftermath of the euro crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) took over responsibilities for banking supervision in the euro area in the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). This expansion of the original ECB mandate in monetary policy was coupled with the establishment of additional accountability mechanisms to balance the newly acquired competences. In terms of political accountability, the relationship with the European Parliament (EP) was placed front and centre — with regular interactions between the two institutions since late 2013. This paper analyses the accountability interactions between the EP’s Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee and ECB Banking Supervision in the first 4.5 years of the functioning of the SSM. In particular, it aims to: 1) situate the relationship between the ECB and the EP in the broader context of political accountability in banking supervision; 2) provide an overview of the frequency and patterns of interactions between the two institutions, describing types of questions asked and answers provided; and 3) identify strengths and weaknesses in the process, with a forward-looking focus on prospects for improvement.

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