


# euro-barometre

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



No. 21 MAY 1984

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES  
RUE DE LA LOI 200 • 1049 BRUSSELS

EUROBAROMETER

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY  
AND ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

- Awareness of the European Parliament and the June 1984 elections
- The image of the European Parliament
- For or against the draft Treaty of Union adopted by the European Parliament
- Voting propensity
- Attitudes towards Europe and the European Community
- Priorities for joint Community action
- A "mock" European referendum

No 21 - May 1984

Commission of the European Communities  
rue de la Loi 200 - 1049 Brussels

PRELIMINARY NOTE

EUROBAROMETER PUBLIC OPINION POLLS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES EACH SPRING AND AUTUMN SINCE SEPTEMBER 1973. THEY HAVE INCLUDED GREECE SINCE AUTUMN 1980.

AN IDENTICAL SET OF QUESTIONS IS PUT TO REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES - DIFFERENT EACH TIME - OF THE POPULATION AGED FIFTEEN AND OVER IN EACH OF THE TEN COUNTRIES. THIS SURVEY WAS CARRIED OUT BY PROFESSIONAL INTERVIEWERS BETWEEN 4 MARCH AND 13 APRIL 1984 IN THE HOMES OF THE 9 748 SELECTED RESPONDENTS.

TEN NATIONAL INSTITUTES, ALL MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING THE POLL. ALL THESE INSTITUTES COMPLY WITH THE STANDARDS SET BY THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR OPINION AND MARKETING RESEARCH. THEY WERE SELECTED BY TENDER.

THE NAMES OF THE INSTITUTES AND FIELD-WORK SPECIALISTS IN EACH COUNTRY ARE LISTED IN THE APPENDIX TOGETHER WITH THE RELEVANT TECHNICAL DETAILS.

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PRACTICE FOR THIS TYPE OF SURVEY THE COMMISSION DISCLAIMS ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUESTIONS, RESULTS AND COMMENTARIES.

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## INTRODUCTION

Shortly, some 200 million or so citizens of the European Community will be going to the polls for the second time to elect their 434 representatives to the European Parliament<sup>1</sup>. Elections will take place on 14 and 17 June, five years after the first elections by direct universal suffrage but once again using different electoral procedures, since the Member States have been unable to reach unanimous agreement on a single method.

Whatever the importance of the event might be for the functioning and development of the European Community<sup>2</sup>, elections to the European Parliament do provide an opportunity for a full-scale study of public attitudes to the Community, its institutions and the objectives set out in the European treaties.

While the periodical Eurobarometer surveys have helped Europeans to get to know each other a little better<sup>3</sup>, the election of a single parliamentary assembly during a single week by the citizens of the ten countries offers an exceptional chance to gain a better insight into socio-political phenomena.

These were the considerations which guided the design and timing of Eurobarometer No 21, which is being presented here as a special edition just two weeks before the elections.

We are also presenting the results of twelve extra questions which were included in the same questionnaire and put to the same population sample as a joint initiative by the European Parliament and the Belgian daily Le Soir<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Greece had not joined the Community in 1979; its members were elected in October 1981.

<sup>2</sup> The Treaties establishing the Community lay down Parliament's advisory and supervisory power over Community legislation and, in particular, the budget. However, pushed by its own momentum, derived from the fact that it is directly elected by the citizens of the Community, Parliament has assumed a sort of general political responsibility gradually extending to all fields affecting the common interests of the peoples of the Member States, even though it may lack the corresponding powers. In other words, Parliament's influence is far greater than is suggested by the formal description of the areas in which it can take decisions.

<sup>3</sup> On this subject see Europe as seen by Europeans: Ten years of European polling - 1973-1983, European Documentation No 7/1983, Brussels.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1 on the next page.

Since the fieldwork was carried out between mid-March and mid-April, very little time was available for analysis of the findings and preparation of the report. Hence this issue is not divided into its usual chapters, and some annexes are missing. Some chapters may be published at a later date and will be included in full in Eurobarometer No 22, next December.

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#### THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE JUNE 1984 ELECTIONS

It should be remembered that these data were gathered before the election campaigns had got under way.

Comparison of the results with those obtained before the 1979 elections shows that awareness of the European Parliament, as measured by the proportion of those who say they have recently seen or heard "something" about it, is greater than five years ago, an average of 75% in the Community as a whole compared with 65% in April 1979.

Strangely enough, this increased awareness is not accompanied by a corresponding rise in the percentage of those who say spontaneously that the "something" they have heard was the election of members of the European Parliament: in April 1979 two thirds (67%) of those who had seen or heard something mentioned the elections but in March-April 1984 the figure had fallen to only 39%. This suggests that the deep-rooted image of Parliament is not sufficiently distinct and stable and that people find it difficult to focus on the elections in the mass of information with which they are presented.

The image of Parliament in the public's mind is not, however, always negative. Out of every ten people interviewed, slightly more than four (43%) consider that Parliament plays a "very important" or "important" role in the life of the Community while slightly fewer than four (38%) disagree and two (19%) don't know.

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Footnote from page 1

<sup>1</sup> The following were associated with this initiative:

Belgium:	Le Soir and De Standaard
Denmark:	Berlingske Tidende
Germany:	Frankfurter Allgemeine
France:	Le Matin
Ireland:	The Irish Times
Italy:	La Repubblica
Luxembourg:	Tele-Luxembourg
Netherlands:	Gemeenschappelijke Pers Dienst (G.P.D.)
United Kingdom:	The Times
Greece:	Eleftherotypia

In most countries, attitudes are less positive than a year ago, but in some cases (Germany, France, Denmark and Belgium) the position has improved compared with five years before; in the first case this may be a reflection of current events and, in the second, perhaps, the gradual acquisition of legitimacy.

Although opinions on Parliament's present role in the life of the Community are divided, a majority in almost all countries would like to see it playing a greater part; the only exception is Denmark, where a further point to note is that over 40% of those questioned either did not know or refused to answer.

Following Parliament's vote last February for a draft Treaty establishing a European Union to extend and strengthen the powers of the Community, a question phrased in public opinion survey terms was asked on the subject: are you for or against a European Government responsible to the European Parliament?<sup>1</sup>

On average, one European in three has not yet formed an opinion: the proportion rises to almost 40% in Ireland and France and to almost 50% in Denmark and the United Kingdom.

Of those expressing a view, there is a majority in favour in the Community as a whole (64% to 17%), and in eight countries out of ten.

These results, both in the Community as a whole and for individual countries, reflect fairly accurately the actual vote in Parliament for adoption of the draft Treaty (76% to 10%). In some countries (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Germany) Parliamentary representatives appear keener than the population as a whole, while the opposite is true in other countries (France and Greece), where the general public seems more committed than the representatives.

What will be the turnout at the June elections? This is a difficult question to answer and, mainly because of the data when it was carried out, the survey can only give a general indication of the tendency. It would seem likely that the turnout in the Community as a whole in June 1984 will be slightly higher than in June 1979: 64% against 62%. Unless the last few weeks of the campaign provoke a surge of interest, the turnout in the United Kingdom and Denmark is likely to remain lower than elsewhere, although higher than last time.

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<sup>1</sup> "Some people say: "The members of the European Parliament who will be elected in 1984 should, as a main aim, work towards a European Government responsible to the European Parliament". Do you have an opinion on that point, and IF YES are you for (very much or to some extent) or against (to some extent or very much)?"



Questioned about the reasons for their attitudes, those who said that they would vote placed most stress on the question of principle but there was also a clear feeling that this was a way of exercising a right as a European citizen. Domestic policy considerations certainly played a part but were not usually mentioned as the crucial factor.

The main reason given by those intending to abstain was that they could see no point in voting in a European election.

Other questions shed a little more light on the motivation of European voters and the factors determining whether or not they will vote.

If all other things (nationality, sex, age, level of education, etc.) are equal, those who favour their country's membership of the European Community support European unification and would like to see the role of the European Parliament increased are the most likely to vote.

#### ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The general attitude towards European unification and the overall assessment of whether membership of the Community is a good thing are slightly less favourable than six months previously, particularly in Greece. This shift is undoubtedly a consequence of the failure of recent European Councils.

Similarly, the percentage of those asked who feel that their country has benefited from Community membership has fallen in the past year in Germany, Denmark and Belgium, and even in Italy and the Netherlands.

But it is perhaps of greater interest to look at the replies to some questions asked either for the first time ever or for the first time in a number of years.

The preferred name for the Community: terminology is never neutral and it is not by chance that the terms "European Communities", "European Economic Community", "Common Market", "the Ten", and so on, are used to refer to this historic and unprecedented venture of uniting the peoples of Europe, the European Community.

The survey showed that the majority of those expressing an opinion (seven out of ten) prefer the name "European Community": 40% on average compared with 17% for "European Economic Community" and the same figure for "Common Market". The British alone prefer "Common Market" (33%) to "European Community" (30%).

The relationship that can be observed between what is being described and the "words for it" is not just at country level, which would have suggested that the influence was each country's cultural characteristics and linguistic practices. Analysis shows that the name "European Community" is chosen more often by those favourable to the Community, whereas those who are unfavourable tend to prefer the more restrictive name "Common Market".

The country or countries which people would prefer not to have in the Community: questions have been asked on a number of occasions in the last ten years concerning the opinions and attitudes of Europeans to one another (confidence, closeness, and so on).

As far back as autumn 1976 people were asked whether there were one or more countries, including their own, which they would prefer not to be in the Community.

In 1984 as in 1976, a large majority of respondents would not exclude any country, though the proportion is smaller: 70% in 1976 and 59% in 1984. But what is new is that certain tensions are now appearing, undoubtedly provoked by current controversy. One person in four, on average, names the United Kingdom. This is true of 41% of the French and 33% of the Germans, while 25% of the British feel the same way about France but only 4% about Germany.

Two other questions, where replies are probably less influenced by current events, deserve a mention.

One deals with the two areas in which the countries of the Community working together should concentrate their efforts in the next five or six years.

One area stands out clearly: creating jobs, followed (at quite some distance) by social welfare.

Slight differences can be seen from one country to another: in France defence comes second, while in Italy it is agriculture and in Greece help to the poorer parts of Europe.

The other question is a kind of "referendum" on various aspects of European unification - eight altogether, covering very different areas.

There is a broad European consensus in both "fors" and "against".

Eight out of ten, on average, are in favour of a kind of European legal area and the creation of a European passport receives a similar degree of support.

About six out of ten are in favour of harmonisation of social benefits and payments (although the majority of Danes are against); a similar majority support the creation of a European currency (but again the majority of Danes and a substantial minority of the British are against).

Almost as many accept the principle that every Community citizen should have the right to be employed in any of the Member States; again the majority of Danes are against.

Lastly, 45% of Europeans are still opposed to any form of protectionism against products from other countries of the Community; here, however, differences between countries are more marked with the Italians largely favourable to the free movement of goods and the British largely against.

Only two of the "proposed decisions" meet with opposition, but in both cases it is quite definite. In no country would the majority of citizens accept that only one ambassador represent the ten countries of the Community in Moscow or Washington or one European team be sent to the next Olympic Games.

It would seem that less importance is attached to the substance of sovereignty than to some of its symbols.

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An attempt to sum up all these results by a multidimensional analysis produces the conclusion that, on average about one third of those questioned form a kind of "hard core" with confirmed pro-European convictions. They will certainly vote because they want the European Parliament to play an increased role in Community life.

At the other extreme, a minority of about 15% on average (though more in the United Kingdom and Denmark) are opposed to European unification and the Community. They consider Parliament's role to be of little significance and this hardly inspires them to go and vote, unless they are die-hard opponents (particularly in Denmark).

Between these two extremes lies a mass with characteristics that are not fairly easy to always clearcut; in it can be distinguished a large group (about 36% of the total) who are fairly favourable rather than hostile, though not actively, and another group (almost 20%) of people who are indifferent (or claim to be).

All things being equal, what proportion of this potential electorate will turn out to vote in countries where voting is not compulsory will depend mainly on the answers given to questions as simple as these:

- What are the short-term and long-term objectives proposed for Europe?
- What can the European Parliament do with its present powers?
- What powers must it claim for the representatives seeking our votes to be credible?

\* \* \* \* \*

Just out

EUROPE AS SEEN BY EUROPEANS

Ten years of European polling - 1973-1983

European Documentation No. 7/1983

(An information brochure for the general public published in the official languages of the Community and in Spanish and Portuguese)

Bfrs 120

CHAPTER ONE

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND

THE JUNE 1984 ELECTIONS

I

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND  
THE JUNE 1984 ELECTIONS

Logically, with a view to measuring the pattern of replies and, specifically, the changes in public awareness and propensity to vote, the answers to the questions on the European Parliament and the forthcoming elections asked in March-April 1984 should be compared with the findings of the previous half-yearly surveys. However, since these are the second elections to Parliament by direct universal suffrage, comparisons with the results obtained in April 1979 are particularly interesting<sup>1</sup>.

One or other in both of these comparisons will be made depending on the point under consideration.

This chapter deals with the following:

- awareness of the European Parliament and the election of its members, i.e. whether or not the interviewee has recently heard of either the institution or the event;
- image of the European Parliament, i.e. the importance of its present role in the Community and the role which the public would like to see it play in future; in this connection, a question was asked about attitudes to the draft Treaty on European Union (adopted by Parliament on 14 February 1984) or, more precisely, about the role which Parliament could play in working "towards a European Government responsible to the European Parliament";
- propensity to vote in June, and reasons;
- distinction between national and Community considerations in the voter's choice of candidate and expectations of his elected representative.

Most of these questions had been asked before.

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<sup>1</sup> See Eurobarometer No 11, May 1979.

## I.1 AWARENESS OF THE INSTITUTION AND THE ELECTIONS

*"Have you recently seen or heard in the papers, or on the radio or TV, anything about the European Parliament? This is the parliamentary assembly of the EEC or Common Market. If YES, can you remember what it was that you heard then?"*

In March-April 1984 on average seven to eight in every ten interviewed, depending on the country concerned or 75% in the Community as a whole, claimed to have recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament.

This is slightly up on the 65% (excluding Greece) recorded in April 1979<sup>1</sup>.

As Table 1 shows, awareness has increased since April 1979 in five countries out of nine: this is particularly marked in Germany, the United Kingdom and France. In the other countries, there has been virtually no change<sup>2</sup>.

A certain optimism about turnout would therefore appear justified but we shall see later that these findings must be treated with considerable caution<sup>3</sup>.

None the less, the spring 1984 results clearly reveal substantial progress since the previous survey in October-November of last year, when the percentage of people who had seen or heard something about the European Parliament was only 48%<sup>4</sup>, the current 75% means that it has risen by over half. There was a similar, albeit less marked, increase between autumn 1978 and spring 1979<sup>5</sup>.

It is difficult to say whether the increased awareness of Parliament is a direct result of the official information campaign undertaken at its request in March 1984 by a group of advertising agencies.

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<sup>1</sup> Greece's population weighting in the Community as a whole (3.4% of the adult population) is too low to invalidate comparisons between the Community of nine and the Community of ten. For example, in 1984 the Community average without Greece would have been 75.7% instead of 75.4%.

<sup>2</sup> No comparison with 1979 can be made for Greece.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> See Eurobarometer No 20, December 1983, p. 68.

<sup>5</sup> The corresponding percentages were 50% and 65%, an increase of only 30%.

The information campaign for the 1979 elections took place in January-February, i.e. relatively earlier than the one for the 1984 elections. This makes it dangerous to compare the effects of the two campaigns.

However, the results do show that the average increase in awareness of the European Parliament in 1984 was slightly lower (43%) in the three countries where the campaign had not yet begun when the survey was carried out than elsewhere (53%). This is no more than an indication, since many other variables could have influenced the figures<sup>1</sup>.

\* \*  
\* \*

<sup>1</sup> These are set out in the table below: the period covered by the information campaign, the type of campaign, the timing of the Eurobarometer fieldwork and the changes in the percentage of those claiming to have recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament.

Country*	Period covered by campaign	Type of campaign	Timing of Eurobarometer fieldwork	Had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament		
				October 1983 %	March/April 1984 %	Increase** %
Belgium	9-31 March	TV	14-30 March	35	74	109
Germany	5-26 March	Magazines	17 March - 9 April	47	79	70
France	4-31 March	TV	17 March - 9 April	50	82	62
United Kingdom	-	-	19 March - 1 April	48	72	51
Italy	5-30 March	TV	19 March - 5 April	48	71	49
Ireland	-	-	21 March - 6 April	52	75	46
Netherlands	9-30 March	Magazines	24-31 March	52	73	41
Greece	-	-	16-27 March	51	67	31
Luxembourg	4-31 March	Multi-media	22 March - 13 April	67	81	21
Denmark	5-29 March	Newspapers & magazines	24 March - 1 April	62	74	19

\* The countries are listed in descending order of increase in positive responses.

\*\* Increases have been calculated from unrounded percentages.

As this table shows, with three months to go to the June 1984 elections, awareness of the European Parliament, reflected in the percentage of people who had seen or heard something about it, was relatively high in all countries. What is more, it was even higher than in April 1979, two months before the previous elections, and considerably higher than last autumn.

What is the reason for this awareness? To what extent were the affirmative replies to the straight question on the European Parliament influenced by the elections?

Here one must admit to a slight degree of disenchantment or at least display extreme caution in using the data available to assess the likely turnout<sup>1</sup>.

The question, reproduced above, was a double one. Those interviewed were first asked whether they had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament (which was mentioned explicitly). If they had, they were then asked, without any prompting, if they could remember what it was about.

The second test was much more difficult. Once again, we shall compare the results with those obtained in April 1979 and autumn 1983.

In March-April 1984, less than four in ten (39%) of those who said that they had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament spontaneously mentioned the elections.

This is a very low percentage, much lower than the 67% recorded in April 1979, despite the fact that the increase over the preceding six-month period was greater in 1983-84 than it had been in 1978-79<sup>2</sup>.

How can this be explained?

As we said earlier, the second part of the question is more difficult than the first. It is not therefore surprising that those who can spontaneously mention the election are outnumbered by those who remember vaguely or otherwise that they have recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament.

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<sup>1</sup> It would seem logical that there should be a strong correlation between turnout and adequate information, and this is borne out by research on the previous election. See Eurobarometer No 20, December 1983, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> Although, on average, the increase between autumn 1983 and spring 1984 was greater in the seven countries where the information campaign had taken place during March, this does not necessarily mean that the campaign was the decisive factor. Italy and Greece were at the same level in October 1983 and both recorded the same very high increase. In the first, the television campaign had begun before the survey while in the second the campaign did not begin until 15 May; other influences must therefore have come into play.



But this logical explanation was also true in 1979. And yet, although the percentage who claimed to have seen or heard something was higher in 1984, the proportion of those able to refer specifically to the election was much smaller in all countries. Obviously, there must be another explanation.

Awareness of an event (or an institution or a person), in other words the fact that it is widely known, is triggered off by several factors, two of which are particularly important: the scale of media coverage given to the event and its deep-rooted image in the public's mind.

There is no doubt that in recent months the media have paid much more attention to Parliament than usual. But it would appear that its basic image was not such as to allow the trickles of information which have percolated through to amalgamate into a stable coherent whole.

Moreover, in 1979 the elections had a certain novelty value whereas in 1984 when the survey was carried out the election had not emerged in its own right from the more or less confused mass of information about the European Parliament.

Without pushing the image too far, there are a large number of individuals who can honestly claim to have heard or seen something about the European Parliament but are then in the position of people who have heard a sound (or at best a piece of music) which they are unable to place or recognize the significance of<sup>1</sup>.

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\* \*

Table 1 shows the percentage of those interviewed in April 1979 and March-April 1984 who said:

1. that they had or had not recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament;
2. that they had heard something and mentioned the elections.

(See Table 1)

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<sup>1</sup> What is it which makes an individual mentally construe a particular event as important? In other words, what makes it emerge from the flood of stimuli which he receives? One factor is the relationship which the individual perceives between the event and himself: the consequences; what is at stake. Another is the profile of the event: the media coverage given to it, but also the scale of perceived public concern and the extent of public discussion which it provokes.

In March-April 1984, elections to the European Parliament did not (or not yet) fill the bill.

Table 1

AWARENESS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>April 1979</u>											
Had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament	65	76	60	65	73	77	76	76	55	:	65
- spontaneously mentioned elections	(47)	(51)	(46)	(38)	(48)	(60)	(57)	(53)	(25)	:	(43)
- did not spontaneously mention elections	(18)	(25)	(14)	(27)	(25)	(17)	(19)	(23)	(30)	:	(22)
Had not seen or heard anything (don,t knows included)	35	24	40	35	27	23	24	24	45	:	35
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Of every 100 who had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament, percentage who mentioned elections	72%	68%	76%	59%	66%	78%	75%	70%	46%	:	67%
<u>March-April 1984</u>											
Had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament	74	74	79	82	75	71	81	73	72	67	75
- spontaneously mentioned elections	(40)	(36)	(38)	(39)	(27)	(29)	(21)	(24)	(10)	(24)	(29)
- did not spontaneously mention elections	(34)	(38)	(41)	(43)	(48)	(42)	(60)	(49)	(62)	(43)	(46)
Had not seen or heard anything (don,t knows included)	26	26	21	18	25	29	19	27	28	33	25
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Of every 100 who had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament, percentage who mentioned elections	54%	49%	48%	47%	36%	41%	26%	33%	14%	36%	39%

1 Average weighted by the population aged 15 and over in the country in question.

## I.2 THE IMAGE OF PARLIAMENT

Considerable research has already been done on this subject, particularly in a survey carried out for Parliament<sup>1</sup>. The updated and expanded results are set out below.

### I.2.1 The importance of Parliament's present role

*"How important, would you say, is the European Parliament in the life of the European Community nowadays: very important, important, not very important, not at all important?"*

On average, just over four people out of every ten interviewed in March-April 1984 considered that Parliament played an "important" (34%) or "very important" (9%) role in the life of the European Community, while slightly fewer than four out of ten disagreed and two out of ten didn't know.

It will be noted that the intermediate replies ("important" and "not very important") were by far the most common; this suggests that even those who answered found it difficult to come down on one side or the other.

Be that as it may, in eight of the ten Member States affirmative replies predominated; Ireland, Luxembourg and Greece were the most positive. Negative views predominated slightly in the Netherlands and, marginally more, in Germany.

As Table 2 shows, in most countries, regardless of whether or not an information campaign had been mounted, the proportion of positive replies was lower than a year earlier.

However, measured over five years, the trend is positive in four countries: Germany, France, Denmark and Belgium.

(See Table 2)

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<sup>1</sup> The European Parliament and the 1984 elections. This survey was published as a supplement to Eurobarometer No 19, April 1983.

<sup>2</sup> The results for these countries show a decline in the number of don't knows, particularly in Belgium. This suggests that, as Parliament becomes better known, or more precisely as its image penetrates more deeply, its importance in the eyes of the public tends to increase.

Surveys over a much longer period of time would obviously be required to verify this hypothesis.

Table 2

THE IMPORTANCE OF PARLIAMENT IN THE LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>April-May 1977</u>											
Very important	5	6	3	5	19	16	11	9	20	:	10
Important	25	17	15	28	34	34	46	40	30	:	27
Not very important	22	31	41	32	23	19	22	32	23	:	29
Not at all important	8	5	16	10	6	6	7	6	9	:	10
Don't know	40	41	25	25	18	25	14	13	18	:	24
Total <sub>2</sub>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
Index	2.46	2.40	2.07	2.36	2.80	2.80	2.71	2.60	2.73	:	2.49
<u>April 1983</u>											
Very important	12	14	5	9	24	14	11	7	15	13	11
Important	33	32	37	45	41	45	51	41	37	43	40
Not very important	25	14	37	22	14	22	23	34	27	13	27
Not at all important	5	5	9	2	3	2	3	5	5	2	5
Don't know	25	35	12	22	18	17	12	13	16	29	17
Total <sub>2</sub>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	2.69	2.85	2.42	2.77	3.03	2.87	2.81	2.57	2.73	2.96	2.69
<u>March-April 1984</u>											
Very important	12	10	8	6	18	10	12	6	9	14	9
Important	32	27	30	38	35	35	43	36	32	35	34
Not very important	30	19	31	31	20	27	25	40	37	22	31
Not at all important	8	9	12	3	8	5	4	6	7	9	7
Don't know	18	35	19	22	19	23	16	12	15	20	19
Total <sub>2</sub>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	2.59	2.58	2.42	2.61	2.78	2.65	2.74	2.48	2.52	2.67	2.55

1 Weighted average.

2 "Very important" = 4, "not at all important" = 1; don't knows excluded. The mid-point is therefore 2.5.

### I.2.2 What role should Parliament play?

*"Would you, personally, prefer that the European Parliament played a more or less important part than it does now?"*

This question has been asked three times since spring 1983. As Table 3 shows, replies have remained remarkably stable and, in most countries, have tended to favour an expansion of Parliament's role. The only exception is Denmark, where two thirds of those interviewed did not reply or answered spontaneously "about the same"<sup>1</sup>. In the United Kingdom, which had about the same percentage of don't knows as the other countries apart from Denmark, there was slightly more support (34%) for expanding Parliament's role than for reducing it (24%).

The main points worth noting are firstly that in the Community as a whole and in nine of the ten Member States there is a majority in favour of extending Parliament's role, and secondly that views remain very stable, uninfluenced in either direction by the information campaign.

(See Table 3)

### I.2.3 For or against the plan for European political union

On 14 February 1984, by a large majority, the European Parliament adopted a draft Treaty establishing the European Union, designed primarily to extend and strengthen the existing Community treaties.

Adoption of the draft Treaty was seen both by its originators and its supporters as one of the issues on which Community citizens would have to work out how they stood when the time came to select their representatives in the June elections.

The following question couched in public opinion survey terms was put to interviewees:

*"Some people say: "The members of the European Parliament who will be elected in 1984 should, as a main aim, work towards a European Government responsible to the European Parliament". Do you have an opinion on that point, and IF YES are you for (very much or to some extent) or against (to some extent or very much)?"*

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<sup>1</sup> This option was not offered in the question but was recorded and counted by the interviewer.

Table 3

WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PLAY?

<u>April 1983</u>	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
The role of the European Parliament should be:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
- more important	48	17	49	55	41	71	50	58	34	58	52
- about the same	16	29	17	16	20	10	33	20	20	6	16
- less important	6	16	11	3	10	1	6	8	27	3	10
Don't know	30	38	23	26	29	18	11	14	19	33	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<u>October 1983</u>											
- more important	50	19	57	60	46	76	58	56	48	70	59
- about the same	16	30	12	14	18	7	20	18	17	5	13
- less important	12	22	10	5	12	2	9	10	20	4	10
Don't know	22	29	21	21	24	15	13	16	15	21	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<u>March-April 1984</u>											
- more important	53	15	44	54	40	67	57	56	34	65	50
- about the same	21	26	20	18	22	8	26	21	23	10	17
- less important	10	19	10	4	11	2	3	8	24	4	10
Don't know	16	40	26	24	27	23	14	15	19	21	23
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

1 Weighted average.

2 Volunteered.

The question begins by asking interviewees whether they have an opinion on the subject. This was a deliberate device to enable don't knows to be filtered out.<sup>1</sup>

The first point of interest is that on average one European in three has not yet formed an opinion. This is hardly surprising, as the proposal is very recent, has been little discussed outside the European Parliament and has not received much media attention. The proportion of don't knows is as high as four in ten in Ireland (38%) and France (39%) and almost one in two in Denmark (45%) and the United Kingdom (47%).

Of those who have an opinion, the vast majority in the Community as a whole is in favour (64% as against 17%); this holds good for eight of the ten Member States. The exceptions are the United Kingdom, where the majority is slim (46% as against 37%) and Denmark, where there is only a small minority in favour (23% as against 63%).

(See Table 4)

It is interesting to compare these figures with the results of voting in the European Parliament on 14 February.

The draft Treaty was adopted by 237 votes to 31 with 43 abstentions; 311 members took part in the vote, giving percentages of 76%, 10% and 14% respectively.

The corresponding percentages for our representative sample were 64%, 17% and 19%, showing that, overall, Members of Parliament are warmer in their support for the plan than the public they represent.

However, although there is a very strong correlation between the two sets of figures, comparison reveals slight differences between the countries.<sup>2</sup>

Members from three countries (Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg) who took part in the vote were unanimously in favour of the draft and those from two other countries were almost unanimous (Netherlands: 96%; Germany: 92%). It is hardly surprising that, in those five countries, the "representatives" were much more pro than the "represented".

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<sup>1</sup> A question on the same subject was asked in October 1983 but it had no "filter", was placed in a different context and the range of answers offered was more limited. (See Eurobarometer No 20, pp. 71-73). It would therefore be extremely hazardous to make comparisons between the two sets of results.

<sup>2</sup> Correlation between percentages showing net support for the draft ("for" - "against") :  $r = .91$ .

Table 4

FOR OR AGAINST THE DRAFT TREATY OF UNION

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>1. Of every 100 interviewed</u>											
Have not yet formed an opinion	24	45	24	39	38	27	21	12	47	33	33
For - very much	14	5	15	9	11	16	21	21	7	17	12
- to some extent	31	7	33	31	23	42	34	42	17	24	31
Indifferent	25	8	20	10	17	8	12	16	9	17	13
Against - to some extent	5	7	6	8	7	5	9	6	11	5	7
- very much	1	28	2	3	4	2	3	3	9	4	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>2. Of every 100 with an opinion</u>											
For - very much	19	9	19	15	18	22	27	24	13	26	18
- to some extent	41	14	44	52	37	58	42	48	33	35	46
Indifferent	33	14	26	16	28	11	15	19	17	25	19
Against - to some extent	6	13	8	12	11	6	12	6	21	7	11
- very much	1	50	3	5	6	3	4	3	16	7	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	3.16	1.79	3.07	2.90	2.91	3.11	3.08	3.13	2.51	3.07	2.94

1 Weighted average.

2 "Very much for" = 4, "very much against" = 1; "indifferents" excluded. The mid-point is therefore 2.5.



The situation in the other countries is different:

- in France and Germany the open opposition of some of the Members and the apparent imposition of a "whip" by the party in power combined to reduce the number of votes in favour of the draft; the result was that Parliament's vote of 14 February recorded a smaller percentage in favour than the Euro-barometer survey;
- in Ireland and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the parliamentary representatives were warmer in their support than the general public when surveyed a few weeks later;
- in Denmark, opposition to the draft ran at about the same level among members of the European Parliament and the public at large but the minority group in favour among the "representatives" was slightly smaller than among the "represented".

(See Table 5)

Table 5

THE DRAFT TREATY OF UNION AS VIEWED BY THE EUROPEAN  
PARLIAMENT AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC

	European Parliament (14 February 1984) <sup>1</sup>			Public opinion (March-April 1984) <sup>2</sup>		
	For	Against	Abstentions	For	Against	Abstentions
Belgium	100%	-	-	60%	7%	33%
Denmark	14	64	22	23	63	14
Germany	92	-	8	63	11	26
France	52	12	36	67	17	16
Ireland	71	29	-	55	17	28
Italy	100	-	-	80	9	11
Luxembourg	100	-	-	69	16	15
Netherlands	96	-	4	72	9	19
United Kingdom	53	28	19	46	37	17
Greece	47	11	42	61	14	25
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>19</b>

<sup>1</sup> Percentages based on number of Members who took part in the vote (311 out of 434).

<sup>2</sup> Percentages based on number of interviewees who claimed to have an opinion.

### I.3 VOTING PROPENSITY AND REASONS

On a number of occasions both before the 1979 elections and again since April 1983, the following question was put to those of voting age:

*"Next June, the citizens of countries belonging to the European Community, including (yours) will be asked to vote to elect members of the European Parliament. Do you think that you will certainly go and vote, probably go and vote, probably will not vote, certainly will not vote?"<sup>1</sup>*

In the run-up to the 1984 elections, two further questions were asked for the first time:

ALL WHO SAY THEY WILL CERTAINLY VOTE OR PROBABLY VOTE:

*"Here is a list of statements (Show CARD) explaining why some people might go and vote in the next election for the European Parliament. Which of these comes close to your own reasons for intending to vote in that election?*

*(Mark all mentioned)*

- 1. Whatever the election, I use my right to vote as a matter of principle.*
- 2. I feel I am a citizen of Europe and it is important for me to vote in an European Election.*
- 3. It will be an opportunity for me to show where I stand in (national) politics.*
- 4. Other reason.*

ALL WHO SAY THEY WILL CERTAINLY NOT OR PROBABLY NOT VOTE IN THE NEXT ELECTION FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:

*"Here is a list of reasons why some people may not go and vote in the next election for the European Parliament (Show CARD). Which of these come close to your own reasons for not intending to vote?*

- 1. I hardly ever vote.*
- 2. Voting in our own election is something worth doing, but I do not really see any point in voting in a European Election.*
- 3. Not voting in the European Election will be my way to show my disagreement with (my country's) membership of the European Community.*
- 4. Other reason.*

<sup>1</sup> In countries where voting is compulsory and failure to turn out is penalized, the question was preceded by "Supposing voting were not compulsory in this country ...".

The 1979 survey showed that the question "Do you think that you will vote?" was an excellent indicator although it should be remembered that in the case of Germany the "probables" had to be added to the "certains" to bring the figure close to the actual turnout.

What then is the position now, with only a few weeks to go before the 1984 elections?

The March-April survey suggests that turnout generally is likely to be slightly higher than in April 1979.

Table 6 contains the raw scores which must be examined and interpreted country by country.

(See Table 6)

While answers "will certainly go and vote" are consistent with those obtained in 1979, now as then some adjustments have to be made. For example, it goes without saying that in Belgium and Luxembourg, where abstention is normally penalized, the turnout will be very much higher than shown by the survey. Similarly, in Germany, it is clear that what was true in 1979 is also true this time: the best indicator of turnout is obtained by adding the "certains" and the "probables".

These corrections based on experience have therefore been made to revise the results to give the best possible indication of turnout in June 1984. They suggest a figure of 64%, marginally higher than the 62% recorded in June 1979.

Table 7 shows the revised estimates by country but it should be remembered that they reflect data gathered in March-April, before the election campaign as such had started.

(See Table 7)

\*  
\*       \*  
\*

Why do people vote or abstain? In an attempt to answer this, we shall now look at the replies to two further questions, one put to those who said that they would vote and one to those who said that they would abstain. But before going any further, we must make it clear that a distinction has to be made between the reasons given to those interviewed and other factors of which they may not be aware. What is of interest to us here are the more or less rationalized explanations advanced by those interviewed to "justify" - in their eyes or those of the interviewer - their decision to vote or to abstain.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> It is irrelevant in this particular context that some of those who said that they would "certainly" or "probably" vote will not turn out and conversely that some of those who said they would abstain will in fact vote.

Table 6

DETERMINATION TO VOTE IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS<sup>1</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>1979 (April)</u>	3						3				
Certainly	:	52	34	65	56	85	:	60	32	:	53
Probably	:	18	36	17	26	12	:	22	29	:	24
Total	:	70	70	82	82	97	:	82	61	:	77
<u>1979 (10-13 June)</u>										5	
Actual turnout <sup>4</sup>	91.3	46.8	65.9	60.7	63.6	85.5	88.9	57.8	32.6	:	62.3
<u>1984 (March-April)</u>											
Certainly	39	55	37	73	55	76	58	64	36	81	56
Probably	17	12	30	16	28	16	19	19	28	13	22
Total	56	67	67	89	83	92	77	83	64	94	78

<sup>1</sup> Registered voters.

<sup>2</sup> Average weighted by the number of registered voters in each country. Greece included in 1984.

<sup>3</sup> Question not asked.

<sup>4</sup> Source: European Parliament: Research and Documentation Papers No 3, December 1983.

<sup>5</sup> 78,6% in October 1981.

Table 7  
TURNOUT PROJECTIONS

	Turnout in previous national election (%)	Turnout in 1979 European elections (%)	Turnout in last national election (%)	ESTIMATED TURNOUT IN 1984 (%)
Belgium	93.7% (17/12/78)	91.3%	94.5% (8/11/81)	90-92%
Denmark	88.7 (15/2/77)	46.8	88.4 (10/1/84)	55
Germany	90.7 (3/10/76)	65.9	89.1 (6/3/83)	67 <sup>1</sup>
France	82.8 (12/3/78)	60.7	70.4 (14/6/81)	73 <sup>2</sup>
Ireland	76.3 (16/6/77)	63.6	72.8 (24/11/82)	55
Italy	89.9 (3/6/79)	85.5	89.0 (26/6/83)	76
Luxembourg	90.1 (26/5/74)	88.9	88.9 (10/6/79)	88-90
Netherlands	88.0 (25/5/77)	57.8	81.0 (9/9/82)	64
United Kingdom	75.1 (3/5/79)	32.6	72.7 (9/6/83)	36 <sup>3</sup>
Greece	:	:	78.6 <sup>4</sup> (18/10/81)	81
COMMUNITY <sup>5</sup>	85.4	62.3	81.2	64

<sup>1</sup> In Germany estimates by three survey institutes average out at 69%.

<sup>2</sup> This estimate is undoubtedly too high; actual turnout will probably be somewhere between this figure and the 1979 turnout.

<sup>3</sup> This estimate for the United Kingdom may be too low. A more recent Marplan survey predicted a turnout of 50%, which seems much too high. Our estimate for Northern Ireland is 52%, slightly down on 1979 (57%).

<sup>4</sup> In Greece the 1981 elections to the national and European Parliaments were held on the same day.

<sup>5</sup> Average weighted by the number of registered voters in each country.

We shall look first at the reasons advanced by intending voters. The two most common are "principle" ("Whatever the election, I use my right to vote as a matter of principle") which is top of the list, followed by "Europeanism" ("I feel I am a citizen of Europe and it is important for me to vote in a European election"). A much smaller proportion are motivated by the desire to show where they stand in national politics.

The breakdown of these replies by country is interesting.

In nearly all the countries, it is the question of principle which counts the most; only in Luxembourg and, to a lesser extent, Germany is the feeling of being a European citizen the most common reason given for voting. Even in France, Germany, Greece and Luxembourg, where the connection between the European elections and national politics was more common than elsewhere, only 25% to 30% of intending voters opted for this explanation.

(See Table 8)

Explanations for abstention are probably less reliable for two reasons: the first is statistical, as calculations are based on a smaller sample in each country; the second is psychological, as interviewees are probably less likely to give reasons for conduct which is regarded as socially undesirable.

That said, the main reason given in almost all countries, and in particular in Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark, is failure to see the point of a European election. This is followed by "other reason", not spelled out in this survey, which probably serves to cover up the reluctance to give explanations, which we mentioned above. Greece is a one-off with two thirds of those who say that they intend to abstain, claiming that they hardly ever vote. The small number of abstentions in that country, where voting is compulsory under certain conditions, suggests that it is highly likely that those concerned will abstain in both European and national elections, even if they are held on different days.

(See Table 9)

Table 8

REASONS FOR VOTING GIVEN BY INTENDING VOTERS <sup>1,2</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>3</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
"Whatever the election, I use my right to vote as a matter of principle"	45	40	40	55	60	58	32	52	46	60	51
"I feel I am a citizen of Europe and it is important for me to vote in a European Election"	36	39	50	44	32	41	58	38	42	19	42
"It will be an opportunity for me to show where I stand in (national) politics"	15	22	25	23	14	17	31	19	18	27	21
Other reason	4	6	5	1	2	2	2	6	3	-	3
Base <sup>4</sup>	520	622	601	819	756	906	228	773	815	871	6 948

<sup>1</sup> Registered voters of voting age.

<sup>2</sup> Since it was possible to give more than one answer, totals may exceed 100. Don't knows (on average 2%) excluded.

<sup>3</sup> Weighted average.

<sup>4</sup> Number of interviewees who answered.

Table 9

REASONS FOR ABSTAINING GIVEN BY INTENDING ABSTAINERS<sup>1,2</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>3</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
"I hardly ever vote"	18	8	13	27	19	17	12	16	18	67	18
"Voting in our own elections is some- thing worth doing, but I do not really see any point in voting in a European election"	43	39	43	23	34	11	34	28	42	6	35
"Not voting in the European Election will be my way to show my disagree- ment with (my country's) membership of the European Community"	12	24	17	11	11	4	10	10	19	7	15
Other reason	27	29	31	44	36	68	46	49	21	20	33
Base <sup>4</sup>	334	215	152	106	144	90	59	139	426	107	1 638

1, 2, 3, 4 See notes to Table 8. Don't knows accounted for slightly less than 8%.



#### I.4 A NATIONAL VOTE OR A EUROPEAN VOTE?

Since those who usually vote in national elections are very likely to vote in European elections and since electors clearly differentiate between the two types of election, an attempt was made to analyse the relationship more closely by asking two further questions: one, which was new, investigated the voter's approach to the European elections; the other, which had already been asked in a number of occasions, concerned the electorate's image of their European representatives.

##### I.4.1 The voter's approach: national politics or European politics?

*"If you were to vote in the next elections for the European Parliament this June, would you tend to vote ...*

- Mainly to show your support for the government or the opposition parties; or*
- mainly to support a candidate whose views about Europe are closest to your own?<sup>1</sup>*

If answers are honest and, more precisely, if it is possible to make a clear distinction between national politics and views about Europe, it would seem that the vast majority of intending voters will be influenced more by European considerations than by national politics when they complete their ballot papers.<sup>2</sup>

Differences between countries are small. After eliminating the don't knows to achieve a more accurate comparison, it appears that the Greeks and Danes are slightly more influenced by national politics than voters in other countries.

(See Table 10)

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<sup>1</sup> Question asked on behalf of Le Soir and other media organisations in Community countries.

<sup>2</sup> These answers are consistent with those reported above (pp. 19-20).

Table 10

NATIONAL VOTE OR EUROPEAN VOTE: THE VOTER'S APPROACH

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>3</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
mainly to show support for the government or the opposition parties	33	38	29	26	32	24	25	21	28	35	27
mainly to support a candidate whose views about Europe are closest to their own	61	52	57	68	61	65	70	66	67	55	64
	6	10	14	6	7	11	5	13	5	10	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base <sup>2</sup>	525	614	561	805	736	910	219	716	793	874	6 774

1 Weighted average.

2 Registered voters who intend to vote.

I.4.2 Attitude expected of European MPs: national interest or Community interest?

*"Which of the following attitudes would you expect a member of the European Parliament (from your country) to have?*

*He should support things that are good for the European Community as a whole, even if they are not always good for (your country) at the time*

*He should support the interest of (your country) all the time, whether or not they are good for the European Community as a whole".*

This question was asked six times between spring 1977 and autumn 1979, and then again in March-April 1984. Answers are surprisingly stable and clearly demonstrate an element of profound conviction associated with general attitudes towards European integration.

Of those expressing a view, on average one person in two gives priority to the national interest; this means that one in two gives priority to the Community interest.

Four countries (Netherlands, followed some distance behind by Germany, Italy and France) consistently rate the Community interest as more important.

Four others, now accompanied by Greece, which is the most "nationalistic" on this issue, expect their representatives to put the national interest first: Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Belgium.

The results in Luxembourg are about fifty-fifty but the size of the sample makes it difficult to draw any conclusions.

(See Table 11)

\*  
\*     \*

Some readers may feel that the replies to the last two questions are possibly inconsistent. Even if we take the answers of intending voters only, it is true that, in the Community as a whole, seven out of every ten who commit themselves say that they will opt for European representatives who support their ideas on Europe, while only one in two feel that their representative should put the Community interest first in all circumstances. But in reality the two questions are very different.

Table 11

A NATIONAL VOTE OR A EUROPEAN VOTE: ATTITUDE EXPECTED OF EUROPEAN MPs<sup>1</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>1977 (spring and autumn)</u>											
"Support things that are good for the European Community as a whole, even if they are not always good for (your country) at the time"	39	34	45	48	37	50	48	63	41	:	46
"Support the interest of (your country) all the time, whether or not they are good for the European Community as a whole"	43	49	38	40	57	43	44	28	53	:	43
Don't know	18	17	17	12	6	7	8	9	6	:	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
<u>1978 (spring and autumn)</u>											
Community interest	38	30	43	43	30	47	46	62	36	:	43
National interest	42	53	35	44	65	42	44	29	56	:	44
Don't know	20	17	22	13	5	11	10	9	8	:	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
<u>1979 (spring and autumn)</u>											
Community interest	38	27	47	39	35	51	44	62	36	:	44
National interest	39	56	37	47	58	42	52	26	57	:	44
Don't know	23	17	16	14	7	7	4	12	7	:	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
<u>1984 (March-April)</u>											
Community interest	37	20	43	48	33	45	46	60	33	18	42
National interest	48	55	39	40	54	44	45	29	54	69	45
Don't know	15	25	18	12	13	11	9	11	13	13	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup> All those interviewed, including those under voting age and those not registered.

<sup>2</sup> Weighted average.

<sup>3</sup> Without Greece the percentages would be 42%, 44% and 14%.

In his answer to the first question, the voter is in a way attempting to justify participation in the European election by saying that his vote will be cast principally with the interests of Europe in mind. The second question, which is doubtless further removed from the personal approach to voting, deals with the behaviour expected in general from a European MP who has to choose between the interests of the Community and the short-term interests of his own country. It is, of course, more difficult to pronounce on a hypothetical case of conscience than to justify behaviour which one has just acknowledged as being "probable".

Be that as it may, answers to both questions, at least the second more than the first, correlate with propensity to vote. The "supranational" reply is more common among those who "certainly" intend to vote than those who are "probably" going to vote.

(See Table 12)

Table 12

A NATIONAL VOTE OR A EUROPEAN VOTE:  
VIEWS OF REGISTERED VOTERS WHO INTEND TO VOTE<sup>1</sup>  
(Community as a whole)

	Those who intend to vote		"Voters" as a whole
	certainly	probably	
	%	%	%
Say that they will vote:			
- mainly to show support for the government or the opposition parties	28	35	30
- mainly to support a candidate whose views about Europe are closest to their own	72	65	70
Total	100	100	100
Expect their representative in the European Parliament:			
- to support things that are good for the European Community as a whole	54	44	51
- to support the interest of their country all the time	46	56	49
Total	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup> Don't knows excluded.

## I.5 TENTATIVE SUMMARY OF FACTORS DETERMINING PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

In discussing participation in the European elections above<sup>1</sup>, we made a distinction between the reasons given by the interviewee for voting or abstaining and the other factors which influence his decision: the former, which are more or less conscious or rationalized, are deduced from what the interviewee says to "explain" his conduct; the latter are revealed by analysis of data such as nationality, sex, age, education, cognitive mobilization, value system and socio-political attitudes.

Previous research has shown that participation in European elections is determined not only by the variables which affect participation in national elections but also by the voter's attitudes to Europe and the Community and his assessment of what is at stake, in other words the importance which he attaches to Parliament and the role which he would like to see the institution play.<sup>2</sup>

These findings are borne out by this survey conducted a few weeks before the election.

With the help of the hypotheses used to draw up Table 7 ("Turnout projections") and the data which we have so far managed to analyse, it is possible to present the likely turnout by country in terms of main factors influencing the decision to vote.

As Table 13 shows, an average turnout of 64% for the Community as a whole would mean rates of 69% for men and 59% for women.

Opinion leaders in all countries are more likely to vote than non-leaders. But the most significant factors are attitudes to Europe (Italy), the Community (Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Denmark) and the role desired for Parliament (United Kingdom).

(See Table 13)

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<sup>1</sup> See p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Eurobarometer No 20, December 1983, pp. 79-81.

Table 13

MAIN FACTORS DETERMINING PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS<sup>1</sup>

(March-April 1984)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC
TURNOUT PROJECTIONS	90-92%	55%	67%	73%	55%	76%	88-90%	64%	36%	81%	64%
BY SEX:	(2)						(2)				
Men		61	72	77	57	81		68	42	83	69
Women		50	63	69	53	71		60	32	78	59
BY COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION:	(2)						(2)				
Leaders		70	84	89	73	90		78	50	87	85
(++)		66	72	79	64	82		66	41	85	69
(+)		47	63	68	52	72		55	39	79	59
Non-leaders		40	52	66	41	66		49	21	69	54
(-)											
(--)											
BY ATTITUDE TO EUROPEAN UNIFICATION:	(2)						(2)				
Very much for		79	82	87	76	89		80	55	87	87
To some extent for		63	74	70	58	76		61	37	81	63
To some extent against		53	54	66	50	62		51	29	82	48
Very much against		62	(42)	(58)	40	(55)		(27)	39	81	52
BY VIEW OF COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP:	(2)						(2)				
Good thing		72	84	79	71	81		70	49	86	78
Neither good nor bad		45	55	65	42	66		44	28	78	48
Bad thing		60	43	64	41	69		(28)	32	84	45
BY ROLE DESIRED FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:	(2)						(2)				
More important		75	86	81	69	82		74	50	84	81
About the same		67	67	71	57	71		66	36	77	55
Less important		59	55	64	44	(74)		34	27	68	38

1 The basic projections are derived from the results of the survey, adjusted using the hypotheses explained on p. 16 to give the figures listed on p. 18. Turnout projections by determining factors are taken direct from the survey results. Percentages in brackets have been calculated on a base of less than n = 30.

2 Since voting is compulsory in Belgium and Luxembourg and failure to turn out is penalized, there is no point in breaking down voting figures by reference to the determining factors which apply in the other countries.

CHAPTER II

ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE  
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



II

ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE AND THE  
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Since this issue of Eurobarometer is concerned mainly with the elections to the European Parliament, we will touch only briefly on the replies to the regular questions in order to devote more space to the new ones.

II.1 FOR OR AGAINST WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

*"In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for, or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent against, or very much against?"*

The results show that support has declined somewhat over the last six months in several countries, no doubt as a result of the failures of the European Councils in Athens (4-6 December 1983) and Brussels (19-20 March 1984), but only in the United Kingdom and Greece is the shift significant.

Despite this fluctuation, a large majority in all countries other than Denmark continue to support European unification.

(See Table 14)

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Notes to accompany Table 14 on p. 31:

- 1 Excluding Northern Ireland in 1973.
- 2 Weighted average.
- 3 In 1973 and 1975 this question included a possible reply of "indifferent"; the percentages for this reply have been added to the "don't knows". The altered wording may partly explain the subsequent drop in "don't knows".
- 4 "Very much for" = 4, "very much against" = 1; "don't knows" excluded.
- 5 Only three surveys, the first in October 1980.

Table 14  
SUPPORT FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION  
(1973-84)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK <sup>1</sup>	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
<u>September 1973</u>	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very much for	22	17	49	23	21	34	47	34	14	:	30
To some extent for	38	28	29	45	31	36	33	39	23	:	33
To some extent against	3	14	4	3	8	2	1	8	15	:	6
Very much against	2	18	2	1	4	1	-	7	15	:	5
Don't know	35	23	16	28	36	27	19	12	33	:	26
<b>Total<sub>4</sub></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>:</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>3.24</b>	<b>2.56</b>	<b>3.50</b>	<b>3.25</b>	<b>3.07</b>	<b>3.41</b>	<b>3.57</b>	<b>3.15</b>	<b>2.53</b>	<b>:</b>	<b>3.19</b>
<u>1975-81 (nine surveys)</u>										(5)	
Very much for	23	15	37	24	22	38	45	33	22	34	29
To some extent for	41	30	40	51	40	44	39	43	36	28	42
To some extent against	5	18	6	6	10	5	7	7	13	10	8
Very much against	2	17	2	2	4	1	2	4	10	10	4
Don't know	29	20	15	17	24	12	7	13	19	18	17
<b>Total<sub>4</sub></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>3.20</b>	<b>2.53</b>	<b>3.31</b>	<b>3.17</b>	<b>3.05</b>	<b>3.34</b>	<b>3.37</b>	<b>3.21</b>	<b>2.85</b>	<b>3.03</b>	<b>3.17</b>
<u>April + Oct. 82 (comb.)</u>											
Very much for	22	12	32	26	16	32	38	28	20	33	27
To some extent for	42	30	46	52	40	46	40	47	40	29	45
To some extent against	7	19	8	6	11	6	9	10	15	7	9
Very much against	7	18	3	1	4	1	2	5	6	6	3
Don't know	27	21	11	15	29	15	11	10	19	25	16
<b>Total<sub>4</sub></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>3.16</b>	<b>2.45</b>	<b>3.20</b>	<b>3.20</b>	<b>2.95</b>	<b>3.29</b>	<b>3.27</b>	<b>3.09</b>	<b>2.93</b>	<b>3.17</b>	<b>3.14</b>
<u>April 1983</u>											
Very much for	27	13	36	25	16	36	39	29	20	31	29
To some extent for	41	32	49	50	39	44	39	46	40	30	45
To some extent against	6	19	5	5	9	5	8	10	15	6	6
Very much against	1	18	1	1	4	1	3	5	5	6	3
Don't know	25	18	9	19	32	14	11	10	20	27	15
<b>Total<sub>4</sub></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>3.25</b>	<b>2.48</b>	<b>3.30</b>	<b>3.20</b>	<b>2.98</b>	<b>3.34</b>	<b>3.27</b>	<b>3.11</b>	<b>2.93</b>	<b>3.17</b>	<b>3.18</b>
<u>October 1983</u>											
Very much for	23	12	34	29	21	35	47	33	29	40	31
To some extent for	48	27	42	50	41	45	32	39	41	29	44
To some extent against	7	20	6	7	7	5	9	9	9	5	7
Very much against	3	23	2	2	4	2	3	6	5	5	3
Don't know	19	18	16	12	27	13	9	13	16	21	15
<b>Total<sub>4</sub></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>3.13</b>	<b>2.34</b>	<b>3.27</b>	<b>3.21</b>	<b>3.07</b>	<b>3.31</b>	<b>3.35</b>	<b>3.13</b>	<b>3.12</b>	<b>3.33</b>	<b>3.21</b>
<u>March-April 1984</u>											
Very much for	20	11	27	29	17	28	43	30	17	28	25
To some extent for	47	25	45	52	41	49	39	51	45	29	46
To some extent against	9	20	10	6	9	7	6	7	16	11	10
Very much against	3	23	3	2	4	1	2	3	7	9	4
Don't know	21	21	15	11	29	15	10	9	15	23	15
<b>Total<sub>4</sub></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>3.08</b>	<b>2.30</b>	<b>3.15</b>	<b>3.21</b>	<b>3.00</b>	<b>3.23</b>	<b>3.38</b>	<b>3.19</b>	<b>2.85</b>	<b>2.98</b>	<b>3.10</b>

1 2 3 4 5 : see previous page.

## II.2 ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

### II.2.1 Preferred name for "the Community"

Newspapers, radio and television, even official publications and speeches all bear witness to the fact that the name "the European Community" is far from standard usage. Lawyers rightly use the term in the Treaties: "the European Communities" (European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community). But that is a kind of legal fabrication. The social and political truth is that there is a "European Community". Hence the decision by Parliament and the Council in 1978 to encourage the use of this name in official documents "as far as may be possible and appropriate"<sup>1</sup>. This policy has also been adopted by the Court of Justice when referring to the entity rather than to the instruments which govern it. Journalists, for their part, have invented or sanctioned a number of simpler or shorter names: "the Common Market", of course, to refer to the European Economic Community, and a host of others, which may vary from language to language and include abbreviations such as CEE, EEC, MEC and EWG, and names involving numbers such as "Europe of the Ten" or simply "the Ten".

Such a proliferation of terms could well generate or perpetuate confusion. We therefore tried to discover people's preferences by asking the following question:

*"Your country and nine other European countries belong to "the European Community", which is also called "the Common Market", or E.E.C. or "The Ten". Among these names is there one you prefer and which one?" (Show CARD)*

The first finding was that nearly one person in every three questioned had no preference; the proportion was as high as 44% in Denmark, 48% in Belgium and 51% in Greece.

Among those who expressed an opinion, the majority in most countries were in favour of "the European Community". The British more readily use "the Common Market", while the Greeks are equally divided between "the European Community" and the "European Economic Community" and the Danes between "the European Community" and abbreviated titles.

In short, the countries most in favour of European unification and Community membership show a greater preference for the name "the European Community".

(See Table 15)

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<sup>1</sup> For references and comments see the introduction by Giancarlo Olmi to Thirty years of Community law (Brussels, 1982) pp. 3 and 4.

Table 15

PREFERRED NAME FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
"The European Community"	32	26	56	32	34	45	52	44	30	26	40
"The European Economic Community"	19	7	14	18	13	22	7	25	12	25	17
"The European Communities"	9	16	3	10	11	7	8	6	10	8	8
"The Common Market"	16	19	11	12	19	13	9	8	33	13	17
"Europe of the Ten"	17	5	6	23	4	9	11	5	2	19	10
EC, EEC or other name or abbrev.	7	27	10	5	19	4	13	12	13	9	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
"Don't know or "no preference"	48%	44%	32%	21%	35%	23%	28%	29%	31%	51%	29%

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average.

But the relationship that can be observed between what is being described and the "words for it" is not just at country level, which would have suggested that the influence was each country's cultural characteristics and linguistic practices. If we look at the choice of term in relation to the attitude of the person concerned towards Community membership, it can be seen that those who consider it "a good thing" are more likely to prefer the name "the European Community", whereas those who are against it prefer the more restrictive name "the Common Market".

These are not neutral terms.

(See Table 16)

### II.2.2 Benefits (or otherwise) of Community membership in relation to other Community countries

The following question, first asked in spring 1983, was asked again in March-April 1984:

*Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community (Common Market)? If YES: "Has it benefited more or less than the other member countries of the European Community"?*

While it is true that in all countries except the United Kingdom the majority of respondents felt that their country had benefited from Community membership, this view has lost ground over the last twelve months, particularly in Italy, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium.

(See Table 17)

Of those who consider that their country has benefited, most think that it has benefited as much as the other countries or do not know. Again the United Kingdom is a notable exception: the majority opinion - even among the minority who consider that the country has benefited from Community membership - is that it has benefited less than other countries.

It is worth noting that among the Greeks, who admittedly are relative newcomers to the Community, even those who acknowledge that their country has benefited from membership feel that they come off worse than other countries. And the Italians, whose pro-European attitudes have been demonstrated time and time again, allow a degree of bitterness to creep in here.

(See Table 18)

Table 16

PREFERRED NAME FOR THE COMMUNITY IN RELATION TO ATTITUDE

TOWARDS COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

(Community as a whole)

	Consider their country's memership of the European Community:		
	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing
	%	%	%
"The European Community"	46	32	29
"The European Economic Community"	17	18	14
"The Common Market"	13	21	25
"Europe of the Ten"	10	11	10
"The European Communities"	7	9	10
Other	7	9	12
TOTAL <sup>1</sup>	100	100	100
"Don't know" or "no preference"	19%	33%	45%

<sup>1</sup> Don't knows excluded.

Table 17

## VIEWS ON WHETHER OR NOT ONE'S COUNTRY HAS BENEFITED FROM COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>March-April 1983</u>											
Consider their country has benefited from Community membership:	59	51	49	54	56	69	74	78	32	44	52
- more than the others	11	9	8	5	16	13	15	14	4	8	8
- less than the others	8	6	16	12	15	19	13	10	15	13	15
- about as much <sup>2</sup>	35	24	10	27	20	24	36	42	7	9	18
- don't know	5	12	15	10	5	13	10	12	6	14	11
Consider their country has not benefited from Community membership	6	31	15	21	28	14	12	11	57	25	25
Don't know	35	18	36	25	16	17	14	11	11	31	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>March-April 1984</u>											
Consider their country has benefited from Community membership:	49	42	39	50	59	58	73	67	32	44	46
- more than the others	7	10	7	5	24	10	15	16	3	7	7
- less than the others	7	6	9	8	13	19	10	9	17	17	13
- about as much <sup>2</sup>	28	26(3)	11	31	15	18	36	32	7	8	17
- don't know	7		2	6	7	11	12	10	5	12	9
Consider their country has not benefited from Community membership	22	34	24	24	29	20	14	17	56	35	30
Don't know	29	24	37	26	12	22	13	16	12	21	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

1 Weighted average.

2 Volunteered.

3 Owing to a technical error one reply code was omitted in Denmark.

Table 18

VIEWS ON WHETHER ONE'S COUNTRY HAS BENEFITED MORE OR LESS THAN THE OTHERS FROM COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>March-April 1983</u>											
Consider their country has benefited from Community membership:											
- more than the others	18	17	16	8	30	19	20	18	14	20	16
- less than the others	14	13	33	22	27	28	17	13	46	29	28
- about as much <sup>2</sup>	59	46	21	51	35	34	49	54	21	20	35
- don't know	9	24	30	19	8	19	14	15	19	31	21
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Reminder of percentages of positive replies	59%	51%	49%	54%	56%	69%	74%	78%	32%	44%	52%
<u>March-April 1984</u>											
Consider their country has benefited from Community membership:											
- more than the others	15	23	18	9	41	18	20	24	8	15	15
- less than the others	14	14	24	16	22	33	14	14	53	39	28
- about as much <sup>2</sup>	58	63(3)	29	62	26	31	50	48	22	17	37
- don't know	13		29	13	11	18	16	14	17	29	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Reminder of percentages of positive replies	49%	42%	39%	50%	59%	58%	73%	67%	32%	44%	46%

1 Weighted average.

2 Volunteered.

3 Owing to a technical error one reply code was omitted in Denmark.



### II.2.3 Which countries should not be in the Community?

Questions have been asked a number of times on Europeans' opinions of and attitudes towards one another in an attempt not to perpetuate prejudice but to assess areas of agreement.

As far back as autumn 1976 we asked the following question, which has just been re-used in the survey carried out for Parliament and a group of media organizations.

*"This is a list of the countries belonging to the European Community (Common Market). (Show CARD) Among these countries of the European Community, are there any, including your own, you would prefer not to be in the Community? Which ones?"<sup>1</sup>*

What is clear at first glance is that in 1984 as in 1976 a large majority of interviewees would not exclude any country from the Community, though the proportion is significantly smaller: seven out of ten in 1976; six out of ten in 1984.

The other point to note is that in 1984 only one country got a large number of negative votes: the United Kingdom, from 25% of interviewees in the Community as a whole, 33% in Germany, 38% in Luxembourg and 41% in France. (Conversely, 25% of the British said that they would like to see France leave the Community).

The percentage of Danes (18%) and British (12%) who would prefer their own country not to be in the Community is surprisingly low, possibly as a result of the relative complexity of the question, which certainly partly accounts for the number of don't knows.<sup>2</sup>

Be that as it may, the replies are an indicator of tension, both in general attitudes towards the Community and attitudes - influenced by current events - towards other countries.

(See Table 19)

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<sup>1</sup> This was followed by a list of the ten member countries of the Community (without Greece in 1979).

<sup>2</sup> As a matter of interest, the proportion of those who replied who would exclude their own country was 47% in Denmark and 28% in the United Kingdom. By comparison, 38% of the Danes who replied would prefer the British not to be in the Community and 17% of the British felt the same way about the Danes.

Table 19

COUNTRIES WHICH INTERVIEWEES WOULD LIKE TO SEE LEAVE THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY<sup>1</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
<u>October 1976</u>	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
None (or don't knows)	85	73	57	73	77	77	68	76	70	:	70
Italy	6	9	26	11	5	3	16	13	9	:	12
Germany	2	3	1	4	3	6	3	2	3	:	3
United Kingdom	6	3	19	15	5	7	14	8	9	:	12
Ireland	4	3	9	3	9	5	10	5	7	:	6
Belgium	.	2	2	1	1	2	2	.	1	:	1
Luxembourg	.	1	1	1	1	2	1	.	1	:	1
Netherlands	1	1	1	1	.	1	.	.	1	:	1
Denmark	.	15	1	1	1	1	2	.	1	:	1
France	1	6	10	2	5	9	3	5	7	:	7
<u>March-April 1984</u>											
None (or don't knows)	69	61	51	54	75	70	55	66	56	59	59
Italy	5	5	11	5	2	.	3	5	7	4	6
Germany	1	3	2	2	2	7	2	2	4	9	3
United Kingdom	20	15	33	41	14	18	38	23	12	27	25
Ireland	4	3	5	2	5	1	6	8	8	2	4
Belgium	.	1	2	.	.	.	3	1	1	2	1
Luxembourg	.	1	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	2	1
Netherlands	1	1	1	1	1	1	.	1	.	2	1
Denmark	1	18	1	1	1	.	.	1	1	2	1
Greece	7	9	13	4	2	3	9	7	8	13	7
France	1	2	4	.	2	5	2	3	25	4	8

<sup>1</sup> Totals exceed 100 since it was possible to give more than one answer.

<sup>2</sup> Weighted average.

#### II.2.4 Views on Community membership

*"Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"*

There has been little change over the last six months, barring a slight increase in positive views in France and a slight drop in Greece.

Despite difficulties and tensions, views on Community membership remain positive in all the member countries, including the United Kingdom and Denmark. In Denmark, however, the gap between the numbers replying "a good thing" and "a bad thing" is statistically insignificant, and most Danes seem more or less resigned to Community membership rather than enthusiastic about staying in or keen to get out.

(See Table 20)

#### II.3 GOALS AND ASPIRATIONS FOR THE YEARS AHEAD

We will end this issue of Eurobarometer with the replies to two questions asked in the survey carried out for the European Parliament and a group of media organizations.

##### II.3.1 Priorities for joint Community action

*"Of the following areas (Show CARD), on which two do you think the countries of the European Community working together should concentrate their efforts in the next 5 or 6 years?"*

One area emerges clearly in all countries: job creation, followed (at quite some distance) by social welfare. Other issues assume varying importance depending on the country: in Greece and Italy agriculture is highly rated; in France and the United Kingdom defence; in Greece and Ireland help to the poorer parts of Europe; in France scientific research; and in the Netherlands help to the Third World.

Table 21 shows overall figures and Table 22 gives a clearer indication of the order of preference by country.

(See Tables 21 and 22)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK <sup>1</sup>	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>September 1973</u>											
Good thing	57	42	63	61	56	69	67	63	31	:	56
Neither good nor bad	19	19	22	22	21	15	22	20	22	:	20
Bad thing	5	30	4	5	15	2	3	4	34	:	11
Don't know	19	9	11	12	8	14	8	13	13	:	13
<b>Total<sub>3</sub></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>:</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>2.64</b>	<b>2.13</b>	<b>2.66</b>	<b>2.64</b>	<b>2.45</b>	<b>2.78</b>	<b>2.70</b>	<b>2.68</b>	<b>1.97</b>	<b>:</b>	<b>2.52</b>
<u>1974-81 (16 surveys)</u>											
Good thing	60	35	59	57	53	73	75	75	34	(4)	56
Neither good nor bad	21	26	25	28	22	16	15	14	22	26	23
Bad thing	4	29	6	7	19	4	4	4	37	21	13
Don't know	15	10	10	8	6	7	6	7	7	13	8
<b>Total<sub>3</sub></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>2.66</b>	<b>2.06</b>	<b>2.59</b>	<b>2.54</b>	<b>2.36</b>	<b>2.73</b>	<b>2.70</b>	<b>2.76</b>	<b>1.97</b>	<b>2.21</b>	<b>2.47</b>
<u>April + Oct. 1982 (comb.)</u>											
Good thing	52	35	56	55	46	67	72	75	28	43	52
Neither good nor bad	24	29	30	29	28	19	20	15	28	30	26
Bad thing	6	26	7	8	20	5	4	5	38	13	14
Don't know	18	10	7	8	6	9	4	5	6	14	8
<b>Total<sub>3</sub></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>2.55</b>	<b>2.10</b>	<b>2.53</b>	<b>2.50</b>	<b>2.27</b>	<b>2.69</b>	<b>2.70</b>	<b>2.74</b>	<b>1.90</b>	<b>2.36</b>	<b>2.42</b>
<u>April 1983</u>											
Good thing	62	35	61	53	45	70	72	77	28	42	53
Neither good nor bad	19	30	26	30	28	18	18	15	29	29	25
Bad thing	3	24	5	7	20	4	5	4	36	12	13
Don't know	16	11	8	10	7	8	5	4	7	17	9
<b>Total<sub>3</sub></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>2.70</b>	<b>2.12</b>	<b>2.60</b>	<b>2.51</b>	<b>2.27</b>	<b>2.71</b>	<b>2.71</b>	<b>2.75</b>	<b>1.91</b>	<b>2.35</b>	<b>2.45</b>
<u>October 1983</u>											
Good thing	62	35	57	55	42	76	70	80	36	47	55
Neither good nor bad	19	28	24	29	26	17	16	10	30	30	24
Bad thing	5	26	9	9	25	5	6	4	28	12	13
Don't know	14	11	10	7	7	2	8	6	6	11	8
<b>Total<sub>3</sub></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>2.66</b>	<b>2.10</b>	<b>2.53</b>	<b>2.49</b>	<b>2.18</b>	<b>2.70</b>	<b>2.73</b>	<b>2.81</b>	<b>2.09</b>	<b>2.40</b>	<b>2.47</b>
<u>March-April 1984</u>											
Good thing	59	31	53	62	43	70	80	80	34	38	55
Neither good nor bad	25	30	31	27	27	20	14	13	30	35	27
Bad thing	7	29	5	4	23	3	3	3	30	18	11
Don't know	9	10	11	7	7	7	3	4	6	9	7
<b>Total<sub>3</sub></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>2.58</b>	<b>2.02</b>	<b>2.54</b>	<b>2.62</b>	<b>2.22</b>	<b>2.71</b>	<b>2.80</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.04</b>	<b>2.22</b>	<b>2.48</b>

1 Excluding Northern Ireland in 1973 and 1974.

2 Weighted average.

3 "Good thing" = 3, "neither good nor bad" = 2, "bad thing" = 1; "Don't knows" excluded.

4 Only three surveys, the first in October 1980.

Table 21  
PRIORITIES FOR JOINT COMMUNITY ACTION  
IN THE NEXT FIVE OR SIX YEARS<sup>1</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Creating jobs	82	66	68	75	87	76	85	73	77	49	73
Social welfare	36	28	30	20	29	18	49	38	35	32	27
Defence	14	10	16	26	10	16	8	13	24	20	19
Agriculture	14	19	17	19	24	27	10	11	12	32	19
Help to poorer parts of Europe	10	14	15	11	25	19	11	9	16	33	16
Scientific research	14	13	12	24	6	16	12	9	12	12	15
Help to the Third World	7	22	9	16	18	15	22	23	16	11	14
Don't know	5	10	13	3	1	2	.	2	3	4	5

<sup>1</sup> Since it was possible to give two answers, totals exceed 100. The areas are listed in order of positive replies for the Community as a whole.

<sup>2</sup> Weighted average.

Table 22

## PRIORITIES FOR JOINT COMMUNITY ACTION BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM		DENMARK		GERMANY		FRANCE		IRELAND	
Jobs	82%	Jobs	66%	Jobs	68%	Jobs	75%	Jobs	87%
Social welfare	36	Social welfare	28	Social welfare	30	Defence	26	Social welfare	29
Defence	14	Third world	22	Agriculture	17	Scientific research	24	Poorer areas	25
Agriculture	14	Agriculture	19	Defence	16	Social welfare	20	Agriculture	24
Scientific research	14	Poorer areas	14	Poorer areas	15	Agriculture	19	Third world	18
Poorer areas	10	Scientific research	13	Scientific research	12	Third world	16	Defence	10
Third world	7	Defence	10	Third world	9	Poorer areas	11	Scientific research	6
ITALY		LUXEMBOURG		NETHERLANDS		UNITED KINGDOM		GREECE	
Jobs	76%	Jobs	85%	Jobs	73%	Jobs	77%	Jobs	49%
Agriculture	27	Social welfare	49	Social welfare	38	Social welfare	35	Poorer areas	33
Poorer areas	19	Third world	22	Third world	23	Defence	24	Agriculture	32
Social welfare	18	Scientific research	12	Defence	13	Poorer areas	16	Social welfare	32
Scientific research	16	Poorer areas	11	Agriculture	11	Third world	16	Defence	20
Defence	16	Agriculture	10	Poorer areas	9	Agriculture	12	Scientific research	12
Third world	15	Defence	8	Scientific research	9	Scientific research	12	Third world	11

II.3.2 A "mock" referendum on various aspects of European integration

*"Supposing you were asked to vote on the following ideas, which would then apply to all countries equally in the European Community. Would you vote for or against?"*

- To give all citizens of European Community countries the possibility to get a European passport which enables them to travel without hindrance in the ten countries*
- To have a European currency as well as our own, with notes and coins that could be used everywhere in the ten countries of the European Community in the same way we use our (national) currency*
- In the next Olympic games, instead of ten teams representing the ten European countries, send one European team representing the best of the European Community as a whole*
- Make it possible to arrest and bring to trial anyone accused of a serious crime, even if they have taken refuge in another country of the Community*
- To have only one ambassador to represent the ten countries of the Community in Washington or in Moscow*
- A firm hiring staff can choose people from any country of the European Community as well as a (national)*
- You receive the same social benefit and payments as in the other countries of the Community neither more nor less*
- It will be forbidden to prevent products of another country of the European Community from being sold here*

The replies to these eight questions confirm that a European consensus exists. With a few exceptions, which we will come back to, all countries approved or disapproved of the same ideas.

Firstly, the ideas which were well received:

- eight Europeans in ten are in favour of a European legal area within which it would be possible to arrest and bring to trial anyone accused of a serious crime who had sought refuge in another Community country;*
- similarly, eight in ten are in favour of all Community citizens having a European passport;*
- about six Europeans in ten are in favour of harmonizing welfare benefits throughout the Community (although the majority of Danes are against);*

- there is a similar majority support for the creation of a European currency, but again the majority of Danes and a substantial minority of the British are against;
- on average almost as many endorse the principle that a firm recruiting staff should be able to choose a citizen from another Community country, but the majority of Danes are against;
- 45% of Europeans are in favour of banning protectionism against products from other Community countries; here, however, national differences are more marked with the Italians very much in favour and a clear majority of the British and the Danes against.

Only two of the ideas mooted met with opposition, but in both cases it was quite unequivocal. In no country would the majority of citizens agree to only one ambassador representing the ten Community countries in Moscow or Washington or one European team being sent to the next Olympic Games. It would seem that less importance is attached to the substance of sovereignty than to some of its symbols.

(See Table 23)

\*  
\*   \*  
\*

If we look not at the details but at the results as a whole, we can see that the country which, on average, cast the greatest number of votes in favour of the proposals was Italy (on average 72% "fors" and 16% "againsts"), followed by Luxembourg, Greece, France and Belgium.

In the United Kingdom the "fors" just outweighed the "againsts".

Denmark is the only country where, on average, there were more "againsts" than "fors".

(See Table 24)

\*  
\*   \*  
\*

The main purpose of this question was not to hand out trophies but to investigate a structure of opinion.

It is simply an indicator, throwing up results at national level which correlate strongly with general attitudes towards European unification and Community membership.



Table 23

"MOCK" EUROPEAN REFERENDUM<sup>1</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>"Make it possible to arrest and bring to trial anyone accused of a serious crime, even if they have taken refuge in another country of the Community"</b>											
For	76	78	77	83	74	86	88	93	90	66	83
Against	12	11	12	9	13	6	7	4	6	17	9
Don't know	12	11	11	8	13	8	5	3	4	17	8
<b>"To give all citizens of European Community countries the possibility to get a European passport which enables them to travel without hindrance in the ten countries"</b>											
For	77	53	79	86	82	93	92	83	71	88	82
Against	9	33	11	7	9	3	6	12	23	3	11
Don't know	14	14	10	7	9	4	2	5	6	9	7
<b>"You receive the same social benefit and payments as in the other countries of the Community, neither more nor less"</b>											
For	55	29	49	59	75	87	71	62	59	85	63
Against	22	<b>48</b>	31	18	11	4	20	25	25	4	20
Don't know	23	23	20	23	14	9	9	13	16	11	17
<b>"To have a European currency as well as our own, with notes and coins that could be used everywhere in the ten countries of the European Community in the same way we use our (national) currency here"</b>											
For	76	36	52	80	75	85	90	68	49	80	66
Against	13	<b>49</b>	34	12	13	7	7	24	44	8	24
Don't know	11	15	14	8	12	8	3	8	7	12	10

1 The ideas are listed in order of average votes in favour ("fors" minus "against") for the Community as a whole. The total for each idea adds up to 100.

2 Weighted average.

Table 23 (contd.)

"MOCK" EUROPEAN REFERENDUM<sup>1</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>"A firm hiring staff can choose people from any country of the European Community as well as a (national)"</b>											
For	47	34	55	55	47	82	59	52	52	59	59
Against	39	46	29	33	34	8	33	36	37	29	28
Don't know	14	20	16	12	19	10	8	12	11	12	13
<b>"It will be forbidden to prevent products of another country of the European Community from being sold here"</b>											
For	40	27	40	40	37	75	52	38	31	44	45
Against	42	48	37	44	45	9	41	52	56	40	38
Don't know	18	25	23	16	18	16	7	10	13	16	17
<b>"To have only one ambassador to represent the ten countries of the Community in Washington or in Moscow"</b>											
For	36	12	22	29	27	34	34	26	13	25	24
Against	40	69	58	55	53	42	52	60	78	51	58
Don't know	24	19	20	16	20	24	14	14	9	24	18
<b>"In the next Olympic Games, instead of ten teams representing the ten European countries, send one European team representing the best of the European Community as a whole"</b>											
For	35	7	18	35	17	37	32	23	12	36	25
Against	41	77	62	50	70	46	51	59	81	40	59
Don't know	24	16	20	15	13	17	17	18	7	24	16

1 and 2 see p. 46.

Table 24

SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF "MOCK" EUROPEAN REFERENDUM

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
Average percentage of "fors" for the eight ideas mooted	55%	35	49	58	54	72	65	56	47	60	56
Average percentage of "against"	27	48	34	28	31	16	27	34	44	24	31
Difference	28	-13	15	30	23	56	38	22	3	36	25

In any case national culture is not the only variable involved in producing the small number of differences observed above. Replies to some of the questions are closely linked to the cognitive mobilization<sup>2</sup> of the respondents; this is true, for example, in the case of the European passport and the rejection of any move to compartmentalize the Community job market. Others correlate more strongly with political ideology: for example, the idea of a European currency is more attractive to the left than to the right.

All the statistics obtained from the survey will be studied in depth at a later date. For the time being it is sufficient to draw the following three-fold conclusion:

- there is a body of European public opinion in the sense of areas of agreement and disagreement common to the majority of countries;
- with the exception of Denmark, this opinion is generally pro rather than anti decisions geared to European unification;
- the level of attachment to symbols of national sovereignty - other than currency - is still very high in all the countries.

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average.

<sup>2</sup> "Cognitive mobilization" means the ability to take an interest in relatively complex, distant or abstract problems. It is measured here by combining the answers to two questions, one dealing with propensity to influence other people and the other with frequency of political discussions.

#### II.4 TENTATIVE SUMMARY OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

A multidimensional analysis was made of all the replies to the questions asked in this survey on attitudes towards European unification and the Community, the role of the European Parliament, intentions to vote and related issues. The main conclusions can be summed up as follows:<sup>1</sup>

(See Table 25)

1. About one third of interviewees (33%) form what could be described as a "hard core" of "pro-Europeans":

- they are broadly in favour of European unification and the Community (as well as the creation of a political union);
- the most committed - because they are the most clear-thinking and the most exacting - do not overestimate the importance of the present role played by the European Parliament, but they are almost unanimous in their desire to see it expanded;
- most of them will vote in the European elections.

The most committed members of this "avant-garde" tend to be men rather than women; their level of education is fairly high; most of them are opinion leaders.

Citizens of this type are to be found in all the member countries; at their most committed they are to be found in much higher numbers in Italy than elsewhere.

2. At the other extreme, there is a minority of about 15% on average who are "to some extent against" or "very much against" European unification and the Community. They consider Parliament's role to be of little or no significance and half of them would like to see it reduced even further. The less committed are likely to abstain but the hard-liners will most probably go and vote.

This type is particularly common in the United Kingdom and Denmark.

3. Between these two extremes lies a mass with characteristics that are not always clearcut, in which one can distinguish:

- an element accounting for more than a third of the overall population (about 36%), which, albeit half-heartedly for rather than against Europe and the Community, is divided concerning the role of the European Parliament; some tend to feel that its current role is not important, but would like to see it increased, whereas others feel that it is important but do not want it to increase any further;

---

<sup>1</sup> In technical terms this is a typological analysis designed to reduce the multiplicity of replies given by interviewees into certain types, as similar and as dissimilar from one another as possible.

- a group of almost 20% who could be described as indifferent since the majority of them fail to reply to most of the questions asked on Europe.

In all countries where voting is not compulsory the thrust of the election campaign will have to be directed at this massive "block" of citizens in an attempt to persuade them to vote. All things being equal, what proportion of this potential electorate turns out to vote will depend mainly on the answers given to questions as simple as these:

- What are the short-term and long-term objectives proposed for Europe?
- What can the European Parliament do with its present powers?
- What powers must it claim for the representatives seeking our votes to be credible?

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Notes to accompany Table 25 on p. 51:

- <sup>1</sup> Type classification based on the non-weighted total of interviewees in the ten countries. The results shown here have been weighted to reproduce the exact structure of the population.
- <sup>2</sup> This estimate is based on the hypotheses set out on pp. 16 and 18; the raw scores projected from the survey have been revised accordingly to take account of the average projected turnout of 64%. Its only purpose is to illustrate the considerable variation in levels of participation according to the attitude of the voters (whatever the basis for calculation).

Table 25

THE CLASSIFICATION OF EUROPEANS ON THE EVE OF THE ELECTIONS TO PARLIAMENT<sup>1</sup>

	In favour of European unification and the Community (33.3%)		Half-hearted support (35.6%)		Indifferent (16.5%)	Hostile to European unification and the Community (14.6%)		TOTAL (100%)
	very committed (16.6%)	less committed (16.7%)	Increased role for EP (21.1%)	Same role for EP (14.5%)		less committed (12.5%)	very committed (2.1%)	
<b>ATTITUDES BY TYPE</b>								
<b>European unification:</b>								
- very much or to some extent for	98%	94%	78%	82%	40%	38%	4%	72%
- to some extent or very much against	.	2	13	7	5	50	95	13
Don't know	2	4	9	11	55	12	1	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>European Community:</b>								
- favourable	96%	89%	58%	63%	30%	7%	2%	58%
- unfavourable	.	1	9	10	8	53	84	13
Don't know	4	10	33	27	62	40	14	29
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Present role of European Parliament:</b>								
- very important or important	49%	73%	41%	63%	11%	18%	17%	43%
- not very or not at all important	48	22	52	21	15	70	76	38
Don't know	3	5	7	16	74	12	7	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Desired role for European Parliament:</b>								
- more important	92%	81%	80%	14%	6%	8%	15%	50%
- the same	6	13	11	42	11	29	22	17
- less important	-	1	2	18	4	41	47	10
Don't know	2	5	7	26	79	22	16	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>PROJECTED TURNOUT FOR THE ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY TYPE<sup>2</sup></b>								
	94%		68%	60%	33%	20%	80%	64%

1 and 2, see p. 50.

Table 25 (contd.)

THE CLASSIFICATION OF EUROPEANS ON THE EVE OF THE ELECTIONS TO PARLIAMENT<sup>1</sup>

DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES BY COUNTRY	In favour of Euro- pean unification and the Community		Half-hearted support		In- differ- ent	Hostile to Euro- pean unification and the Community		TOTAL
	(33.3%)		(35.6%)			(14.6%)		
	very committed (16.6%)	less committed (16.7%)	Increased role for EP (21.1%)	Same role for EP (14.5%)	less committed (12.5%)	very committed (2.1%)	(100%)	
Belgium	12%	21%	26%	9%	19%	13%		100%
Denmark	3	5	8	19	21	24	20	100
Germany	14	16	21	14	19	15	1	100
France	19	18	25	14	18	5	1	100
Ireland	9	19	19	17	23	11	2	100
Italy	30	22	20	7	18	2	1	100
Luxembourg	20	30	24	11	10	5	.	100
Netherlands	20	19	23	20	9	8	1	100
United Kingdom	6	9	16	24	12	29	4	100
Greece	10	24	31	5	20	6	4	100

ANNEXES / APPENDIX



INSTITUTS CHARGES DU SONDAGE ET SPECIALISTES RESPONSABLES /  
INSTITUTES WHICH CARRIED OUT THE SURVEY AND EXPERTS IN CHARGE (x)

<b>Belgique/België</b>	DIMARSO N.V. rue des Colonies, 54 B-1000 Bruxelles Tél.: 02/219.24.08	Leo VEREYCKEN Nicole GOOSSENS
<b>Danmark</b>	GALLUP MARKEDSANALYSE A/S Gammel Vartov Vej 6 DK-2900 Hellerup Tél.: 01/29.88.00	Rolf RANDRUP
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Toutes les données relatives aux Euro-Baromètres sont déposées aux "Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences", (1 Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). Elles sont tenues à la disposition des organismes membres du European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), du Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) et des chercheurs justifiant d'un intérêt de recherche.

All Euro-Barometre data are stored at the Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences (1, Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research.

Pour tous renseignements sur les études d'opinion publique faites à l'initiative de la Commission des Communautés européennes, écrire à J.-R. RABIER, Conseiller spécial, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Bruxelles.

For all information regarding opinion surveys carried out for the Commission of the European Communities, please write to J.-R. RABIER, special Counsellor, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels.

- (x) Les dix instituts actuellement chargés de ces sondages ont formé entre eux THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY, dont le comité de direction comprend: Robert GIJS (DIMARSO, Bruxelles), Jan STAPEL (NIPO, Amsterdam) et Norman WEBB (Social Surveys, London). / The ten institutes which carried out these surveys have formed amongst themselves THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY of which the Management Committee comprises: Robert GIJS (DIMARSO, Brussels), Jan STAPEL (NIPO, Amsterdam) and Norman WEBB (Social Surveys, London).
- (XX) Le sondage en Northern Ireland est fait en collaboration par le Irish Marketing Surveys et le Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). / The Northern Ireland Survey is conducted jointly by Irish Marketing Surveys and the Social Surveys (Gallup Poll).

ECHANTILLONNAGE / SAMPLING

L'objectif de la méthode d'échantillonnage est de couvrir de façon représentative la totalité de la population des dix pays de la Communauté âgée de 15 ans et plus.

L'échantillon de chaque pays est constitué à deux niveaux:

1° Régions et localités d'enquête

Les statistiques de la Communauté européenne divisent l'espace européen en 117 régions (voir liste ci-jointe).

L'enquête a lieu dans 115 régions (Corse et Val d'Aoste exceptés).

Chaque pays a constitué aléatoirement un échantillon-maître de localités d'enquête de telle sorte que toutes les catégories d'habitat soient représentées proportionnellement à leurs populations respectives.

Au total, les interviews de l'enquête Omnibus Européenne ont lieu dans environ 1 150 points d'enquête.

2° Choix des personnes interrogées

Les personnes interrogées sont toujours différentes d'une enquête à l'autre.

L'échantillon-maître aléatoire évoqué ci-dessus indique le nombre de personnes à interroger à chaque point d'enquête. Au stade suivant, les personnes à interroger sont désignées:

- soit par un tirage au sort sur liste dans les pays où on peut avoir accès à des listes exhaustives d'individus ou de foyers: Belgique, Pays-Bas, Danemark, Luxembourg;
- soit par échantillonnage stratifié sur la base des statistiques de recensement, l'échantillon étant construit à partir des critères de sexe, âge et profession: France, Italie, Royaume-Uni, Irlande, Allemagne;
- soit par une méthode combinant les deux précédentes (cheminement systématique): Grèce.

The sample has been designed to be representative of the total population aged 15 years and over of the ten countries of the Community.

In each country a two stage sampling method is used:

1° Geographical distribution

For statistical purposes the European Community divides Europe into 117 regions (see attached list). The survey takes place in 115 of these regions (Corsica and Val D'aoste excluded).

In each country a random selection of sampling points is made in such a way that all types of area (urban, rural, etc.) are represented in proportion to their populations.

The interviews are distributed in more or less 1 150 sampling points.

2° Choice of respondents

For each survey different individuals are interviewed in the master sample of sampling point described above. Within these sampling points the individuals to be interviewed are chosen:

- either at random from the population or electoral lists in those countries where access to suitable lists of individuals or households is possible: Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg;
- or by quota sampling. In these cases the quotas are established by sex, age and occupation on the basis of census data: this system is used in France, Italy, United-Kingdom, Ireland and Germany;
- or by a method combining the two precedent ones ("random route"): Greece.

REGIONS D'ENQUETES / GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

BELGIQUE/BELGIE

AN : Antwerpen  
 W.V. : West-Vlaanderen  
 O.V. : Oost-Vlaanderen  
 BR : Brabant  
 LI : Limburg  
 LIE : Liège  
 HAI : Hainaut  
 NA : Namur  
 LX : Luxembourg

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

S.H. : Schleswig-Holstein  
 STA : Stade  
 AUR : Aurich  
 OLD : Oldenburg  
 B : Bremen  
 LUN : Lüneburg  
 BR : Braunschweig  
 OSN : Osnabrück  
 HAN : Hannover  
 MUN : Münster  
 DET : Detmold  
 HIL : Hildesheim  
 DUS : Düsseldorf  
 ARN : Arnsberg  
 KAS : Kassel  
 AA : Aachen  
 KOL : Köln  
 TRI : Trier  
 KOB : Koblenz  
 DA.WI. : Darmstadt-Wiesbaden  
 U.F. : Unterfranken  
 O.F. : Oberfranken  
 SAA : Saarland  
 RH.PF. : Rheinessen-Pfalz  
 N.B. : Nordbaden  
 N.W. : Nordwürttemberg  
 M.F. : Mittelfranken  
 O.PF. : Oberpfalz  
 N.BAY. : Niederbayern  
 S.B. : Südbaden  
 S.W. : SüdWürttemberg  
 SCH : Schwaben  
 O.BAY. : Oberbayern  
 BER : Berlin

DANMARK

JYLL : Jylland  
 SJAE : Sjaelland  
 FYN : Fyn

FRANCE

NORD : Nord  
 PIC : Picardie  
 H.N. : Haute-Normandie  
 R.P. : Région Parisienne  
 CHA : Champagne

LOR : Lorraine  
 AL : Alsace  
 B.N. : Basse-Normandie  
 BRE : Bretagne  
 P.LOI : Pays de la Loire  
 CEN : Centre  
 BOU : Bourgogne  
 F.C. : Franche-Comté  
 P.CH. : Poitou-Charentes  
 LIM : Limousin  
 AUV : Auvergne  
 R-A : Rhône-Alpes  
 AQU : Aquitaine  
 M.P. : Midi-Pyrénées  
 LAN : Languedoc  
 P.CDA : Provence-Côte d'Azur  
 COR : (Corse)

IRELAND

DON : Donegal  
 N.W. : North West  
 N.E. : North East  
 W. : West  
 M. : Midlands  
 E. : East  
 M.W. : Mid West  
 S.E. : South East  
 S.W. : South West

ITALIA

V.D.A. : (Valle d'Aosta)  
 PIE : Piemonte  
 LOM : Lombardia  
 T.AA : Trentino-Alto Adige  
 VEN : Veneto  
 F.VG : Friuli-Venezia-Giulia  
 LIG : Liguria  
 E-R : Emilia-Romagna  
 TOS : Toscana  
 UMB : Umbria  
 MAR : Marche  
 LAZ : Lazio  
 ABR : Abruzzi  
 MOL : Molise  
 CAM : Campania  
 PUG : Puglia  
 BAS : Basilicata  
 CAL : Calabria  
 SIC : Sicilia  
 SAR : Sardegna

LUXEMBOURG

LX : G.D. du Luxembourg

NEDERLAND

GR : Groningen  
 FR : Friesland  
 DR : Drenthe

OV : Overijssel  
 NH : Noord-Holland  
 GEL : Gelderland  
 ZH : Zuid-Holland  
 UT : Utrecht  
 ZE : Zeeland  
 N.B. : Noord-Brabant  
 LI : Limburg

UNITED KINGDOM

SCOTL : Scotland  
 N. : North  
 N.I. : Northern Ireland  
 N.W. : North West  
 Y.H. : Yorkshire and Humberside  
 WALES : Wales  
 W.M. : West Midlands  
 E.M. : East Midlands  
 E.A. : East Anglia  
 S.W. : South West  
 S.E. : South East

ELLAS

Kentriki Ellás kai Evia  
 Pelopónnissos  
 Iónioi Nissoi  
 Ipiros  
 Thessalia  
 Makedonia  
 Thráki  
 Nissoi Aigaiou  
 Kriti

POPULATION ETUDIEE, TAILLE DES ECHANTILLONS, DATES DU TRAVAIL /  
SURVEYED POPULATION, SIZE OF THE SAMPLE, DATES OF FIELDWORK

	Population (1)		Echantillons / Samples (2) (Baro 21)	Dates (Baro 21)
	milliers / thousands	%		
B	7 878	3.66	1.018	14-30/III/1984
DK	4 070	1.89	997	24/III-1/IV
D	50 656	23.55	992	17/III-9/IV
GR	7 551	3.51	1 000	16-27/III
F	41 904	19.48	1 008	17/III-9/IV
IRL	2 408	1.12	1 002	21/III-6/IV
I	44 739	20.80	1 060	19/III-5/IV
L	298	0.14	300	22/III-13/IV
NL	11 075	5.15	1 015	24-31/III
UK	44 489	20.69	1 356	19/III-5/IV
CE/EC	215 068	100.00	9 748	14/III-13/IV/1984

RECOMMANDATION AU LECTEUR / ADVICE TO READERS

Il est rappelé que les résultats obtenus par sondage sont des estimations dont le degré de certitude et de précision dépend, toutes choses égales d'ailleurs, du nombre des individus constituant l'échantillon. Avec des échantillons de l'ordre de 1 000, on admet généralement qu'une différence inférieure à cinq pour cent entre deux pourcentages est au-dessous du niveau acceptable de confiance.

Readers are reminded that sample survey results are estimations, the degree of certainty and precision of which, everything being kept equal, rests upon the number of cases. With samples of about 1 000, it is generally admitted that a percentage difference of less than five per cent is below the acceptable level of confidence.

(1) 15 ans et plus / 15 years and over.

(2) Nombre d'interviews / Number of interviews.