

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November 1976

III

Assembly Documents

W E U

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32

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The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume III : Assembly Documents.

Volume IV : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo BONNEL Raoul DEQUAE André LEYNEN Hubert SCHUGENS Willy de STEXHE Paul TANGHE Francis	Socialist PLP Chr. Soc. Chr. Soc. Socialist Chr. Soc. Chr. Soc.
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Substitutes

MM. BREYNE Gustave de BRUYNE Hektor DUVIEUSART Etienne Mrs. GODINACHE-LAMBERT Marie-Thérèse MM. HULPIAU Raphaël PLASMAN Marcel VAN HOEYLANDT D. Bernard	Socialist Volksunie FDF-RW PLP Chr. Soc. Chr. Soc. Socialist
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FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BOUCHENY Serge BOULLOCHE André BRUGNON Maurice BURCKEL Jean-Claude CERMOLACCE Paul CERNEAU Marcel DELORME Claude GRANGIER Edouard KAUFFMANN Michel NESSLER Edmond President of the Assembly PÉRIDIÉ Jean PÉRONNET Gabriel RADIUS René RIVIÈRE Paul SCHLEITER François SCHMITT Robert VALLEIX Jean VITTER Pierre	Communist Socialist Socialist UDR Communist Centre Union Socialist Dem. Left UCDP UDR Socialist Soc. Dem. Ref. UDR UDR Ind. Rep. UDR (App.) UDR Ind. Rep.
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Substitutes

MM. BEAUGUITTE André BELIN Gilbert BIZET Émile BOURGEOIS Georges CROZE Pierre DAILLET Jean-Marie DEPIETRI César FORNI Raymond GRUSSENMEYER François JEAMBRUN Pierre LA COMBE René	Ind. Rep. Socialist UDR (App.) UDR Ind. Rep. Soc. Dem. Ref. Communist Socialist UDR Dem. Left UDR
---	---

MM. du LUART Ladislas
 MÉNARD Jacques
 PIGNION Lucien
 ROGER Émile
 SOUSTELLE Jacques
 VADEPIED Raoul
 WEBER Pierre

RIAS
 Ind. Rep.
 Socialist
 Communist
 Non-party
 UCDP
 Ind. Rep. (App.)

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl ALBER Siegbert AMREHN Franz DREGGER Alfred ENDERS Wendelin GESSNER Manfred KEMPFER Friedrich LEMMRICH Karl Heinz MARQUARDT Werner MATTICK Kurt MENDE Erich MÜLLER Günther RICHTER Klaus SCHMIDT Hansheinrich SCHWENCKE Olaf SIEGLERSCHMIDT Hellmut VOHRER Manfred Mrs. WOLF Erika	SPD CDU/CSU CDU/CSU CDU/CSU SPD SPD CDU/CSU CDU/CSU SPD SPD CDU/CSU CDU/CSU FDP SPD SPD FDP CDU/CSU
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Substitutes

Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte MM. BÜCHNER Peter CARSTENS Karl GÖLTER Georg HAASE Horst HOLTZ Uwe KLEPSCH Egon KLIESING Georg LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans LENZER Christian OPITZ Rudolf PAWELCZYK Alfons SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang SCHULTE Manfred WALTHER Rudi WENDE Manfred WÖRNER Manfred WURBS Richard	SPD SPD CDU/CSU CDU/CSU SPD SPD CDU/CSU CDU/CSU FDP SPD CDU/CSU SPD SPD SPD CDU/CSU FDP
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ITALY

Representatives

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BOLDRINI Arrigo	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CORALLO Salvatore	Communist
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
GONELLA Guido	Chr. Dem.
MAGGIONI Desiderio	Chr. Dem.
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
ORSINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
ROBERTI Giovanni	MSI-DN
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SEGRE Sergio	Communist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

Mrs. AGNELLI Susanna	Republican
MM. ANTONI Varese	Communist
ARIOSTO Egidio	PSDI
AVELLONE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BORGHI Luigi	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DEL DUCA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FACCIO Adele	Radical
MM. GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
Mrs. PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina	Communist
MM. PINTO Biagio	Republican
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
ROSSI Raffaele	Communist
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SGHERRI Evaristo	Communist
TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko	MSI-DN
URSO Salvatore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Chr. Soc.
MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Chr. Soc.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	Pop. Cath.
DANKERT Pieter	Labour
de NIET Maarten	Labour
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
REIJNEN Johannes	Pop. Cath.
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	Anti-Revolut.
VOOGD Joop	Labour

Substitutes

MM. van KLEEF Dik	Radical
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
van OOIJEN David	Labour
PEIJNENBURG Marinus	Pop. Cath.
PIKET Frederik	Chr. Hist.
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Ronald BROWN	Labour
Paul CHANNON	Conservative
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH	Labour
MM. John FARR	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
John HUNT	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
John MENDELSON	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord PEDDIE	Labour
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
Thomas URWIN	Labour
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour

Substitutes

Mr. Gordon BAGIER	Labour
Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Antony BUCK	Conservative
John CORDLE	Conservative
Jim CRAIGEN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
Sir Harwood HARRISON	Conservative
Mr. Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
MM. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Kevin McNAMARA	Labour
Dr. Colin PHIPPS	Labour
Lord SELSDON	Conservative
Mrs. Ann TAYLOR	Labour
Lord WALLACE of COSLAN	Labour
MM. Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
John WATKINSON	Labour

AGENDA
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session
Paris, 29th November-2nd December 1976

I. Political Questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. European union and WEU | <i>Report tabled by Mr. de Bruyne on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Burckel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

II. Defence Questions

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. European security and East-West relations | <i>Report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. Anti-submarine warfare | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

III. Technical and Scientific Questions

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. European oceanographic activities | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Craigen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Cornelissen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |

IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 3. Financial Regulations of the Assembly — Amendment of Article 9 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |

V. Relations with Parliaments

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| Relations with parliaments | <i>Information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments</i> |
|----------------------------|---|

ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session
Paris, 29th November-2nd December 1976

MONDAY, 29th NOVEMBER

Morning 9 a.m.

Meeting of the British Conservatives.

10 a.m.

Meeting of the Federated Christian Democrat Group and British Conservatives.

10.30 a.m.

Meeting of the Socialist Group.

Meeting of the Liberal Group.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the Session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session.
5. Votes on the draft recommendations postponed from the last session :
 - (a) Détente and security in Europe :
Vote on the draft recommendation in Document 703 presented by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
 - (b) Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today :
Vote on the draft recommendation in Document 711 presented by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
6. European union and WEU :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Bruyne on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

At the close of the sitting

Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

TUESDAY, 30th NOVEMBER

Morning 9.30 a.m.

Meeting of the General Affairs Committee.

10 a.m.

1. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
3. Financial Regulations of the Assembly — Amendment of Article 9 :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Votes on the draft texts.

10.30 a.m.

4. Address by Mr. Taittinger, Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
5. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Burckel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

11.30 a.m.

6. Address by Mr. Stavropoulos, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece.
Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems :
Resumed debate.
2. European oceanographic activities :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Craigen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

WEDNESDAY, 1st DECEMBER

Morning 9 a.m.

Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

10 a.m.

1. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cornelissen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

11.30 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.

3. Relations with Parliaments :

presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

At the close of the sitting

Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. European security and East-West relations :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

3.30 p.m.

2. Address by Mr. Duffy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom.

4 p.m.

3. Address by Mr. Feyzioglu, Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey.

4. *Votes on the draft recommendations not already voted upon by the Assembly.*

THURSDAY, 2nd DECEMBER**Morning 10 a.m.**

1. Anti-submarine warfare :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

11 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Wischniewski, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

3. Anti-submarine warfare :

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION

**Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly
for the Financial Year 1975**

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1975.

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE AUDITOR OF THE ASSEMBLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1975.

APPENDICES

- Appendix I : Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1975. Financial position as at 31st December 1975.
- Appendix II : Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1975.
- Appendix III : Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, in respect of contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1975.
- Appendix IV : Provident Fund — Account for the financial year ended 31st December 1975.

**Report of the external Auditor
to the Assembly
of Western European Union
on the accounts for the financial year 1975**

General

1. The following financial statements, together with an explanatory memorandum, were submitted to me by the President :

- (a) Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1975 and financial position as at 31st December 1975 (Appendix I).
- (b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1975 (showing also transfers between sub-heads) (Appendix II).

(c) Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of Western European Union, London, in respect of contributions to the Assembly of Western European Union budget for 1975 (Appendix III).

(d) Account of the provident fund for the financial year ended 31st December 1975 (Appendix IV).

2. My examination of the accounts has been carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

*Summary of Income and Expenditure
(Appendix I)*

3. The approved original budget provided for expenditure of F 6,100,000 of which F 35,000

was expected to be covered by miscellaneous receipts.

4. In paragraph 5 of his report on the accounts for 1974 my predecessor recorded that, although Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly required the surplus of F 161,748 for 1974 to be reimbursed to the Council of Western European Union, the Council's Budget and Organisation Committee were considering whether the Assembly should exceptionally be allowed to carry forward to 1975 unexpended credits which would be required to meet retrospective increases in staff salaries and allowances relating to 1974. The Council agreed to this procedure in July 1975 and subsequently approved a revised budget for the Assembly of F 6,213,644 which included F 113,644 to meet the retrospective increases in staff salaries and allowances. The remainder of the 1974 surplus, F 48,104, has been reimbursed to the Council.

5. In 1975 total income was F 6,268,081 of which F 6,065,000 came from contributions requested and received, F 113,644 from the 1974 surplus and F 89,437 from miscellaneous receipts. Expenditure amounted to F 5,711,267, leaving a surplus for the year of F 556,814 made up of a budgetary surplus of F 502,377 (as shown in Appendix II) and extra miscellaneous receipts of F 54,437.

Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits

(Appendix II)

6. The transfers between sub-heads within the same head of the budget, shown in this statement, were duly authorised in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations.

Provident fund

(Appendix IV)

7. The assets of the provident fund of the Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of the provident funds of the other organs of Western European Union in joint deposits held in a number of currencies and administered by the Office of the Secretary-General. On the advice of an Advisory Panel representing all the

interested parties, the number of currencies held was reduced during 1975 from six to three.

8. In accordance with a decision taken in 1974 by the Office of the Secretary-General the balances on the accounts of staff members of the Assembly record the book value of the Assembly's share of the joint deposits and do not reflect differences between book and market values. At 31st December 1975 the total book value of the balances was F 4,091,098, which includes F 130,139 in the accounts of two former members of the staff which were awaiting repayment. The actual repayments due in these two cases to be made in 1976, total F 127,853 and the difference of F 2,286 between the book and market values will be charged in the provident fund account for 1976.

9. I have received from the Office of the Secretary-General a certificate by the depositary showing the amount of the joint deposits held at 31st December 1975 and a statement confirming the share of those deposits standing to the credit of the Assembly's provident fund in the Office's books at 31st December 1975. A valuation of the currencies held in the joint deposits at that date showed a loss on book value of some F 265,000 of which F 62,146 related to the accounts of the staff of the Assembly.

10. I wish to record my appreciation of the willing co-operation of the officers of the Assembly during my audit.

Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B.

*(Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom)*

External Auditor

10th June 1976

Explanatory Memorandum

(communicated by the President to the Auditor of the Assembly in connection with the financial year 1975)

1. The statements attached hereto refer to :
 - (a) Summary of income and expenditure — financial position as at 31st December 1975 (Appendix I) ;

(b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II) ;

(c) Contributions (Appendix III) ;

(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits indicates that a sum of F 502,377 remains unexpended, whereas the final balance of income over expenditure was F 556,814. The difference between these two figures, F 54,437, represents :

	F	F
— Bank interest	65,878	
— Sundry receipts	10,216	
— Sale of publications ..	13,343	
		89,437
— Less receipts for 1975 estimated in the bud- get		35,000
		<u>54,437</u>

3. On 15th October 1975 the Council approved the transfer to the budget for 1975 of F 113,644 relating to unexpended salary credits in the 1974 accounts of the Assembly¹. This amount related to increases in salaries of the permanent staff following the 1974 general review of emoluments.

Transfers

4. Excess expenditure amounting to F 29,860

¹. See Document CB (75) 6.

has been met by transfer between sub-heads within heads.

Contributions

5. All contributions were received from the Secretary-General WEU London before 31st December 1975.

Provident fund

6. The Assembly's funds are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the entire fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

7. The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of the funds. These are at present held in United States dollars, French francs and pounds sterling with the International Westminster Bank Ltd., London.

8. The balance of the fund on 31st December 1975, as shown in Appendix IV, was F 4,091,098. Interest was distributed to individual accounts on 31st December 1975.

9. The President would like to take this opportunity of expressing the appreciation of the Assembly for the help which was extended to the Office of the Clerk by the United Kingdom Comptroller and Auditor General.

Edmond NESSLER

President of the Assembly

3rd May 1976

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1975

(in French francs)

Per attached statement

Assessments of member States (see Appendix III)	6,065,000	
Transfer of credits from 1974 to 1975.....	113,644	
		6,178,644
<i>Miscellaneous</i>		
Bank interest	65,878	
Sundry receipts	10,216	
Sale of publications	13,343	
		89,437
		6,268,081
Expenditure under budget authorisation (see Appendix II).....		5,711,267
Excess of income over expenditure		F 556,814

Financial position as at 31st December 1975*Assets*

Cash at bank	615,848	
Sundry advances	73,143	
Accounts receivable	88,940	
		777,931

*Less:**Liabilities*

Accounts payable	221,117	
Excess of income over expenditure	556,814	
		F 777,931

Certified correct :

Edmond NESSLER
President of the Assembly

Francis HUMBLET
Clerk of the Assembly

André DEQUAE
*Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing Summary of Income and Expenditure and the Statement of Assets and Liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these Statements are correct.

Signed : Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B.
*Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom
External Auditor*

10th June 1976

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE AND

DETAILS	Total budget for 1975 ¹
HEAD I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF	
<i>Sub-Head 1</i> (a) Salaries of permanent establishment	2,594,078
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and French social security	8,000
<i>Sub-Head 2</i> Allowances, social charges, etc.	
(A) Allowances	
(a) Household allowance	90,861
(b) Children's allowance	122,847
(c) Expatriation allowance	227,321
(d) Compensatory rent allowance	14,618
(e) Overtime	18,517
(f) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-French staff	—
(g) Education allowance	28,990
(h) Allowance for language courses	2,000
(B) Social charges	
(a) Social security	164,078
(b) Supplementary insurance	104,022
(c) Provident fund	349,312
(d) Retirement pension	—
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials	
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers	1,600
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons	1,500
(c) Removal expenses	3,000
(d) Installation allowance	4,500
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials	6,000
(f) Medical examination	2,400
Total of Head I	3,743,644

1. Documents 648, A/WEU/CP (75) 8 revised and CB (75) 6.

DIX II

UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1975

Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-			
	17,991	2,576,087	2,476,017	100,070
755		8,755	8,755	—
		90,861	85,540	5,321
4,961		127,808	127,808	—
		227,321	208,771	18,550
		14,618	4,347	10,271
		18,517	6,617	11,900
12,275		41,265	41,265	—
		2,000	510	1,490
		164,078	157,396	6,682
		104,022	94,816	9,206
		349,312	334,033	15,279
29		1,629	1,629	—
	29	1,471	252	1,219
		3,000	—	3,000
		4,500	3,549	951
		6,000	4,613	1,387
		2,400	1,763	637
18,020	18,020	3,743,644	3,557,681	185,963

DETAILS	Total budget for 1975
HEAD II - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i> 1. <i>Temporary staff</i>	
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly	335,000
2. <i>Linguistic staff</i>	
(A) <i>Interpretation services</i>	
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly	130,000
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of Committees between sessions	120,000
(B) <i>Translation services</i>	
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly	264,000
3. <i>Insurance for temporary staff</i>	4,000
4. <i>Installation of equipment and hire of offices for the sessions</i>	70,000
5. <i>Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions</i>	28,000
Total of Head II	951,000
HEAD III - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT	
<i>Sub-Head 4</i> Premises	143,000
<i>Sub-Head 5</i> Capital equipment	10,000
Total of Head III	153,000

APPENDIX II

Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-			
		335,000	271,210	63,790
		130,000	127,341	2,659
	4,978	115,022	88,214	26,808
4,978		268,978	268,978	—
		4,000	3,415	585
		70,000	68,831	1,169
		28,000	20,906	7,094
4,978	4,978	951,000	848,895	102,105
	2,793	140,207	100,960	39,247
2,793		12,793	12,793	—
2,793	2,793	153,000	113,753	39,247

DETAILS		Total budget for 1975
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS		
<i>Sub-Head 6</i>	Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents	223,000
<i>Sub-Head 7</i>	Paper, stationery and office supplies	118,000
<i>Sub-Head 8</i>	Printing and publishing of Assembly documents	620,000
<i>Sub-Head 9</i>	Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	18,500
<i>Sub-Head 10</i>	Official car	20,000
<i>Sub-Head 11</i>	Bank charges	500
Total of Head IV		1,000,000
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE		
<i>Sub-Head 12</i>	Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs	55,000
<i>Sub-Head 13</i>	Expenses for representation and receptions	75,000
<i>Sub-Head 14</i>	Committee study missions	2,000
<i>Sub-Head 15</i>	Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	161,000
<i>Sub-Head 16</i>	Expenses of experts and the auditor	18,000
<i>Sub-Head 17</i>	Expenditure on information	30,000
<i>Sub-Head 18</i>	Expenses for groups of the Assembly	15,000
<i>Sub-Head 19</i>	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000
<i>Sub-Head 20</i>	Non-recoverable taxes	7,000
Total of Head V		366,000
TOTAL		6,213,644

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1975, and

Edmond NESSLER
President of the Assembly

Francis
Clerk of the

Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-			
		223,000	178,968	44,032
		118,000	97,969	20,031
		620,000	596,277	23,723
		18,500	17,891	609
	288	19,712	13,825	5,887
288		788	788	—
288	288	1,000,000	905,718	94,282
		51,219	21,837	29,382
	3,781	78,781	78,781	—
		2,000	—	2,000
		161,000	123,876	37,124
		18,000	17,600	400
		30,000	24,760	5,240
		15,000	13,988	1,012
		3,000	795	2,205
		7,000	3,583	3,417
3,781	3,781	366,000	285,220	80,780
29,860	29,860	6,213,644	5,711,267	502,377

paid for up to 31st March 1976, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

HUMBLET
Assembly

André DEQUAE
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration

APPENDIX III

**STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY
BUDGET FOR 1975**

Member States	600ths	Budget (surplus) from 1974	Main budget (revised) for 1975	2nd revised budget for 1975	Net contributions required
		F	F	F	F
Belgium	59	(15,905)	596,392	11,175	591,662
France	120	(32,350)	1,213,000	22,729	1,203,379
Federal Republic of Germany	120	(32,350)	1,213,000	22,729	1,203,379
Italy	120	(32,350)	1,213,000	22,729	1,203,379
Luxembourg	2	(538)	20,216	378	20,056
Netherlands	59	(15,905)	596,392	11,175	591,662
United Kingdom	120	(32,350)	1,213,000	22,729	1,203,379
	600	(161,748)	6,065,000	113,644	6,016,896

APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1975

	F		F
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1975	3,317,552	Withdrawals	17,195
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	501,049	Loans to staff members	109,000
Repayments of loans by staff members	138,150	<i>Balances carried forward :</i>	
Interest received during year	260,542	Accounts of former staff members awaiting settlement at 31st December 1975	130,139
		Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1975	3,960,959
	4,217,293		4,217,293

Edmond NESSLER

President of the Assembly

Francis HUMBLET

Clerk of the Assembly

André DEQUAE

*Chairman of the Committee on
 Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing Statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion this Statement is correct.

Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B.

*Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom
 External Auditor*

10th June 1976

*Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly
for the Financial Year 1975*

**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1975¹**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1975, together with the Auditor's Report, in accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Dequae (Chairman); Lord Selodon (Vice-Chairman); MM. Ahrens, Alber, de Bruyne (Substitute: *Adriaensens*), Castellucci, Croze, Depietri, Hengel (Substitute: *Margue*), Kaufmann, de Koster, Lewis, Moneti, Page, Lord Peddie, MM. Prearo,

Schleiter (Substitute: *Schmitt*, Vice-Chairman), Talamona, Vohrer, Waltmans (Substitute: *Voogd*), Mrs. Wolf (Substitute: *Kempfler*).

Also present: Sir John Rodgers.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Amendment of Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly

REPORT ¹

**submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur**

Draft Resolution

to amend Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly

The Assembly,

DECIDES to amend paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly to read as follows :

“If payment of a commitment for the previous year has not been made before 1st April, the credits concerned shall be cancelled automatically and corresponding credits will be taken up in the budget of the current financial year.

Such action shall be submitted to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration for approval and then brought to the attention of the Council.”

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur)

Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly lays down that :

“Credits unexpired at the end of the financial year shall remain available until 31st March of the ensuing year in order to discharge liabilities in respect of supplies furnished, services rendered, or other charges incurred up to the previous 31st December and for which payment has not been made.

Any such credits remaining unexpended on 1st April of the ensuing financial year shall be cancelled and reimbursed to the Council.”

During the current financial year, certain expenditure relating to increased salaries for permanent staff of the Assembly in respect of the financial year 1974 could not be made until after 1st April 1975.

For this purpose, the Council had to grant the Assembly exceptional authorisation to carry over the sums corresponding to these increases from one financial year to another.

Recourse to this procedure could be avoided in future if the Assembly's Financial Regulations contained a provision similar to that in the

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Dequae (Chairman) ; Lord Selkirk (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Ahrens, Alber, de Bruyne (Substitute : *Adriaensens*), Castellucci, Croze, Depietri, Hengel (Substitute : *Margue*), Kauffmann, de Koster, Lewis, Moneti, Page, Lord Peddie, MM. Prearo,

Schleiter (Substitute : *Schmitt*, Vice-Chairman), Talamona, Vohrer, Waltmans (Substitute : *Voogd*), Mrs. Wolf (Substitute : *Kempfler*).

Also present : Sir John Rodgers.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Financial Regulations of the ministerial organs of WEU, i.e. :

“If payment of a commitment for the previous year has not been made before 1st April, the credits concerned shall be cancelled automatically and corresponding credits will be taken up in the budget of the current financial year. Such action shall be regularised by notification to the Budget Committee.”

The Committee therefore proposes that the Assembly include in its Financial Regulations a provision based on the above text but adapted to the statutes of the parliamentary side of WEU.

The last sentence of this paragraph should thus be worded as follows :

“Such action shall be submitted to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-

tration for approval and then brought to the attention of the Council.”

In conclusion, the Committee proposes that Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly be amended in accordance with the following text :

The first two paragraphs are unchanged.

Third paragraph :

“If payment of a commitment for the previous year has not been made before 1st April, the credits concerned shall be cancelled automatically and corresponding credits will be taken up in the budget of the current financial year.

Such action shall be submitted to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration for approval and then brought to the attention of the Council.”

**BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1977¹**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1977
Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads
Explanatory Memorandum

Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1977

Details	Estimate for 1977 F
<i>Head I</i> : Expenditure for staff	4,373,000
<i>Head II</i> : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel	1,205,000
<i>Head III</i> : Expenditure on premises and equipment	248,000
<i>Head IV</i> : General administrative costs	1,107,000
<i>Head V</i> : Other expenditure	368,000
<i>Head VI</i> : Pensions	pro mem.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	7,301,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS	65,000
NET TOTAL	7,236,000

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and approved unanimously by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Dequae (Chairman) ; Lord Selsdon (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Ahrens, Alber, de Bruyne (Substitute : *Adriaensens*), Castellucci, Croze, Depietri, Hengel (Substitute : *Margue*), Kauffmann,

de Koster, Lewis, Moneti, Page, Lord Peddie, MM. Prearo, Schleiter (Substitute : *Schmitt*, Vice-Chairman), Talamona, Vohrer, Waltmans (Substitute : *Voogd*), Mrs. Wolf (Substitute : *Kempfler*).

Also present : Sir John Rodgers.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads

Details	Estimate for 1977 F
Head I — EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF	
Sub-Head 1: Salaries of permanent establishment	3,040,000
Sub-Head 2: (A) Allowances	565,000
(B) Social charges	748,000
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials	20,000
TOTAL OF HEAD I	4,373,000
Head II — EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY	
Sub-Head 3: 1. Temporary staff	366,000
2. Linguistic staff	636,000
3. Insurance for temporary staff	5,000
4. Installation of equipment for sessions	158,000
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions	40,000
TOTAL OF HEAD II	1,205,000
Head III — EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT	
Sub-Head 4: Premises	165,000
Sub-Head 5: Capital equipment	83,000
TOTAL OF HEAD III	248,000
Head IV — GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS	
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents, typewriters, etc.	250,000
Sub-Head 7: Paper, stationery and office supplies	135,000
Sub-Head 8: Printing and publishing of Assembly documents	680,000
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	19,500
Sub-Head 10: Official cars	22,000
Sub-Head 11: Bank charges	500
TOTAL OF HEAD IV	1,107,000
Head V — OTHER EXPENDITURE	
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for Chairmen of Committees, Rapporteurs and Represent- atives attending meetings of the Bureau, Presidential Committee and joint meetings	55,000
Sub-Head 13: Expenses for representation and receptions	90,000
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions	3,000
Sub-Head 15: Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	140,000
Sub-Head 16: Expenses of experts and the auditors	22,000
Sub-Head 17: Expenditure on information	33,000
Sub-Head 18: Expenses for groups of the Assembly	15,000
Sub-Head 19: Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000
Sub-Head 20: Non-recoverable taxes	7,000
TOTAL OF HEAD V	368,000
Head VI — PENSIONS	
Sub-Head 21: (A) Pensions	Pro mem.
(B) Allowances	Pro mem.
(C) Severance grant	Pro mem.
(D) Payments to member States for validation	Pro mem.

Head I — Expenditure for Staff**Sub-Head 1****SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT***Estimate : F 3,040,000***(a) Basic salaries***Estimate : F 3,030,000*

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
The Clerk	Hors cadre	1	107,000
The Clerk Assistant	Hors cadre	1	191,000
Counsellors.....	A5	5	936,000
First Secretaries	A4	2	322,000
Secretary	A3	1	136,000
Secretaries-Translators/Publications	A2	3	322,000
Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator			
Chief Accountant	B6	1	106,000
Personal Assistants	B4	4	312,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	6	376,000
Switchboard Operator	B3	1	67,000
Head Roneo-Storekeeper	C6	1	63,000
Messengers	C3	2	92,000
		28	3,030,000

**(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C),
including travelling expenses and French social security**

Estimate : F 10,000

Sub-Head 2

ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

(A) ALLOWANCES

Estimate : F 565,000

(a) Household allowance

Estimate : F 105,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Clerk Assistant	Hors cadre	1	12,000
Counsellors.....	A5	4	45,000
First Secretary	A4	1	9,000
Secretary	A3	1	8,000
Personal Assistants	B4	3	14,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	3	11,000
Messenger.....	C3	2	6,000
		15	105,000

(b) Children's allowance

*Estimate : F 145,000*5,000 F per year per child : $5,000 \times 29$ F 145,000

(c) Expatriation allowance

Estimate : F 251,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Counsellors.....	A5	3	107,000
First Secretary	A4	1	32,000
Secretary	A3	1	28,000
Secretary-Translator / Publications Administrative Assistant / Assistant Translator	A2	2	34,000
Personal Assistants	B4	2	29,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	2	21,000
		11	251,000

(d) Compensatory rent allowance

Estimate : F 10,000

(e) Overtime

Estimate : F 14,000

(f)

(g) Education allowance

Estimate : F 38,000

(h) Allowance for language courses

Estimate : F 2,000

(B) SOCIAL CHARGES*Estimate* : F 748,000

(a) Social Security	<i>Estimate</i> : F 215,000
27 officials	F 215,000
(b) Supplementary insurance	<i>Estimate</i> : F 123,000
3.55 % of total emoluments × 3,472,000 F	F 123,000
(c) Provident fund	<i>Estimate</i> : F 410,000
14 % of basic salaries × 2,923,000 F	F 410,000

(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS*Estimate* : F 20,000

(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and cost of marking examination papers	<i>Estimate</i> : F 1,600
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons	<i>Estimate</i> : F 1,500
(c) Removal expenses	<i>Estimate</i> : F 3,000
(d) Installation allowance	<i>Estimate</i> : F 4,500
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials	<i>Estimate</i> : F 7,000
(f) Medical examination	<i>Estimate</i> : F 2,400

Head II — Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly*Estimate* : F 1,205,000**Sub-Head 3****1. TEMPORARY STAFF****Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly**

Function	Paris : 10 days		
	Daily remuneration F	No.	Total F
Head of the sittings office	420	1 <i>a</i>	6,300
Heads of sections	320	2 <i>a</i>	26,600
	420	4 <i>b</i>	
Sergeant-at-Arms	365	1 <i>b</i>	4,400
Secretaries for the Assembly	300	2 <i>a</i>	14,600
	365	2 <i>b</i>	
Précis writers	300	4 <i>a</i>	29,200
	365	4 <i>b</i>	
Verbatim reporters	365	14 <i>b</i>	78,500
	465	4 <i>c</i>	
Assistants	235	4 <i>b</i>	100,500
	225	23 <i>b</i>	
	175	6 <i>a</i>	
	160	10 <i>a</i>	
Head ushers	110	2 <i>a</i>	2,700
Ushers	100	16 <i>a</i>	17,600
Roneo /Assemblers	100	18 <i>a</i>	18,000
		117	298,400

a. Recruited locally.*b.* Recruited outside France.*c.* Recruited as free-lance staff.

Travelling expenses F 67,600

366,000

2. LINGUISTIC STAFF

(A) Interpretation Services

(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	10 days	
	No.	Total F
Interpreters	12	154,000
	12	

Travelling expenses F 11,000
 F 165,000

(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions F 150,000

(B) Translation Services

Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	Daily remuneration F	No.	Estimate ¹ F
Revisers	430	2 a	118,000
	668	4 b	
Translators	333	4 a	117,000
	544	4 b	
Assistants	175	4 a	77,000
	235	3 b	
	160	3 a	
	225	2 b	
		26	312,000

1. Based on 32 days for the revisers and translators.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside France.

Travelling expenses F 9,000
 F 321,000

3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate : F 5,000

4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS

— Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment	F 128,000
— Installation of telephone booths	F 13,000
— Installation of tape-recorders and a teleprinter "France-Presse" for the Press Service	F 10,000
— Technicians necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation equipment in the WEU committee rooms	F 7,000

Estimate : F 158,000

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS

— Removal expenses	F 5,000
— Medical Service (Doctor and Nurse)	F 5,000
— Hire of typewriters and technicians	F 4,000
— Servicing of lifts	F 8,000
— Cleaning	F 6,000
— Miscellaneous	F 12,000

Estimate : F 40,000

Head III — Expenditure on premises and equipment

Estimate : F 248,000

Sub-Head 4

PREMISES

— Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment	F 8,000
— Technician necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation equipment in the WEU committee rooms between sessions	F 4,000
— Joint overheads for the premises	F 145,000
— Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture	F 8,000

Estimate : F 165,000

Sub-Head 5

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

— Replacement of 3 electric typewriters	F 12,000
— Purchase of an assembling machine.....	F 61,000
— Replacement of arm chairs and typists' chairs.....	F 10,000
	<i>Estimate</i> : F 83,000

*Head IV — General administrative costs**Estimate* : F 1,107,000*Sub-Head 6*

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

— Postage	F 150,000
— Telephone.....	F 80,000
— Telegrams.....	F 6,000
— Transport of documents	F 14,000
	<i>Estimate</i> : F 250,000

Sub-Head 7

PAPER, STATIONERY AND OFFICE SUPPLIES

— Purchase of roneo paper, stencils, headed writing paper and other office supplies	<i>Estimate</i> : F 135,000
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Sub-Head 8

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

— Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of debates, minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents)	<i>Estimate</i> : F 680,000
— Printing of Reports of the Council	
— Printing of Texts Adopted	
— Miscellaneous — Bulletins, printing of the Agenda and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc.	
— Reprints	
— Brochures	

Sub-Head 9

PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

Estimate : F 19,500

Sub-Head 10
OFFICIAL CARS

— Hire of official cars

Estimate : F 22,000

Sub-Head 11
BANK CHARGES

Estimate : F 500

Head V — Other expenditure

Estimate : F 368,000

Sub-Head 12
TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY,
CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPORTEURS

Estimate : F 55,000

Sub-Head 13
EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate : F 90,000

Sub-Head 14
COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate : F 3,000

Sub-Head 15
OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate : F 140,000

Sub-Head 16
EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOR

Estimate : F 22,000

Sub-Head 17
EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate : F 33,000

Sub-Head 18
EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate : F 15,000

Sub-Head 19
CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate : F 3,000

Sub-Head 20
NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate : F 7,000

Head VI — Pensions*Sub-Head 21*

PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC.

(A) *Pensions**Estimate* : pro mem.

- (a) Retirement pension *Estimate* : pro mem.
 (b) Invalidity pension *Estimate* : pro mem.
 (c) Survivors' pension *Estimate* : pro mem.
 (d) Orphans' pension *Estimate* : pro mem.

(B) *Allowances**Estimate* : pro mem.

- (a) Household allowance *Estimate* : pro mem.
 (b) Dependants' allowance *Estimate* : pro mem.
 (c) Education allowance *Estimate* : pro mem.
 (d) Relief allowance *Estimate* : pro mem.

(C) *Severance grant**Estimate* : pro mem.(D) *Payments to member States for validation**Estimate* : pro mem.**Income**(A) *Sundry receipts*

- (a) Sale of publications F 15,000
 (b) Bank interest F 40,000
 (c) Social security reimbursements F 10,000
Estimate : F 65,000

(B) *Pensions*

- (a) Contributions (7 %) *Estimate* : pro mem.
 (b) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.). *Estimate* : pro mem.
 (c) Validation receipts from the provident fund and interest to
 30th June 1974 *Estimate* : pro mem.
 (d) Provident fund contributions and interest since 1st July 1974 *Estimate* : pro mem.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 7,256,000. The budget for 1976 amounted to F 6,559,000. The difference is therefore F 697,000, i.e. 10.63 %.

2. *Head I — Expenditure for staff*

The increase (F 434,000) in the estimate for this head takes account of :

- (i) the effect over a full year of increases granted in 1976 in basic salaries and payments to the provident fund, expatriation and household allowances and contributions in respect of supplementary insurance ;
- (ii) annual increments ;
- (iii) two further increases of 5 %, one in January 1977 and the other in July 1977, i.e. an increase of 7.50 % over a full year.

3. *Head II — Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly*

Sub-head 3.1 — Temporary staff

The estimated increase is F 35,000.

Salaries for temporary staff follow the scales applied in the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. In accordance with the decision of the Budget Committee of the Council, the WEU Assembly applies automatically, in the course of the year, all increases in salary scales as and when they are applied by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.

Sub-head 3.2 (A) — Interpretation services

The increase (F 34,000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes into account probable increases in the scales applied by the co-ordinated organisations in respect of salaries and daily allowances payable to interpreters.

Sub-head 3.2 (B) — Translation services

The increase (F 45,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the scales applied in the Council of Europe and to the fact that the recruitment of translators, revisers and assistants has been calculated on a basis of thirty-two days instead of thirty.

Sub-head 3.4 — Installation of equipment for the sessions

The increase (F 11,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increased cost of installing equipment needed for two part-sessions held in Paris.

Sub-head 3.5 — Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions

The increase (F 6,000) in the estimate for this sub-head, covering two part-sessions held in Paris, is to meet certain expenses affected by the rise in the cost of living.

4. *Head III — Expenditure on premises and equipment*

Sub-head 4 — Premises

The increase (F 12,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is to meet the higher cost of maintenance for the premises at 43, avenue du Président Wilson.

Sub-head 5 — Capital equipment

The sum of F 26,000 is for the replacement of an assembling machine which the Council had asked the Assembly to defer when the 1976 budget was being prepared. It is also planned to replace three typewriters purchased in 1971 and chairs purchased in 1962 which are now in a very poor condition.

5. *Head IV — General administrative costs*

Sub-head 7 — Paper, stationery and office supplies

The increase (F 10,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increased cost of paper and office supplies.

Sub-head 8 — Printing and publishing of Assembly documents

The increase (F 60,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to increased printing costs.

Sub-head 9 — Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.

The increase (F 1,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the increased cost of subscriptions to newspapers, periodicals and reference works.

6. *Head V — Other expenditure*

Sub-head 13 — Expenses for representation and receptions

The increase (F 10,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices

Sub-head 15 — Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk

The increase (F 15,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to an increase in travelling expenses and daily allowances expected in 1977.

Sub-head 16 — Expenses of experts and the auditors

The increase (F 2,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in fees payable to the auditor and experts.

Sub-head 17 — Expenditure on information

The increase (F 3,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increased cost of living.

7. *Head VI — Pensions*

This head has been opened pro mem. in order to take account of decisions to be taken in 1977 concerning pensions.

Sundry receipts

Expected receipts in 1977 include :

- (i) sale of publications ;
- (ii) bank interest ;
- (iii) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave ;
- (iv) income resulting from the entry into force of the pension scheme in 1977.

Head I — Expenditure for Staff*Sub-Head 1***SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT****(a) Basic salaries**

Estimate for 1977	F 3,030,000
Budget for 1976	F 2,725,000
Net increase	F 305,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2.

(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and French social security

Estimate for 1977	F 10,000
Budget for 1976	F 9,000
Net increase	F 1,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of increased rates payable to temporary staff.

*Sub-Head 2***ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.****(A) ALLOWANCES****(a) Household allowance**

Estimate for 1977	F 105,000
Budget for 1976	F 95,000
Net increase.....	F 10,000

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

(b) Children's allowance

Estimate for 1977	F 145,000
Budget for 1976	F 132,000
Net increase.....	F 13,000

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

(c) Expatriation allowance

Estimate for 1977	F 251,000
Budget for 1976	F 234,000
Net increase.....	F 17,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the allowance.

(d) Compensatory rent allowance

Estimate for 1977	F 10,000
Budget for 1976	F 10,000
Estimate unchanged	

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of officials qualifying for an allowance.

(e) Overtime

Estimate for 1977	F	14,000
Budget for 1976	F	14,000
		Estimate unchanged

(f)

(g) Education allowance

Estimate for 1977	F	38,000
Budget for 1976	F	38,000
		Estimate unchanged

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

(h) Allowance for language courses

Estimate for 1977	F	2,000
Budget for 1976	F	2,000
		Estimate unchanged

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

(B) SOCIAL CHARGES

(a) Social security

Estimate for 1977	F	215,000
Budget for 1976	F	180,000
		<u>Net increase.....</u>
	F	35,000

(b) Supplementary insurance

Estimate for 1977	F	123,000
Budget for 1976	F	112,000
		<u>Net increase</u>
	F	11,000

This calculation is based on 3.55 % of total emoluments.

(c) Provident Fund

Estimate for 1977	F	410,000
Budget for 1976	F	368,000
		<u>Net increase</u>
	F	42,000

This calculation is based on 14 % of basic salaries.

(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS

(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers

Estimate for 1977	F	1,600
Budget for 1976	F	1,600
		Estimate unchanged

(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons

Estimate for 1977	F	1,500
Budget for 1976	F	1,500
Estimate unchanged		

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

(c) Removal expenses

Estimate for 1977	F	3,000
Budget for 1976	F	3,000
Estimate unchanged		

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

(d) Installation allowance

Estimate for 1977	F	4,500
Budget for 1976	F	4,500
Estimate unchanged		

Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements.

(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials

Estimate for 1977	F	7,000
Budget for 1976	F	7,000
Estimate unchanged		

Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1977.

(f) Medical examination

Estimate for 1977	F	2,400
Budget for 1976	F	2,400
Estimate unchanged		

Head II — Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly**Sub-Head 3****1. TEMPORARY STAFF****Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly**

Estimate for 1977	F	366,000
Budget for 1976	F	331,000
		Net increase
		F 35,000

The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

2. LINGUISTIC STAFF**(A) Interpretation Services****(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly**

Estimate for 1977	F 165,000
Budget for 1976	<u>F 151,000</u>
Net increase.....	F 14,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions

Estimate for 1977	F 150,000
Budget for 1976	<u>F 130,000</u>
Net increase.....	F 20,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

(B) Translation Services**Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly**

Estimate for 1977	F 321,000
Budget for 1976	<u>F 276,000</u>
Net increase.....	F 45,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate for 1977	F 5,000
Budget for 1976	<u>F 4,500</u>
Net increase	F 500

4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE SESSIONS

Estimate for 1977	F 158,000
Budget for 1976	<u>F 147,000</u>
Net increase.....	F 11,000

This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris.
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING THE SESSIONS

Estimate for 1977	F 40,000
Budget for 1976	<u>F 34,000</u>
Net increase	F 6,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

Head III — Expenditure on premises and equipment*Sub-Head 4*

PREMISES

Estimate for 1977	F 165,000
Budget for 1976	<u>F 153,000</u>
Net increase	F 12,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs and hire of committee rooms.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.

Sub-Head 5

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

Estimate for 1977	F 83,000
Budget for 1976	<u>F 57,000</u>
Net increase	F 26,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.

Head IV — General administrative costs*Sub-Head 6*

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

Estimate for 1977	F 250,000
Budget for 1976	F 250,000
Estimate unchanged	

Sub-Head 7

PAPER, STATIONERY AND OFFICE SUPPLIES

Estimate for 1977	F 135,000
Budget for 1976	<u>F 125,000</u>
Net increase	F 10,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 8

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

Estimate for 1977	F 680,000
Budget for 1976	<u>F 620,000</u>
Net increase	F 60,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 9

PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

Estimate for 1977	F	19,500
Budget for 1976	F	18,500
		Net increase..... F 1,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 10

OFFICIAL CARS

Estimate for 1977	F	22,000
Budget for 1976	F	22,000
		Estimate unchanged

In the absence of a car belonging to the Assembly, provision must be made for the hire of chauffeur-driven cars for the President of the Assembly and the Clerk.

Sub-Head 11

BANK CHARGES

Estimate for 1977	F	500
Budget for 1976	F	500
		Estimate unchanged

Head V — Other expenditure*Sub-Head 12*

TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPORTEURS

Estimate for 1977	F	55,000
Budget for 1976	F	55,000
		Estimate unchanged

Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments.

The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of the Assembly, Rapporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee.

Sub-Head 13

EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate for 1977	F	90,000
Budget for 1976	F	80,000
		Net increase..... F 10,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 14

COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate for 1977	F	3,000
Budget for 1976	F	3,000
		Estimate unchanged

Sub-Head 15

OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate for 1977	F	140,000
Budget for 1976	F	125,000
		Net increase
	F	15,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 16

EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS

Estimate for 1977	F	22,000
Budget for 1976	F	20,000
		Net increase
	F	2,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 17

EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate for 1977	F	33,000
Budget for 1976	F	30,000
		Net increase
	F	3,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 18

EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate for 1977	F	15,000
Budget for 1976	F	15,000
		Estimate unchanged

Sub-Head 19

CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate for 1977	F	3,000
Budget for 1976	F	3,000
		Estimate unchanged

Sub-Head 20

NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate for 1977	F	7,000
Budget for 1976	F	7,000
		Estimate unchanged

Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee**TEXT OF THE MANDATE ¹**

**approved by the Council of Ministers at its
meeting in Brussels on 31st May 1976**

1. The Standing Armaments Committee is instructed to submit to the Permanent Council, before the end of 1976, a detailed outline programme for a study as set out in the Annex, and a description of its proposed method of work ;

2. The Permanent Council will study carefully the outline programme and the proposed method of work submitted to them by the SAC, taking account of the determination of governments to avoid all duplication and any encroachment on work in progress elsewhere. The aim of the Council's consideration of the SAC's outline programme will be to specify the terms and define the scope of the study to be assigned to it. They will take account, in particular, of the tasks undertaken by the European programme group at their meeting in the autumn of 1976 ;

3. The Permanent Council are authorised to take decisions on the proposals thus submitted ;

4. The Permanent Council will follow the development of the work and will report to Ministers at their next meeting ;

5. The Permanent Council have also been authorised to consider at a later stage the possibility of including the following points in the study :

Inventory of capacities

Here, the aim would be to identify, by main categories, the weak and strong points of the European industry, together with the sectors where it can compete on favourable terms.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th October 1976.

Inventory of relations between industries in different European countries

At industrial level, there is already a network of contacts and various forms of occasional or systematic co-operation. These experiments should be analysed with a view to possible rationalisation on a European scale.

Annex

The Standing Armaments Committee, acting under the authority of the Council, is instructed to make a descriptive analysis of the situation of the armaments industry in member countries. The purpose of this analysis is to gain a clearer insight into the industrial and economic implications of the standardisation of armaments. It shall be directed to formulating a diagnosis.

(a) Definition of the armaments sector

The concept of armaments should be defined by distinguishing between armaments as such and the production of goods and services for national defence.

(b) Collection of economic data

One purpose of the study will be to assemble figures showing the relative scale of armaments production in each of the countries and between them, and covering such points as amount of investment, research, sources of funds (public and private), manpower and exports (divided into the European, Atlantic and other areas).

(c) Legal status of firms and domestic legislation

The study should also identify the various legal statuses of arms firms.

*Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems***REPORT ¹**

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Burckel, Rapporteur**

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Burckel, Rapporteur

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- III. Political instability in the Eastern Mediterranean
- IV. Greece and Western Europe
- V. Turkey and the EEC
- VI. Conclusions

1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers (Vice-Chairman); MM. Abens, Amrehn, Sir Frederic Bennet, Mrs. von Bothmer (Substitute : *Schwencke*), MM. Brugnon, Cermolacce, Fioret,

Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substitute : *de Bruyne*), MM. Grangier (Substitute : *Burckel*), *Leynen*, *Mende*, Mendelson, Minnoci, Nessler, *de Niet*, Peijnenburg, *Péridier*, *Portheine*, Preti, Quilleri (Substitute : *Treu*), *Schmidt*, Steel, Urwin, *Van Hoeylandt*.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems

The Assembly,

Considering the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean to be an essential part of European security ;

Recalling that WEU is the only European organisation with responsibilities in defence matters ;

Welcoming the opening of negotiations for the early accession of Greece to the EEC ;

Recalling that the agreement of association between Turkey and the EEC provides for the accession of Turkey after a period of adaptation ;

Considering it essential to associate Greece and Turkey here and now with examination of matters affecting the security and the building of Europe ;

Recalling that paragraph 10 of the decision of the WEU Council of 7th May 1955 setting up a Standing Armaments Committee provided that the undertakings of that Committee "would remain open to participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" ;

Gratified that the three member countries represented in the Security Council have acted jointly to encourage Greece and Turkey to seek together a solution to the points at issue between them ;

Deploring the wait-and-see policy pursued by the United Nations towards the Lebanese tragedy and the increasingly systematic deviation of worldwide organisations from their original tasks,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Draw up a programme forthwith to strengthen Europe's share in the joint defence of the Eastern Mediterranean ;
2. Invite the Greek and Turkish Governments to be associated with the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, including the study on European armaments industries ;
3. Make every effort for Greece and Turkey to be associated ever more closely with the building of Europe ;
4. Continue its work towards settling issues between Greece and Turkey ;
5. Co-ordinate the efforts of member countries with a view to finding a fair solution to the Lebanese conflict ;
6. Invite member States in the United Nations and other worldwide organisations to adhere firmly to the commitments they entered into on joining, particularly as regards the Middle East conflict and the situation in the Mediterranean.

Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Burckel, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Your Rapporteur was asked to prepare only the section on the Eastern Mediterranean of a more extensive report on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems. For various reasons, only the present document will be submitted at this session of the Assembly and the General Affairs Committee intends to prepare a second report, dealing mainly with the Western Mediterranean, for the next session.

2. This report owes much to the information obtained by the General Affairs Committee during its visit to Greece and Turkey from 6th to 13th October 1976. Your Rapporteur wishes to express his deepest gratitude to the Greek and Turkish governmental representatives and members of parliament who expressed their views with the utmost clarity and replied in great detail to the questions put to them. He realises that he will not have satisfied all concerned but hopes he has done his best to define the lines of a Western European policy which both these countries are likely to accept and which should help to draw them closer together, this being essential for the common security and if they are both to take part in the effort to unite Europe, where there is every reason for them to find a place in the near future.

3. Here, your Rapporteur will merely recall the problems of the Western Mediterranean for the record, the principal one now being the progressive re-establishment of a democratic régime in Spain. It is quite obvious that, if confirmed, this trend will lead in the years ahead to a complete reassessment of relations between Spain and the rest of Western Europe, and the General Affairs Committee must consider the implications of this reassessment as soon as circumstances allow. It is not possible to do so now.

II. The Eastern Mediterranean and European security

4. Although geographically the Mediterranean may be considered as a whole, it is quite evident that politically the problems which arise differ widely from north to south. Greece and Turkey — and probably soon Spain — are mainly concerned with the development of institutionalised

relations between each other and with the rest of Western Europe, whereas the southern part is mainly Arab and has only concluded co-operation agreements with the European Economic Community of limited political effect. However, in 1972 the Common Market countries decided to implement an "overall Mediterranean policy". In this connection, it is evident that any action the Community takes in the Mediterranean must be *adapted to the different levels of development of the States concerned and their various requirements*.

5. *Second-generation countries* (the Mashrek countries) seem to be seeking technical, industrial and financial co-operation agreements and oil agreements. It is no longer a question merely of commercial promotion but of establishing lasting and organised co-operation with these States on an equal footing. For States with oil surpluses, the aim of co-operation might be wider than the mere short-term acceptance of orders and capital. Europe might propose long-term technological and industrial co-operation with them, which would provide a lasting guarantee of energy supplies.

6. *First-generation countries, particularly Greece and Turkey*, have problems in terms of agricultural concessions — which are probably necessary — and also economic integration. Candidate countries must therefore make a very great effort. Greece in particular seems aware of this since it has launched a vigorous reorganisation of its economy in the framework of a five-year plan.

7. These are the lines along which the Community's Mediterranean policy should be conducted. At the moment, however, this policy is highly diversified and contradictory. Regarding the countries which have applied for membership, for instance, Greece is on the way towards integration, but the association agreement with Turkey no longer corresponds to reality today and a reappraisal is urgent. Only ambitious concrete proposals can re-establish a balance between the two States and avoid Turkey drifting away from Europe and the West¹. In general,

¹ Similarly, it is gratifying that Malta has recently been able to catch up in implementing its association agreement with the EEC which opens the way for accession.

Community action is over-cautious, due perhaps to the lack of a common approach towards foreign policy in the Mediterranean area.

8. The Western European countries now no longer play a leading rôle in the military balance in the Eastern Mediterranean where mainly American and Soviet air and naval forces are stationed. The result is that whereas in economic matters Greece and Turkey are striving to strengthen their links with the EEC, their defence, even more than other European countries, is still almost wholly dependent on the American military guarantee. Thus, the outcome of Greece's decision to withdraw its armed forces from NATO following the Cypriot crisis in July 1974, although in some ways reminiscent of the decision taken by France in 1966, is not the same. Greece has also taken the initiative of renegotiating the terms governing the facilities granted to American forces using Greek installations and the conditions in which it will participate in the common defence in the event of emergency. In the defence field, Greece is thus in an unusual position, and attention should be paid to the extent to which a European union including Greece can take account of this. Similarly, the United States Congress embargo on deliveries of weapons to Turkey in 1974 had serious repercussions for the whole western defence system in Turkey. This is another fact which Western Europe can neither overlook nor neglect.

9. The two great powers' naval forces in this sector have been strengthened considerably in the last ten years and may increase as Soviet naval strength develops. Whereas the Americans have permanent naval bases around the Eastern Mediterranean the bases established by the Soviets for their sizable fleet in these waters have proved rather precarious, particularly in Syria and Egypt. According to recent information in the 1976-77 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships, one of the weak points of the Soviet fleet is its logistic infrastructure.

10. These considerations probably explain why the Soviet Union wished to develop a naval air arm. The first 35,000-ton ship with an aircraft-carrying capability, the Kiev, was built in the Black Sea, passed through the Straits on 18th July 1976 and for some time joined the Soviet Mediterranean fleet before moving on to the Baltic. A second ship of this class, the Minsk, is navigating in the Black Sea and will probably soon be brought in to strengthen the Soviet

Mediterranean fleet. Two others are reportedly being built¹.

11. A moot point is how far the passage of these ships through the Straits, although not officially termed aircraft-carriers but "anti-submarine cruisers", infringes the Montreux Convention governing the passage of warships through the Straits and banning the passage of aircraft-carriers. The United States, which has not signed the Montreux Convention, is hardly in a position to approach the signatories to invite them to insist on the convention being respected, since the matter is a delicate one in which everything depends on the various parties' definition of Kiev-class ships, which are not ordinary aircraft-carriers but cruisers equipped for the transport and launching of very short take-off and landing aircraft. The signatories of the Montreux Convention should agree on an interpretation of the text where the points now at issue are concerned so that an agreement which is as important for the security of the Soviet Union as for the Mediterranean does not become a dead letter. In any event, Turkey cannot be expected to insist on a restrictive application of the Montreux Convention at the present juncture. It could perhaps do so if the solution of its problems with Greece allowed its allies to give it the guarantees which it requires.

12. In fact, as the General Affairs Committee well realises, the security of Turkey, Greece and the whole of Western Europe has the same basis. Should Soviet forces become preponderant in the Mediterranean, the whole of Europe would be threatened, particularly because of its oil supplies. But if the balance were upset anywhere at all in Central or Southern Europe this would also have disastrous effects on the security of Greece or Turkey which cannot, without enormous risk, consider breaking up this solidarity. On the contrary, the present report will be devoted to considering ways in which it might be strengthened.

13. To determine the wherewithal, the Western European countries must improve the co-ordination of their defence policies in the Mediterranean at European level.

14. Although co-operation so far carried out in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance has made an essential contribution to Europe's security in

1. Cf. *Voici le Kiev*, Defence Magazine, September 1976, pages 67-70.

the Eastern Mediterranean, it has proved inadequate in certain respects. The NATO integrated military structure is now relatively weak and most allied forces — e.g. the United States Sixth Fleet — are not included. There are threats to Britain's installations in Malta, and soon it may also have to reduce its military strength in Cyprus. All this indicates that Europe's security in the Eastern Mediterranean should be based at one and the same time on continued Atlantic co-operation, stronger united action by the European countries and closer links between Western Europe and the States in that region.

15. Indeed, the progressive economic integration, at different speeds, of Mediterranean and Western European States can develop only if based on a common defence policy. Europe's active economic presence in the Eastern Mediterranean would ultimately be jeopardised if it continued to occupy a back seat in diplomatic and military matters.

III. Political instability in the Eastern Mediterranean

16. The economic and strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean and its position on the main oil route from the Middle East to the West and on the route through the Straits which throughout the year gives the Soviet Union access to the sea are sufficient reason for the presence of Soviet and American fleets and the active policy pursued by the two great powers in this area in the last twenty years. It would certainly be exaggerated to attribute to either of these powers responsibility for the crises which have occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean countries in recent years. In almost every case, these conflicts have been of local origin but, because of the interest shown by the two great powers in the area, they have assumed such proportions that at times, particularly in the case of the three main wars between Israel and some of its Arab neighbours, it was feared that world peace might be threatened.

17. The Western European countries cannot therefore tackle Eastern Mediterranean problems without taking into account the two factors of uncertainty constituted by the instability of several territories on the one hand and the Soviet military presence on the other. These two elements force them to act with the utmost caution and do nothing which might inflame differences or make the situation worse. Conversely, Europe's

interest in the Eastern Mediterranean is linked with détente and the solution of local conflicts.

18. In recent years, three serious crises have shaken the stability of the Middle East :

19. (i) *A crisis in relations between Greece and Turkey*, which has become considerably worse since summer 1974.

20. (a) *Over Cyprus*, where it has never been possible to apply satisfactorily the 1959 and 1960 London and Zurich Agreements. Cyprus, governed by a Greek Cypriot Government, had more than four hundred Turkish enclaves scattered throughout the territory in continual conflict with the Greek majority. Only the presence of a United Nations force prevented them from coming to grips.

21. However, when in July 1974 the Greek Government — then the colonels' junta — tried to terminate this situation by a *coup d'Etat* against Archbishop Makarios, Turkey reacted by sending armed forces which took up positions in the north-east of the island in order to protect the Turkish minority. Despite the collapse of the colonels' régime in Athens and orders from the Security Council, Turkish forces again took the offensive on 14th August and extended their control to almost 40 % of the island, regrouping the Turkish Cypriot population in the richest part. After bitter fighting, the Greek element, representing more than 80 % of the population of Cyprus, was relegated to 60 to 65 % of the island in the south-west, a mountainous and poor area.

22. United Nations intervention allowed a provisional cease-fire line to be determined. Almost all Turkish Cypriots have been evacuated from the southern part of the island and there are hardly more than 6,000 Greek Cypriots in the north. According to *Le Monde* of 3rd and 4th September 1976 the Turkish authorities are bringing Turkish citizens from Anatolia to replace them. There are believed to be about 125,000 Turks living in this part of the island at present. Finally, it should be noted that Mr. Waldheim, United Nations Secretary-General, looked for a settlement through new inter-community talks, but this initiative encountered difficulties which it has not yet been possible to overcome.

23. It is not for your Rapporteur to take stock of the rights claimed by one or other party. He felt that both sides were prepared to open negotiations and had abandoned their extreme posi-

tions. Enosis is no longer Greece's political aim and Turkey is no longer calling for partition of the island; everything thus seems to be leading towards the reconstitution of a Cypriot State federalising the two communities, but on a different territorial basis from 1960. It is logical that Greece should stress the problem of the demarcation line and that Turkey, since it has secured a major territorial gain, should refuse to negotiate the matter unless both parties manage to open parallel negotiations on the status of the island in the framework of inter-community negotiations.

24. The elections held in May 1976 in the Turkish-occupied sector and on 5th September 1976 in the Greek sector allowed the two communities to appoint their representatives. These two elections were not acts of appeasement and those in favour of a compromise did not win. The Turkish intervention in 1974 left deep scars and Turkey apparently feels that Archbishop Makarios, who won the elections in the Greek sector of the island, is not likely to offer the Turkish community the guarantees which it expects from the constitutional status of Cyprus. In short, there is a risk that suspicion and strong feelings may make the negotiations long and difficult, although the outcome is fairly clear: independence for the island, a federal constitution guaranteeing protection of the two communities and a change in the demarcation line in favour of the Greek majority.

25. (b) *Over the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea.* Under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and the 1947 peace treaty with Italy, Greece obtained sovereignty over virtually all of the some three thousand islands in the Aegean and the Dodecanese, only 354 of which are inhabited, the vast majority of the population being Greek.

26. However, several of these islands are just off the coast of Turkey. For instance, Rhodes, Chios and Lesbos are less than fifteen kilometres from the Turkish coast, Samos less than two kilometres and other islands even closer.

27. The Greek Government therefore considers that as each Aegean island has a continental shelf the Greek continental shelf in fact covers a very vast part of the Aegean. The Turkish Government for its part considers that the Aegean is a case apart which should not be covered by the usual law. This point of view was underlined by Mr. Demirel, the Prime Minister, on 22nd August 1976 in a speech in which he stated that

the Aegean islands should not be called Greek but Aegean so as to indicate their special status.

28. The conflict assumed new dimensions in recent years:

(1) Greece has acceded to the Geneva Convention on continental shelves of 29th April 1958 but Turkey has refused to do so. Greece contends that this convention, which merely codifies current international law, is also binding on non-signatory countries, but Turkey, arguing the special nature of the Aegean, calls for the continental shelf to be divided in such a way as to take account of its position as an Aegean power.

(2) Turkey criticised Greece for not respecting the 1923 and 1947¹ treaties on demilitarising the Aegean islands and uses this as an argument for the treaties to be interpreted in accordance with its views. Greece, for its part, considers that the measures it has taken are purely security ones imposed by necessity and underlines that the Lausanne Treaty provides for the demilitarisation of Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Nikaria only in order to maintain peace, which would not prevent it ensuring their defence if they were threatened.

(3) In 1974, Turkey formed an "Aegean army" opposite the Greek islands well equipped with landing craft. This army does not come under NATO command.

(4) During the crisis in summer 1974, when Turkey insisted on taking over air traffic control from the half-way line in the Aegean, air traffic between Greece and Turkey came to a halt.

(5) Geological formations favourable for oil prospecting have been found in the Aegean and in 1974 Turkey launched a succession of prospecting campaigns. In summer 1976 further campaigns were carried out in the eastern half of the Aegean with the ocean research ship Sismik I. Turkey has already granted prospecting licences for the eastern half of the Aegean seabed.

(6) The Greek Government appealed to the Security Council and on 10th August called upon the International Court of Justice in The Hague to set the limits of sovereignty over the continental shelf and insist that Turkey cease its prospecting campaign in the meantime. The International Court of Justice subsequently

¹ Turkey has not signed the 1947 Paris Treaty on the demilitarisation of the Dodecanese.

refused to take provisional measures although reserving the right to consider its competence on the substance of the matter. Greece wants the matter to be solved by the Court whereas Turkey wants prior bilateral negotiations. But the matter is further complicated by the fact that the law of the sea is at present the subject of negotiations at world level seeking to lay down principles meeting present-day economic requirements, which leaves scope for speculation, particularly about the rôle of islands in determining under-water prospecting areas.

(7) In the United Nations, the four members of the Atlantic Alliance which are on the Security Council — the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Italy — tried to obtain the agreement of the two parties to a draft resolution asking them to avoid hostile action, to do nothing which might aggravate the situation and to settle their differences by negotiations, underlining that the International Court of Justice should consider the matter only from a purely legal standpoint. This resolution was adopted by consensus of the Security Council on 25th August 1976. It led the Greek and Turkish Governments to consider step-by-step negotiations on the various aspects of their dispute. On 2nd November, negotiations at the level of experts were started in Paris on air space and in Bern on the continental shelf. Your Rapporteur is gratified that the two parties have managed to agree to start these negotiations.

(8) Finally, the present tendency to extend territorial waters from six to twelve miles would mean a very large part of the territorial waters of the Aegean would become Greek. This too is making Turkey call for the special situation of the Aegean to be taken into account and oppose any extension of Greek territorial waters in the area.

29. There can be no question of the WEU Assembly taking sides in two such delicate matters as those of Cyprus and the Aegean. But it cannot overlook the gravity of these problems for Greece and Turkey, nor, consequently, the need to solve them with an eye to safeguarding the legitimate interests of the two sides. Even if account is taken of the tension necessarily created by the prospect of early negotiations, it would appear that fears and suspicion on both sides far surpass what is really at stake in the two affairs.

30. In the case of Cyprus, the Greek side remembers above all the Turkish intervention of

July 1974 whose violence brought about a *fait accompli*, and there is fear of further action of this kind in Cyprus or elsewhere. The fact that following the intervention on 20th July the Turkish forces took the offensive again on 14th August 1974 is interpreted in Greece as proof of a Turkish desire for conquest, and it believes that Turkey prepared the Cyprus intervention a long time beforehand. The Greek view is that Turkish actions in the Aegean and in Cyprus are breaches of international law and call in question the treaties on which the country's sovereignty and security are based. The Greeks are inclined to think that, over and above the problem of the seabed, there is a Turkish threat to Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands.

31. In Turkey, it is feared that renunciation of Enosis in Cyprus may be merely a tactical move and that Greece may isolate Turkey from its western partners through its control of the Aegean. This is not without consequences even for Turkey's relations with Western Europe since it appears afraid that once Greece has joined the EEC it may keep the doors firmly closed to Turkey.

32. Thus, it is the underlying reservations of both sides which are involved, and this may make the negotiations most difficult. At first sight, the starting positions are clear and should allow agreement to be reached on the main points at issue. But there seems to be so much reciprocal mistrust that it may be wondered whether such agreement can really be reached in the near future. An open dialogue, away from inter-governmental negotiations, in the framework *inter alia* of the European parliamentary assemblies, should help to dispel such mistrust and ulterior motives.

33. (i) *The Lebanese affair* started with the arrival of some 300,000 Palestinian refugees, whose presence tipped in favour of the Moslem element the delicate and already threatened religious and political balance on which the Lebanese constitution and political customs were based, and its sovereignty was seriously jeopardised.

34. It would be pointless to try to attribute prime responsibility for the fighting which has become particularly bitter since the summer of 1975. But the fact that the Lebanese people, often Christian, had to endure reprisals by Israeli forces against Palestinian armed elements which had settled in Fatah Land in the south of Lebanon, whence they carried out deadly raids on Israeli territory (Maalot, Qiryat-Shemona,

etc.), made the presence of Palestinian forces over which the Lebanese Government had no control increasingly intolerable for a large part of the population. In Beirut itself or in the southern mountains, many bloody incidents occurred between Christian Phalangists and Palestinian guerrillas. The presence of armed Palestinians became an increasing source of division between Christians and Moslems, left and right, and confrontations led to the outright massacre of inhabitants of Christian villages, Moslem areas of Beirut and Palestinian refugee camps.

35. When all offers of mediation from outside the Arab world proved fruitless and the Arab States themselves, united against such mediation, failed to agree on joint action, Syria took military action in June 1976. But although the Syrian forces have reversed the situation they have not yet managed to stop the fighting and it has been thought that the war would end only if there were a *de facto* partition of the territory between Christians and Moslems. The Israeli authorities, for their part, announced a long time ago that they would not tolerate the establishment of a Palestinian State in Fatah Land, on Israel's frontiers, but have pursued an open-frontier policy with Southern Lebanon in order to assist, in Israel itself, the thousands of Lebanese refugees seeking hospital treatment or merely employment, thus creating a unique situation demonstrating the possibilities of trans-frontier understanding. It is quite obviously in Europe's interests for the Israeli-Arab conflict to be contained and brought to an end through direct negotiations and probably too for the territorial integrity of Lebanon to be maintained, even at the price of a federal status.

36. Where Lebanon is concerned, it is impossible at present to foresee the possible outcome of the peace plan proposed by the Arab League and even less the grand scheme for a federation of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. There is apparently little chance of this being agreed to by the Palestinians or by the Lebanese Christians and the Israelis will probably do their utmost to avoid what they might call encirclement. Similarly, Soviet warnings to Syria arouse fears that if the Lebanese affair is not settled quickly it may escalate to international level which would make it difficult for the West to remain on the sidelines.

37. While the Lebanese tragedy is unfolding before the eyes of a powerless United Nations, certain groups of countries are systematically diverting this organisation and its specialised

agencies from their statutory tasks although much store had been set by them initially. This is illustrated by the unilateral approach to the problem of international terrorism and racism which the western community can but condemn and fight.

38. (iii) There has been a marked deterioration in *relations between Egypt and Libya* since the death of President Nasser and particularly since the 1973 war and the subsequent improvement in relations between Egypt and Israel. The situation became even worse in August 1976 when Egypt said Libya was implicated in the hijacking of an aircraft on an internal Egyptian flight and had organised or encouraged a series of attempts on the life of President Sadat.

39. Colonel Kadhafi said the Egyptian Government was trying to stir up trouble in Libya, and at the beginning of September 1976 it was announced that the forces of both countries were being mobilised.

40. It is still difficult to assess what is really at stake here and foresee the consequences since Libya is one of the few Eastern Mediterranean powers to be on good terms with the Soviet Union on which it would be compelled to rely in the event of hostilities with Egypt.

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41. It is evident that Western Europe has every interest in peace being restored in the Eastern Mediterranean because, although the great powers were not responsible for the latest confrontations, they cannot remain indefinitely on the sidelines. For instance, through an article in Pravda at the end of August 1976, the Soviet Government informed the Syrian Government that it should stop supporting the Lebanese Christians. Similarly, the Soviet Union has publicly promised assistance to Colonel Kadhafi in his dispute with Egypt.

42. Western Europe imports a large proportion of its oil requirements from the Eastern Mediterranean area. It has a direct interest in maintaining a Lebanese State which is an essential centre for its trade with the Arab world. Finally, it is interested to the highest degree in maintaining the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, which has been constantly threatened since July 1974 by differences between Greece and Turkey.

43. However, Western Europe must take full account of the constantly expressed desire of the

Arab world as a whole to settle matters concerning Arab countries among themselves. Any European intervention in the internal affairs of Arab countries or in confrontations between them might be viewed by a world opinion as neo-colonialism and should consequently be avoided as long as all concerned have not clearly expressed their desire to seek European mediation.

44. Furthermore, in differences such as exist between Greece and Turkey, it is extremely difficult for Western European countries to rally one way or the other because of the danger of diverting one of these countries towards internal revolution or a foreign policy which would take it away from the Atlantic Alliance and Europe. The policy defined by Britain, the United States, France and Italy in August 1976 is to encourage those concerned to agree among themselves. This policy seems far more in the interests of Europe and the West than any attempt to bring useless pressure to bear, particularly through embargos on weapons, which might break up the Atlantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean, as was to be feared when the United States took measures against Turkey in February 1975. At the same time, the development of political and economic links between Western Europe and Greece and Turkey can but help to convince these countries that they should settle their differences by direct negotiations.

IV. Greece and Western Europe

45. On 9th July 1961, Greece concluded an association agreement with the EEC which came into force on 1st November 1962. Based on Article 238 of the Rome Treaty, this agreement provided for reciprocal rights and obligations between the contracting parties, economic co-ordination in fields covered by the association agreement and the creation of special organs, separate from those of the Community, to run the association.

46. The association agreement implied that improved economic relations between the EEC and Greece and the rising standard of living and level of employment in Greece would lead the Community to consider the possibility of Greece becoming a member of the EEC. An Association Council and a Joint Parliamentary Committee were set up to administer the association.

47. However, following the *coup d'Etat* on 21st April 1967, the European Community decided to freeze its relations with Greece, i.e. to limit

application of the association agreement to current transactions, until a democratic régime was re-established. Harmonisation of agricultural and financial policies was abandoned and the negotiations on harmonising economic policies were not even started. Loans from the European Investment Bank were suspended.

48. The last twenty years were a period of remarkable expansion in the Greek economy, bringing it closer to that of the EEC countries, although this was accompanied by an extremely high rate of inflation which made it more difficult for Greece to take its place in a European monetary system.

49. However, on 22nd August 1974, almost a month after the fall of the military régime and the restoration of democracy, the Greek Government sent an aide-mémoire to the President of the EEC Council requesting the reactivation of the association. This was followed by a request for exceptional aid of \$800 million. On a proposal by the Commission, the Council decided on 17th September 1974 to revive the process of association and on 25th June 1975, after the Greek elections, the EEC-Greece Parliamentary Committee resumed its activities. But the new Greek Government had already informed the Commission that it intended to request accelerated integration of Greece into the Community.

50. The Greek Government probably had several reasons for this :

(a) In the economic field, the increase from six to nine members of the European Community meant that the EEC was more than ever Greece's principal trading partner. In 1973, 55 % of Greece's exports were to the EEC and 50 % of its imports from the EEC.

(b) The development of Greece's economy and particularly its industry now made it a possible partner for the EEC.

(c) Insofar as membership of the European Communities was still its aim, the Greek Government felt it was in its interests to play an early rôle in the process leading to the establishment of the future European union.

(d) The Greek Government had no objection of principle to Turkey joining the European Community and thought the integration of both countries in the Community would help to solve their differences. Your Rapporteur learnt from the Greek authorities that the Greek Prime Minister and Minister for Economic Co-ordina-

tion had frequently said that Greece would raise no objections to Turkey's accession to the European Communities when the question arose. Greece had no reason to impede Turkey's economic and social progress. Not a full EEC member itself, Greece was not in a position to determine the positions of member States of the Community towards Turkey and had never presumed to influence them in any way whatsoever.

(e) The fact that NATO had not managed to prevent Turkish military action in Cyprus therefore led Greece to seek a framework more likely to shield it from Turkey's military strength.

(f) Finally, the democratic parties considered that accession to the European Communities would help to strengthen democracy in Greece itself.

51. The request for accession was made in Brussels on 12th June 1975, when Mr. Karamanlis, the Prime Minister, said that :

"The Greek Government believes that the membership agreement should foresee a five-year adaptation period, proportional to that foreseen for the accession of Great Britain and Ireland."

He added :

"I wish to stress, however, that Greece does not desire to become a member of the EEC solely for economic reasons. She mainly desires so for reasons which are political and concern the stabilisation of democracy and the future of the nation. The Greeks believe in the destiny of Europe, whose fulfilment presupposes the acceleration of the procedure for unification at present under development. Greece believes she can contribute to these procedures of the unification of Europe."

52. On 29th January 1976, the Commission adopted a recommendation which was in favour of the Greek application but advocating a transitional period of unspecified duration during which Greece would participate in the various Community bodies and bring its economic system into line with that of the Community. But the Council of Ministers did not endorse the Commission's reservations about the Greek proposal and asked the permanent representatives to prepare to start negotiations as soon as possible in a positive spirit. These negotiations have just begun and since the essential political decisions

have been taken the problem of Greece's accession to the Communities can now only be a question of time.

53. In economic terms, the gross national product per capita in Greece is almost the same as in Ireland, but the annual increase is far greater in Greece than in the EEC member countries. For the Nine as a whole, the average increase in the gross national product between 1963 and 1972 was 4.5% per year compared with 7.4% in Greece. In 1974, the gross national product per capita was \$4,486 for the EEC as a whole and \$2,140 for Greece.

54. Moreover, a comparison of the various sectors in Greece shows a considerable increase in the industrial sector, which employed only 18.4% of the labour force in 1961 compared with 25.7% in 1974. It represented 14% of the gross national product in 1961 and 21.4% in 1974. Manufactured products accounted for 3.4% of Greece's exports in 1961 and 53.2% in 1974. In less than fifteen years, Greece has therefore become a highly industrialised country and is apparently well on the way to catching up with the EEC countries.

55. However, there are still some weak points in the Greek economy which call for early action.

56. The first stems from unemployment. The rate was particularly high in 1974 but improved considerably in 1975.

57. The second is the trade balance, which is in constant deficit. In 1974, exports represented only \$1,774 million, whereas imports amounted to \$4,659 million, i.e. a deficit of \$2,885 million. There is nothing abnormal about this situation in a country in the process of equipping itself and in fact capital goods accounted for 33.7% of imports in 1974. Moreover, large invisible resources left only a small deficit of \$87 million in the balance of payments in 1974, account being taken of net imports of capital to the sum of \$1,151 million.

58. Finally, the problem of the extremely high rate of inflation seems to have been more or less solved since estimates for 1976 give a figure of between 10 and 12%, equivalent to that of several EEC member countries, whereas in 1974 it was 26.9%.

59. Thus, although Greece's application for membership of the EEC raises problems, they are limited and now seem to be in the process

of being solved. The Nine and Greece are certainly intent on finding a solution and the prospect of Greece's accession to the EEC can be viewed with optimism.

60. Greece's application also raises political problems which must not be taken lightly.

61. Greece can naturally not consider mobilising its European partners against Turkey; it has confirmed that two considerations carried weight:

(1) Turkish territory is an essential part of the western defence system in which the Turkish army plays an important rôle. Greece's security is very largely ensured by Turkey's participation in the system. It must therefore aim not at disarming Turkey but at finding a solution to its problems with that country and ensuring its long-term security with regard to Turkey. Attempts made *inter alia* by Mr. Max van der Stoep, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, President of the EEC Council, at the beginning of September 1976 to reconcile Greek and Turkish views therefore received a warm welcome in Athens. However, considering that for its security Turkey also needs Greece to take part in the western defence system, the Greek Government wishes to be reassured that Turkey's military efforts cannot be directed against Greece.

(2) The best guarantee for Greece would obviously be for Turkey to join the European Community too. If only because of its size and geographical position, the defence of Turkey goes hand in hand with that of Greece. Even if accession were to be delayed for economic reasons, it would probably be in Greece's interest for Turkey to take part in building the European union, particularly in foreign policy and defence matters.

62. However, although Greece's special position towards NATO does not raise any economic problems, it will nevertheless have to say what part it intends to play in a European union whose activities will one day include foreign policy and defence matters. Greece's decision to review its relations with NATO stemmed from the Turkish intervention of 14th August 1974 against Greek forces stationed in Cyprus: the Greek Government considered this to be an attack on a member of NATO by another member, armed by NATO. Greece noted that NATO had been unable to handle the situation and decided, while remaining a member of the

Alliance's political organisation, to resume full command of its national forces in peacetime and hold negotiations on means of changing over from this peacetime situation to a wartime situation, when Greek forces would be assigned to NATO commands. These negotiations seem to be progressing satisfactorily.

63. But apparently this in no way implies that Greece intends to remain outside a European defence policy, particularly in the field of armaments. The Greek Ministers who addressed the General Affairs Committee showed they were anxious to tighten links between Greece and WEU, particularly by appointing a permanent Greek delegation of observers to the WEU Assembly, and stressed their interest in the enquiry undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee on European armaments industries from the point of view of developing joint production. Your Rapporteur considers that it is of the utmost importance for the WEU Assembly and Council to consider these openings.

64. Furthermore, the Greek Government attaches great importance to possibilities of Balkan co-operation which it has been endeavouring to develop since the return to democracy. Yugoslavia, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria have responded favourably to the Greek proposals, and experts from the five countries met in Athens in 1976 to work out a series of specific points for co-operation. Moreover, this can but improve the application of the final act signed in Helsinki.

65. This step, far from separating Greece from Western Europe, can on the contrary only increase the latter's interest in having Greece take part in its work in the foreign policy field, since it aims at consolidating détente, associating neutral and eastern countries with Europe's economic organisation and — an essential aspect — bringing Greece and Turkey closer together.

66. In view of the essential position of the Eastern Mediterranean in the European security system and the leading rôle played by Greece — and Turkey — your Rapporteur considers it essential that Greek — and Turkish — parliamentarians be invited to participate regularly in the Assembly's debates. He therefore submitted a draft resolution to the General Affairs Committee calling on the Assembly to ask the Greek and Turkish parliaments each to appoint a delegation of observers with a statutory place in the Assembly.

V. Turkey and the EEC

67. Relations between Turkey and the EEC have largely run parallel to those with Greece. However, although relations with Turkey have not encountered such ups and downs as the Greek *coup d'Etat*, the economic gap is far wider than in the case of Greece.

68. An association agreement between the EEC and Turkey was signed on 12th September 1963 and came into force on 1st December 1964. The implications of the agreement were similar to those of the agreement with Greece. But provision was not made in the treaty for every aspect of the harmonisation of economic policies and it was left to the association institutions to work them out during the transitional period. Association with Turkey is therefore still at the development stage with many difficulties standing in the way of accession which could only take place after a particularly long transitional period of adaptation.

69. Turkey has at one and the same time good reasons for wishing to draw closer to the EEC and special problems which slow down this process. Favourable factors include :

70. (a) The policy deliberately adopted by Kemal Ataturk and constantly followed by all subsequent Heads of the Turkish State, which aims at making Turkey a western-type national State as opposed to the theocratic cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman Empire.

71. (b) Turkey's special position with about 500 km. of frontiers with the Soviet Union and about the same with Iran in areas where the ethnic division of the population on either side of the frontier is far from clear and unchallenged. Turkey is therefore obliged to give priority to ensuring its security with regard to these two powers, the latter now being in the process of building up a first-class military force, mainly thanks to large-scale arms deliveries recently agreed to by the United States. Although Turkey has so far sought security solely in close association with the West in the framework of NATO, it is still afraid of its links with the West being cut off.

72. There appear to be three reasons for this fear :

(1) Because of the independence of Cyprus and developments in the law of the sea, Turkey is afraid its links with the rest of the western

world may be controlled by Greece. This is probably the main reason for its claims on air traffic control in the Aegean and exploitation of the seabed, its absolute refusal to allow Greece to extend its territorial waters round the Aegean islands to twelve miles and its intervention in Cyprus in 1974. From this point of view, Greece's accession to the EEC, if not accompanied by measures to reassure Turkey, may make the latter afraid that it will be isolated on the edge of the western world by a power whose hostility it fears.

(2) The evolution of public opinion in the United States since the Vietnam war and the improvement in American-Soviet relations make Turkey fear a weakening in the American guarantee and encourage it to seek other means of ensuring its security.

(3) The embargo on deliveries of arms to Turkey imposed by the United States Congress in February 1975 and the halt to American military assistance have been attributed to the strength of the "Greek lobby" in the United States. They gave rise to the decision to open talks with the United States on co-operation in the defence field, place American bases in Turkey under Turkish control and make air traffic movements subject to prior authorisation. On 26th March 1976, the talks led to an agreement providing for the embargo to be lifted, bases to be reactivated and military assistance to be resumed, but relations between Turkey and the United States definitely suffered a setback from the crisis.

73. These considerations led Turkey to envisage a policy of continuing loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance but greater independence of the United States, particularly where arms were concerned. Mr. Kosygin's visit enabled Turkey to improve its relations with its Soviet neighbour. It has taken part in Balkan co-operative projects which, in themselves, are not liable to call in question Turkey's wish to prepare for accession to the EEC. However, it would appear essential for the members of the European Community to reassure Turkey, particularly about the possible consequences of Greece's accession, and strengthen their links with a country which has not always had cause to be satisfied with its relations with Western Europe.

74. (c) In the economic field, Turkey can hardly hope to develop its trade and industry outside the EEC, which accounts for 45 % of its exports and 50 % of its imports, employs 1,500,000 Tur-

kish workers and provides about 50 % of the investments made in Turkey.

75. There has certainly been a large increase in Turkey's gross national product in recent years and at a time when all the western countries are facing a serious crisis resulting in an overall drop of 1.75 % in the gross national product of the OECD countries, Turkey's gross national product is increasing at an ever-faster rate : 7.9 % in 1975. Despite an average annual increase of 10 % in its industrial production since 1970, Turkey is still an essentially agricultural country. Moreover, a very high birth rate (25 per thousand), high unemployment and a constantly rising trade deficit mean that this remarkable increase in the gross national product has not had the effect that might have been hoped. In 1975, the per capita GNP was still only about \$875.

76. In 1975, exports amounted to only \$1,600 million compared with \$4,600 million for imports, i.e. a trade deficit of \$3,000 million (of which \$1,720 million in trade with the EEC), which means that only 30.4 % of imports were covered by exports. Turkey does not have such high invisible resources as Greece. The main one is its manpower, for which there are not enough jobs in Turkey, and in principle there were 1,500,000 unemployed in 1975, although the figure in fact is probably over 2,000,000. Furthermore, Turkish workers abroad repatriated \$1,476 million in 1976, i.e. almost half the deficit in the balance of trade. For the Turkish authorities, it is therefore essential to retain and improve outlets for Turkish workers in the EEC countries and from this point of view Turkey's association should provide guaranteed employment and satisfactory conditions of work for Turkish workers. But the economic crisis which has been rife in European countries since 1973 has led to a reduction in the number of jobs open to Turkish workers and quotas for the number who may be employed, particularly in the Federal Republic. Turkey, associated with the EEC, is claiming treatment in this respect on at least an equal footing with countries which do not have associate status, and this seems perfectly justified.

77. It is not therefore surprising that Mr. Çaglayangil, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, should have been dissatisfied with the way Turkey's association with the EEC was working in September 1976. The development of a global approach by the EEC to Mediter-

anean matters has led to a marked reduction in imports of Turkish agricultural products in favour of products from other Mediterranean countries, particularly Israel. This has increased Turkey's deficit in the balance of trade, which was intensified because at the same time openings for Turkish workers were closing, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands, the main employer countries. There is every reason to take seriously Turkey's threat to review its links with the EEC if its European partners do not show more good will towards it.

78. In view of the difficulties which the crisis might stir up in Turkey, the EEC Commission recently suggested new methods of industrial and technological co-operation involving greater freedom of investment for foreign capital in Turkey to induce the EEC countries to export capital rather than import manpower. They would be encouraged by the proximity of the Middle East oilfields, the fact that the industrial population in Western Europe is reaching an often intolerable degree of density and diminishing possibilities of profitable investment in Western Europe, compared with widespread and particularly profitable possibilities in Turkey.

79. These proposals and all the work done since Turkey became associated with the European Community are being discussed in Turkey. A subject of discussion is the fear that Turkey might be colonised by foreign capital integrating it into an economic system in which the Turkish State would have no part in the decision-taking procedure. Both Mr. Demirel's government majority and the opposition are divided over this matter.

80. It is therefore particularly regrettable that the Council of Association between the EEC and Turkey should have had to postpone its July meeting and subsequently the one which should have been held on 16th October 1976. These decisions taken by the Nine appear to show unwillingness to give serious consideration to the progressive establishment of a customs union with Turkey, a necessary basis for Turkey's accession to the EEC. Such last-minute postponements can but strengthen the position of those in Turkey who are in favour of changing the country's external policy, which would be neither in the interests of the West nor of Turkey, the country of Ataturk.

81. But apart from fears of an economic nature there are major political reactions against Turkey joining the European Communities which

have been exacerbated since July 1974. Turkey found there was a lack of understanding and support from its western partners in its differences with Greece and is afraid they may bring pressure to bear for it to abandon its very firm stand over Cyprus and in respect of the situation on the Aegean continental shelf.

82. Here again, the situation must be viewed as a whole : in the long run, differences between Greece and Turkey are about matters on which a compromise might be found if both sides really wished, as now seems to be the case. Insofar as Turkey fears being isolated from the West, it may be tempted to use force or seek support elsewhere. It is therefore essential for Greece's accession to the EEC not to be considered as support or the beginning of future support for the Greek cause, which implies that if Turkey so wishes it must be associated, at the same time as Greece, with those elements of the future European union in which it is possible for it to participate and particularly in foreign policy and defence matters. This leads your Rapporteur to propose that the Assembly approach Turkish observers, parallel with the course proposed for Greek observers, and that in general Turkey be associated as soon as possible and to the same extent as Greece with European foreign policy and defence consultations, even if Turkey's accession to the EEC cannot be achieved as quickly as that of Greece.

83. Similarly, your Rapporteur considers that Turkey can and should, on the same basis as Greece, be invited to take part in any of WEU's activities which might interest it, particularly those relating to the joint production of armaments.

VI. Conclusions

84. Although WEU is not the appropriate framework in which to consider matters dividing Greece and Turkey or to study the evolution of economic relations between the EEC and these two countries, it seemed essential to mention these matters in the better interests of Europe.

85. The state of Greek-Turkish relations at present prevents either of these countries acceding to the modified Brussels Treaty because the WEU countries cannot take the risk implied by

Article V of the Treaty as regards possible disturbances between Greece and Turkey. On the other hand, a settlement of such matters by means which could be accepted by both countries would open up new prospects.

86. At the present juncture, it is essential to endeavour to develop relations between Western Europe and Greece and Turkey in parallel and on an equal basis. Although the two countries' economic positions do not allow them to advance at the same rate, there is nothing to prevent them doing so in the foreign policy and defence fields. It would in any event be extremely dangerous for all concerned and for western defence as a whole to associate one of the two partners with a joint policy but not the other.

87. Finally, since any real progress depends closely on the re-establishment of confidence in relations between Greece and Turkey, it seems necessary not only to encourage both countries to find a way of agreeing on the points at issue but also to promote an atmosphere of understanding, as far as circumstances allow, by associating one with the other and both with the creation of a European union in which differences would lose most of their substance.

88. For all these reasons, your Rapporteur concludes that, where WEU is concerned, an immediate attempt should be made to associate Greece and Turkey with those activities of WEU which do not imply accession to the modified Brussels Treaty, i.e. those aiming at the joint production of armaments, and with the work of the Assembly.

89. If consideration is now given to the Eastern Mediterranean as a whole, it is evident that for military reasons Western Europe's position must be relatively reserved. But the foreseeable accession of Greece and Turkey to the EEC and the future European union will not allow it to maintain this attitude indefinitely and it will have to envisage playing a larger part in the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean in the future. This would imply directing its military effort — particularly where air forces and navies are concerned — along lines which would allow it to assist its allies effectively if need be. This also means that Western European countries must consider the requirements of such a policy in terms of forces and armaments here and now.

Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems

AMENDMENT No. 1¹
tabled by Mr. Urwin

Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed : Urwin

1. See 11th Sitting, 1st December 1976 (Amendment negatived).

423.02 +
420.4 + 420.41

European union and WEU

REPORT¹

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur**

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on European union and WEU

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submitted by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers (Vice-Chairman); MM. Abens, Amrehn, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mrs. von Bothmer (Substitute: *Schwencke*), MM. Brugnon, Cermolacce, Fioret, Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substitute: *de Bruyne*), MM.

Grangier (Substitute: *Burckel*), Leynen, Mende, Mendelson Minnocci, Nessler, *de Niet*, Peijnenburg, *Péridier*, *Portheine* Preti, Quilléri (Substitute: *Treu*), *Schmidt*, Steel, Urwin *Van Hoeylandt*.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on European union and WEU

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision taken by the European Council to elect the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage as from 1978 ;

Regretting the European Council's slowness in considering and implementing the Tindemans report ;

Recalling its Resolution 59 ;

Considering that the decision taken by the WEU Council on 31st May 1976 can help to develop the activities of the future European union in the field of armaments industries ;

Noting that this undertaking requires close co-operation between WEU and the European programme group ;

Considering that the co-ordination of European armaments industries can produce satisfactory results for the European economy and for the common defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance only if started without delay,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Study at an early date the outline programme which is to be submitted to it by the Standing Armaments Committee in order to be able to determine that body's new tasks as soon as possible and at the latest at its ministerial meeting in 1977 ;
2. Pay close attention to co-ordinating this undertaking with the work of the European programme group and have the latter's decisions communicated to it or be kept informed, through the international secretariat of the SAC, of the activities of that body in matters affecting the mandate of the SAC ;
3. Report to the Assembly in the appropriate manner on the results of the studies conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee and the decisions it takes in pursuit thereof ;
4. Invite the signatory countries of the North Atlantic Treaty who are members of the EEC or associated with it under Article 238 of the Rome Treaty to take part in the study to be undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Following the publication of the Tindemans report, your Rapporteur was instructed to submit a report on the future European union at the June 1976 session. In view of the fact that the Tindemans report seemed to call in question the very existence of the WEU Assembly the Presidential Committee had already adopted on 1st March a resolution addressed to the European Council recalling the need "to maintain at all events a parliamentary assembly with statutory competence for all aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty". This resolution was adopted by the Assembly last June.

2. The Assembly obviously decided to include a report on European union and WEU in its agenda for the December session because it expected the nine governments to continue their study of the Tindemans report during the year and because it must voice its opinions on any decisions the Ministers may have reached already. There is every indication however that the report has not yet been studied in much detail and so far few decisions have been taken. The Tindemans report is admittedly still on the agenda of the forthcoming meetings of the European Council, but the governments' slowness in tackling the joint study and their discretion about their work give the impression that they are in no hurry to reach conclusions, nor perhaps do they even wish to.

3. Only one real decision has been taken by the nine Ministers, and that was on 20th September 1976. It was the decision to elect the members of the European Parliament by universal suffrage at one and the same time during the period May-June 1978. This decision was accompanied by a bill which it recommends the parliaments of the member States to adopt.

4. Conversely, the Tindemans report was only given a first reading by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Nine at an informal meeting in Beetsterwaag, Netherlands, on 11th and 12th September. Obviously such a meeting only served to prepare the next official meeting of the Ministers on 29th and 30th November 1976.

5. Finally, on the WEU side the Council acted on 31st May 1976: it entrusted the Standing Armaments Committee with the task of working out an outline programme for a study on Euro-

pean armaments industries. This is a very modest step, but an assessment must be made of its political repercussions and the possible implications for the future European union.

6. The fact that progress towards greater cohesion in the political and defence fields in Western Europe has been very limited is not surprising in view of the difficulties encountered by the European Community in the economic field. The acute recession throughout the West in 1974 and 1975 slowed down the Community's progress and in many respects even reversed the process. The prospects of economic and monetary union which seemed to be taking shape before the crisis are now becoming blurred. The decision to link the currencies of the various Community countries has been respected by only half of them and in view of the magnitude of the problem now facing both strong and weak currencies alike, the outlook is not very promising for the immediate future.

7. Monetary tension has been largely responsible for making the settlement of economic problems even more difficult. At present, the Nine are having a hard task reaching agreement on fishing zones and the agricultural common market is being constantly disturbed by variations in currency rates. Some of the association agreements signed by the European Communities are not working properly, particularly the one with Turkey, because of the employment crisis and the difficulty experienced by the Western European countries in finding the investment funds necessary for the Turkish economy.

8. In short, your Rapporteur feels that the difficulties encountered by governments in the political and defence fields in their efforts to establish real European co-operation cannot be attributed solely to ill will. Today, therefore, attention must be paid to what might be done to maintain and develop such co-operation, albeit at a modest level at the present juncture.

II. Election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage

9. The decision taken by the Nine to elect the European Parliament by universal suffrage as from 1978 meets a wish constantly expressed by the European assemblies and particularly in a report by Mr. Patijn adopted by the European

Parliament in 1974 which appears to have provided the basis for intergovernmental discussions on this matter.

10. Very serious obstacles stood in the way of this decision since the number of seats and their attribution between the various member countries had to be recalculated. Secondly, it meant deciding whether the members of the European Parliament would necessarily continue to be national parliamentarians or whether a specifically European parliamentary system should be set up alongside the national parliamentary system. It is easy to imagine the difficulties raised by such a question in view of the risk of increasing the number of clashes between national and European parliaments. Finally, the elections themselves raised problems because of wide differences between legislation and electoral tradition in the various member countries.

11. The European Council took a bold step in deciding that elections by universal suffrage would be held as from 1978 without having reached agreement on the method of election. It was in fact left to the European Parliament which will be elected in 1978 to determine procedure governing its renewal.

12. It should be noted, however, that ratification of the agreement reached by the nine governments might encounter difficulties and opposition in some of the national parliaments. It is not so much the actual principle of electing the parliament of the European Communities by universal suffrage which raises problems, since this was written into the Rome Treaty ratified long ago by the parliaments of the signatory countries, as the fact that an elected parliament is intrinsically destined to have all-round responsibilities. Indeed, in several countries, fears have been expressed that the European Parliament may seriously impinge upon and acquire a legislative rôle in fields not covered by the Rome Treaty or the ECSC and Euratom Treaties, at the expense of the authority of the national parliaments or governments. These countries must therefore be expected to surround themselves with every precaution to ward off what they consider to be possible encroachment on their national prerogatives.

13. If we now turn to the consequences which these elections may have for the WEU Assembly, two aspects may be discerned.

14. First, the composition of the WEU Assembly will be very different from the European Par-

liament. It will continue to represent the national parliaments whereas the European Parliament will represent the electorate of the various countries. It will be possible for members of the European Parliament to be concurrently members of a national parliament but not necessarily.

15. Compared with the new European Parliament, the WEU Assembly will probably have less authority but it will have the advantage of continuing to ensure a close link between national and European parliamentary functions, which, in fields where member States retain full sovereignty, should provide a better outlet for its work on the foreign and defence policies of WEU member countries. Its rôle will obviously depend on the extent of the rights attributed to the European Parliament in terms of nine-power political co-operation. But in any event the Assembly will still retain its essential rôle of ensuring the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.

16. Your Rapporteur believes that this consideration largely meets the note in Mr. Tindemans' report where he mentioned the possible disappearance of the Assembly. At the present juncture, there is in fact no indication that another European assembly could take its place in the near future.

17. However, insofar as there are grounds for anticipating that Europe will in the future shoulder a larger share of the problems of its own defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the way should now be paved for co-operation between the member countries of WEU and any members of the EEC in the Atlantic Alliance but not WEU who wish to take part in preparing this policy. Enquiries by the General Affairs Committee in Norway and Denmark in 1975 showed that neither seemed prepared to be permanently associated with the work of the Assembly. Enquiries in Greece and Turkey in 1976 were more rewarding since authorities in both countries stated their interest in European co-operation in the fields of foreign policy, defence and armaments production and announced their intention of examining the possibilities offered by WEU in these fields and playing a greater rôle than heretofore in the work of the Assembly.

III. *European union*

18. Information obtained about the informal meeting of the nine Ministers for Foreign Affairs

in Brussels on 20th September 1976 showed that no decisive progress was made in considering the Tindemans report on that occasion. The most detailed discussions appear to have been on the chapter of the report dealing with foreign policy and the conclusion appears to have been reached that the work of the European Council should be extended further in this field. But the governments were not at all inclined to give the Commission any right of initiative in this connection. Moreover, the idea of foreign policy decisions being taken by majority vote seems to be excluded, at least in the near future. The Council will therefore continue to seek a consensus and it is quite evident that it will be far easier to reach agreement on specific issues than on more general definitions of European policy.

19. The Nine are reported to have agreed at that meeting to support the German proposal in the United Nations concerning international measures to combat the taking of hostages, providing *inter alia* for the extradition of guilty parties and the creation of an international human rights tribunal. But this is a very limited step and there is no hope of much progress being made with political union in the immediate future.

20. A second informal meeting was to be held to study the Tindemans report on 30th October. It is understood that most of the Ministers' time was taken up with other matters but although they were prepared to stop differentiating between meetings on the application of the treaties and meetings on political subjects not now covered by the treaties, they nevertheless have not changed the procedure for taking decisions by consensus on political questions. Moreover, they are believed to have discussed the European Parliament's "right of initiative", but no agreement was reached.

21. The indications are therefore that the Nine are still a long way from political union and that their progress may be very slow in the coming years in view of the rate at which they appear to be advancing with their study of the Tindemans report and with structural decisions. This means that although several governments agree with Mr. Tindemans that it is Europe's duty to organise its defence, it will be a long time before anything definite is done since they all appear to agree with Mr. Destremau and Mr. van der Stoep, who both told the Assembly last June that there could be no European defence policy without a common foreign policy.

22. Realism compels the Assembly to be very modest in its requests to the governments and WEU in defence matters. Measures which can be envisaged now are mainly concerned with conserving and applying what exists, i.e. the modified Brussels Treaty, without trying to establish a true European defence system which no one now seems to want. It may at least be wondered to what extent WEU is adapting itself to this situation.

IV. The activities of WEU

23. Only at its meeting on 20th October did the WEU Council consent to communicate to the Assembly the terms of the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee on 31st May 1976.

24. A perusal of the text leaves one perplexed that anything so innocuous, whose tenor was well known, could not have been published earlier. The delay obviously makes one wonder about the validity of the Council's oft-repeated affirmation of its eagerness to maintain good relations with the Assembly. So far, the indications already available to the parliamentarians had been gleaned mainly from speeches to the Assembly at its session in June 1976 by Ministers from three member countries and in particular by the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Destremau, who presented the twenty-first annual report of the Council to the Assembly, and from replies to Recommendation 281 and Written Question 167.

25. Mr. Destremau spoke as follows :

"... bearing in mind the need to avoid any danger of duplication of effort or any interference with the work now being done in other organisations, the Council instructed the Standing Armaments Committee, as an immediate task, to submit a detailed plan for a study which, in the form of a descriptive analysis of the situation of the armaments industries in the member countries, would contribute to a better knowledge of the industrial and economic implications of the standardisation of armaments.

The Council will monitor the progress of work and instruct the Standing Armaments Committee, as may be appropriate."

26. Speaking subsequently on behalf of the French Government and not the Council, Mr.

Destremau explained his country's view of this mandate :

"Although, in sound logic, there cannot be a unified European operational defence without there being a unified European political power, there is no reason why, to save time, we should not conceptualise here and now the conditions for establishing such a defence. In this area and until such time as the strategic concept takes shape, the setting up of a programme group for the standardisation of armaments designed and manufactured by Europeans might prove the desired trigger for developing a European armaments industry. In the same prospect may be viewed the Council of Ministers' remit to the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU to conduct an in-depth survey of our countries' armaments industries. This is being done at Belgium's instigation, firmly backed by ourselves. Moreover it was your Assembly which, on a report I had the honour to submit to it on 8th November 1972, advocated reactivating the Standing Armaments Committee."

27. Similarly, Mr. van der Stoel, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave his country's views :

"I can very well imagine that at a certain point in time the whole complex of existing relations between the member countries of the Community will be translated into what will then be called a union, but that then at a later stage this union will be given powers that it did not possess at the time it came into being.

It does, indeed, seem to me to be a logical sequel to a constantly advancing process of European integration that ultimately defence, too, should be a matter for the union. I have come across a number of comments on this in the report by the Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans. In answering Mr. Leynen my view was, indeed, that I could not imagine how the European Communities could succeed, inside the union, in reaching a common defence policy so long as there was no common foreign policy. The common defence policy must, in the end, be based on a common foreign policy.

.....

I think it would be interesting if we could, at the end of the year, and in the light

of the progress made in the European programme group, show it to have given particularly valuable services, while the Standing Armaments Committee in the WEU sphere made an inventory of industries dealing with armaments. I believe that these analyses and studies might contribute usefully to the continuing discussion on the building of European union."

28. Finally, Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, said in reply to a question by Mr. Rivière on his government's attitude towards the mandate :

"I did not mention (the Standing Armaments Committee) since in my address I was dealing primarily with the political matters that affect us in the Federal Republic in relation to the Alliance as a whole."

29. The difference between these four replies, one given on behalf of the Council by Mr. Destremau and the others by three Ministers on behalf of their countries, call for some comment.

30. First, the decision to give a mandate to the Standing Armaments Committee is not based on the same concepts in the various countries.

31. Only Mr. Destremau, speaking of French policy, placed the Council's move in the context of a European defence policy, which implies that he considered its effect would be quite considerable, whereas the German Secretary of State clearly asserted that the reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee was not among "the political matters that affect us in the Federal Republic in relation to the Alliance as a whole".

32. Mr. van der Stoel's position does not link European union, which he admits will one day have responsibilities in the foreign policy and defence fields, with reactivation of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee. The Seven have therefore agreed on technical measures without, apparently, being clear about their scope.

33. The nature of the mandate in the light of statements made by the Council or by its members should therefore be examined. First of all, it was a Council decision taken in the framework of its organic decision of 7th May 1955 in application of Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty and setting out the rôle of the Standing Armaments Committee. This rôle would thus not be in any way changed or curtailed by the Coun-

cil's new decision which is merely to be seen as a measure in implementation of the 1955 decision.

34. Second, at the moment it only seems to be of limited scope. The Standing Armaments Committee has merely been asked to prepare an outline programme for a study and the Council has yet to decide whether it should lead to the study itself.

35. Third, it would appear that the governments intend to avoid overlapping between the Standing Armaments Committee and the European programme group, but at the same time they allowed for no organic link between the two bodies. Consequently, it is for the governments to ensure co-ordination between the two bodies, one of which is permanent whereas the second is only an *ad hoc* group with no legal status. It might however seem reasonable for the European programme group, to which all the WEU members belong, to be asked to report in one form or another to the WEU Council in order to ensure co-ordination or for a system of reciprocal information to be established, in particular through the international secretariat of the SAC. This would be nothing new since NATO communicates to the Agency for the Control of Armaments the information it needs to fulfil its rôle, sends observers to meetings of the SAC and receives observers from the SAC at the conference of national armaments directors.

36. Finally, it should be pointed out that although the Standing Armaments Committee is to submit its outline programme for a study to the Council before the end of 1976, no time limit is given in the Council's decision for the possible implementation of the outline programme, which considerably restricts the scope of the Council's initiative.

37. Regarding the political aspect of the Council's decision, at least two courses emerge.

38. Mr. Van Elslande's speeches to the Assembly in December 1974 and May 1975, the press conference given by Mr. Van Elslande at the close of the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 31st May 1975, Mr. Destremau's speech to the Assembly in June 1976 and the Council's reply to Recommendation 281 seem to indicate that at least two member governments were concerned about organising European defence and that they intended to leave open the possibility of the organs of WEU playing a rôle in this

field sooner or later. Their view seems to be that WEU might provide the defence element of a future European union.

39. This view does not emerge from the statements by Mr. van der Stoep and Mr. Schmidt in June 1976.

40. The nine Ministers will inevitably have to discuss this matter during their study of the Van Elslande plan. While at the present juncture defence questions are to be excluded from the European union, the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee consists of "a descriptive analysis of the situation of the armaments industry in member countries" to "gain a clear insight into the industrial and economic implications of the standardisation of armaments", i.e. it comes under the heading of economic activities of member countries and consequently concerns the European Economic Community.

41. The study which the Standing Armaments Committee is to prepare does not in fact appear to concern the equipment of armed forces but the armaments industry rather. It is thus far more economic than military and is a matter of drawing up an inventory of such industries and considering their structure and links, which probably implies that it will not be able to overlook commercial matters. It therefore differs fundamentally from the work of the European programme group which deals with the requirements of the armed forces and is, so to speak, the second part of a task which is quite obviously aimed at preparing a European armaments policy based on the now very widely shared view that standardisation is necessary and rationalisation of European production essential if Europe wishes to maintain an industry in this sector capable of holding its own in the world market.

42. Considering the size of the armaments industry in several member countries, its share in exports and the jobs it provides, its survival seems essential in a period of economic recession with employment in jeopardy everywhere and the trade balances of many European countries seriously in deficit. There must be lower cost prices for military equipment if Europe is to maintain and improve its defence capability without too heavy a burden being imposed upon the countries' finances.

43. There is therefore every justification for making an analysis of the particular position

of each country's industry since, in this field, legal status, economic capability, the proportion of State orders, the rôle of international co-operation and technical capabilities vary considerably. This study will probably bring out the weak points of the various industries and show in which fields real European co-operation, or even European organisation of industries and markets, is necessary, desirable or possible. But first and foremost a diagnosis of the European armaments industry must be expected.

44. The fact that the Council made the Standing Armaments Committee responsible for a study of industries shows that it realised that defence matters alone were not the only basis for a European armaments policy and that account had to be taken of economic, legal and industrial aspects. Thus, if it so wishes it can pursue the movement it has started by instructing the Standing Armaments Committee to effect the study for which it is preparing the outline programme with an eye to co-ordination, co-operation and distribution of production, failing which the limited outlets offered by Western Europe's national armed forces would quickly result in the European firms no longer being capable of competing on the world market and in the long run they would be swallowed up.

45. Evidently there was no need for the Seven to agree on the prospects of a European defence policy before contemplating this study in the industrial field. Nor is such agreement necessary for starting it, nor is there any need for supra-national terms of reference before conducting it. The Standing Armaments Committee, composed of government representatives assisted by an international secretariat, will be able to carry out its task on the basis of information provided by governments.

46. Thus, the undertaking is a modest one invoking none of the principles which might arouse differences between member countries. It sets up no new institutions but has the merit of using an existing body whose *raison d'être* was being called in question by the formation of the European programme group. Nevertheless, it must be carried through to a conclusion and this depends essentially on the Council: in view of Europe's present economic difficulties and what is to be expected of the European programme group in the standardisation of armaments, WEU must act without delay, i.e. the outline programme which the Standing Armaments Committee is soon to submit must be studied immediately and the decision to carry out the study

proper must be taken forthwith since, as the Council said in its reply to Written Question 167, "this study could also be useful for the work to be done by the European programme group". Whether this is a serious move or merely a limited step to allay the Assembly's concern about the Council's inaction will be demonstrated by the Council's willingness to act without delay. The time-limit for the Council's decision should normally be its next ministerial meeting at the beginning of summer 1977.

47. Finally, it is to be hoped that the Council will be more diligent in informing the Assembly of its decisions than it was in informing it of the May 1976 mandate.

V. Conclusions

48. To be realistic, it must be admitted that the economic recession in the West since 1973 raises new and serious obstacles to the establishment of the European union sought by the Nine and has made governments cling more firmly to their sovereignty than heretofore. Similarly, no spectacular progress can be expected in the near future. It is some consolation to note that the governments have agreed on a not too remote date for electing the European Parliament by universal suffrage, but the full consequences of this decision must not be drawn until it is seen what reservations the parliaments of certain countries may make in adopting legislation to implement this decision. Likewise, further progress must be made in the European Council's study of the Tindemans report before assessing its impact.

49. The fact that during this period of waiting the WEU Council has taken a step which might lead to an undertaking of concern to the European armaments industry and, perhaps, a future European defence policy seems to indicate that the governments, like the Assembly, believe that WEU should pursue its activities until such time as it can be included in a European union with responsibilities in defence matters. This is a welcome step, but attention should be paid to ensure that the Council does not just stop there. The first indication of the meaningfulness of the decision taken in May 1976 will be given when it is time to pass from the first stage — the outline programme for a study being prepared by the SAC — to the study proper. The scope of the study will then have to be assessed and consideration given to the decisions it leads up to.

*Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new
sources of energy*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Cornelissen, Rapporteur*

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on safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Warren (Chairman) ; MM. Vallez, Lenzer (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Adriaensens, Boucheny (Substitute : Bizet), Mrs. Cattaneo-Petrini, MM. Cornelissen, Craigen, Gölter, Lewis, Mammi, Mart (Substi-

tute : Spautz), van Ooijen, Pecoraro, Phipps (Substitute : Hawkins), Richter, Schmitt, Schwencke (Substitute : Enders), de Stexhe (Substitute : de Bruyne), Treu, Cerneau.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on safeguarding Europe's energy supplies
— new sources of energy

The Assembly,

Considering that there is a close link between Europe's security and safeguarding its energy supplies ;

Aware that even so the Western European governments are unwilling to establish a common energy supply policy within a European framework ;

Considering that no nuclear programme on a large scale is acceptable without a solution being found for the hazards posed by nuclear power, stringent safety measures being established to eliminate these hazards and special attention being paid to the problems of the disposal of radioactive waste ;

Acknowledging the need to reduce consumption of all forms of energy by using them more efficiently and thereby lessening the need to resort to nuclear power ;

Convinced that alternative sources of energy, especially solar energy, could be used more widely instead of nuclear means,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To promote a worldwide convention on both primary and energy resources during which equal consideration should be given to the interests of the developing and developed countries ;
2. To establish a common strategy here and now since oil prices will increase by 10 or 15 % by the end of this year ;
3. To accept joint planning for the improved use of energy resources, increase investments, particularly in coal production including the gasification process, and promote action by industry by guaranteeing long-term security for the development of coal power ;
4. To accord greater attention and financial means to research and development of alternative sources of energy in general, and to solar energy in particular, at both national and European Community levels ;
5. To hold a wide-ranging conference in the framework of the OECD covering all aspects of energy-saving through oil conservation programmes, invitations also being extended to parliamentarians and representatives of employers' and employees' organisations and other civic groups such as consumers' and women's organisations in order to elaborate a common energy-saving strategy.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Cornelissen, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. When the Committee decided to report on alternative sources of energy, the then Chairman, Mr. de Montesquiou, remarked that he had received from Senator Bonnefous his book *Sauver l'humain* in which the author pointed out that alternative sources of energy should be developed since conventional sources of energy were becoming increasingly scarce and nuclear energy was not yet sufficiently developed to be used on a large scale without dangers for humanity.
2. Nobody can be quite sure how the energy demand will have increased by the end of the century. It will depend on many factors subject to considerable uncertainty, two of the more important being the rate of economic growth and the success of energy conservation measures taken in response to the very probable increase in energy prices. However, in the next two decades it is probable that in Western Europe the demand for energy will almost double, in which case a tight rein on consumption will be essential. A tight rein will also be required in the light of increased dependence on oil resources and the increased danger of pollution. Furthermore governments will have to make major changes in their energy policy, reduce consumption of energy and find means of making this policy acceptable to the people.
3. More efficient use of energy resources is most necessary and research and development projects must be undertaken with this in view. Until 1973 the cost of energy from existing sources did not include a charge to cover the cost of seeking alternative sources to take over when existing means were depleted. Future prices will have to allow for this and it is therefore very unlikely that there will be a return to low energy prices in the near future.
4. An examination of the present situation reveals that apart from nuclear fission there are no real short-term alternatives to oil, gas and coal. It would appear that until 1990 the world will be as dependent as always on existing energy resources. However, this does not mean that one day there will be an acute crisis. Coal is in abundant supply everywhere in the world and a shortage is therefore unlikely in the coming century. Australia, South Africa, Indonesia and Alaska, for instance, have enormous coalfields which could be developed, but the extraction of this coal would mean building a vast infrastructure of roads, canals and harbours. Research and development is also being conducted on the gasification of coal which will be in commercial use by the mid-1980s, but a real impact on the energy market is not expected until after the year 2000. Much of the present infrastructure — installations and methods of production and consumption — is still based on rather low oil prices. In housing, for instance, insulation could be greatly improved without much extra research and development but building regulations and measures have to be adapted on a municipal, regional and national scale.
5. Liquefied natural gas is already being shipped from the Middle East to European harbours but much remains to be done concerning better freezing procedures and ensuring security against explosions which, if they occurred in a harbour, would be catastrophic. Nearly all of this natural gas is now burned off at the oilfields. In the future it should be utilised.
6. It is also possible to explore the continental shelf of many countries for oil and gas, and modern technology provides the means of exploiting reserves at great depths and in adverse conditions.
7. The questions now are : How should Western Europe ensure its energy supplies? Should it organise collaboration on a European, Atlantic or worldwide scale? Are there any alternatives to nuclear energy?
8. Your Rapporteur believes that in the short term Western Europe, the United States, Canada and Japan will have to collaborate and set up machinery for crisis management. He feels a purely European or even Atlantic policy is not enough to deal with the worldwide problem of energy supplies for sustaining the industrial growth of the western world.
9. At the same time your Rapporteur wishes to stress the need for joint action by the oil-producing and oil-consuming countries as he considers that a solution which takes account of the interests of all countries concerned can be found only through a joint approach.

10. This is the Committee's first report on new sources of energy and it has been decided that in a further report special attention will be paid to tidal and wave power as well as special measures to economise on energy consumption.

I. The International Energy Agency

11. As early as 1957, leading European politicians and experts began discussing the unhealthy situation of European energy supplies. But in spite of this not one western government was prepared when, in October 1973, earlier prophecies became true, and prices took a sharp upward turn because of the oil crisis. In the United States, price increases led immediately to sharp political reactions, whereas in Western Europe each country began to seek solutions on its own in order to ensure its oil supplies.

12. In the Community, eight of the member States — France excepted — became members of the International Energy Agency which, closely linked to the OECD, was established on an American initiative. France preferred to go its own way, apprehending the consequences for its relations with countries in the Middle East if it became identified with the American policy of confrontation. The French Government, followed by the governments of other EEC countries, tried to establish bilateral collaboration projects with the Middle East oil suppliers. On a diplomatic level contracts were concluded which even the national industries were not able to execute.

13. In the meantime it became clear that Europe did not have the same interests as the United States: Western Europe depended for more than 60% on Middle East oil imports whereas the United States imported 30-40% of its consumption from the Middle East. Moreover, the United States had large energy resources — oil and gas — whereas Western Europe had only small resources. However, President Nixon's goal, that the United States would be independent of foreign energy resources by 1980, will not and probably cannot be achieved — even by 1990.

14. Some of the tasks of the International Energy Agency are to find a means of distributing oil equally in times of crises, to establish measures to economise energy resources and to develop alternative energy resources. The Agency has established an emergency sharing plan which is now operational and which should help the participating countries to overcome an energy

crisis of short duration. Two main measures have been taken, the first being concerned with saving energy and curtailing consumption and the second with the use of each other's stocks and production in the participating countries. Statistically the emergency plan has been tested twice and although there were difficulties in communication the results were positive. Even when statistical exercises are successful, there can be no guarantee that, in the event of another oil boycott by the OPEC countries, the economies of western industrialised countries would not be greatly disrupted.

15. The Agency¹ has also proposed a financial support plan which should protect the industrial world against a financial crisis caused by rising oil prices. The plan would enable industrial oil-importing nations to borrow up to \$25 billion in a financial emergency to continue paying for imported oil and thus to maintain high levels of economic activity and employment. The proposed new fund has found widespread support in Europe and Japan, but the American Senate Banking Committee did not wish to commit itself since it thought such a fund was unnecessary as the industrialised countries have been able to finance their oil bills by borrowing back petrodollars from OPEC members, either through the private market or through the International Monetary Fund.

16. The Federal Republic of Germany which, together with the United States, would have to guarantee most of the borrowing, has made its participation dependent on United States membership.

17. During the 1973 oil crisis the industrialised countries were spared the most serious consequences of the oil boycott imposed by the OPEC countries thanks to the international oil companies which were able to direct oil supplies to the countries subject to boycott. However, the western countries cannot continue to rely only on the international oil companies; they must establish crisis management machinery to handle another crisis should it arise. Apart from action by the Agency, a common policy in a European framework is a necessity, but all proposals made by the European Commission during the past three years have come to naught. The conclusions of the European Commission have been attacked time and again on technical points with the result

1. See Appendix I.

that no common energy policy has been established. On the other hand, none of the European governments has established an acceptable national policy which could operate effectively should the energy crisis of 1973 be repeated. A very serious situation would arise if the OPEC countries again decided to take joint action against the western industrialised world. The latter's security would be jeopardised.

II. *The position of Western Europe*

18. The position of Western Europe has been weaker than it might have been since it failed to establish a common energy policy. Of course it has to be acknowledged that in the Communities the situation varies from country to country, some countries having a favourable and others an unfavourable energy balance. The differences are accentuated by the balance of payments situations in the member countries. An attempt will have to be made to improve their policies towards energy matters and first and foremost governments will have to co-ordinate their fiscal and price policies for energy products. Co-ordination of measures to economise on the use of energy resources also remains a necessity. The lack of energy resources, instead of inspiring unification has, in fact, reduced the possibilities of European collaboration. As a guaranteed supply of energy is one of the essential bases for sound industrial, economic and social development, governments are showing a growing tendency to try first to find national solutions to this international problem.

19. Norway and the United Kingdom have often indicated that the exploitation of oil and gas in their parts of the continental shelf will primarily be conducted in accordance with their own national interests. When the oil crisis started, France, Germany and the United Kingdom opened bilateral discussions with oil-producing countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia and the European Communities were unable to counter these national approaches.

20. One reason for this lack of collaboration is perhaps the close link between security and energy supplies. The unwillingness of the European governments to discuss questions of security within a European framework automatically produces difficulties in establishing a common energy supply policy.

21. Another reason is that many consider Western Europe too small to handle this world-

wide problem of energy resources. In Europe there is clearly a will to collaborate as long as it is a matter of basic research. Within the Community the JET (Joint European Torus) is the masterpiece in the research plans elaborated by the Communities in order to try a new source of energy — fusion. However, once basic research is completed and the stage of applied research and industrial development reached, each country wants to have a say in the trend of development and how their money should be spent. The Community approach means decisions being taken by the Commission in Brussels whereas the International Energy Agency approach leaves decision-making in the hands of the governments of the participating countries. Another disadvantage of the Community approach is that collaboration is between nine countries and it is extremely difficult to organise collaboration between more than three or four. In the International Energy Agency work is conducted by working groups in the same way as in the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society. In this way fourteen working groups of national experts — with one or two lead countries doing the main research and development assisted by participating countries which have a real interest in the subject — prepare reports which are submitted to the plenary committee on energy research and development, which in turn submits them to the Agency authorities for implementation.

22. To his regret, your Rapporteur has to point out that the failure of Euratom has proved that no Community approach to energy is acceptable to the governments of the member countries and that only intergovernmental action can produce results.

23. Participating in the Agency are the United States, Japan and other countries outside Europe — in fact the whole western industrialised world. The European Communities however are at the same time too large and too small: too large to organise detailed research and development and too small as the energy problem requires collaboration between Western Europe, the United States, Canada and Japan, and so the Agency was set up.

24. For theoretical subjects such as energy analysis a systematic study of the energy systems in different countries could be conducted in the framework of international co-operation, in the Community, for instance. It is therefore regrettable that official government representatives originally attributed a low priority to this type of international collaboration.

III. *The North-South dialogue*

25. The so-called North-South dialogue was established on the initiative of the French President. Twice the representatives of the West, OPEC and the third world have met in Paris to discuss a fair distribution of the earth's resources. At the first meeting the United States Government abandoned its policy of trying to break the OPEC cartel and was even prepared to act on OPEC demands to link talks about oil prices with discussions on the future of other raw materials. The third world, however, called for a new economic world order, but this was not acted upon as the West had to turn its full attention to its own recession and inflation problems, which caused commodity prices upon which many poor countries depend for foreign exchange to drop sharply in 1974-75, and increased the prices of manufactured goods. The debt burden that the third world now carries also makes it difficult for them to press too strongly for a new economic world order. The recession and consequently the reduction in oil consumption and the diminishing revenue of the OPEC countries also reduced the negotiating power of these countries. For the time being the North-South dialogue is at a standstill and not much is likely to change until the new United States, German and Japanese governments have been formed and the present economic recovery more firmly established.

26. The interests of the third world, the OPEC countries and the industrialised world nevertheless converge in the desirability of achieving positive results in this dialogue. There is therefore general willingness to work towards this objective.

27. The OPEC countries are aware that one day their oil reserves will be exhausted and therefore they need western technology to help build up a new infrastructure in their countries and thereby continue the industrial development started with oil revenues.

28. Already the third world countries, unable to pay their oil bills, want higher and fixed prices for their own primary resources, but for reasons of recession and inflation the industrialised countries are very reluctant to agree.

29. There is general agreement that new sources of energy should be developed and existing resources used as economically as possible in order to postpone the post-oil era, even though this may mean industry having to adapt itself

to new energy prices and high-energy-consuming machinery being replaced. An example might be to consider reintroducing propeller aircraft which, in terms of energy, are much cheaper to run than jet aircraft. Your Rapporteur always had doubts about the decision to build supersonic aircraft and these are now stronger than ever. The changeover from an economy of cheap energy to more expensive energy resources is however a long-term process.

30. Conservation of energy was a sadly neglected subject until two years ago and much certainly remains to be done. A good start has been made in countries like Sweden and the United Kingdom which have established quite vigorous conservation policies. Within the International Energy Agency national programmes are being confronted, experiences exchanged and detailed examination made of the efficiency of energy utilisation in particular sectors such as transport. But not all countries want rigorous conservation policies and there is hardly any willingness to pursue energy conservation if there is any risk for employment or lifestyle.

IV. *Nuclear energy*

31. The present situation calls for further research into nuclear energy. It seems impossible to dispense with this type of energy although its disadvantages have to be acknowledged.

32. Immediately after the oil crisis there was an even greater interest in nuclear power than before since it is almost the only promising means available to many countries with few energy resources for diversifying their supplies. The lack of a domestic market large enough to justify a nuclear industry may preclude use of this option by some countries, but even a country as small as Luxembourg is planning to build a nuclear power station.

33. By 1980 the OECD could have 180 gigawatts of nuclear capacity, and by 1985, 375 gigawatts, and nuclear energy's contribution to the increase in OECD energy production between 1974 and 1985 could be 415 Mtoe, which is substantially greater than the contribution of any other single form of energy. Given the technical complexity and very large capital investment associated with nuclear power, increases of such magnitude would be a major achievement. Nevertheless, these estimates are considerably lower than the targets adopted by governments after the OPEC oil price increases, indeed they are lower than predic-

tions made before 1974. The project of 474 Mtoe for 1985 is not only much less than the OECD "Energy Prospects" \$9 projection of 756 Mtoe, it is much less than the base case level of 657 Mtoe. Furthermore, in order to achieve the 1985 targets the current lead times of ten years imply that it will be necessary to establish the required sites by the end of 1976, but it is highly unlikely that this can be done.

34. One of the most important reasons for reducing nuclear forecasts has nothing whatever to do with difficulties of building nuclear power plants. It is that the need for nuclear power will be less because of the expectation that the growth in energy consumption of the industrialised countries will be slower, and therefore also the growth in their electricity consumption. Since most of the new electrical capacity is planned to be nuclear, reduced growth in the demand for electricity automatically implies a reduced demand for nuclear power plants.

35. Other constraints to rapid nuclear expansion include financial difficulties, since nuclear power plants are very capital intensive, technical difficulties, and strong general opposition on grounds of health and safety.

36. There is a direct link between zero growth and reduced growth on the one hand and use of energy resources and nuclear energy on the other hand. It might be a good idea if Western European governments were to consider holding a broad-based international conference at which all aspects of nuclear energy would be discussed by the utilities, employers' and employees' unions, parliamentary representatives and representatives of other groups of the population.

37. Your Rapporteur is happy to note that in many OECD countries there is now a trend towards separating institutions concerned with the promotion of nuclear technology from those entrusted with ensuring its safety through appropriate regulations and controls. The worldwide issue of nuclear pollution is extremely worrying as it might lead to the spread of plutonium among the nations of the world. Proliferation of atomic wastes is another aspect to which no solution has yet been found. Light-water reactor safety, safety aspects of steel components in power reactors, protection of installations against external impacts such as crashing aircraft, protection against terrorism: all these require national and international action.

38. So far nuclear fuel has been plentiful in supply and low in cost. However, there may soon

be problems. Due to the tripling of the price of natural uranium over the last three years and the prospect of steep rises in the cost of enrichment facilities — hitherto subsidised by national governments — nuclear fuel costs may in future not be a negligible component of cost as they have been in the past. Furthermore, present reserves of low-cost uranium correspond to only about thirteen years of forward requirements, and there are not yet enough enrichment facilities under contract to provide adequate fuel supplies over the lifetime of nuclear plants now being planned.

39. Because of the steep increase in capital costs (partly due to expenses needed to meet new safety requirements) and in fuel costs, it is not certain that nuclear power will continue to be cheaper than electricity generated by fossil fuels.

40. While these problems are serious and will require close attention, it still seems inevitable that nuclear power will have to make a major contribution towards increasing energy supplies in the next ten years, and that by the end of that period it will represent a significant proportion of total energy production in the industrialised countries. However, safety requirements should have higher priority than the building of nuclear reactors to meet energy requirements.

41. In the past it has taken some sixty years from the time at which a transition to a new energy resource was first discernible until that resource, in turn, reached its peak use and began to decline in favour of other sources. Supplies of oil and gas appear to have reached their sixty-year peak and their respective shares in the energy market are expected to decrease with time. It now seems impossible to wait another sixty years to complete the next transition; a major technological development programme should expedite this process.

42. For nuclear energy this means that special attention should be paid now to the fast-breeder reactors which should become economically operational within fifteen years. The management of plutonium should be made the responsibility of an international organisation as proposed by the United States President.

43. Of special importance is the need to curb the proliferation of nuclear materials and especially spent fuel from civil reactors. On 3rd October 1976, President Ford approved an anti-proliferation programme which involves both domestic and international decisions. The United States will seek to renegotiate existing agree-

ments for nuclear co-operation with some thirty other nations in order to exercise tighter control of the use of nuclear materials ; it will propose an international moratorium of at least three years on the export of nuclear enrichment plants to nations that do not have them and will propose that spent nuclear fuel and non-military plutonium of the United States as well as of other countries be placed under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Finally, it will offer to purchase the spent nuclear fuel of other nations to reduce the risk of misuse. Your Rapporteur is convinced that in the security aspects Euratom could play a greater rôle than at present.

44. Although the present safety record for existing nuclear power programmes in Europe and America is good, many problems, especially safety problems, will have to be solved if nuclear energy is to attain the proportions necessary to fill the gap between the oil-based economy and new sources of energy which are now being developed.

45. Your Rapporteur fully approves the United Kingdom report on nuclear energy, drafted by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution under the chairmanship of Sir Brian Flowers and dated 22nd September 1976, which stated that there should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure the safe containment of long-life highly radioactive waste for the indefinite future. The Royal Commission therefore recommended that research be directed towards other sources of energy such as coal, wind, solar, tide and wave-generated energy.

V. Development of alternative energy resources

46. Since the 1950s the evolution of energy has been characterised by access to low-cost resources. As a result there has been no great research and development on alternative energy resources except nuclear fission and no new technologies with high economic risks have been taken into serious consideration. Nevertheless other sources of energy, such as solar, wind power, methanol and breeder reactors, have promising prospects and much research should be conducted to overcome technical problems. Wave power, biomass conversion and thermonuclear fusion are less promising.

Solar energy

47. One of the fields in which this research and development should now be concentrated is solar energy which, together with geothermal energy, is one of the most promising. Although solar energy is called a new energy source, it has always been used by mankind. The sun was a major source of energy until the advent of the industrial revolution. The problem in exploiting solar energy is not one of developing from first principles an unfamiliar, novel resource, but rather of intercepting and converting to useful localised forms even a very small fraction before it is degraded to heat near the temperature of the earth's surface.

48. Water heating by means of roof collectors is the most developed system among the uses of solar energy for thermal applications in buildings. These collectors are commercially manufactured and used in countries like Australia, Israel, the United States, the USSR and Japan. One of the most interesting experiments was a house in New Mexico, designed to conserve heat, water and electricity so effectively that its heating and electrical needs could be supplied by the sun and wind. In summer the heating system could be converted into a cooling system.

49. However, present commercial developments are limited to small-scale applications and specifically to water heating. The potential for expansion is considerable, especially in countries which have more than a hundred days' sunshine per year. Even in countries like the Netherlands, solar energy for domestic heating might result in a considerable reduction in the demands made on conventional sources of energy, especially natural gas. An energy research study group from the Netherlands Ministries of Economic Affairs and of Scientific Policy considers that some 20 % of existing houses could be partially heated by solar energy if equipped with solar panels and adapted for a conversion installation. These installations could become generally acceptable between 1985 and 2000.

50. The absence of environmental nuisances from these applications provides a strong incentive to further development. Government-subsidised experimental studies are now taking place.

51. Much more research and development would be needed to develop a system whereby solar energy could be transformed into fuel. Several methods are now being studied : biochemical, chemical, electrochemical and agricultural.

52. The technological problems and obstacles standing in the way of a large-scale application such as electricity generation are quite different from those referred to above and a more cautious approach is essential. Both terrestrial and space power generation have been envisaged and there are possibilities of establishing solar power stations in space after the space shuttle has become operational. The most cautious estimates nevertheless show that such power plants would be five to ten times more costly than conventional thermal power plants.

Wind energy

53. Wind could produce sufficient energy to find application in, for instance, electricity generation. Research and development on this source of energy has started seriously and experiments are taking place on a small scale. However, if used on a large scale, environmental problems could become serious. For instance, if 20 % of electricity generated in the Netherlands came from wind energy, 5,000 mills of about sixty metres high would have to be built. Although technologically possible, further study of the environmental aspects is necessary, especially if groups of such mills were to be built in special lots near the coast.

54. Major wind projects are also under way in Japan, Canada, Israel, West Germany and America. Present windmill technology — or other rotary systems using wind for small electricity production — is viable for household electricity or heating, specifically in agriculture. In Britain, it is estimated that 12 % of electricity demand could be met with wind power, if some way could be found to feed it into the power grid.

55. Most of the wind power devices at experimental stage are geared to improving the efficiency of the windmill. Even the newest American design cannot hope to bring large-scale electrical generation.

56. Unfortunately, wind power, like solar power, runs up against the obstacle of storage. Moreover, wind is come-and-go, and thus not as reliable for electricity. Alternate, usually fossil-fuelled, stand-by systems would have to be kept on hand for windless spells.

Geothermal energy

57. After solar and wind energy, geothermal energy is the next most important of the non-conventional natural sources, which are virtually

inexhaustible. Natural underground reservoirs of steam and hot water are now being tapped on a small scale, and by the end of this decade the production of electric power from steam fields will probably be quadrupled.

58. Basically there are two sources of geothermal energy :

(i) Deposits of hot water associated with a volcanic environment. These so-called "hot springs" have been used since Roman times and have been developed in Italy, the United States, Iceland, Japan, the USSR and New Zealand. In 1960, in the United States a small geothermal power plant of 12,500 kilowatts capacity was established in Northern California — the so-called "Geysers" field.

(ii) Hot rocks. Research workers at the energy technology support unit at Harwell are urging the Department of Energy to invest £250,000 a year for the next two or three years to study in detail the viability of drilling for heat. Energy is obtained from hot rocks by boring down to their level, pumping in cold water, and extracting hot water. However, the technical difficulties of this method are such that it has not yet proved practical. Experiments are being carried out in New Mexico.

59. The EEC has 5.4 m.u.a. to spend on research and development on geothermal energy. The money will be spent in two phases — the first phase, worth just over 1 m.u.a., will cover work to the end of 1976, and the second phase will run from 1977 to the middle of 1979.

60. The Commission wants to encourage work in all areas of geothermal energy — from information gathering (which covers Britain's position on the subject) to the exploitation of hot rock geothermal energy, and the use of hot water from geothermal sources.

61. A major factor standing in the way of the exploitation of geothermal energy is the high cost of transmitting the energy over any distance. Another technical problem is that of extracting energy from hot rock reservoirs, where there is no water underground to bring the heat to the surface.

Energy through bioconversion

62. Scientists from many countries met in Washington on 17th and 18th March 1976 to study on a large scale the means of converting waste

into useful products. A rough definition of bioconversion is the conversion of the earth's unused organic matter into combustible or edible matter. Waste from cities, industries, farms and forests can be burned and used as a source of energy. New forms of food and fuel can be grown on farms either on land or sea.

63. During the two-day conference in Washington, it was pointed out that organic waste alone represents in energy terms the equivalent of over 1,000 million barrels of oil.

VI. Conclusions

64. There is no doubt whatsoever that there is a close link between the security of Western Europe and the safeguarding of its energy supplies. The immediate reaction of the United States Secretary of State on the oil boycott of the OPEC countries and his threat to send in American troops to occupy the oilfields of the Middle East make it more than clear how closely western defence is linked to a steady oil supply. The reverse side of this close link is that the Western European governments are extremely reluctant to hand over any decision-making in the field of energy supplies to a common authority¹. One reason is that national governments will do anything they can to assure their countries' needs even to the detriment of their neighbours. Secondly, as the defence of Western Europe is assured in an Atlantic and not a European framework all Western European countries, except France, wish to discuss oil supplies in this type of framework and accepted the American proposal to establish an international energy agency accessible to all OECD member countries. Further, of the NATO countries, Norway did not agree to be a full member because of its own oil resources. The result of this state of affairs was that the Western European governments did not wish to establish a common energy supply policy within a European framework. This is the more regrettable because a consequence was that no common policy could be adopted on alternative sources of energy either.

65. Most of our present energy is obtained by depleting irreplaceable fossil fuels — coal, oil

1. See Document 626 on oil and energy problems submitted by Mr. Krieg, and Document 656 on the energy crisis and European security submitted by Sir John Rodgers.

and natural gas. It took hundreds of millions of years to accumulate these resources of the earth and with the exception of coal they are due to run out in a relatively short time at the present rate of consumption. In the long term other sources of energy must be found and it is important to examine the practical options that technology may offer in solar and nuclear energy in relation to the economic, environmental and social consequences of these choices.

66. At the same time it is absolutely necessary to reduce consumption of all forms of energy by using them more efficiently. A recent study by the International Energy Agency has shown that at least 20 % more energy could be gained on present consumption if more efficient use were made of existing resources and with only minor alterations in the equipment in service. The Agency is very concerned about the meagre results of the oil conservation programmes and the dangerous complacency in the public mind about the problem of future supplies and prices. Three years after prices were quadrupled, at a moment when the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is considering yet another increase in prices, the general public believes that the energy crisis is behind us, although this could not be further from the truth.

67. The consumer countries are less than a decade away from the point at which their demand will reach the maximum levels the producing nations are willing to supply. The implications are an ever-greater price pressure and further interruptions in supplies. Given the long lead times of energy research and development and energy investment, Western Europe cannot rely on the early availability of energy alternatives on a commercial basis. Oil remains today the dominant source of energy. Last year it provided half the total primary energy requirements of the industrial democracies. More than two-thirds of their oil requirements were met by imports. In several member countries of the International Energy Agency, such as the United States, Canada and New Zealand, fuel prices remain well below world levels which does not encourage fuel-saving measures. Increased energy saving requires measures such as prices raised to world market levels, the introduction of effective motor and other transportation efficiency standards, the monitoring of energy conservation in industry, the application of insulation standards and energy-saving building codes.

68. The Agency sees as measures required to stimulate energy production outside the OPEC

States : more investment in oil and gas exploration and development, larger private sector financing and involvement in alternative energy resources with particular attention to the production of energy from coal, and research into the gasification process.

69. Public opposition to nuclear power in Western Europe is gathering the kind of impetus that has already slowed down reactor building in many parts of the United States. There, opponents of nuclear power have managed to have proposals to limit its development discussed in the 2nd November 1976 elections in the States of Arizona, Colorado, Oregon, Washington, Montana and Ohio, as earlier on in California, but they were defeated in all these States.

70. In the Netherlands, a decision to build more than the two existing nuclear facilities has been postponed until next year. In Norway and Denmark, plans to build the first atomic power plant have been put off. This development brings logically with it a programme of research directed towards the most effective use of coal and alternative energy resources such as solar energy, whose large-scale use it is believed would have a minimal effect on the environment.

71. For several decades the needs for electrical energy in Western Europe will be met mainly from coal or oil-fired stations. The possible use of nuclear fission energy from uranium as an alternative depends upon economic viability, which in its turn will be governed by safety factors. The cost of fusion energy cannot be assessed until its scientific and engineering feasibility is established and this may require two decades of research. Solar energy has the potential, as yet unproven, to supplement resources but extensive

research will be required to identify appropriate means of solar energy conversion.

72. Solar energy research is being undertaken in countries such as the United States, the USSR, India, Japan and Israel and, in Western Europe, in France and Italy. Close collaboration within a European framework as well as with other countries will provide more rapid progress than going it alone. However, the financial means should be placed at the disposal of the experts. An impediment to establishing a common energy strategy within the European framework is that no common bottom price for North Sea oil has been adopted although the latest European Council meeting of Heads of State and Government gave its approval to such a decision.

73. In its recommendation the Committee warns the Council of Ministers that a common strategy on energy should be established since oil prices will certainly be increased by 10 or 15 % before the end of this year. A worldwide convention on primary and energy resources should be promoted, the interests of both the developing and industrialised countries being safeguarded.

74. Finally, the Committee proposes a wide-ranging conference covering all aspects of energy saving. Representatives of parliaments, of employers' and employees' organisations and other civic groups such as consumers' and women's organisations should be invited together with experts from national and international institutions and organisations. Only then will it be possible to adopt a sensible attitude towards energy-saving measures, which are in the short term the only alternative to a more serious energy crisis than in 1973, and to elaborate a common energy-saving strategy.

APPENDIX I

***International Energy Agency stresses need for continued efforts to save energy*¹**

The member countries of the International Energy Agency have achieved substantial results as regards energy saving. They could, however, considerably reduce demand, but the prospects of the conservation drive being maintained are uncertain.

These are among the summary conclusions of the report on energy conservation which the International Energy Agency has just published. It appears that in 1975, total energy consumption was reduced by 14.3 % compared to the expected consumption had the average 1968-73 energy consumption growth rate held through 1975. The 1975 consumption was 4.8 % below actual 1973 figures, though a portion of these savings was attributable to an exceptionally mild winter in many IEA regions, and the general world economic slowdown. However, even with the cyclical slowdown which caused a drop in industry's output (because it was operating at a level much lower than its full capacity), most countries reduced the amount of energy consumed for every unit of gdp produced.

Furthermore, many countries have adopted vigorous measures and have implemented programmes to increase energy yields. The majority have considerably increased energy prices or energy taxes, in order to stimulate energy conservation, and nearly all have adopted new insulation standards for new buildings and measures to encourage the renovation of old buildings. Finally, all the IEA countries are trying to bring home to their citizens the principles of the rational use of energy resources.

The authors of the IEA report note however that the majority of the countries are not devoting as much determination and effort to conserving energy as they are to increasing their own energy supply. This is decidedly regrettable, since one barrel of oil saved is as useful as a barrel of oil produced, and it is even more useful in many respects. However, in many countries the increase in the supply of energy is considered

from the investment angle, with all the advantages that this is supposed to bring in the form of increased employment and gdp growth. On the other hand, conservation expenditure is discussed in terms of costs and is assumed to reduce gdp growth. Most careful studies show that this conclusion is wrong, stresses the IEA in its report, since, because of their better economic returns, investments aimed at conserving energy are less expensive than the development of internal energy sources. Moreover most investments for conserving energy have positive side-effects on the environment.

The report makes very precise criticism with respect to the member countries of the Agency whose energy conservation programmes are considered insufficient, and for future development it believes that the main countries of the IEA should insist on conservation programmes being adopted. In fact, it is very worrying to note that certain member States are still fixing energy prices at a level which is lower than prices on the world market, which in coming years might lead to a decrease in the investments set aside for improving energy efficiency and cause energy consumers to lose interest in the rational use of energy.

Amongst the countries whose effective results of energy conservation are higher than average, the report above all mentions *Germany*, where the programme is based on fixing energy prices to correspond to world market levels, except in the case of coal whose price is kept above international levels; moreover, petrol and heating oil are heavily taxed; *Belgium* which has a very full programme, providing loans with interest subsidies and subsidies for industry and the construction industry, but strict measures are perhaps necessary to implement a system of private car sharing, to improve public transport and to cut down the use of cars by one person; *Denmark* which ranks among the leading IEA countries for the results it has effectively achieved in energy conservation by means of a tariff and taxation system which is one of the most stringent in the IEA countries; *Italy* is also above the average and has recorded very high specific efficiency results in the transport sector and in industry

1. See "Europe", No. 2058 (new series), 24th September 1976.

where a fairly full programme has been adopted ; the *Netherlands* — excellent results on the basis of prices which are higher than or equal to world prices, despite the fact that specific measures are not fully in place ; the *United Kingdom* where results are higher than average, particularly in the transport sphere, though specific efficiency is fairly low in industry. In this sector a programme has been adopted which includes some very posi-

tive aspects, but which could also be greatly improved.

If nearly all the member States of the Community have results which are higher than the average recorded by the whole of the IEA countries (this is also true of Japan), the United States, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland and Sweden recorded results which were lower than average.

APPENDIX II

Energy consumption in WEU countries

The development of total primary commercial consumption of energy from 1960 to 1973 was from 487.3 million tons of oil, or equivalent, to 870.1 million tons of oil, or equivalent, i.e. a yearly increase of 4.56 %. For the years 1974 and 1975 the figures were 856.2 and 816 million tons of oil or equivalent respectively.

1960	487.3			
1961	500.9			
1962	530.8			
1963	573.2			
1964	586.5			
1965	605.2			
1966	615.7			
1967	627.6			
1968	664.7			
1969	714.5			
1970	771.0	Projection from 1975 onwards		
1971	788.2			
1972	815.1			
1973	870.1			
1974	856.2			
1975	816.0			
		On the basis of the average annual increase of 4.56 % from 1960-73	On the basis of EEC forecasts : 1975-80 a 4 % annual increase ; 1980-85 a 3.5 % annual increase	If consumption doubled from 1975 to 2000 and the annual growth rate were 2.81 %
	1980	1020	993	937
	1985	1275	1179	1077
	1990	1593	—	1237
	1995	1991	—	1421
	2000	2488	—	1632

Source : Statistical office of the Netherlands Ministry for Economic Affairs, Directorate-General for Energy.

Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy

AMENDMENT No. 1¹
tabled by Mr. Cornelissen

In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “during which equal consideration should be” and insert “equal consideration being”.

Signed : Cornelissen

1. See 11th Sitting, 1st December 1976 (Amendment adopted).

Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy

AMENDMENT No. 2¹

tabled by Mr. Valleix

In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in the framework of the OECD" and insert "with the concurrence of the OECD and in the framework of the EEC".

Signed: Valleix

1. See 11th Sitting, 1st December 1976 (Amendment adopted).

Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy

AMENDMENT No. 3¹
tabled by Mr. Vohrer

After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph :

“To draft further safety regulations for nuclear energy production, harmonised at Western European level, which should allow any population concerned, especially in frontier regions, to be involved in a democratic decision on the siting of nuclear plants ;”

Signed : Vohrer

1. See 11th Sitting, 1st December 1976 (Amendment adopted).

551.46
+ 341.225
+ 6(CST 03)(1)

European oceanographic activities

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Craigen, Rapporteur*

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on European oceanographic activities

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APPENDIX

Fourth and fifth sessions of the Law of the Sea Conference, United Nations Headquarters, New York City — 15th March-17th May and 2nd August-17th September 1976

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Warren (Chairman); MM. Valleix, Lenzer (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Boucheny (Substitute: Bizet), Mrs. Cattaneo-Petrini, MM. Cornelissen, Craigen, Göltner, Lewis, Mammi, Mart (Substi-

tute: Spautz), van Ooijen, Pecoraro, Phipps (Substitute: Hawkins), Richter, Schmitt, Schwenecke (Substitute: Enders), de Stexhe (Substitute: de Bruyne), Treu, Cerneau.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on European oceanographic activities

The Assembly,

Noting the Council's reply to Recommendation 275 that no European oceanographic authority should be set up, even in the framework of an existing European organisation ;

Noting also the total absence of a common overall European policy with respect to mining seabed minerals, prospecting for and exploitation of other marine resources, marine pollution and scientific oceanographic research ;

Expressing satisfaction however with European co-operation during the negotiations of the Law of the Sea Conference in New York ;

Aware of the existence of numerous oceanographic organisations and *ad hoc* bodies in worldwide, Atlantic, Western European and smaller regional frameworks ;

Aware of the defence aspects of many oceanographic activities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

1. To define their own national maritime policies ;
2. To try to work out a general European strategy while at the same time proceeding with co-operation in practical and specific oceanographic subjects and to consider setting up a standing steering committee of national authorities for this purpose ;
3. To study possible means of co-operation in a regional framework, such as the North Sea area, between all countries interested in :
 - (a) the defence by national coastguard forces or navies of oil rigs and other installations which come within that area but which are outside territorial waters ;
 - (b) the establishment of a common programme and strategy for policing the 200-mile economic zone ;
 - (c) reaching agreement on the joint implementation of all conventions on pollution ;
 - (d) collaboration on basic maritime research and development.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Craigen, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. The purpose of this report is to focus the attention of parliamentarians in WEU member countries on some, though by no means all, of the political, strategic, economic and ecological questions which will have to be considered by electorates in the member States and decided upon by their respective governments.

I. United Nations Law of the Sea Conference

2. The third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference has set itself an ambitious set of tasks in its aim of attaining international agreement on a comprehensive treaty to cover all aspects of ocean use and management. The forthcoming session next spring will be a make or break affair in establishing an international régime for the world's oceans which cover seven-tenths of the surface of the globe. Although the fifth session ended at New York in September 1976 with no agreement in sight, national governments have been required to think more about the problems of oceanography and the need for international solutions.

3. The third Law of the Sea Conference has gone further than its two predecessors in the fifties and sixties. But then nations have been thinking more about the treasures of the seas in the last decade. They may also have to think more about the dangers of uncontrolled exploitation of these resources. "People must understand that their fate is at stake" warned Commander Jacques Cousteau of the Oceanic Institute of Monaco when speaking on 24th April 1976 about the conference, for "ecologists know very well that the human species cannot survive if the oceans die".

4. Dr. Kurt Waldheim emphasised the global significance of the Law of the Sea Conference when at Caracas on 20th June 1976 he said the deliberations "must succeed lest old quarrels on land be replaced by new quarrels at sea". There has been a growing consciousness of the economic potential of the seas since the second world war and President Truman's declaration of a 200-mile economic zone round the coast of the United States back in 1945 foreshadowed the United States hegemony in the field of ocean technology

which has developed. Speaking for the United States on 8th April 1976, the Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, highlighted the importance of what is at stake in the law of the sea deliberations when he said "the world was facing the prospect of mounting conflict" and the current negotiations might be "the world's last chance to avoid such a conflict".

5. The work of the Law of the Sea Conference has been developed by three principal committees :

- (i) the proposed international seabed authority and the exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed ;
- (ii) the extent of the territorial jurisdiction of States and the proposed 200-mile economic zone, including the problems of fishing rights and the passage through straits ; and
- (iii) the protection of the marine environment, scientific research and technology.

There was also a working group on the settlement of disputes dealing with the principle of compulsory settlement procedure.

II. Western European union

6. Even if international agreement is beyond reach at the moment through the Law of the Sea Conference, there are compelling reasons why some form of régime within the European continent may be necessary. Europe is enveloped by a coastline of some 36,000 miles stretching from the Norwegian and Soviet border in the north to the Dardanelles in the south. The British Isles alone have a coastline of about 8,600 miles. All but Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Holy See and San Marino are littoral States. WEU has long since recognised the importance of oceanography. Mr. Schloesing's report on European policy in the field of technology — oceanography (Document 496) was presented at the fifteenth ordinary session in 1969, and the juridical problems of oceanography today (Document 523) was presented by Mr. La Loggia at the sixteenth ordinary session in 1970.

7. Within the past five years the demand for new sources of energy and the potential of North Sea oil and natural gas deposits has coloured public thinking about oceanography in Western Europe. It has possibly distracted public attention away from the ecological and military implications of the use and management of the waters around our shores. Growing conflict may develop between fishing interests in meeting our demands for food supplies and the economic interests in the race for energy and mineral resources. To some extent space exploration has an attraction for the public which the exploration of our seas or inner depths does not hold.

8. Two recent studies by the Council of Europe may be related to oceanographic matters for they touch respectively on the distribution of the potential wealth of the world's oceans and on the technological exploitation of those resources. North-South dialogue (Document 3763) by Mr. Vedovato deals with the question of industrialised nations assisting the developing countries. The other report by Mr. Holtz on multinational corporations has a bearing on the exploitation of seabed resources.

9. Many of today's developing countries had not yet emerged in 1958 when the first United Nations Law of the Sea Conference reached agreement on the continental shelf. The group of seventy-seven would like a moratorium on the exploitation of seabed mineral resources until an international régime can be established and agreement reached on the distribution of resources. They would like ocean resources to be developed for the benefit of the world community and especially the underdeveloped nations. Natural self-interest rather than ecological considerations are uppermost in their minds. However, it is doubtful if the forces of technology can be held back until such international agreements are concluded.

10. Friction between the developed and underdeveloped nations will grow if oceanic resources are to be gained only by the advanced industrial nations. President Giscard d'Estaing pointed out at the Franco-African Conference in Paris in May 1976 that 45 % of the world's mineral production is controlled by the industrialised nations. With 70 % of the world's population the non-industrialised nations have a mere 7 % of world industrial production. But the developing countries export about one-half of the requirements of the industrialised countries for some products. The price of certain commodities

may already be forcing the industrialised nations to look for alternative sources of supply if not on grounds of cost then on strategic considerations. Since technological resources are largely in the hands of the advanced industrial nations they monopolise the means of exploiting and developing seabed resources. It is here that the importance of multinational corporations operating on the basis of a global strategy is discernible. The OECD has already found it necessary to draw up guidelines for multinational companies and some form of oversight of multinational corporations may be even more necessary in the future in respect of their oceanographic activities.

III. Territorial jurisdiction and economic zones

11. All but one member of WEU is a coastal State and Belgium with 60 km has the smallest coastline. However, all depend on the free passage of their imports and exports. Western Europe's prosperity has been largely developed through international trade and the manufactures of its people. The EEC is the largest trading bloc in the world with one-quarter of world imports and one-fifth of world exports. Free passage on the high seas is therefore essential to its lifelines. The extension of the limits of territorial waters throughout the world from three miles to twelve miles is the equivalent of something like five times the land area of WEU member States. The recognition of economic zones of 200 miles around the world's littoral States will mean that two-fifths of the ocean surface lies within the grasp of the coastal States. Russia has accepted a 12-mile limit for about seventy years and will accept a 200-mile economic zone. The Soviet Government was critical of the Chinese for supporting the idea of a 200-mile territorial area. The Pacific States of Latin America proclaimed sovereignty over a 200-mile area of sea in 1954 under the Santiago Conference in order to safeguard natural resources. More recently Iceland has declared unilaterally a 200-mile fishing zone.

12. Western Europe is likely to come under increasing pressure in its domestic politics as the developing nations seek to exercise new forms of collective bargaining in the world's commodity markets. The 1973 oil crisis was a foretaste of what is happening and did not exactly demonstrate cohesion within the EEC against the pull of national self-interest within the Community's membership. The European Community is not rich in raw materials and in 1974 some

60 % of its imports were raw materials and unprocessed goods. In that same year mineral fuels represented about one-third of the total imports. It is known that the world's seabeds cover greater mineral deposits than exist under land. When the mineral deposits on land become scarce or strategically beyond reach, national governments will be under pressure to encourage the exploration and exploitation of underwater deposits. Whether the costs of extraction will be calculated on the basis of including the social and ecological factors involved remains to be seen.

13. The EEC is generally approaching the extension of limits within a Community framework. However, conflicting national interests are not going to be easily reconciled. Negotiations over a common fisheries policy indicate only too well the difficulties of obtaining a settlement within a Community of Nine. A 200-mile Community fishing zone which keeps out non-Community members is one matter, but the problems of catches, conservation and competition represent a real obstacle to agreement. United Kingdom fishermen want an exclusive preference zone of fifty miles and see their industry's economic future at stake. Since more than half of Europe's fish are caught within fifty miles of the British coastline there is real concern over unfair competition and the dangerous depletion of stocks. Lack of trust and suspicion over the operation of quotas will not make for easy agreement.

14. The Treaty of Rome clearly specifies the sovereign rights of member States over economic activities on the continental shelf. As recently as April 1975 the Commission made it clear that the Community's energy policy would not affect the United Kingdom's control of North Sea oil and gas because the United Kingdom Government enjoyed "complete sovereignty over these resources". There would certainly be ruptions within the Community if it were otherwise. It is difficult to envisage national governments in Europe, whether in NATO, COMECON or neutral, being willing to surrender their sovereignty when it comes to the extraction of economic resources off their coasts. The pressures are already in the opposite direction. The economies of nations may increasingly depend upon success in underwater mining. This independent compulsion towards sea mining will however demand greater interdependence of action in terms of civil co-operation and changing defence strategies.

15. The policing of extended territorial waters and of the economic zone limits beyond will not be without cost. National governments will require to strengthen their civil police and coast-guard authorities to meet these additional responsibilities. Navies which have the natural rôle of defence may well be somewhat reluctant to become police authorities as well. Moreover, internal security is a factor which cannot be ignored as the Dutch discovered recently in respect of the number of Palestinians employed on oil rig developments. The problems of sea traffic management are also likely to increase. It may be imperative before long to establish a navigational régime in the North Sea. Experience has already been gained from the Dover Strait traffic separation scheme. There will certainly be a need for more hydrographic information. With the use of larger vessels there is the constant danger of vessels, particularly oil tankers, running aground in waters which may not have been properly charted. Last year the United Kingdom hydrographic service earned £3 million in foreign exchange from sales of charts and other publications. Although operating within the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, the hydrographic school at Plymouth has an international reputation and attendance and an important civil function.

IV. *Protecting marine environment*

16. It is optimistic to believe that ecological imperatives will lead to a common approach towards the use and management of the seas and the control and prevention of pollution. In the short term, financial considerations, resource factors and defence strategies are bound to outweigh marine pollution in importance. Yet closed seas like the Mediterranean present the problems which arise when ecological considerations are not given their proper importance. Beaches have already been closed to tourists on certain parts of the Mediterranean and it should be remembered that both the North Sea and Mediterranean are considerable recreational resources. Commander Cousteau has warned that the oceans could be "dead in less than fifty years" unless drastic action is taken. There may be no long term for the world community unless our priorities alter. But efforts to achieve international agreement will not be easy. There is the polarisation between the developed and developing nations, between the coastal and landlocked countries and there is the ideological divide between East and West. Agreement even

within the European region of the globe will have to overcome these factors.

17. Much of the pollution of sea water comes from land-based sources and particularly in estuaries and ports. The EEC approach to legislation on pollution is generally founded on the need to prevent the distortion of competition among member States. This requires member States to adopt similar measures although their geography varies considerably. United Kingdom rivers are generally shorter than many of those on the European continent and the United Kingdom Government has taken the view that the anti-pollution measures required on the Humber or Thames are often different from those needed for the Rhine. Although there is a pollution problem on Britain's shores its impact is lessened by the turbulence of the North Sea and Atlantic waters which partly clean themselves. Anti-pollution measures cost money and there is a disinclination among industrial nations to meet these costs. But there is equally no great interest evident among the developing countries in their desire for economic growth to lose investment by imposing off-putting anti-pollution restrictions on industrialists. Yet the experience of industrial countries in river purification measures must suggest that the cost of undoing the damage done is greater than the short-term cost of initial control of pollution.

18. The activities of the oil companies in the North Sea has naturally centred attention in that area. The United Kingdom Government has recently published a report on accidental oil pollution of the sea. The report covers most risks, including spills from oil tankers. The Torrey Canyon disaster probably resulted in more ecological damage from detergents used to disperse the oil. The Norwegians have been considering a mechanical recovery clean-up system with inflatable booms to contain the spillage until the oil can be scooped up. This would avoid the expense of detergents, but there are doubts about the viability of mechanical systems in North Sea conditions.

19. Anti-pollution conventions necessitate political will on the part of their signatories if they are to be effective. On 4th May 1976 the Council of Ministers of the EEC adopted a directive on dangerous substances in the marine environment which should eventually lead to an oversight at Community level of marine pollution originating from land-based sources. The European Commission has introduced a draft directive on dumping at sea and has intimated its intention

of preparing a draft directive on marine pollution originating from shipping. The practice of shunting waste products may be more serious than is generally admitted, and the decision, for example, of the Finns in May 1975 not to allow the Finnish tanker to dump 100 tons of arsenic waste in the South Atlantic serves to highlight the dilemmas involved and the need for firm governmental action in such situations.

V. A European maritime régime

20. The first question is whether most countries are clear on their own maritime policies before any realistic attempts can be made to achieve the kind of co-operation necessary to safeguard the life of our seas whilst responding to national resource needs. The existence of Western European Union is in itself recognition of a common interest. So too are many of the other treaties to which European nations are signatories. But tidal movements are no respecters of national boundaries and one nation's sewage can easily be washed onto another nation's coastline. WEU represents only seven of the nine member States of the EEC, and Ireland and Denmark, with its interest in the Faroes and Greenland, are important maritime States. The Council of Europe contains only nineteen member States with varying interests in maritime matters.

21. It has been suggested that a European maritime régime is urgently required. However, an essential precondition for this will be the need for WEU member governments to define their own national maritime policies. Moreover, even with détente the potential for conflict in Europe is ever present. The lack of entente on oceanographic matters could have its dangers too. Collective inaction over the use and management of European waters is unlikely to happen because the dangers of doing nothing are too great. COST (European co-operation in scientific and technological research) is an example of co-operation over the establishment of a European network of ocean data stations. This should provide a good deal of data about meteorological and oceanographic conditions. CREST (European co-operation in scientific and technological research committee) currently has a working group looking at the calibration and inter-calibration of oceanographic instruments in the European Community.

22. European waters are bound to hold an increasing economic importance for littoral

States. The balance of economies as well as the balance of sea power may depend upon their effective policing. To what extent there could be a pooling of the policing arrangements in the areas outwith territorial waters is something which national governments may have to consider. The need for more adequate charting will grow as policing arrangements gain in importance. Moreover, in the North Sea, with the

operation of oil rigs and laying of pipelines and cables, the movement of shipping and submarines will come up against added hazards. The effectiveness of the submarine as a strike force cannot be ignored in terms of defence strategies in normal times. But as more of the littoral States find their economies becoming orientated to seabed mining they will have more at stake in the protection of coastal waters.

APPENDIX

**Fourth and fifth sessions of the Law of the Sea Conference
United Nations Headquarters, New York City**

15th March-7th May 1976

and

2nd August-17th September 1976

Attendance

About 5,000 participants representing about 150 member countries of the United Nations and twelve other countries that are members of one or more of the United Nations specialised agencies. The conference is the largest international gathering of States ever held.

Previous sessions

These are the fourth and fifth sessions of the conference. The conference opened on 3rd December 1973 with an organisational session in New York City. The first substantive session was from 20th June to 29th August 1974 in Caracas. The second substantive session was from 26th March to 10th May 1975 in Geneva.

Objective

The goal of the conference is to draw up a single international treaty covering all aspects of ocean use. Some of the issues before the conference are provided for in four Geneva conventions on the law of the sea that are in effect¹. The conference also is considering issues that are new concepts in international maritime law.

Previous conference

The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea met at Geneva in 1958, with eighty-six States participating. It produced four international conventions: the territorial sea and contiguous zone, the high seas, fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas, the continental shelf. The number of parties to these conventions ranges from thirty-five to fifty-five.

A second conference met in Geneva in 1960 to resolve disagreements over fishery limits and the breadth of the territorial sea. However, the

1. See Mr. Schloesing's report, Document 496.

eighty-two States represented were unable to adopt any substantive proposals.

Method of operation

The work of the third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference has been organised into the following committee structure:

- Committee One handles all issues relating to the exploration for and exploitation of deep sea resources, particularly the establishment of an international authority to regulate such activity.
- Committee Two deals with the territorial sea, zones of jurisdiction adjacent to the territorial sea (economic zone), straits used for international navigation, the continental shelf, maritime boundaries of archipelagic States and islands, and all aspects of national jurisdiction.
- Committee Three deals with marine pollution and scientific research.
- In addition, there is a General Committee, which makes procedural decisions, a Credentials Committee (nine members), a Drafting Committee (twenty-three members) and a Working Group on the settlement of disputes.

Rules

So far the conference has proceeded on the basis of consensus reached through negotiations, without formal voting. The rules, adopted at Caracas in 1974, require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting in plenary session for adoption of a substantive decision, and a simple majority of those present and voting for a substantive decision by a committee. In 1974, the conference endorsed a statement by the President that it should make every effort to reach agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus and there should be no voting on such matters until all efforts of consensus had been exhausted.

Position of the European Community

On 27th July 1976, the Ministerial Council of the Communities defined joint positions to be submitted by the Community representatives at the Law of the Sea Conference which was to reconvene in New York on 2nd August and last until 17th September 1976. The joint positions related in particular to the following matters: establishment of a 200-mile economic zone, extension of the continental shelf and exploitation of the seabed.

The Community representatives were also briefed on the negotiation of a clause allowing the Community as such to participate in the future Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Also on 27th July, the Ministerial Council adopted the following declaration of intent regarding the problems raised for the Community fishing industry by the establishment of a 200-mile economic zone:

“The Council notes an increasing trend amongst countries with large-scale sea fishing industries to extend unilaterally their fishing zones to 200 miles, without awaiting the outcome of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Certain countries which have been very active in fishing in coastal zones, particularly in the North Atlantic, have already extended the boundaries of their jurisdiction or taken a decision to do so as from 1st January 1977. This trend is bound to result in over-exploitation of the fish stocks, thus jeopardising the maintenance of the Community’s fishing resources.

The Council expresses its resolve to protect the legitimate rights of Community fishermen.

The Council, convinced of the necessity for the member States to act jointly:

- considers that measures must be adopted in order to deal with this situation and that they must be taken in accordance with the conclusions of the third Conference of the United Nations on the Law of the Sea: it is aware however that the trend referred to above could force the member States to act as soon as circumstances render action necessary, i.e. before the proceedings of the conference are brought to a conclusion;
- to this end, adopts the principle of concerted action under which member States

would be led to extend the limits of fishing zones to 200 miles, fishing within these limits being subject to the common fisheries policy of the Community;

- agrees to decide on the ways of implementing such action in the light of the outcome of the next meeting of the Conference on the Law of the Sea and not later than 1st October 1976.”

It should be noted that Canada, Iceland, Mexico and the United States had already prepared or adopted the necessary legislation for a 200-mile fishing zone. France, too, is preparing legislation to create along its coast an economic zone of 200 miles.

The conference issues

Mining of the seabed

Before the conference opened many people were of the opinion that it would be concluded successfully, although a number of problems still had to be solved. The most serious problems concerned control of the seabed. The United States and other industrialised nations want free and orderly, non-discriminatory access on the part of individual countries to deep-sea raw materials beyond the 200-mile limit or, if the case arises, the periphery of the continental shelf. This is the basic principle put forward by the industrialised nations with the necessary marine technology at their disposal. The United States in particular opposed any State-by-State quota or similar provisions which would arbitrarily restrict access to the ocean floor.

The opposing view was put forward by the group of seventy-seven which favoured the setting up of an international seabed authority with a monopoly status to protect the interest of land producers. This group fears an exploitation of the seabed before the developing countries are in a position to do so. It is known that seabed deposits include fifteen times more copper, 1,500 times more nickel and 4,000 times more manganese than those on land.

The discussions on this subject took place in Committee One.

In an opening statement on 2nd August 1976, the United States Ambassador declared that he understood the dissatisfaction of a number of developing countries with regard to the powers of the seabed authority and the function-

ing of the so-called "enterprise" which would be the executive arm of this authority. The question of voting and composition of the seabed council should reflect the economic interest of major consumers and producers; both States and private companies should have access to the deep seabed minerals. He warned that unless political decisions were made at this conference there would be unilateral action involving seabed resources such as fish, oil and minerals.

The American point of view

This issue in Committee One remained the most difficult of the conference, and when the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, addressed the conference on 5th August he made special reference to this issue.

Before explaining the United States attitude, he said that no current matter on the international agenda was more vital for the long-term stability and prosperity of our planet. Unless the competitive practices and claims of nations were harmonised the world might well face the prospect of mounting contention or even conflict.

He warned that the United States had drawn a limit beyond which it would not go in negotiating an international oceans treaty. He emphasised the need to move as quickly as possible towards a final consensus acceptable to all major groups of States. If there were delays, the pressure of events and contention would place international consensus irretrievably beyond the grasp of the nations of the world. One of the most complex and contentious issues was that of deep-sea mining — who should do it and under what conditions; the United States would agree to an "enterprise" representing the seabed authority which would be able to mine, on its own, seabed minerals. Revenue sharing from all mining would go to the world community to be used primarily for economic development of the poor countries. No other solution would be fair to the developing countries who desire to have an enterprise which can exploit seabed resources and who want revenues from mining for necessary economic growth.

In a further statement on this issue on 1st September 1976, the Secretary of State stressed that there was no need to disregard the basic interests of industrialised States in ensuring a non-discriminatory non-discretionary access system in order to solve these problems. He said that the United States Delegation would make a major effort to break the impasse in the

negotiations. He indicated that, as a part of that effort, the United States would make a contribution to the international authority so that it would have the financial resources and means to function. If a compromise agreement was reached which was acceptable to both the industrialised nations and the group of seventy-seven, then "dual track" mining could be undertaken by both an international agency and individual nations and their private firms. Seabed mining would then not be reserved exclusively for an international authority with strict limits on production for the protection of land-based producers — which is what the group of seventy-seven wishes and which is unacceptable to the industrialised countries.

The United States also agreed to periodic reviews of the working of the enterprise. However, it was pointed out that deep-sea mining could not start for another ten years, which meant a review of the exploitation system should take place in twenty-five years' time.

In respect of the voting and composition of the council of the seabed authority (which has not yet been negotiated), Mr. Kissinger said that a satisfactory package on deep seabed mining had to contain assurances that States would have influence commensurate with their economic interests on the decision-making process.

The economic zone

At the conference there was continued broad support for a 12-mile territorial sea, a transit passage régime in straits used for international navigation and a 200-mile economic zone. It was also felt that there should be a guaranteed freedom of shipping, including supply ships, guaranteed basic maritime research and a preservation of fishing interests.

However, countries with extensive coastlines are in opposition to this and are demanding exclusive rights — in some cases to the extent of complete sovereignty. Fishing rights of other nations will be respected only within the terms of bilateral agreements. With regard to maritime environmental conservation, these countries are seeking complete legal competence and rights of control. They also want permission for research activities to be the prerogative of the coastal State.

The United States and the European countries are of the opinion that the high sea status of the economic zone should be continued.

No solution has yet been found regarding jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond 200 miles ; the question here is who will share in the benefits from these resources. In view of all these controversial issues, a compulsory dispute settlement procedure should be set up. The economic zone is an area of mixed international and coastal State rights.

Committee Two is also studying the need for a resolution on issues concerning the interests of landlocked countries and geographically disadvantaged States.

The most difficult problem the committee has to deal with is the high sea status of the economic zone. The interests of the international community require that the high sea freedoms remain reserved to that community and that the rights of coastal States over the economic resources of these zones should not touch on the interests of the international community in crucial matters such as navigation.

Marine pollution and scientific research

In Committee Three — which deals with marine pollution and scientific research — the industrialised countries want freedom of basic marine exploration within the economic zone and the continental shelf. The group of seventy-seven wants all research activities to be subject to approval by the coastal States.

In respect of maritime environmental conservation, the industrialised countries are of the opinion that maritime nations should be permitted to establish marine conservation norms for coastal waters and economic zones for the application of internationally-agreed regulations

and internationally-agreed standards for ship construction only and that the right of control and implementation by coastal States be subsidiary and limited in scope. In order to achieve this, it has been proposed that a distinction be made between resources related research, for which the coastal State would have to give its consent, and other research for which open access would be guaranteed with the provision of sharing information and plans with the coastal States. Only by open scientific research and the wide dissemination of its results throughout the world can the global community continue to probe the mysteries of our planet. The treaty should therefore incorporate a balance of rights and responsibilities, guarantee the freedom of basic scientific research and the participation of coastal States in resources related research.

Conclusion of the conference

On 17th September, the current session of the law of the sea negotiations was concluded in New York. Decisions still have to be taken in a number of key areas such as :

- rules for mining deep seabed minerals ;
- the nature of the economic zone ;
- the provisions for marine scientific research in the economic zone ;
- the articles dealing with the exploitation of resources in the continental shelf beyond 200 miles ;
- the rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States in the economic zone.

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 284 to 290

RECOMMENDATION 284¹

***on the application of the Brussels Treaty —
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council²***

The Assembly,

Welcoming the continued prompt action by the Council which enabled the twenty-first annual report to be communicated by 4th March ;

Believing that when the mutual defence obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty are effectively incorporated in a treaty on a European union controlling all its external defence and foreign policy, only then will the time have come to abrogate the arms control provisions of the treaty ;

Again congratulating the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the way in which it has carried out in difficult circumstances the regrettably still too-limited tasks assigned to it by the Council ;

Welcoming the Council's replies to Recommendation 281 and to Written Question 167, and the assignment to the Standing Armaments Committee of a study of the situation of the armaments industry in the member countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Apply each year the Secretary-General's new procedure for the prompt communication of the annual report ;
2. Ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty until such time as the mutual defence undertakings are effectively incorporated in a treaty of European union, and meanwhile that it :
 - (i) Include in annual reports, in addition to the present statement of the total level of British forces on the continent at 31st December, a statement of the level of British forces on the mainland on that date, established in accordance with the Council's definition of the approved level ;
 - (ii) Include in annual reports a statement of the numbers of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both by category of installation and by country visited ;
 - (iii) Include in the conclusion of the arms control chapter of the annual report a full and clear statement of all those aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which are not fully applied as it did in earlier years ;
 - (iv) Continue to press for the entry into force of the convention for the due process of law signed on 14th December 1957 ;
3. Report to the Assembly on the rôle it envisages for the independent programme group.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Haase on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 700).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 284

1. The Council endorse the Assembly's satisfaction with the new procedure for the preparation and communication of the annual report and will continue to follow this procedure.

2. The information given in this report about the total level of British forces on the continent is supplied at the Assembly's request and in accordance with the undertaking given in the Council's reply to the Assembly's Recommendation 213. As was explained in the Council's reply to Written Question 170 the United Kingdom's commitment (under Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty) to maintain a certain level of forces on the mainland of Europe relates not to the total level of United Kingdom forces on the mainland (which includes personnel in Berlin and Gibraltar), but only to those which are assigned to SACEUR. For the purpose of this commitment the level approved by the Council is still 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force.

3. As was also explained in the Council's reply to Recommendation 213, because of the wide circulation of the annual report the Council are of the opinion that information about the number of inspections carried out by the Armaments Control Agency ought not to be included in the report. The Council have however in the past provided this information in confidence to the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to assist him in compiling his report on the Council's annual report. The Council would be willing to continue this practice.

4. Chapter III, B, 2 outlines the fields in which the Agency is not authorised to exercise its mandate. As explained in this section of the report the situation described in previous reports regarding certain armaments remains unchanged and the Council doubt whether any useful purpose would be served by repeating in full what has been said in the previous reports.

5. The convention on the due process of law has not yet been ratified by all member nations. This is not therefore a subject on which the Council can take effective action.

6. The Council have been pleased to note the formation of the independent European Programme Group. The group is not however an organ of Western European Union and it would not be appropriate for the Council to assign a rôle to a group for which they have no responsibility.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th October 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 285¹***on the political activities of the Council —
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council²***

The Assembly,

Noting the twenty-first annual report of the Council ;

Recalling Resolutions 55 and 59 ;

Noting with satisfaction that the Council “makes no distinction between the Council of Western European Union meeting at ministerial level and the same Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives” ;

Recalling that the Council “is fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in the treaty” as long as these rights and duties have not been transferred by treaty to another institution ;

Deploring that the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives makes only exceptional use of its prerogatives ;

Noting however that circumstances continue to make it essential to maintain procedure for consultation between the Western European countries on matters affecting their security ;

Noting that the Council's refusal to reply to Written Questions 158, 159 and 160 and to hold a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee in 1975 shows that the Council is shirking its responsibilities in respect of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;

Recalling that the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty commits its signatories to “preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage” ;

Recalling finally Recommendation 266 to which the Council gave only a very incomplete reply,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by ;
 - (a) examining in which framework each question concerning European security should be discussed by the Seven ;
 - (b) dealing effectively with the various problems raised by the application of the modified Brussels Treaty even when it meets at the level of Permanent Representatives ;
 - (c) examining attentively the means whereby it may complement possible action by the Nine in defence matters, particularly in emergencies ;
 - (d) illustrating how the Council's activities reflect the constantly-repeated statement by the Council and by the member countries that they attach the greatest importance to the full application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
2. Give the Assembly a precise reply to paragraph 3 of Recommendation 266 ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : See the Report tabled by Mr. Périquier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 702).

3. Report without hesitation in its communications to the Assembly on any differences between the positions adopted by its members, as it did in its reply to Recommendation 283 ;
4. Consider, together with the other powers concerned, how it might follow the political consultations between the nine member countries of the EEC on the one hand and on the other, in view of the study it is undertaking on "the possibility that WEU might undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe", the activities of the European programme group ;
5. Should not invoke the possibility of members using national procedure in order to avoid replying to recommendations and written questions.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 285

I. (a) The Council have, on several previous occasions, stressed the importance which they attach to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. They now wish to reaffirm, as they did in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 266, that member governments are determined to fulfil their obligations under the treaty. They feel, therefore, that it hardly corresponds to the facts to say, as the Assembly does, that the Council are "shirking their responsibilities" in respect of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.

(b) Since the Brussels Treaty makes no distinction between the Council meeting at ministerial level and the same Council meeting at the level of permanent representatives, the latter are fully empowered to discuss all problems arising in connection with the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. As the Assembly is aware, such problems frequently appear on the Council's agenda. Finally, a detailed account of the Council's activities is given in the annual report to the Assembly.

(c) No realistic approach can be made to the question of a European defence policy until substantial progress has been made towards political union. On the other hand it is quite obvious that the development of a common foreign policy of the Nine cannot stop short of common security issues. At present it appears premature to consider what means would be available to the Council to complement hypothetical action by the Nine. If, at some future date, consideration is given in the European union to the possibility of a common defence policy, careful thought will, of course, have to be given to the problem of harmonising the areas of competence of the Seven and the Nine. In this connection, the Council have noted with interest Assembly Resolutions 55 and 59 and the report of the General Affairs Committee to the Presidential Committee on European union and WEU.

(d) The only way in which the Council can illustrate how their concern to ensure the full application of the modified Brussels Treaty is reflected is to remind the Assembly of all their activities as described in the annual report and to refer to the very carefully drafted replies sent to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions.

In the Council's view, the presence of Ministers from the governments of four WEU member countries at the first part of the Assembly's twenty-second session and the reaffirmation, through them, of the Council's concern for the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, offers clear and recent proof of the importance which every member of WEU attaches to the observance of the treaty.

II. In response to the Assembly's reference to paragraph 3 of Recommendation 266, the Council would recall the terms of the reply sent to the Assembly on 24th July 1975. They feel that there is no justification for "drawing up a list of problems connected with the application of the modified Brussels Treaty over which the governments of the seven member countries are divided so that they may be considered at ministerial level or that attention may be drawn to them in the North Atlantic Council or in the European Council". In their view, this would have no positive effect for the application of the treaty because the Council are not the only international body empowered to deal with the questions covered by Article VIII of the treaty.

The Assembly is of course aware that the member States of WEU are also members of the European Community, the North Atlantic Council and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which also have authority to discuss these problems.

As regards their own responsibilities, the Council wish to remind the Assembly of the efforts which they have made in recent months to reactivate the Standing Armaments Committee. As stated

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1976.

in their replies to Assembly Recommendation 281 and Written Question 167, they have instructed the Standing Armaments Committee, as a task for the immediate future, to produce a detailed outline programme for a study which, in the form of a descriptive analysis of the armaments industries in member countries, would help to give a clearer insight into the industrial and economic implications of the standardisation of armaments, and at the same time make it possible to offer a diagnosis.

III. The Council wish to reiterate that they try to answer the Assembly's recommendations and written questions as fully and substantially as possible. In accordance with the principles governing the Council's work these replies normally reflect the common view of the seven member countries and it is only in most exceptional circumstances that it may be necessary to indicate that members' positions differ as, for example, when those positions are a logical consequence of the differing relations which member States have with a particular outside organisation (for example, reply to Recommendation 283).

IV. In view of the specific functions assigned to them by the modified Brussels Treaty and of the current terms of the texts governing the European Communities, the Council could not, as such, follow the political consultations between the Nine. In this connection, they recall that the foreign ministers of the Seven participate in political co-operation between the Nine and are, therefore, fully informed.

Nor can it be considered part of the Council's duty to follow closely the activities of the independent European programme group. However, WEU member governments are doing all in their power to avoid any risk of duplication between the Standing Armaments Committee and the independent European programme group.

V. The rule followed by the Council in drafting replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions is that of unanimity and they spare no efforts in seeking to achieve this objective.

RECOMMENDATION 286¹***on scientific, technological and aerospace questions —
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council²***

The Assembly,

Appreciating the Council's interest in promoting technological collaboration in a European framework ;

Regretting the absence of a medium- and long-term policy to encourage advanced technology programmes, although such a policy is necessary if Western European industry is to maintain a valid civil and military capability,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Include in its twenty-second annual report on its activities guidelines for a long-term European policy in sectors of advanced technology such as space, aeronautics, aviation, nuclear reactors, computers and electronics, taking both civil and military aspects into consideration and indicating how effective decision-making machinery could be set up in Western Europe.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 705).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 286

The Council note with interest Recommendation 286 on scientific, technological and aerospace questions. They share the view expressed in the recommendation that the promotion of technological co-operation in a European framework continues to be of great importance. They note with satisfaction that progress towards a common medium- and long-term policy has already been achieved in several sectors. With regard to space applications, the European Space Agency has been entrusted with the elaboration and implementation of a long-term European space programme. In the field of research, the European Communities continue to carry out medium-term programmes, with special emphasis on energy and environmental protection. The Council agree with the view that the effort to co-ordinate and harmonise national medium- and long-term programmes should be encouraged.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th October 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 287¹
on improving the status of WEU staff²

The Assembly,

Recalling Recommendations 250 and 265 ;

Deploring the slow progress of work in the Co-ordinating Committee ;

Regretting that the governments have still not introduced a pension scheme for all the co-ordinated organisations ;

Regretting the governments' decision to abandon present procedure for adjusting salaries before introducing new procedure ;

Noting the ensuing unrest among staff members of the co-ordinated organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :

1. Endeavour to have the pension scheme brought into effect before the end of 1976, its provisions being applied as from the date of adoption of the regulations governing its application, but payment of pensions for retired officials still being made as from 1st January 1973 ;

2. Ensure that the scheme includes all necessary guarantees, based *inter alia* on joint management for all the co-ordinated organisations in accordance with the principles set out in Recommendations 250 and 265 ;

3. Amend the Staff Rules to avoid the widow or orphans of an official suffering hardship through a break in income during the period preceding payment of the first arrears of the pension ;

4. Introduce procedure for salary reviews similar to practice in the European Communities ;

5. Improve the speed and efficiency of co-ordination by tightening up procedure ;

6. Change the system of indemnities for loss of job on the lines of regulations in the European Communities and in the meantime improve the pension rights of officials who have become redundant by adding to their entitlement the period for which an indemnity for loss of job is granted ;

7. Make provision for a reinstatement allowance for officials terminating their service and who were granted an installation allowance at the time of recruitment, as is the case in the European Communities ;

II. Ask the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly as soon as available its study on conditions for seconding national officials.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (4th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 701).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 287

I.1. The Council are in a position to inform the Assembly that, at their meeting of 23rd November 1976, they approved the 127th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts which contained at annex the rules implementing the pension scheme set up in the 94th report. This scheme, which for WEU staff is now in force, takes effect from 1st July 1974.

2. The Council believe that guarantees are provided by Article 40, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the draft pension scheme rules. The question of a joint management is currently under study in the Co-ordinating Committee.

3. Neither the WEU nor Assembly Staff Rules stipulate that payment of a staff member's salary should terminate on the day of his death. In practice, these emoluments have been paid by the Secretariat-General up to the end of the month in which the official died.

4. A procedure for salary reviews broadly comparable to that followed in the European Communities is at present under study by the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations. It is expected that the new procedure will be approved by Councils before the end of this year.

5. Consideration is at present being given to the reform of co-ordinating procedures. However, the Assembly will be aware of the difficulties in achieving this when in addition to the seven members of WEU, the interests of some eighteen other governments are involved within the co-ordinated framework.

6.-7. The present system of indemnities for loss of job has been in force since 1972. At that time, it represented a substantial improvement on the previous system. No proposals for improving the indemnities for loss of job, or for introducing a reinstatement allowance have, at the moment, been submitted to the governments of member countries.

II. The survey carried out by the Public Administration Committee at the Council's request, on the implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Council for the secondment of national officials to international organisations, has now been completed. The relevant documents have been transmitted by the Secretariat-General to the Clerk of the Assembly.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th November 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 288¹
***on security in the Mediterranean*²**

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world naval power presents the Soviet Government with new options for extending its influence ;
- (ii) Aware that the many political uncertainties and local disputes and conflicts that afflict both allied and non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean area present an ever-present danger of major conflict arising through miscalculation or escalation ;
- (iii) Calling for the broadening and strengthening of the Alliance based on parliamentary democracy and human rights and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis ;
- (iv) Welcoming the advent of a freely-elected parliament in Portugal and the signs of democratic developments in Spain ;
- (v) Recalling and reaffirming its earlier recommendations for the correct application of the Montreux Convention to prohibit the passage of aircraft carriers through the Turkish Straits ; for the provision of diplomatic advice from the NATO international staff for NATO commanders ; and for the NATO Gibraltar command to be transferred to the IBERLANT command,

I. RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Examine regularly all questions relating to the security of Europe in the Mediterranean and thus foster a rapprochement of political and strategic concepts underlying the defence of the different member countries of Western European Union in the Mediterranean basin,

II. RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND REQUESTS THAT THE MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

- 1. Call on the North Atlantic Council to broaden and strengthen the basis of the Alliance :
 - (a) by negotiating with the Government of Spain that emerges from free elections the accession of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty, and an appropriate rôle for the Spanish armed forces ;
 - (b) by fostering the accession of Malta to the North Atlantic Treaty, should a Maltese Government so request, or the conclusion of bilateral defence arrangements between Malta and Italy ;
 - (c) by recognising the value of NATO military facilities located in several countries of the Mediterranean area ;
 - (d) by more publicly identifying all the member countries and the Alliance as a whole with NATO defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area ;
 - (e) by providing military assistance to modernise the armed forces of Portugal to enable them to play a new and more vital rôle in allied defence plans ;
 - (f) by advising the Secretary-General to assign political advisers from his Political Affairs Division to all significant NATO military headquarters ;
 - (g) by transferring the Gibraltar Mediterranean Command from the Command of Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe to that of the Iberian Atlantic area ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Reports tabled by Mr. Buck on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Documents 708 and 712).

2. (a) Join with the other governments of the Alliance in making clear to the Soviet Union and to the country concerned the serious disadvantages for normal relations and détente of any installation of new Soviet bases or similar facilities in the Mediterranean area ;

(b) Call on the North Atlantic Council to have full political and military contingency plans prepared to meet any of the foregoing eventualities, with no more secrecy than that required for their success ;

3. Propose that NATO issue an annual defence white paper incorporating a joint assessment of the threat and statement of allied strategy, combined with separate chapters on national defence programmes.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 288

1. The Council observe that the concern expressed by the Assembly regarding the state of security in the Mediterranean is focused on aspects which were discussed in detail at the North Atlantic Council held in Oslo on 20th and 21st May 1976, and at the meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in Brussels on 22nd May, by the countries of WEU who are members of that body.

The North Atlantic Council consider that the policy of détente should be pursued and that any development which might lead to confrontation should be avoided.

They have also voiced their concern at the growing military power of the Warsaw Pact, beyond levels apparently justified for the defensive purposes of the countries of that organisation; they have also stressed the determination of the member States to take the measures necessary to maintain and improve the efficiency of their forces as an essential safeguard for their security. In this context, the Defence Ministers of the member countries of the integrated military organisation have approved, in Brussels, the force goals proposed for 1977-82.

Having regard to the objectives laid down by the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly in the field of international peace and security, the WEU Council, like the Assembly, are aware of the links between the security of the continent of Europe and that of the Mediterranean and therefore of the rôle which the WEU member States might have to play in the Mediterranean basin.

2. Those parts of the Assembly's recommendation which are addressed to the North Atlantic Council have been forwarded to them.

APPENDIX

Letter from the acting Secretary-General of WEU to the President of the Assembly dated 20th December 1976

As indicated in point 2 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 288 on security in the Mediterranean, the Council communicated to the North Atlantic Council the part of the recommendation which concerned it.

I have the honour to bring to your notice the enclosed copy of the reply from Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, dated 6th December 1976.

Letter from the Secretary-General of NATO to the acting Secretary-General of WEU dated 6th December 1976

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 24th November 1976 for which I thank you. I have taken note with interest of the enclosed recommendation on security in the Mediterranean.

I can assure you that this matter and problems connected with the southern flank of the Alliance are followed with the greatest attention by the Council, by my colleagues in the international secretariat and by myself. I shall always be pleased to receive recommendations from Western European Union on matters relating to the interests of the Alliance.

I have had copies of the documents which you sent me distributed to all the national delegations.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 22nd November 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 289¹
on European aeronautical policy —
guidelines emerging from the colloquy
on 2nd and 3rd February 1976²

The Assembly,

Acknowledging the conclusions of the colloquy on a European aeronautical policy held in Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 under the aegis of its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ;

Aware of the difficulties in the aeronautical industry, which employs 400,000 persons, and the airlines, and the threats to the very existence of these sectors which may have serious consequences for Europe's security and well-being ;

Convinced that without an affirmation of political determination the governments concerned will be unable to take joint action to safeguard this industry ;

Regretting that governments have not yet adopted a position on the action programme for the European aeronautical sector proposed by the Commission of the European Communities on 1st October 1975 ;

Reiterating its regret that there is a risk of Eurocontrol being dismantled ;

Aware that the problems cannot be solved through protectionism and the creation of a closed European market ;

Advocating on the contrary an investigation of world markets and of possibilities of co-operation with the United States on a basis of equality and reciprocity and not as subcontractors,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote the creation in each member country concerned of a national aeronautical council associating, for instance, representatives of parliaments, ministries, manufacturers, airlines and trades unions under the chairmanship of the appropriate government representative ;
2. Invite the national aeronautical councils to form a European aeronautical council to ;
 - (a) develop together with the Commission of the European Communities a European aeronautical manufacturing programme with a view to developing, producing and marketing large civil aircraft ;
 - (b) arrange for joint financing for marketing these aircraft and study the possibilities of a European Import-Export Bank ;
 - (c) ensure that Concorde remains in production and that Europe is able to benefit from the technical lead thus acquired ;
 - (d) establish a civil aviation agency for Western Europe responsible for European airworthiness certification ;
 - (e) develop in concert with the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) a joint policy for air transport and examine the possibilities of adopting a joint European position in negotiations

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by MM. Richter, Valleix and Warren on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 704).

between Western Europe and the rest of the world on problems such as landing rights and recognition of European airspace ;

3. Create a study group to determine the military aircraft requirements of member countries in liaison with the Standing Armaments Committee ;

FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the member States of Eurocontrol :

4. To set themselves as a long-term aim in the future Eurocontrol convention, which will be applied as from 1983, the establishment of a joint agency for the control of air traffic networks, including major terminal areas ;
5. To standardise equipment and systems to the maximum for the sake of efficiency and economy and in particular make a joint study in the Eurocontrol agency of new systems to be brought into service as from 1985 ;
6. To draw up a common industrial policy for applied electronics in these fields, giving priority, when calling for tenders, to industries in the member States of the Eurocontrol community, and maintain a joint investment budget in the future agency with a view to procuring the said equipment through the agency ;
7. To make the maximum use of the Eurocontrol agency in the field of research and development and draw up a joint research and development programme to avoid duplication wherever possible.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 289

1. The uncertainties which hang over the future of Europe's aeronautical industry and airlines both as regards maintenance of their production, marketing and operating capacity and as regards research and advanced techniques, are a matter of concern to the Council, who recognise the need for closer co-operation between the national aeronautical industries.

As the Assembly is aware, the introduction of a concerted European policy designed to safeguard these industries, and to limit competition and encourage co-operation between them is today the subject of detailed bilateral and multilateral discussions between member countries of the Community and at Community level. In particular, the ideas put forward in the action programme for the European aeronautical industry, proposed by the Commission of the Communities on 1st October 1975, are being studied, together with the conclusions of the colloquy organised at Toulouse by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions of WEU.

Any such policy should aim not at creating a protected European market but at ensuring the continued activity of this major sector of industry and, therefore, at expanding its international markets.

The Council consider that the creation of a national aeronautical council in each of the member countries concerned might help to initiate concerted action at national level by the various interests concerned with aeronautical questions. At the same time such national councils might duplicate the work of other institutions and their establishment does not seem to be essential as a first step.

2. From this standpoint, the idea of setting up a special European institution to promote the policy of concerted action referred to above has its merits. However, in the present state of the aeronautical industry in Europe, its problems are unlikely to be resolved by such an institution. Moreover, its establishment seems out of the question until major progress has been made towards European union.

Consequently, while taking note of the Assembly's recommendation on this point, the Council feel that it is too soon to consider setting up a European aeronautical council, based on national aeronautical councils. Such institutions would at present simply be superimposed on existing administrations without, it would appear, substantially improving the situation of the European aircraft industries.

(a) The development of new aeronautical manufacturing programmes and the marketing of large civil aircraft would involve finding a market wider than that available in Europe.

(b) As regards setting up European machinery for financing exports, the Assembly will appreciate that any such move would appear to be at least premature in Europe, in view of the frequently divergent interests of the members of the Community and the differences which are particularly evident at the moment between their economic and monetary situations.

The Council therefore feel that it would be better at present to limit action to the encouragement of joint activities on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements for the production and marketing of particular items of equipment.

(c) On the special problem of Concorde, the Council share the Assembly's interest in this example of European co-operation in aircraft production, but can only observe that, in current circumstances, the continuation of this programme beyond the commitments entered into by the French and British partners cannot be guaranteed. A final decision on this subject should however be possible when full data on the operation of the supersonic aircraft are available, and the routes on which it can fly have been decided. Furthermore, a clearer indication of the sales prospects for the aircraft should be awaited.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1976.

(d) The Council nevertheless favour any move to harmonise national aeronautical policies. They believe that a pragmatic approach should be adopted in the matter. For example, there may well be scope for the creation of a Western European agency responsible for airworthiness, and this might in due course assume other functions in connection with air safety. As a first step, national rules for airworthiness should be harmonised.

(e) In present circumstances however they feel it would be unrealistic to consider formulating a joint European air transport policy or adopting a joint European position in negotiations with the rest of the world.

3. The Council recognise the need for member countries to determine their military aircraft requirements and study the question jointly. On the other hand, as the independent European programme group is already in existence, with tasks which include military aircraft problems, they feel that there is no need to promote the creation of a special study group in WEU.

4. Finally, the aims which the Assembly suggests for inclusion in the future Eurocontrol convention, which is at present under re-examination, should not be overlooked as a means of strengthening co-operation between member States in the matter of equipment, techniques and research. Here again, however, it would appear too soon to consider concerted action between partners who do not share the same interests within the convention.

RECOMMENDATION 290¹

on reserve forces²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that improved organisation, recruitment and training of reserve forces would allow :
 - (a) a considerable strengthening of the deterrent potential of the field forces of the European armies ;
 - (b) European defence to be based to a substantial extent on recourse to the widest possible mobilisation of the people's energies in the event of attack ;
- (ii) Considering that the defence of Europe must not be based solely on nuclear deterrence and a modern and effective field force but must also be ensured by a people's deterrent, expressing the will of the peoples of Europe to remain responsible for their own destinies ;
- (iii) Aware of the importance of the rôle which reserves can play in strengthening the links between the European peoples and their armies, particularly in keeping public opinion better informed about the importance of defence problems ;
- (iv) Underlining the financial advantages of forming large-scale reserves, as opposed to an equivalent active force, when the proportion of national budgets devoted to defence tends to remain constant or even diminish and when personnel costs linked with the maintenance of active forces are continuously increasing to the point of sometimes jeopardising the implementation of certain equipment programmes ;
- (v) Considering it necessary to harmonise the concepts which govern the organisation of reserves in Europe, in the framework of a common strategy for all the Western European States,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. (a) Together with the member States of the Atlantic Alliance which are not members of WEU, specify the type of tasks entrusted to the various components of the European defence system : nuclear forces, combat forces, internal defence forces ;
 - (b) Consequently define requirements in respect of internal defence forces and combat forces with a view to harmonising the concepts of European States in this field ;
2. To this end, set up a group of experts consisting of senior defence officials to study measures likely to develop the contribution by reserves to the internal defence of European territory and *inter alia* consider the possibility of :
 - (a) increasing the number of reservists who could be called up for internal defence, particularly where there is no system of conscription ;
 - (b) producing special equipment for reserves for internal defence forces, combining power, simplicity and robustness, and ensuring that it is made available immediately in the event of mobilisation ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 707).

- (c) improving training of reserve officers responsible for commanding the units forming internal defence forces, such training to include on the one hand periods of training in active units and on the other hand periods of training together with reservists in the ranks ;
- (d) adapting compulsory military service, where this exists, to the requirements of internal defence and consequently provide for a short but intensive period of active service followed by a number of training periods at regular intervals ;
- (e) organising internal defence forces on a territorial basis by assigning the necessary number of national servicemen and the essential reservists, according to their place of residence ;
- (f) paying reservists undergoing periods of training at an appropriate rate ;

3. (a) Study measures likely to increase the availability and effectiveness of reserves for combat forces and *inter alia* seek means of improving the training of such reserves and the speed and efficiency of their mobilisation ;

(b) Pay particular attention to the question of the time required for the mobilisation and immediate use of reserve units in the field forces ;

4. Consider setting up a European defence college where those responsible for Europe's defence and reserve officers would discuss their experiences and endeavour to define joint principles which might govern the use of reserves in Europe.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 290

Those member countries of WEU which participate in the integrated command structure of NATO consider that existing contacts within that framework with regard to the nature of the tasks assigned to the various components of the European defence system meet the concern expressed by the Assembly.

The reserve requirements of the internal defence forces and of the combat forces are dependent upon the size of the forces and the form of peacetime military service. Since the systems necessarily vary from one country to another, it is questionable whether harmonisation would be possible or even useful in this field.

In view of the above, the setting-up of a group of experts, as proposed by the Assembly, does not appear to fulfil an actual need. The Council therefore regret that they cannot agree with the Assembly on this point.

The Council consider that the establishment of a European Defence College, where the experience of reserve officers and those responsible for defence would be compared, is not in line with present requirements as understood by the competent authorities of the member countries.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th October 1976.

Relations with Parliaments

INFORMATION REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments ²
by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur*

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(b) Statements on regionalisation in Belgium

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.
2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Radius (Chairman) ;
MM. Enders, Schlingemann (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Delorme,
Farr, Hengel, Jeambrun, Mendelson (Substitute : Roper),

Müller, Peijnenburg, Schugens, Spautz, Stoffelen, Tanghe
(Substitute : *Plasman*).

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in
the vote are printed in italics.*

Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. This report is presented in a different manner from previous reports in the hope that it will prove more interesting reading.

2. The terms of reference of the Committee — which was only a working party until 1968 — are that it should submit a twice-yearly report on its activities and on action taken in the parliaments of member States and other relevant institutions on the basis of the work of the WEU Assembly and its texts and another report on European activities in parliaments.

3. Since then, the Committee has submitted to the Assembly studies on parliamentary methods and activities and in particular on parliamentary activities and powers at European level, for instance in the series of reports submitted by Mr. Péronnet (Documents 555, 570 and 585) on regional parliaments and a further series (Documents 600 and 614) on members of national, European and regional parliaments.

4. Your Rapporteur now wishes to outline the position of parliamentarians vis-à-vis information available in parliaments, the first chapter being entitled "Members of parliament and defence". The second chapter will deal with parliamentary action on texts adopted by the WEU Assembly. The following recommendations were selected by the Committee for transmission to the presidents of the chambers of member countries :

- 285 on the political activities of the Council ;
- 288 on security in the Mediterranean ;
- 289 on European aeronautical policy ;
- 290 on reserve forces.

5. Moreover, before the June 1976 session, the Committee had already agreed that questions should be put on Resolution 59 on European union and WEU and Recommendation 287 on improving the status of WEU staff.

I. Members of parliament and defence

6. An assembly such as that of WEU is a privileged forum to which parliamentarians from

member States can bring valuable, concrete information on the state of defence in their own countries from which the broad lines of a European defence policy can be worked out for submission to national executives.

7. Your Rapporteur therefore considered it useful and necessary to study the rôle of parliamentarians in the defence policy of each member country and ascertain the means available to him for fulfilling this rôle. From that basis, it would perhaps be possible to decide how a national parliamentarian can handle defence matters at European level and what contribution he should make to plans for European security.

8. Many members of the WEU Assembly have been enthusiastically dealing with defence matters for years. With various means, but above all with faith and enthusiasm, they have been tackling all these matters from the most pragmatic angle, which is no doubt an element of the realism shown in the Assembly's studies and recommendations. The aim of the study now before the Assembly is not to "theorise" about this realism but on the contrary to make it more effective by making us aware of the contributions we can make to Europe and also exchange.

9. The time available to your Rapporteur was too short for him to expand and develop these considerations in full. He therefore proposes to submit a plan for study and research which he intends to complete with the assistance of fellow members.

10. The next report will give the results of this enquiry and seek to set out a few guidelines for improving our work. Proper co-ordination of defence problems must be based on co-ordinated democratic action by representatives of the nations of Europe which are members of WEU.

(i) The member of parliament's scope in defence matters

11. At first sight, defence does not appear to be any different from other legislative or political subjects and therefore seems to come within the general scope of members of parliament. Closer study shows that in almost all political systems defence occupies a specific place in the constitutional order.

12. It is thus possible, by examining the various traditional duties of members of parliament, to see what place they occupy in national security matters in each country.

13. Parliamentary powers definitely form a whole and it is arbitrary — although traditional — to divide them up. Nevertheless it is a fairly practical approach to take each aspect separately.

14. It is customary to distinguish three parliamentary functions: legislation, supervision, information. For each country, therefore, the extent and importance of the rôle of members of parliament in the exercise of these functions in the very specific sector of defence will be assessed.

(ii) Legislation

15. In most European countries, defence is considered an essential prerogative of government in view of its continuing nature, speed of implementation and magnitude of the means involved. Most constitutions, written or unwritten, make the Head of State or of Government responsible for defence with supreme command over the armed forces. This is the case in France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Italy, and also in the United States.

16. However, the development of parliamentary democracy in the last 150 years has led to the powers of the executive being limited to the strict field of defining and setting in motion the military means of defence. Because defence involves the use of force, places at stake the very life of the nation and constraints upon the population, it must be made subject to rules which guarantee its effectiveness without it becoming a threat to democratic institutions.

17. The rôle now incumbent on parliaments, and thus their members, has therefore developed in three legislative respects:

- (i) prior authorisation to the government to set in motion the military aspect of defence;
- (ii) definition of conditions in which the population may be called upon to defend their country;
- (iii) the status, rights and duties of regular servicemen.

18. Preliminary information obtained by your Rapporteur on these three points shows that solutions, and thus the rôle of members of par-

liament, differ widely from one country to another. They will be studied in detail in the next report. Parliamentary authorisation for declaration of war, for instance, varies considerably and has been affected radically by the formation of nuclear deterrent forces.

19. As regards the defence obligations of the population, the prescribed responsibilities of members of parliament vary from country to country, as also for the status of servicemen. Here too, where fundamental freedoms are concerned, a comparative study may prove interesting.

(iii) Supervision

20. Insofar as action on defence matters is essentially a matter for the government, parliaments have given priority to supervision. This is where members of parliament individually or collectively have important duties.

21. There are two aspects to supervision: political, linked with supervision of government action as a whole, and administrative, to verify the efficiency and realism of defence activities.

22. Here too procedure in the various western countries, although there are many points in common, involves original solutions which should be studied in greater detail.

23. The scope of members of parliament is both varied and important, ranging from the apparent absence of any organised means in the United Kingdom to the rôle played by the parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, not to speak of the special powers of the defence committees in States such as France, Italy, Belgium, the Federal Republic, etc. Interesting lessons may certainly be drawn at European level for improving the conditions in which the action of members of parliament is exercised in defence matters.

(iv) Information

24. Finally, although there is little provision for this in constitutional texts, the information rôle of members of parliament in a modern democracy is on the increase.

25. Your Rapporteur sees three fundamental aspects:

- (a) At national level, members of parliament are a privileged contact with defence policy whose various aspects

and technical organisation are not well-known to the public that often bears the heaviest burden. Defence, or the need for defence, is almost always the subject of a general consensus, and members of parliament with sovereign power must maintain this consensus throughout the nation.

How can this be done? Here again the solutions adopted by each WEU State deserve consideration at European level.

- (b) Still at national level, members of parliament also have the privilege of conveying the nation's feelings on defence matters to the executive.

The defence apparatus is inherently cumbersome and difficult to change. In expressing the desires and feelings of the people, members of parliament must urge the executive to keep a permanent watch on its thinking and the means of implementing its policies.

To take only France as an example today, the action taken before the war by President Paul Reynaud in favour of an armoured force may be recalled or more recently that of a large number of members of parliament from all parties for adapting the conditions of national service to the present state of society. Changes in rules governing military discipline, improved conditions of military service, the revalorisation of regular servicemen's careers and the introduction of the status of conscientious objector — all these measures adopted in recent years originated in demands by members of parliament voicing the changing public attitude towards the operation of the machinery of defence. Each country has had to face these problems of adaptation and it seems appropriate to study the rôle of members of parliament in this adaptation.

- (c) Finally, information plays a primordial rôle at European level. In the WEU countries, there are two apparently contradictory aspects to defence. It must be national in order to set its roots in the deepest community feelings of the population and remain a true expression of independence and freedom. It must also be European to be

fully effective in face of the crushing strength of the possible threat.

Who can better ensure a link and co-ordination between these two aspects than the parliamentarians who have been appointed by their respective parliaments to form the WEU Assembly?

Admittedly, they have been playing this rôle ever since the Assembly came into existence and as an example your Rapporteur will merely mention the action pursued for years by the late Pierre de Montesquiou with a view to establishing a co-ordinated European aircraft and space industry.

26. The rôle of members of parliament at the European level of defence could probably gain in breadth and effectiveness if account were taken of their rôle at national level.

27. This will be your Rapporteur's final aim at the conclusion of his proposed study.

28. A study of the rôle of members of parliament in defence should take us back to the fundamental principles on which WEU is based, i.e. democracy, which implies freedom, national independence and European solidarity.

II. Action taken on texts adopted

29. Reports on the activities of WEU — whether emanating from governments or prepared by delegations — have continued to appear fairly regularly in France¹ and Germany². It should be noted that as requested by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments the document prepared by the German Delegation now lists at the beginning the texts selected for transmission to member countries and gives the full text in German. Moreover, the annual report on European activities prepared by the Parliamentary Committee for European Affairs in Italy³, included a report on the activities of WEU in 1975.

30. The Committee secretariat has recorded interventions on seven recommendations:

- 264 on the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- 268 on the European Space Agency;

1. National Assembly Document 2470, Senate Document 358, National Assembly Bulletin and Senate Bulletin.

2. Documents 7/4985 and 7/5564.

3. Document 4-4 bis A.

- 275 on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology ;
- 285 on the political activities of the Council of WEU ;
- 287 on improving the status of WEU staff ;
- 289 on European aeronautical policy ;
- 290 on reserve forces ;

and on Resolution 59 on European union and WEU.

31. All these interventions were given in full in Collected Texts 24¹.

32. During the same period, the Committee recorded interventions in plenary debates as follows :

(i) *House of Lords (United Kingdom)*

33. On 29th April 1976, Baroness Vickers referred to WEU during a speech on the defence estimates.

34. On 12th May, a debate was held on WEU and the Council of Europe. This debate, in which four speakers and a member of the government took part, dealt with the situation, problems and activities of these European organisations. Only the passages on WEU are given in Collected Texts 24.

(ii) *National Assembly (France)*

35. On 20th May 1976, Mr. Rivière spoke during the debate on the military programme for 1977-82, but unfortunately without eliciting a response from the government.

36. On 25th May, the President of the WEU Assembly, Mr. Nessler, and your Rapporteur spoke at length in the same debate and received a reply from Mr. Yvon Bourges, Minister of Defence.

37. On 9th June, Mr. Rivière spoke again on French defence policy and the Minister gave his opinion.

(iii) *Senate (France)*

38. On 4th June 1976, Mr. Périquier asked why France did not take part in the conference on limiting nuclear weapons and Mr. Destremau,

then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied.

39. On 15th June, Mr. Grangier raised the question of WEU and the Tindemans report.

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40. All these interventions are given in Collected Texts 24 but your Rapporteur wished to underline them since they represent a major effort by members of the Assembly to make WEU known during debates which are given wider publicity than written questions, to which answers are given in writing and consequently pass unnoticed by parliamentarians who are not members of the WEU Assembly.

41. The Committee is gratified that these instances have been recorded and urges the various delegations to take advantage of debates on defence, foreign policy, budgets, etc., to have their members speak on matters dealt with by the WEU Assembly.

42. Finally, your Rapporteur is happy to announce that the total number of interventions was the same as in the first six months (fifty-six). The total for the year is therefore over a hundred and Appendix I to this report shows that the drop recorded in 1970-74 has been followed by a return to the more normal situation of previous years.

III. *Activities of the Committee*

43. The Committee visited the Belgian Parliament on 25th and 26th November 1976. It made a wide-ranging review of regional and cultural problems, with the participation of MM. Hulpiau, Janssens and Lepaffe, Chairmen of the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Councils respectively, and was received in Hasselt by Mr. Leynen of the newspaper *Het Belang van Limburg* and by the Burgomaster, Professor Paul A. J. Meyers, former Minister and former Chairman of the Committee. The text of the addresses by MM. Hulpiau, Janssens and Lepaffe is given at Appendix III (b).

Conclusions

44. However dynamic the Committee may be, it cannot be forgotten that WEU's handicap is not attributable to its Assembly but to the fact that member governments make scant use of the possibilities afforded by the treaty. In its recommendations, the Assembly is constantly drawing

1. So as not to overburden this report, your Rapporteur thought it preferable not to give a complete list of interventions as in his earlier report. Furthermore, a number of replies have not yet reached the Office of the Clerk.

the Council's attention to the need to exercise its responsibilities in ensuring Europe's security. But these recommendations are not followed up since in most cases the governments are not prepared to pursue joint action in foreign policy and defence matters where the Assembly considers such action necessary.

45. It is therefore felt that the greatest reward for the Committee's action would be to make the governments realise that WEU constitutes the future shape of a European union with responsibilities in foreign policy and defence matters. It is the duty of parliamentarians to bring pressure to bear in this sense during debates on foreign policy or defence in the respective parliaments.

46. The Assembly must instruct all its committees, and particularly the Defence Committee, to remind governments continually that WEU provides the institutional framework for consultations on Europe's security in every field — military, political or industrial — where its security may be threatened.

47. It is obviously not possible to forget the existence of other groups with similar responsibilities, but this is no reason to neglect the task incumbent on the WEU Council and its subsidiary bodies, particularly the Standing Armaments Committee.

48. Once the committees have completed their work and the Assembly has voted, the work of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments begins.

49. The Committee must first ensure that new members of delegations are fully informed. This is an immediate problem. The Italian Delegation was appointed in October 1976. Only four of its thirty-six members were already members of the Assembly. A new German Delegation will be appointed at the beginning of 1977. The new members must be prepared for their future tasks.

50. It is customary to send new members an information booklet on the WEU Assembly prepared by the Press Counsellor and other documents. This documentation might be completed and more easily absorbed if the chairman of the delegation concerned were to organise a meeting with the Committee for Relations with Parliaments shortly after the formation of a new delegation. Thus new members would be acquainted with the positions adopted by the WEU Assembly and would have an opportunity of asking detailed questions about the Assembly's methods of work.

51. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments must extend its action beyond parliamentary circles by helping to keep the press in member countries informed about Western European Union and the problems it tackles. It might therefore encourage national delegations, perhaps in liaison with the Press Counsellor, to organise conferences with the participation of Rapporteurs who are members of the delegation concerned. Such conferences would probably have greater significance if they were held either after the adoption of reports by the committees, but before the debate in plenary sitting, or immediately after sessions in order to draw attention to the positions adopted by members of the delegation during the debates.

52. If the ideas expressed by the WEU Assembly are to gain a foothold in the parliaments of member countries, the people must know what they are and ask their members of parliament to introduce them into national legislation. But this cannot be done unless the Committee and the Press Counsellor have made the facts known to them.

53. The Press Counsellor might transmit to the appropriate press media interventions or questions concerning the activities of the Assembly (he should be given the list of newspapers concerned). Such action would not automatically lead to publication, particularly in view of the probable time-lag, but it would make the work of members known in their constituencies.

54. These are merely suggestions which would require the active assistance of secretariats of national delegations, but some might perhaps be considered.

55. Resolutions 45 and 49 and Orders 35 and 44 in 1970, 1971 and 1974 urged that procedure for hearings — of Assembly Rapporteurs, for instance — be introduced in foreign and European affairs committees and that relations with parliaments be pursued, intensified and, if possible, extended to other interested institutions¹.

56. Your Rapporteur feels that one task of national delegations might be to arrange such hearings and another to promote relations between the Assembly and parliaments. The Committee proposes that its Chairman — and perhaps the Rapporteur — accompanied by the Secretary take part in a meeting of each delegation in order to establish such procedure.

1. See also Document 506, pages 4 and 5, 15th April 1970.

APPENDIX I

Table of action in the parliaments of member countries
(Totals by country for each session)

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							Total
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	8	19	3	11	3	82
1976	4	27	9	6	0	3	8	57
Total	65	178	185	243	16	87	197	971
Annual average	3.17	8.68	9.02	11.90	0.78	4.24	9.61	6.77

APPENDIX II

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1974

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1975	260									—	28
	261									—	
	262			2		2		4		8	
	263					2				2	
	264					2				2	
	265									—	
	266	x	4					2		6	
	267									—	
	268					2				2	
	269	x				2				4	
	270	x				2			2	2	
271								2	—		
272		x		2					2	2	
Dec. 1975	273	x	2			1		3		6	54
	274	x	2	2		1				5	
	275			4						4	
	276	x	2			1				3	
	277									—	
	278									—	
	279									—	
	280									—	
	281									—	
	282									—	
	283									—	
	Res. 55		2	1		3	2			8	
	Res. 56									—	
	Res. 57									—	
Res. 58									—		
Other action			2	17	4	1	1	2	1	28	
June 1976	Res. 59		2	4				2		8	57
	284									—	
	285	x		3	2	1				6	
	286									—	
	287			2	2	1		1	2	8	
	288	x								—	
	289	x		1	2	2				5	
290	x		2		1				3		
Other action			2	15	3	1		6		27	

APPENDIX III

(a) Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

22nd February 1963	Paris
10th October 1963	Rome
11th-12th November 1964	Bonn
28th-29th April 1965	The Hague
15th-16th December 1965	Brussels
30th October-1st November 1966	London
23rd-24th November 1967	Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin)
2nd-3rd April 1968	Luxembourg
26th-27th March 1969	Rome
27th-28th October 1969	Paris
14th-15th April 1970	Bonn
1st-2nd April 1971	Rome
4th-5th November 1971	Bonn
24th-25th February 1972	The Hague
18th-19th September 1972	Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany)
1st-2nd May 1973	St. Hélier (Regional parliament of the States of Jersey)
15th-18th October 1973	Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State of Bavaria)
8th-10th July 1974	Palermo (Regional parliament of Sicily)
27th-28th October 1975	The Hague
11th-12th May 1976	Luxembourg
25th-26th November 1976	Brussels

(b) Statements on regionalisation in Belgium

The Presidents of the three regional councils each addressed the Committee on a specific aspect of regionalisation :

Mr. Hulpiau, President of the Flemish Regional Council, described the background to regionalisation in Belgium ;

Mr. Janssens, President of the Walloon Regional Council, explained the organisation and functioning of the regional councils ;

Mr. Lepaffe, President of the Brussels Regional Council, spoke about future prospects for regionalisation in Belgium.

(i) Statement by Mr. Hulpiau, President of the Flemish Regional Council

I shall try to explain to you how regionalisation in Belgium has reached its present stage and how its various institutions work.

I shall start with three preliminary remarks:

First, regionalisation in Belgium has a long history behind it and I do not think it is useful for our colleagues to hear the full background to the present situation. Second, please bear in mind that regionalisation is not complete. It is at an intermediary stage on the way to other solutions, i.e. we are now in a developing situa-

tion. Third, it is also important to note that regionalisation in Belgium is only part of a much wider problem which we call State reform and it is therefore only one chapter in a much vaster undertaking.

I will start with the aim of this State reform but, as I said, I will not go into its history because it has been in preparation for years and years : basically, it is a redistribution of political power, a new, a different breakdown. So far, we have lived in a State which has been and still is called a unified one, with considerable powers centralised with the central authority.

When we speak about redistributing political power, we mean two directions in particular : on the one hand towards the cultural communities, of which there are three in Belgium : Flemish, French and German, and on the other towards the regions, of which there are also three : Flemish (in the north), Walloon (south) and Brussels (centre). The redistribution of political power is thus being directed either towards the communities or towards the regions.

The subject of these reforms was laid down in the constitutional revision held in Belgium in 1970. Here, it is essential to remember that :

First, redistribution of political power in favour of the cultural communities is a closed chapter in that we have cultural councils which have the necessary powers to legislate.

This is not so for the redistribution of political powers in favour of the regions in that this is governed by Article 107 *quater* of the Constitution. This new constitutional article makes provision first for the establishment of three regions in Belgium : Flemish, Walloon and Brussels area ; second, for the composition of these bodies it lays down only that they shall be composed of elected representatives. Reference is also made without further details to the bodies which must be set up for the purposes of regionalisation and, in the same article, to the responsibilities of these regional bodies *ratione materiae*. It stipulates that these regional councils may settle — this is vague — a number of matters, but excluding linguistic and cultural problems which are the responsibility of the cultural councils.

Article 107 *quater* also makes provision — and this is important if you are to understand what follows — for procedure for the practical application or completion of the general idea of the special majority in parliament for voting the laws of implementation referred to in Article

107 *quater*. These laws must be passed and require a special majority in parliament.

After the constitutional revision, there were difficulties and periods of crisis at governmental level and at a certain moment we managed to start up again with a government which, on the one hand, had the task of pursuing regionalisation and on the other hand had to take account of this special majority. But on the basis of the parties supporting the government the majority is not sufficient to meet procedural requirements, i.e. the present majority does not have the quorum needed to ensure this special majority. So, in view of the fact that regionalisation had to be pursued but not having the special majority, a successful search was made for procedure which is not further to or in application of Article 107 *quater* — this being impossible because the special majority did not exist — i.e. not final or full regionalisation but provisional and limited regionalisation. Provisional regionalisation could be voted by an ordinary majority.

So you can see the difficulty facing us : to continue with regionalisation but realising that we were not able implement it in the form provided for in Article 107 *quater*. An attempt was then made to move in a provisional, limited way towards regionalisation. The law of 1st August 1974 established the present form of regionalisation by ordinary majority.

This law first provides for three regions in Belgium and, as organs of regionalisation, regional councils and ministerial committees.

Regional councils are composed *hic et nunc* exclusively of senators from the Flemish or Walloon region for the Flemish or Walloon Councils. The Brussels Regional Council is composed of senators from the Brussels region and councillors from the Brussels Urban Council. Two features of these councils are their provisional nature and their exclusively consultative powers.

At present, therefore, regional councils may not legislate or take statutory or normative measures. All they can do is give opinions.

I personally consider this at one and the same time a little and a lot. A little in that we can only give opinions — and if you want to know what an opinion is worth I can tell you that that depends on what happens to it afterwards — but at the same time a lot because of the subjects on which regional councils may

express opinions either on their own initiative or at the request of the government. The law even provides for cases when it is compulsory to ask for the council's opinion.

The list of subjects contained in the law of 1st August 1974 is very long. What is important is that the regional councils can express opinions — I repeat, on their own initiative or at the request of the government — wherever a differentiated policy is wholly or partly justified according to region: for instance, housing, family and demographic policy, water problems, industrial and energy policy problems, communal structural problems, etc.

All these are listed, and I must say that the field is a vast one. For all these subjects we can take the initiative as soon as we see there is a reason to pursue a differentiated policy in Flanders, Brussels or Wallonia.

The other regionalisation organs are the ministerial committees. There are three, one for each region, and their responsibilities too are laid down by law. These ministerial committees are in a way the executive power for all matters on which regional councils express opinions in that they may table royal decrees or where appropriate take action in parliament by transforming the councils' opinions into bills. A peculiarity of our country is therefore that in order to settle matters specific to the regions there is always an independent ministerial committee.

Third, the same law also has a very important financial chapter because, when dealing with regional policy, provision must also be made for the necessary resources. Each year the government makes provision for what I will call overall appropriations made available to the regional councils for pursuing a regional policy. In the general State budget there is therefore an overall amount allocated for financing all action and projects in one region or another.

The overall amount is divided between the three regions on the basis of three criteria: the population of each region; the size of each region; sums received from income tax, each criterion representing exactly one-third.

When these sums are handed over to the different regions, the ministerial committee decides on how they shall be allocated and what use shall be made of them within the regional budgets. In the framework of the general State

budget, there are therefore three elements which are intended for the exclusive use of one region or another.

The regional councils also give their opinion on the use of these amounts in that, when proposals are made by the ministerial committee, the regional council may suggest changes.

I think that, without going into details, I have described the main aspects of the origins and position reached in regionalisation in Belgium.

(ii) Statement by Mr. Janssens, President of the Walloon Regional Council

Mr. Hulpiau has just described to you the background and contents of the law of 1st August 1974 setting up regional institutions prior to the application of Article 107 *quater* of the Constitution. We shall now deal with the implementation of this law.

The legislator left regional councillors much latitude for the organisation and functioning of the assemblies. The question of the date and place for convening, opening and closing sessions of the assemblies was dealt with by the ministerial committee on institutional reforms. The discussions revealed the tendencies and main lines which guided the various ministers, particularly the Ministers for Institutional Reforms, Mr. Perin and Mr. Vandekerkhove.

Mr. Perin's cabinet proposed the text of a royal decree defining only the provisions necessary for setting up the Walloon Regional Council. This text was submitted to the State Council for its opinion. Its view was that "this institution was not an organ of the administration whose organisation and procedure the King would have the power to settle as head of the executive".

Mr. Vandekerkhove's cabinet drafted a more elaborate royal decree containing the same provisions for the organisation and procedure of the Flemish Regional Council. This text also provided that the staff of the *Cultuurraad* (Cultural Council of the Flemish Community) would take on the same tasks as the Flemish Regional Council. Here there is a fundamental difference compared with the proposed royal decree on the Walloon Regional Council, which makes no provision in this sense.

The text prepared by Mr. Vanden Boeynants' cabinet for the Brussels Regional Council contained the same provisions on procedure as the other two as regards the opening sitting, i.e. it would be presided by the oldest member, assisted by the two youngest members of the assembly, and a bureau composed of a president, vice-president and secretaries would be elected by the assembly.

At the end of October 1974, the cabinet of the Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans, tabled in the Council of Ministers a motion for a royal decree common to the three regional councils; it was dated 12th November 1974 and settled problems affecting the functioning of future assemblies and council meetings, the opening and closing of sessions, the qualifications of members of the council and the presence of the executive.

This royal decree was followed by three others convening the assemblies for their opening sittings. It was decided to hold these sittings on 26th November 1974, the Brussels Regional Council meeting in Brussels, the Flemish Regional Council in Malines and the Walloon Regional Council in Namur. The composition of the regional councils was described in the previous address.

The Walloon Regional Council is composed of sixty-two senators resident in Wallonia. Since yesterday, the original political breakdown has been changed and the council is now composed of twenty-five Socialists, fourteen Social Christians, seventeen Liberals, five Walloon Unionists and one Independent (UDP).

The Flemish Regional Council is composed of ninety-two senators resident in Flanders of whom forty-seven belong to the Christian Social Party, twenty-two to the Belgian Socialist Party, fourteen to the People's Union Party and fourteen to the Freedom and Progress Party.

The composition of the Brussels Regional Council is rather different, since it includes twenty-one senators resident in the Brussels administrative district and forty-two members of the Brussels Urban Council, appointed for each linguistic group in proportion to its political representation in the Urban Council.

In application of the law on preparatory regionalisation, the opening sittings of the regional councils were held on 26th November 1974, when the leaders of the socialist groups in each council expressed in various terms their refusal to take part in preparatory regionali-

sation. The socialist groups then left the sittings, their leaders declaring that the establishment of regional councils was merely intended to give the impression that regionalisation was under way. The other political groups nevertheless decided to put preparatory regionalisation to the test.

Each council then elected its bureau and appointed working groups to draw up the internal regulations for each regional council.

The second body set up by the law of 1st August 1974 is the ministerial committee for regional affairs, the executive organ of each region during the preparatory regionalisation stage. Article 9 of that law provides that the three ministerial committees for regional affairs shall be set up by royal decree discussed in the Council of Ministers. This provision stipulates that the Ministerial Committee for Brussels Affairs shall include secretaries of State, one of whom must belong to a different linguistic group from the presiding minister.

The implementation of this article necessitated a change in the structure of Mr. Tindemans' government which had been formed before the vote on preparatory regionalisation. This change was made on 4th October 1974.

Certain ministers and secretaries of State were made responsible for questions where a differentiated regional policy is wholly or partly justified. For this purpose, they were attached to their minister for regional affairs.

The composition of the three ministerial committees is laid down in the royal decree of 8th October 1974. The structure of the Walloon and Flemish Ministerial Committees is as follows: a minister for regional affairs, who chairs the committee; two ministers (education and institutional reforms); secretaries of State, deputies to the ministers for regional affairs. The structure of the Brussels Ministerial Committee is different: a minister for regional affairs assisted by two secretaries of State.

The law of 1st August stipulates that each ministerial committee shall be chaired by the minister for regional affairs. Moreover, the law also lays down that deliberations in these committees are collegiate and in the event of disagreement the matter shall be submitted to the Council of Ministers.

A royal decree of 19th November 1974 organises the ministerial committees for regional

affairs by defining the rôle of the chairman, procedure for considering different matters and liaison with the government.

The royal decree of 20th November 1974 defined the responsibilities of the ministers for regional affairs and the regional secretaries of State.

Each minister for regional affairs has additional duties to those he already exercises as chairman of the regional ministerial committee: he must also ensure co-ordination of the policy of his ministerial committee for regional affairs in regional matters and ensure that the regulations and decisions of the regional secretaries of State conform to the government's general policy.

The secretaries of State have statutory powers only with the agreement of the ministers to whom they are attached. Any motion for a statutory decree on regionalised matters is submitted by the minister for regional affairs to the national minister responsible for this matter at national level.

A series of royal decrees determines which areas of ministerial responsibility warrant a differentiated regional policy in whole or in part. Some matters may be fully regionalised, housing for instance. Other matters are regionalised as a whole with certain limited exceptions: rural regrouping, forestry, fishing and hunting, and regional planning.

For other matters which are partially regionalised, royal decrees determine the limits of regional action. This is the case for family and demographic policy, hygiene, health, employment policy, immigrant workers, regional economic expansion, industrial and energy policy, economic expansion and the promotion of the middle classes.

It should be noted that a royal decree of 10th December 1974 changed the composition of the Ministerial Committee for Walloon Affairs. The Minister for Institutional Reforms left the ministerial committee whereas the Secretary of State for Water Policy became a member.

The ministerial committees for regional affairs met for the first time in November 1974, before the regional councils had started work. They now meet regularly to consider regional matters.

Mr. Hulpiau spoke to you earlier about the breakdown of overall appropriations which is, I would remind you, as follows:

- (i) one-third according to the population of each region;
- (ii) one-third according to the size of each region;
- (iii) one-third according to the sums received from income tax in each region.

Each year, the percentage for each region varies since the calculation is based on the latest figures laid down by royal decree determined in the Council of Ministers. After this breakdown, each committee for regional affairs proposes the allocation of budgetary estimates to cover expenditure on the regional policy it will pursue. After obtaining the opinion of the relevant regional council, each draft regional budget is submitted to the bureaux of the chambers. This procedure allows appropriate action to be implemented in each region in the light of the course to be followed, more or less importance being attached to certain estimates in relation to the share which each region previously received from the national budget.

The last problem to be tackled in implementing preparatory regionalisation is the regionalisation of administration.

The government had a choice between keeping the officials responsible for regional affairs within existing departments or setting up three regional ministerial departments.

At a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 5th November 1976, the government decided to give ministers with regional responsibilities their own administrative services. This measure concerns more than two thousand officials. The idea of setting up simple regional administrative cells within existing administrations has been abandoned. The case of the future Brussels administration will be submitted to the Council of State, which will have to decide whether these services should be considered as national or regional.

(iii) Statement by Mr. Lepaffe, President of the Brussels Regional Council

You have heard about the background and organisation of regionalisation and I will now review results. They are obviously recent since our regional councils have been meeting regularly only since November 1974. As you have been told, our new Constitution and the 1974 law establishing regional institutions on a

provisional basis have been applied and our critics say that they have at least the merit of having been applied at no great expense and to have cost far less than a normal ministerial cabinet.

But I will not embark on such an impertinent course. What is interesting is to note that the three councils have expressed opinions and made proposals in fields where a differentiated regional policy was justifiable.

The annual consideration of regional budgets has allowed an analysis to be made of the opinions of regional representatives on regional planning, economic expansion, employment, housing, demography, hygiene, health, communal organisation, regionalisation of the administration and sometimes also on the simplification of our institutions, which had an annoying tendency to become increasingly complicated, to which there were obviously reactions.

By the tabling of motions, i.e. through spontaneous action by members of the council, the councils have dealt more particularly with industrial policy, public works, small and medium-sized firms, unemployment, communal finances, hospital policy, housing, the five-year economic plan and urban development.

Some councils have been more interested in some questions than others. Consideration of these questions after two years brings out an important fact: the birth or revelation of a regional conscience. It has been noticed that although in some fields our councils have had identical reactions in others the three regional councils proposed solutions which differed from one region to another.

Work has shown the situation was not the same in Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia but also that mentalities sometimes differed and that even as universal a subject as housing, for instance, is solved differently from one region to another.

Something else which we have noticed and which will be interesting when final regionalisation is discussed, since that is our aim, is the necessary identity of views which there must be between a regional council and the executive and ministerial committee about which Mr. Hulpiau spoke. If the regional council does not have the same political majority as the appropriate ministerial committee, I do not need to explain at length why this slows down rather than speeds up regionalisation plans.

What have we been seeking since the 1970 reform now that we have one State, two cultural communities and three regions? It is for this single State which we are anxious to retain and whose existence we do not wish to jeopardise that we are trying to find a balance through the regions. It is obvious that there is no question of any form of separatism; more dynamic formulae must be found for the State as a whole. Moreover, in 1970 more than 90 % of the votes were in favour of regional reforms, and this is obviously an important element.

As we are about to embark on the community dialogue, which is a major and important aspect of this reform, it now seems important to determine the points of convergence between the various projects being pursued on both sides of our linguistic frontier and in the three regions. They must not be considered as textbook theories, for there would be no interest in this; they must be viewed rather as a catalyser of future political reactions. Moreover, since a first attempt at a community dialogue in 1974, a working approach emerged in all the parties — the Christian Social Party, the Walloon Union and the People's Union Party. Sometimes important documents have been made available for everyone to study ways of promoting our community relations.

In these various documents, certain trends emerge clearly, some of which are shared, which is important. It seems to be an accepted fact that each region must have an assembly composed of representatives elected by ballot for that purpose alone. This is not yet the case. You were told earlier that for the Brussels Regional Council there are senators, i.e. who have not been elected as regional councillors, and members of the Urban Council who have been elected as urban councillors but not as members of the regional council, and the other regional councillors at present are senators who are appointed automatically.

An agreement also seems to be taking shape for granting these assemblies the right in future to issue ordinances on regional affairs, i.e. they are acquiring power which is no longer consultative but legislative and just as our cultural councils have now acquired the right to issue decrees regional councils might issue ordinances and the hierarchy between a law and an ordinance and the hierarchy between a law and an ordinance would be similar to that existing between the law and the decree confirming the cultural autonomy which we now enjoy.

Furthermore, there is also a move towards appointing regional executives separate from the national executive and elected by the regional assembly, which would obviously avoid the paradox to which I referred earlier, where an executive may be different from the regional assembly.

Consideration is also being given to the cultural assemblies hearing ministers who are responsible to them in certain fields such as education, culture or scientific research. An important problem then arises, i.e. the transfer of fiscal power to these regional assemblies. Fiscal powers are at present entirely in the hands of the State. It must be recognised that the share now transferred, the appropriations I referred to earlier, is still very small compared to the State budget, and this does not facilitate decentralisation or deconcentration, which is what we are trying to achieve.

There is of course disagreement, but the main thing is the dynamic nature of the evolution now under way. First, simplification and rationalisation are important matters. Second, any solution which jeopardised or failed to take account of a region's real wishes would consequently harm the overall balance and each region thus has to give reasonable consideration to the concessions it might make to ensure that the balance is maintained, which is obviously an important element.

Because there are different institutions, the responsibilities of each must be very clearly defined. This raises a problem: should or should not a jurisdictional body be set up to define the limits of responsibilities and above all arbitrate in the event of infringements? We — or at least I personally — consider this to be more important than a political body because I feel that in the event of arbitration political arbitration is subject to majorities which are sometimes temporary; there is obviously less risk of this in jurisdictional arbitration.

As I have said, the present resources of the regional institutions are very limited. The regions share practically 9 % of the national budget and 4 % of its staff, but you have heard the reassuring news that since the beginning of the month consideration has been given to giving them a slightly stronger administration. Fortunately, because we, like many others in Europe, are passing through a period of budgetary restrictions and it is to be feared that our resources

will increase less easily than in a period of prosperity.

But here the problem of fiscal power crops up again. We consider this to be an essential condition for regional autonomy: without financial independence — partial, of course, since many matters obviously remain national — the regions cannot be truly autonomous. This reform must include fiscal reform to give the regions the right to introduce, levy and administer regional taxes, which should terminate the disproportion which sometimes exists between State resources and those of local authorities in general, whether regions or communes, because it is not possible at one and the same time to extend local responsibilities and increase the resources needed by local authorities.

From this point of view, it might be considered that a much larger proportion of the State's financial resources should be allocated to the regions than is the case at present.

There are two essential principles: it is not because fiscal powers are regionalised that total fiscal pressure has to be increased. In other words, new taxes must not be introduced, there must just be transfers, because otherwise the ridiculous result would be to impose such a heavy burden on citizens that they would see only the negative aspects of decentralisation and not the rest.

What therefore is the conclusion? In Belgium, we feel that the State is now at an important turningpoint in its history. At every level, the community problem which has arisen involves consequences which regional-type solutions seem capable of solving in the near future. But what is important, and essential for us, is that during this period new habits and attitudes are emerging. The regions perhaps have new respect for each other in view of the similar problems arising. Positive conditions for contacts between the various regions are being established again, and this is extremely important because in the end they form an original synthesis of the words which have sometimes become rather too banal, that is the right of peoples or regions to self-determination, cultural autonomy and regional claims. We believe that with the move towards final regionalisation these words will be given tangible meaning which will in fact be a feeling of harmony throughout the State.

Someone has said that to give life to a region is to make it a responsible entity, capable

of taking risks, making sacrifices — we have to think of this sometimes after all — showing regional spirit and concentrating local forces. We feel this to be of importance for the good of all.

Finally, regionalisation raises the problem of the structure of our political institutions, which must represent the regions without jeopardising national unity. On the twenty-fifth

anniversary of his accession to the throne, the King, in a speech to the Chamber of Representatives, said: "To federate is to unite while accepting differences, not to split up in opposition."

With this in mind, we all sincerely hope that commonsense and moderation will preside over all these negotiations which should lead to final regionalisation.

Anti-submarine warfare

REPORT¹

**submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur**

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APPENDIX

Anti-submarine weapons platforms in service with allied countries

1. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 1 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Critchley (Chairman) ; MM. Klepsch (Substitute : *Alber*), *Dankert* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Beauguitte, Bizet, *Boldrini*, *Bonnel*, Bouloche, Buck (Substitute : *Sir Harwood Harrison*), Fosson, Haase,

Hardy, *Konen*, de *Koster* (Substitute : *de Niet*), *Lemmrich*, *Maggioni* (Substitute : *Calamandrei*), *Ménard*, *Pawelczyk*, *Pecchioli*, *Richter*, *Rivière*, *Roberti*, *Roper* (Substitute : *Lord Duncan-Sandys*), *Scholten*, *Schugens*, *Tanghe*, *Urwin*.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Abbreviations employed in current reports of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments***

ABM	Anti-ballistic missile
ACE	Allied Command Europe
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe
AFNORTH	Allied Forces Northern Europe
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe
ASW	Anti-submarine warfare
CSCE	Conference on security and co-operation in Europe
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
MAD	Magnetic anomaly detection
MBFR	Mutual and balanced force reductions
MIRV	Multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SALT	Strategic arms limitation talks
SOSUS	Sonar surveillance system
SURTASS	Surveillance towed array sensor system
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union

Draft Recommendation
on anti-submarine warfare

The Assembly,

Aware that the large numbers of modern attack submarines in service with the Soviet navy pose a serious threat to allied communications, both across the Atlantic and between the different parts of Western Europe ;

Aware that a significant part of the Soviet nuclear threat arises from the Soviet strategic submarines ;

Believing that the European NATO countries must be able to provide an effective ASW capability from their limited resources,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To ensure that their anti-submarine warfare forces are fully interoperable, and in appropriate cases to increase the standardisation of these forces ;
2. To call on the independent European programme group or on Eurogroup to undertake an evaluation of European ASW requirements and capabilities with particular reference to coastal waters and the use of maritime patrol aircraft ;
3. To increase their support for the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre at La Spezia through closer liaison with national centres and improved facilities for national research staff to spend time in the international allied environment of the SACLANT centre.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The submarine developed in the first half of the twentieth century as an anti-surface ship weapon proved itself highly effective in two world wars, both against merchant shipping and naval forces. The German U-boat campaign in the first world war employed a total of 373 submarines, of which 199 were lost ; for those casualties 5,708 merchant ships were sunk totalling over 11,000,000 tons — an average of 28 merchant ships and 57,000 tons for every submarine lost. In the second world war, the German campaign employed a total of 1,162 submarines, of which 785 were lost. They succeeded in sinking 2,828 merchant ships totalling nearly 15,000,000 tons — an average of 3.6 ships, or 18,700 tons for each submarine lost. The United States campaign against Japan from 1942-45 employed a total of 288 submarines, of which 52 were lost. They sank 1,178 Japanese transports totalling nearly 5,000,000 tons — an average of 23 ships and 93,500 tons for every submarine lost.

2. Losses of naval surface forces to the submarines were also extensive. The German first world war U-boat campaign sank 10 battleships, 18 cruisers and 21 destroyers ; the second world war campaign sank 2 battleships, 5 aircraft carriers, 8 cruisers and 36 destroyers. The American campaign against Japan sank 1 battleship, 8 aircraft carriers, 11 cruisers and 39 destroyers.

3. The 1950s saw the emergence of the nuclear-propelled submarine which dramatically transformed the capabilities from a relatively slow-moving vessel with short range when submerged, to a vessel of virtually indefinite underwater endurance with a speed comparable to or exceeding that of surface vessels.

4. The world's first nuclear-propelled submarine, the United States Nautilus, was commissioned in September 1954. Only five years later, the first nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarine, the George Washington, was commissioned, carrying sixteen ballistic missiles which could engage at strategic surface targets at a range of well over 1,000 n.m. The carrying of ballistic missiles was an entirely new rôle for a submarine, imposing the quite different tactics

of getting lost instead of having to seek out a surface ship target. The requirements of anti-submarine warfare to deal with the second use of the submarine are similarly changed, and complicated by an order of magnitude. The importance attached by the United States to the advantages of nuclear-propulsion in a submarine is illustrated by the fact that of a fleet of 120 conventionally-propelled submarines in service in the United States in 1960, only nine have been retained in service today ; no new construction of conventionally-propelled submarines has been undertaken by the United States since 1956.

5. Anti-submarine warfare involves, first, devices to detect the presence of a submarine ; to locate it sufficiently accurately for it to be attacked and to discriminate it from possible friendly submarines ; secondly, specialised weapons for destroying, which may be torpedoes, depth charges or mines. Both methods of detection and attack are carried in the whole range of weapons platforms used in naval warfare from fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters which can be combined with aircraft carriers or surface vessels with special landing platforms, to surface escorts of the destroyer and frigate type. Detection devices may also be static, mounted on the seabed and connected to the shore by cable.

6. Because the strategic-missile-carrying submarine is concerned primarily with hiding itself in the oceans provided only that it remains within range of its target — which at present may be some 2,500 nautical miles away — the problem of locating and destroying it in the huge ocean areas available to it is very much more complicated than the problem of defending the use of the sea by friendly surface vessels, since defence in the second case can be concentrated in the much smaller areas of sea in the neighbourhood of friendly ports and vessels at sea. A distinction has thus been drawn between "strategic anti-submarine warfare" and "tactical anti-submarine warfare". In practice, however, the second aim of ASW — defending the use of the sea — can also be based on a policy of denying the ocean to attack submarines — seeking them out and destroying them wherever they may be, in transit to their targets or near their home ports — and the types of operations involved in this case are not different in nature from those involved in the destruction of strategic

missile submarines. These tactics are unlikely to be able to discriminate between an adversary's attack submarines on the one hand and his strategic submarines on the other, and can be expected to destroy a proportion of both.

7. The primary concern of the European members of NATO will be ASW in coastal waters, both for the protection of reinforcement convoys from the United States in the approaches to European ports, and for the maintenance of European trade on which Europe is dependent for its food. Coastal ASW is of further interest in situations short of general war in which a threat could be posed to fishing rights or off-shore mineral extraction. This report therefore will pay particular attention to the problems of coastal ASW. The United States concentrates a large part of its ASW effort on deep-sea capability, both to counter the Soviet submarine-borne missile threat and to maintain the invulnerability of its own strategic forces, but the

necessary resources are not within the reach of many of the other members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

II. Soviet capabilities

(a) The Soviet submarine threat

8. The Soviet navy has traditionally had a strong submarine force. Surprisingly, in numbers, it was the largest in the world, even at the outbreak of the second world war when it had 165 submarines, compared with 57 in service with the German navy at that time.

9. The Soviet submarine force today is still numerically the largest in the world with 309 submarines of all types compared with 116 in service with the United States navy. But the age and capability of the Soviet submarines need to be borne in mind. The information is presented in tabular form :

(i) Soviet Union — Strategic submarines

No.	Class	Year first commissioned or reported	Last year of construction	Displacement dived tons	Missiles			Propulsion
					No. per submarine	Type	Range n.m.	
4	D-II	Nov. 1973	—	16,000	16	SSN 8	4,200	Nuclear
13	D-I	1972	—	10,000	12	SSN 8	4,200	Nuclear
34	Y	1968	?	9,000	16	SSN 6	1,600	Nuclear
7	H	1958	1962	5,150	3	SSN 5	700	Nuclear
20	G	1958	1961-62	2,800	3	SSN 4 (45)	300	Diesel electric
78				Totals	845			

(ii) Soviet Union — Cruise missile submarines

No.	Class	Year first commissioned or reported	Last year of construction	Displacement dived tons	Missiles			Propulsion
					No. per submarine	Type	Range n.m.	
1	P	1972	—	5,100	8 ?	SSN 7	30	Nuclear
14	C	1968	—	5,100	8	SSN 7	30	Nuclear
29	E-II	1963	1967	5,600	8	SSN 3	400	Nuclear
16	J	1962	1967	3,600	4	SSN 3	400	Diesel electric
5	W	1960 ¹	1963	1,800	4	SSN 3	400	Diesel electric
65				Totals	436			

1. Modified from W-class attack submarine first built 1951.

(iii) Soviet Union — Attack submarines

No.	Class	Year first commissioned or reported	Last year of construction	Displacement dived tons	Speed		Range n.m. surfaced cruising	Propulsion
					Surface	Dived		
2	A	1970	—	4,500	?	?		Nuclear?
1	V-II	1974	—	6,000	?	?		Nuclear
19	V	1967	—	5,100	26	30+		Nuclear
13	N	1958	1963	4,800	20	25		Nuclear
5	E-I	1960	1962 ¹	5,000	20			Nuclear
3	T	1973	—	2,500	?			Diesel electric
60	F	1958	1967	2,300	20	15	20,000	Diesel electric
9	R	1958	1961	1,600	17	14		Diesel electric
10	Z	1951	1955	2,200	18	15	20,000	Diesel electric
40	W	1951	1957	1,350	17	15	13,000	Diesel electric
4	B	1968	—	2,800	?	?		Diesel electric
166	Total							

1. Converted to attack submarine from cruise missile submarine 1973-74.

Sources: IISS Military Balance 1976-77; "The Soviet Navy Today", Captain J. E. Moore, Macdonald and James, 1975; US/Soviet Military Balance, Library of Congress, 1976.

10. Summarising recent construction trends in the Soviet navy, it can be said that submarines less than 10 years old now in service amount to 50 strategic submarines, 15 cruise-missile submarines, 22 nuclear-propelled attack submarines and about 10 diesel attack submarines.

(b) Soviet anti-submarine warfare capability

11. Despite the lesson of 1937, when Soviet merchant ships delivering war supplies to the Republican forces in the Spanish civil war were sunk by Italian submarines, the Soviet anti-submarine capabilities and effort during the second world war were limited to defensive measures close to the coast in reaction to submarine attacks. The Soviet effort has been criticised by the then allies of the Soviet Union as being inadequate to deal with U-boats lying in wait for British convoys in the Kola inlet.

12. Despite its own large submarine forces, the modern Soviet navy which can be said to have begun with the appointment of Admiral Gorshkov as chief of naval staff in 1956, does not seem initially to have laid great emphasis on anti-submarine warfare. The major naval threat to the Soviet Union was felt to lie in the nuclear-strike aircraft on United States aircraft carriers, in response to which the Soviet Union developed naval surface-to-surface missiles of considerable range.

13. When the Polaris submarine first became operational in 1961, with the 1,500 nautical mile range A-1 missile, its area of patrol was necessarily limited to the Norwegian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Soviet Union has operational today a significant ASW capability, which may have been designed in an attempt to counter Polaris. With the increased 2,500 nautical mile range of the A-3 and Poseidon missile, the Polaris submarine can now patrol in a much larger area covering virtually the whole of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean. The Soviet ASW capability now in service is not believed to offer any significant threat to Polaris in these circumstances, but it is not possible to know whether the Soviet Union is developing further forces with a view to countering the Polaris threat, or whether it has concluded that the vulnerability of the submarine is so low that the size of the effort that will be required to counter it would be beyond the resources of the Soviet Union. The Trident submarines planned to come into service from late 1978, and equipped with missiles with a range of over 4,000 n.m., will be more difficult to counter.

14. The Soviet ASW capability now in service comprises bottom-mounted sensors in coastal areas, maritime patrol aircraft, surface vessels of various types including the two Moskva class ASW helicopter carriers, and the attack submarines¹. The principal platforms and weapon systems concerned are as follows :

Maritime patrol aircraft

- 55 Il-38 "May" aircraft with MAD, sonobuoys, radar ;
- 60 Tu-95 "Bear" D + F long-range bomber fitted for ASW ;
- 100 Be-12 "Mail" flying boat.

Chief ASW surface vessels

- 2 Moskva ASW helicopter carriers with ASW torpedoes, SUW-N-1 launchers, RBU 2500-A rocket launchers, and ASW helicopters ; VD sonar ;
- 17 Kashin ASW destroyers with RBU 2500 and 4500 rocket launchers and ASW torpedoes ; VD sonar ;
- 8 Kresta II ASW cruisers with RBU 2500 and 4500 rocket launchers, ASW torpedoes and ASW helicopter.

ASW submarines

The attack submarines listed earlier must be assumed to have ASW homing torpedoes.

It is also reported that some Y-class submarines may be fitted with the SSN × 13 ASW missile.

ASW weapons

RBU 2500 rocket launcher — propels depth charges to 2500 metres range ;

RBU 4500 rocket launcher — heavier, shorter-range SUW-N-1 surface-to-underwater naval missile reported capable of launching either FRAS rocket with nuclear depth charge range 16 n.m. — or SSN 14 missile 20 n.m. range carrying homing ASW torpedo ;

SSN × 13 submarine launched missile 400 n.m. range, carrying homing ASW torpedo.

1. The aircraft carrier Kiev now operational and its two sister-ships now being built probably have an ASW rôle as well.

"Wing-in-Ground"

"WIG or "EKRAANOPLAN". The Soviet Union is said to be developing a "Wing-in-Ground" surface skimmer machine — essentially a very low-flying aircraft, making use of the extra lift which conventional airfoils experience close to the ground. It is variously reported to have a 650 metre wing-span, capable of flying up to half a wing-span above ground or ocean at 350 n.m.p.h. and weighing up to 1,000 tons. Fitted with MAD or even laser detectors it could be a useful ASW platform in "ground effect" flight. A Soviet article has referred to a laser capable of detecting submarines down to a depth of 140 m.

III. Western vulnerability**(a) The vulnerable sea-lanes**

15. The European NATO countries depend on seaborne traffic, both for military supplies and reinforcements which would flow across the Atlantic in the event of hostilities, as well as for intra-European trade and transatlantic trade for normal civilian supplies.

16. Speaking in Copenhagen on 3rd September 1976, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, Vice-Admiral Jungius, pointed out that the 31,000,000 square miles of the Atlantic was the most active ocean in the world and that the total goods traffic in both directions between Europe and America amounted to 1.6 billion tons each year. On any day, some 7,000 merchant ships could be found in the North Atlantic or in the ports of the riparian NATO countries. Even in a period of rationing and austerity, the Admiral estimated, half of the goods and raw materials would still have to be transported, amounting to some 70 million tons each month. Moreover, reinforcements for SACEUR in the event of hostilities would amount to more than 1 million men in the first month, including equipment weighing 1 million tons. Ammunition would add a further 4.5 million tons and initial supplies yet another 4.5 million tons. Fuel supply to the forces would amount to 600,000 barrels a day. Although most of the men and their light equipment could be transported by air, there would still remain 1,000 cargoes of ammunition, supplies and fuel and later 500 cargoes a month of supplies to sustain the forces. Military planners would hope that in the first month of a conflict, transport priority would be given to military requirements while civilian consump-

tion was met from existing stocks in Europe. Subsequently, however, civilian requirements would inevitably increase to perhaps 70 million tons of civilian supplies a month which might require as many as 5,000 merchant ships to sustain.

17. According to the German White Paper on Defence, 1975-76, oil supplies transiting the Atlantic Ocean in 1974 amounted to 651 million tons of which 512 million came from the Middle East and Persian Gulf by the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic. A further 140 million of oil crossed the Mediterranean from North Africa.

18. Other more conservative assessments of civilian maritime transport requirements in a period of hostilities suggest that Western Europe as a whole can be regarded as self-contained in food, iron and steel, provided that the coastal waters are kept free for intra-European trade; even this conservative assessment shows that oil and cobalt would have to be imported from further afield. A policy of stockpiling for civilian requirements in the first month of hostilities to free surface transport for military purposes would be valuable. Oil and cobalt are particularly indicated for longer-term stockpiling.

19. Admiral Jungius in the speech quoted above did not express undue concern about the ability of Soviet surface forces to interrupt supplies on the sea-lanes, unless considerable Soviet air forces were deployed in the Atlantic for reconnaissance and missile guidance against shipping, in which case NATO would require a higher level of air defence in the Atlantic than had hitherto been considered.

20. The Soviet submarine threat however was infinitely more serious: of the 320 operational attack submarines, it was estimated that 100 would be deployed in the Atlantic at the beginning of hostilities. Furthermore, the powerful Soviet navy offered other more attractive choices to the Soviet Union than launching a general war in Europe. The "NATO area" is limited by the treaty to the area north of the Tropic of Cancer. Outside that area, as Admiral Gorshkov had not failed to note, there were other areas of equal importance to the NATO countries and the increasing size of the Soviet nuclear-propelled submarine fleet gave it the possibility of attacking and sinking ships in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean and still further afield. Without undertaking any military operations within the NATO area, which alone

could be a cause for automatically invoking the North Atlantic Treaty, the Soviet Union could drastically reduce oil supplies to the NATO countries. No NATO commander had any authority to act or to deploy forces outside the NATO area, and all that SACLANT could do at the present time was to develop contingency plans for the protection of shipping in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. SACLANT could not of course apply any such plan or deploy forces without specific authorisation from the Defence Planning Council.

21. In conclusion, Admiral Jungius pointed out that although fifteen years ago the NATO countries had 1,300 warships, the same countries now possessed only half that number, although they were more modern and better equipped. The reduced number of ships, however, would mean that NATO might have to order its priorities for larger-scale naval operations, as no ship could be in two places at once. If, for example, air strikes were to be launched from carriers in support of SACEUR in a particular area, it might not be possible to maintain a maximum level of civilian seaborne supplies until the strike operation had been concluded.

22. Soviet naval activities in the Atlantic in peacetime increased significantly after 1969, involving twice-yearly rotation of submarines in the Mediterranean from the Soviet northern fleet, the establishment of Y-class strategic submarine patrols in the central Atlantic. From a peak in 1972, the level of Soviet deployment in the Atlantic fell only slightly the following year and now appears to have levelled off. Although it has been estimated that if the Soviet Union were to maintain one-third of its general purpose naval forces at sea, as the United States attempts to do, it could from its northern and Baltic fleets have maintained some 42,800 combat ship days in the Atlantic in 1974, whereas in practice, the total for both combat and auxiliaries was only 14,600 ship days, suggesting that the Soviet navy spends most of its time in port in home waters. However, if the forces operating in the Atlantic on a typical day are taken, which can be assumed to constitute the core forces of a steady state forward deployment, it will be found that there are usually 3-5 Soviet strategic submarines and from 1-3 attack cruise missile submarines present¹. Compared with

Admiral Jungius' estimate of 100 Soviet submarines in the Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities, it is clear that some warning time might be expected from such a very large increase — some at least of the 90 or so additional submarines would very likely be detected on passage to the North Atlantic.

(b) *Strategic vulnerability*

23. The three member countries of NATO which possess nuclear weapons rely heavily on the strategic submarine as the basis of their deterrent forces. The United States Poseidon missile has ten independently targetable re-entry vehicles, and with its deployment in 31 Polaris submarines, the United States now has a total of 5,120 independently targetable re-entry vehicles deployed in strategic submarines compared with 2,154 independent vehicles deployed on land-based strategic missiles — on this basis, the United States can be said to be keeping 70 % of its strategic missile strike power in its submarines. When the fourth French strategic submarine becomes operational at the end of 1976, France will have 64 warheads in its submarine force compared with 18 in its land-based missiles, representing an 80 % reliance on submarines. The United Kingdom reliance on submarines is total with 64 missiles.

24. While the shorter ranges of the missiles fitted to the first three French submarines presumably limit their possible area of patrol to the Arctic Ocean and parts of the Norwegian and North Seas¹, the remaining submarines of the NATO countries have a possible operating area extending from the southern tip of Greenland, through the North-Eastern Atlantic down to Gibraltar and embracing the whole of the Mediterranean. United States submarines presumably patrol in the Pacific Ocean as well. The huge extent and range of depth of this ocean area make it highly unlikely that with present technology the Soviet Union will be able to deploy anti-submarine resources capable of destroying even a small proportion of allied strategic submarines. One possible tactic which has been proposed, that of active tailing of all strategic submarines on patrol by Soviet nuclear-

1. In a forthcoming book: *The State and Future of the Soviet Navy in the North Atlantic*, Robert G. Weinland, the Brookings Institution.

1. Assuming the target to be Moscow. The Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean would also be within range but the transit time from the base in Brest to these areas would be twice as long.

propelled attack submarines, would require a force of such submarines considerably larger, perhaps several times larger, than the numbers of allied strategic submarines. With only about 32 suitable attack submarines operational at the moment compared with 49 allied strategic submarines, the Soviet Union is not assumed to possess such a "tailing" capability. Nevertheless, much of the modern ASW capability now possessed by the Soviet Union is generally considered to have been developed initially to counter the Polaris threat when the possible area of patrol was much closer to Soviet home waters, and the Soviet Union is known from published accounts to have deployed bottom-mounted sonars off its coast in the Arctic Ocean which may well provide significant submarine location capability in that area and will do so increasingly with the introduction of the Trident submarines.

(c) *The geographical balance*

25. The navies of all the maritime NATO countries enjoy direct access to the open seas from their home ports, without having to pass near any territory belonging to Warsaw Pact countries. The Warsaw Pact navies are in a very different position. There is little doubt that passage through the Black Sea and Baltic exits could be denied for submarines and surface vessels alike during a period of hostilities, as long as the contiguous NATO territory remained in allied hands. Thus the Soviet Baltic and Black Sea fleets which had not reached the open seas prior to hostilities could be kept off the ocean. The Soviet northern fleet operating from the ice-free Kola Peninsula still has to pass through gaps between territory of NATO countries before it can reach the Atlantic Ocean. The Spitzbergen-Bear Island and Bear Island-North Cape passages are 110 and 230 nautical miles wide respectively. At the exits from the Norwegian Sea, the passages are Greenland-Iceland 150 nautical miles, Iceland-Faroes 220, Faroes-Shetland 150 and Shetland-Norway 150. Except for a deeper trench, 10 miles wide at its narrowest, between the Faroes and the Shetlands, the depth nowhere exceeds 1,000 metres. With the very large bottom-mounted sonar arrays mentioned later, and the use of maritime patrol aircraft from the contiguous territory of NATO countries, NATO ASW forces possess a significant capability for detecting the passage of a substantial proportion of Soviet submarines. This does not mean however that they can be followed at sea once

they have reached the Atlantic Ocean. Only the Soviet Pacific fleet enjoys access to the oceans comparable to that of the NATO navies.

IV. *Allied anti-submarine capability*

(a) *The SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre*

26. The SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre in La Spezia, Italy, was originally established in 1959 to support SACLANT by providing research results that could lead to equipment development. Twelve NATO countries — all those with navies except France — now participate in the centre, sharing the cost and contributing scientists to its staff. Although France, which was originally a full participant, technically withdrew from the centre ten years ago, your Rapporteur understands that the country can be considered a participant in practice, but it contributes only a proportionate share of certain projects undertaken by the centre which receive specific French approval. French scientists attached to the centre work as full members of the staff and may be assigned to any project whether selected by France or not.

27. The centre's annual budget of \$ 6.5 million represents some three-quarters of the total SACLANT international budget. The staff include fifty scientists, for the most part seconded from national anti-submarine research centres for periods of three to five years, together with a few naval officers from the participating countries who act as service advisers.

28. The work of the centre is under the general direction of SACLANT. A scientific committee of national representatives advises SACLANT on the best use of the centre. The centre can undertake projects at the request of a member nation provided its main mission in support of SACLANT permits. It endeavours to work in as close association as possible with national research centres.

29. Anti-submarine warfare research is normally a highly classified subject, and much national research is probably too sensitive for details to be communicated to the centre. At the same time, the growing cost of such research is making it impossible for the smaller NATO countries to pursue significant work on a national basis; they tend to rely more heavily on the centre than do the larger countries. Despite these security difficulties, which are declining in importance as the cost of research increases,

the centre is making a very useful contribution to anti-submarine work. Half of its reports, which are unclassified, can be published, and only a few receive high security gradings.

30. The activities of the centre are divided among three principal divisions — underwater research; systems research; and operational research. The underwater research division, the largest, studies the behaviour of the ocean, especially the propagation of acoustic waves in it. It operates the centre's oceanographic research ship. The systems research division has been set up to provide a link between underwater research, operational research and the needs of the customer — i.e. SACLANT. It studies new conceptual systems — acoustic and other — to the point at which those found suitable may be offered to NATO for possible development. The operational research group, the smallest, studies operational implications of ASW research and the capabilities required of operators; it provides a mathematical approach to ASW.

31. Although based in the Mediterranean, the centre is not primarily concerned with research work in that sea. Having spent some time working on conditions in the North Atlantic in general, it is at present concentrating more on coastal waters where it is felt that there is an increasing submarine threat. Your Rapporteur believes that there could be a case for moving the centre to a country with a strong national ASW research centre with which the SACLANT centre could collaborate more closely.

32. In 1972 another ocean acoustics project was established independently of the centre. The Azores fixed acoustics range (AFAR) has been constructed and financed independently by France, Germany, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States, but with NATO backing. Equipped with towers and transducers the facility is intended primarily to study the acoustic properties of the ocean as a communication medium; it is essentially experimental rather than operational.

(b) Submarine detection systems

Sonar

33. The ocean being virtually opaque to radio waves or light¹, the detection of submerged sub-

1. Light from lasers may perhaps be used for submarine detection, but ranges of only a few hundred metres are reported.

marines at any distance depends almost entirely on the propagation of acoustic waves. While active sonar systems have been in service since the second world war — depending on the emission of acoustic pulses, detection of the echo after reflection from a submarine target, and measurement of the time interval between the two to give an estimate of range — the inherent capabilities of this system are much less than that of the analogous radar which uses radio instead of acoustic waves in a similar manner. In general, acoustic waves may not be transmitted in straight lines in water — the path will curve because the speed of sound changes with temperature, pressure and salinity. Sound is reflected or scattered from the surface and bottom; the sea itself and its biological content also scatter sound; attenuation in any case is far more rapid than that of radio waves in air.

34. In general, the effectiveness of sonars of all types may be improved by locating them at an optimum depth in the ocean, which for certain applications may be very great — i.e. 1-2,000 metres where the "reliable acoustic path" is reached. Depths of several hundred metres may be required to penetrate the "shadow zone" — the volume of water into which sound emitted near the surface will not reach because of the curved acoustic path.

35. Since the second world war, greater attention has been paid to the development of passive sonar systems which do not emit acoustic waves, but depend solely on listening to sounds generated by a submarine target, analysing their frequency components and determining their direction. One of the most effective passive submarine detection systems is the bottom-mounted SOSUS or sonar surveillance system initially deployed by the United States in the early 1960s. This system employs large arrays of bottom-mounted hydrophones which may be many miles apart, linked to the shore by cable where the received signals are analysed by computer systems. The maximum range of this elaborate system is reported to be as much as 1,000 nautical miles. A total of 21 SOSUS stations were reported to be operational in 1971, deployed in an number of integrated installations code-named Caesar, Colossus, Barrier and Bronco. The last two are reported to be on the territory of allied countries, and Canada is known to have taken over the operation of one SOSUS station from the United States. SOSUS is believed to be an effective system capable

of identifying and locating strategic submarines at long ranges except for remote shallow water areas. The United States 1977 Defence Department report says that SOSUS has been under "improvement development" since 1972 to provide completely new sensors to improve its effectiveness. At the same time, a surveillance towed array sensor system SURTASS is in advanced development — it represents a mobile version of SOSUS. The effectiveness of all passive systems will decrease if improvements can be made in quietening submarines.

36. The inherent capabilities of sonar fall off somewhat when systems have to be mounted on moving platforms, because the optimum size for transducers — the electro-mechanical device placed in the water which is the interface between acoustic waves and electronic circuitry — may be thirty metres or more. The most powerful "bottom-bounce" sonars are suitable only for major war vessels of 5,000 tons or more, and not many ships of this size are in service with the NATO navies. There are less powerful sonars that are deployed in the majority of anti-submarine surface vessels — both hull-mounted and variable depth sonar (VDS) whereby the transducer can be lowered on a cable to depths which may be several hundred metres to reach environmental conditions that will provide an acoustic path that will penetrate the shadow zone. Submarines for this reason provide an ideal platform for a mobile hull-mounted sonar, but operational submarines can reach depths only one-third of those required to find the reliable acoustic path. Fixed-wing aircraft can use sonars by dropping expendable sonobuoys into the ocean which deploy a sonar transducer below the surface and transmit data acquired to the parent aircraft by radio. Helicopters when hovering can employ a dipping sonar, the transducer being lowered below the surface on the end of a cable.

37. The detection systems which do not employ acoustic waves are few. Magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) is in service with maritime patrol aircraft and can reveal the presence of a submarine to an aircraft in the near vicinity because the presence of the steel submarine hull causes a slight distortion of the earth's magnetic field. This is a short-range localisation system only. It is also possible for aircraft to detect fumes from diesel submarines when the diesel engines are being run, and infra-red devices may detect local temperature rises in the ocean surface which may be attributable to the presence of a

submarine. Lasers are reported to have some short-range applications of a few hundred metres.

(c) Weapons systems

38. Specialised ordnance for destroying submarines has developed since the simple depth charge of the first world war, although they are still in use both by surface ships and aircraft. In the second world war, depth charge launchers or projectors were developed which project depth charges to distances of one or two hundred metres from the ship. There are now depth charge mortars which can fire depth charges up to one or two kilometres from a ship, and these are in service with most NATO navies and in the Soviet Union.

39. The increasing range of weapons employed by submarines, particularly anti-shiping missile systems, has led to the development of longer range anti-submarine ordnance. There is a variety of anti-submarine torpedoes in service with ranges of from two to as much as thirty nautical miles with terminal acoustic guidance or with wire guidance from a parent submarine — a system originally developed with anti-tank missiles. Torpedoes however are relatively slow-moving. Coupled with a missile system they can be brought more rapidly to the immediate vicinity of a target and used over much longer ranges. Such missile/torpedo systems now in service have ranges of from two to fifteen nautical miles.

40. Anti-submarine mines are also available, and the United States has developed the Captor anti-submarine mine which contains a Mark 46 anti-submarine torpedo which is released when a submarine is detected by the acoustic sensors of the mine — with a reported range of 1,000 metres — thus vastly increasing the effectiveness. According to the 1977 Defence Department report, development of Captor is complete and "a procurement objective has been established".

(d) Capabilities of the allied countries

41. A catalogue of numbers and types of anti-submarine weapons platforms in service with the allied countries is presented at Appendix.

(e) Tactics and need for interoperability

42. The big debate in anti-submarine warfare appears to your Rapporteur to concern the area

in which priority should be given by the European members of NATO in determining their contribution to anti-submarine operations. Is area defence the best approach, with a policy of actively seeking out and destroying submarines wherever they may be in the oceans, employing long-range platforms and sophisticated detection systems to cover the vast areas involved? The alternative tactic is to concentrate on local and point defence — the provision of local ASW protection for naval forces and possibly certain civilian convoys, and the concentration of ASW activities round the area of allied ports.

43. Protagonists of the second school maintained that the large size and relatively high speed of modern merchant vessels, whether bulk carriers or oil tankers, had made them difficult targets for submarines in the mid-ocean areas. The large size has considerably reduced the total numbers of ships afloat, making it less likely that a patrolling submarine will actually encounter them, while their higher speed has made them much more difficult targets to intercept. The coastal waters and particularly the approaches to the ports of the NATO countries would be much more profitable areas, it is argued, for Soviet submarines to hunt civilian shipping, and an effective ASW defence can be concentrated in these areas at much lower cost than in the remote ocean.

44. On the other hand, an area defence capability undoubtedly provides some opportunities for destroying strategic missile-carrying submarines which will never operate in the coastal waters of the NATO countries. Nuclear-propelled attack submarines and very long-range patrol aircraft are complementary and effective weapon systems for area defence. Smaller ASW surface craft and helicopters can provide good coastal defence, while helicopters on carriers or through-deck cruisers provide anti-submarine capability for naval task forces or convoys, supplementing surface escorts.

45. For area defence, maritime patrol aircraft provide a cheaper capability than nuclear-propelled attack submarines, but submarines can operate in areas where the slow-moving aircraft would be vulnerable, in particular the gap off the north coast of Norway can probably be most effectively patrolled by nuclear-propelled attack submarines.

46. The United States obviously has devoted a considerable effort to an ASW area defence

capability comprising elaborate bottom-mounted surveillance systems, long-range maritime patrol aircraft Orion and 65 nuclear-propelled attack submarines. Of the other NATO countries, only Britain has a long-range patrol aircraft, the Nimrod, and nine nuclear-propelled attack submarines. France has a nuclear-propelled attack submarine under construction and, in common with several European NATO countries, operates the shorter range Bréguet Atlantic patrol aircraft.

47. If the NATO countries, other than the United States, are to concentrate on coastal ASW, there is a strong case for co-operative tactics between the larger and smaller navies. Because really effective sonars can be carried only on large ships, it has been pointed out that smaller passive sonars operated on small ships working in conjunction with a powerful active sonar on one larger ship can operate in such a way that the effective range of detection can be increased by over 50 %, and because the acoustic signals would no longer be reflected at a normal incidence, the effect of anechoic coatings on submarines would be reduced. "Clip-on" towed sonar arrays can much more easily be fitted to vessels than hull-mounted transducers which requires a major refit.

48. For effective ASW in the NATO theatre, interoperability between the ASW weapons systems of all countries is obviously essential. Not only must ship-to-ship communications systems be completely standard, but sonar systems must be fully interoperable if the multi-ship type of operation suggested above is to be possible. Expendable stores such as sonobuoys and anti-submarine ordnance carried by helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft, if completely standardised throughout NATO, could provide existing forces with several times the operational capability because aircraft on patrol could then be re-supplied at any NATO ship or maritime patrol airfield.

V. Conclusion

49. The Committee believes that considerations of cost alone must lead most NATO nations to concentrate their ASW effort on coastal and point defence. Such specialisation would not of course stop joint operations with Canadian and United States ASW forces — "point defence" includes the capability of protecting convoys and naval forces. The very large resources devoted by the United States to area defence

are not believed to have yet provided a capability of destroying simultaneously all Soviet strategic nuclear submarines. Such an overwhelming capability could be held to be destabilising in the strategic nuclear sense, because it could act as an incentive for an aggressor to initiate a pre-emptive nuclear strike by his strategic submarines before they were destroyed. Nevertheless, the Committee feels it essential that active research and development must continue in all ASW fields, even if only as an insurance policy against the possible development of a destabilising capability by the Soviet Union.

50. If the European members of NATO must necessarily, if only from considerations of cost, concentrate on coastal ASW, there should be closer co-operation between the allied countries and more interoperability in equipment. The Committee recommends that Eurogroup or, if all the member countries are prepared to participate, the independent programme group, should undertake an evaluation of the ASW requirements and capabilities of the member

countries. Lastly, the Committee believes that vulnerability to submarine attack can be reduced by indirect methods such as the repositioning of equipment and supplies on the central front that would otherwise have to be brought from across the Atlantic on the outset of hostilities. Increased stocks of aviation fuel in particular could effect a marked reduction in possible submarine targets; the many tankers now lying unused could provide economical storage.

51. Finally, the Committee draws attention to the advantages of closer international liaison with the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre at La Spezia and recommends that research staff working in national anti-submarine research centres should be enabled to spend time in the international allied environment of the SACLANT centre. Full support for the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre at La Spezia offers the most economic way for most countries to have access to ASW research and advice on operational priorities.

APPENDIX

Anti-submarine weapons platforms in service with allied countries

Country	Aircraft		Surface vessels				
	Maritime patrol aircraft	Helicopters	Anti-submarine carriers	Cruisers	Destroyers	Frigates	Other
Belgium	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Canada	26 CP-107	32 CH-124 Sea King	—	—	4	16	—
	40 Tracker	—	—	—	—	—	—
Denmark	—	—	—	—	—	6	3
France	24 Alizé	12 Super Frelon	2	2	20	25	22
	25 Atlantic	11 HSS-1	—	—	—	—	—
	10 Neptune	7 Alouette III	—	—	—	—	—
Fed. Rep. of Germany	20 Atlantic	22 Sea King	—	—	11	6	6
Greece	8 Albatross	—	—	—	11	4	5
Italy	18 Atlantic	24 SH-3D	—	3	9	11	12
	8 Trackers	28 AB-204B	—	—	—	—	—
		12 AB-212	—	—	—	—	—
Netherlands	8 Atlantic	6 AB-204B	—	1	1	16	11
	15 Neptune	12 Wasp	—	—	—	—	—
Norway	5 P-3B	—	—	—	—	5	2
Portugal	8 P2 V5 Neptune	34 Alouette III	—	—	—	11	15
Turkey	14 S-2E Tracker	3 AB-204A	—	—	12	2	5
United Kingdom	43 Nimrod	30 Sea King	1	12	1	57	—
		40 Wasp	—	—	—	—	—
		7 Wessex 3	—	—	—	—	—
United States	220 P-3 Orion	80 SH-3 Sea King	3	27	107	65	—
	80 S-3	—	—	—	—	—	—
	30 S-2	—	—	—	—	—	—

European security and East-West relations

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur*

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on European security and East-West relations

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1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 2 with 5 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Critchley (Chairman) ; MM. Klepsch (Substitute : Alber), Dankert (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Beauguitte (Substitute : Delorme), Bizet, Boldrini, Bonnel, Bouloche, Buck (Substitute : Sir Harwood Harrison), Fosson, Haase, Hardy, Konen, de Koster

(Substitute : *de Niet*), Lemmrich, Maggioni (Substitute : Calamandrei), Ménard, Pawelczyk, Pecchioli, Richter, Rivière, Roberti, Roper (Substitute : Lord Duncan-Sandys), Scholten, Schugens, Tanghe, Urwin.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Abbreviations employed in current reports of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments***

ABM	Anti-ballistic missile
ACE	Allied Command Europe
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe
AFNORTH	Allied Forces Northern Europe
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe
ASW	Anti-submarine warfare
CSCE	Conference on security and co-operation in Europe
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
MAD	Magnetic anomaly detection
MBFR	Mutual and balanced force reductions
MIRV	Multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SALT	Strategic arms limitation talks
SOSUS	Sonar surveillance system
SURTASS	Surveillance towed array sensor system
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union

Draft Recommendation
on European security and East-West relations

The Assembly,

Aware that the military capability of the Soviet Union is continually increasing, as vast improvements in Soviet technology enhance the effectiveness of its unquestioned numerical superiority in manpower and equipment, and as new strategic nuclear missiles are deployed which threaten Western Europe ;

Believing that a policy of détente can be actively and safely pursued only on the basis of close consultation and cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance, backed by public support for a fully adequate defence effort ;

Considering that there are both positive and negative features in the application by the Warsaw Pact countries of existing East-West agreements affecting détente, and in the progress of other ongoing negotiations ;

Calling for all such agreements to be continuously and closely monitored in the Alliance, as well as in WEU, with a view to ensuring their strict observation by both sides, and to assessing the spirit in which the voluntary provisions of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe are being interpreted by the Warsaw Pact countries ;

Believing however that, properly conducted, the process of détente can bring advantages to both East and West in increasing stability and security at lower economic cost to both,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

That it urge member governments :

1. To seek to ensure that the North Atlantic Council make careful preparation for the meeting to be held in Belgrade in 1977 in pursuance of the CSCE final act :

(a) by compiling, on the basis of reports from member States, a full record of the implementation by the Warsaw Pact countries of the CSCE final act, with particular attention to all items in the documents on "confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament", on "co-operation in humanitarian and other fields" as well as to co-operation in other fields ;

(b) by agreeing that the policy of all members of the Alliance at the meeting shall be :

- (i) to ensure at the preparatory meeting to be held on 15th June that the meeting at the level of representatives appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs is not delayed ;
- (ii) to exclude from the agenda any proposed new items which seek to undermine Alliance policy ;
- (iii) to present the full record of the implementation of the final act so far, to seek to strengthen and extend the voluntary provisions for confidence-building measures, and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions ;

2. To ensure that the MBFR negotiations are pursued with determination on the present lines until the Soviet Union is prepared to make acceptable concessions to the NATO position ;

3. To propose that Soviet nuclear missiles based outside the MBFR guidelines area, but targeted on Western Europe, and other comparable forward-based nuclear weapons, be discussed in an appropriate East-West arms control forum.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. It is some time since the Committee reported in any depth on the growing network of negotiations and agreements between East and West that have a bearing on European security¹. Meanwhile, the number of bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union with direct arms control content has steadily increased over the last five years. The "agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the United States of America and the Soviet Union" was signed in 1971 in the course of the early SALT negotiations, and a second agreement dealt with improvements in the "hot line" originally agreed in 1963. The original SALT agreement — SALT I of 1972 — comprising the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, and the interim agreement on strategic offensive arms, has been amplified by protocols signed in July 1974 clarifying arrangements for replacing ICBMs and the dismantling of anti-ballistic missile systems. In July 1974, the treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests was signed, followed in May 1976 by the treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

2. The multilateral agreements to which most WEU countries are parties are nearly as numerous. The Antarctic treaty of 1959 prohibits any military activity and provides inspection facilities of the continent. The outer space treaty of 1967 and the seabed arms control treaty of 1971 are similar prophylactic agreements that ban military activity before it has begun. The partial test-ban treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water was signed in 1963 (there are now 114 parties) and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, signed in 1968, entered into force in 1970. The biological weapons convention was signed in 1972 and most recently the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in August 1975.

¹ The Committee reported briefly on these subjects in April 1975 (Document 671), May 1974 (Document 635) and more fully in November 1973 (Document 623), May 1973 (Document 604) and November 1972 (Document 587). It reported on agreements affecting the proliferation of nuclear weapons in April 1975 (Document 672).

3. Bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union continue in the framework of SALT, held in Geneva, where the Standing Consultative Commission, established by the two countries under the first SALT agreement, also meets. In the second half of August 1976, the two countries also consulted in Geneva on the possibility of a partial ban on chemical weapons. The WEU countries as well as the two superpowers are similarly involved almost permanently in arms control negotiations in several frameworks — the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna; the conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva; and the United Nations General Assembly and its First Committee. The western positions in all these talks — whether bilateral or multilateral — are the subject of consultation and concertation in the North Atlantic Council and, as far as the multilateral talks are concerned, in the political framework of the nine countries of the European Community.

4. This maze of agreements and negotiations requires a careful effort to assess progress and achievement, to distinguish the meaningful from the merely cosmetic. There are many hopeful signs that suggest that the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in arms control agreements in certain specific areas where they are perceived to be advantageous. At the same time, there are many disquieting features about Soviet policy which lead its critics to cast doubts on the policy of détente. Détente certainly cannot be divisible; as the North Atlantic Council communiqué of 21st May 1976 points out "the necessary confidence could not be established between East and West if crises and tensions were to be avoided in Europe only to appear elsewhere". The Soviet-inspired intervention in Angola, as Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, principal adviser to Dr. Kissinger, pointed out on 31st August, showed that the Soviet Union could not be deterred from carrying out certain activities merely by words. To be deterred, the Soviet Union would have to perceive a risk, and western policy would have to be backed by a strong defence effort.

5. 1977 promises to be a year of particularly intensive negotiations, and possibly of significant agreement, in the area of arms control. Important elections have been held in Germany and

the United States, removing one reason for delaying decision in the eyes of the Soviet Union ; on 15th June a preparatory meeting is to be held in Belgrade to organise the follow-up meeting to the CSCE. In October the interim SALT agreement is due to expire unless replaced by another. The Committee therefore considers it appropriate to report now on the application

of existing agreements, and to make recommendations about the conduct of future negotiations.

II. The military balance

6. The main features of the balance of forces between East and West, as it affects Europe, are shown in the table below :

Military balance in conventional forces
(from IISS Military Balance 1976-77)

Ground forces available in peacetime (division equivalents) ³	Northern and Central Europe ¹			Southern Europe ²		
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	(of which USSR)	NATO	Warsaw Pact	(of which USSR)
Armoured infantry	11	31	19	6	6	3
Mechanised and airborne	18	36	21	35	27	7
Combat and direct support troops available (000)	635	910	620	540	395	155
Main battle tanks in operational service in peacetime ⁴	7,000	19,000	11,000	4,000	7,500 ⁵	2,750 ⁵
Tactical aircraft in operational service ⁶						
Light bombers	185	225	200	—	50 ⁷	50 ⁷
Fighter/ground attack	1,250	1,375	950	450	250 ⁷	100 ⁷
Interceptors	375	2,050	950	275	700	200
Reconnaissance	275	550	400	150	100	50

1. Includes, on the NATO side, the commands for which AFCENT and AFNORTH commanders have responsibility. France is not included, nor are any allied ground forces in Portugal or Britain. On the Warsaw Pact side it includes the command for which the Pact High Commander has responsibility, but excludes the armed forces of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania ; certain Soviet units stationed in the Western USSR and such troops as might be committed to the Baltic and Norwegian areas of operation have, however, been included.

2. Includes, on the NATO side, the Italian, Greek and Turkish land forces (including those in Asian Turkey) and such American and British units as would be committed to the Mediterranean theatre of operations, and, on the Warsaw Pact side, the land forces of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania and such Soviet units normally stationed in Hungary and South-Western USSR as might be committed to the Mediterranean theatre.

3. Divisions, brigades and similar formations, aggregated on the basis of three brigades to a division.

4. These are tanks with formations, or which are earmarked for the use of dual-based or immediate reinforcing formations (some 550). They do not include those in reserve, or small stocks held to replace tanks damaged or destroyed. In this latter category NATO has perhaps 2,000 tanks in Europe. There are tanks in reserve in the Warsaw Pact area, but the figures are difficult to establish. The total tank holdings are, however, materially higher than the formation totals in the table.

5. Soviet tank production is high ; some 1,000 T-72 have been built in the last two years.

6. For Northern and Central Europe the area covered here is slightly wider than for ground troops as described in note 1. Many aircraft have a long-range capability and in any case can be redeployed very quickly. Accordingly, the figures here include the appropriate British and American aircraft in Britain, American aircraft in Spain and Soviet aircraft in the Western USSR. They do not, however, include the American dual-based squadrons, which would add about 100 fighter-type aircraft to the NATO totals, nor French squadrons with perhaps another 400 fighters. Carrier-borne aircraft of the United States navy are excluded, but so are the medium bombers in the Soviet air force, which could operate in a tactical rôle.

7. The latest versions of the MiG-23 Flogger, Su-17/20 Fitter and Su-19 Fencer are reported to have substantially improved range, payload, avionics and electronic countermeasures capabilities. This may well be at the expense of overall numbers in future, since there has been an increase of some 1,300 tactical aircraft in the Pact in the last seven years or so.

N.B. If French forces were included in the Northern and Central Europe totals, these should be increased by two divisions (being reduced by 10,000 men), 325 tanks and 400 fighter aircraft. Outside the command area are a further 485 tanks and seven divisions, but these forces are being reorganised.

7. As far as theatre nuclear weapons are concerned, NATO has been said on many occasions to have 7,000 (United States) nuclear warheads stockpiled in Europe, as against some 3,500 for the Warsaw Pact. These include bombs for tactical aircraft as well as warheads for missiles such as the Lance and Pershing and atomic demolition munitions.

8. The superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces in men, numbers of tanks and tactical aircraft is unquestioned, although unclassified figures are believed to present an over-pessimistic view of the situation known to western intelligence today. Despite the steady improvement of Soviet technology, in particular the increased range of much of the Warsaw Pact tactical aviation, the quality of equipment in western hands is still

judged to be superior. Second-generation anti-tank missiles such as Tow, Hot and Milan and new short-range air defence systems such as Roland and Guépard are coming into service with the NATO forces. Recently, there have been significant improvements in the integration of NATO forces to operate as a cohesive whole. Air forces on the central front have been reorganised under the new command Allied Air Forces Central Europe; military exercises since General Haig became Supreme Allied Commander Europe have been co-ordinated to a far greater extent, to provide genuine NATO-wide manoeuvres. While the press has reported particular phases, too little attention has been paid to the exercise Display Determination held in September and October, which ranged over

Strategic missile balance — 1976-77

	Missile	Number	Independent warheads on each missile	Total number independent warheads
<i>United States</i>				
Land-based	Titan	54	1	54
	Minuteman II	450	1	450
	Minuteman III	550 ⁴	3	1,650
Submarine-launched	Polaris A-3	224 ¹	1	224
	Poseidon	432 ¹	~ 10	4,320
Totals		1,710		6,698
<i>Soviet Union</i>				
Land-based	SS-7	140 ²	1	140 ²
	8	19 ²	1	19 ²
	9	252	1	252
	11	900	1	900
	13	60	1	60
	17	20	4	50 ³
	18	36	8	162 ³
	19	100	6	350 ³
Submarine-launched	SSN-4	27	1	27
	5	54	1	54
	6	544	1	544
	8	220	1	220
Totals		2,372		2,780³

1. By early 1978 conversion of four more Polaris submarines to Poseidon will provide 160 Polaris A-3 and 496 Poseidon missiles.

2. Being dismantled.

3. Assuming half of missiles only with MIRV. Press reports of the briefing given to the Nuclear Planning Group on 17th November 1976 by the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Rumsfeld, speak of a total of 175 SS-17 and SS-19 with MIRV, but suggest SS-18 had only one warhead. In this case, the present total of 2,780 would become about 3,000. If the Soviet Union in time fits MIRV to 1,320 missiles as permitted under the Vladivostok agreement, the total might be about 9,000.

4. A decision to produce a further 60 Minuteman III was announced on 18th November 1976.

4,000 kms. from the Atlantic to the Eastern Mediterranean, involving two ocean convoys, amphibious landings in Sardinia, and air reinforcement by ACE Mobile Force in Eastern Turkey. Naval and air forces from France, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States took part. More serious attention is now being paid to the problem of standardisation and France in this connection is participating fully in the NATO study of interoperability to be submitted to the North Atlantic Council in December.

9. The strategic missile balance as it affects the two superpowers is shown in the table on the previous page. To the total numbers of warheads shown for the United States can be added 82 for the French land- and submarine-based missile force, and a further 64 for the British submarine-based force.

10. The United States' next generation of strategic submarines — Trident — is now being built at the rate of three every two years and should begin to be operational towards the end of 1978 with the Trident I missile. A replacement strategic bomber B-1 for the elderly B-52 is now being flight-tested and a decision to go into full engineering development is at present pending. Research is also under way for a replacement missile for Minuteman, the so-called MX, which could be operational in the mid-1980s. A decision on full-scale development is not expected until 1977.

11. Also under development in the United States is the cruise missile in both air-launched and sea-launched versions. The annual Defence Department report for financial year 1977 recognises that the cruise missile is an important issue in the SALT II negotiations "pending outcome of these negotiations we are proceeding with the two programmes at a deliberate pace during the advanced development phase... this will allow us to accommodate SALT developments and still maintain an orderly development effort" until the cruise missile concept has been satisfactorily demonstrated. A decision on full-scale engineering development is to be made in early 1977. Various writers¹ have drawn attention to the possible destabilising effects of these cruise missiles if they are developed to an operational

1. Richard Burt: "The cruise missile and arms control", *Survival*, January/February 1976; Alexander R. Vershbow: "The cruise missile: The end of arms control?", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976.

stage. They are basically pilotless aircraft fitted with the new high efficiency type of fan jet engine which will permit relatively small missiles to have ranges comparable to those of existing ballistic missiles, but with far greater accuracy based on terrain-matching techniques. The expected accuracy of these systems when fully developed would give them a counter-force capability — the ability to destroy Soviet missiles in their silos. It is claimed that these cruise missiles would be versatile as to range; medium-range or intercontinental-range missiles would be indistinguishable. Some 53 cms. in diameter and 6 metres in length, they can be fired from standard submarine torpedo tubes.

12. Of particular concern to Europe are the 600 medium- and intermediate-range Soviet missiles which are not included in the foregoing table. In June 1976, the United States released information about the replacement missile SSX-20 fitted with MIRV which is being introduced to replace some of the 600 missiles. It is pointed out that such weapons systems are not included in any of the ongoing talks — either MBFR or SALT — and the Soviet Union is securing a unilateral advantage with this new missile. At the end of October, the United States Defence Department announced that a second wing of F-111 nuclear capable bombers would be moved to Britain to supplement the existing wing which has been based there since 1970.

13. Nuclear systems belonging to the United States and the Soviet Union which can be assumed to be targeted within the broad European area are shown in the table on the following page.

14. Despite the unquestioned Soviet superiority in numbers of men, tanks and tactical aircraft, views are divided about the overall military balance at the present time. As Dr. Kissinger recently pointed out¹:

"We have always had to face Soviet ground forces larger than our own — partly because of the Soviet Union's definition of its needs as a power in the heart of the Eurasian land mass, with perceived threats on both flanks. Its naval power, while a growing and serious problem, is far weaker than combined allied naval strength in terms of tonnage, fire power, range, access to the sea, experience and seamanship... United

1. Alastair Buchan memorial lecture, London, 25th June 1976.

United States and Soviet nuclear systems assigned to European targets

	United States	Soviet Union
<i>Systems based in United States and USSR</i>		
Medium-range /intermediate-range ballistic missiles (more than 600 miles)	0	Approx. 600 (SS-4, SS-5) ; (SSX-20 under development)
Medium bombers	60 (FB-111s)	Approx. 600 (Badger, Blinder)
<i>Systems based in Central Europe</i>		
Combat aircraft ¹	Approx. 200	Approx. 1,000
[Tactical missiles] ²		
Naval aircraft	(Approx. 200 deployed on 5 carriers at any given time)	Approx. 400 (land-based)

Source : US ACDA 1976.

1. All nuclear-capable fighters, light bombers, and attack aircraft (excluding reconnaissance variants) whether or not they have primary nuclear rôles ; armed helicopters and naval aircraft not included.

2. [Reminder] There are also surface-to-surface missile launchers based in Central Europe on both sides — Lance, Pershing (United States) ; Frog, Scud (Soviet) — of less than 600 miles range.

States strategic forces are superior in accuracy, diversity, reliability, survivability, and numbers of separately targetable nuclear warheads. We have a commanding lead in strategic bombers. In addition, there are American deployments overseas and the nuclear forces of two Atlantic allies. Even with our different priorities, the economic and technological base which underlies western military strength remains overwhelmingly superior in size and capacity for innovation. The Soviet Union suffers endemic weakness in its industry and agriculture ; recent studies indicate that this chronic inefficiency extends even into the military sector to a much greater extent than realised before... Therefore let us not paralyse ourselves by a rhetoric of weakness... The fact is that nowhere has the West been defeated for lack of strength. Our setbacks have been self-inflicted, either because leaders chose objectives that were beyond our psychological capabilities or because our legislatures refused to support what the executive branch believed was essential."

15. The real problem facing the West as far as the defence effort is concerned is that of maintaining the effort at the present level despite the severe economic recession, and despite the relaxed atmosphere inevitably generated by a

policy of détente. Military forces and hardware in being at any time reflect decisions taken ten years previously. While the West in the past had overwhelming strategic superiority, the present equality leaves no margin for error in forward defence planning. Today's mistaken decisions would be reflected in forces only in the late 1980s by which time it would be too late to rectify them.

III. Strategic arms limitation talks

16. The SALT delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union have been meeting in regular sessions since the first SALT agreement of 1972 to prepare a successor to the present interim agreement which more or less froze strategic missiles at the 1972 United States levels, and which expires in October 1977. The 1972 ABM treaty has been supplemented by a protocol of July 1974 which entered into force in May 1976, reducing the number of ABM sites of each party from two to one. The present round of talks opened in Geneva on 21st September 1976.

17. The outline of the future agreement was sketched by President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev at the Vladivostok meeting in November 1974. It is planned to have a ten-year life, to limit each side to 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles

(missiles and heavy bombers) of which up to 1,320 may be fitted with multiple independent warheads (MIRVs). It is reported that drafting of the future agreement is well advanced, but there is disagreement over the need to include either the new Soviet bomber Backfire or the United States cruise missiles which have been referred to above. This issue is now being handled directly at high level between the two capitals, having been removed from the domain of the two SALT delegations in Geneva.

18. When the strategic arms limitation talks were first proposed by the United States during the Johnson administration, the arms control community believed it would be possible to reach agreement on a strategic balance with the then-existing roughly equal numbers of missiles, without the expense and uncertainties involved in the production and deployment of the MIRV system. By the time the SALT negotiations began, flight testing of MIRV by the United States had been completed and its deployment was inevitable. The Vladivostok understanding now permits each party to deploy equal numbers of missiles fitted with MIRV. The cruise missile is now in the early stage of development that the MIRV system had reached a decade ago. An agreement in SALT II to ban the further development by either party will not jeopardise western security. Experience shows that the only possible alternative in the longer run would be the full deployment of cruise missiles by both the United States and the Soviet Union, with greatly increased uncertainties in the nuclear equation.

19. The United States reports from time to time on the progress of the SALT talks to its allies in NATO, and there is no reason to suppose that the United States would ever accept an agreement that fixed its own strategic nuclear forces at levels lower than those necessary to maintain a balance with the Soviet Union. On 18th November 1976, the Pentagon announced that a further 60 Minuteman III ICBMs would be produced because of the slowness of the SALT negotiations.

20. European interests however are more directly involved in other ways. The 1972 ABM agreement included a clause prohibiting the transfer of ABM technology to other countries. It is important that no such prohibition should appear in any strategic arms agreement, and that the United States should remain free to

co-operate with its allies in the production of nuclear weapons where such co-operation is mutually desired. British nuclear warheads since the 1958 agreement have been developed on the basis of an exchange of technology and fissile material with the United States, while the Polaris A-3 missile in British submarines has been procured from the United States under the 1963 agreement. The French nuclear forces have been developed independently, but United States assistance in two fields has enabled them to be operational sooner than would otherwise have been possible. The prototype nuclear propulsion reactor for the French strategic submarine — the so-called *prototype à terre* — PAT — was supplied with United States enriched uranium, and the French Mirage IV nuclear bomber force depends on tanker aircraft supplied by the United States for the inflight refuelling necessary for the force to reach its objectives. The Committee stresses that it would not be in the interest of the Alliance for the necessary nuclear co-operation between the United States and its allies to be limited in any way in a future arms control agreement.

21. The second issue of concern to European members of NATO is the possible effect of SALT agreements on the level of the French and British nuclear forces, and vice versa. The Soviet Union sought to include a reference to these forces in the SALT I interim agreement; this demand was of course rejected by the United States. In the event the Soviet Union made a unilateral statement included in the record to the effect that it would be free to increase the level of its own forces above those permitted by the agreement, in the event of the strategic nuclear forces of allies of the United States being increased beyond the programmed levels. It is clearly important that the level of nuclear forces of NATO countries should not be limited by agreements to which the countries concerned are not parties.

22. The last area of direct concern to European NATO countries is that of the strategic nuclear weapons systems which are at present excluded from any East-West negotiations. These are discussed in the next chapter.

23. The objectives of SALT have been cogently stated by Dr. Kissinger¹:

1. Alastair Buchan memorial lecture, London, 25th June 1976.

“A continuing build-up of strategic arms, therefore, only leads to fresh balances — but at higher levels of expenditure and uncertainties... Moreover, a continuing race diverts resources from other needed areas, such as forces for regional defence, where imbalances can have serious geopolitical consequences. All these factors have made arms limitation a practical interest of both sides, as well as a factor for stability in the world.”

24. 1977 is very likely to prove a year of decision for SALT II. The 1972 interim agreement expires in October, and the uncertainties which the Soviet Union always sees in United States presidential elections have been removed.

IV. Euro-strategic weapons

25. Attention has been drawn above to the introduction by the Soviet Union of a mobile medium-range missile SSX-20, fitted with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), in place of some of the 600 medium-range missiles targeted on Europe. At the meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group held in London on 17th and 18th November 1976, the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Rumsfeld, is reported to have said that he had no proof that the SSX-20 had been deployed, but he expected it would be at any time. After the meeting the NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Luns, said it had been agreed that NATO experts would study plans for deploying in Europe cruise missiles to counter the increase in the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and United States electronic surveillance equipment to locate mobile missile-launching sites.

26. These weapons systems are two of a number of nuclear weapons systems of strategic capability which are not included in the SALT talks. Of major interest to the Soviet Union is the United States F-111 aircraft referred to above; one nuclear strike wing of the F-111E version has been based in the United Kingdom since 1970; the intention to move a second wing, this time of the longer-range F-111F version, to the United Kingdom was announced at the end of October, a few months after attention had been drawn to the Soviet SSX-20 capability.

27. Weapons systems such as these remained outside the scope of the SALT talks, because those talks were to be limited to weapons systems based on the territory of one party, having enough range for them to reach the territory of the other. These systems are similarly outside

the scope of the MBFR talks because they are based outside the so-called guidelines area within which reductions are to be negotiated — Germany and the Benelux countries; East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

28. The Committee recommends that a new negotiating forum be established to seek acceptable arms control agreements of Euro-strategic nuclear weapons systems. One possibility would be to establish within the framework of the existing bilateral strategic arms limitation talks a Euro-strategic sub-committee. The United States Delegation could continue to be the negotiator as far as the United States weapons systems were concerned, provided that its position was concerted within NATO as closely as the western position on MBFRs is concerted at present. An advisory mission of representatives of certain European NATO countries could be established in Geneva to maintain close liaison with the United States Delegation, and would then be in a position to meet the Soviet negotiating team informally. Such an advisory mission might be supplied by Britain and France as nuclear powers, and by Germany as a country whose territory is most exposed to the Soviet weapons systems. There would then be a case for including British and French strategic nuclear forces in multilateral negotiations in which the Soviet and United States SALT Delegations would participate, together with three European delegations from the advisory mission.

29. The problems of what are now called Euro-strategic weapons are now being discussed very seriously in the NATO framework. The Committee believes that there is a strong case for including in some such negotiating framework as is suggested above all weapons systems such as the 600 Soviet intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles, including the new SSX-20, the new F-111 and Backfire bombers, and also the British and French strategic nuclear forces. If a ban on the further development of cruise missiles can be included in a bilateral SALT II agreement, a similar parallel ban should also be included in any EUROSALT agreement.

V. Mutual and balanced force reductions

30. Since 30th October 1973, negotiations have been proceeding in Vienna on what NATO calls mutual and balanced force reductions, but which in the agreed communiqué of the preparatory consultations are known as “Mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures

in Central Europe". The geographical area within which reductions are envisaged (the NATO guidelines area, or the reductions area) is comprised by the territories of Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland on the one hand and Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands on the other. The direct participants from the NATO countries are Belgium, Canada, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States and from the Warsaw Pact Czechoslovakia, Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union — on the grounds that these are the countries having forces in the area. Special status participants are Denmark, Greece, Italy and Norway on the one hand and Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania on the other — countries not having forces in the reduction area. The NATO participants have reserved the right to review the status of Hungary, considering that the four Soviet first category divisions stationed there with 1,100 tanks and 55,000 men, together with 90,000 men and 1,500 tanks in the Hungarian army, immediately contiguous to the reductions area, are directly relevant to the problem. France has declined to participate in the negotiations.

31. The NATO countries have claimed that within the reduction area, the Warsaw Pact maintains 925,000 ground forces and 16,000 battle tanks against NATO's 777,000 and 6,000 operational main battle tanks. As the Warsaw Pact countries were not prepared to reveal figures for their estimates of forces in the early stages, no definition of the NATO figures has been given but they no doubt include French forces in Germany and count only tanks in operational units, excluding those held in reserve. In addition to stressing the disparity of conventional forces, the NATO countries have also stressed the geographical disparity that the United States, a chief source of reinforcements for the central front, is 6,000 kms from the demarcation line in Central Europe, compared with 650 kms from the Soviet Union which has a common frontier with the reductions area.

32. The initial Warsaw Pact proposal of November 1973 called first for a reduction of 20,000 ground and air force personnel on each side, comprising both indigenous and foreign-stationed forces, followed by a further 5 % reduction in 1976 and another 10 % in 1977 — proposals which would leave NATO ground forces in the area at 644,000 compared with 775,000 for the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact proposal would

further freeze the remaining forces and armaments of each country within the area.

33. The NATO countries, which have necessarily insisted on balanced reductions aimed at achieving eventual parity in forces, initially proposed reductions in two phases, to lead to a common ceiling of 700,000 men in the ground forces on either side. In the first phase 29,000 United States ground forces would be withdrawn and 68,000 Russians, including a tank army with all its equipment — amounting to a reduction of 1,700 tanks. In the second phase, other forces would be reduced to reach the common ceiling but there would be no limit on armaments or nuclear weapons. The overall level of military personnel on both sides in the reduction area, including air force personnel, would not be increased between the phases.

34. While the Warsaw Pact proposals were not seen by NATO as calling for drastic and destabilising reductions in United States forces in Europe, they were unacceptable in that they would severely limit the right of Western European countries to organise their own defence in the future, to compensate for example for any later withdrawal of United States forces, or to modernise their weapons systems.

35. In December 1975, the NATO countries introduced the so-called "Option 3" proposing the withdrawal of 1,000 United States nuclear warheads from the reduction area, together with certain delivery systems — 54 F-4 combat aircraft and 36 Pershing missiles. In return, the Warsaw Pact countries would have to accept asymmetrical reductions to the common collective ceiling of 700,000 ground force personnel on each side, and the Soviet Union would have to withdraw a complete tank army including 1,700 main battle tanks, against the withdrawal of 29,000 United States ground forces. The offer further included a 900,000 man ceiling for combined ground and air forces on each side — implying that air force personnel could thereafter be increased only if ground forces were reduced below the 700,000 ceiling.

36. The Assembly in Recommendation 269, adopted on 28th May 1975 on the report of the Committee, suggested that reductions agreed in the MBFR negotiations might include theatre nuclear weapons. The Committee therefore welcomes the latest NATO proposals which constitute a realistic offer to lead the Soviet Union to reduce its unnecessary superiority in tanks, in exchange for a reduction in NATO's superiority

in tactical nuclear weapons — the NATO stockpile figure of 7,000 dates from an earlier strategy than that of flexible response.

37. In the course of the first half of 1976, the Warsaw Pact countries have moved in two directions. In February, supplementary proposals to the November 1973 draft agreement were made, calling for equal percentage reductions of 2 to 3 % of the total personnel (ground and air forces) of the United States and Soviet Union in the reduction area. The reductions would include 300 tanks, 54 nuclear capable aircraft and 36 nuclear missiles on each side as well as unspecified numbers of surface-to-air missiles.

38. This is not of course an acceptable proposal from the NATO point of view for various reasons, chiefly because equal percentage reductions are proposed instead of asymmetric reductions leading to common ceilings ; because the disadvantages of the original proposals — freezing European forces in the area in the future — would remain and because the proposed reductions in aircraft would greatly advantage the Soviet Union because of the superior performance and smaller numbers of the F-4 aircraft in the area. The proposed tank reductions would do nothing to reduce the overwhelming superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries.

39. In June, for the first time, the Warsaw Pact countries put forward figures which they claimed to be the present levels of their ground and air forces in the reductions area — reportedly a total of 965,000 men for ground and air forces, including 805,000 ground forces. While at first sight the ground forces appear to be 100,000 men fewer than NATO estimates, until agreed definitions of figures have been discussed between the two sides it will not be possible to make a proper assessment of the discrepancies.

40. The Vienna negotiations reopened after the summer break on 28th September. Although there is a wide divergence between the positions of the two sides, the Warsaw Pact countries may be said to have shifted very slightly towards the NATO position. The cumbersome Soviet decision-making machine is notorious for taking only one decision at a time and it is generally believed that an agreement on SALT II will precede any serious Soviet approach to the MBFR negotiations.

41. The Committee believes therefore that the NATO countries, which initially had linked their

agreement to a conference on security and co-operation in Europe with parallel progress on MBFRs, must insist on making a full report on the lack of progress to the Belgrade meeting which is to be held in 1977 to review progress under the CSCE final act. The NATO countries are in a stronger negotiating position at Vienna than they were at the outset of the talks. Pressure for unilateral reductions in United States forces in Europe — the Mansfield amendments — are now in the past, and the cohesion of the Alliance works well in the talks, the western position being closely concerted in NATO at all times. The NATO countries concerned must continue to persevere with determination in the Vienna negotiations for as long as is necessary to reach acceptable agreement which will fix common ceilings for both sides in the reductions area — the only basis for lasting security in Europe. Whatever the domestic pressures, calls for unilateral reductions in NATO forces must more than ever be resisted because they can only jeopardise progress in the MBFR talks. The Committee continues to regret the absence of France from these and other important negotiations, and notes that the withdrawal of 10,000 French forces from Germany, although part of general reorganisation which may increase the capability of the French ground forces, may appear to weaken the western negotiating position in Vienna. At the same time, the full participation of France in joint arms production talks in the Rome group has undoubtedly strengthened the cohesion of the Alliance.

VI. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe

42. The final act of the conference, signed in Helsinki on 1st August 1975 after more than two years of continuous discussions between special delegations of the 35 participating States, is more of a declaration of intent — or rather several declarations of intent — than a binding international agreement. Specifically, it is not registered with the United Nations under Article 102 of the Charter as a treaty would be, and cannot therefore be invoked before any organ of the United Nations. The three baskets of the negotiations appear as distinct declarations on “Questions relating to security in Europe”, “Co-operation in the field of economics, of science and technology and of the environment”, and lastly, “Co-operation in humanitarian and other fields”. The texts inevitably are a detailed and careful compromise between the starting

positions of the Warsaw Pact countries on the one hand and the NATO countries on the other, with the non-aligned European countries very largely supporting the views of the NATO countries, especially on the important third basket on humanitarian co-operation.

43. When the final act is compared with the initial position of the Soviet Union before negotiations began, the text can be regarded as a satisfactory compromise from the western point of view. The Soviet Union sought in the conference a means of imposing permanently the division of Europe into two halves, and the postwar frontiers imposed by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. In the event, the western countries have secured the full participation of the United States and Canada in the conference, the insertion in basket one of the statement that "frontiers can be changed in accordance with international law by peaceful means and by agreement", the inclusion in basket one of a section on "confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament"; and the whole of the third basket on co-operation in humanitarian and other fields containing detailed provisions for the freer contact of peoples and flow of information across frontiers. While the West was reluctant to agree to the Soviet Union's demand for permanent machinery to supervise the application of the final act, it now appears that the West will have more to gain in publicising the performance of all countries in implementing all three baskets when the meeting of representatives of foreign ministers is convened in Belgrade next year; Soviet spokesmen are already adopting defensive attitudes to the meeting.

44. While the Committee recognises that performance under all three baskets of the final act, especially the third, is important to the security of Europe and a continuance of the policy of détente, the terms of reference of the present report, devoted to European security, make it desirable to pay particular attention to action taken under the confidence-building measures. These are discussed here under the headings of the confidence-building measures document.

Prior notification of major military manoeuvres

45. The final act declares that the participating States "will notify their major military manoeuvres to all other participating States". These are defined as manoeuvres exceeding a

total of 25,000 troops, taking place on the territory in Europe of any participating State or the adjoining sea and air space. But participating States whose territory extends beyond Europe need notify only manoeuvres within an area of 250 kms from its frontier facing or shared with other European participants, and need not give notification if the area is also contiguous to a frontier facing or shared with a non-European non-participating State. Notification will be given 21 days or more in advance, or at the earliest possible opportunity if manoeuvres are arranged at short notice.

46. Since the signature of the final act, NATO countries appear to have been involved in six major military manoeuvres employing more than 25,000 men, and all have been notified to CSCE participants. A further seven smaller exercises have also been notified.

47. No notification of exercises was received from the Soviet Union until January 1976 when it gave notice of manoeuvres in the Caucasus, followed by a second notification of manoeuvres in the Baltic in May. A smaller exercise by Hungary in April, with 10,000 men, was brought to the notice of military attachés, but less than 21 days beforehand. Poland notified participating countries of the exercise Shield 76 involving some 35,000 troops from East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union which was held in Poland from 9th to 16th September.

Prior notification of other military manoeuvres

48. The final act says that participating States "may also notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other participating States, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres". As noted above, the NATO countries appear to have notified seven manoeuvres of less than 25,000 men, whereas there has been only one comparable notification by a Warsaw Pact country — that of Hungary given informally with less than 21 days' notice.

Exchange of observers

49. The final act provides that "the participating States will invite other participating States, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis... to send observers to attend military manoeuvres. The inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and the conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful. It will

provide appropriate facilities and hospitality. The invitation will be given as far ahead as is conveniently possible..."

50. NATO countries sent invitations to all CSCE participants to observe the Certain Trek exercise in 1975 as well as *Grosser Bär* — land and sea exercises involving some 50,000 troops from Britain, the Netherlands, the United States and Germany held in North Germany from 6th to 10th September 1976, Lares Team — involving 44,000 troops from Germany, the United States and Canada which was held from 13th to 17th September 1976, and Gordian Shield — an exercise involving 30,000 men from the United States, Belgium and Germany in land and sea manoeuvres in the South of Germany from 7th to 11th September 1976. The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries were invited to send observers to exercise Teamwork 76 — the largest naval exercise held from 10th to 23rd September 1976 in Central Norway and Denmark, involving over 80,000 men from land, sea and air forces of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Britain and the United States.

51. All Warsaw Pact countries refused invitations to these exercises — in 1975 no reply to the invitations was sent; in 1976 the Soviet Union gave as the reason for refusing an invitation to *Grosser Bär*, the absence of a Soviet military attaché in Bonn. An article in *Izvestia* of 9th September complained that "the invitation extended to diplomatic representatives of the Soviet Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to attend the exercises as observers reflects a rather formal approach on the part of the West German Government... These representatives are not competent in the military field and would not be able to perform the function of observers". This excuse could not be valid in the case of exercise Teamwork, as the Soviet Union has a military attaché in Oslo. The same *Izvestia* article contained a strong attack on NATO exercises which it claimed were hostile "to the Soviet Union and the other European socialist countries". Although the Helsinki final act imposes no limitations on manoeuvres, an article in *Krasnaya Zvezda* similarly condemned the manoeuvres, claiming that they showed that the "leadership of the North Atlantic bloc does not intend to take the accords reached at the European conference at Helsinki seriously into consideration". Despite its refusal to send official observers to exercise Teamwork, the Soviet Union as usual was careful to observe

it from a distance with two *Kresta*-class cruisers and intelligence-gathering ships, and a number of overflights by long-range *Bear* aircraft.

52. The Soviet Union invited observers from neighbouring CSCE participants — Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia — to observe the exercise *Caucasus* held in that region in February 1976. It invited observers from Norway, Finland and Sweden as well as East Germany and Poland to attend exercise *Sever* held from 14th to 18th June in the Baltic area of the Soviet Union. Poland invited observers from Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden to attend exercise *Shield 76* held in the Baltic area of Poland from 9th to 16th September involving some 35,000 men from land and air forces of Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Two Danish military attachés duly attended *Shield 76*, and reported that although they spent five days in the area of the manoeuvres, they were able to see them only three times, from rather distant fixed positions — too distant to observe the military equipment employed. They appear, however, to have been given precisely the same facilities as other observers, and were well-received by their hosts, having the opportunity to meet and discuss with the defence ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries participating in the manoeuvres. These impressions appear to have been somewhat better than those of NATO country observers attending the Soviet exercises *Sever* and *Caucasus*.

Prior notification of major military movements

53. The final act states that participating States "recognise that they may, at their own discretion... notify their major military movements". Further consideration is to be given to the matter. Major military movements do not appear to have been notified by either NATO or Warsaw Pact countries.

Other items

54. The confidence-building document of the final act refers to other measures, including exchanges of military personnel and visits by military delegations. Under the heading "disarmament", "the participating States recognise the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security". Among the "essential consid-

rations" listed is "the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security".

Basket III

55. As far as "co-operation in humanitarian and other fields is concerned", the Committee notes in passing a generally unsatisfactory performance by Warsaw Pact countries, although there appears in general to have been some improvement in bilateral arrangements for the reuniting of families¹. If there has been a slight increase in the numbers of western publications imported into the Warsaw Pact countries, western newspapers are still not generally available outside a few specialist points such as the international hotels. Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union co-operated readily during the European Architectural Heritage Year of 1975, and some East European countries, including the Soviet Union, supplied material for the Europa Nostra film.

Follow-up to the conference

56. Under the follow-up procedure, the final act provides for a meeting at the level of representatives of foreign ministers to be held in Belgrade in 1977, and stipulates that a preparatory meeting to organise it will be held in that town on 15th June 1977. The Committee recommends that the allied countries make every effort to ensure that the meeting at the level of representatives of foreign ministers is held promptly, and used to give full publicity to the performance of all countries under the final act, which recognises that military measures must accompany political measures to ensure détente. In this connection, a full report should be made at the meeting of the progress of the MBFR negotiations.

57. The meeting should be used to strengthen and extend the confidence-building measures by lowering the ceilings on the notification of manoeuvres, by making invitations to observers mandatory and improving the conditions for the observation of manoeuvres, and by making reporting of troop movements of any significance equally mandatory. At the same time, care must be taken to resist any Soviet attempts to change the nature of the Helsinki document by introducing extraneous propaganda items

1. Except in the case of Romania, the harshest of the Warsaw Pact régimes in this respect.

such as the Soviet proposal in the United Nations General Assembly to ban the use of force, or any declaration to ban the first use of nuclear weapons.

VII. Other arms control measures

58. The Committee draws attention to certain other arms control measures recently agreed or in the process of agreement, which indicate the interest of the Soviet Union in these areas. Most significant perhaps are the bilateral agreements with the United States — the threshold test-ban treaty signed in Moscow in July 1974 and the associated peaceful nuclear explosions treaty signed in May 1976. These two agreements were submitted to Congress for ratification on 29th July. The threshold treaty places a ceiling of 150 kilotons on all underground nuclear weapon tests carried out by either party. As both are also bound by the 1963 limited test ban which prohibits all nuclear testing in all other environments, the United States and the Soviet Union have thus effectively given up the testing of any nuclear device in excess of 150 kilotons. Provision is made for the exchange of extensive technical data to improve verification of these tests by national means, i.e. seismic and other external evidence, but without on-site inspection. The peaceful nuclear explosions treaty on the other hand, which also limits individual explosions to a ceiling of 150 kilotons, provides that each party shall have access to sites of explosions conducted by the other party where groups of explosions having an aggregate yield in excess of 150 kilotons are involved. As the Soviet Union has been insisting for some time that it has a requirement for peaceful nuclear explosions for major engineering projects, it is likely that it foresees a genuine requirement for group explosions, and is prepared to accept on-site inspection of such events.

59. In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 21st August 1975, the United States and the Soviet Union introduced identical texts of a draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. This convention is now before the United Nations General Assembly and can be expected to be open for signature shortly. The Committee considers that it represents a useful measure of arms control, although apparently not related to any present applications of military technology.

60. Another significant but totally unpublicised area of Soviet collaboration with the West on arms control measures is the so-called London Club. Without public announcement, delegations from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States met first in London in April 1975 to discuss guidelines for the export of civilian nuclear technology and plants, with a view to preventing such exports facilitating in any way the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At a fourth meeting in London on 2nd June 1976 the original seven were joined by representatives from East Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. At a fifth meeting in London on 11th and 12th November the club became fourteen with the addition of Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland, with a fifteenth, Switzerland, also present as an observer. No public announcement has ever been made about these meetings; at the fourth meeting the participants agreed merely on a laconic press line to be given in answer to any questions: "Officials from a number of governments have met in London to exchange views on the problems of nuclear proliferation. The content of their discussions is confidential."

VIII. Conclusions

61. The Committee's conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation. The essential points are made in the second paragraph of the preamble: a policy of détente can be safely pursued only on the basis of an adequate and sustained defence effort, and close cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance to ensure that only a concerted allied position is put forward in East-West negotiations; there must be no privileged interlocutor among allied countries. As Dr. Kissinger has said¹:

"We should not allow the Soviet Union to apply détente selectively within the Alliance. Competition among us in our diplomatic or economic policies toward the East risks dissipating western advantages and opening up Soviet opportunities. We must resist division and maintain the closest co-ordination."

Operative text

Paragraph 1

62. The records of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries in implementing some of the confidence-

building measures of the Helsinki final act are described in paragraphs 45 to 55 above. The objects to be pursued at the Belgrade meeting are described in paragraphs 56 and 57.

Paragraph 2

63. The limited progress of the MBFR negotiations has been described in Chapter V.

Paragraph 3

64. The disturbing aspects of the introduction of the SSX-20 missile by the Soviet Union, with independent warheads targeted against Western Europe, have been described in Chapter IV. In paragraphs 28 and 29, proposals are made for a suitable forum for East-West negotiations on Euro-strategic missiles.

Opinion of the minority

65. The report as a whole was adopted in Committee by twelve votes to two with five abstentions. In the second paragraph of the preamble, a minority of the Committee would have added the words "Western European Union and the European Economic Community" after the words "in the Alliance", on the grounds that the policy of détente, to be effective, should be concerted also in a body with defence competences which brings together the principal Western European States. Aspects such as economic co-operation with eastern countries or traditional links between certain countries are of specific concern to Europe; European security and East-West relations concern the Europeans more directly than the Americans, and should be dealt with in WEU, and doubtless the EEC, as well as in the North Atlantic Council.

66. At the end of the fifth paragraph, the minority would have added "and in permitting the division of Europe in antagonistic blocs to be attenuated," on the grounds that a reason for détente deeper than economic is the need to make the hegemonies which weigh on the continent withdraw in the long term, and that the Helsinki agreements can foster moves towards independence by certain eastern countries. Europe would no longer need to defer to the protection of the United States for its big decisions — détente should be sought for the increased sovereignty and independence of nations and the decline of blocs.

67. At the beginning of the operative text, the minority would have replaced the words "Recommends to the Council that it urge member

1. Alastair Buchan memorial lecture, London, 25th June 1976.

governments: 1. To ensure that the North Atlantic Council" with the words "Recommends that the Council: 1. Make careful preparation..." on the grounds that the recommendation should not be addressed to the North Atlantic Council but only to the Council of WEU which could juridically resume the exercise of the military competences transferred to NATO, which transfer does not correspond to reality since France left the integrated military structure of NATO.

68. For similar reasons, the minority, in paragraph 1 (b) of the operative text, would have replaced "Alliance" by "WEU", and in paragraph 1 (b) (ii) would have replaced "Alliance policy" with the words "jointly-defined policy".

69. In paragraph 1 (b) (iii), the minority would have deleted the words "and to report on the

progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions". It would have also deleted paragraph 2, for the reasons for which France has not participated in the MBR negotiations, because they weaken the credibility of the Atlantic Alliance by leading the European countries to give up a real defence effort, leaving the two big powers to dominate strategy in Central Europe. Force reductions should be only a consequence of agreements on all points aimed at in the Helsinki conference.

70. Finally, the minority would have deleted paragraph 3 on the grounds that it would ask France to sacrifice its nuclear force for hypothetical Soviet concessions, and that force is a guarantee of national security and one guarantee of the defence of Europe.

European security and East-West relations

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mr. Rivière

1. In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Atlantic Alliance" insert "Western European Union and the European Economic Community,".
2. In paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the Alliance" and insert "WEU".
In paragraph 1 (b) (ii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Alliance" and insert "jointly-defined".

Signed : Rivière

1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee).

European security and East-West relations

AMENDMENT No. 2¹

tabled by Mr. Rivière

1. At the end of the last paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert :
“and in permitting the division of Europe in antagonistic blocs to be attenuated,”
2. In paragraph 1 (b) (iii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out :
“and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions ;”
3. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed : Rivière

1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee).

European security and East-West relations

AMENDMENT No. 3¹

tabled by Mr. La Combe

In the draft recommendation proper, after the words "RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL" leave out "that it urge member governments : 1. To ensure that the North Atlantic Council make careful preparation" and insert "1. To make careful preparation".

Signed : La Combe

1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee).

European security and East-West relations

AMENDMENT No. 4¹

tabled by Mr. Scholten

1. In paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "full".
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "make acceptable concessions to the NATO position" and insert "bridge the gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO proposals".

Signed: Scholten

1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee).

European security and East-West relations

AMENDMENT No. 5¹

tabled by Mr. Dankert

1. At the end of the last paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert :
“and in permitting the division of Europe in antagonistic blocs to be attenuated,”
2. In paragraph 1 (b) (iii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out :
“and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions ;”

Signed : Dankert

1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee).

Designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

***tabled by Mr. Burckel and others
with a request for urgent procedure***

The Assembly,

Considering the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean to be an essential part of European security ;

Welcoming the rôle played by Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers in its work during recent sessions ;

Considering that under the modified Brussels Treaty the WEU Assembly is the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence matters ;

Considering that under the same treaty the WEU Assembly is composed of the representatives of the signatory countries to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ;

Recalling that Greece and Turkey are members of the Council of Europe ;

Considering it essential for representatives of the Greek and Turkish parliaments to be continuously associated with examination of matters affecting European security ;

Considering that the regular participation of Greek and Turkish parliamentarians in its work can but strengthen the contribution of Greece and Turkey to the Atlantic Alliance ;

Welcoming the opening of negotiations for the early accession of Greece to the EEC ;

Welcoming the fact that the agreement of association between Turkey and the EEC provides for the accession of Turkey after a period of adaptation,

INVITES THE GREEK CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

To be represented at each session of the WEU Assembly by its delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, whose members would have observer status ;

INVITES THE TURKISH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND SENATE

To be represented at each session of the WEU Assembly by its delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, whose members would have observer status.

Signed : Burckel, Radius, Treu, Valleix, Amrehn, Tanghe, Lewis, McNamara, Schwencke, Mende

Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee

MOTION FOR AN ORDER

inviting the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to follow attentively the implementation of the mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee

tabled by Mr. Delorme and others

The Assembly,

Recalling the interest shown by the governments of member countries in co-operating closely for the production of armaments ;

Recalling that in its Order 45 it agreed to organise a symposium on a European armaments policy in order to work out proposals likely to foster increased co-operation between WEU member States on the production and procurement of military equipment ;

Gratified that on 31st May 1976 the WEU Council of Ministers gave the Standing Armaments Committee a new mandate in this field ;

Emphasising that the problem of reactivating the Standing Armaments Committee is central to the responsibilities granted to WEU and its Assembly under the modified Brussels Treaty,

INVITES THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

To follow attentively the implementation of the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee.

Signed : Delorme, de Bruyne, Tanghe, Radius, Burckel, Grieve, Valleix, Kliesing, Amrehn, Treu

Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mr. Delorme

After the words "INVITES THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS" insert "AND THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, each within its own sphere of responsibilities".

Signed : Delorme

1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment negatived).