ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November 1978

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume III : Assembly Documents.

Volume IV : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM.	ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
	BONNEL Raoul	PVV
	HANIN Charles	Soc. Chr.
	MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
	PEETERS Renaat	Soc. Chr.
	TANGHE Francis	Soc. Chr.
	VAN WATERSCHOOT John	Soc. Chr.

Substitutes

MM.	*BRASSEUR Guy*	*FDF*
	DEJARDIN Claude	*Socialist*
	LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	*Socialist*
	PERIN François	*PRLW*
	VAN AAL Henri-François	*Soc. Chr.*
	VAN DER ELST Frans	*Volksunie*
	VERLEYSEN William	*Soc. Chr.*

FRANCE

Representatives

MM.	BIZET Emile	RPR (App.)
	BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
	BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
	DEPIETRI César	Communist
	DESCHAMPS Bernard	Communist
	FERRETTI Henri	UDF
	GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
	JAGER René	UCDP
	JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
	PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
	PÉRONNET Gabriel	UDF (App.)
	PETIT Camille	RPR
	PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
	SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
	SEITLINGER Jean	UDF
	SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
	TALON Bernard	RPR
	VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM.	*BAUMEL Jacques*	*RPR*
	BECHTER Jean-Pierre	*RPR*
	BELIN Gilbert	*Socialist*
	BERRIER Noël	*Socialist*
	BOZZI Jean	*RPR*
	COUDERC Pierre	*UDF*
	DELEHEDDE André	*Socialist*
	DRUON Maurice	*RPR*
	JUNG Louis	*UCDP*
	KOEHL Emile	*UDF*
MM.	*LAGOURGUE Pierre*	*UDF*
	LEMAIRE Marcel	*CNIP*
	LEMOINE Georges	*Socialist*
	MALVY Martin	*Socialist*
	MÉNARD Jacques	*Ind. Rep.*
	MERCIER Jean	*Dem. Left*
	VISSE René	*Communist*
	WARGNIES Claude	*Communist*

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM.	AHRENS Karl	SPD
	BARDENS Hans	SPD
Mrs.	von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM.	ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
	EVERS Hans	CDU/CSU
	GESSNER Manfred	SPD
	HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
	von HASSEL Kai-Uwe President of the Assembly	CDU/CSU
	LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
	MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
	MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
	MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
	MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
	PFENNIG Gero	CDU/CSU
	REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
	SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
	SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
	VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM.	*ALBER Siegbert*	*CDU/CSU*
	AMREHN Franz	*CDU/CSU*
	BÖHM Wilfried	*CDU/CSU*
	BÜCHNER Peter	*SPD*
	HOLTZ Uwe	*SPD*
	KLEPSCH Egon	*CDU/CSU*
	LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	*CDU/CSU*
	LENZER Christian	*CDU/CSU*
	MATTICK Kurt	*SPD*
	PAWELCZYK Alfons	*SPD*
	SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	*CDU/CSU*
	SCHEFFLER Hermann	*SPD*
	SCHMIDHUBER Peter	*CDU/CSU*
	SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	*FDP*
	SCHULTE Manfred	*SPD*
	SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	*CDU/CSU*
	UEBERHORST Reinhard	*SPD*
	ZEBISCH Franz Josef	*SPD*

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
	BERNINI Bruno	Communist
	BOLDRINI Arrigo	Communist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
	CORALLO Salvatore	Communist
	DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
	FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
	GONELLA Guido	Chr. Dem.
	MAGGIONI Desiderio	Chr. Dem.
	MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
	ORSINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
	PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
	ROBERTI Giovanni	Chr. Dem.
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	SEGRE Sergio	Communist
	TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

Mrs.	*AGNELLI Susanna*	*Ind. Rep.*
MM.	*ANTONI Varese*	*Communist*
	ARIOSTO Egidio	*PSDI*
	AVELLONE Giuseppe	*Chr. Dem.*
	BORGHI Luigi	*Chr. Dem.*
	CAVALIERE Stefano	*Chr. Dem.*
	DEL DUCA Antonio	*Chr. Dem.*
Mrs.	*FACCIO Adele*	*Radical*
MM.	*GIUST Bruno*	*Chr. Dem.*
	MARAVALLE Fabio	*Socialist*
Mrs.	*PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina*	*Communist*
MM.	*PINTO Biagio*	*Republican*
	ROMANO Angelo	*Ind. Left*
	ROSSI Raffaele	*Communist*
	RUBBI Antonio	*Communist*
	SGHERRI Evaristo	*Communist*
	TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko	*MSI*
	URSO Salvatore	*Chr. Dem.*

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
	MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
	MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM.	*HENGEL René*	*Soc. Workers*
	KONEN René	*Dem.*
	SPAUTZ Jean	*Soc. Chr.*

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
	van HULST Johan	CDA
	KOOPMAN Bram	Labour
	de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
	SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
	VOOGD Johan	Labour

Substitutes

Mr.	*van den BERGH Harry*	*Labour*
Mrs.	*van den HEUVEL-de BLANK Ien*	*Labour*
MM.	*KONINGS Martin*	*Labour*
	MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	*CDA*
	PORTHEINE Frederik	*Liberal*
	SCHLINGEMANN Johan	*Liberal*
Mrs.	*van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria*	*CDA*

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr.	Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM.	Paul CHANNON	Conservative
	William CRAIG	Ulster Unionist
	Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
	Andrew FAULDS	Labour
	W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
	Peter HARDY	Labour
	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
MM.	Arthur LEWIS	Labour
	John PAGE	Conservative
Sir	John RODGERS	Conservative
MM.	John ROPER	Labour
	Thomas URWIN	Labour
	Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
	John WATKINSON	Labour
	Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour

Substitutes

MM.	*Gordon BAGIER*	*Labour*
	Robert BANKS	*Conservative*
	Robin COOK	*Labour*
	Jim CRAIGEN	*Labour*
Lord	*DUNCAN-SANDYS*	*Conservative*
MM.	*Anthony GRANT*	*Conservative*
	Toby JESSEL	*Conservative*
	Anthony KERSHAW	*Conservative*
Mrs.	*Jill KNIGHT*	*Conservative*
Mr.	*Michael McGUIRE*	*Labour*
Lord	*McNAIR*	*Liberal*
Mr.	*Kevin McNAMARA*	*Labour*
Lord	*MORRIS*	*Conservative*
Lord	*NORTHFIELD*	*Labour*
Mr.	*Cranley ONSLOW*	*Conservative*
Dr.	*Colin PHIPPS*	*Labour*
MM.	*George REID*	*Scottish Nation.*
	Frank TOMNEY	*Labour*

AGENDA

of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session Paris, 20th-23rd November 1978

I. Political Questions

1. Europe's external relations — *Report tabled by Mr. Gessner on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*
2. Consequences of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Communities for the defence of Europe and for WEU — *Report tabled by Mr. Druon on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*

II. Defence Questions

1. Disarmament — *Report tabled by Mr. Roper (reference back to Committee of the draft Recommendation not voted upon in the absence of a quorum) on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
2. A European armaments policy — *Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
3. Limitation of strategic arms — *Report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
4. New weapons and defence strategy — *Preliminary report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*

III. Technical and Scientific Questions

1. Application satellites (Part II) — *Report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*
2. Weather forecasting — *Report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*

IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions

1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 — *Report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*
2. Accounts of the Administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts — *Report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*
3. Draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1978 — *Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

V. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

1. Methods of voting — *Report tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*
2. Second reading of texts amended by the Assembly — *Report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*
3. Right of Substitutes who are Committee Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the Assembly — *Report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*

VI. Relations with Parliaments

Relations with Parliaments — *Information report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*

ORDER OF BUSINESS

of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session Paris, 20th-23rd November 1978

MONDAY, 20th NOVEMBER

Morning 9 to 11 a.m.

Meetings of Political Groups.

11 a.m.

1. Opening of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session.

11.30 a.m.

5. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
6. Consequences of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Communities for the defence of Europe and for WEU :
   draft order submitted by Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.
   Debate.
   Vote on the draft order.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

7. Europe's external relations :
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Gessner on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
   Debate.
   Vote on the draft recommendation.

6 p.m.

Meeting of the General Affairs Committee.

TUESDAY, 21st NOVEMBER

Morning 9 a.m.

Meeting of the Presidential Committee.

10 a.m.

1. Disarmament :
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
2. Limitation of strategic arms :
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
3. New weapons and defence strategy :
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
   Joint debate.

11 a.m.

4. Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

5. Disarmament ; Limitation of strategic arms ; New weapons and defence strategy :
   Resumed joint debate.
   Votes on the draft recommendations.

6. Relations with Parliaments :
   presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

WEDNESDAY, 22nd NOVEMBER

Morning 9 a.m.

Meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

10 a.m.

1. A European armaments policy :
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
   Debate.

10.30 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Mazzola, Minister of State for Defence of Italy.

11.30 a.m.

3. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

4. A European armaments policy :
   Resumed debate.
   Vote on the draft recommendation.

4 p.m.

5. Address by Mr. Peijnenburg, Minister for Scientific Affairs of the Netherlands.

6. Application satellites (Part II) :
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.
   Debate.

At the close of the afternoon sitting

Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

THURSDAY, 23rd NOVEMBER

Morning 9 a.m.

Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

9.30. a.m.

1. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 :
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts :
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

   Debate.

   Votes on the draft texts.

3. Draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1978 :
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

4. Application satellites (Part II) :
   Resumed debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

5. Weather forecasting :
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

   Debate.

12 noon

6. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

7. Weather forecasting :
   Resumed debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

8. Voting methods :
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

   Debate.

   Vote on the draft order.

9. Second reading of texts amended by the Assembly :
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

   Debate.

   Vote on the draft resolution.

10. Right of substitutes who are Committee Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the Assembly :
    presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

    Debate.

    Vote on the draft resolution.

CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION

Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly for the Financial Year 1977

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Report of the external Auditor to the Assembly of Western European Union on the accounts for the financial year 1977

General

1. The following financial statements, together with an explanatory memorandum, were submitted to me by the President :

(*a*) Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1977 and financial position as at 31st December 1977 (Appendix I).

(*b*) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1977 (showing also transfers between sub-heads) (Appendix II).

(*c*) Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of Western European Union, London, in respect of contributions to the Assembly of Western European Union budget for 1977 (Appendix III).

(*d*) Account of the provident fund for the financial year ended 31st December 1977 (Appendix IV).

2. My examination of the accounts has been carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

Summary of Income and Expenditure

(Appendix I)

(*a*) *General*

3. The approved original budget provided for expenditure of F 7,301,000 of which F 65,000 was expected to be covered by miscellaneous receipts and the balance by contributions.

4. Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly states that if payment of a commitment for the previous year has not been made before 1st April, the credits concerned shall be cancelled automatically and corresponding credits will be taken up in the budget of the current financial year. The Council of Western European Union accordingly agreed that unspent salary credits (F 81,523) on Head I of the 1976 budget should be brought forward

into 1977 to meet the balance of sums due to staff arising from the new scale of emoluments effective from 1st July 1976 but not implemented in full until after 31st March 1977. The revised budget for the Assembly thus amounted to F 7,382,523 and the remainder of the 1976 surplus (F 337,466) has been reimbursed to the Council.

5. Actual expenditure in the year amounted to F 7,108,483 and income amounted to F 7,497,593 comprising F 7,236,000 from contributions requested and received, F 81,523 from the 1976 surplus and F 180,070 from miscellaneous receipts. There was thus an excess of income over expenditure of F 389,110 arising from a budgetary surplus of F 274,040 (as shown in Appendix II) and extra miscellaneous receipts of F 115,070.

(*b*) *Pension scheme*

6. In January 1974 the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts recommended that the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations, Western European Union, Council of Europe, NATO, OECD and the European Space Agency, should introduce a common pension scheme. The Council of Western European Union approved these recommendations in March 1974 and later, in 1976 and 1977, approved further reports of the Committee concerning the pension scheme rules and associated tax arrangements. The pension scheme was implemented in 1977 and provides for pensions to be payable from 1st January 1973.

7. The cost of pension benefits is charged to the budget of the organisation. Eligible staff employed before 1st July 1974 have until 30th June 1978 to choose whether or not to join the scheme but those recruited on or after 1st July 1974 are obliged to join. Staff pension contributions made under the new scheme from 1st January 1977 are credited to the budget as miscellaneous income. In lieu of the contributions due for the period to 31st December 1976 or to the date of the option if later, staff members are required on joining the scheme to surrender sums from their provident fund holdings. These sums are held in special pension validation accounts by the office of the Secretary-General pending transfer to member governments.

8. The 1977 contributions (F 14,447) of three Assembly staff members who joined the pension scheme are included as income in the Assembly's 1977 accounts. Amounts in lieu of their contributions for the period to 31st December 1976 and interest thereon (F 27,427) have been transferred from the provident fund account to the pension validation accounts.

9. The pension scheme rules may also apply to staff whose service terminated before 1st January 1973. The widow of one former staff member of the Assembly, who retired in April 1970, opted to join the pension scheme in 1977 and refunded F 43,960 in validation of her deceased husband's past service. The Budget and Organisation Committee agreed in September 1977 that for 1977 only, to avoid calling for additional contributions from member governments, pension payments could be financed by transfers to the budget from the validation accounts. The F 43,960 was so transferred and is included as income in the Assembly's 1977 accounts.

(*c*) *Provident fund compensation account*

10. In paragraphs 5-7 of my report on the Assembly's accounts for 1976, I explained the circumstances under which a provident fund compensation account had been established out of 1964 budgetary surpluses and maintained by the Secretary-General for the benefit of certain staff members. I recorded that the office of the Secretary-General had submitted for approval by delegations that amounts equivalent to the interest earned on the principal held in the compensation account should be credited to the account and distributed, along with the principal, to the eligible staff members still serving at 1st January 1976. The amount required for this purpose was to be met from the 1976 budgetary surpluses of all the organs of Western European Union. I further reported that pending the Council's approval of this proposal the Assembly had charged the interest due (F 20,945) to their 1976 budget and credited a suspense account.

11. The Council gave their approval in September 1977 and the interest was duly paid over to the eligible staff members from the suspense account. The principal was distributed at the same time and the provident fund compensation account has now been closed.

Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits

(Appendix II)

12. The transfers between sub-heads within Heads I to V of the budget, as shown in Appendix II, were duly authorised in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations. These regulations contain no provision for the authorisation of transfers between heads but, in accordance with a procedure approved by the Council in 1973, the Assembly informed the Council in February 1978 that expenditure of F 91,562 would be incurred on Head VI (Pensions) for which no provision had been made in the 1977 budget. The expenditure was met from savings on Head II.

Provident fund

(Appendix IV)

13. The assets of the provident fund of the Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of the provident funds of the other organs of Western European Union in joint deposits held in a number of currencies and administered by the Office of the Secretary-General. On the advice of an Advisory Panel representing all the interested parties, the number of currencies held during 1977 remained at four.

14. In accordance with a decision taken in 1974 by the Office of the Secretary-General the balance on the accounts of staff members of the Assembly reflect the book value of the Assembly's share of the joint deposits and have not been adjusted for differences between book and market values resulting from fluctuation in exchange rates. Withdrawals from the fund in 1977 of F 35,502 include F 27,427 transferred to the pensions validation account maintained by the Office of the Secretary-General (paragraph 7 above) and F 7,145 (including interest accrued in 1977) to a former staff member (paragraph 10 of my report on the Assembly's 1976 accounts refers).

15. I have received from the Office of the Secretary-General of the Western European Union a certificate by the depositary showing the amount of the joint deposits held at 31st December 1977 and a statement confirming the share of those deposits standing to the credit of the Assembly's provident fund in the Office's books at 31st December 1977. A valuation of the currencies held in the joint deposits at that date showed a gain on book value of F 1,041,678 of which F 243,362 related to the accounts of the staff of the Assembly.

16. I wish to record my appreciation of the willing co-operation of the officers of the Assembly during my audit.

Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B.

(Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom)

External Auditor

12th July 1978

Explanatory Memorandum

(communicated by the President to the Auditor of the Assembly in connection with the financial year 1977)

1. The statements attached hereto refer to:

(*a*) Summary of income and expenditure — financial position as at 31st December 1977 (Appendix I) ;

(*b*) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II) ;

(*c*) Contributions (Appendix III) ;

(*d*) Provident fund (Appendix IV).

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits indicates that a sum of F 274,040 remains unexpended, whereas the final balance of income over expenditure was F 389,110. The difference between these two figures, F 115,070, represents :

	F	F
— Bank interest	97,497	
— Sundry receipts	5,265	
— Sale of publications ..	18,901	
— Validation amounts received	43,960[1]	
— Contributions 7 % ..	14,447[2]	
		180,070
— Less receipts for 1977 estimated in the budget		65,000
		115,070

3. On 1st April 1977[3] the Council approved the transfer to the 1977 budget of F 81,523 relating to unexpended salary credits in the 1976 accounts of the Assembly[3]. This amount referred to increases in salaries for the permanent staff following the 1976 general review of emoluments.

Transfers

4. Excess expenditure amounting to F 212,634 has been met by transfer between sub-heads within heads. Of this amount, F 91,562 corresponded to certain payments under Head VI for which no credits had been requested in the 1977 budget.

Contributions

5. All contributions were received from the Secretary-General WEU London before 31st December 1977.

1. In accordance with the Council's decision of 7th December 1976 (Document C (76) 165).

2. Concerns staff recruited after 1st July 1974 who automatically join the pension scheme.

3. Document C. B. (77) 1.

Provident fund

6. The Assembly's funds are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the entire fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

7. The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of the funds. These are at present held in United States dollars, French francs, German marks and pounds sterling with the International Westminster Bank Ltd., London.

8. Interest was distributed to individual accounts on 31st December 1977. As shown in Appendix IV, the balance of the fund on 31st December 1977 was F 5,716,755.

9. The President would like to take this opportunity of expressing the appreciation of the Assembly for the help which was extended to the Office of the Clerk by the United Kingdom Comptroller and Auditor General.

Kai-Uwe von HASSEL
President of the Assembly

17th April 1978

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1977

(in French francs)

Per attached statement

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)	7,236,000	
Transfer of credits from 1976 to 1977	81,523	
		7,317,523
Miscellaneous		
(A) Sundry receipts		
Bank interest	97,497	
Sundry receipts	5,265	
Sale of publications	18,901	
(B) Pensions		
Contributions (7 %)	14,447	
Validation receipts	43,960	
		180,070
		7,497,593
Expenditure under budget authorisation (see Appendix II).....		7,108,483
Excess of income over expenditure		F 389,110

Financial position as at 31st December 1977

Assets

Cash at bank	552,511	
Sundry advances	65,752	
Accounts receivable	62,004	
		680,267
Less:		
Liabilities		
Accounts payable	291,157	
Excess of income over expenditure	389,110	
		F 680,267

Certified correct:

Kai-Uwe von HASSEL	Francis HUMBLET	Siegbert ALBER
President of the Assembly	*Clerk of the Assembly*	*Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets and liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these statements are correct.

Signed: Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B.

Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom
External Auditor

12th July 1978

APPEN

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE AND

DETAILS	Total budget for 1977 [1]
HEAD I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF	
Sub-Head 1 (*a*) Salaries of permanent establishment	3,061,664
(*b*) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and French social security	10,000
Sub-Head 2 *Allowances, social charges, etc.*	
(*A*) *Allowances*	
(*a*) Household allowance	107,100
(*b*) Children's allowance	146,616
(*c*) Expatriation allowance	261,723
(*d*) Compensatory rent allowance	15,026
(*e*) Overtime	16,024
(*f*)	
(*g*) Education allowance	38,000
(*h*) Allowance for language courses	3,730
(*B*) *Social charges*	
(*a*) Social security	215,000
(*b*) Supplementary insurance	132,828
(*c*) Provident fund	417,088
(*d*) Retirement pension	—
(*C*) *Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials*	
(*a*) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers	2,008
(*b*) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons	3,000
(*c*) Removal expenses	6,000
(*d*) Installation allowance	9,000
(*e*) Biennial home leave for non-French officials	7,102
(*f*) Medical examination	2,614
Total of Head I	4,454,523

1. Document 750.

DIX II

UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1977

Transfers +	Transfers —	Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
29,138		3,090,802	3,090,802	—
17,976		27,976	27,976	—
	213	106,887	106,887	—
	5,870	140,746	140,746	—
	6,943	254,780	254,780	—
	11,895	3,131	3,131	—
	3,943	12,081	12,081	—
23,984		61,984	61,984	—
	3,370	360	360	—
9,072		224,072	224,072	—
	15,506	117,322	117,322	—
	28,143	388,945	388,945	—
174		2,182	2,182	—
		3,000	350	2,650
		6,000	1,752	4,248
	4,461	4,539	3,082	1,457
		7,102	4,638	2,464
		2,614	1,916	698
80,344	80,344	4,454,523	4,443,006	11,517

DETAILS	Total budget for 1977
HEAD II - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY	
Sub-Head 3 1. *Temporary staff*	
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly	366,000
2. *Linguistic staff*	
(*A*) *Interpretation services*	
(*a*) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly	165,000
(*b*) Interpretation services required for meetings of Committees between sessions	150,000
(*B*) *Translation services*	
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly	321,000
3. *Insurance for temporary staff*	5,000
4. *Installation of equipment for sessions*	158,000
5. *Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions*	40,000
Total of Head II	1,205,000
HEAD III - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT	
Sub-Head 4 Premises	165,000
Sub-Head 5 Capital equipment	83,000
Total of Head III	248,000

Transfers +	Transfers —	Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	60,000	306,000	305,267	733
		165,000	150,479	14,521
		150,000	132,412	17,588
	31,562	289,438	289,229	209
		5,000	3,552	1,448
	5,984	152,016	151,985	31
5,984		45,984	45,984	—
5,984	97,546	1,113,438	1,078,908	34,530
	16,733	148,267	143,567	4,700
16,733		99,733	99,733	—
16,733	16,733	248,000	243,300	4,700

DETAILS		Total budget for 1977
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS		
Sub-Head 6	Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents	250,000
Sub-Head 7	Paper, stationery and office supplies	135,000
Sub-Head 8	Printing and publishing of Assembly documents	680,000
Sub-Head 9	Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	19,500
Sub-Head 10	Official cars	22,000
Sub-Head 11	Bank charges	500
	Total of Head IV	1,107,000
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE		
Sub-Head 12	Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs	55,000
Sub-Head 13	Expenses for representation and receptions	90,000
Sub-Head 14	Committee study missions	3,000
Sub-Head 15	Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	140,000
Sub-Head 16	Expenses of experts and the auditor	22,000
Sub-Head 17	Expenditure on information	33,000
Sub-Head 18	Expenses for groups of the Assembly	15,000
Sub-Head 19	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000
Sub-Head 20	Non-recoverable taxes	7,000
	Total of Head V	368,000
HEAD VI - PENSIONS		
Sub-Head 21	Pensions, allowances, etc.	
	(A) *Pensions*	
	(*a*) Retirement pension	
	(*b*) Invalidity pension	
	(*c*) Survivors' pension	
	(*d*) Orphans' pension	
	(B) *Allowances*	
	(*a*) Household allowance	
	(*b*) Dependants' allowance	
	(*c*) Education allowance	
	(*d*) Relief allowance	
	(C) *Severance grant*	
	(D) *Payments to member states for validation*	
	Total of Head VI	
	TOTAL	7,382,523

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1977, an

Kai-Uwe von HASSEL
President of the Assembly

Francis
Clerk of t

Transfers +	Transfers —	Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	6,790	243,210	204,424	38,786
3,026		138,026	138,026	—
		680,000	539,921	140,079
		19,500	17,683	1,817
3,764		25,764	25,764	—
		500	73	427
6,790	6,790	1,107,000	925,891	181,109
	11,221	43,779	19,733	24,046
1,573		91,573	91,573	—
		3,000	1,129	1,871
		140,000	136,127	3,873
		22,000	12,568	9,432
8,609		41,609	41,609	—
1,039		16,039	16,039	—
		3,000	796	2,204
		7,000	6,242	758
11,221	11,221	368,000	325,816	42,184
27,034		27,034	27,034	
49,452		49,452	49,452	
15,076		15,076	15,076	
91,562		91,562	91,562	
212,634	212,634	7,382,523	7,108,483	274,040

aid for up to 31st March 1978, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

Siegbert ALBER
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

UMBLET
Assembly

APPENDIX III

STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY BUDGET FOR 1977

Member states	600ths	Contributions overpaid in 1976	Budget surplus 1976	Main budget for 1977	Revised budget for 1977	Net contributions required
		F	F	F	F	F
Belgium	59	(—) 54,753	(—) 41,200	711,540	8,016	623,603
France	120	(—) 111,363	(—) 83,798	1,447,200	16,305	1,268,344
Federal Republic of Germany	120	(—) 111,363	(—) 83,798	1,447,200	16,305	1,268,344
Italy	120	(—) 111,363	(—) 83,798	1,447,200	16,305	1,268,344
Luxembourg	2	(—) 1,856	(—) 1,397	24,120	271	21,138
Netherlands	59	(—) 54,753	(—) 41,200	711,540	8,016	623,603
United Kingdom	120	(—) 111,363	(—) 83,798	1,447,200	16,305	1,268,344
	600	(—) 556,814	(—) 418,989	7,236,000	81,523	6,341,720

APPENDIX IV

PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1977

	F		F
Balances brought forward:			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1977	4,546,738	Withdrawals	35,502
Accounts of a former staff member awaiting settlement	7,056		
Interest to be distributed	88		
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	586,212		
Repayments of loans by staff members	237,200		
Interest received during year	374,963	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1977	5,716,755
	5,752,257		5,752,257

Kai-Uwe von HASSEL
President of the Assembly

Francis HUMBLET
Clerk of the Assembly

Siegbert ALBER
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

I have examined the foregoing Statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion this Statement is correct.

Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B.
Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom
External Auditor

12th July 1978

Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly for the Financial Year 1977

MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1977 [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration [2] ***by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur***

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1977, together with the Auditor's Report, in accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Alber* (Chairman) ; MM. Jager, Adriaensens (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Ahrens,* Antoni (Alternate : *Rossi*), Bonalumi, Del Duca, Depietri, *Evers, Hengel, Jeambrun,* Koopman (Alternate : *Voogd*), *Lewis, McNamara, Lord Morris,* MM. Orsini, Page (Alternate : *Kershaw*), Peeters, Schleiter, *Vohrer,* Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.

N. B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Document 782 **26th September 1978**

DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1979 [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration [2]
by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1979

Details	Estimate for 1979 F
Head I : Expenditure for staff	4,997,000
Head II : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel	1,697,000
Head III : Expenditure on premises and equipment	363,000
Head IV : General administrative costs	1,286,000
Head V : Other expenditure	893,000
Head VI : Pensions	83,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	9,319,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS	387,000
NET TOTAL	8,932,000

1. Adopted in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by 11 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions and approved unanimously by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Alber* (Chairman) ; MM. Jager, Adriaensens (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Ahrens,* Antoni (Alternate : *Bossi*), Bonalumi, Del Duca, Depietri, *Evers, Hengel, Jeambrun,* Koopman (Alternate : *Voogd*), *Lewis, McNamara, Lord Morris,* MM. Orsini, Page (Alternate : *Kershaw*), Peeters, Schleiter, *Vohrer,* Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.

N. B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads

Details	Estimate for 1979 F	
Head I — EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF		
Sub-Head 1: Salaries of permanent establishment	3,768,000	
Sub-Head 2: (A) Allowances	707,000	
(B) Social charges	498,000	
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials	24,000	
TOTAL OF HEAD I		4,997,000
Head II — EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY		
Sub-Head 3: 1. Temporary staff	460,000	
2. Linguistic staff	770,000	
3. Insurance for temporary staff	5,000	
4. Installation of equipment for sessions	321,000	
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions	41,000	
6. Reception of groups of students	100,000	
TOTAL OF HEAD II		1,697,000
Head III — EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT		
Sub-Head 4: Premises	337,000	
Sub-Head 5: Capital equipment	26,000	
TOTAL OF HEAD III		363,000
Head IV — GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS		
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents	295,000	
Sub-Head 7: Office supplies and hire of machines	181,000	
Sub-Head 8: Printing and publishingof Assembly documents	740,000	
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	25,000	
Sub-Head 10: Official cars	44,500	
Sub-Head 11: Bank charges	500	
TOTAL OF HEAD IV		1,286,000
Head V — OTHER EXPENDITURE		
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs	70,000	
Sub-Head 13: Expenses for representation and receptions	110,000	
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions	3,000	
Sub-Head 15: Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	170,000	
Sub-Head 16: Expenses of experts and the auditors	27,000	
Sub-Head 17: Expenditure on information	300,000	
Sub-Head 18: Expenses for groups of the Assembly	200,000	
Sub-Head 19: Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000	
Sub-Head 20: Non-recoverable taxes	10,000	
TOTAL OF HEAD V		893,000
Head VI — PENSIONS		
Sub-Head 21: (A) Pensions	83,000	
(B) Allowances	—	
(C) Severance grant	—	
TOTAL OF HEAD VI		83,000

Head I — Expenditure for Staff

Sub-Head 1

SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

Estimate: F 3,768,000

(*a*) Basic salaries — *Estimate:* F 3,754,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
The Clerk	Hors cadre	1	125,000
The Clerk Assistant	Hors cadre	1	221,000
Counsellors	A5	5	1,150,000
First Secretaries	A4	2	389,000
Secretary	A3	1	173,000
Secretaries-Translators/Publications Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator	A2	3	379,000
Chief Accountant	B6	1	134,000
Personal Assistants	B4	4	404,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	6	502,000
Switchboard Operator	B3	1	87,000
Head Roneo-Storekeeper	C6	1	75,000
Messengers	C3	2	115,000
		28	3,754,000

(*b*) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and French social security

Estimate: F 14,000

Sub-Head 2

ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

(A) ALLOWANCES

Estimate: F 707,000

(*a*) Household allowance — *Estimate:* F 135,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Clerk Assistant	Hors cadre	1	13,000
Counsellors	A5	4	55,000
First Secretary	A4	1	11,000
Secretary	A3	1	10,000
Personal Assistants	B4	3	18,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	3	15,000
Head Roneo-Storekeeper	C6	1	5,000
Messengers	C3	2	8,000
		16	135,000

(*b*) Children's allowance — *Estimate:* F 170,000

6,300 F per year per child : 27 ..... F 170,000

(*c*) Expatriation allowance — *Estimate:* F 310,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Counsellors	A5	3	130,000
First Secretary	A4	1	38,000
Secretary	A3	1	35,000
Secretary-Translator / Publications Administrative Assistant / Assistant Translator	A2	2	42,000
Personal Assistants	B4	2	37,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	2	28,000
		11	310,000

(*d*) Compensatory rent allowance — *Estimate:* F 10,000

(*e*) Overtime — *Estimate:* F 20,000

(*f*)

(*g*) Education allowance — *Estimate:* F 60,000

(*h*) Allowance for language courses — *Estimate:* F 2,000

(B) SOCIAL CHARGES

Estimate: F 498,000

(*a*) Social Security — *Estimate:* F 275,000

27 officials — F 275,000

(*b*) Supplementary insurance — *Estimate:* F 150,000

(*c*) Provident fund — *Estimate:* F 73,000

14 % of basic salaries × 521,900 F — F 73,000

(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS

Estimate: F 24,000

(*a*) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and cost of marking examination papers

Estimate: F 1,600

(*b*) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons

Estimate: F 1,500

(*c*) Removal expenses

Estimate: F 3,400

(*d*) Installation allowance

Estimate: F 4,500

(*e*) Biennial home leave for non-French officials

Estimate: F 10,000

(*f*) Medical examination

Estimate: F 3,000

Head II — Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate: F 1,697,000

Sub-Head 3

1. TEMPORARY STAFF

Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	Paris: 10 days		
	Daily remuneration F	No.	Total F
Head of the sittings office	495	1 *a*	6,900
Heads of sections	380	2 *a*	31,400
	495	4 *b*	
Sergeant-at-Arms	430	1 *b*	5,200
Secretaries for the Assembly	350	2 *a*	17,300
	430	2 *b*	
Précis writers	350	4 *a*	34,600
	430	4 *b*	
Verbatim reporters	430	12 *b*	98,500
	555	6 *c*	
Assistants	300	4 *b*	124,400
	285	23 *b*	
	210	6 *a*	
	185	10 *a*	
Head ushers	160	2 *a*	3,200
Ushers	145	12 *a*	31,100
	285	4 *b*	
Roneo/Assemblers	145	12 *a*	17,400
		111	370,000

a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside France.
c. Recruited as free-lance staff.

Travelling expenses ..... F 90,000

460,000

2. LINGUISTIC STAFF

(A) *Interpretation Services*

(*a*) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	10 days	
	No.	Total F
Interpreters	12	180,000
	12	180,000

Travelling expenses ..... F 13,000

F 193,000

(*b*) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions ..... F 170,000

(B) *Translation Services*

Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	Daily remuneration F	No.	Estimate [1] F
Revisers	490 815	3 *a* 4 *b*	158,000
Translators	395 680	4 *a* 4 *b*	143,000
Assistants.....	300 285 210 185	3 *b* 2 *b* 4 *a* 3 *a*	95,000
		27	396,000

1. Based on 32 days for the revisers and translators.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside France.

Travelling expenses ..... F 11,000

F 407,000

3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate: F 5,000

4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS

— Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment	F 193,000
— Installation of telephone booths	F 14,000
— Installation of a teleprinter "France-Presse" for the Press Service	F 8,000
— Technicians necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation equipment in the WEU committee rooms	F 6,000
— Installation of closed-circuit television	F 100,000

Estimate: F 321,000

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS

— Removal expenses	F 4,000
— Medical Service (Doctor and Nurse)	F 5,500
— Hire of typewriters and technicians	F 5,500
— Servicing of lifts	F 6,000
— Cleaning	F 11,000
— Miscellaneous	F 9,000

Estimate: F 41,000

6. RECEPTION OF GROUPS OF STUDENTS

Estimate: F 100,000

Head III — Expenditure on premises and equipment

Estimate: F 363,000

Sub-Head 4

PREMISES

— Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment	F 10,000
— Technician necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation equipment in the WEU committee rooms between sessions	F 4,500
— Joint overheads for the premises and insurance	F 186,000
— Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture	F 14,500
	F 215,000
— Share of renovation of conference rooms	F 122,000

Estimate: F 337,000

Sub-Head 5

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

— Equipment for the archives office ..... F 6,000
— 4 English-keyboard typewriters ..... F 10,000
— 10 typists' desks ..... F 10,000

Estimate: F 26,000

Head IV — General administrative costs

Estimate: F 1,286,000

Sub-Head 6

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

— Postage ..... F 171,000
— Telephone..... F 100,000
— Telegrams..... F 9,000
— Transport of documents ..... F 15,000

Estimate: F 295,000

Sub-Head 7

OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES

— Purchase of roneo paper, stencils, headed writing paper and other office supplies

— Hire of machines for photocopying and printing

Estimate: F 181,000

Sub-Head 8

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

— Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of debates, minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents)
— Printing of Reports of the Council
— Printing of Texts Adopted
— Miscellaneous — Bulletins, printing of the Agenda and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc.
— Reprints
— Brochures

Estimate: F 740,000

Sub-Head 9

PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

Estimate: F 25,000

Sub-Head 10

OFFICIAL CARS

— Hire of official cars

Estimate : F 44,500

Sub-Head 11

BANK CHARGES

Estimate : F 500

Head V — Other expenditure

Estimate : F 893,000

Sub-Head 12

TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS

Estimate : F 70,000

Sub-Head 13

EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate : F 110,000

Sub-Head 14

COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate : F 3,000

Sub-Head 15

OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate : F 170,000

Sub-Head 16

EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOR

Estimate : F 27,000

Sub-Head 17

EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate : F 300,000

Sub-Head 18

EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate : F 200,000

Sub-Head 19

CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate : F 3,000

Sub-Head 20

NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate : F 10,000

Head VI — Pensions

Sub-Head 21

PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC.

(A) *Pensions*

Estimate: F 83,000

(*a*) Retirement pension ..... *Estimate:* F 46,000

(*b*) Invalidity pension ..... *Estimate:* pro mem.

(*c*) Survivors' pension ..... *Estimate:* F 24,000

(*d*) Orphans' pension ..... *Estimate:* F 13,000

(B) *Allowances*

Estimate: pro mem.

(*a*) Household allowance ..... *Estimate:* pro mem.

(*b*) Dependants' allowance ..... *Estimate:* pro mem.

(*c*) Education allowance ..... *Estimate:* pro mem.

(*d*) Relief allowance ..... *Estimate:* pro mem.

(C) *Severance grant*

Estimate: pro mem.

Income

(A) *Sundry receipts*

Estimate: F 100,000

(*a*) Sale of publications ..... F 15,000

(*b*) Bank interest ..... F 75,000

(*c*) Social security reimbursements ..... F 10,000

(B) *Pensions*

Estimate: F 287,000

(*a*) Contributions (7 %) ..... *Estimate:* F 217,000

(*b*) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.). *Estimate:* F 70,000

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 8,932,000. The budget for 1978 amounted to F 7,778,000 [1]. The difference is therefore F 1,154,000.

2. *Head I — Expenditure for staff*

The increase (F 190,000) in the estimate for this head takes account of:

(*i*) the effect over a full year of increases granted in 1978 in basic salaries, expatriation and household allowances and contributions in respect of supplementary insurance and social security;

(*ii*) annual increments;

(*iii*) an expected increase of 7.5 % in 1979.

3. *Head II — Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly*

Sub-head 3.1 — Temporary staff

The estimated increase is F 64,000.

Salaries for temporary staff follow the scales applied in the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. In accordance with the decision of the Budget Committee of the Council, the WEU Assembly applies automatically, in the course of the year, all increases in salary scales as and when they are applied by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.

Sub-head 3.2 (A) — Interpretation services

The increase (F 25,000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes into account probable increases in the scales applied by the co-ordinated organisations for salaries and per diem allowances payable to interpreters.

Sub-head 3.2 (B) — Translation services

The increase (F 61,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to scales applied in the Council of Europe.

Sub-head 3.4 — Installation of equipment for sessions

The increase (F 148,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in the cost of installing equipment needed for two part-sessions held in Paris and to the installation of closed-circuit television in the national delegation offices and in certain parts of the building of the Economic and Social Council to allow members to be kept constantly informed of the names of speakers and the conduct of votes [2].

Sub-head 3.6 (new sub-head) — Reception of groups of students (F 100,000) [2]

4. *Head III — Expenditure on premises and equipment*

Sub-head 4 — Premises

The increase (F 155,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is to meet the higher cost of maintenance for the premises at 43, avenue du Président-Wilson, insurance for the building and a share in the cost of renovating conference rooms.

Sub-head 5 — Capital equipment

The sum of F 26,000 is for the purchase of additional equipment for the archives office, four English-keyboard typewriters for the use of temporary staff during sessions and the replacement of ten typists' desks for temporary staff (twenty-five have been in use since 1956 and it is planned to replace fifteen others in 1980).

5. *Head IV — General administrative costs*

Sub-head 6 — Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents

The increase (F 35,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices.

1. The 1978 budget included F 40,000 from Head V of the 1977 budget for opening a doorway to connect the Wilson Wing with the Palais d'Iéna.

2. See Document 782, Addendum.

Sub-head 7 — Office supplies and hire of machines

The increase (F 31,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the higher cost of paper and office supplies. This sub-head now also covers the hire of a printing machine for addressing envelopes for despatching documents of the Assembly. An Addressograph machine had been purchased in 1965 but the manufacturer can no longer guarantee its maintenance nor the supply of address plates.

Sub-head 8 — Printing and publishing of Assembly documents

The increase (F 60,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in the cost of printing.

Sub-head 9 — Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.

The increase (F 2,500) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the higher cost of subscriptions to newspapers, periodicals and reference works.

Sub-head 10 — Official cars

The increase (F 4,500) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the higher cost of hiring cars.

6. *Head V — Other expenditure*

Sub-head 12 — Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs

The increase (F 15,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the increase in travelling expenses and per diem allowances.

Sub-head 13 — Expenses for representation and receptions

The increase (F 10,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices.

Sub-head 15 — Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk

The increase (F 15,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increase in travelling expenses and per diem allowances foreseen in 1979.

Sub-head 16 — Expenses of experts and the auditors

The increase (F 3,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in fees payable to the auditor and experts.

Sub-head 17 — Expenditure on information

Increase (F 264,000) [1].

Sub-head 18 — Expenses for groups of the Assembly

There are now five political groups in the Assembly. This sub-head has been increased by F 183,000 [1].

7. *Head VI — Pensions*

In this budget, account has been taken of only three pensions to be paid: one retirement, one survivor's and one orphan's pension.

8. *Sundry receipts*

Expected receipts in 1979 include:

(*i*) sale of publications;

(*ii*) bank interest;

(*iii*) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave;

(*iv*) income resulting from the contribution of 7 % from staff subscribing to the pension fund and the reimbursement of loans and withdrawals.

1. See Document 782, Addendum.

Head I — Expenditure for Staff

Sub-Head 1

SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

(*a*) Basic salaries

Estimate for 1979	F	3,754,000
Budget for 1978	F	3,488,000
Net increase	F	266,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2.

(*b*) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and French social security

Estimate for 1979	F	14,000
Budget for 1978	F	12,000
Net increase	F	2,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of increased rates payable to temporary staff.

Sub-Head 2

ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

(A) ALLOWANCES

(*a*) Household allowance

Estimate for 1979	F	135,000
Budget for 1978	F	127,100
Net increase	F	8,000

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

(*b*) Children's allowance

Estimate for 1979	F	170,000
Budget for 1978	F	174,000
Net decrease	F	4,000

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

(*c*) Expatriation allowance

Estimate for 1979	F	310,000
Budget for 1978	F	291,000
Net increase	F	19,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the allowance.

(*d*) Compensatory rent allowance

Estimate for 1979	F	10,000
Budget for 1978	F	10,000
Estimate unchanged		

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of officials qualifying for an allowance.

(*e*) Overtime

Estimate for 1979	F	20,000
Budget for 1978	F	15,000
Net increase	F	5,000

(*f*)

(*g*) Education allowance

Estimate for 1979	F	60,000
Budget for 1978	F	55,000
Net increase	F	5,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

(*h*) Allowance for language courses

Estimate for 1979	F	2,000
Budget for 1978	F	2,000
Estimate unchanged		

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

(B) SOCIAL CHARGES

(*a*) Social security

Estimate for 1979	F	275,000
Budget for 1978	F	250,000
Net increase	F	25,000

(*b*) Supplementary insurance

Estimate for 1979	F	150,000
Budget for 1978	F	141,000
Net increase	F	9,000

(*c*) Provident Fund

Estimate for 1979	F	73,000
Budget for 1978	F	218,000
Net decrease	F	145,000

This calculation is based on 14 % of basic salaries for staff having opted to remain in the provident fund scheme.

(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS

(*a*) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers

Estimate for 1979	F	1,600
Budget for 1978	F	1,600
Estimate unchanged		

(*b*) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons

Estimate for 1979	F	1,500
Budget for 1978	F	1,500
Estimate unchanged		

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

(*c*) Removal expenses

Estimate for 1979	F	3,400
Budget for 1978	F	3,400
Estimate unchanged		

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

(*d*) Installation allowance

Estimate for 1979	F	4,500
Budget for 1978	F	4,500

Estimate unchanged

Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements.

(*e*) Biennial home leave for non-French officials

Estimate for 1979	F	10,000
Budget for 1978	F	10,000

Estimate unchanged

Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1978.

(*f*) Medical examination

Estimate for 1979	F	3,000
Budget for 1978	F	3,000

Estimate unchanged

Head II — Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly

Sub-Head 3

1. TEMPORARY STAFF

Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1979	F	460,000
Budget for 1978	F	396,000
Net increase	F	64,000

The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days.
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

2. LINGUISTIC STAFF

(A) *Interpretation Services*

(*a*) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1979	F	193,000
Budget for 1978	F	178,000
Net increase	F	15,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

(*b*) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions

Estimate for 1979	F	170,000
Budget for 1978	F	160,000
Net increase	F	10,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

(B) *Translation Services*

Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1979	F 407,000
Budget for 1978	F 346,000
Net increase	F 61,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate for 1979	F 5,000
Budget for 1978	F 5,000

Estimate unchanged

4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE SESSIONS

Estimate for 1979	F 321,000
Budget for 1978	F 173,000
Net increase	F 148,000

This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris and the installation of closed-circuit television.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3, and Document 782, Addendum.

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING THE SESSIONS

Estimate for 1979	F 41,000
Budget for 1978	F 44,000
Net decrease	F 3,000

6. RECEPTION OF GROUPS OF STUDENTS

Estimate for 1979	F 100,000
Budget for 1978	—
Net increase	F 100,000

See Document 782, Addendum.

Head III — Expenditure on premises and equipment

Sub-Head 4

PREMISES

Estimate for 1979	F 337,000
Budget for 1978	F 182,000
Net increase	F 155,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs, the hire of committee rooms and insurance.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.

Sub-Head 5

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

Estimate for 1979	F 26,000
Budget for 1978	F 70,000
Net decrease	F 44,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.

Head IV — General administrative costs

Sub-Head 6

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

Estimate for 1979	F 295,000
Budget for 1978	F 260,000
Net increase	F 35,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 7

OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES

Estimate for 1979	F 181,000
Budget for 1978	F 150,000
Net increase	F 31,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 8

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

Estimate for 1979	F 740,000
Budget for 1978	F 680,000
Net increase	F 60,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 9

PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

Estimate for 1979	F 25,000
Budget for 1978	F 22,500
Net increase	F 2,500

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 10

OFFICIAL CARS

Estimate for 1979	F 44,500
Budget for 1978	F 40,000
Net increase	F 4,500

In the absence of a car belonging to the Assembly, provision must be made for the hire of chauffeur-driven cars for the President of the Assembly and the Clerk.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 11

BANK CHARGES

Estimate for 1979	F 500
Budget for 1978	F 500
Estimate unchanged	

Head V — Other expenditure

Sub-Head 12

TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS

Estimate for 1979	F	70,000
Budget for 1978	F	55,000
Net increase	F	15,000

Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments.

The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of the Assembly, Rapporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 13

EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate for 1979	F	110,000
Budget for 1978	F	100,000
Net increase	F	10,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 14

COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate for 1979	F	3,000
Budget for 1978	F	3,000
Estimate unchanged		

Sub-Head 15

OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate for 1979	F	170,000
Budget for 1978	F	155,000
Net increase	F	15,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 16

EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS

Estimate for 1979	F	27,000
Budget for 1978	F	24,000
Net increase	F	3,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 17

EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate for 1979	F	300,000
Budget for 1978	F	36,000
Net increase	F	264,000

See Document 782, Addendum.

Sub-Head 18

EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate for 1979	F	200,000
Budget for 1978	F	17,000
Net increase	F	183,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6, and Document 782, Addendum.

Sub-Head 19

CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate for 1979	F	3,000
Budget for 1978	F	3,000
Estimate unchanged		

Sub-Head 20

NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate for 1979	F	10,000
Budget for 1978	F	10,000
Estimate unchanged		

Head VI — Pensions

Sub-Head 21

PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC.

(A) *Pensions*

(*a*) Retirement pension

Estimate for 1979	F	46,000
Estimate for 1978	F	40,000
Net increase	F	6,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(*b*) Invalidity pension ..... pro mem.

(*c*) Survivors' pension

Estimate for 1979	F	24,000
Estimate for 1978	F	22,000
Net increase	F	2,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(*d*) Orphans' pension

Estimate for 1979	F	13,000
Estimate for 1978		—
Net increase	F	13,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(B) *Allowances*

pro mem.

(C) *Severance grant*

pro mem.

Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979

NOTE

submitted by Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly

During his official visits, the President of the Assembly noted that the governments of member countries were agreed in recognising the importance of the rôle accorded to the WEU Assembly and in considering that recent political developments could not jeopardise its responsibilities nor lead to any restriction of its activities.

The President concluded therefore that the Council cannot refuse to grant the Assembly the financial means it needs to accomplish its tasks when it is felt that the insignificance of appropriations under certain heads of the budget or the total absence of budgetary means are an impediment to its work.

The Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration have decided to make substantial increases in sums available under two heads of the Assembly's budget for the financial year 1979 as follows :

(*i*) appropriations for the Assembly's information service are to be increased from 36,000 French francs for the financial year 1978 to 300,000 French francs for the financial year 1979 (Sub-Head 17) ;

(*ii*) appropriations for the political groups are to be increased from 17,000 French francs for the financial years 1978 to 200,000 French francs for the financial year 1979 (Sub-Head 18).

It has also been decided to include a new item in the Assembly's budget for the reception of groups of students for which there would be an appropriation of 100,000 French francs for the financial year 1979 (Sub-Head 3 (6)).

It was considered necessary to make these increases in the budget for the following reasons :

1. The WEU Assembly is the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence matters. Its duties are based on a treaty in which the contracting parties assumed specific commitments, particularly the commitment in Article V to afford each other aid and assistance in the event of attack.

It deals with the political, military and technical conditions of European security. Its work is therefore no less important than that of the other European assemblies which deal with economic, social, cultural or juridical matters.

Persistent tension in the world today, the continued arms race and the imbalance of forces in Europe clearly demonstrate the need for the WEU Assembly to be able to carry out one of its most important duties, i.e. to alert public opinion in our countries to the need to recognise in full the threats to Europe's security and to encourage parliaments, over and above present economic difficulties, to maintain a defence effort equal to these threats by voting the necessary money.

2. The Assembly is the only WEU organ in touch with public opinion since the Council has no information budget and does nothing in this field. The Assembly is responsible for all efforts to make WEU known.

Yet many parliamentarians have realised that a large section of public opinion is unaware of the very existence of WEU and that even in political circles there is a tendency for it to pass unnoticed or for its importance to be overlooked.

3. Only the lack of adequate financial means prevents the WEU Assembly from taking certain steps it considers necessary to draw the attention of public opinion to its Committees' reports, the ensuing debates and the conclusions drawn.

Students should therefore be given an opportunity of gaining an on-the-spot knowledge of its work and attending debates on matters relating to their studies. In particular, the Assembly should be able to invite students from military academies to follow the debates on reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, students from institutes for political studies to follow the debates on reports of the General Affairs Committee and certain university engineering students to follow the debates on reports of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Further, the Assembly's information budget should allow its Rapporteurs to be given hearings by certain committees in national parliaments or certain associations directly concerned by the subject of their reports. It should also be possible to invite journalists from member countries who specialise in defence questions to

attend the debates at each session, to arrange press conferences in the capitals of member countries before each session in order to present the reports on the agenda in liaison with the delegation of the host country and, depending on the subjects on the Assembly's agenda, to organise seminars and symposia to which parliamentarians, journalists and representatives of governments or industry would be invited.

Finally, it was considered that adequate funds should be earmarked for political groups to allow them to choose what they consider to be the most appropriate way of making known their position on questions on the agenda. The election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage will probably increase the cohesion and work of transnational political groups. The sums now at the disposal of WEU Assembly political groups would not allow them to meet these changed circumstances, particularly in view of the foreseeable increase in their secretarial requirements.

Although not negligible, the planned increases do not bring the appropriations in the above-mentioned sub-heads to a level comparable to the means available for similar work in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, not to mention the European Parliament, but, nevertheless, they have the merit of ending a discriminatory situation [1] which the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration considered intolerable.

1. For instance, appropriations in the WEU Assembly's budget for information amounted to 36,000 francs in 1978, whereas under the same head the Council of Europe had 2,201,000 francs, of which 129,000 francs for the purchase of newspapers and information bulletins alone.

Document 783 **26th September 1978**

OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1978 [1]

submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration [2]
by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Draft Opinion

on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1978

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (*c*) of the Charter ;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Alber* (Chairman) ; MM. Jager, Adriaensens (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Ahrens,* Antoni (Alternate : *Rossi*), Bonalumi, Del Duca, Depietri, *Evers, Hengel, Jeambrun,* Koopman (Alternate : *Voogd*), *Lewis, McNamara, Lord Morris,* MM. Orsini, Page (Alternate : *Kershaw*), Peeters, Schleiter, *Vohrer,* Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on improving the status of WEU staff

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to set up a joint pensions administration section as a first step towards the creation of a truly independent body to deal with pensions ;

Reiterating its regret that provision has still not been made for a reversionary pension to be granted to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ;

Deploring the fact that no reply was given to the Assembly's recommendation to set up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :

1. The creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-ordinated organisations ;

2. The granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ;

3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy ;

II. Give consideration to using a percentage of the pension validation monies received to create a fund from which interest-bearing housing loans could be made to the staff of WEU ;

III. Invite the Secretary-General to give priority, when vacancies arise, to staff already serving in the organisation in order to ensure maximum career prospects.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur)

I. *Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU*

(i) Approval

1. I have studied the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1978 and have, for the time being, no comment to make thereon. I therefore submit the attached draft opinion and draft recommendation to the Committee for its approval.

(ii) The budget

2. The total budget of WEU for 1978 as compared to 1977 is as follows :

	1977 Budget		*1978 Budget*	
	£	F	£	F
Secretariat-General	569,840	—	666,705	—
Standing Armaments Committee..	—	4,243,320	—	4,747,625
Agency for the Control of Armaments	—	9,089,060	—	10,207,655
Office of the Clerk	—	7,236,000	—	7,778,000
TOTAL BUDGET OF WEU	569,840	20,568,380	666,705	22,733,280

(iii) WEU establishment

3. The total establishment of WEU for 1978 is as follows :

Secretariat-General	48
Standing Armaments Committee	28
Agency for the Control of Armaments	52
	128
Office of the Clerk	28
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF WEU FOR 1978	156

II. *Pension scheme*

4. On 30th June 1978, the staff of the co-ordinated organisations exercised their option rights in respect of the pension scheme. Staff recruited before 1st July 1974 were given three options :

Option I : partial validation of past service ;

Option II : full validation of past service ;

Option III : retainment of the provident fund.

Staff recruited after 1st July 1974 were automatically affiliated to the pension scheme.

5. Your Rapporteur has asked the Secretary-General of WEU to obtain replies to the questionnaire at Appendix IV from the secretaries-general of the other co-ordinated organisations. These replies will be communicated to the Assembly as and when they are received.

6. In the various reports which he submitted to the Assembly, Lord Selsdon outlined his suggestions for setting up a pension unit. The Co-ordinating Committee of Budget Experts adopted a report (see Appendix VI) which goes part of the way to meeting the Assembly's proposals. It is envisaged that a joint pensions administration section would be created :

— a pensions study unit and pensions computation unit I, installed at the OECD, Paris, would take over the co-ordinated management of pensions for the staff of all the co-ordinated organisations with the exception of the actual calculation of pensions for NATO ;

— a pensions computation unit II would be installed at the NATO headquarters and would calculate the pensions of the NATO staff.

There would naturally be co-ordination between the two units, as foreseen in the regulations of the joint pensions administrative section. The units would start to operate as soon as the necessary staff had been recruited and all material arrangements made, so that one could hope for both to be in service by 1st January 1979.

7. While welcoming the creation of these units, the Assembly feels that the final goal of the co-ordinated organisations must be the setting up of a truly independent body as outlined in Document 742 :

> "19. The fund should be an entirely independent body, set up by governments who are members of the co-ordinated organisations. This would require the ratification of protocols by all the governments concerned. It would thereafter follow that this organisation would have its own budget, with its

own independent staff ; its head should have both financial and legal experience.

20. A joint arbitration committee should be set up to deal with all litigation. The organisation should, if possible, be housed in the OECD in order that contact with the inter-organisation study section on salaries and prices might be maintained and access facilitated to the OECD computer.

21. The joint management fund should be governed by a board comprising one or two senior officials from each of the co-ordinated organisations.

22. Once the organisation had been set up, it would follow that all the pensions previously paid by the co-ordinated organisations would be paid by the joint management fund. The new organisation would take over all administration in respect of pensioners, including the problem of taxation.

23. The budget of the joint management fund would make provision for all retired staff. The budget would also include the normal running expenses of the organisation. Contributions to this budget would be levied from all present and former member governments of the co-ordinated organisations, who have an implied debt to the pensioners of these organisations. It should be stressed that the setting up of the joint management fund would not entail a staff establishment very much larger than that of the pension unit.

24. The creation of a reserve fund should also be envisaged since the organisation would have only the aforementioned contributions at its disposal and it would appear essential for some funds to be available for emergencies, i.e. late payment of contributions, a government or governments withdrawing from an organisation, etc. It would be for member governments to calculate the amount to be held in such a reserve fund."

Provident fund

8. The WEU provident fund, which since 1956 has comprised the holdings (contributions plus interest) of the permanent staff in the organisation, will now be constituted by the holdings of those members having opted to retain the provident fund, the partial holdings of those not having chosen to validate all past service and, in some cases, a minimal surplus for certain members after full validation.

9. The fund, which at 30th June 1978 stood at approximately F 25,700,000, now stands at only F 5,600,000. Quite obviously, with fund holdings so considerably reduced, some thought should be given to transferring the WEU fund to that of one of the larger co-ordinated organisations since it would appear logical to invest the holdings with those of a larger unit.

Housing loans

10. Staff having opted to remain in the provident fund will continue to benefit from the possibility of obtaining housing loans. However, out of a total of 150 staff, only 36 members will actually have this possibility. It is therefore obvious that some alternative must be provided for the other staff members who require financial assistance in purchasing a house. The matter is of particular urgency for those taking up employment in WEU, those faced with changes in family circumstances and those nearing retirement who wish to resettle in their country of origin.

11. The WEU Council should therefore give serious consideration as to how the granting of such loans might be achieved. One possibility might be to use, say, 20 % of the validation monies received to create a fund from which interest-bearing loans could be made. Rules would naturally have to be worked out in respect of reimbursement periods and interest rates.

Careers and conditions of employment for staff in the co-ordinated organisations

12. In its Recommendation 302, the Assembly recommended that the Council :

"I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :

.....

4. The establishment as soon as possible of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy ;".

The Council made no reference to this point in its reply to the recommendation, which touched upon the basic problem of staff careers. Previous Assembly reports have dealt in depth with the lack of career opportunities within the co-ordinated organisations. It may be argued that in WEU, where the tasks which devolve upon the various organs are diverse, the transfer of staff from one part of the organisation to another is often precluded. However, this does not detract from the fact that before any vacancies are filled, consideration should be given to staff already serving in the organisation, with a view to facilitating some promotions ; no post should, in any case, be the prerogative of a specific government. In many instances, the fact that a permanent official of WEU has been with the organisation for a number of years means that he is better qualified than a newcomer to fill a particular post. Although such a policy would

only be a modest step towards helping some officials to obtain a higher post, it would be a move in the right direction as far as reviewing the career possibilities of WEU permanent officials is concerned.

13. Careful consideration should also be given to the age at which staff members are recruited on permanent contract now that a pension scheme has been brought into operation, and the Secretary-General of WEU should seek, together with the secretaries-general of the other co-ordinated organisations, better methods for enabling qualified staff, when vacancies occur, to be transferred from one co-ordinated organisation to another.

14. A high percentage of WEU staff are now at the top of their grade, with no immediate possibility of promotion, and indeed faced with every likelihood of remaining in the same post and at the same grade until retirement. This situation cannot be conducive, in the long run, to staff giving of their best. The Assembly would therefore again urge governments to give the idea of setting up a "committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy" urgent consideration.

Co-ordinated procedure for salary adjustments

15. As from 1st July 1978, the previous salary adjustment procedure as defined in the 133rd report of the Co-ordinating Committee came to an end. Proposals for a new procedure have now been worked out by the secretaries-general of the co-ordinated organisations for the future. The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts has been invited by one Council to examine these proposals and make a recommendation before the end of 1978.

APPENDIX I

WEU BUDGET ESTIMATE FOR 1978

Proposed expenditure and income

	A*	B*	C*	TOTAL B + C
	£	Francs	Francs	Francs
Salaries and allowances	814,120	6,240,350	13,501,600	19,741,950
Pensions	27,425	365,000	704,300	1,069,300
Travel	26,685	81,000	387,450	468,450
Other operating costs	87,740	352,475	491,505	843,980
Purchase of furniture, etc.	3,495	5,500	43,700	49,200
Buildings	—	—	—	—
Total expenditure	959,465	7,044,325	15,128,555	22,172,880
WEU tax	270,050	2,140,100	4,590,150	6,730,250
Other receipts	9,600	39,500	83,500	123,000
Pension receipts	13,110	117,100	247,250	364,350
Total income	292,760	2,296,700	4,920,900	7,217,600
NET TOTAL	666,705	4,747,625	10,207,655	14,955,280

National contributions

	600ths	A*	B* C*	Office of the Clerk
		£	Francs	Francs
Belgium	59	65,559.33	1,470,602.53	764,840
France	120	133,341.00	2,991,056.00	1,555,600
Federal Republic of Germany.	120	133,341.00	2,991,056.00	1,555,600
Italy	120	133,341.00	2,991,056.00	1,555,600
Luxembourg	2	2,222.34	49,850.94	25,920
Netherlands	59	65,559.33	1,470,602.53	764,840
United Kingdom	120	133,341.00	2,991,056.00	1,555,600
	600	666,705.00	14,955,280.00	7,778,000

Total WEU budget	£ 666,705 Francs 22,733,280

* A - Secretariat-General.
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

APPENDIX II

Table of establishment

WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

	A[1]	B[1]	C[1]	Total A, B, C	Office of the Clerk	
Secretary-General	1	—	—	1	Clerk	1
Deputy Secretary-General	1	—	—	1		—
Director of the Agency	—	—	1	1		—
Assistant Secretary-General	1	1	—	2	Clerk Assistant	1
A7	—	—	1	1		—
A6	1	—	3	4		—
A5	2	1	6	9		5
A4	—	4	8	12		2 [2]
A3	3	—	1	4		1
A2	2	—	2	4		3 [2]
L5	1	—	—	1		
L4	1	1	—	2		
L3	1	3	2	6		—
L2	1	—	—	1		
B6	—	—	—	—		1
B5	—	—	—	—		—
B4	8	4	8	20		4
B3	7	7	8	22		7
B2	5	—	2	7		—
B1	2	—	—	2		—
C6	—	—	—	—		1
C5	—	—	1	1		—
C4	1	4	—	5		—
C3	8	3	9	20		2
C2	2	—	—	2		—
	48	28	52	128		28

1. A - Secretariat-General.
   B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.
   C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.
2. Including four secretaries Translations/Publications.

APPENDIX III

RECOMMENDATION 302 [1]

on improving the status of WEU staff [2]

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision by the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to introduce a pension scheme;

Deploring nevertheless that the governments did not take an immediate decision to set up a joint body to manage the pension scheme for all the co-ordinated organisations;

Regretting that the pension scheme regulations do not provide for a reversionary pension to be granted to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff;

Noting the slowness in reforming the procedure for co-ordination and the unacceptable delay in applying the adjustments proposed by the Co-ordinating Committee in May 1977,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations:

1. The early establishment of a joint body to manage the pension scheme;

2. The granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff;

3. The creation of a voluntary savings system for granting loans for the purchase of accommodation;

4. The establishment as soon as possible of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy;

II. Avoid excessive delays in adjusting salaries in accordance with increases in the cost of living which lead to a progressive decline in the purchasing power of staff;

III. Invite the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly its study on conditions for seconding national officials.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd June 1977 during the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session (4th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 742).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 302

I. 1. The Council consider that the pension scheme of the five co-ordinated organisations could with advantage be managed by a joint unit. The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts has instituted a working party to study this question. On this subject, the Secretaries-General have called on the assistance of an internationally reputed expert to advise on the practical problems associated with the creation of such a unit. The expert recommends the setting-up of the administrative unit to operate as from January 1978.

The Council however have not yet taken a position on this question.

2. As requested by one of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations in June 1977, the Co-ordinating Committee is now studying the question of reversionary pensions. Consideration has been given to the possibility of allowing female staff who have opted to stay in the provident fund to reopen this option in the event of the pension scheme rules being amended to include unconditional reversion on a widower of a survivor's pension upon the death of his spouse.

3. Staff members who opt for the provident fund will continue to have the possibility of obtaining loans as in the past. For those staff members who opt for the pension scheme, the Council note that the Secretary-General of WEU is already studying various suggestions.

4. The functioning of the machinery for co-ordination is currently under review by various authorities.

II. In December 1976 and January 1977, the councils of the five co-ordinated organisations approved the 133rd Report of the Co-ordinating Committee which amended the procedure for adjusting the remuneration of staff of those organisations.

This more elaborate procedure, applied this year for the first time, for the annual salary adjustments due on 1st July, allowing for changes in cost of living and in standard of living, has caused delays in preparing intermediate but related advances limited to cost of living increases. Advances based on these increases for the first half of 1976 were granted in December 1976 and for the second half of 1976 in June 1977.

The Council are following closely the development of this problem.

III. As recommended by the Assembly, the Secretariat-General has transmitted to the Clerk of the Assembly the information collected by the Public Administration Committee during its enquiry into conditions for the secondment of national officials to international organisations.

It is recalled that this study, carried out at the request of the Council, was concerned with the implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Council in this matter. These principles, which were transmitted to the Assembly with the Council's twentieth annual report, were the outcome of the studies of the special working group set up in October 1971 following Recommendation 200.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd November 1977.

APPENDIX IV

Letter to the Secretary-General concerning the pension scheme

10th July 1978

The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration has appointed me as Rapporteur on the report to be tabled in the Assembly next November on the opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1978.

Since the staff in the co-ordinated organisations have now exercised their options in respect of the pension scheme, I should be most grateful if you could obtain replies to the questions at appendix [hereafter] from the Secretaries-General of these organisations. This information would be most useful in the preparation of my report.

Anthony KERSHAW
Rapporteur

H. E. Mr. Edouard Longerstaey,
Secretary-General,
Western European Union,
9 Grosvenor Place,
London SW1X 7HL

Questionnaire submitted to the Secretaries-General of the co-ordinated organisations [1]

Information in respect of the pension scheme
(*As at 1st July 1978*)

Name of organisation .....

1. Total number of staff employed
2. Number of staff having opted for the pension scheme with full validation of past service
3. Number of staff having opted for the pension scheme with partial validation of past service
4. Number of staff having opted for the provident fund
5. Number of staff recruited after 1st July 1974 and hence automatically bound by the pension scheme
6. Number of pensions already being paid to :
   (*i*) retired staff
   (*ii*) survivors
7. Total amount of money being returned to governments for pension validation costs

1. A table summarising the answers will be published separately.

APPENDIX V

Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts

Reopening for female staff of the option provided for in the pension scheme rules of the co-ordinated organisations

154th report [1]

Paris, 8th June 1978

1. At its meeting on 16th and 17th May 1978 the Co-ordinating Committee decided on the proposal of the Representative of the United Kingdom, to include on the agenda for its next meeting, the examination of the problems raised by the possible attribution of reversion of pension rights to the widowers of female staff of the co-ordinated organisations.

2. At this meeting on 16th and 17th May the Committee decided it would be in favour of the reopening of the option for the female staff concerned if and when it were decided to modify the pension rules by attributing reversion of pension rights to the widowers of female staff. It was stressed that the possibility of reopening the option should be strictly limited to the female staff concerned and to this particular case only, and that it should in no way be invoked as constituting a precedent for other changes which might be made in the pension rules.

3. The Committee accordingly recommends that Councils decide :

(*a*) to reopen the option for the female staff concerned if and when it were decided to modify the pension rules by attributing reversion of pension rights to the widowers of female staff ;

(*b*) that the possibility of reopening the option should be strictly limited to the female staff concerned and to this particular case only, and that it should in no way be invoked as constituting a precedent for other changes which might be made in the pension rules.

(*Signed*) : Y. HYNDERICK DE THEULEGOET
Chairman

1. Approved by the Council on 19th July 1978.

APPENDIX VI

Regulations for the joint pensions administrative section of the co-ordinated organisations [1]

I. *General*

1. Article 51 of the pension scheme rules provides that the Secretaries- and Director-General of the co-ordinated organisations shall consult among themselves in order to carry out the co-ordination necessary to ensure that these rules are applied in a uniform manner. To this end, the Secretaries- and Director-General of the organisations set up on 11th September 1974 a pensions administrative committee of the co-ordinated organisations, hereafter called PACCO.

2. Article 31 of the pension scheme rules provides that "...the assessment of entitlement of the benefits payable under these rules shall be made by the organisation in which the staff member was serving at the time when his active employment ended with the assistance of a joint administrative unit for the organisations listed in Article 1.1, responsible for such part of the work as can be centralised".

3. In this context, the Secretaries- and Director-General of the organisations listed in Article 1.1 have agreed that a joint pensions administrative section, hereafter called "the section", should be set up with effect from 1st May 1978 under the conditions and arrangements specified below.

II. *Rôle of the section*

4. The section shall have the following duties :

A. *Tasks performed on behalf of all co-ordinated organisations*

(*i*) To carry out allotted functions for the general application of the pension scheme of the co-ordinated organisations and in particular :

(*a*) to examine, on the basis of standard forms containing the relevant personnel data, all provisional assessments of pension entitlement prepared by the organisation concerned to ensure that these are in conformity with the pension scheme rules and that all beneficiaries in the various co-ordinated organisations receive uniform treatment ; to obtain from the organisation concerned any additional information needed for the assessment of entitlement ;

(*b*) to transmit monthly to the pensions administrative committee of the co-ordinated organisations (PACCO), the assessment forms, together with a report of its findings, to enable the committee to check the provisional assessments and make a recommendation, before a decision is taken by the Secretary- or Director-General of the organisation concerned ;

(*c*) to advise PACCO, in conjunction with the inter-organisations study section (IOSS), on the manner in which Article 42 should be applied on a case by case basis and, if instructed by PACCO, enter into discussions with national tax authorities as required ;

(*d*) to maintain all records of all pension assessments to constitute a guide for the future interpretation of cases ;

(*e*) to prepare and maintain the standard forms used for the establishment of individual entitlement ;

(*f*) to arrange that the pension scheme computer programmes are tested at least once each year and immediately after any change in the rules and regulations affecting them, to ensure that the programme at each computer centre will produce identical and correct results ;

(*g*) on the basis of experience, to advise on :

— questions arising out of the assessment of entitlement ;

— the need for amendments to the pension scheme rules, the implementing instructions, standard forms and the calculation programmes ;

— any other matters referred to it by PACCO or by an administration of a co-ordinated organisation.

(*ii*) To provide the secretariat for PACCO. In this capacity and under the direction of the chairman of PACCO, the head of the section shall :

(*a*) prepare and circulate the agenda and minutes of the meetings ;

1. Approved by the Council on 21st April 1978.

(*b*) prepare and circulate in time to permit prior study all documents required by the committee, particularly in compliance with paragraph 4.A. (*i*) (*b*) ;

(*c*) prepare proposals for amendments to the pension scheme rules and/or implementing instructions ;

(*d*) prepare, as required, draft agreements to be concluded by the co-ordinated organisations for the inward and outward transfer of pension rights in application of the provisions of Article 12 of the pension scheme rules.

B. *Additional tasks performed on behalf of some organisations*

For those co-ordinated organisations which decide to delegate to it specific tasks relating to the monthly pension computation after final assessment, the section shall in particular :

(*i*) receive from the co-ordinated organisations and register data regarding persons entitled to pensions ;

(*ii*) calculate the amount of individual pensions, allowances and tax adjustments and deductions from pension benefits, if any ;

(*iii*) communicate the result to the entitled person, to the organisation concerned and, as provided for by Article 42 of the pension scheme rules, to the member country ;

(*iv*) draw up the lists required by each co-ordinated organisation for making the monthly pension payments ;

(*v*) draw up the lists required for recovering from the member countries tax adjustment disbursements made by the co-ordinated organisations ; transmit these lists to the organisation responsible for reclaiming funds from member countries concerned ;

(*vi*) provide the data required by each co-ordinated organisation for working out the annual pensions budget for the following year ;

(*vii*) maintain full historical records of personal, administrative and financial data of pensioners, including that pertaining to persons entitled to deferred pensions.

C. *Supplementary tasks delegated by some organisations — Payment of pensions*

The section shall furthermore carry out the task of paying pensions, allowances and tax adjustments in the name and on behalf of any organisation which shall remit to it in written form a separate delegation of power to this effect.

III. *Organisation of the section*

5. The staff of the section shall be organised in three units : pension study unit, pension computation unit I and pension computation unit II.

6. The pension study unit, located at OECD, shall carry out all tasks specified in II.A. above. The unit will be responsive to the requirements of all the co-ordinated organisations in its area of responsibility. The head of the section shall be responsible for the work of the unit to the standing committee of Secretaries-General. He will receive from the chairman of that committee general direction and detailed directives necessary for the organisation of the unit's work, the priorities to be observed, assignments to be carried out, etc.

7. Pension computation unit I, located at OECD headquarters, shall carry out all tasks specified in II.B. above for such co-ordinated organisations as delegate those tasks to the unit. Where a separate delegation has been made in written form by an organisation, this unit shall carry out the additional tasks specified in II.C. above. The head of the section shall be responsible for the work of the unit through the standing committee of Secretaries-General to the Secretary- or Director-General of each organisation from which delegation has been received. Further, where any delegation of powers has been made, the section shall be subject to the internal and external financial controls of the organisation from which delegation has been received.

8. Pension computation unit II, located at NATO headquarters, Brussels, shall carry out all tasks specified in II.B. above for all NATO bodies. In addition, if so decided, it shall carry out the tasks specified in II.C. above. It shall be responsible to the Director of Management at NATO headquarters, Brussels, and shall form an integral part of the NATO international staff. It shall be responsive to the technical direction of the head of the joint pensions administrative section and to the requirements of the heads of all NATO bodies in its area of responsibility. It shall be subject to the internal and external financial controls of NATO.

9. The staff of the pension study unit and of pension computation unit I shall be attached to and form part of the OECD and shall come under the authority of the head of personnel services of that organisation for all administrative purposes. The staff of pension computation

unit II shall be attached to and form part of the NATO international staff and shall come under the authority of the head of personnel services of that organisation for all administrative purposes. All units shall be subject to the staff rules and regulations of the organisation to which they are attached, and shall be bound by professional secrecy in the performance of their duties.

10. In view of their responsibilities to all co-ordinated organisations, staff members of the pension study unit shall be :

(*i*) recruited through open competition from staff serving in all of the co-ordinated organisations as well as elsewhere ; and

(*ii*) if occupying an A-grade post, confirmed in their appointments by all Secretaries/Director-General of the co-ordinated organisations.

IV. *Budget of the section*

11. Draft budget estimates of the section, including detailed indications of the establishment necessary for the operation of each unit for the forthcoming year, with the appropriate justification where necessary, shall be submitted to the standing committee of Secretaries-General. The standing committee of Secretaries-General, after consideration of these budget estimates, shall make any amendments to them deemed necessary in the light of the duties to be performed on behalf of all or any of the co-ordinated organisations.

12. The draft budget estimates, after approval by the standing committee of Secretaries-General, shall be transmitted to the Co-ordinating Committee for its opinion.

13. The opinion of the Co-ordinating Committee on the draft budget estimates of the section shall be communicated to the standing committee of Secretaries-General which shall, if appropriate, revise them, having due regard to such opinion.

14. The draft budget estimates of the section, to which shall be attached as annex the opinions of the Co-ordinating Committee, shall then be incorporated, as appropriate, in the draft budgets of the OECD and NATO for submission to their budget committees, and approved by the Councils of those organisations as provided in their financial regulations.

V. *Distribution of the budgetary cost of the section*

15. The costs of the section will be divided for any given financial year :

(*i*) as to the actual cost of the pension study unit, among all co-ordinated organisations in proportion to the total number of their authorised posts at 30th June of the preceding year. The contribution of any one co-ordinated organisation shall, however, not exceed 40 % of the total expenditure ;

(*ii*) as to the actual cost of pension computation unit I, among such co-ordinated organisations that delegate powers to the unit in regard to tasks set out in II.B. above in proportion to the total number of persons shown in their books as being entitled to immediate or deferred pension benefits at 30th June of the preceding year. However, should any organisation request the unit to carry out any such additional work as foreseen in II.C. above, its share will be augmented by increasing the number of such persons by 10 % ;

(*iii*) as to the actual cost of pension computation unit II, by NATO.

16. The contribution of each organisation, calculated on the basis of the draft budget estimates for each year, shall be entered in the draft budget of each co-ordinated organisation. If it appears on the completion of the financial year that the actual expenditure of operating the section has exceeded or fallen short of the budget estimates, any necessary adjustment upward or downward shall be made in the next ensuing budget after the financial year in which such expenditure has been incurred.

APPENDIX VII

Budgetary establishments of the organisations as at 1st January 1976 by countries

Countries	Co-ordinated Organisations																					Observer			Grand Total		
	OECD			Council of Europe			NATO						Total NATO - SHAPE			ESA			WEU			ECMWF [1]					
							Secretariat Agencies Milit. Com.			SHAPE																	
	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
Germany							152	122	274	36	77	113	188	199	387	152	115	267							340	314	654
Belgium				1	1	2	445	988	1433	126	183	309	571	1171	1742	1	—	1							573	1172	1745
Canada										1	—	1	1	—	1										1	—	1
Denmark										5	17	22	5	17	22										5	17	22
Spain																1	—	1							1	—	1
United States	2	—	2				10	1	11	1	—	1	11	1	12	4	—	4							17	1	18
France	616	1008	1624	266	456	722	85	160	245				85	160	245	158	156	314	43	61	104				1168	1841	3009
Italy	4	8	12				79	249	328	71	158	229	150	407	557	17	35	52							171	450	621
Japan	2	—	2																						2	—	2
Luxembourg							130	533	663				130	533	663										130	533	663
Norway										19	56	75	19	56	75										19	56	75
Netherlands										164	319	483	164	319	483	606	302	908							770	621	1391
Portugal							2	3	5	1	—	1	3	3	6										3	3	6
United Kingdom							6	6	12	4	2	6	10	8	18				12	33	45	50	25	75	72	66	138
Turkey and Greece										47	74	121	47	74	121										47	74	121
Grand Total	624	1016	1640	267	457	724	909	2062	2971	475	886	1361	1384	2948	4332	939	608	1547	55	94	149	50	25	75	3319	5148	8467

1. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting.

APPENDIX VIII

Membership of the co-ordinated organisations

Member countries	Organisations					Observer
	OECD	Council of Europe	NATO	ESA	WEU	ECMWF[1]
EUROPE						
Germany	x	x	x	x	x	x
Austria	x	x				x
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x	x
Cyprus		x				
Denmark	x	x	x	x		x
Spain	x			x		x
Finland	x					x
France	x	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x			x
Ireland	x	x				x
Iceland	x	x	x			
Italy	x	x	x	x	x	
Luxembourg	x	x	x		x	
Malta		x				
Norway	x	x	x			
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x	x
Portugal	x		x			x
United Kingdom	x	x	x	x	x	x
Sweden	x	x		x		x
Switzerland	x	x		x		x
Turkey	x	x	x			x
Yugoslavia						x
AMERICA						
Canada	x		x			
United States	x		x			
ASIA						
Japan	x					
AUSTRALASIA						
Australia	x					
New Zealand	x					
TOTAL	24	18	15	10	7	16

1. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting.

Document 784 **26th October 1978**

Application satellites

Part II

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions [2]
by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Warren* (Chairman) ; MM. *Valleix, Lenzer* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Adriaensens (Alternate : *Brasseur*), Bernini, Cavaliere, *Cornelissen, Hawkins,* Konings (Alternate : *Portheine*), *Lewis,* Malvy, Mart, Müller, Péronnet, Dr. Phipps (Alternate : *Jessel*), MM. Pinto, *Schwencke,* Talon, Treu, Ueberhorst (Alternate : *Scheffler*), Van Waterschoot (Alternate : *Peeters*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on application satellites

The Assembly,

Considering the continuing high level of Soviet space efforts which might result in the Soviet Union occupying a dominating technological position with dangerous consequences in the economic, political and military fields;

Aware that the United States space efforts are levelling off and that decisions are not being taken for a detailed long-term United States space programme;

Convinced that the European space policy to be defined in the near future should take into account the danger which might result from this world situation;

Considering the vast industrial potential which has been developed during the last fifteen years and especially since 1971 when the space applications programme started;

Taking into account the need to provide mankind with knowledge of and the means to attenuate the consequences of drought, energy shortages, pollution, famine and natural disasters,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member states:

A. To instruct ESA to study the possibility of:

(*i*) establishing a more sophisticated global communications network in which the data gathered by remote sensing, environmental and meteorological satellites could be combined;

(*ii*) building a small prototype solar power satellite providing electrical capacity;

and to release the financial means necessary for these studies;

B. To indicate at the next ESA Council meetings which elements of ESA's draft spacelab follow-on development programme are to be carried out;

C. To prepare a policy defining the medium- and long-term goals of the European Space Agency and their financial implications and to have a draft long-term budget drawn up, *inter alia* to ensure, in the future, the existence of a study group to draw up a coherent programme;

D. In the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and in its sub-committees, to afford strong support to steps to oblige states launching satellites, in addition to measures governing security and the provision of mutual assistance, to accept specific commitments to provide information about their satellites which have sources of nuclear energy on board.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. Since your Rapporteur had to submit his first report on application satellites [1] to the Committee on 2nd March 1978, he is now gratified to be able to submit a follow-up report to take into account the developments of significance which have taken place since the beginning of the year. Important meetings of the ESA Council and the communications satellites programme board were held in March, April, June and October 1978.

2. During the spring meetings, approval was given to undertake the building of a second maritime communications satellite, Marots B. Two operational satellites, ECS 1 and 2, will be built for intra-European telephone, telegraph and telex communications and television relay. As already mentioned during the debate on the first report, the ESA Council also approved the building of a first series of five operational Ariane launchers.

3. Your Rapporteur regrets that the Council has still not been able to adopt a firm three-year budget for the expenditure of the European Space Agency apart from the budgets for optional programmes. Part of the agency's finances is still covered by what is known as "one-twelfth financing". Consequently, the stability of the agency is not fully assured and no reasonable planning for the next few years is possible. This is the more serious as the agency needs to project its long-term goals up to the year 2000.

4. The lack of long-term planning impedes the promotion of European-United States co-operation in advanced technology projects, the need for which was advocated unanimously in the recommendation on United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology [2]. NASA has not yet spelt out its long-term plans either.

5. One of the most important projects mentioned in the report on United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology [3] concerns the building of solar power satellites. The building of such satellites could eventually contribute to re-establishing a sound economy based on Europe's own energy resources. The advent of the space shuttle, the reusable manned space vehicle, is a significant first step towards the possibility of building solar power satellites.

6. New applications of satellites can now be envisaged which were not feasible with expendable rockets. Routine trips to low earth orbit aboard the shuttle mean that solar power satellites could be installed on a sufficiently large scale to provide an electrical capacity which would meet future European requirements. New applications in communications, remote sensing of the earth's resources, and monitoring of weather, climate and the environment are also within reach. New scientific activities can also be planned.

7. However, there will be no long-term planning if the Council, at its meetings, cannot even adopt the three-year budget of the European Space Agency. The Council should meet at ministerial level and try to establish a comprehensive European space policy and formulate specific goals for the coming decades.

8. Your Rapporteur believes that in the 1980s a global information system should be developed in which the data gathered by remote sensing, environmental and meteorological satellites should be brought together. Such a system would provide mankind with invaluable knowledge about such physical problems as drought, energy shortages, pollution, famine and natural disasters. Enhanced communications techniques using a large antenna in space would provide many new services. The experience gained in developing these systems, including the assembling of large structures in space, would be directly applicable to more advanced projects such as space-based energy systems and space industrialisation.

9. Apart from these peaceful activities, it is not excluded that space might assume an even more important place than it now has in the military arms race. Military competition in space is already being discussed in bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States; whether they can stop this competition depends on the outcome of the SALT discussions. If these are successful, all nations capable of operating in space should be included in a treaty following the treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies [1].

I. *Applications programmes*

(a) Historical review

10. The European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) started a number of applications pro-

1. Document 766.
2. Document 773, 17th May 1978.
3. Document 773, paragraph 142.

1. See Document 388.

grammes but none became operational during ESRO's existence. The organisation's original mission, as set forth in the ESRO Convention, was to provide for and promote collaboration in space research and technology. The programme thus defined was implemented through scientific satellites and sounding rockets.

11. However, in the middle of the 1960s the growing importance of application satellites, particularly in communications, became evident, especially to the European Conference on Satellite Telecommunications (CETS), which requested ESRO to conduct a six months' study on experimental television distribution satellites. This and following studies determined that Europe was technically capable of carrying out an applied research programme in communications satellites.

12. The presence of three European space organisations, ESRO, ELDO and CETS, rendered the decision-making machinery so cumbersome that no definite decisions could be taken. However, when the European Space Conference came into being with regular meetings at ministerial level, some progress became possible.

13. In 1968, the decision was taken to allocate some modest sums for studies in application satellites. These studies were to assess the economic and technological aspects of application satellite projects such as meteorological satellites and satellites for air and sea traffic control. The study group formed by the Ministers was given the task of defining a European communications satellite programme capable of meeting the requirements of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and the European Conference on Posts and Telecommunications (CEPT). It was considered that Europe would have no future in space if it failed to concern itself with application satellites.

14. The first launch of a telecommunications satellite was planned for between 1978 and 1980. At the same time preliminary studies were undertaken on an aeronautical satellite system which would be developed jointly by the United States and ESRO and, finally, a feasibility study was made of a European meteorological satellite. These three study programmes were the focal point of European efforts in space applications at that time and the studies were funded to the tune of approximately 1.9 million accounting units. Strong ties were established between ESRO and potential users.

15. The formal start of the ESRO applications programme took place in 1971 when the ESRO Council agreed on a European space programme in which applications activities would be given adequate consideration.

16. ESRO's resolution of 20th September 1971 on the reform of the organisation gave details of the new European space programme :

(1) a joint aeronautical programme to be undertaken with the United States and Canada by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom with a budget not to exceed 100 MAU ;

(2) a meteorological statellite programme to be undertaken by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom with a budget not to exceed 115 MAU ; and

(3) la communications satellite programme complying with the requirements of the CEPT and EBU undertaken in an experimental phase followed by an operational phase by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom with a budget not to exceed 100 MAU.

17. A fourth applications project for ESRO was Marots, a satellite designed to study maritime navigation. The United Kingdom was the prime sponsor of the project, other participants being Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. The decision to undertake the Marots programme was facilitated by the fact that Marots would use the modular platform being developed for the orbital test satellite programme (OTS), which was to be a forerunner of the future European communications satellites. By using a design developed for another satellite, Marots was expected to be ready for launching six months after the launching of OTS. The total cost of the Marots programme was estimated at not more than 75 million accounting units at 1973 prices. It was considered possible to carry out this concept of developing families of satellites which could economically use the same structure for different purposes.

18. ESRO's activities in 1973 and 1974 were characterised by further definition of the four major applications programmes. During this time ESRO introduced the concept of allowing financial participation in special projects to the degree a member state was interested, rather than requiring participation according to the fixed scale ESRO had set up for support of its mandatory programme. This facilitated participation by member states in the various programmes ; thus the Netherlands joined the OTS programme in 1973, and in 1974 the Netherlands and Sweden joined the Marots programme, as did Norway which is not an ESRO member country.

19. In the middle of 1975 when the European Space Agency came into being, ESRO's Marots and OTS programmes were in the development stage and Aerosat and Meteosat design definition were being finalised.

20. In addition to the four major applications programmes, ESRO conducted many studies on possible applications activities in diverse fields: specialised telecommunications missions, television and sound broadcasting, definition of remote sensing technology and meteorological applications. These studies explored the future possibilities of developing applications technologies.

21. From the very beginning, the applications programmes were definitely international in outlook. Aerosat was an international programme from the very beginning with the United States and Canada as partners. Meteosat will become an important element of the World Weather Watch with satellites from Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union. A co-operative programme between Europe and Canada was operative with the Canadian communications technology satellite (CTS) for which Europe provided certain advanced technical equipment. This satellite was launched in 1976. European interest in the CTS programme was to have a mechanism to test on-board equipment for possible use in the orbital test satellite (OTS) and the European communications satellite (ECS).

22. When the International Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) discussed the possibilities of maritime application satellites, Europe sent its observers as it was very interested in the establishment of a world-wide network of maritime satellite communications. IMCO is the United Nations agency which studied the characteristics and operational requirements of a maritime mobile satellite system. Once this study was completed, in the spring of 1975 IMCO organised a conference in London called the intergovernmental conference on the establishment of an international maritime satellite system (Inmarsat). One of the items on the agenda was the establishment of a permanent Inmarsat organisation comparable to the international telecommunications satellite organisation (Intelsat), which would develop and administer the space segments of the maritime communications satellite but not its fixed land-based terminals. The Inmarsat convention was concluded on 3rd September 1976 and is now open for signature but has not yet come into force.

(b) Orbital test satellite (OTS) programme

23. In describing present-day programmes your Rapporteur will discuss respectively — and in the same order as in his first report — the orbital test satellite programme, the communications satellite programme, the Meteosat programme, the earth resources programme and, in separate chapters, military application satellites, spacelab and the Ariane launcher.

24. As indicated in his first report, the OTS is an experimental telecommunications satellite and is described as a stabilised programme with sun-oriented solar arrays. The satellite is built on the modular concept with a service module carrying the service's payloads. The communications module can be adapted to carry alternative payloads without major redesign and the service module can carry other payloads without costly redesign. The structure is furthermore designed to accommodate a weight heavier than that required for the OTS programme.

25. The first OTS launch failed due to the explosion of the Thor-Delta rocket. The second OTS was launched from Cape Canaveral on 12th May and reached its final position on 25th May 1978. On 7th July 1978, ESA confirmed that the OTS-2 was functioning correctly. The satellite could operate for more than five years.

26. At the end of October 1978 the satellite will be placed at the disposal of its users, i.e. the national telecommunications administrations, originally organised in the European Conference on Posts and Telecommunications and now in a new organisation called Eutelsat. Eutelsat has two Councils: one for maritime and one for fixed communications. Another important user will be the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) which will use the TV relay service from the satellite. The experimental programme will consist for the most part of telephone and television routing tests, propagation experiments and a variety of experiments connected with new communications satellite applications in Europe, including the semi-direct broadcasting of television programmes.

(c) European communications satellite programme

27. The European communications satellite will be an operational version of the OTS. One specific experiment is particularly worth mentioning, i.e. the high-speed transmission of data between the European high energy physics laboratories. This experiment is partly financed by the Commission of the European Community and, in addition to the European Space Agency and CERN, groups French, British, German and Italian laboratories. This experiment is Europe's first test of computer-to-computer liaison by satellite and opens the way to major developments.

28. As currently planned, the ECS is expected to be able to carry a large portion of the ever-increasing intra-European telephone, telegraph and telex traffic and to relay Eurovision programmes. The ESA Council and the communications satellite programme board approved the production of two operational satellites, the ECS 1 and ECS 2, for intra-European telephone, telegraph and telex communications and television relay. Only minor modifications to the OTS will be necessary as far as the vehicle is concerned. There will of course be major modifications to the payload. The two flight models and the

stand-by model will cost some $100 million. It is estimated that the satellites, as currently designed, will be operational for up to seven years.

29. As your Rapporteur stated in his earlier report [1], the overall communications satellite programme was based on the expansion of existing programmes and was composed of four elements : (*i*) completion of the initial two-satellite ECS mission ; (*ii*) operational extension of the Marots programme ; (*iii*) a research and development programme starting in 1979-80 to keep ESA abreast of the latest developments in satellite communications ; and (*iv*) the development of a heavy platform with a payload primarily devoted to the development of direct television broadcasting.

30. The research and development programme preparing the next stage in space application technology has been adopted by the member countries of ESA, with the exception of France and Germany which still have separate national research and development programmes in this field.

31. The purpose of developing the heavy platform is to provide an alternative television and broadcasting network for countries which do not have elaborate ground communication and broadcasting infrastructures and whose sparse populations cannot be economically served by standardised earth stations. The system is considered to be complementary to the ECS programme which is designed primarily to meet the high-density telecommunications requirements of Western Europe. The implementation of the whole telecommunications programme might place European industry in a strong position to offer highly-flexible satellite communications systems to the many new markets which are now appearing in the third world.

32. The impetus for a European maritime communications satellite programme came from the involvement of the European nations in shipping activities. Existing communications at sea can be quite slow and unreliable and the European nations involved in shipping felt the need for a faster and more reliable communications system. 93 % of all messages are sent by telegraph and it takes about six hours for a message to reach a ship and an additional six hours for the reply to be received.

33. The United Kingdom agreed to undertake the major financial share of the Marots programme and therefore two United Kingdom firms were awarded the prime contract for the main platform and the main payload.

1. Document 766, paragraph 16.

34. The Marots programme was changed in 1974 when its original geostationary position over the Atlantic was shifted considerably. The American Marisat satellite will be obsolete in 1981 and a new global system will then be set up. This could be a joint American-European venture, established along the lines of Intelsat ; an international agreement for this purpose is now being discussed. The satellite-to-shore communications frequency also had to be changed in response to a request from European postal authorities. In order to incorporate the programme in the overall European communications satellite system its name has been changed to Marecs (maritime European communications satellite).

35. The Aerosat programme — a joint undertaking by ESA, Canada and the United States — was abandoned at the end of 1977 as the American Federal Aviation Agency did not wish to spend any more money on it. It also appeared that the airlines were not inclined to use a world-wide operational system of air traffic control by satellite. The development of air traffic brought in large-capacity wide-bodied aircraft and not the expected multiplication of small-bodied aircraft. With fewer rather than more aircraft in operation, the use of an aeronautical satellite became less urgent.

(d) Meteosat programme

36. The meteorological satellite programme consists of two identical satellites the first of which was launched from Cape Canaveral on 23rd November 1977. The principal mission objectives of Meteosat are the following :

(1) imaging of the earth's surface and cloud system simultaneously at visible and infrared wavelengths, every half-hour, and transmission to earth of the raw data ;

(2) dissemination of the processed data in suitable formats from the Meteosat ground facilities via the satellite to the data users' stations ;

(3) collection by the satellite and relay to the ground of data from drifting or fixed sea- or land-based sensor platforms (interrogated or self-timed) or from a polar orbiting satellite.

37. There are two aspects to the mission of Meteosat : (*i*) meeting the scientific requirements of European meteorologists and of the international conduct of global meteorological research through GARP (the global atmospheric research programme) of the World Meteorological Organisation, and (*ii*) allowing meteorological data to be applied in weather forecasting. A third aspect of Meteosat's mission is that it will help the

growth of the World Weather Watch surface observation network by providing a reliable telecommunications link to any ground station.

38. Although it will have operational applications, Meteosat is experimental in the sense that it is a new untried prototype. The fixed position of Meteosat in relation to the earth enables it to scan the same part of the globe continuously and to transmit very quickly information on weather developments. The lifetime of the satellite is about five years. The satellite is able to detect and image water vapour in the atmosphere ; water vapour data are important because of the vapour's effect on the whole meteorological situation in a given area. This type of observation also has a bearing on aircraft routing and long-range weather forecasting. Meteosat is currently the only synchronous orbit weather spacecraft to carry the water vapour imaging capability. Meteosat has an infrared capability as well which also has been used to take photographs of Europe and North America.

39. The second Meteosat satellite will be launched in 1980. The estimated cost of the whole Meteosat programme to completion is some 170 million accounting units, of which 20 % is being paid by France, 24.6 % by Germany, 20 % by the United Kingdom, 15 % by Italy and the rest by the other four participants in the programme. The second Meteosat satellite will be launched by the third Ariane test launch.

(e) Earth resources programme

40. The Meteosat programme was the first step towards earth observation and the building of satellites to detect earth resources by remote sensing. Although ESA has shown great interest in earth resources satellites Europe has not yet defined a programme to achieve an independent European remote sensing capability in the earth resources field. It was for this reason that the recommendation in your Rapporteur's first report asked the governments to promote the Europeanisation of the French project Spot (*satellite probatoire d'observation de la terre*), after all, the Meteosat programme also started as a French national programme.

41. In its note of 1st December 1976 to the United Nations Committee on the peaceful uses of outer space, ESA stated that its future plans for remote sensing of earth resources were to install remote sensing instrumentation in spacelab, to base pre-operational activity on European automatic satellites and to set up a ground station system, Earthnet. This system would receive, preprocess and distribute remote sensing data — initially from NASA satellites and later on from European satellites.

42. ESA's interest was in the following areas : agriculture, water resources management, coastal zone surveys, monitoring of land use and aid to developing countries. The late interest of Europeans in earth observation is understandable as much more is known about the surface of European countries than of many other regions. In Europe non-space-based centres have been in use for a long time and have proved reasonably satisfactory. Nevertheless, Europe has specific problems in environmental control such as pollution in the Mediterranean, control of fisheries and of the new sea boundaries, etc. It was for these reasons that in February 1977 the ESA Ministerial Council approved the Earthnet programme as an ESA special project and authorised the Director General to examine further proposals for a European earth resources satellite programme.

43. The European association of remote sensing laboratories was set up in 1976 to promote coordination of European research on various aspects of remote sensing for the benefit of all mankind, to facilitate the exchange of ideas and scientific information between the participating institutions and to identify priority sectors in remote sensing.

44. The ESA-Canadian agreement of 1977 covered the study of remote sensing applications, development of microwave remote sensing systems and other activities in this field. The creation of a European ocean satellite programme is also being discussed.

II. *Military application satellites*

45. In his first report your Rapporteur described military satellite programmes, especially in the United States, and the uses of military application satellites. These are used for the following tasks :

(*a*) reconnaissance ;

(*b*) countering enemy satellites ;

(*c*) telecommunications ;

(*d*) navigation ;

(*e*) meteorology ;

(*f*) other tasks (radar calibration, surveying, military participation in research programmes and manned space flights).

46. Reconnaissance satellites can be divided into photographic reconnaissance satellites, early-warning satellites and Elint satellites. Photographic reconnaissance satellites, many of which have been launched by the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as by China and France, use special types of cameras and are programmed from ground stations. The disadvantage of this type is that they cannot be used when there is cloud cover ; through their infrared equipment night reconnaissance is, however, possible.

47. Early-warning satellites have the task of detecting missile launchings and attacks and are able to calculate the missiles' trajectory, thus giving the country controlling these satellites the time to launch its own missiles. Early-warning satellites are also capable of detecting nuclear explosions. Only the United States and the USSR have this type of satellite.

48. Elint satellites are used to locate radar sources and determine their characteristics and possiblities. Radar-equipped ocean observation satellites are special reconnaissance satellites.

49. Interceptor satellites are being tested by the Soviet Union, mostly against low-altitude identification satellites. As far as is known, the United States has not carried out tests with this type of satellite.

50. Military telecommunications satellites are so far the most important as they provide the safest way for military commands to maintain contact with all their units. One of the first communications satellites was established by the United States navy in the 1950s. The specialised technology developed by the military command put great emphasis on security and certainty under hostile conditions.

51. The Americans now have the defence satellite communication system (DSCS), and the Russians the Molnya system ; both systems have geostationary satellites. NATO has a share in the American system but also owns its own communications satellites and ground stations to link its major commands via satellites. This system was considered necessary for the organisation as secure communications are vital to successful military operations, especially when efforts involve co-ordination of different forces in separate locations. Moreover in NATO there are many sovereign states with different languages and with forces deployed from the Eastern Mediterranean to Greenland.

52. Before NATO had an independent capability it shared in the United States defence communications satellite programme and for that purpose purchased two transportable ground stations : one placed in Casteau in Belgium and the other in Naples. In the early 1970s it decided to establish its own system and launch several communications satellites of the British Skynet type. In the second half of the 1970s new satellites with improved capacity were ordered. The latest satellites are called the NATO 3-A and NATO 3-B satellites ; the NATO 3-C will follow in 1979 and after. These satellites are expected to last seven years ; therefore in the early 1980s new orders should be placed and, as indicated in the recommendation in your Rapporteur's first report, a fair share of those should be obtained by the European industries.

53. In his first report your Rapporteur has already described the Navstar global positioning system ; navigation satellites are also being used to detect the launching of ballistic missiles from submarines and to determine the position of aircraft.

54. The Federal German navy has chosen the compact military satellite navigation system to provide some of its frigates with satellite navigation facilities. The system was designed for warships of all types, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft. It can be used in all civilian or military activities requiring accurate and immediate knowledge of the position of a moving object : control of approaches by sea to national territories ; surveillance of the economic zone and tanker navigation corridors. It is to be hoped that through this system the number of serious accidents at sea frequently reported in the press will be greatly reduced.

55. Military meteorological satellites have already been mentioned. The United States and the USSR also use calibration satellites, especially to calibrate particularly important radar systems.

56. Satellite research programmes for surveys and studies of the magnetosphere are also of military interest as the results might affect the accuracy of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles.

57. Manned spaceflight can be of use for military forces : for instance, the cosmonauts on the Soviet Soyuz space station, now in operation, can perfectly well take photographs of sectors or regions of military interest.

58. According to Annex II of the Aerospace Daily of 5th January 1978, in 1977 the Soviet Union conducted ninety-eight launchings involving 105 space vessels, whereas the United States launched a total of twenty-three satellites for their domestic requirements and seven for other countries. Of the Soviet satellites, about two-thirds are used exclusively for military purposes. Military satellites account for some 50 % of the American launches. One should take into account that the American satellites are more complex, allow more frequent multiple applications and can often be used for much longer periods. It might be for these reasons that the United States has launched four times fewer space vessels than the Soviet Union. This ratio has been the same for many years.

III. *Spacelab*

59. The spacelab development programme appears to be on schedule : delivery of the flight module to NASA will take place next year and in 1980 the first spacelab will be launched aboard the shuttle. The prototype of the spacelab payload is now in the initial stages of final assembly in

Germany. This prototype will be built in the flight configuration which has a large pressurised cabin and two scientific experimental palets exposed to the ambient space environment.

60. The space shuttle orbiter 102 is under final assembly at the Rockwell International factory, Palmdale, California. The spacecraft should be in orbit some time between September and December 1979.

61. As the spacelab development programme is phased down, ESA's future plans are for deep involvement in spacelab utilisation and production, the development of a corps of European payload specialists, and extension and evolution of spacelab concepts for utilisation in future international programmes.

62. Your Rapporteur wishes to recall here what he wrote in his first report on these developments [1]:

> "If the spacelab experiment succeeds it will mark a new low-cost concept of space exploration and exploitation. A permanent relationship between Western Europe and the United States in the space field will then prove essential.
>
> Europe will have invested some 500 million accounting units ($550 million) in the space transportation system which will be the basis of all great space ventures by the year 2000. It is therefore logical and necessary that Europe should be intimately associated with the space transportation system and its further development from the very outset. Europe should avoid the situation which arose with the post-Apollo programme when political decisions were postponed for so long that European participation [in the main part of the shuttle] came too late. In order to take appropriate decisions in time a sufficient research and development programme should be established to provide the decision-making authorities with all the required data."

63. Future European co-operative activities will therefore involve utilisation of the spacelab and its capabilities.

64. In addition to its activities through ESA, Germany is interested in spacelab utilisation and has formed a group to afford commercial support to spacelab users and to promote international use of spacelab capabilities. Except for France, no other member countries have an active policy for spacelab utilisation. A German spacelab utilisation working group of interested industries and laboratories has been formed and a national payload centre to plan for the most economic use of spacelab has been created. One of its leading aims is materials research and processing technology.

65. Apart from the German national effort there is also the United States national effort. So far, however, the United States has not clearly defined the future of the spacelab programme. At present there is some concern in the United States that the shuttle might have excess unused capacity which will make its operation less economical. Should this situation arise, NASA will probably encourage the Europeans and all potential users to make maximum use of the spacelab and shuttle and may formulate pricing policies to this end.

66. At the moment space shuttle reassessment being conducted in NASA is close to defining a first manned orbital flight goal. When the vehicle is considered operational and capable of carrying commercial payloads, a decision will have to be made on how many — five, six or seven — shuttle test flights should be made, before an operational capability is declared.

67. In its 1978 — draft — spacelab follow-on development programme, ESA has stated that a certain degree of programme continuity is essential to preserve the teams of engineers and other manpower and the valuable European know-how acquired in this field. From the very beginning ESA anticipated that co-operation between the United States and Europe would continue with increased sharing of responsibilities. There were several ESA-NASA co-ordination and working meetings in 1977 and 1978. One of these groups was especially concerned with new mission applications, advanced concepts for space exploration and attractive avenues for future space utilisation possibilities.

68. A spacelab follow-on development programme is therefore the next logical step for Europe in order to allow it to maintain its rôle in manned space flights. The European objectives, political and economic as well as industrial, should be to continue participation in manned space activities in co-operation with the United States and to share in the use of the space shuttle and complementary new systems. It is to be hoped that the United States Government will also prepare the forward planning for the NASA activities.

69. One motivation for continuous participation in manned space activities is to maintain the potential of participating in important commercial application activities which may devolve from the spacelab utilisation programme. One such example is the space solar power satellite which might be capable of generating and transmitting to earth electrical energy in the gigawatt range. This would mean that habitation and working stations in space would have to be built to support construction activities.

1. Document 766, paragraphs 67 and 68.

70. The ESA Council will therefore soon have to take important decisions on its medium- and long-term programmes.

71. At the last Ministerial Council meeting the figure of 350 million accounting units was suggested and more or less accepted by the Council. On the basis of this figure the future programmes should therefore be established.

IV. *Ariane launcher*

72. As in his first report, your Rapporteur wishes to record here too the developments concerning the Ariane launcher as they are of such great importance for the whole of European space co-operation. The present situation is that the 1979 launch dates will be met and, if all goes well, the Europeans will at last have an independent launch capability for their scientific and applied satellites.

73. The launches will take place at Kourou in French Guiana. The first four Ariane launches will be test launches and are planned for 15th June 1979, 15th December 1979, 15th May 1980 and 15th October 1980 respectively. The first launch will be without a satellite but the other three offer the possibility of free launches for those who wish to entrust their satellites to these launches.

74. The decision concerning the launcher of the last three of the seven Intelsat V spacecraft will be of major importance. Will this be done by the shuttle, and Atlas Centaur launcher, or by Ariane ?

75. Between 1980 and 1984 five European satellites will be launched : two European communications satellites and Marots B, the scientific European satellite Exosat and the French observation satellite Spot. These five Ariane launches will of course be operational. If a decision is taken to build the heavy experimental satellite then a sixth launch by Ariane is assured. Six other launches which ESA hopes to obtain are those of the last three Intelsat V satellites and the three Anik C satellites for the Canadian telecommunications network. Should this come about, the four test launches would be followed by twelve operational launches within some forty months.

76. Eurospace (the association of European industries interested in the promotion of civilian space projects) has made a market study indicating that of the 200 geostationary satellites to be launched in the next fourteen years, the Ariane launchers could be used to put into orbit between sixteen and sixty-two satellites.

V. *Conclusions*

77. At the end of this year, ESA's programme [1] will be the culmination of fourteen years of joint European space activities. During that period European co-operative space involvement has increased considerably and has changed in character in three major ways : first, the structure for collective European space activities has been consolidated and strengthened in ESA ; second, European collaborative space activities were originally oriented solely towards scientific endeavours whereas now the applications programmes, spacelab and Ariane included, account for over 80% of the budget; third, resources for purely national programmes have been reduced in favour of European collaborative ventures.

78. It seems clear that ESA will continue its involvement in applications programmes, both to ensure the availability of services to the member states and to establish the European space industry as a commercial source of utilisation of space applications throughout the world.

79. There is much uncertainty as to whether ESA's member states will be willing to maintain an appropriate level of financing for future space activities. Both the spacelab and Ariane programmes are now reaching completion and a follow-on development programme is required. ESA's proposed budget for the three-year period 1978-80 averages some $500 million per year [2] and it remains to be seen what ESA's future finances will be. It is on these that its future programme depends.

80. Your Rapporteur wishes to stress the continuing high level of Soviet space efforts which might lead to the Soviet Union occupying a dominating technological position which eventually might be translated into economic and military domination of the western world. European space policy to be defined in the near future should take account of this danger and the following essential policy criteria: (*i*) there should be continuity in space policy, as should be apparent to all concerned ; (*ii*) the policy should be flexible enough to take full advantage of new scientific and technological developments; (*iii*) the policy should be directly related to major terrestrial problems affecting basic human needs.

81. The decade of the 1980s should lead to a more sophisticated world-wide communications network, earth and ocean resources discovery and/or monitoring, weather forecasting and the prediction of natural disasters.

82. In the scientific field, the exploration of the solar system and outer space through manned and unmanned missions should be continued and accelerated.

1. See Appendix I — Programmes and activities of the European Space Agency.

2. See Appendix II — ESA's 1977 budget and contributions.

APPENDIX I

Programmes and activities of the European Space Agency

I. *The scientific programme*

1. *Scientific satellites*

Cos-B — mission : gamma rays ; launch date : 9th August 1975.

Geos-1 — mission : magnetosphere ; launch date : 20th April 1977 (satellite placed in too low an orbit due to a malfunction of its Delta 2914 launcher).

ISEE-B — mission : sun-earth ; launch date : 22nd December 1977.

IUE — the international ultraviolet explorer (IUE) satellite, an element of a programme undertaken jointly by NASA, ESA and the United Kingdom Science Research Council (SRC), was launched on 26th January 1978. The purpose of this programme is to provide the international scientific community with an orbiting laboratory for the ultraviolet that can be operated from two ground stations (one provided by ESA) in much the same way as if it was an earth-based observatory.

Geos-2 — launched into geostationary orbit on 14th July 1978 to replace Geos-1, which was placed in too low an orbit by its Delta 2914 launcher in April 1977.

2. *Current scientific activity*

Exosat — this satellite, which is due to be launched in the first half of 1981 by the European Ariane launcher, will determine the position and examine the structure of celestial X-ray sources.

Space telescope — ESA is participating in this NASA programme, which provides for the operation for at least fifteen years of an observatory in space, placed in orbit by the space shuttle in 1983.

International polar solar mission (IPSM) — exploration of deep space by two satellites, one European and one American, as from 1983. This mission will enable the exploration for the first time of the solar system's third dimension and of the region around the sun into which no spacecraft has yet penetrated.

Space sled — a piece of equipment designed to study the vestibular function, which has its seat in the inner ear and on which the sense of equilibrium in humans and animals depends. It will be flown by Spacelab in 1980 and will be accelerated (together with its passenger) at well-defined rates.

LIDAR (contraction of LIght and raDAR) — a device designed for the study of the earth's atmosphere. By making use of Spacelab, the atmosphere will be actively sounded with powerful laser beams at altitudes between 35 and 120 km. It will be possible to analyse the back-scattered signals by means of a variety of spectrophotometric devices.

II. *ESA applications satellites*

OTS — mission : communications (pre-operational satellite) ; launch date and launcher : 14th September 1977 (satellite destroyed by explosion of its Delta 3914 launcher).

Meteosat-1 — mission : meteorology ; launch date and launcher : 23rd November 1977 (Delta 2914).

OTS-2 — mission : communications (pre-operational satellite) ; launch date and launcher : 12th May 1978 (Delta 3914).

Meteosat-2 — mission : meteorology ; launch date and launcher : May 1980 (Ariane).

Marots-A — mission : maritime communications ; launch date and launcher : October 1980 (Ariane).

ECS-1 — mission : communications (operational system) ; launch date and launcher : late 1981 (Ariane).

Marots-B — mission : maritime communications ; launch date and launcher : mid-1981 (Ariane).

H-SAT — mission : communications (direct broadcasting) ; launch date and launcher : 1982 (Ariane).

ECS-2 — mission : communications (operational system) ; launch date and launcher : 1982 (Ariane).

Earth observation

Meteosat — Meteosat-1, the first European meteorological satellite, was launched from Cape Canaveral on 23rd November 1977. Every thirty minutes, it provides images of the earth and its cloud cover produced by a radiometer operating in three spectral bands. Once the Meteosat system is fully operational, in mid-1978, the information thus provided will enable the users (meteorologists, oceanographers and hydrologists) to improve the quality of long-term weather forecasts. Meteosat-1 also represents Europe's contribution to the World Weather Watch and the Global Atmospheric Research Programme (GARP). Meteosat-2 will be launched by the third Ariane development flight in May 1980.

Earthnet — ESA's activities in the remote-sensing field constitute the Earthnet programme,

whose purpose is to build up a European ground network for the acquisition, pre-processing and dissemination of the images produced by the NASA remote-sensing satellites : Landsat 1 and 2, HCMM, Seasat and Nimbus G. Having thus gained access to the data from the American satellites, the European users will acquire experience that will enable them to lay down the bases of the future remote-sensing programmes. The Earthnet network at present consists of two Landsat data-reception stations, located at Fucino (Italy) and Kiruna (Sweden).

In addition, the first Spacelab mission will carry remote-sensing instruments, whose data will be exploited by European laboratories.

III. *Space transportation systems*

Ariane launcher

The Ariane launcher is intended to give Europe a launch capability for its own applications and scientific satellites, and to enable it to secure a share of the important launcher market forecast for the 1980s, estimated at about 200 geostationary satellites.

Ariane, designed in particular to place satellites of up to 970 kg in geostationary orbit, will be operational at the end of 1980. The four development firings in the qualification programme are scheduled for June and December 1979 and May and October 1980, and will be carried out from the Ariane launch site located within the Guiana Space Centre at Kourou, French Guiana.

At the end of 1977, the ESA member states decided to undertake the series production of the Ariane European launcher with a first batch of five launchers known as the promotion series. This promotion series will serve to launch ESA satellites and satellites belonging to member states and non-member states or international organisations.

Spacelab

Spacelab, a manned and reusable space laboratory, developed for ESA by European industry, was designed to be placed in orbit by NASA's space shuttle. Up to four persons — scientists, engineers and technicians — will be able to work in Spacelab for a week to a month at a time. Spacelab is the most important programme carried out by ESA and NASA in co-operation.

A total of seventy-six scientific and technological experiments — sixty European, fifteen American and one Japanese — have been chosen by ESA and NASA to be carried out on the first Spacelab mission, scheduled for late 1980. ESA and NASA planned this mission jointly, sharing equally the available Spacelab experiment weight, energy and crew time.

APPENDIX II

ESA's 1977 budget

	MAU[1]
General budget	59.670
Scientific budget	67.864
Meteosat	33.675
OTS	35.317
Marots	33.671
Aerosat	2.572
Ariane	133.320
Spacelab	99.837
Earthnet	0.804
Budgets for new activities yet to be approved (as at May 1977)	27.836
Unallocated	0.216
	494.782

1. Million accounting units (= EEC accounting units).

1977 contributions

	%
Member states	
Belgium	4.31
Denmark	1.44
France	34.25
Germany	27.26
Italy	9.93
Netherlands	2.91
Spain	2.40
Sweden	2.43
Switzerland	2.02
United Kingdom	12.71
Other participants	
Austria	0.19
Ireland	0.03
Norway	0.12
	100.00

Document 785 **26th October 1978**

Weather forecasting

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions [2] by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins, Rapporteurs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Warren* (Chairman) ; MM. *Valleix, Lenzer* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Adriaensens (Alternate : *Peeters*), Bernini, Cavaliere *Cornelissen, Hawkins,* Konings (Alternate : *Portheine*), *Lewis,* Malvy, Mart, Müller, Péronnet, Dr. Phipps (Alternate : *Jessel*), MM. Pinto, *Schwencke,* Talon, Treu, Ueberhorst (Alternate : *Scheffler*), *Van Waterschoot.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on weather forecasting

The Assembly,

Aware that meteorology for both civil and military purposes is a national responsibility but by definition it is an international co-operative science calling for continuous international collaboration;

Considering that co-ordination at civil level is conducted in the World Meteorological Organisation, its regional organisations and technical commissions and at military level in the NATO meteorological group of the Military Committee;

Noting that the availability of adequate data on surface weather and upper air conditions over the North Atlantic and North and Central Africa is of vital importance for weather forecasting in Europe;

Regretting that the network covering the North Atlantic has been reduced to four stations and that the USSR has replaced the United States as an operator of weather ships;

Considering ESA's success in pursuing the Meteosat research and development programme and convinced that the time is now ripe to urge the users, i.e. the national European meteorological services, to launch the operational phase of a European Meteosat system;

Aware that civil and military agencies in the United States have to share the same meteorological satellites, ocean surveillance satellites and also the space shuttle, but that in Europe, since countries such as Sweden and Switzerland take part in the Meteosat programme, this is not possible for political reasons;

Considering that the need for a defence meteorological satellite programme nevertheless exists in Europe, possibly linked to the NATO communications satellite system,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

A. Draw the attention of member governments to the need to provide more reliable meteorological information covering the North Atlantic and North and Central Africa by increasing the number of observation posts in these areas, and, especially in the North Atlantic, by establishing a network of ocean buoys, organising automated meteorological data collection by specially-equipped aircraft and placing a system of meteorological satellites in polar orbit;

B. Promote the formation of an organisation by the European meteorological services or institutes to start the operational phase of a European meteorological satellite system "Eurometsat" similar to the "Eutelsat" of the European postal authorities;

C. Afford its active support to the study of the establishment of a meteorological satellite system for defence purposes, possibly linked to the domestic United States and NATO satellite programmes, together with an appropriate network of mobile ground stations;

D. Invite member governments to test existing military meteorological co-ordination by means of more frequent exercises to verify the implementation of recommendations made by the meteorological group of the NATO Military Committee;

E. Encourage member states to engage fully in fundamental research so as to understand the mechanism which determines weather conditions and climate, as well as the possible disturbances human activities can bring about.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins, Rapporteurs)

Introduction

1. The implications of weather and climate for military manoeuvres and developments on the battlefield are well known. Weather forecasting played a major rôle for instance in the selection of the right day for the allied invasion of the European continent in June 1944.

2. The effects of weather and climate on mankind, nations, regions and private lives are only dimly perceived. Realising the importance of their rôle, we as parliamentarians would wish to improve our knowledge and understanding of the major causes and mechanisms of climatic variations.

3. With this aim in view, the Committee thought it would be useful to study the national and international organisations concerned with these matters in order to understand the political and military aspects of weather services.

4. For the first time man has come to realise the fragile nature of the earth's environment with the knowledge that land, sea and air are not limitless resources. Can weather conditions be controlled and modified and if so should we try to do so ?

5. Weather forecasting as a public service has been known for only a century or so. Initially meteorologists were concerned mainly with forecasting major storms. The invention of radio-telegraphy allowed weather reports to be gathered from wider areas. After the first world war, aircraft and balloons equipped with instruments began to provide regular information on the state of the atmosphere at higher levels. The second world war brought radar to the fore capable of providing information on clouds and precipitation. Radar was also used in locating and tracking thunder-storms and tornadoes.

6. Electronic computers are making a major contribution to improving the processing of meteorological data and allowed many mathematical problems to be solved which could not otherwise be solved within acceptable time-limits.

7. Since the United States launched its first weather satellite Tiros on 1st April 1960 the weather has been monitored without interruption. Space photographs gave meteorologists the first global view of weather patterns. Since then, satellite control systems, orbital configurations, sensors and data-processing have been improved enormously.

8. All major military operations require detailed weather forecasts. Highly specialised forecasts are needed for air operations in darkness, amphibious operations, etc., and the importance of military weather forecasting has grown at the same rate as the advancement of military technology and meteorological techniques.

9. On an initiative by the European Community, a new and independent European organisation is being established near Reading in the United Kingdom — the European centre for medium-range weather forecasts [1].

10. Moreover, in September 1978 the European Commission asked the Council of Ministers to allow it to conduct a study on climate and weather in view of the increasingly extraordinary nature of the weather situation. A question to be asked is whether man's interference through chemical or thermal pollution is not one of the causes of these climatic changes in recent years — changes which, of course, have a direct influence on earth resources, especially agricultural production and water.

11. The Commission's proposals [2] were accompanied by a list of extraordinary meteorological situations since 1960. The list includes extremely cold winters, extreme droughts, wide-scale flooding and other unusual climatic situations.

12. Your Rapporteurs have been unable to provide the Committee in a relatively short time with a full picture of the different organisations, their workings and possibilities, but hope the insight they offer is sufficient to draw some political conclusions.

13. Your Rapporteurs are most grateful to all authorities of national and international services and organisations for their help in preparing this report.

Part I

(submitted by Mr. Cavaliere, Rapporteur)

I. *World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)*

14. Organised international meteorological co-operation started in Vienna in 1873 with the first international meteorological congress. The invention of the electric telegraph and the technological development of meteorology as a science, stimulated by the rapid expansion of

1. See Part II, Chapter VI.
2. See Appendix.

international maritime trade, made world-wide weather forecasting possible.

15. Meteorology is by definition an international co-operative science and continuous international collaboration is therefore of the greatest importance. The world organisation in its present form was formally established in 1951 and is a specialised United Nations agency. The purposes of the organisation are to facilitate world-wide co-operation in the establishment of networks of stations for meteorological as well as hydrological and other geophysical observations related to meteorology, to promote the establishment and maintenance of systems for the rapid exchange of meteorological and related information, to promote activities in operational hydrology and to encourage research and training in meteorology for improving knowledge of weather systems and enhancing weather prediction capabilities.

16. Membership of the organisation is open to any state or territory which maintains a meteorological service. Nearly 150 countries or territories are now members. The organisation has a technical and scientific secretariat which enables it to play an important rôle in supporting members of the organisation. The WMO secretariat has about 270 members and some seventy meteorologists and other scientific or technical staff are now employed on a temporary basis to provide technical assistance as requested by countries.

17. The directors of the national meteorological services are directly involved in the technical activities of the organisation. Implementation of most of the programmes of the organisation depends mainly on the efforts of the countries themselves. Adherence to this principle has paved the way for a world-wide businesslike collaboration and for programmes which in fact respond to the real needs of the countries themselves.

18. The Congress in which most principal delegates are directors of the national meteorological services meets every four years. Between Congresses the executive committee, which consists of twenty-four members, meets annually and includes in its membership the presidents of the six regional associations — Africa, Asia, South America, North and Central America, the South-West Pacific and Europe.

19. The executive committee is, in turn, assisted by numerous committees and panels of experts. In addition there are eight technical commissions on which experts of all member countries may serve.

20. Meteorology has in recent years made an important step forward through the enormous technological developments in other technological fields, notably outer space techniques and high-speed electronic computers. In December 1961, the United Nations General Assembly recognised the potential of space technology and called upon WMO to make studies which in fact led to the development of a single co-ordinated global meteorological service, the World Weather Watch (WWW). This is a world-wide meteorological system composed of the co-ordinated national facilities and services provided by the member countries and supplemented by the regional and world centres in certain countries. Its primary purpose is to ensure that all members obtain the meteorological observations and processed data they require for both their operational and research work.

21. The operational elements of the World Weather Watch are the global observing system, the global data-processing system and the global telecommunication system.

22. The global observing system provides data from satellites and ground-based observation stations, merchant ships at sea, commercial aircraft etc. There were originally two nations whose satellites provided meteorological data: the United States through the Tiros satellites and the Soviet Union through its Meteor satellite system. Recently however the European Space Agency and Japan have also provided satellites for the global observing system. The latest developments will provide for satellites to collect data from ships, buoys, aircraft and automated weather balloons.

23. The global data-processing system is designed to make available to all the world's meteorological services the processed data required for preparing forecasts and warnings and for research purposes. The three world meteorological centres are in Washington, Moscow and Melbourne, at which hemisphere forecasts are made twice a day. The one in Melbourne has a limited capacity and Moscow has limited computer facilities. Only Washington, Bracknell and Offenbach have very large computers to process the data and prepare forecasts for most of the northern hemisphere. In addition there are twenty-three regional meteorological centres which furnish processed data and forecasts and analyses on a regional basis. Finally, nearly all members of the world organisation have national meteorological centres which satisfy the data-processing requirements at national level.

24. The technical co-operation programmes of the world organisation, in particular the voluntary assistance programme, play an important part in enabling the regional and national centres to be properly manned and equipped. In this way they can reap the full benefit of the information obtained. These programmes are only established if the donor country and the receiving country both agree.

25. The third operational element of the World Weather Watch is the global telecommunication system, a world-wide system for collecting weather information and for distributing the raw and processed material to the three world, twenty-three regional and all national meteorological centres. It works at three levels: the main trunk circuit connects Melbourne, Moscow and Washington and a number of other important centres. All regional centres are linked to the main trunk circuit, and these in turn inform the national centres. The regional meteorological centres in Europe are at Bracknell (United Kingdom), Offenbach (Germany), Rome (Italy) and Norrköping, near Stockholm (Sweden).

26. With satellite data-processing and communications systems the World Weather Watch provides continuous information on cloud cover, both day and night, snow and ice cover and information on temperature and water vapour. In addition, many of the satellites are equipped with automatic picture transmission equipment which allows immediate transmission of satellite data. These transmissions can be received by any country over which the satellite is passing by means of a simple ground receiver. This is of great value, especially in areas where conventional meteorological observing systems have not yet been fully developed.

27. In 1967, the WMO and the International Council of Scientific Unions decided with the blessing of the United Nations to establish a global atmospheric research programme (GARP). The two major objectives of this programme are to extend the range, scope and accuracy of weather forecasts and to gain an improved understanding of the physical basis of climate and climatic fluctuations. Both objectives require special investigation of complex physical processes and observational experiments to formulate and test series and models.

28. For forecasts beyond a few days the atmosphere must be treated as a single integrated physical system which is global in extent. Over a period of days weather events at remote locations can influence the weather anywhere, thus the forecast problems of any nation are closely related to those faced by every other nation. Furthermore, since a model requires data everywhere in its domain, the need for global observation is inescapable. The research programme is thus essentially a global research programme which is of such dimensions that it is far beyond the capacity of even the largest countries.

29. The programme started in 1969 with a number of regional experiments and the first global atmospheric research experiment is to be started on 1st December 1978. All countries of the world will participate in this exercise. For a period of one year the atmospheric conditions of the entire globe will be under observation. Never before has such an enormous research programme been undertaken. This has been made possible through the availability of a satellite system consisting of two polar orbiting satellites and five geostationary satellites spaced around the globe over the equator, two of which will be provided by the United States and the other three by Japan, the USSR and the European Space Agency (through Meteosat). The planning and co-ordination of this research programme is conducted by the WMO secretariat in Geneva.

30. Data will also be gathered from ground-based and airborne sources for the first global atmospheric research programme experiment. Emphasis will be placed on the development of links between these data platforms and certain meteorological satellites.

31. In order to make every effort to assist economic planners and decision-makers at national and international level to take the right decisions at this difficult time for the world economic situation, the WMO is also working on a plan known as the world climate programme. This plan has been launched because many important aspects of progress and development are highly sensitive to climate and climatic fluctuation. On 7th July 1978, the Secretary-General of the WMO, addressing the second regular session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, made the following remarks concerning the programme:

> "For example the severe drought in the Sudano-Sahelian region a few years ago gave rise to a major disaster which shocked the whole world; the problems of desertification now require urgent attention; the effects of cold spells and dry spells even in the most highly developed countries have in recent years presented grave problems in energy supplies and distribution and have seriously affected agricultural output. In many cases it is indeed the hard-earned progress that has been achieved in economic development which renders the economy more vulnerable to climatic fluctuations.
>
> A further relevant factor is that as a result of such progress, especially in industrial development, man's own activities may now be influencing the world's climate.
>
> It is for reasons such as these that WMO, two years ago, embarked upon the preparation of a plan for the world climate programme and the planning process has now reached an advanced stage. The world climate programme will be a comprehensive programme which will have several separate though interrelated aims. In the first place it aims to improve significantly and rapidly the advice and information which each national meteorological and hydrological service already provides to the

planners and decision-makers on the national level. To this end, the global system for the collection and processing of the climatic observational data will be reviewed and improved. Fortunately other existing WMO programmes will assist greatly in this process — particularly the World Weather Watch and the new meteorological geostationary satellite system which now encircles the earth and to which I referred in my statement to the Council a year ago. By using an improved data acquisition system and by applying modern methods and technology, it is believed that much greater assistance can be give to economic planners in the individual countries.

Another component of the programme will involve a broad study of the impacts of climate on human activities, the aim in this case being to gain a better understanding of the rôle of climate in relation to environmental and socio-economic systems and thereby ultimately to enable individual countries to lessen their economic vulnerability to climatic fluctuations. Already several climate-sensitive fields have been identified for special study under this component — namely : energy, agriculture and forestry, development of ocean resources, ecology and environment, water resources use and management, socio-economic conditions. Studies and investigations into such subjects will clearly involve disciplines other than meteorology and hydrology and the closest co-operation is envisaged between WMO and other international organisations, notably FAO, UNESCO and UNEP as well as non-governmental bodies such as the International Council of Scientific Unions and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.

Yet another component of the world climate programme will deal with research on climate change and variability. The main objectives of this work will be to study the predictability of climate behaviour and the sensitivity of climate to external influences — whether natural or anthropogenic. I will not attempt to describe this research programme in detail ; suffice it to say that a well-defined and broad-based approach to the problem is envisaged and that it will require a major scientific effort. It is of course an extremely complex subject and it must be considered as a long-term project rather than one likely to produce immediate results.

An essential element in the planning process of the world climate programme is a world climate conference which will take place in February of next year — that is prior to the world meteorological congress at which the overall plan for the world climate programme will be considered. This conference which, from many points of view, will be a unique occasion will take the form of a conference of experts on climate and mankind..."

32. Your Rapporteur would point out that one example of the way in which weather has had a major influence on the political life of a country is the upheaval in Ethiopia after the three-year drought, leading to the overthrow of the Emperor and his government.

II. *The meteorological service in the Federal Republic of Germany*

33. The present service was set up under a law on the German meteorological service dated November 1952. This law was modified in 1955 and 1959 in order to enlarge the competences of the service. The Federal Transport Minister is politically responsible for the service.

34. The Ministry of Defence has its own service called the geophysical advisory service of the Federal military forces. Within this service is the military meteorological service which works closely with the civil service ; together they have many joint working groups which meet every month and between which there is a data exchange arrangement.

35. The civil meteorological service has four regional main offices : the maritime meteorological office in Hamburg and offices in Essen, Munich and Frankfurt. The whole service employs some 2,200 staff ; the meteorologists are trained at universities. A major problem arises where staff are concerned since there are far more trained meteorologists than there are jobs in the Federal Republic ; there are some 200 places in universities, 300 in the forces, 300 in the civil meteorological service and some 100 jobs in private industry.

36. The hydrological service is separate from the meteorological service. This service comes under the responsibility of the *Länder* and there is a Federal office in Coblenz. The meteorological service maintains close contact with the Federal office. The same is true with the oceanographic institute in Hamburg. The meteorological office provides all the data in the atmosphere, whereas the oceanographic institute takes measurements at sea level and under seas and oceans. The Federal Republic has no weather ships.

37. The meteorological service is divided into weather forecasting, climatological activities, the agricultural meteorological service, communications and research. Since the installation of the World Weather Watch, data from the Federal

service are used by eighteen national meteorological services.

38. Apart from collaborating in the World Meteorological Organisation, to the overall budget of which the Federal Republic contributes 4.5 %, the service is also collaborating in the framework of the EEC for the establishment in the United Kingdom of the European centre for medium-range weather forecasts and in the Meteosat programme in the framework of the European Space Agency.

39. The weather forecasting service has a network of eighty stations, around fifty-five of which provide each day reports at all eight standard hours of observation and about twenty-five of which provide reports at five standard hours of observation. The climatological service has some 450 stations, each of which provides some 1,000 data per year.

40. All data are collected and filed on magnetic tapes in computer systems for communication to all interested users. A difference is made between data which are checked and rough data.

41. The possibility of forecasting weather for more than four days and less than ten is now being studied at the European centre, part of which has already been established.

42. The national service has a forecasting reliability of three or four days, depending on the meteorological stituation. Three-day weather forecasting is now reliable due to the use of large computers and satellites.

43. The service's budget is some DM 120 million, nearly half of which is for staff and the other half for hardware. The staff question is a major problem as the Federal Government is extremely reluctant to allow more staff to be recruited and consequently the average age of staff is relatively high and the structure unbalanced.

44. The national meteorological centre at Offenbach is also a regional meteorological centre for the World Weather Watch and the area forecast centre for communicating meteorological information to airlines. The centre's activities are especially concentrated on the eastern part of the United States, the Northern Atlantic and Europe. Weather forecasting data and weather charts for these areas are provided four times a day. Moreover, weather forecasting information is sent out daily for the next forty-eight hours. Four times a day the area forecast centre also sends all airports information on flying conditions at different heights.

45. The centre at Offenbach has direct relations with the Washington and Moscow world weather centres ; it often "translates" the data between these two centres. It also has a special relationship with the meteorological centre in Nairobi.

46. The climatological division is becoming more and more important as climatic conditions play an important rôle in planning, whether in national, regional, or municipal frameworks. They can, for instance, be of great importance for the establishment of nuclear power plants. Considerable research is also being carried out in biometeorology, medical meteorology, pollution and many other fields.

III. *Meteorological services in Italy*

47. Three separate independent bodies deal with meteorology in Italy :

(*i*) the air force meteorological service ;

(*ii*) the central office of agricultural ecology, responsible to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry ;

(*iii*) the hydrographic service, responsible to the Ministry of Public Works.

48. The most important one and the most comprehensive, is the air force meteorological service ; the other two deal with specific aspects. It also represents Italy in the World Meteorological Organisation.

Structure of the air force meteorological service

49. The director of the air force meteorological service is a general officer from GARF (aeronautical physical engineering). He is assisted by a deputy director.

50. The central organisation of this service at present includes the following offices and centres :

Offices	*Duties*
Technical co-ordination	— Co-ordination of the overall operation of the meteorological service
Scientific co-ordination	— Co-ordination of meteorological research
	— Staff training
Planning office	— Organisation and management of networks of meteorological stations
	— Preparation of national technical regulations and ensuring application of international regulations

Offices	*Duties*
	— Organisation of meteorological telecommunications networks
Documentation office	— National and international meteorological documentation
Instruments and maintenance office	— Supply, installation and maintenance of meteorological instruments
International co-operation office	— Contacts with foreign meteorological services — Handling matters relating to international organisations
Office of the permanent representative	— Handling matters concerning the World Meteorological Organisation

Centres	*Duties*
Meteorological information, forecasting and analysis	— Issue of meteorological information and maps and national and international level — Study of analytical and forecasting techniques and methods — Technical supervision
Climatology	— Preparation of meteorological data
Meteorological telecommunications and electronic processing of meteorological data	— Use of national and international meteorological data transmission networks — Distribution and exchange of national and international meteorological information

51. The peripheral organisation of the air force meteorological service consists of three regional meteorological centres at Milan Linate, Rome Fiumicino and Brindisi. The following depend on these centres at technical level :

4 main airport meteorological offices (Uffici Meteorologici Aeroportuali principali — UMAp) ;

15 airport meteorological offices (Uffici Meteorologici Aeroportuali — UMA) ;

17 meteorological information posts (Posti di Informazioni Meteorologiche — PIM) ;

19 meteorological information stations (Stazioni di Informazioni Meteorologiche — SIM) ;

141 ground meteorological data observation stations ;

6 high-altitude meteorological data observation stations.

52. All data obtained are recorded on magnetic tapes for statistical and climatological purposes and on magnetic discs for practical purposes. They are processed by IBM 360/25 computers for data on the magnetic tapes and by two principal IBM 370/145 computers and two secondary IBM/7 computers for the magnetic discs.

53. The Director of the air force meteorological service is Italy's permanent representative to the WMO. There is close co-operation between the civil and military services although each of them is independent. The data obtained are generally highly reliable and in accordance with the standards of the WMO.

IV. *The civil meteorological service in the United States*

54. The National Weather Service (NWS), which comes under the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the Department of Commerce, is efficient and very well organised. It has a wide-ranging programme of activities in which more than 400 stations in the fifty states and elsewhere take part.

55. Overall, NWS employs about 5,000 full-time staff in its meteorological, hydrological and oceanographic departments. To indicate the scale of its operations, each year some 3.5 million observations are recorded and some 2 million atmospheric forecasts and advance information given.

56. National and foreign activities are linked to a vast international communications system.

57. Preparation of forecasts and opinions on weather trends are the main activity of NWS. A lesser known activity is oceanography. NWS also obtains meteorological data gathered at sea, on the ground and in the upper atmosphere. The information satellite also receives data from a large number of stations. The data gathered are used for preparing weather forecasts.

58. Meteorological forecasts and services include :

(*i*) the gathering of data and preparation of analyses and forecasts in addition to basic material ;

(*ii*) the transformation of basic material into a form suitable for use by the public and specific groups of users.

Organisation of forecasts

59. The NWS meteorological organisation consists of three groups of services :

(*i*) The National Meteorological Centre (NMC) is the backbone of the whole organisation. This first group includes the National Severe Storms Forecast Centre (NSSFC) in Kansas City, which broadcasts warnings of tornadoes ; the National Hurricane Centre (NHC) in Miami and the Hurricane Warning Centres in San Francisco and Honolulu which are responsible for detecting and notifying hurricanes.

(*ii*) The Weather Service Forecast Offices (WSFOs), of which there are fifty-two, situated *inter alia* in Anchorage, Juneau, Honolulu and San Juan. The larger and more densely-populated states have several WSFOs (Texas, California, New York, etc.), whereas a few smaller states are integrated in the area of responsibility of neighbouring states' WSFOs. WSFOs are the main bodies for forecasting and are responsible for the notices and forecasts issued to states, the navy and the air force.

(*iii*) The Weather Service Offices (WSOs) ensure local services providing estimates and data specific to a given area.

60. The NMC is in Camp Springs, a suburb of Washington. It is directly dependent on the Director of the NWS and is responsible for preparing most of the basic material and forecasts over a wide area and provides hemispheric analyses and forecasts.

61. It has information on the weather for the United States and the rest of the world. In fact, the area covered by the NMC embraces the whole world, particularly the northern hemisphere and the tropical regions of the southern hemisphere.

62. The NMC has three divisions and one group carrying out complementary tasks. The NMC, which uses the most advanced computers and forecasting systems, is capable of making atmospheric forecasts for five days ahead. It also has a group of technicians working to improve forecasts.

63. These are the broad lines of the way the United States meteorological services are organised. In the absence of a full and detailed description, they should suffice to give a clear picture of the complexity, accuracy and great usefulness of these services which are made available to the whole world and consequently to Europe.

64. The data for forecasts are broadcast by the NOAA weather radio in messages repeated every four minutes and usually revised every two or three hours, and more often if necessary.

The global telecommunications system

65. The global telecommunications system (GTS) ensures the exchange of meteorological data at world level. The GTS main trunk circuit links the world weather centres, the regional meteorological centres and the regional telecommunications hubs.

66. Data received from Washington by computer through extremely fast channels are made available to other centres in accordance with international agreements and are circulated to users. American data for foreign centres are gathered in circuits, prepared in the form of bulletins by the communications computer in Suitland and transmitted by telex and radio telex.

67. The GTS has four channels : Washington-London ; Washington-Toronto ; Washington-Tokyo and Washington-Brasilia. A Washington-Moscow circuit is also in operation.

68. Data transmitted from Washington to London are sent from London to other European countries to reach them within a maximum of two hours.

69. Our talks with NWS officials showed the need to gather data in Central and North African countries, the absence of which is at present a source of concern, particularly for air traffic which is now expanding quickly. These officials also expressed the opinion that Italy might do something in this respect. Those responsible for the Italian meteorological service pointed out that only intervention by the World Meteorological Organisation, which has its seat in Geneva, might allow this deficiency to be overcome.

Part II

(submitted by Mr. Hawkins, Rapporteur)

I. *General remarks*

70. Of vital importance for weather forecasting in Europe is the availability of sufficient data on surface weather and upper-air conditions over the North Atlantic. For budgetary reasons, the United States withdrew its weather ships from the North Atlantic, which caused the termination in 1975 of an ICAO agreement on the operation of ocean weather ships.

71. A new joint financing agreement on North Atlantic ocean stations (NAOS) came into force under WMO, initially with a limited number of European states as contracting parties. The new ocean station network had to be reduced to four stations, with France, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the USSR as ship-

operating countries. The Netherlands institute runs a weather ship on a position between Norway and Iceland.

72. The limited number of stations is regrettable, especially where a satellite observing system is not yet accurate enough to replace on-the-spot observations. The situation in the North Atlantic grew even worse because of difficulties in financing the observation stations in Iceland and Greenland.

73. Your Rapporteur feels that this left a considerable gap in the information from the Atlantic area where most of Europe's weather comes from.

74. On the military side one always has to reckon with the possibility of an armed conflict. There is a good chance that in such circumstances the weather ships, being an easy target for any enemy, will be withdrawn. Satellites can take over the task of a weather ship only partly, as stated above. Moreover, nobody knows what will happen with satellites during hostilities. Killer satellites are already a technical possibility and information transmitted by satellites may be in code or jammed.

75. Installing a denser observation network in the Atlantic, as with ocean buoys and specially-equipped aircraft, would be very costly. An experimental project is now being developed for automated meteorological data collection from commercial aircraft via satellite : ASDAR.

76. For the development of civil weather forecasting it would be useful if, apart from Inmarsat, OTS and Meteosat all of which are in geostationary orbit, a system of meteorological satellites in polar orbit were guaranteed ; in particular, meteorological institutes at higher latitudes would be interested in such a development.

77. Another problem is that equipment for observing, transmitting, plotting and forecasting the weather is becoming more and more sophisticated. A relatively small technical failure, a break in a cable or in the power supply may paralyse the greater part of a meteorological service. To return to a manually-operated system would in most cases be impossible.

78. Your Rapporteur received this general information from the Netherlands but is fully aware that this applies to the whole of Western Europe.

II. *The meteorological service in Belgium*

79. The Belgian meteorological service includes three different branches : (*i*) the Royal Institute, which comes under the Minister of National Education and Culture ; (*ii*) civil aviation, which comes under the Ministry of Communications ; and (*iii*) the military meteorological service called meteo wing of the air force, under the Ministry of Defence.

80. During the last world war Belgian meteorologists in London organised a service to assure the security of air lanes for civil aircraft in the future. After the war this service was incorporated into the Ministry of Communications and has remained there ever since. In 1951, the meteo wing of the air force was created.

81. There is close collaboration between the three services and this co-ordination is presided over by the Director of the Royal Meteorological Institute.

82. The Royal Institute has stations in Uccle, Ostend, Ghent, Wevelgem, Sinsin, Virton, Genk and Botrange. It employs some 200 persons, nearly fifty of whom are scientists. The domain in Uccle, surrounded by the Circular Avenue, also has a Royal Observatory and an Aeronomy Institute.

83. There are thus three institutions with three different directors and a total of roughly 400 staff (200 Royal Meteorological Institute ; 100 Royal Observatory ; 100 Aeronomy Space Institute).

84. As far as weather forecasting is concerned, forecasting for twenty-four hours is 90 % accurate, for forty-eight hours : 80 %, for seventy-two hours : 70 %, and for ninety-six hours (or more) : 60 % (or 50 %). Obviously the last figure is of no use as a forecast.

85. In the fields of hydrology and oceanography the institute works in conjunction with the Ministry of Public Works and the universities (particularly those of Liège and Louvain-La-Neuve).

86. Regarding international collaboration, the institute has many activities outside Belgium, especially in Africa, where it works on problems in the Sahel region south of the Sahara, and also in Corsica where it works on problems in the Mediterranean Sea and trains scientists from developing countries (sea-air interactions). It works with institutes of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden and Norway on marine meteorology in the North Sea.

87. Inside Belgium there is a constant flow of information between the three services and all the data are computerised. Close links with the RAF remain as a result of co-operation built up during the war.

88. The military meteorological service, apart from being in charge of all meteorological services for the Belgian forces, is also linked to NATO and provides some meteorological services for the NATO forces.

89. According to NATO, meteorology is a national responsibility and not therefore an integrated NATO service. Co-operation takes place in the NATO meteorological group of the military committee. From time to time "white shadow" exercises [1] are held ; safety regulations require them to be restricted however.

90. Your Rapporteur feels that these exercises are not held frequently enough and that it is only lack of money which prevents this.

III. *Meteorological services in the Netherlands*

91. The Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute comes under the Ministry of Transport and Public Works.

92. The Ministry of Defence has three meteorological services, one for each of the three forces, but the air force is pre-eminent.

93. A co-ordinating committee in which the four meteorological services are represented seeks to ensure close co-operation.

94. The Netherlands is represented by the institute in civil organisations and normally by the air force in military organisations.

95. World-wide, the institute co-operates in the World Meteorological Organisation of which the foremost priority is the collection and exchange of meteorological information required by national weather services. This information, together with some information from military airfields, is also available at military commands..

96. Within the framework of the global telecommunication system of WMO the regional communications centre for the Netherlands is Bracknell in the United Kingdom. A number of other international and national data links are also available, especially with Offenbach.

97. The task of the institute is divided into two main sectors: operational service and scientific research (meteorological, oceanographical and geophysical). The operational department comprises the central weather service, the civil aviation service and the climatological service. There are also supporting departments for computer activities, administration and instrumentation.

98. The staff of the institute totals some 600 persons, 260 of whom are employed in the operational department.

99. More directly engaged in the daily operational activities are 120 persons for the central weather service (De Bilt), 100 for the civil aviation service (mostly at Amsterdam/ Schiphol airport), twenty for the climatological service and twenty for the sub-stations in Den Helder and Vlissigen together and the special office at Zierikzee in Zeeland for the "Delta Works".

100. Present budgetary restraints mean that few new staff are being recruited. Scientific personnel comes mostly from the University of Utrecht.

101. The training of meteorologists (semi-academic) for both the civil and military service starts with a half-year primary forecasting course run by the air force. The secondary advanced course for meteorologists is organised by the institute in co-ordination with the air force. This is a part-time two-year course which has to be passed to become a senior forecaster. Staff for weather-observing and other meteorological-technical duties are trained mostly in co-operation between the institute and the air force.

102. Hydrological information on the flow of the rivers Rhine and Meuse comes from Germany and Belgium. The problem of inland flooding has largely been overcome in the Netherlands as there is a complete system of dykes (banks) and controlled overflows.

103. Along the North Sea coast of the Netherlands flood protection is monitored by a 24-hour storm-warning service which also calculates the rise of the water due to tidal and wind effects. In dangerous situations, a special office of the Ministry of Transport and Public Works is brought into being to monitor developments and action.

IV. *Meteorological services in the United Kingdom*

104. At Bracknell is the United Kingdom Meteorological Office which is also a regional meteorological centre within the framework of the World Weather Watch set up by the World Meteorological Organisation. The Bracknell office provides regional forecasts and guidance for Europe. As a regional centre it has direct contacts and special lines with Brussels and De Bilt for instance.

105. The Meteorological Office forms part of the RAF department of the Ministry of Defence. The Director-General is responsible to the Secretary of State for Defence through the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force.

106. The general functions of the Meteorological Office are :

(*a*) the provision of meteorological services for the Royal Air Force, army, civil aviation, the merchant navy and fishing fleets; provision of basic meteo-

1. Exercises without the help of information gathered from civil sources.

rological information for use by the Royal Navy ; and liaison with the Director of Naval Oceanography and Meteorology ;

(*b*) the provision of meteorological services to other government departments, public corporations, local authorities, the press, television, radio, industry and the general public ;

(*c*) the organisation of meteorological observations, including observations of radiation, atmospheric electricity and ozone, in the United Kingdom and at certain stations overseas ;

(*d*) the collection, distribution and publication of meteorological information from all parts of the world ;

(*e*) the maintenance of the observatories at Kew and Lerwick ;

(*f*) the provision of professional training in meteorology ;

(*g*) research in meteorology and geophysics.

107. The office is divided into two parts : one is the directorate of services and the other the directorate of research. Currently it has about 630 observation stations and the whole service employs some 3,500 persons. The defence services of the Meteorological Office have sixty-three offices and around 1,000 staff. The military sometimes provide buildings or building sites.

108. The office has its own meteorological training board which determines policy on the professional and managerial training of staff. Most of the professional training is provided either at the meteorological office college or at the meteorological technical training school. For university graduates the office provides post-graduate training ; some 100 people take this course each year.

109. The directorate of research at Bracknell plays an extremely important rôle in improving forecasting. This is true for basic as well as applied research. However, it is not always easy to direct the research to cover all the different fields required by the users.

110. Apart from services provided by the directorate of naval oceanography and meteorology for the navy, the office provides services for defence, civil aviation and other public services.

111. The RAF is a principal client of this office which works 25 % for the RAF and 75 % for civilian users such as farmers, civil aviation and the oil industry, which have to pay for the services. The Meteorological Office has offices at all RAF flying stations. Most communications services for defence meteorology are taken care of by the RAF central signals staff. The RAF also provides support for research flying by the Meteorological Research Flight at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough.

112. The meteorological requirements of the RAF are in general more localised, specialised in location and time-scale, with emphasis on safety regulations. The RAF also receives the same type of general meteorological information as the civil and general aviation.

113. The protected communications systems and additional information circuits are of special importance for the RAF.

114. The Meteorological Office is also an agent of the Civil Aviation Authority with special emphasis on upper wind and temperature forecasts required by civil aviation. The most important office is at Heathrow which is the flight information base and provides all the necessary documentation for all airports in the United Kingdom and Europe.

115. When the RAF has special requirements they are met by the Meteorological Office. The Ministry of Defence can ensure that civil research programmes pay sufficient attention to RAF requirements through the Meteorological Research Committee.

116. RAF requirements for meteorological services and research are established by the air staff in the Ministry of Defence. In peacetime the information for the RAF meets their requirements ; it is difficult to give details of what will happen in wartime or in case of emergency, but generally speaking there are plans for supporting the major subordinate NATO commanders and automatic weather stations in remote places are being planned. Mobile meteorological units are also used to support RAF or army bases and units. In wartime the link between the civil and military elements will be more clearly defined.

117. For the United Kingdom the question of the continued existence of weather ships will become acute in a few years' time as the two existing weather ships (one on and one off duty) are nearly forty years old and will have to be replaced ; it is highly unlikely that the British Government will want to pay for two new ships. Therefore a study has to be undertaken to see what should be done, taking into account other sources of information such as satellites and buoys. For the moment there is one French station with two ships, one Russian station with three ships, one combined Dutch-Scandinavian station with two ships. The future of the Atlantic observation posts will therefore depend on the possibilities of maintaining these stations.

118. The Meteorological Office takes a leading part in international co-operation in meteorology. The Director-General acts in concert with the other directors of the meteorological services in Western Europe in the co-ordination of their programmes and the Meteorological Office participates actively in the work of NATO through the NATO Military Committee meteorological group.

Royal Navy

119. The Royal Navy has a special meteorological service, established in 1937, and now known as the Directorate of Naval Oceanography and Meteorology (DNOM). Provision of tidal surge warnings for the national flood protection service comes under DNOM.

120. Although the directorate was initially set up for the provision of a naval weather service, it is now also responsible for environmental aspects related to underwater warfare. The Meteorological Office also has some ocean research activities. The naval service has some 250 staff, which includes personnel deployed on board every ship down to and including missile ships. Observational information gathered goes to the operational naval headquarters as well as to the RAF Strike Command. Information of value for civil purposes is sent to Bracknell with whom close liaison is maintained. Staff posts are held at the headquarters of the three major NATO commands and at the subordinate commands in the Mediterranean, Portugal and Norway.

NATO

121. Apart from a small office in Maastricht (Netherlands) there is no NATO military meteorological service ; nor is there a separate NATO skeleton staff. Each nation is normally responsible for ensuring the provision of adequate meteorological services for its own military forces. The Military Committee meteorological group is responsible for developing and maintaining effective plans for integrating the separate national meteorological services meeting military needs into an efficient NATO-wide organisation in an emergency. In such a situation extra resources are likely to be available for this purpose through the reduction of meteorological services to the civilian community.

122. A major problem in providing meteorological services for both military and civilian needs is the constant reduction in meteorological observations, mainly as a result of economic pressures. The military and civilian agencies which require meteorological support and are concerned with the funding of the means for obtaining observations have been made aware of this problem. In particular, NATO has asked its member nations to bear in mind the effects of station closures on the ability of meteorological services for defence to function effectively in an emergency.

123. It was drawn to the attention of the national authorities, for instance, that the withdrawal of the weather ships from the Northern Atlantic has been done without taking into account the defence aspects of this action. To depend solely on satellites is not acceptable. The ships were withdrawn as the civil aviation authorities were no longer willing to pay for their services and thus for part of their upkeep. This was a major reason for the withdrawal of these ships.

124. According to various sources, sometimes Russian ships remove weather buoys which belong to other services to study them and put them back again.

125. Probably the most urgent study that should be done now is on the future requirements for data gathering in the Atlantic for the next ten or fifteen years. At present there are gaps because of the loss of American weather ships and because satellites cannot replace the data gathered on land or at sea. There is also question of reducing observations by the closure of airfields in the United Kingdom and in other countries. The study should set out how best this could be handled.

126. There are also shortcomings in the communications systems for exchanging information gathered from ships or aircraft crossing the Atlantic. This is of particular importance for military aviation. Furthermore, it would be interesting to know whether the recommendations made by the Military Committee to national governments at the instigation of the Military Committee meteorological group have an effect.

V. *Meteorological services in France*

127. There are two meteorological services in France: one for the overseas departments and territories and the other for the metropolitan territory. France has fifty-nine overseas stations in the various parts of the world. The metropolitan service is divided into six regions, each with its own director and subordinate stations. The six directorates are at Le Bourget (42 stations), Strasbourg (20 stations), Lyons (28 stations), Aix-en-Provence (35 stations), Bordeaux (26 stations) and Rennes (22 stations). The division for meteorological research has six research centres in the different parts of the country. There is also a technical and material centre at Trappes and the national meteorological school which is in Paris.

128. The World Meteorological Organisation has established its requirements, for instance for the navigation of aircraft and ships, for industry, agriculture and ecology. In accordance with these requirements the stations send in their data ; depending on the importance of the station, data are sent in every six hours, every hour or even every half-hour. All these data are received by

computers and processed. Apart from the ground stations, France has two weather ships which work together with nine other ships in the North Atlantic to meet the requirements of the WMO. Furthermore there are the data from satellites and radio soundings. The distance on land between stations, sub-stations and posts should be some 150 km whereas the ocean stations should be 1,000 km apart. However, these WMO requirements cannot be met for budgetary reasons. The total staff of the service is some 3,000 persons, 2,000 of whom are civil servants.

129. In France like everywhere else the foremost client of the service is aviation. The second most important client is agriculture and a special agricultural meteorological service has been set up. The third client is the navy and merchant shipping. Efforts are also made to provide industry and transport with special information. A growing activity is that related to the environment.

130. River flow forecasting is carried out in direct relation with the national hydrological service, which issues special information on possibilities of flooding, rains, etc. The national services are co-ordinated on a regional basis by the Préfet concerned.

131. A special feature of the French organisation is the national meteorological school which provides three types of courses: (*i*) to train technicians; (*ii*) to train works engineers requiring the Baccalauréat and two years of higher mathematics; (*iii*) to train meteorological engineers — only open to graduates from the higher French technical schools. In 1977, from 3,188 candidates only 145 were accepted. The school also has a certain number of students from overseas territories.

132. There are no special military meteorological services in France. The civil service provides all the necessary information on whatever level it is requested. If necessary, the staff of the service may sometimes wear a military uniform but they remain attached to the national civil meteorological service with the exception of some non-commissioned officers, mainly from the air force, who have been trained at the national school.

133. France co-operates with the NATO meteorological service but since it is not an integrated part of the NATO forces it has an observer status.

VI. *The European centre for medium-range weather forecasts*

134. In order to set up a European centre for medium-range weather forecasts (four to ten days) seventeen European countries have joined together to build such a centre at Reading in the United Kingdom. The agreement was ratified in 1975. The permanent buildings are nearly complete and the international staff — some 140 persons — will be equipped with a large-capacity computer. Making this centre a joint European venture was not only necessary for financial reasons in order to share the cost of the computer between a large number of countries, but also because it was not possible for one country alone to bring together such a concentration of scientists.

135. The seventeen countries are: eight from the EEC, Austria, Spain, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Budget contributions are: Federal Republic of Germany 25 %, France 18 %, United Kingdom 13 %, Italy 11 % and the other States 5 % or less.

136. The purpose of the centre is to study the possibilities of establishing mathematical models for weather forecasting for four to ten days, to improve the quality of weather forecasting, to submit to the participating states the result of the use of its computer and, finally, to participate in the 1979 global experiments organised by the WMO. If the studies at Reading prove successful the centre might become operational in five or six years, but it is not at all sure that the timetable can be adhered to.

137. There is no fear of duplication of effort as meteorologists fully realise that only if all data are exchanged reciprocally will they be able to do their job properly. There is a great deal of international co-operation at a world-wide level as well as at a regional level.

138. Satellites have certainly revolutionised meteorology by making it possible to observe the formation of cyclones and tornadoes, especially important for areas above deserts and oceans from where there was little information. Nevertheless, there are still many unknown factors and it is not sure that with all the data it can collect the centre at Reading will give the hoped-for results.

Conclusions

139. Ever since the 1960s the American military authorities have been studying the possibilities of a defence meteorological satellite programme. The present system provides weather data for the entire earth four times a day using two satellites in polar orbit. One collects early-morning and evening data and the other collects noon and midnight data. These weather data are stored aboard the satellites and later transmitted to the air force global weather centre in Nebraska and the fleet numerical weather centre in California. The images are also transmitted to mobile stations at military locations, world-wide, to support tactical operations. Great improvements have been made in satellite reliability and life.

140. The latest Tiros-N domestic United States weather satellite will be adapted to the defence

meteorological satellite programme. There is also close collaboration with NASA on the new Nimbus meteorological satellite, Seasat-A (specialised experimental applications satellite) and GOES-A (geostationary operational environmental satellite). The United States navy is establishing a central satellite data-processing centre at the fleet weather centre in California.

141. Although the United States has co-operation agreements with the United Kingdom for its Skynet satellite and with NATO for the NATO communications satellites, no international co-operative agreements exist on the meteorological satellite programmes for the armed forces, the main reason being that on the European side no military meteorological satellite programme exists.

142. From what is known today, it can logically be concluded that weather satellites will probably provide in the not-too-distant future a global weather network not just for disasters and emergencies, but for accurate long-term forecasts, i.e. forecasts up to two weeks. By knowing overall weather trends through out the world, accurate long-term forecasts might be routine within the next decade. Then it will probably be possible to make exact measurement of the atmosphere itself, temperature versus depth in the atmosphere and also the condition of the oceans and the temperature of lakes, all of which have an impact on the global weather.

143. The economic potential of accurate forecasting for a two-week period is already evident. Agriculture, forestry and fishing will all benefit from longer-term forecasts. The same is true for the construction and transport industries. There is also a potential for weather modification which might have a tremendous impact in the future.

144. Thought must also be given to the impact of such satellites on military plans and strategic and tactical situations.

145. Your Rapporteurs are convinced that the European aerospace industries would be able to provide the military forces with an adequate military meteorological satellite network. This would fill the gap which at the moment and certainly in the future will exist with regard to weather forecasting for defence operations.

146. There are still technological limitations in existing meteorological satellite systems, but progress is so fast that this will soon no longer be so and Europe should therefore prepare for the future and consider establishing a defence meteorological satellite programme.

147. No one can say whether the superpowers would continue to allow existing civilian meteorological satellites to be used. How would the national meteorological services then receive the necessary data ? It would not be possible to establish an independent military infrastructure for all meteorological activities but a separate satellite network linked to the American one would be feasible and desirable.

148. It has been claimed that the information the Soviets obtain from their meteorological offices is less comprehensive than the information available to western countries. The conclusion of a treaty on the inviolability of satellites might therefore be to their advantage. However, the outcome of present negotiations in this respect is far from certain, but it can safely be assumed that no information will be forthcoming without a system of one's own.

149. Long-range forecasts are worked out from information communicated by both satellites and ships. Here again the European position is not very favourable. The withdrawal of American vessels from the North Atlantic and the fact that British ships may not be replaced will have serious consequences for European weather forecasting. The competent NATO and national military authorities should remind member countries of the importance of meteorological services for the defence of the West. Alternatives should be found for land or ocean stations which are phased out and new developments in automatic observation stations should be given high priority in the defence budgets.

150. Your Rapporteurs are disappointed to have learned that there has been little improvement in forecasts for periods of less than twenty-four hours ahead. These shorter period forecasts can have considerable economic importance. However, they were glad to learn that the meteorological service at Bracknell in the United Kingdom has started a major research and development programme to deal with this problem which it is hoped will lead to real progress.

APPENDIX

EEC weather research programme

20th October 1978

Since earliest times, man has turned his attention towards the sky to discern what the heavens had in store for him. Sometimes it was a question of his survival.

It is not really necessary to point to the great flood to be convinced of the dangers from extreme meteorological conditions. One glance at the events in recent years shows how harshly droughts, crop failure and floods have hit many regions of the globe, including our own.

Droughts and hurricanes

— 1968-1973 : Africa's Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, etc.), Ethiopia and the Cape Verde islands were badly hit by the prolonged drought which was the most severe this century.

— 1975 : a heat-wave descended on Western Europe during the summer and countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark experienced their highest temperatures on record. For the first time in the 20th century, ice from the Arctic ocean found its way to Iceland in the month of July.

— 1975-1976: the drought hit all of western, central and southern Europe. Rainfall in England from May 1975 over the following 16 months was the lowest recorded since 1727.

— 1976 : a new heat-wave hit Western Europe at the beginning of the summer. For 24 days in England, temperatures were 4°C above the monthly average for the previous 300 years. The USSR and Canada, by contrast, suffered a very cold and humid summer.

The catastrophic drought which tortured a large number of tropical and sub-tropical countries between April and August (from Sri Lanka to West Africa) was followed by torrential rains. Over the same period, Europe suffered bad weather, whilst extremely violent hurricanes ravaged the coasts of Madagascar and Mexico.

Zero safety margin

The impact of such climatic traumas on man and the earth's resources is enormous. During the period 1960-70 for example, extreme meteorological phenomenon caused some economic disasters. World reserves of wheat were reduced to negligible size, foodstuff and market prices went haywire. Millions of people in developing countries found themselves threatened with starvation.

The climate of our planet has always been unstable and will doubtless stay so in the future. We know neither the causes of these changes, nor their size or speed. It is vital to direct our research and forecasting resources to these climatic variables.

Whilst our vulnerability has greatly increased compared to past centuries, current world reserves of wheat only represent a small fraction of our annual consumption. The galloping birthrate and increased food requirements imply that a period of bad weather could be catastrophic. It would not require another glacial era to destroy our agriculture. Our water resources are also becoming increasingly scarce given the population growth and the expansion of our cities and industries. For the future, we can probably expect droughts to threaten our supplies of water for home, industrial and agricultural use. By contrast, well-dispersed rain could feed our underground waters and increase our water reserves. Though we know that our security (water and food) depends on the climate, we do not know the precise quantitative relationships involved. Urgent scientific research is required.

Weather forecasting limits

This urgency has led the European Commission to propose to the Council of Ministers a research programme into the mechanics of climate and temperature. The five-year programme aims to co-ordinate research work in Community and associated countries. The total cost will be around 15 million EUA (1 EUA = ± 1.3 dollars) of which 8 million EUA will come from the Community budget.

This European climatology programme will form part of the international research being conducted by the World Meteorological Organisation (GARP). In the science of climatology, co-ordination of efforts produces good results which is why the European Commission wishes to mobilise the leading specialists from the Nine rather than see European researchers work in relative isolation.

The programme proposed by the Commission covers two research fields :

1. *Climatic mechanisms*

This area of research covers short-term climatic forecasting, i.e. over a period of a few weeks. All weather forecasting techniques have their limits and it is currently impossible to forecast the weather or the state of the atmosphere more than two weeks ahead.

The gaps in our knowledge not only concern the actual weather but also causes and origins and the precise moments when certain changes will occur.

At the moment only visionaries can predict climatic disasters with any precision.

To develop useful forecasting techniques, the climatic conditions of ancient times have to be reconstructed to find historical precedents for the current climatic cycles. Information on climates in ancient times can be collected from fossils, tree rings, river beds, analysis of insect life and marine micro-organisms in sedimentary layers, etc.

2. *Man-climate interactions*

Man is increasingly concerned to know if he is in any way responsible for the increasing changes in climatic conditions. Technological progress increases energy consumption which pollutes the atmosphere either thermically or chemically.

The second area of research proposed by the European Commission is composed of the following two themes :

— the effect of climate on European resources (food and water). Evaluation of climatic risks (crops, droughts, avalanches, etc.) The impact of climatic conditions on energy production (importance of rainfall for feeding hydro-electric power stations or cooling nuclear power stations) ;

— influence of man on the climate: chemical pollution through carbon dioxide in particular and thermal pollution of the atmosphere.

Source : Euroforum No. 34, 3rd October 1978, Appendix 1.

Document 785 **21st November 1978**
Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5

Weather forecasting

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5[1]

tabled by Mr. Hardy

1. In paragraph A of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, after "reliable" insert "but cost-effective".

2. In paragraph B of the draft recommendation proper, at end add "providing that this can be carried out inexpensively".

3. In paragraph C of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, leave out "Afford its active support to" and insert "Consider providing modest support for".

4. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph D.

5. In paragraph E of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, leave out "fully".

Signed: Hardy

1. See 13th Sitting, 23rd November 1978 (Amendment 1 agreed to ; Amendments 2, 3, 4 and 5 withdrawn).

Weather forecasting

AMENDMENT 6 [1]

tabled by Mr. Cornelissen

6. In paragraph E of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "fully" and insert "their efforts jointly".

Signed : Cornelissen

1. See 13th Sitting, 23rd November 1978 (Amendment amended and agreed to).

Document 786 **31st October 1978**

A European armaments policy

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments [2]
by Mr. Critchley, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in Committee by 7 votes to 6 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Roper* (Chairman) ; MM. Bonnel, *Roberti* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Ahrens, Baumel,* Bechter (Alternate : *Bozzi*), *van den Bergh,* Boldrini, *Boucheny, Critchley, Dejardin,* Fosson, *Grant,* Handlos, *Hardy,* Konen, de Koster, Lemmrich, *Maggioni,* Ménard, Pawelczyk (Alternate : *Büchner*), Pecchioli, Péronnet, Hermann Schmidt (Alternate : *Vohrer*), Scholten, *Tanghe,* Whitehead (Alternate : *Banks*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on a European armaments policy

The Assembly,

Aware that the growing cost of modern armaments technology and current economic trends can lead to unilateral disarmament through inflation in the countries of the Alliance;

Stressing the need for the joint production of armaments in order to provide interoperability and standardisation of military equipment; to ensure the survival of a viable European armaments industry; and lastly a two-way street in armaments with the United States;

Considering that limited but as yet too slow progress in these directions is now being made in the independent European programme group, in the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, and Military Agency for Standardisation, in all of which all WEU countries participate;

Believing that only if the European armaments industry as a whole is restructured on a viable and competitive commercial and industrial basis will adequate progress be made;

Welcoming the study of the European armaments industry being undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge that efforts to achieve joint production, interoperability and the standardisation of defence equipment in the European countries of the Alliance be concentrated in the independent European programme group;

2. Call for the restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Community, relying on its responsibility in the fields of industrial and customs policy and research;

3. Ensure that once the present study of the European armaments industry is completed, full use be made of the resources of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist in the foregoing tasks;

4. Request the governments concerned to arrange for the IEPG to submit an annual report on its activities to the Assembly.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Critchley, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. There are two vital objectives of the North Atlantic Alliance which are subject to chronic delays, if not frustration, for lack of effective unity between its European members. One is the standardisation and interoperability of arms equipment, the other is the establishment of a two-way street between Europe and North America, which is needed not only to provide a more cost-effective use of resources and increased standardisation of weapons systems but also for the psychological and political purpose of creating a better balance in the Alliance between the United States and its European allies. These frustrations and delays are a great impediment to the build-up of the defensive strength of the Alliance, which the ever-growing weight of the Warsaw Pact's offensive capability has made necessary.

II. *The problems*

2. It is, of course, an essential feature of the Atlantic Alliance that it is an association of independent, democratic states, within which are divergent trends of public opinion, in contrast to the political conformity to the Marxist ideology and the control of the CPSU, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (commonly called Russia in the West), which characterise the Warsaw Pact. The lack of political unity between the NATO countries is reflected in every sphere of activity, diplomatic, strategic and financial ; and it is an astounding tribute to the validity of voluntary co-operation between free societies that NATO has held together as well as it has for nearly thirty years. But it is in the field of arms procurement and manufacture, with the rapidly rising costs of weapons, that the lack of an integrated European programme is most marked and its disadvantages most evident, both in regard to the Soviet bloc and to the industrial and financial strength of the United States.

3. Indeed, if any real progress is to be made along the two-way street in view of the constant development and sales-drive of the great American armament corporations, then there is no time to lose. Given the time-scale in the design and production of weapons systems, decisions will have to be taken by 1980 if new equipment is to enter service by the nineties.

4. If no progress is made towards rationalisation within Europe, large European arms or aircraft manufacturers will enter into joint agreements with American companies, such as that already signed between Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm and McDonnell Douglas in September 1977, with a view to the development of a new fighter aircraft. The result of such transcontinental collaboration would be the disappearance of the independent European firms from the market. The threat that faces the European aircraft industry can best be understood when we look at the difference between American and European civil and military aircraft manufacturers. There are nineteen companies within the European Community as compared to only eight in the United States. The nineteen companies have to share a substantially lower turnover of 7.4 billion units of account in the Community, as against 17.6 billion in the United States. This can only mean that both military and civil aircraft industries in Europe are badly planned from the point of view of competition ; their research and development activities overlap thus reducing effectiveness ; costs are disproportionately high, while the benefits of economy of scale cannot be exploited. The result is that both the civil and military aircraft industries are threatened unless military procurement policy is used to promote increased collaboration across national frontiers.

5. Apart from the danger of American dominance of the European armaments industries, one of the greatest threats that faces the western Alliance is the danger of "disarmament through inflation". At a time of low economic growth, governments are reluctant to direct further scarce resources to defence even though weapon costs are growing fast and even though weapon effectiveness offers Alliance members the best hope of counteracting the ever-increasing offensive capability of the Warsaw Pact forces. Greater efficiency in weapon supply and a rationalisation of the equipment procurement process are therefore of paramount importance for western security. As Elliott R. Goodman has written : "...some observers look hopefully to a new arms technology that promises to provide inexpensive but extremely effective weapons. Their general adoption might make it possible for Europe to avoid being priced out of the weapons market, while also reducing the United States Defence Bill." [1]

6. Mr. Goodman cites the increased accuracy of precision-guided munitions and the example of their effectiveness in the Arab/Israeli war of October 1973 as evidence of the greater cost-effectiveness of future defensive short-range

1. Elliott R. Goodman : "The puzzle of European defence : the issue of arms procurement", Survey, summer/autumn 1976, page 219.

battlefield weapon systems. However, he concedes Richard Burt's argument that "both long-range and all-weather precision-guided munitions now under development will cost far more than present generation systems." [1]

Wasted money

7. Another unhappy consequence of the separate national procurement and production of land, sea and air armaments, which tend to be increasingly sophisticated and costly, is the duplication of expenditure on research. Thomas A. Callaghan, the "doyen" of writers on this subject, estimates that in 1974 Europe spent $2.5 billion on research and development, while the United States spent $7.6 billion. As the United States research and development programme duplicated virtually all European projects and included much else besides, the Alliance as a whole could save $2.5 billion if research and development projects were shared equitably between Europe and the United States instead of being duplicated. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the overlap in research and development between the European countries themselves is any less than that between the European allies of the United States. One has only to count up the different types of weapons with the same functions in use today with the armed forces of the European members of the Alliance to have some vivid idea of the waste involved. It is not simply a matter of the procurement of non-standardised equipment, manufactured in different countries on a small scale — the training of operating and maintenance personnel, and the setting up of repair and maintenance facilities will be far more expensive as well.

8. Thus we can only conclude that if national defence budgets are taken as a yardstick, countries are getting too little defence for their money, or, if existing capabilities are used as a yardstick, countries are paying too much for what they are getting. The present policies of the European allies entail an unwarrantable waste of resources, which, if properly used, would amount to a policy of European rearmament. Up till now, the problem of producing standardised military material and reducing duplication has been seen as one of achieving specific objectives of defence policy. This has been due to the fact that discussion has taken place within organisations chiefly concerned with defence, e.g. Eurogroup, WEU and most recently the independent European programme group.

9. In other words, the new weapons technology heightens the advantages which the United States already possesses of greater resources for research and development and longer production runs. The European members of the Atlantic Alliance would without countervailing measures be even more likely to increase their dependence on the United States, thereby perpetuating the imbalance in the arms trade between Western Europe and the United States.

The European defence equipment market

10. The manufacture and procurement of aircraft, though the most costly, is, of course, only part of the whole operation of supplying the manifold defence requirements of the European Atlantic allies. They constitute (including France) a very substantial market, amounting to nearly $40 billion in 1976, compared with the arms expenditure of $77 billion of the United States. This gives us some idea in financial terms of the size of the defence transactions by members of the Atlantic Alliance who also constitute the whole of the European Community, except Ireland.

11. The following table shows the spending by countries which form part of the NATO military system on major purchases of equipment as a percentage of their overall defence spending, and from this we see that the Community countries for which figures are given spent between 10 % and 21 % of their 1977 defence budgets for this purpose, apart from Luxembourg with its very low figure. At the same time, nearly all these countries show a substantial increase for 1977 by comparison with previous years. The figures must, however, be viewed with some reservation as they only cover major purchases of equipment, and it is often difficult to draw the line accurately between the purchase of equipment and expenditure on buildings and installations. In most cases, total spending on equipment would be considerably higher than indicated in the table.

12. While American equipment (e.g. computers, precision-guided weapons, airborne missiles and aircraft) account for a sizable proportion of the European non-nuclear weapons market, the German Federal Republic, France, Italy and the United Kingdom are basically self-supporting in conventional arms. The other countries in the Community are obliged to import most of their military requirements. This aggravates the present situation in which the equipment of their armed forces is not only not standardised but for the most part not interoperable either.

13. Fortunately, there is now not only a recognition throughout NATO of the nature of the problem, but also a publicly-declared determination to achieve overdue reforms in the field of weapons procurement which is already being translated into concrete action. The problems in this field have been clearly identified. Thomas Callaghan has estimated that weapon

1. R. Burt : "New weapons technologies and European security", Orbis, summer 1975, page 256.

Spending on major purchases of equipment as a percentage of total defence expenditure

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Belgium	11.4	8.4	8.8	9.1	11.1	10.3
Canada	6.1	7.3	5.9	6.3	8.0	9.1
Denmark	15.4	17.2	19.3	19.0	19.4	17.3
Federal Republic of Germany	12.3	12.1	11.9	11.8	13.2	13.3
Italy	16.9	15.2	15.2	13.9	13.1	14.0
Luxembourg	1.5	1.3	2.4	1.0	3.4	2.9
Netherlands	10.7	11.2	13.2	15.6	15.2	18.2
Norway	11.8	11.7	13.4	14.4	13.3	16.6
Portugal	7.5	4.5	3.1	1.9	1.9	2.2
Turkey	4.9	5.0	3.0	—	—	—
United Kingdom	18.6	19.3	17.2	19.3	20.6	21.8
United States	21.6	18.9	18.1	17.5	18.5	20.8

Source : NATO.

duplication [1] has cost NATO more than $10 billion per annum. He believes that the appalling waste of manpower, money, energy and materials has occurred because NATO has failed to achieve :

(*a*) common military requirements for weapons and equipment through common tactical doctrine ;

(*b*) complementary research and development projects through rationalisation of development tasks and through specialisation in development areas ;

(*c*) a diversity of weapon system options and hardware through a United States/European technology base and through savings in system acquisition and support practices ;

(*d*) larger weapons inventories at lower unit cost through rationalisation of production sources and through production runs of the combined European/American scale ;

(*e*) mutually-supporting general-purpose forces through standardisation of weapons and equipment and through common spares and maintenance logistics ;

(*f*) a balanced, collective, conventional force deterrent through military, technological and industrial interdependence and through marshalling available economic means to achieve desired military ends ;

(*g*) equitable financial burden-sharing in all defence areas through economic and technological benefit-sharing ;

(*h*) jobs and markets for underemployed defence industries through non-duplicative projects on an Atlantic development and production scale and through a North Atlantic common defence market [1].

Joint production and the arms trade

14. The cost of modern arms having risen far more than the rate of inflation, simple economics has obliged some countries to co-operate, mainly in the production of military aircraft. The very high research and development costs of aircraft, such as the Tornado, makes it virtually impossible for a single country to build such aircraft on its own. Thus joint production has become one obvious solution, and one which, whenever possible, NATO has encouraged. The other has been to reduce unit costs by selling arms abroad. This arms trade has three disadvantages : it depends upon the procurement policies of others ; it runs the risk of accelerating arms races in other continents which may lead towards involv-

1. For table on advanced missile duplication, see the previous report of the Committee : Document 671. Explanatory Memorandum, Chapter V "Production of missiles in Europe" and Appendix II (Rapporteur Mr. Wall, 29th April 1975) ; see also R. Burt : "New weapons technologies", page 4, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1976.

1. Thomas A. Callaghan, Jnr. : "A common market for Atlantic defence" Survival, May/June 1975, page 129, Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

ing Europe to its disadvantage, and it subordinates NATO standardisation to the competitive interests in the third world. Nevertheless, the size of the arms business makes it such an important element both in regard to the balance of trade and employment in at least two major countries of Western Europe that it could not be dispensed with. A survey made by the United States Department of Defence shows that in 1974 France was the largest arms exporter in the European Community with total exports worth $3 billion, followed by the United Kingdom with $1.5 billion, Italy with $0.25 billion and the German Federal Republic with $0.18 billion. Evidently, the sale of armaments to other countries is essential to the present structure of the French and British arms industries, even if it is not an instrument of foreign policy such as the United States' export of military aircraft to the Middle East. This is not a factor which operates in favour of a coherent European arms procurement policy.

Standardisation and interoperability

15. The notorious inefficiency, which stems from the diversity of weapons, ammunition and communications systems produced and operated, has been denounced for years by NATO's supreme commanders and contrasted with the advantages of uniformity in the armament of the Warsaw Pact. Standardisation and interoperability of arms have been under discussion virtually since 1949 and in a growing number of forums. Many standardisation agreements (STANAGs) have been negotiated and, no doubt, as the NATO long-term defence programme goes into action there will be more, particularly as the result of Task Force 7 (electronic warfare) and Task Force 8 (rationalisation). But progress has been slow and piecemeal. There is, of course, no way of removing two of the main causes of diversity, the rights of independent states to determine their defence policies, of which the French is the most extreme example, and the competition and vested interests of rival arms manufacturers in a free-market economy. All must be accomplished by agreement. But there can be no question of the urgency of the matter. The attainment of interoperability is an absolute minimum requirement. Standardisation itself is urgently needed not simply from the point of view of cost, but also to achieve proper logistic support. Non-standardised but interoperable equipment could not, in the event of damage, be repaired and supplied with spare parts in all allied countries using different types of weapons, unless those countries held stocks of spare parts, special tools, and, in many cases, had specially trained personnel. Interoperable but non-standardised equipment would therefore become rapidly unusable as a result of minor damage in situations where equipment was dependent on an allied country's supply and maintenance facilities.

III. *The approach to solutions*

16. There is broad agreement on both sides of the Atlantic that urgent measures are necessary to rectify these deficiencies and the Alliance has acknowledged the principle that there is a "need to maintain a highly developed technological scientific and industrial base in Europe whilst also seeking to achieve the closest possible co-operation in arms production and procurement between the countries of North America and Europe". This Eurogroup statement of June 1974 was officially noted by the NATO Defence Planning Committee.

17. The British Secretary of State for Defence told the House of Commons on 16th December 1974 that "there was general agreement — and in this I include my colleague the United States Defence Secretary — that progress on standardisation of equipment must involve genuine two-way traffic between the European allies and the United States".

18. By May 1975, following the circulation in official quarters of the Callaghan report on United States/European economic co-operation in military and civil technology in late summer and autumn 1974, and following the approval by the United States Senate Armed Services Committee of the Culver/Nunn amendment on harmonisation and interdependence between the United States of America and Western Europe in the field of military equipment, the NATO Defence Planning Committee agreed at its meeting of 22nd-23rd May 1975 "to pursue within the appropriate machinery the establishment of a two-way street between Europe and North America in order to provide a more cost-effective use of resources and increased standardisation of weapons systems" [1]. The then United States Secretary for Defence, Mr. Schlesinger, made it clear in October 1975 that he expected the Europeans "to put their own house in order, and to make such arrangements as would enable them to compete realistically with American industry." [2]

19. Western European equipment experts responsible to the national armaments directors examined the collective resources necessary to meet the organisational and technical challenge to the European arms industries which a genuine two-way street on American terms would present. The result of their recommendations was

1. NATO communiqué.

2. The Alliance and Europe, Part IV — the European programme group — D.C.R. Heyhoe, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1977, page 8.

the decision of Eurogroup Ministers at their meeting in The Hague on 5th November 1975 "to explore further the potential for extending co-operation in European armaments collaboration in an independent forum open to all European members of the Alliance". Having participated in the meeting of United States, British and German Defence Ministers in October 1975 and the French Mirage F-1 aircraft having lost out in the *marché du siècle* to the General Dynamics F-16 for the re-equipment of the Norwegian, Danish, Dutch and Belgian air forces, the French Government felt more willing to participate in a European arms procurement organisation which accorded to French strategic concepts of independence from the United States while offering to French armaments industries the benefits of additional economies of scale allied to access to useful technological information.

20. Accordingly, a meeting of the Eurogroup countries and France was held in Rome on 2nd February 1976. The independent European programme group (IEPG) [1] which was formed at that meeting has proved an invaluable forum and workshop for evolving at both a technical and political level a European armament policy which is independent of Eurogroup and of NATO's integrated military structure but which nevertheless brings together twelve European members of the Alliance (i.e. the Eurogroup members plus France) in a way which should enable them not only to harmonise their own weapon requirements but to adopt a common position in transatlantic dialogue with North Americans in the field of equipment procurement. In Europe, the work of the IEPG has made some progress, while in the United States a declared commitment to the two-way street and to equipment rationalisation has been maintained. In Congress, the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on 24th January 1978 announced the appointment of a special subcommittee on NATO standardisation, interoperability and readiness.

21. Furthermore, the United States Administration has been pursuing similar objectives for a considerable time. Defence Secretary Harold Brown stated at a press conference on 6th May 1977 that "we need to concentrate on rationalising NATO's defence posture. That is, individual national contributions must be fitted together better. In the short run, we need the ability to interchange parts, ammunition, supplies and units of soldiers. In the longer run, we aim for more standardisation of equipment, together with the development of compatible doctrine, tactics and procedures... Such co-operation", Mr. Brown argued, "inevitably means more of a two-way street in defence procurement. The overwhelming predominance of United States arms and equipment in use by NATO forces generally should give way to greater United States military purchases in Europe. Moreover, there should be more licensing of European-designed equipment for production in the United States." [1]

IV. *The international organisations*

A. *The rôle of NATO*

22. While American political determination to develop a transatlantic dialogue on armaments questions persists and while Western Europe has concerted its efforts to improve European co-operation in arms production, the Alliance as a whole has within the ambit of NATO pressed forward its studies on standardisation and interoperability. Interoperability is now accepted as essential throughout the Alliance, not least by the United States. Standardisation, however, is regarded as a desirable objective for the more distant future — the late 1980s or 1990s. Dr. Walter Laberge, the previous NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Support, used to argue that "competition makes western technology great" and it is accepted within NATO that the military benefits of standardisation must not be allowed to be outweighed by any drawbacks inherent in monopoly supply.

23. Improved co-ordination of research and development between the members of NATO is necessary. This will be a difficult task which would be achieved by the creation of a supranational agency to allocate research and development tasks and resources. Information would have to be stored which for primarily commercial considerations is bound always to be a sensitive issue.

24. Secondly, for interoperability, the standardisation of component parts rather than of systems is of prime importance. One of the main difficulties that NATO has faced in this regard is that national operational requirements are not harmonised by NATO. Nevertheless, strenuous efforts are made to achieve the maximum rationalisation of arms procurement.

25. Following the Atlantic summit in London in the summer of 1977, NATO launched a long-term defence programme in which ten areas of particular importance (task forces) for the next ten years were specified such as readiness, reinforcement, etc. [2] The long-term defence pro-

1. Described in Chapter IV B below.

1. "NATO defence co-operation", press conference with Harold Brown, Survival, July/August 1977, page 179, Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

2. The task forces are listed at appendix.

gramme draws up specific objectives and identifies national participation and costings. It consists of long- and medium-term elements. The medium-term one overlaps the normal five-year rolling programme in which force goals for up to five years ahead are established and biennially reviewed.

26. One of the sector studies is known as Task Force 8 and deals with rationalisation, i.e. the search for more efficient use of NATO resources in the field of standardisation and interoperability of military equipment; its recommendations were transmitted to the capitals of the member countries in preparation for a discussion during a ministerial meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in mid-May, followed by the Washington summit meeting. This task force has examined the way NATO plans its equipment reprovisioning; whether there should be more central planning; whether changes in procedures are needed to implement standardisation and interoperability; and whether changes are needed in staffing in NATO to implement standardisation. It has also examined a few other spheres, such as the question of intellectual property rights (the study of problems concerning ownership of patents, payment of royalties for licences, etc., in which joint ventures very often become bogged down) and other schemes to improve standardisation by having more countries collaborating in the production of the same defence equipment.

27. The recommendations of this task force are considered to be "reasonable and modest" at NATO. Certain countries, including the United States in particular, consider that the recommendations should have gone further but, in general, all the countries agree on the fact that they "will oil the wheels of the organisation according to one Atlantic source". The three main recommendations of the task force are[1]:

> *"The efforts to implement the STANAGs should be stepped up*
>
> For many years, through the Military Agency for Standardisation (in which France participates), the NATO countries have concluded standardisation agreements — STANAGs — concerning the standardisation in particular of the components of military equipment. Task Force 8 considers that more pressure should be exercised on the national governments to implement them. The first stage will consist in asking the main NATO commanders (MNC) why certain STANAGs have not been implemented.
>
> *Continuation of the PAPS studies*
>
> NATO would like to establish a long-term armaments planning system. About two years ago, the foundations were laid of a PAPS (periodic armaments planning system) which combines the present and future armament requirements of the allied countries and also examines the requirements of future warfare so as to enable the member countries to collaborate to a greater extent in developing armaments. The PAPS system is only in its initial stage, that of the NATO armaments planning (NAPR). This essentially consists in reviewing national military equipment schedules (replacement dates, etc.) against NATO requirements for standardisation to enforce maximum interoperability.
>
> NATO has chosen six test areas. The two naval spheres concern underwater weapons — torpedoes and sonobuoys (for detecting submarines); the two army fields concern anti-tank weapons and mortars; and the two air force fields laser illuminators and cluster bombs. The results of this first test will not be known until the end of the year. Subsequently, it is hoped that it will be possible to go on to the second stage of the PAPS system, i.e. to group together the national countries with respect to NATO programmes before they embark on their own national plans for the development of military equipment. In its conclusions, Task Force 8 endorses the PAPS studies.
>
> *A new review of national armaments planning*
>
> There is a suggestion to set up a kind of high-level committee (probably at the level of the deputy national armaments directors) to co-ordinate and even exercise pressure on the main NATO armaments groups, for example the army, navy and air forces research groups. It might be said, however, that the CNAD (Conference of National Armaments Directors, which meets twice a year) is already accomplishing this co-ordination task. It is considered, however, at NATO that the CNAD, being formed by experts at a very high level, is often far too removed from the daily work of the individual armaments groups."

28. The long-term defence programme was endorsed at the Washington summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 30th and 31st May 1978, but France, represented by its Foreign Minister, did not subscribe to that part of the communiqué. The work of Task Force 8 was thus referred to :

1. From Atlantic News, No. 1015, 5th April 1978.

"Rationalisation

13. The objective is to achieve economic savings and enhanced military efficiency through increased standardisation and interoperability. Programmes include development of new procedures for systematic long-range armaments planning, new procedures for the improved formulation and utilisation of standardisation agreements, and continuation of the work undertaken by the Conference of National Armaments Directors in the field of intellectual property rights. In the development and acquisition of the equipment recommended in the long-term defence programme, co-operative programmes will be pursued to the greatest extent possible. Nations have also endorsed the need for the transfer of technology between member countries where such transfers contribute to the furtherance of standardisation/interoperability of NATO defence equipment."

29. Although it does not participate in the long-term defence programme, France through its continued membership of the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors remains a participant in the arms co-operation activities of the Alliance. Some members of Task Force 8 attend IEPG meetings, but no formal decision has yet been taken on the method of informing the IEPG of the work of the task forces; certainly the IEPG also is an essential tool of weapon rationalisation.

30. However, there are inherent drawbacks to be overcome in any economic rationalisation of arms procurement. Buying equipment from abroad entails the export of funds and jobs to the supplier nation. Of course, equipment designs can be purchased and licence construction initiated, but then the economies of large-scale production are lost. Task Force 8 is engaged in the resolution of these problems. For example, countries can build sections of the equipment to be procured. There can be an allocation to individual countries of responsibility for the supply of different categories of weapon systems. Common research and development programmes can be instituted although it is unlikely that they would produce major financial savings — perhaps a maximum of 10 %. However, joint production can be very cost-effective, but only for really major programmes such as warships, aircraft and guided weapons.

31. From all this, the two basic reasons for standardisation stand clear — military effectiveness and economic logic. The logistic simplification inherent in weapon standardisation is a very important military consideration. The principal economic considerations are the economics of scale in production and savings in research and development. The work, therefore, of Task Force 8 (defence support) covering the equipment and support of NATO forces has great potential. Both the support and equipment functions offer scope for savings as does the whole area of logistics. However, for the immediate future, the achievement of a good measure of interoperability is vital such as the ability to turn round allied aircraft on the completion of a sortie, and harmonisation in the field of ammunition, communications and fuel.

B. *The independent European programme group*

32. The IEPG which is only some two and a half years old [1] was established under the pressure of increasing weapons sophistication which prevents any European country meeting its own weapon requirements alone, and from the desire to include France in a purely European armaments forum with all other European NATO members. The IEPG is attempting to achieve practical results, particularly to present agreed projects to the participating governments. The IEPG is seeking to create a balance between the armaments capability of the United States and Europe by concerting the European allies' efforts in the field of defence equipment.

33. The greatest difficulty which the IEPG faces is in achieving a common position without damaging the varying national interests of the twelve member countries. The problem of balance between the nations with advanced defence industries and the others is especially intractable and offset considerations are often crucial to the agreement of joint projects.

34. The IEPG meets on two planes. The first is at under-secretary of state level [2] under the chairmanship of the Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and takes place once a year in Rome [3]. The second level is technical. The national armaments directors meet under Italian chairmanship (originally Admiral Mainini, now General Moizo) in Rome. Under it, there are three working panels. The first (the equipment planning panel) identifies areas for potential co-operation and compiles equipment replacement schedules. The second (the specific projects co-ordinating panel) works out the machinery of collaboration. The third (the defence economics and procedures panel) identifies differences in national company laws, export regulations, etc., and proposes means of harmonising them. *Panel I* has collated equipment replacement schedules, transmitted them to NATO and

1. See paragraph 20.

2. Some countries being represented by (political) under-secretaries of state, others by senior officials.

3. At the meeting in Rome on 6th and 7th November the question of the chairmanship of IEPG is expected to be discussed.

received comparable schedules from the United States and Canada ; *Panel II* has reached an advanced stage in some projects and a number of agreed collaborative programmes are likely to be started soon ; *Panel III* has been operating in the very delicate area of economic compensation and procedures.

Transatlantic dialogue

35. Between the three panels and the national armaments directors, there is an ad hoc working group on transatlantic dialogue. The IEPG has identified four topics for discussion with the North Americans :

(*i*) the preparation and offer of a list of equipment which the West Europeans feel that the United States and Canada should consider purchasing for their troops in Europe ;

(*ii*) a list of supplies for American and Canadian forces in Europe ;

(*iii*) the identification of technical and legal obstacles to the entry of European equipment to the North American market ;

(*iv*) the exchange of information — e.g. replacement schedules.

36. Both the IEPG and North Americans have agreed that a working group on obstacles be set up, but the latter wish to establish at the same time two further open-ended working groups. The first would examine possible rationalisation of research and development and production. The second would examine industrial co-operation. However, the IEPG is not yet ready to respond to these two initiatives. Rationalisation is already being studied by the Conference of National Armaments Directors in NATO and there is a danger that these suggestions, if taken up, could lead to a duplication of work being done already in another forum — particularly as France participates in NATO's CNAD. Panel I and Panel II of the IEPG are therefore making a careful study of the American proposals before the IEPG responds. It has been agreed that exchange of basic information between the IEPG and the North Americans is adequately covered by the production of the combined equipment replacement schedules.

37. At its meeting on 2nd and 3rd October 1978 the IEPG at the level of national armaments directors welcomed recent United States proposals for complementary competitive development of families of weapons (designed to avoid duplication of development projects in Europe and the United States), but called for more information at the CNAD meeting on 24th and 25th October. The IEPG also stressed that the bilateral memoranda of understanding now being concluded between the United States and its European allies should not jeopardise efforts in the IEPG to develop specific equipment projects at the European level.

38. At the present time such memoranda of understanding have been concluded between the United States on the one hand, and France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom on the other. Others are being negotiated with Belgium and Denmark as well as Canada. These memoranda on mutual trade in defence equipment are designed to waive the Buy American Act, to enable the Europeans to sell defence equipment in the United States to the same value as that sold by the United States in Europe.

39. The success of the IEPG will depend on its ability to speak with a single voice and on the ability of the United States and Canada to develop a truly balanced trade with the Europeans in armaments. In this regard, the attitude of the United States Administration alone will not be critical — the practical attitude of Congress will be crucial also, as the matter of the selection of a German or American for the new United States army main battle tank has shown.

The European Defence Industries Group (EDIG)

40. This body, established by the major armaments firms to make contact with the IEPG, meets under the chairmanship of Admiral Azzoni of Oto Melara. Its aims are :

(*i*) to make proposals to and react to suggestions from the IEPG on industrial matters ;

(*ii*) to consider the possible association of groups of companies to implement IEPG programmes ;

(*iii*) to offer industrial expertise for use if necessary by the IEPG ;

(*iv*) to co-operate more closely together with a view to making better use of available financial and technical resources.

The EDIG informs the IEPG on its proceedings and keeps in touch with progress in the work of the IEPG panels and group, although no formal relationship between the EDIG and IEPG has yet been agreed.

C. *The rôle of WEU*

41. The Council has instructed the Standing Armaments Committee to carry out a study in three parts. The first part is to define and list European armaments and arms manufacturers. This task upon which the SAC and IEPG have worked together is now complete.

42. The second part is to define the legal status of the various armaments industries to define which companies are private, which public, which transnational and which nationalised. Also the government ordnance factories have had to be listed. This report is complete and has been sent to the respective national authorities.

43. The third part concerns the economic facts about the European armaments industries. To avoid all danger of duplicating the work of Panel III Sub-Committee 4 of the IEPG in this field, its tempo has been carefully phased and method of working appropriately organised.

44. On the question of staffing, there is flexibility in the composition of delegations to the Standing Armaments Committee. For example, economic experts are invited to attend. An economic specialist on the staff of the French DGA was attached to the SAC. Likewise, two Belgian economic experts have been attached. (The IEPG, in contrast, has no permanent secretariat and is dependent on the goodwill and co-operation of member governments).

45. At the present time the SAC and the IEPG are seeking to obtain from national sources the economic and commercial data required for the study, taking into acount considerations of commercial or governmental confidentiality. The means required to obtain the information are different for different countries and industrial sectors. For example Germany, where most of the equipment firms are free enterprise concerns, requires a different approach from the United Kingdom where much of the armament industry is nationalised. The kind of data that the SAC has been seeking for the study concerns technology, co-operation, employment and financial inputs.

46. WEU like the IEPG meets various kinds of difficulty from national quarters. WEU is mostly engaged in paper studies, not in making decisions at the present time on specific armament projects.

D. *Panavia Tornado — A case study in collaborative procurement*

NAMMA

47. The NATO Multiple Combat Aircraft Development and Production Management Agency is responsible for the day-to-day management of the programme for the MRCA, now known as the Tornado, which is being produced for the Luftwaffe, German navy, Italian air force and the Royal Air Force.

48. The top policy-making body responsible for the Tornado programme is the trinational policy group which is constituted twice a year at national armament director level. The policy group gives guidance to the board of directors on essential and principal matters of policy and resolves those issues which can only be decided at a political level.

49. The more routine control of the project is exercised by the board of directors upon which official representatives of the three participating governments sit together with a representative of the Secretary-General of NATO, although he rarely attends. Each country has one vote and decisions are taken unanimously. NAMMA is located at Munich. The staff of NAMMA is 240 with 107 from Britain, 109 from West Germany and 27 from Italy, reflecting broadly the governments' participation in the programme.

50. NAMMA is set up as follows :

(*i*) office of general manager and deputy general manager ;

(*ii*) programme and configuration control ;

(*iii*) military factors division ;

(*iv*) systems engineering ;

(*v*) production and quality assurance ;

(*vi*) budgets and contracts ;

(*vii*) administration and personnel ;

(*viii*) office of the financial controller ;

(*ix*) office of secretary to board of directors.

51. Britain has ordered a total of 384 Tornados of the interdictor/strike variant and air defence variant ; West Germany has ordered 322 aircraft for the Luftwaffe and navy and Italy 99 aircraft, both the latter being the interdictor/strike variant. Two production batches have been authorised. From the second production batch, Panavia will become the prime contractor and all contracts will be authorised through them.

52. Well over half of the aircraft's flight test programme has been completed. The first instructors for the Tornado will be trained at MBB's military division airfield at Manching and possibly all subsequent ones at a joint operational conversion unit, RAF Cottesmore. It is possible that an Anglo-German weapon training unit will be formed at RAF Honington.

53. NAMMA is the trinational procurement agency for spares. The three countries will exchange defect data with NAMMA establishing interim trinational repair procedures.

54. Co-operation has, however, had its price as well as its advantages. There are of course additional administrative and communication costs, although no single nation could have afforded to build the aircraft alone. Furthermore, it has not always been possible to select the optimum equipment and in some instances,

out of consideration of equity in work sharing or for operational reasons, national equipment fits have been demanded.

55. Stores commonality also between the customer services will not be as good as had been envisaged because of the need to maximise the utilisation of respective countries' existing weapon stocks.

56. The experience and expertise of NAMMA should be harnessed for the procurement of a European successor to the Tornado. In this regard, the time-scales for the two clear potential national inputs to such a project — the Royal Air Force's AST-403 and the Luftwaffe's *Neue Kampf Flugzeug* — must be resolved.

57. The Tornado approach to collaboration has proved basically sound. Pure subcontracting as with the F-16 programme is less satisfactory. The Tornado system of procurement ensures that continuous in-service development is possible and that expertise is spread among the partner companies. The procurement system by contrast used for the British Phantom made in-service development difficult.

58. A dilemma remains over work sharing, Should it in the future be based on proportionality of financial input as with the Tornado or should partner nations in a successor project be able to play down social and political considerations by specifying the most cost-effective options on airframe and engine construction and equipment ?

59. Lessons also need to be learned from the experience with Tornado over the aircraft's RB-199 power plant which was developed at the same time as the aircraft. However, engines take usually three years longer to develop than a new airframe and the aircraft's development has been consequently delayed.

View of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm

60. Clearly, one of the great benefits of a multinational combat aircraft programme is that the differing expertise of the participating countries can ensure an optimised joint approach to the project.

61. If a new joint combat aircraft programme were initiated by the partner companies, the design team should be centralised, but final assembly and flight test should be decentralised as with Tornado. Separate flight testing increases the overall cost but speeds up the development programme. The friendly rivalry of the respective flight test establishments is a spur to progress.

62. If a new military aircraft were initiated with the United States, there would be difficulties changing all the standards from metric. However, if a new project were initiated by the Panavia partners, some 20 % of the development time would be cut.

63. The repair of aircraft sections made by one of the other partner nations usually presents no problem except when a return to the jigs is required. Because final assembly takes place in each of the partner countries, general expertise on the aircraft is satisfactorily spread and shared.

64. NAMMA's rôle in ensuring a degree of commonality between the aircraft in service with the different services is very important. The co-location also of NAMMA and Panavia in the same building is extremely useful. However, NAMMA can be slow in reaching decisions and should have more authority, likewise Panavia should be given more authority over the resolution of technical problems.

65. The choice of equipments specified rests with the partner nations. When a system manufacturer is chosen, he may choose two subsystem collaborators in the partner countries. The aircraft would not have been built in the view of the MBB experts if design leadership had rested with one airframe manufacturer.

66. The project is thought to be especially helpful to Italy industrially. Almost every Italian aerospace company is involved in the aircraft in one way or another. The employment-generating effect of the Tornado programme in Italy is considerable. Furthermore, although Italy contributes to only a 15 % share of the work, Italian industry benefits fully from sharing technical knowledge and acts as a full partner in the aircraft's management.

Panavia

67. The long-term significance of the Panavia Tornado programme has been well summarised by Mr. F.W. Page, Chairman of Panavia, at a press conference at the Hanover air show on 26th April 1978, who, when asked whether Panavia would undertake further projects now that the Tornado was in production, said :

> "The answer must be Yes, if and when our customers agree on their future requirements. Panavia represents the first determined and successful attempt by three major European nations to get together to rationalise their defence requirements and to co-produce a major weapon system to meet those requirements. It is a huge step forward in the evolution of European commonality which has important ramifications in many important areas such as finance, tax and company law, as well as in supply, logistics, operations and training. It is therefore inconceivable that this pioneering effort should in future be

thrown away and wasted. Indeed, we hope it will expand so that Panavia will include other nations." [1]

V. *The view from national capitals*

A. *Belgium*

68. The greatest constraint on Belgian weapons procurement lies in the fact that Belgium's defence requirements are well below its industrial capacity and it is therefore difficult for it to develop or produce defence equipment in general, except for telecommunications equipment, small arms and munitions of all calibres which are Belgium's principal exports in this field.

69. There is no specific research and development allocation within the Belgian defence budget — such research as does take place is purely on the scientific level and not directed towards particular projects or weapons. Weapon research at *Fabrique Nationale* is financed privately. Where possible, Belgium is trying to participate in joint research and development as has been done with the new minehunters which are being developed with France, Germany and the Netherlands.

70. Belgium hopes that the IEPG will prove helpful and that both European co-production and transatlantic co-production (two-way street) will be possible. If the Belgian armaments industry produced only for the Belgian market, the production runs would be too short and unit costs too high. Belgium has therefore to be involved in co-operative ventures and the most effective were co-production programmes like the General Dynamics F-16.

71. The creation of a European Armaments Agency would be desirable so long as competition is retained. For a small country like Belgium, offset considerations are of crucial significance in the work allocation for any jointly-agreed weapon programme as are social considerations such as employment.

B. *France*

72. The percentage of the defence budget allocated to personnel and associated functions is 57 % and the percentage allocated to equipment 43 %.

73. Of the expenditure on equipment, 25 % is spent on research and development of which 5 % is research in the pure sense and 20 % is development expenditure. These figures are on the old basis of budgetary computation whereby the cost of service pensions is not included in the defence budget.

74. A summary of the major equipment replacement programmes for the French armed forces for the next ten years is at Appendix III.

Air force

75. To replace the Mirage 3 and Mirage F-1 interceptors, the Mirage 2000 is entering production in 1982. To replace the Jaguar attack/strike aircraft, a new aeroplane would be required. Discussions are being held with the British and West German Ministries of Defence on this project. In addition, a new generation of air-launched guided weapons would be required.

Army

76. The principal requirement is for a new battle tank to replace the AMX-30.

Navy

77. The Foch and Clemenceau aircraft carriers will need to be replaced. This is so far only at the planning stage. No firm decisions have yet been made. New anti-submarine and anti-aircraft frigates will be required throughout the next decade. A second generation of surface-to-surface guided weapons to succeed the Exocet will be required.

Strategic strike force

78. Multiple warheads need to be developed as a matter of urgency for France's submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the first of a new generation of ballistic missile submarines is to be constructed to enter service in 1985.

French view of independent European programme group

79. Progress is difficult with twelve nations participating. There are sometimes divergent views and interests. For example, the more industrialised nations with highly developed armaments industries have different interests and criteria to apply to the questions of arms procurement from those nations which have no armaments industries of their own.

80. A policy of deliberate preference in favour of European equipment is essential if the European armaments industry is not to be overwhelmed by American imports. The United States enjoys the advantage of scale, great research and development funding and protection (the Buy American Act).

81. Before the independent European programme group was initiated all other avenues

1. Panavia press release, Munich, 27th April 1978.

of co-operation had been exhausted. France would like the SAC of WEU to have more work to do also.

C. *Federal Republic of Germany*

82. From experience already derived, particularly from the Panavia Tornado and Sepecat Jaguar consortia, it is clear that Europe has the capability to carry out future military aircraft programmes.

83. The three leading nations in the aerospace field, France, West Germany and the United Kingdom, will all be looking for new combat aircraft around the 1990s. France and the United Kingdom will be seeking a successor to Jaguar, whereas West Germany will be seeking a successor to the Phantom.

84. The aircraft industry in the Federal Republic values outside technical support for a European programme, hence the usefulness of the support from the McDonnell Douglas company which MBB is currently receiving and of the support which BAC in Britain receives from the Grumman company.

85. An industrial approach to arms procurement rationalisation is preferred. However, it has to be borne in mind that in the Federal Republic, the armament industry is in private hands and cannot therefore be ordered to rationalise by the government. The government can only encourage rationalisation by a judicious administration of its powers of project sponsorship and funding.

86. The Federal Republic of Germany is probably better suited than the United Kingdom to giving up some of its authority to a supranational body like an international armament agency. The United Kingdom is in a more ambivalent position having ties with both Europe and with the United States.

87. West Germany's defence expenditure is rising at 3.5 % per annum, but because of inflation the real increase is smaller.

88. The two-way street has already been initiated. First on the question of a gun for the United States army's new main battle tanks, the American Administration has decided in principle to purchase the German gun for all tanks procured beyond number 3,000 on the production line.

89. Over Roland II, Germany has had to persuade the American authorities that full Americanisation of the system is against United States interests in view of the considerable benefits of standardisation with the weapons with which the French and German armed forces are equipped.

90. The lack of a united policy to concert the production in Europe of weapons which could be offered to the United States is especially regrettable. In three particular areas the Europeans could develop weapons of the highest quality — third-generation anti-tank missiles, air-to-air missiles and air-to-ship missiles. The Europeans could develop their systems in parallel with those being developed by the United States with the selection being decided by a competition.

91. The current difficulty has been that the United States has offered to participate from the start in arms programmes in Europe while continuing to develop its own competitor weapon systems.

92. As far as West Germany is concerned, all its new projects will be done co-operatively and the Federal Republic will do its very best to concert its requirements with those of its allies. In the field of small projects however, such as telecommunications and small arms, the emphasis within NATO is on standardisation and they could initially be developed separately with a competitive final selection.

D. *Italy*

93. Italy gives tangible support to the IEPG and encourages its activities which are now concentrated on two basic sectors, transatlantic dialogue and the drafting of specific projects; where the transatlantic dialogue is concerned, it has become apparent that the parties wish to move on as quickly as possible to the concrete stage of achievements. In comparing positions, it became clear that there are still different positions between the two sides of the Atlantic.

94. The tendency of the North American allies to speed up the dialogue and extend the framework to cover wider subjects is limited by the IEPG's need in each case to harmonise its position beforehand within the organisation so as to speak with a single voice, which the North Americans expect, moreover.

95. In any event, Italy believes that in view of the complexity of the dialogue it must take the form of continuing negotiations but on a pragmatic and gradual basis; differences of opinion which are inevitable at the outset when tackling matters which involve the parties' fundamental interests must not lead to discouragement.

96. Progress in the dialogue assumes parallel progress in the constructive work within the IEPG where the greatest effort is needed, i.e. carrying out meaningful projects on a collaborative basis.

97. In this context, it seems essential for the IEPG's work to be given constant and effective political impetus by member countries with a

view to carrying out a few wholly IEPG projects without delay. Italy has taken appropriate steps to ensure that its national representatives in the various working groups concentrate their attention on specific procedure relating to every aspect of co-operation, recently confirmed by the national armaments directors, with a view to finding concrete and effective means of speeding work up.

98. The coming months can be used for continuing the present work of shaping and composition which, in spite of the various levels of agreement to be successively obtained, should allow the major difficulties to be overcome and even more effective forms of co-operation to be found.

VI. *Conclusions*

99. Mr. Leo Tindemans in his report on European union suggested that consideration should be given to the establishment of a European armaments agency. Likewise the Commission of the EEC's action programme for the aeronautical sector (Spinelli report) presented to the Council of the European Communities on 30th October 1975 advocated a similar body for the procurement of military aircraft. Also the European Parliament resolved on 15th December 1975 that "an agency ultimately aimed at the joint manufacture of weapons meeting the requirements of the NATO states" be established.

100. More recently there was the tabling in the European Parliament on 15th December 1976 by Mr. Berkhouwer of a motion for a resolution on co-operation in the armaments sector, in which he referred to the Tindemans proposal for the establishment of a European armaments agency and the importance for the attainment of a common European industrial policy of rationalisation of the European armaments industry, and called on the Commission of the European Communities to submit to the Council an action programme for a European policy on the procurement of armaments.

101. This text was referred to the Political Committee of the European Parliament and Mr. Egon Klepsch appointed as Rapporteur. His report of 8th May 1978 on European armaments procurement co-operation (Document 83/1978) reiterates the call for the Commission of the European Communities to draw up an action programme to define "potential responsibilities concerning the development of a common armaments procurement policy within the overall framework of a common industrial policy". It even considers as "indefensible any further attempts to establish a common industrial policy which does not include this key sector". On 14th June 1978 the European Parliament adopted the resolution in the Klepsch report calling on the European Commission "to submit to the Council in the near future a European action programme for the development and production of conventional armaments within the framework of the common industrial policy".

102. While Mr. Davignon, replying for the Commission, considered that armaments production and trade could be the subject of a Community approach, either in the framework of commercial policy (customs) or of industrial policy, reactions of governments so far have been divided. Mr. de Guiringaud, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 23rd June considered Mr. Davignon's interpretation of the Rome Treaties "open to criticism", while Mr. Simonet, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, said on 20th July that the Belgian Government considered it "desirable" that the institutions of the Community should pay attention to the armaments industry. The Klepsch report was discussed by the IEPG on 3rd October 1978, which found it an "interesting proposal" according to press reports.

103. What is surprising is that the pursuit of common industrial objectives in the context of a joint policy for the procurement and manufacture of arms should have been neglected so long.

104. There is surely a strong case for the European Economic Community to be concerned in this important aspect of the economies of its member states. All the members of the Community, except the Irish Republic, are also members of the North Atlantic Alliance. So are Greece, Turkey and Portugal whose admission to the Community is on the way. They are the same countries though associated for different purposes. The Treaty of Rome makes no reference to defence, nor have the organs of the Community — Council, Commission, Court and Assembly — any military function. This is well understood. It is the Treaty of Brussels and the North Atlantic Treaty which provided concurrently for the collective defence of the same group of European powers, though many of us believe that the failure of the attempt to create a European defence community in 1954 marked a tragic set-back for the idea of Europe. The designation of specific weapons, standardisation agreements, joint production and all the technical aspects of NATO's long-term defence programme must remain the responsibility of the Military Committee of the Alliance, assisted by the Military Agency for Standardisation, the Conference of National Armaments Directors and the international bodies mentioned above, notably the IEPG, which has the practical merit of including France, as well as the other NATO members. But, none of these bodies, whose aim is to achieve particular objectives of the defence programme, is competent to devise a common policy for the procurement and manufacture of arms as a necessary part of the economy and

industrial life of the nations concerned. The EEC is the only European institution in a position to bring about the restructuring of the European arms industry, which is vital to the introduction of a common procurement policy as well as to systematic co-operation and interchange with the armaments industry of the United States, which could make the two-way street a permanent feature of the Atlantic Alliance. Hitherto, the Community has suffered from having no regard to the armaments industry in Europe. In 1976, 22 % of all the research and development funds of its governments were accounted for by that industry, so that, without it, a common industrial policy cannot be established. Secondly, the co-ordination of procurement and manufacture of weapons by the national defence establishments has, so far, resulted in a number of fragmented, individual projects because there was no coherent organisation on the production side.

How the task might be discharged

105. Were the EEC to set up, as is suggested, a body to co-ordinate the procurement and manufacture of the arms of its member states, which would be either a section of the Commission, or an agency responsible to it, what would be its *modus operandi?* It would be through the Ministers of Defence sitting on the Council of the Community that it would receive definitions of the military material needed for a given period, the Ministers of states represented in NATO's Defence Planning Committee basing their requirement on their commitments to the medium- and long-term defence programmes of the organisation, the French and Irish Ministers indicating the common projects, if any, in which their governments wished to participate. It would then be a question of identifying and co-ordinating the expertise available in each of the existing national arms industries and firms contracting for governments. On the industrial side the problems would not be essentially different from those of industrial policy in general, in much of which the European Community is already involved — location of works, employment, worker participation, investment, social welfare and the environment.

106. There would be a number of financial, technical and legal problems involved in a system of co-ordinated production of armaments. For example, guarantees would be needed to protect some countries against losses in their balance of payments, incurred in the short term. For example, this would not necessarily apply to individual projects, but, on the basis of several projects over a number of years, an effort ought to be made to operate the principle of fair return. Procurement, that is the purchase of arms and technical know-how from countries outside the Community, should also come under the responsibility of the Community's agency, in order to protect fair competition, and ensure, as far as possible, equality of advantages (with the exception of the particular United States legislative restrictions on the transfer of nuclear devices).

107. This would be necessary, particularly in the longer term, so as to prevent a few European undertakings from acquiring a virtual monopoly through the restructuring of industry that must take place. Such companies should continue to live at risk. Co-operation on such procurement would also be necessary as part of any intercontinental collaboration between Europe and the United States. Through close collaboration on procurement, it would be possible to make purchases of American arms and equipment conditional on equivalent purchases by the Americans from Europe, so establishing the desired two-way street.

108. Another important area where the Community could make its influence felt is the financing of industrial research and development, undertaken in co-operation between firms in several member states in areas of special interest to the armaments industry as well. Most research and development projects in the aircraft, computer and electronic industries fall into this category.

109. Furthermore, the creation of a common fund to facilitate structural change would be a natural task for the Commission. Consideration might also be given to whether or not the Community should play some part in building up common buffer stocks of strategic raw materials so that, in a crisis, production could be maintained in both defence and civilian industries.

110. Having regard to the existing overlapping and wastage of money on research and development in the production of armaments, the co-ordination of research and development suggests itself as a subject particularly suitable for an arms-production agency of the Community. This is a prickly subject, involving not only the expertise, *amour-propre* and vested interests of many pundits in each country but also patents and national security legislation.

111. Evidently, the research findings of a particular project sponsored by the Community ought to be fully accessible to all those undertakings taking part in it. But there is also the question of whether research findings should be available to the participating countries for onward transmission to other enterprises, in cases where organisations from only some of the countries taking part are involved on the manufacturing side. If this cannot be implemented, steps should be taken to ensure that, over a period of time, projects are allocated in such a way that individual participating countries do

not acquire a monopoly of advanced technology in one or more areas.

112. Other problems which would arise from the intervention of the Community in the restructuring of the European arms industry would include: rules of compensation, particularly for loss of exports; the legal framework for co-operation between undertakings, both in respect of company law and the law of contract, would need revision; and, in the same way, the legal basis for the allocation of research and development contracts and production contracts, including, in particular, common rules for adjudicating tenders, should, if not actually determined within an EEC framework, be worked out in collaboration with the Commission.

113. The real difficulty of any such plan outlined above, is not detail but principle. We are dealing with sovereign, independent states, all of whom to a greater or lesser extent, regard a nationally-owned arms industry as going to the heart of their concept of sovereignty. It is clear that such co-operation as there is at present between the member states of the EEC on the procurement and manufacture of arms is not the result of any coherent, long-term policy, but relates solely to isolated projects, where the partners have usually had to choose between collaboration or abandonment of the project.

114. Has Europe the political will to recommence its journey towards unity? There are three traditional routes: unity through conquest, which has been tried and failed; unity through economic integration, which has run into the sands, and unity through the fear of a common enemy. Soviet rearmament has increased the perception of the threat in Europe. But are we sufficiently afraid to begin the necessary process of dismantling the bastions of our national sovereignty? The idea of a European defence community evaporated, as we know, in the 1950s, when Germany joined its former enemies in the American-European Alliance. Today, we should start to talk once again about the defence of Europe in the context of Europe. A Community-wide arms procurement and manufacture agency, the purpose of which would be to restructure the European arms industry, is, in the long term, the only way in which Europe can retain the ability to make arms, which it needs today, and by so doing, guarantee its own independence.

VII. *Opinion of the minority*

115. The report as a whole was adopted in Committee by 7 votes to 6 with 3 abstentions. A minority of the Committee was opposed to involving the European Community in armaments industry policy, and some members would therefore have deleted paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation. Some members believed such involvement would be divisive of the Alliance, possibly isolating the United States or the allied European countries which are not members of the Community, or might impose too great a burden on the Community or undermine the IEPG; others again doubted the legality of the proposal. Several were anxious to ensure greater parliamentary control — at national and international level — of the armaments industry. The view was also expressed that some proposals of the report could lead, through standardisation, to a new integration which was held to be detrimental.

APPENDIX I

The ten action areas under the NATO long-term defence programme on which task forces have been established [1]

1. Readiness
2. Reinforcement
3. Reserve mobilisation
4. Maritime posture
5. Air defence
6. Communications, command and control
7. Electronic warfare
8. Rationalisation
9. Logistics
10. Theatre nuclear modernisation

1. See paragraphs 25 *et seq.* of the explanatory memorandum.

APPENDIX II


IEPG
Under-Secretaries of State
(Rome)
IEPG
National Armament Directors
(Rome)
Ad Hoc Working Group on Transatlantic Dialogue
(Dep. Nad. level)
(Meets in Brussels)
(FRG)
IEPG/DEPP
Defence Economics and Procedures Panel
(Bel)
IEPG/SPCP
Specific Projects' Co-ordinating Panel
(UK)
IEPG/EPP
Equipment Planning Panel
Replacement Schedules' Up-dating
Ad Hoc
Exploratory
FRG
MBT-105 Improved ammo
UK
Tactical combat aircraft
IT
SR Unguided anti-tank weapons
FR
Mine hunters
FR
Maritime patrol aircraft
NL
Naval exercise mines
UK
Lightweight torpedoes
UK
Military helicopters
FR
Med.-Long R. guided and unguided anti-tank weapons
FRG
Vil-man port surf/air guided weapons
N
Army system
BE
Project procedures
NOR
Compensation
FRG
Competition transfer of techn. know-how
FR
Industrial co-operation Rationalisation
FR
Arms export

APPENDIX III

Future equipment programmes

(a) Belgium

Equipment to be replaced in the future in the three armed forces subject to the approval of the various supervisory bodies :

(*a*) improvement of six Hawk (Helip) batteries ;

(*b*) replacement of ±1,200 infantry armoured vehicles (IAV) ;

(*c*) modernisation of the equipment of a signals battalion ensuring communications for the staff headquarters ;

(*d*) renewal of army transport vehicles in continuation of a programme already under way covering :

— 1,800 quarter-ton 4 × 4 vehicles ;

— 900 8-10-ton lorries ;

— 160 tractors and semi-trailers ;

— 100 wheeled breakdown vehicles ;

(*e*) procurement of 330 Milan systems for the ATK surface programme ;

(*f*) RITA programme : extension to other transmission equipment ;

(*g*) procurement of air-to-air and air-to-surface munitions, mainly for F-16 aircraft.

(b) France

Principal armaments programmes recently launched or likely to be launched by France in the coming years

Naval armaments

— Nuclear submarine (attack)

— Minehunter (with Belgium and the Netherlands)

— ASW and anti-aircraft corvettes

— Carrier-borne Super Etendard fighter aircraft

— New-generation Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft

— Anti-submarine helicopters

— Torpedoes

— Second-generation anti-ship missile

— Self-defence systems for ships

Land armaments

— Main combat vehicle

— Anti-tank helicopter

— Tactical transport helicopter

— Third-generation anti-tank missiles

— Individual light weapon

— Self-propelled and towed 155 mm howitzers

— Very short-range ground-air missile

— Artillery rockets

— Battlefield surveillance systems

— Artillery assistance systems

— RITA communications network

Air armaments

— Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft

— Alpha-Jet trainer aircraft

— Air-air missiles

— Laser-guided air-surface missiles and rockets

— Interception radar

— Helicopter and aircraft engines

— Tactical fighter aircraft

(c) United Kingdom

Production and development [1]

Royal Navy

311. *Ships*

(*a*) *Nuclear-powered fleet submarines.* These vessels are designed for hunter/killer operations against surface ships and submarines. HMS *Sceptre,* the tenth nuclear-powered fleet submarine and the fourth of the Swiftsure class, is planned to enter service shortly and two more of the class are under construction. The order for HMS *Trafalgar,* the first vessel of a new class of nuclear-powered fleet submarines, was placed last year and a second is planned for the coming year. These submarines will have improvements in equipment, endurance and speed which will enable them to be more effective in their primary rôle of hunting and detecting enemy submarines and surface ships in support of NATO operations.

(*b*) *Anti-submarine cruisers.* HMS *Invincible,* the first of the anti-submarine cruisers, was

1. Statement on defence estimates 1978, Cmnd 7099.

launched in May 1977 and construction work on the second, HMS *Illustrious,* continues. A third ship of this class is planned.

(*c*) *Destroyers.* Two Type 42 guided-missile destroyers are now in service and a third, HMS *Newcastle,* will shortly be accepted into service. Three more are due to enter service in the coming year. Four more ships were on order at the beginning of this year and further orders are planned.

(*d*) *Frigates.* Seven Type 21 frigates are now in service and the last of the class is expected to enter service shortly. With the launching of HMS *Battleaxe* in 1977, two Type 22 frigates are now fitting out and two more are under construction. A fifth Type 22 is planned to be ordered this year.

(*e*) *Mine countermeasures vessels.* HMS *Ledbury,* the second vessel of the Hunt class of mine countermeasures vessels, is under construction and further orders are planned for this year.

(*f*) *Patrol vessels.* Five ships of the Island class have now entered service as offshore patrol vessels. Two further ships of this class have been ordered for a variety of tasks including coastal fishery protection.

(*g*) *Fleet replenishment ships.* RFA *Fort Grange* will enter service this year and a further vessel is under construction.

(*h*) *Refits.* The modernisation of HMS *Dido,* the last of the first batch of eight ships in the Leander class frigate refit programme, is expected to be completed later this year. Modernisation of three ships in the second batch is complete, with four more in progress. Work has also begun on the refit of HMS *Andromeda,* the first ship in the third batch, which will include the fitting of the Sea Wolf point-defence missile system, Exocet anti-ship missiles, enhanced sonar equipments and electronic warfare equipment.

312. *Naval aviation*

(*a*) *Sea Harrier.* The first front-line Sea Harrier squadron is planned to form in 1980 for embarkation initially in HMS *Hermes.* The second will embark in HMS *Invincible,* and ultimately all squadrons will be deployed in ships of her class. The aircraft will be armed with Sidewinder AIM9L air-to-air and P3T air-to-surface missiles to provide it with a quick-reaction capability against enemy aircraft and an attack capability against surface vessels.

(*b*) *Naval helicopters.* Sea King Mark 1 helicopters are being modified to the standards of Mark 2 helicopters, currently in production. Sea Kings will also be fitted with an improved radar and communications system and an acoustic processor and sonobuoys to supplement the existing dunking sonar. The other helicopter under production for the Royal Navy is the Lynx Mark 2, which will be operated from most destroyers and frigates.

Naval weapons

313. *Air-defence weapons*

(*a*) *Sea Dart.* This medium-range surface-to-air guided weapon system is now fitted in three ships, and is expected to be accepted into operational service this year. A programme is under way for an improved Sea Dart system and supporting radars to increase its air-defence capabilities to meet the expected threat in the mid to late 1980s.

(*b*)*Sea Wolf.* The intensive series of sea trials on board HMS *Penelope* proved highly successful and production of both missile and ship system has begun. The weapon system is in advance of all others of its type and will provide the Type 22 frigate and other ships with a close-range self-defence capability against missiles and aircraft. A programme of improvements is in hand to maintain the capability of Sea Wolf in the face of expected developments in the threat.

314. *Anti-surface ship weapons*

(*a*) *Sub-Harpoon.* Negotiations were completed with the United States Government last October for the full development of Sub-Harpoon, a submarine-launched, air flight long-range anti-ship missile which will provide the main anti-surface ship armament of our submarine fleet from the early 1980s.

(*b*) *Sea Skua.* This anti-ship missile is expected to enter service in the early 1980s. Carried by the Lynx helicopter, it is intended to provide destroyers and frigates with an attack capability stretching far beyond their horizon.

(*c*) *NATO anti-surface ship missile.* Joint feasibility studies are now in hand with a number of NATO allies for the next generation of anti-ship missiles for service in the late 1980s and 1990s.

315. *Anti-submarine weapons*

(*a*) *Heavyweight torpedoes.* Feasibility studies for a successor to the submarine-launched Tigerfish torpedo have begun.

(*b*) *Lightweight torpedoes.* Development is continuing on Sting Ray, the advanced lightweight torpedo. It is designed to succeed the American Mk 46 torpedo and will be capable of being launched from surface ships, helicopters and RAF Nimrod aircraft.

316. *Other naval equipment*

(*a*) *Propulsion units.* A new marine propulsion unit based on the latest version of the Rolls-

Royce Spey aero-engine has entered full development.

(*b*) *Sonars.* Several types of new sonar equipment are being developed and fitted to provide surface ships, submarines and helicopters with improved anti-submarine detection and classification capabilities.

(*c*) *Electronic warfare and communications equipment.* Advanced new electronic warfare and communications equipment are included in national and collaborative development and production programmes. A NATO collaborative development programme is in hand for a decoy system for use against anti-surface ship missiles.

(*d*) *Navigation equipment.* Production orders have been placed for an improved inertial navigational system which will be fitted in submarines and the new anti-submarine cruiser.

(*e*) *Ship radars.* An advanced air surveillance and target indication radar is being developed and will be in service with the surface fleet by the mid-1980s.

(*f*) *Airborne radars.* The Seaspray airborne search radar is now in full production. This is being fitted in the Lynx helicopter and will provide target information for Sea Skua missiles. Blue Fox, a derivative of Seaspray, is under development and will be fitted in the Sea Harrier for air-to-air and air-to-surface rôles.

(*g*) *Action information systems.* The large majority of the surface fleet will be fitted with computer-based action information systems together with digital data links by the mid-1980s.

Army

317. *Armoured forces*

(*a*) *Chieftain.* Work on the planned improvements to maintain and enhance the effectiveness of Chieftain into the 1980s is going ahead. In addition to latest marks of the tank laser sight, units will also this year begin to receive the muzzle reference system. A number of modifications to improve the reliability of the main engine are being incorporated into the fleet.

(*b*) *Chieftain replacement (MBT 80).* The Anglo-German collaborative studies on a future main battle tank were terminated in March last year. Although there was a large measure of agreement on the details of the requirement, both countries felt that collaborative development and production would not be possible, mainly because the time-scales in which each country required the replacement tank became incompatible during the course of the joint work. National studies on the best way of meeting our requirement for a tank to be in service by the late 1980s are now in progress, and these will make use of the valuable work carried out during the joint concept studies.

(*c*) *Mechanised infantry combat vehicle.* The second phase of project definition for a mechanised infantry combat vehicle, to replace part of the present FV430 series of armoured personnel carriers in the 1980s, began in August last year. Project definition has also begun on a series of variants.

(*d*) *Tracked combat reconnaissance vehicles.* Two more variants in the series are now entering service — Striker, which carries the Swingfire anti-tank guided weapon system, and the command vehicle, Sultan. The last variants in the series, Samaritan, an armoured ambulance, and Samson, a recovery vehicle, are planned to enter the production phase this year.

(*e*) *Combat engineer tractor.* The new combat engineer tractor will enter service this year.

318. *Artillery and associated equipment*

(*a*) *FH 70 and SP 70.* The towed 155 mm field howitzer, FH 70, will begin to enter service early next year. The three collaborating countries, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, are also continuing development work on the self-propelled version, SP 70. Prototypes have been produced and are now undergoing technical evaluation trials.

(*b*) *Supervisor.* Development of Supervisor, a battlefield surveillance and target acquisition system using real-time data transmission, is continuing. Supervisor is based on an unmanned miniature helicopter, the prototype of which will make its first flight in the spring of this year.

(*c*) *Cervantes.* Development of a trailer-mounted radar, to locate rocket launchers and mortars, is continuing.

319. *Army guided weapons.*

(*a*) *Rapier air-defence missile system.* Deployment of the all-weather blindfire tracking radar, DN 181, will begin early this year. Studies are now being carried out on further improvements to Rapier and to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of a tracked version.

(*b*) *Helicopter-borne anti-tank guided weapon.* Following the evaluation of the Franco-German HOT and the American TOW systems, the Ministry of Defence announced in August last year that TOW is to be adopted and will enter service with the army Lynx helicopter in the early 1980s. A substantial part of the equipment will be manufactured under licence in the United Kingdom.

(*c*) *Swingfire long-range anti-tank guided weapon.* Development is continuing of a thermal-imaging night sight for Swingfire. Discussions

have also begun with France and the Federal Republic of Germany on the requirement for a third-generation long-range anti-tank guided weapon.

(*d*) *Milan medium-range anti-tank guided weapon.* It has been possible to accelerate delivery of the initial batch of Milan equipments being bought from the Franco-German consortium, Euromissile. Deliveries of this batch began last year and will be spread over two years. Development of a thermal-imaging night sight for Milan has begun on a collaborative tripartite basis between the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France.

320. *Other army equipment*

(*a*) *Light anti-armour weapon.* Project definition began last year on a man-portable anti-armour weapon to replace the 84 mm Carl Gustav recoilless rifle and 66 mm M72 rocket. Discussions are taking place within the EPG on the possibilities of collaboration.

(*b*) *Small arms.* NATO technical trials to select a standard calibre for future small arms began last year, and military tests will begin later this year. The new British 4.85 mm weapon system, comprising an automatic rifle and light support weapon, has been entered in the trials and the results should be available by the end of next year.

(*c*) *Mines.* The Barmine anti-tank mine is now in service and work began last year to develop additional fuses to extend its operational application and improve its resistance to countermeasures. The complementary off-route mine and the Ranger scatterable anti-personnel mine system will enter service later this year.

(*d*) *Electronic warfare.* In July last year, an electronic-warfare regiment took its place in the order of battle of 1 (BR) Corps. Most of its equipment will be British, although some is being bought from France. Further improvements in our electronic-warfare capability are under consideration.

(*e*) *Lynx helicopter.* Intensive flying trials of the army version of Lynx have been completed, and the helicopter is expected to enter service in the middle of this year, replacing the Scout.

(*f*) *Vehicles.* The introduction of a range of low-mobility vehicles — a basic cargo carrier, with tipper, fuel tanker and recovery variants — is proceeding according to plan. A main contractor has been chosen by competitive tender for the production of an 8-tonne medium-mobility load carrier which, together with its variants, will form the backbone of the Army's future logistic fleet.

(*g*) *Communications.* The Ptarmigan tactical trunk communications system, which will replace the present Bruin system, has now entered the final stages of development. Ptarmigan has been designed to conform with standards agreed in the communications sub-group of the Eurogroup, to enable future trunk systems to be fully interoperable.

(*h*) *Automatic data processing (ADP) system.* Trials will be carried out in BAOR of a new command and control ADP system, Wavell. If these trials are successful it is planned eventually to equip all formation headquarters in 1 (BR) Corps with Wavell to assist them in data-handling.

(*i*) *Logistic landing craft.* Two newly-built logistic landing craft have been launched. HMAV *Ardennes* was commissioned in December last year and HMAV *Arakan* will be commissioned in August this year. These vessels will provide peacetime logistic support to the Hebrides and logistic support for the reinforcement of Europe in war.

Royal Air Force

321. *New aircraft*

(*a*) *Tornado GR1.* First deliveries of production aircraft, of which 150 have so far been ordered, are expected next year. The variable geometry configuration will confer great operational flexibility and permit a combination of high-speed low-level flight, good range and an excellent take-off and landing performance. The tri-national flight test programme had amassed some 1,500 hours by the end of 1977, and test data indicate that service requirements will be met.

(*b*) *Tornado F2.* The Tornado F2 air-defence variant is now in full development with the first of three development aircraft under construction. It will have an excellent loiter capability and its armament will include Sky Flash medium-range and AIM9L short-range air-to-air missiles, and cannon. The first phase of the airborne trials of an important new air-intercept radar for the Tornado F2 has been completed and the second phase, to demonstrate full mission capability, will begin shortly.

(*c*) *Nimrod AEW.* Full development is under way to convert eleven Nimrod aircraft to the AEW rôle. They will enter service progressively in the early 1980s, replacing the Shackleton. Mission system avionics will be developed and integrated into a modified Nimrod airframe. The main features of the system will be a new radar, electronic support measures, "identification friend or foe" interrogators, an integrated data-handling system and associated communications equipment. The aircraft is planned to be interoperable to the maximum extent possible with other NATO airborne early warning systems.

(*d*) *The Harrier/Jaguar successor.* Studies of various designs for an aircraft to replace the Harrier and Jaguar are continuing with the aim of combining a capability for battlefield attack and for air combat in one airframe. The possibility of developing such an aircraft collaboratively is being explored with a number of potential partners in the EPG.

(*e*) *Support helicopters.* It is intended to meet the army's requirement for medium-lift helicopter support by the purchase of 30 Boeing-Vertol CH-147 Chinook helicopters from the United States. The helicopters would be equipped with British equipment, where appropriate, to ensure commonality with equipment already in service with the Royal Air Force. At the same time a number of Wessex helicopters would be withdrawn from the front-line and transferred to other rôles, or placed in reserve.

(*f*) *Sea King search and rescue helicopters.* The first of the Sea King search and rescue helicopters have been delivered to the Royal Air Force. They will enter service during the year and the Whirlwinds they replace will be withdrawn.

322. *Aircraft in service*

(*a*) *Nimrod maritime reconnaissance (MR) aircraft.* The major refit of Nimrod long-range maritime patrol aircraft is now in hand and flight trials of the acoustic processor start this year. The first refitted Nimrod MR2s with the processor, the associated active attack and long-range passive sonobuoys, and the Searchwater radar are due to enter service next year. The refit is to be completed by the mid-1980s.

(*b*) *Harrier.* An order for a further 24 aircraft has been placed and deliveries should start next year. The feasibility of fitting a new improved wing to the aircraft is also under study.

(*c*) *Jaguar.* Work is in hand to increase the take-off thrust and the time between overhauls of the Adour Mk 102 engine. Reconnaissance pods containing British infra-red linescan and camera equipment are now being fitted.

(*d*) *Puma.* The fleet will be progressively updated by modifications to improve performance and extend component life, and by the introduction of fibre-composite main rotor blades and an ice and snow protection system. Delivery of an advanced tactical navigation system is planned to take place this year.

(*e*) *Phantom.* Work has begun on a programme to improve the combat capability of the Phantom to maintain a high level of operational effectiveness until it is replaced by the Tornado F2 in the mid-1980s.

323. *Aircraft weapons*

(*a*) *Air-to-air missiles.* The Sky Flash medium-range air-to-air missile, to be carried by the Phantom and the Tornado F2, is now entering full production. Requirements for future short-range air-to-air missiles for the Phantom and Tornado F2 will be met by the procurement of AIM9L missiles most of which, subject to satisfactory negotiation, will be manufactured by a European consortium of which the United Kingdom will be a member.

(*b*) *Air-to-surface weapons.* Project definition has begun of the British Aerospace P3T anti-ship sea-skimming missile, which will be fitted to the Buccaneer in the early 1980s to replace TV Martel and will later be carried by those Tornado GR1s which operate in the maritime strike/attack rôle. P3T will have a considerably longer range than Martel, will be guided by active radar to provide an all-weather day and night capability and will be able to penetrate the enemy's electronic countermeasures (ECM) defences. During the year American laser-guidance kits to improve the accuracy of RAF 1,000 lb high-explosive bombs and laser-designator pods for use on Buccaneers will be delivered. Agreement in principle has been reached with the United States for the co-operative development of an advanced airfield attack system. Other weapons projects include studies of anti-armour and defence-suppression weapons, planned to enter service in the 1980s.

324. *Ground-based air-defence equipment*

(*a*) *Rapier.* The Rapier systems now in service with the RAF Regiment are being fitted with the blindfire tracking radar, DN 181. A study of further improvements is under way (see paragraph 319(*a*)).

(*b*) *The United Kingdom air-defence ground environment (UKADGE).* The planned programme of improvements to UKADGE, which is receiving NATO funding support, is now well advanced and development work will begin this year. Work is also in hand to re-equip a number of early warning stations.

325. *Other electronics*

(*a*) *"Identification friend or foe" (IFF).* Feasibility studies are in progress in order to define a replacement IFF system with NATO-wide application.

(*b*) *Communications.* High-speed data communications are planned for the transfer of information required by future command and control systems. Project definition has begun on the exchange of digital data between fighters, AEW aircraft, ships and UKADGE, and the feasibility of introducing a general purpose ground communication system, using digital transmission and computer switching techniques, is being investigated. New very high frequency (VHF)

and ultra high frequency (UHF) airborne radio systems are being installed in most RAF aircraft to replace obsolescent equipment and to satisfy revised international compatibility standards; new VHF and UHF ground radios are also being introduced. Techniques to improve beyond-line-of-sight radio systems are being studied and the installation of a new HF radio ground/air network for Strike Command aircraft has begun. The United Kingdom is co-operating closely with its allies to ensure that, where necessary, future communications systems are interoperable.

(*c*) *Electronic warfare.* Passive radar warning equipment is being fitted in a variety of combat aircraft and active ECM equipment is planned to be fitted in the Tornado GR1 and the Jaguar GR1. ECM for the Harrier are also being studied.

326. *Other development programmes*

Work is continuing on improving engine safety, efficiency and reliability and on reducing costs. In order to build up experience on advanced technologies relevant to new aircraft and weapons, demonstrator programmes are being carried out on the use of composite materials for helicopters; on the application of active control technology to enable the pilot to get maximum capability from the aircraft and allow greater freedom to the designer; and on advanced air-to-air missiles.

APPENDIX IV

Joint production — Collaborative projects as a proportion of national defence equipment procurement for countries replying to enquiries by the Rapporteur

(a) Percentage of "procurement" head of defence budget spent on collaborative projects

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Belgium	15.6	30.6	31.1	49.4	60.6
United Kingdom	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	17.1	17.6

n.a. = not available.

(b) Collaborative projects to which foregoing percentages relate

(*i*) *Belgium*

CVRT	BE/UK
Gépard (AA 35 mm)	BE/FRG
RITA (already approved)	BE/FR
Alpha-Jet aircraft	BE/FR/FRG
F-16 aircraft	BE/NL/NO/DK/US
Minehunters	BE/NL/FR

(*ii*) *United Kingdom*

Sea systems

Tyne/Olympus logistic support	BE/NL/UK
Olympus gas turbine support	FR/UK
Seagnat — anti-ship missile decoy system	DK/FRG/NO/UK/US
NATO anti-surface ship missile	FR/FRG/NL/NO/UK

Land systems

CVR(T) family — tracker armoured vehicles	BE/UK
SP 70 — 155 mm self-propelled gun	FRG/IT/UK
FH 70 — 155 mm towed gun	FRG/IT/UK
Midge surveillance system	CAN/FRG/UK
Milan : night sight	FR/FRG/UK

Air systems

Tornado — multi-rôle combat aircraft	FRG/IT/UK
Jaguar — strike/attack aircraft	FR/UK
Puma — twin engine GP helicopter	FR/UK
Gazelle — GP light helicopter	FR/UK
Lynx — anti-submarine and utility helicopter	FR/UK
Martel — stand-off air-to-surface guided weapon	FR/UK
JP 233 — airfield attack weapon	UK/US
Long-range passive sonobuoy and sonic processor	AUS/UK

AUS — Australia
BE — Belgium
CAN — Canada
DK — Denmark
FR — France
FRG — Federal Republic of Germany
IT — Italy
NL — Netherlands
NO — Norway
UK — United Kingdom
US — United States of America

APPENDIX V

Procurement, research and development, and research as a percentage of defence budget for countries replying to enquiries by the Rapporteur

	Procurement	Research and development	Research
Belgium	18 %	n.a.	0.06 %
France	43 %	10.8 %	2.1 %
United Kingdom [1]	44.2-38.1 %	13.1-12.2 %	1.9-1.8 %

1. Range for years 1974-78.

n.a. = not available.

A European armaments policy

AMENDMENT 1 [1]

tabled by Mr. Hermann Schmidt and others

1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Hermann Schmidt, Hardy, van den Bergh, Stoffelen

1. See 12th Sitting, 22nd November 1978 (Amendment negatived).

Document 786
Amendments 2 and 3

22nd November 1978

A European armaments policy

AMENDMENTS 2 and 3[1]

tabled by Mr. Valleix

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, before "the standardisation" insert ", when necessary for the security of Europe,".

3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "be concentrated in" insert "the Standing Armaments Committee and".

Signed : Valleix

1. See 12th Sitting, 22nd November 1978 (Amendment 2 agreed to ; Amendment 3 negatived).

A European armaments policy

AMENDMENT 4[1]

tabled by Mr. Stoffelen

4. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add "with such assistance as the Standing Armaments Committee can provide".

Signed: Stoffelen

1. See 12th Sitting, 22nd November 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

Document 787 **31st October 1978**

The limitation of strategic arms

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments [2]
by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Roper* (Chairman) ; MM. Bonnel, *Roberti* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Ahrens, Baumel,* Bechter (Alternate : *Bozzi*), *van den Bergh,* Boldrini, *Boucheny, Critchley, Dejardin,* Fosson, *Grant,* Handlos, *Hardy,* Konen, de Koster, Lemmrich, *Maggioni,* Ménard, Pawelczyk (Alternate : *Büchner*), Pecchioli, Péronnet, Hermann Schmidt (Alternate : *Vohrer*), Scholten, *Tanghe,* Whitehead (Alternate : *Banks*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the limitation of strategic arms

The Assembly,

Believing that the security of Europe must continue to rely both on a credible nuclear deterrent, i.e. a clearly-demonstrated threat of destruction to the adversary far greater than the stake represented by the territories defended, and on sufficiently numerous conventional forces;

Considering that the United States strategic nuclear forces form the preponderant part of the allied deterrent but that the British and French nuclear forces, through the uncertainties with which they face Soviet planners, make a greater contribution than their size would suggest;

Stressing that the Atlantic declaration made in Ottawa on 19th June 1974 assigns to the British and French strategic nuclear forces a deterrent rôle of their own;

Deploring the inadequacy of progress in détente and concerned by the deterioration of East-West relations;

Welcoming any attempt to curb or stop the quantitative or qualitative strategic arms race;

Convinced of the essential and urgent nature of genuine European concertation on defence matters, for which the WEU Council is the natural framework,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Work together to reach agreement on a common defence policy based on deterrence and taking account of the results of the strategic arms limitation talks;

2. Accept no restrictions, imposed or implied, on the forces of allied countries not directly participating in the talks;

3. Maintain the right of nuclear powers members of the Alliance to provide mutual assistance in respect of nuclear weapons;

4. Look to a co-ordinated effort to re-establish the true balance of nuclear and conventional forces between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact;

5. Monitor the pursuit, deepening and extension of the process of détente;

6. Ensure that the North Atlantic Council effectively examines every aspect of the strategic arms limitation talks and that the WEU member states may through this channel assert their interests in this field.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. Your Rapporteur was asked to examine the on-going strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and their implications for European security.

2. It might naturally be considered that these talks relate solely to the interests and responsibilities of the United States and the Soviet Union, but it must be noted that they are of primary concern to Europe in view of the overwhelming part played by Soviet and American nuclear weapons in the two systems of alliance. Any change in the conditions of the balance of forces between the two great powers in fact immediately leads to an alteration in the environment in which Europe has to ensure its security. It compels the Atlantic Alliance to make a critical review of the strategic concepts on which its defence policy is based.

3. The strategic arms limitation treaties already concluded or to be concluded do not of course in themselves modify the balance of forces between the two great powers, but they give official recognition to the divergent trends in their military capabilities and circumscribe their competition.

4. Consideration must therefore be given to the present state of the strategic potential of each of the two great powers and in particular the question of the proportionally faster growth in Soviet strategic weapons : with the possibility of parts of the American strategic system becoming vulnerable in the near future, is this not a sign of the development of serious threats to the credibility of the strategy of graduated response on which is based the security of member countries of the NATO integrated military structure ?

5. Moreover, can negotiations which seek to control armaments rather than bring about disarmament and which organise the armaments race rather than stop it fundamentally meet Europe's needs ?

6. The strategic arms limitation talks must not be taken for true negotiations on full and controlled disarmament. They are merely an arrangement of competition between the two great powers, which is now largely a matter of qualitative improvement of strategic weapons. It is therefore possible to observe a direct agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which may have negative consequences of two kinds for Europe : on the one hand, the territories of the two great powers are mutually recognised as nuclear sanctuaries although the possibility of a confrontation in other theatres, particularly Europe, is not precluded.

7. On the other hand, the United States may be tempted to give its policy of co-operation with its allies second place to the search for a compromise with its Soviet partner.

8. Finally, a disturbing trend in American policy since the Carter Administration took office must be recognised. Previously, under the Nixon and Ford Administrations, the strategic arms limitation talks were considered as part and parcel of the process of détente. Today, as Richard Burt wrote in the July 1978 issue of *Foreign Affairs :*

> "The new administration views SALT more as an arms control process and less as a political enterprise : the talks, it is said, can be separated somewhat from the wider Soviet-American political relationship and arms control approached on its own technical merits."

9. Agreed, the maintenance of deterrence at a quantitatively lower and economically more bearable level is a most positive goal, but there is no proof that the future SALT II agreements will bring the Alliance much closer to this goal. On the contrary, insofar as these agreements might be merely a technical instrument for the control of armaments and not a step towards détente, their effect in reducing tension might be quite limited. To speak of limiting or banning technical improvements, i.e. a *de facto* qualitative freeze, would be acceptable to France only if it were a freeze at the technological level reached by the two great powers, thus leaving France the possibility of continuing to improve its nuclear forces up to the desirable level. A freeze which kept French forces at their present level would be unacceptable.

10. The report is drafted at a time when negotiations on a second SALT agreement — SALT II — are reported by United States spokesmen to be "perhaps 95 % complete", with a draft of sixty pages. The meetings in New York between the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, on 27th and 28th September and in Washington with President Carter were followed by a further meeting in Moscow on 22nd and 23rd October, and will be followed by others in November. It is anticipated however that outstanding points still to be settled will delay signature and publication of the agreed text until after the Assembly has debated this report in the week beginning 20th November. The report cannot therefore attempt to pass judgment on a document which members of the Committee have not seen ; instead it will report and comment on the positions of the parties to

the extent that these are publicly known and, in conclusion, reiterate the *desiderata* for present and future agreements on the control of strategic weapons which the Assembly has adopted in the past on reports from the Committee.

11. The Committee reported in November 1972 [1] on the first SALT agreements signed by Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev on 26th May of that year, and has reported most recently in 1977 [2] on subsequent negotiations. As a basis for its conclusions the present report first describes the present status of the strategic nuclear forces of the nuclear weapon powers, then recalls the provisions of the first SALT agreements, before finally describing the status of the present negotiations.

II. *The strategic nuclear forces*

(a) Definition of United States and Soviet strategic forces

12. The SALT negotiations at present cover only the strategic nuclear forces of the two superpowers which are based on the territory of one (or on submarines) and are capable of reaching targets on the territory of the other superpower. These cover the three categories of ICBM, SLBM and the strategic bombers.

13. Although it is believed that at one time the Soviet Union would have wished to include forward-based systems in the talks, and conceivably the strategic forces of the allies of the United States, these have so far been excluded and SALT II is not expected to contain any reference to them. Forward-based systems comprise nuclear weapons systems located outside the territory of the two superpowers, but nevertheless capable of attaining targets on the territory of the other power. Forward-based systems are not by definition outside the MBFR area. However, it is true that they are not deployed in the MBFR area in peacetime. These weapons include bombers such as the American F-111 bombers based in the United Kingdom and American carrier-borne aircraft. Soviet IRBMs and MRBMs are not considered to be forward-based systems because they are stationed on Soviet territory but targeted on Western Europe (i.e. the SS-20, with a range of 5,000 km. and a triple warhead, in service since 1977) but they are a growing threat. The definition of theatre weapons now in force in the Alliance is completely different and extends very largely beyond the MBFR reduction area (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). In principle, the MBFR talks were not to cover nuclear weapons. An allied proposal (option III) began to bring them into the discussion, but the principle of taking them into account has not yet been accepted by the West. Some of the NATO aircraft concerned are capable of reaching targets in the western area of the Soviet Union.

(b) Capabilities and strategy of the superpowers

14. Since the first SALT agreement neither of the superpowers has claimed to possess or to be seeking "superiority" in strategic nuclear weapons. "Essential equivalence", or "rough parity" is the current language in official United States documents.

15. The objectives of United States strategic nuclear policy are described in the financial year 1979 annual report of the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Harold Brown, as follows :

> "The possibility of a strategic nuclear attack on the United States itself is very low. But since the consequences of such an attack would be so catastrophic, we must maintain a powerful strategic force to deter it. Because of our unique rôle in the collective security system of the West, we have a special obligation to deter nuclear attacks on our allies... or on our forces overseas. In addition the United States and its allies must be free from any coercion and intimidation that could result from perceptions of an overall imbalance or particular asymmetry of nuclear forces. The strategic forces, in conjunction with the United States and allied theatre nuclear and conventional forces, also have a rôle to play in deterring non-nuclear attacks — particularly large-scale conventional attacks on NATO and our Asian allies.
>
> We want mutual deterrence to be so stable that it cannot be upset in a crisis. We want it to be so well designed that neither side will be tempted to try to upset it over the longer term."

16. The basis of the stable mutual deterrence is the capability of the remaining nuclear forces that would survive any nuclear attack by the adversary, still to be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. A study released by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on 29th August estimated that by the mid-1980s improvements in Soviet strategic forces would have made the two countries "essentially equal" in target destruction capability, although at the present time the United States had a lead. The study estimated that current Soviet capability in a surprise attack could destroy some 55 % of American hard

1. Document 587, East-West relations and defence, Rapporteur Mr. Destremeau.

2. Documents 726 and 744, European security and East-West relations, Rapporteur Mr. de Koster.

TABLE I

Strategic nuclear forces covered by SALT (as at mid-1978)

United States						Soviet Union				
Category	Type	Range [1] km	Number of missiles or aircraft	Number [2] and yield of warheads	Total number of warheads	Type	Range [1] km	Number of missiles or aircraft	Number [2] and yield of warheads	Total number of warheads
ICBMs	Minuteman II Minuteman III Titan II	11,000 12,000 11,000	450 550 54	1 × 2Mt 3×170kt 1×5-10Mt	450 1,650 54	SS-9 SS-11 SS-13 SS-17 SS-18 SS-19	12,000 10,500 8,000 10,500 12,000 10,500	190 780 60 60 110 200	1 × 15-25Mt 1 × 1-2Mt 1 × 1Mt 1 or 4 × 900kt 1×20 or 8×2Mt 1 or 6 × 1Mt	190 780 60 150 200 700
ICBM sub-total			1,054		2,154			1,400		2,080
SLBMs	Polaris A-3 Poseidon	4,600 4,600	160 496	1 × 600kt 10 × 50kt	160 4,960	SS-N4 SS-N5 SS-N6 SS-N8 SS-N × 17 SS-N × 18	560 1,200 2,800 7,600 4,800 + 8,000 +	27 54 528 370 16 ?	 1 × 1-2Mt 1 × 1Mt 3 × 1-2Mt	27 54 528 370 16 ?
SLBM sub-total			656		5,120			1,000		1,000
Heavy bombers	B-52	9,000 — 10,000	400	10 or more	4,056	Tu-95 Bear Mja-4 Bison	6,500 4,800	100 35	2 × Mt 2 × Mt	200 70
Total delivery vehicles and warheads			2,110		11,330			2,535		3,350

1. Maximum combat radius for bombers.
2. Number of independently-targeted warheads (MIRV). Other multiple warheads (MRV) counted as one.

Sources: Adapted from IISS Military Balance 1978-79 and United States Department of Defence Annual Report, financial year 1979.

targets — i.e. the protected ICBMs and command and control facilities. United States nuclear forces that would survive such an attack would still be capable of destroying more than 60 % of Soviet hard targets. Mr. Brown in his annual report estimates that the United States retains in all circumstances, with forces that would survive an all-out Soviet surprise attack, the capability to destroy two hundred Soviet cities — which are estimated to contain 34 % of the population and 62 % of the industrial capacity. This may be said to be the statistical basis of mutual assured deterrence.

17. This situation is essential to the security of the Alliance. Deterrence is in fact the very basis of Europe's defence. The Soviet Union must remain convinced that any operation seriously threatening the independence of European states would quickly expose it to the risk of strategic nuclear retaliation on its towns.

18. However, United States and, in particular, French concepts differ over the speed at which such a threat must be revealed. While the United States considers that a diversified escalation must precede the threat of strategic retaliation, France considers that the purpose of deterrence is to avoid any confrontation whatsoever, even limited, and thus after a number of warnings including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the enemy must be placed before the risk of anti-city nuclear launches immediately after the first defeats threatening the security of national territory. The underlying concern here is to prevent Europe becoming a battlefield where the two great powers test their forces without exposing their own territory.

19. Despite these differences, a point of agreement remains : in the last resort, the Alliance's security depends on the threat to Soviet territory represented by the strategic capacity of the United States and, with specific means at a specific level, those of France and the United Kingdom.

20. From this point of view, however, certain disturbing factors may, in the medium term, affect the American strategic protection which Europe enjoys. The recent improvement and increase in Soviet strategic weapons, the erosion of American superiority in many areas such as the accuracy of missiles or MIRV technology and the possible vulnerability of surface-to-surface intercontinental missiles located in the United States make one wonder whether by the end of the eighties the United States will be able to maintain a nuclear deterrent which effectively covers Europe and not just United States territory.

21. It is moreover this very concern to provide Europe with the greatest possible nuclear protection that has led France to reserve its position towards what are called the MBFR talks in Vienna.

22. There are various ways of comparing the capability of nuclear forces which vary with warhead yield, more importantly with missile accuracy, and other less publicised factors such as missile reliability (not all missiles can be expected to function when required) and the geographical distribution of targets to be attacked. The following comparisons of United States and Soviet forces, according to different criteria, have been published :

TABLE II

Comparison of strategic forces covered by SALT — mid-1977

Category	Number of warheads		Equivalent megatonnage [1]		Throw-weight or payload (tonnes)	
	United States	Soviet Union	United States	Soviet Union	United States	Soviet Union
ICBM	2,154	2,647	1,460	2,950	1,000	3,540
SLBM	5,120	909	830	860	500	590
Bombers	4,056	270	4,400	780	10,360	2,140
Totals	11,330	3,826	6,690	4,590	11,860	6,270

1. Calculated destructive power.

$\frac{2}{3}$ Y — for yields up to 1 MT.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Y — for yields over 1 MT (radius of destruction assumed to extend beyond target area).

23. The United States has an active programme for improving and replacing its various strategic weapons systems. According to the 1979 fiscal year annual report of the Secretary of Defence, the "highest national priority" is being devoted to the development of air-launched cruise missiles of which both an air force version AGM-86 B and a navy version Tomahawk are under development. There will be competitive flight tests in 1979 leading to the selection of one for production in November 1979 and entry into service from March 1980 onwards. A submarine-launched version of Tomahawk is under full development and production of the ground-launched version is scheduled to start in 1979. These capabilities are seen as better options than the new penetrating bomber B-1 which was cancelled by President Carter. The strategic submarine programme provides for the new submarine Trident carrying twenty-four missiles to begin entry into service in 1981 and construction to continue at the rate of three every two years. The new missile Trident I with a range of 7,400 km. is in production and will be back-fitted to twelve Poseidon submarines from October 1979, as well as being fitted to the Trident submarines. An improved missile Trident II is under "concept formulation" to retain an option to improve range, payload and accuracy. Development continues to "provide a technology base" for the new mobile missile MX designed to move either between a large number of silos, or along a trench some tens of kilometres in length. In the field of re-entry vehicle design the technology is being developed for a manoeuvring evader re-entry vehicle (the so-called MARV).

(c) Strategic forces of France and the United Kingdom

24. France and the United Kingdom are not parties to the SALT negotiations, and their strategic forces cannot of course be in any way circumscribed by SALT II. The existence of these forces was however alluded to in the course of the negotiations on SALT I in 1972 when the Soviet Union in a unilateral statement concerning its strategic missile submarines stated that it would consider itself free to increase the number allowed the Soviet Union under SALT I if the number of strategic submarines of the allies of the United States were to be increased beyond the numbers then operational or under construction. Clearly too the relative importance of the strategic nuclear forces of these two allies would increase if the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union were in the course of future SALT negotiations to be reduced significantly below their present levels.

25. For all these reasons it is convenient to describe here the present status of the strategic forces of these two countries.

26. While British, French and Italian scientists had participated in various parts of the United States nuclear weapon programme during World War II, at the conclusion of hostilities the United States took a unilateral decision to terminate any further co-operation on nuclear energy with its allies or any other country. The decision was subsequently enshrined in the United States Atomic Energy Act of 2nd August 1946 (McMahon Act) which prohibited the divulgation of nuclear information for any purposes to any country. The decision led the British and French Governments to initiate their own national nuclear energy programmes ; a certain amount of technical information was already available to them with the return of their scientists who had participated in various aspects of the United States programme. The British military nuclear programme started a few years before that of France, the first experimental explosions being conducted by Britain in 1952 and by France in 1960.

(i) *The strategic nuclear forces of France*

27. French policy has laid particular emphasis upon the independence under national control of its nuclear forces. The Minister of Defence, Mr. Yvon Bourges, addressing the National Assembly on 15th June 1978 made a typical statement :

> "National independence — it is first to the weapons of deterrence that we look to guarantee it. It is on the strategic nuclear force that it is based. Nationally conceived and nationally constructed, it is obviously national in its use. Linked to the appreciation of the vital interests of France and of any threat to them, such use rests solely with the authority of the Head of State."

28. The French doctrine of deterrence is not however stated in the statistically precise terms of assured destruction afforded by the larger force of the United States. In the same speech Mr. Bourges said merely :

> "...the level of damage judged necessary for the credibility of our deterrent has now been reached, through a yield in megatons which has doubled over the last four years and which will continue to increase, and because the numbers of targets within our range is also increasing."

General Méry, the French Chief of Staff, speaking on 3rd April 1978, said :

> "It would be particularly deceptive at this time to try to ascertain the nuclear force level of the superpowers and calculate it precisely as a basis for limiting our own strategic forces, because our forces are not

> determined in relation to the force level of potential adversaries. This is why we believe... that the first stage of nuclear disarmament must be achieved by the superpowers. We cannot take part until they have very substantially reduced the volume of their arsenals and ended the unrestrained qualitative competition in which they are engaged."

France being a medium-sized power, the destructive capability necessary for the effectiveness of its deterrent is well below the potential of the great powers. It is in fact enough for the French strategic nuclear force to be capable of causing material and human damage on enemy territory which is clearly greater than the stake represented by the territory it is defending. This is what is often called the logic of the weak deterring the strong. The French strategic nuclear force seems particularly able to play this deterrent rôle since it has a considerable second-strike capability. While the Mirage IV bombers are the most vulnerable and the missiles on the Plateau d'Albion may in the medium term be exposed to a pre-emptive attack from an adversary, for the time being no existing technical means threaten the invulnerability of nuclear missile-launching submarines.

29. The French strategic nuclear forces at present comprise :

TABLE III

French strategic forces — mid-1978

Category	Type	Range [1] km	Number of missiles or aircraft	Yield of warhead
ICBMs	SSBS S-2	3,000	18	150kt
SLBMs	1 submarine with 16 MSBS M-2	3,000	16	500kt
	3 submarines with MSBS M-20	4,800	48	1Mt
Bombers	Mirage IV	1,600	50	70kt
Total warheads			132	

1. Maximum un-refuelled combat radius for bombers.

30. There is an active programme for upgrading the French strategic forces. The Mirage IV strategic bombers are expected to remain in service until 1985 or beyond and studies are being undertaken for replacement systems which might involve either an air-launched cruise missile of simpler and cheaper design than that envisaged in the United States or a new light air-to-surface ballistic missile which could be launched from an aircraft. The S-3 strategic missiles of the Plateau d'Albion to be installed in 1980 will have the range and warhead of the M-20 ; it may be replaced in the 1990s either by a missile equivalent to the M-4 planned for the strategic submarines which would have multiple re-entry vehicles, but as the vulnerability of these static weapons is recognised they may alternatively be replaced by the lighter missile which might be developed for launching from the air or from mobile ground launchers. As far as the strategic submarines are concerned, the fifth will be operational in 1979, and all five will then carry the M-20 missile. The decision has just been announced to undertake construction of a sixth submarine to a totally new design which should be ready by 1985. This submarine will be designed for quieter operation, with a quieter reactor, and be capable of operating at depths in excess of 600 m. The M-4 missile to enter into service at the same time will have seven re-entry vehicles and a range of 4,500 km., capable of being launched when the submarine is below 40 m. (present models are launched from depths of between 15 and 20 m.) The M-4 will then be fitted to the first five submarines.

31. The desirability of a quieter submarine was alluded to by General Méry in the speech quoted above when he discussed the present invulnerability of the strategic submarines :

> "But it is practically certain that advances will be made in the field of accoustics, especially the passive mode. The Americans are making a big effort in this direction helped by their geographical location and that of their allies which permit them to put vast barriers between islands or continents, a procedure that is however effective only against noisy submarines. But it does mean that we should give immediate attention to making our SNLEs quieter in order to retain complete freedom of action as much in regard to the

United States as to the USSR which is also making strides in this area though it is less favoured from the standpoint of geographical location."

32. France has succeeded in producing a virtually independent nuclear force which owes nothing to assistance from its allies except for the supply of uranium fuel for the original land prototype (PAT) of the submarine propulsion reactor, which permitted development to be completed a year or two earlier than would have been possible with fuel from France's own enrichment plant at Pierrelatte, and the supply of eleven KC 135-F tanker aircraft for refuelling of the Mirage IV force. The cost however has been some diversion of resources from other areas of the defence effort including the French navy. Mr. Bourges in his speech to the National Assembly recognised that :

> "On the other hand during the 1960s the need to devote the greater part of navy credits to the construction of the strategic ocean force obliged us to reduce the rate of construction of surface vessels..."

Thus the French programme for nuclear-propelled attack submarines provides for the construction of five to be started between 1976 and 1982. The United Kingdom in comparison already has nine such submarines operational, a tenth is about to enter service and two more are under construction.

(*ii*) *United Kingdom strategic forces*

33. The post-war British nuclear weapons programme remained a purely national one until shortly after the first experimental thermo-nuclear explosion in 1957. United States atomic energy legislation was being modified, first in 1954 with the replacement of the 1946 McMahon Act by the Atomic Energy Act (1954) which permitted the communication of information to allied countries for training in the use of nuclear weapons — bilateral agreements were subsequently concluded with the NATO countries : Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Then in 1958 the 1954 Act was substantially amended to permit the transfer of information and fissile material for the production of nuclear weapons to an allied country that "has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons", and to permit the transfer of information, plant and fissile material for military nuclear propulsion units ; all such exchanges were to be subject to the conclusion of specific bilateral agreements with recipient countries.

34. On the day following the latter amendment the United Kingdom concluded an agreement with the United States providing for the mutual exchange of information on various nuclear weapons matters including information on the construction of nuclear warheads and propulsion reactors, and providing for the transfer to the United Kingdom of one complete submarine nuclear propulsion plant, and the supply of replacement cores and nuclear fuel to operate it. This agreement was amended the following year (1959) to provide for the exchange of fissile and other nuclear material for the operation of propulsion reactors and for the construction of nuclear warheads. The agreement precludes either party communicating to third parties information or material which it has received from the other.

35. While the agreement as a whole is of indefinite duration, particular provisions have terminal dates which may be extended by subsequent agreement. Thus the exchange of information on the construction of propulsion reactors and warheads could be terminated on one year's notice to take effect on 31st December 1968 and every five years thereafter ; it is currently in force therefore at least until 31st December 1983. The provision of nuclear fuel for propulsion plants originally agreed up to August 1968 has been extended until 31st December 1979, while the exchange of fissile and other nuclear material for construction of nuclear warheads originally in force until 31st December 1969 has been successively extended by five-year periods, the most recent of which will also expire on 31st December 1979.

36. Since the 1958 agreement the United Kingdom has continued to design and construct its own nuclear warheads and propulsion reactors, but has done so on the basis of a mutual exchange of information and nuclear material with the United States. The United Kingdom retains a national capacity for producing military grade fissile material, but has found it more economical to close down the uranium enrichment plant and to obtain uranium 235 from the United States in return for British plutonium 239 which can be produced more cheaply. In 1976 the United Kingdom decided to construct a plant for the production of tritium, an ingredient of thermonuclear warheads, which had hitherto been imported from the United States. The Ministry of Defence claimed that domestic production was more convenient and would save dollars, but the decision clearly ensured the autonomy of British nuclear weapon manufacture.

37. Britain however has not pursued a policy of self-sufficiency in the production of strategic missiles. Development of a liquid-fuelled missile Blue Streak was suspended in 1960 because liquid fuels had become obsolete in military missiles ; instead agreement was reached with the United States for the supply of an air-launched

ballistic missile Skybolt, development of which was however abandoned by the United States in December 1962. The United States then agreed, at the Nassau meeting between President Kennedy and Mr. Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, to supply the Polaris submarine-launched missile instead of Skybolt, on the understanding that the British Polaris force would be assigned to NATO "except where Her Majesty's Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake..."

38. The present British strategic nuclear force comprises four Polaris nuclear-propelled submarines each equipped with sixteen Polaris A-3 missiles with a range of 2,500 nautical miles. The submarine hulls, the nuclear-propulsion reactors, and the thermonuclear warheads (three per missile, but not independently targetable) are of British construction, while the Polaris missile, less warhead, is imported from the United States. The force is operated by British crews under British command. As the force is assigned to NATO the selection of targets is undertaken by SACEUR's liaison team attached to the United States Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in Omaha. It is obviously possible for the force to engage nationally selected targets without delay if ever the "supreme national interests" clause were to be invoked. The original strategic air force of Vulcan bombers, with a 3,000-km. radius, was reassigned to theatre nuclear tasks in support of NATO some years ago, being judged obsolete as a strategic force.

39. Official British statements lay little emphasis on the strategic nuclear forces, and do not expound an underlying doctrine. For some five years, under successive governments, the defence white paper has referred to them in terms very similar to the most recent :

> "The United Kingdom Polaris submarines... between them maintain a continuous patrol and constitute an integral part of NATO's strategic nuclear force."

40. Unlike the French strategic nuclear programme there appears to be no clear programme for the replacement of the present British Polaris force, partly perhaps because this force, based on second-generation missiles, propulsion units and submarines, derived from earlier United States designs, is considered in Britain about one generation ahead of currently-operational French forces, although obviously it lags behind the United States Poseidon missiles and still further behind the Trident submarines and missiles which will shortly enter service. There has been a British warhead improvement programme for some years which will improve the penetration capability of the triple thermonuclear warheads now fitted to the Polaris A-3 missile. Answering parliamentary questions on 21st March 1978 the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Mulley, said that the limited studies into cruise missiles being undertaken were to enable the United Kingdom to participate in NATO discussion on the defence potential and arms control implications of those systems ; the United Kingdom had no plans to develop a cruise missile or a successor to Polaris. British experts are believed to be dubious about the prospects of cruise missiles for replacing submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

41. However both the hulls of the Polaris submarines, and the solid-fuel motors of the Polaris missiles must be assumed to come to the end of their lives in the early 1990s. The submarine hulls were designed for a twenty-year life, and the first was launched in 1967. Even if some might last as long as thirty years, a single hull failure among the four submarines would end the national capability of the British deterrent because it would no longer be possible to ensure that one boat was always on patrol ; as a contribution to the NATO deterrent however even two or three submarines could continue to serve because some United States Polaris submarines are also assigned to SACEUR on a similar basis, thus ensuring that SACEUR's targets would always be covered by more than one boat on patrol. If Britain decides to construct new submarines to replace the present force it will have to plan for entry into service in the early 1990s, which will require a decision to undertake production by 1980.

42. For missiles however, as pointed out above, Britain has no national production capability. The last United States Polaris missiles are to be phased out of service in the United States by 1985 and despite the indefinite duration of the 1963 United Kingdom-United States Polaris sales agreement, Britain must assume that replacement missiles for its own force will cease to be available thereafter — and the life of solid-fuel motors, albeit of many years, is limited. Thus it must be assumed that the British Polaris missiles will cease to be operational in the early 1990s. One option for Britain could be to seek to secure the United States Trident missile on similar terms to those on which Polaris missiles have been supplied — this prospect may seem attractive in Britain if agreement could be reached with the United States, as British estimates suggest that the present strategic force cost only one-third of the independently-produced French force. The alternative would be co-operation with France to purchase the M-4 generation of missiles, if the French Government was prepared to sell them. This supposes that different attitudes to assignment of nuclear forces to NATO did not create political difficulties, and that the British assessment of the M-4 missile found it to be a useful replacement for Polaris A-3. In either case a decision would again have to be taken by about 1980 if the

British force is to remain operational after the early 1990s.

43. Lastly, if Britain is to maintain its present arrangements for exchanging information and fissile material for nuclear warheads with the United States, the corresponding clause of the 1958 bilateral agreement will have to be renewed before its expiry on 31st December 1979.

(d) Chinese strategic forces

44. Chinese nuclear forces must loom large in the eyes of the Soviet Union, on whose territory they are targeted, and be a factor in the Soviet approach to SALT.

45. According to the United States Department of Defence annual report and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, China at present possesses some thirty to forty MRBMs with a range of some 1,000 to 1,200 km and a further thirty to forty IRBMs with a range of 2,400 km., both liquid fuelled. There are eighty TU-16 bombers with a radius of action of 3,000 km. All these systems must be assumed to be fitted with thermonuclear warheads.

III. *The SALT I agreements*

46. Since 1959, the United States and the Soviet Union have managed to reach agreement on a number of measures, some bilateral, others multilateral, for limiting or more accurately bringing a degree of order to the armaments race.

47. Among the multilateral agreements, mention should be made of the 1959 treaty banning all military use of the Antarctic, the 1967 treaty banning nuclear weapons in outer space, the 1963 treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space and under water, the 1968 non-proliferation treaty and the 1971 treaty banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed. All WEU countries are parties to the first of these treaties, all except France to the others ; the United Kingdom was a co-negotiator and depository government for the last four.

48. Taken as a whole, these agreements show a continuing concern and a determined policy pursued by the two great powers and accepted more or less willingly by a large number of other countries for various reasons, the main one probably being that apart from the United Kingdom none of them has nuclear weapons or expects to have them in the future.

49. A major preoccupation is taking shape on both the Soviet and American side : not to become involved in a nuclear war. The non-proliferation treaty and the agreement banning nuclear tests are so far the centre of a legal arsenal whose main effect is to reserve for the two great powers a joint monopoly of major political and strategic decisions. A primary aim of the SALT agreements is to organise this duopoly so as to make it permanent.

50. The strategic arms limitation talks began in 1969, since when the process has been continuous, one stage of which is the 1972-73 group of agreements known as SALT I, signed by Mr. Brezhnev and President Nixon on 26th May 1972. They comprise a treaty of indefinite duration on the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles and a five-year agreement and protocol on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. None of these texts imposed a *reduction* in the levels of weapons then in service. However, the ABM treaty imposed major limits on future production since the two parties undertook to establish only two complexes with a radius of 150 km each deploying 100 ABM missiles and 100 ABM launchers ; the first complex was to protect the respective national capitals and the second ICBM launcher silos. Since then, the two countries have agreed to limit their ABM systems to a single complex ; the Soviet Union deploys sixty-four launchers of this type round Moscow but the United States on the contrary has deactivated all its ABM launchers.

51. An important element of the ABM treaty is its Article IX, according to which :

> "...each party undertakes not to transfer to other states, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this treaty."

These provisions prohibited the transfer by the United States to an ally of ABM weapons (although not the communication of information about their manufacture). However, in a statement on 18th April 1972, the United States indicated that the non-transfer incorporated in the ABM treaty in no way constituted a precedent for a treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

52. The interim agreement on the limitation of offensive arms froze ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) at more or less their then current or planned level. Strategic bombers were not limited. A ceiling of 710 launchers was imposed for the United States for its 44 strategic submarines, compared with 950 launchers for the Soviet Union's 62 submarines. The numerical disparity was only apparent since American launchers were starting to be armed with ten independent multiple warheads per missile with the introduction of Poseidon. In a unilateral statement on 17th May 1972 the Soviet Union asserted that at the time of signature the United States and its allies were believed to have a total of fifty ballistic-missile submarines with 800 launchers and that if, in the period during which the agreement remained in force, the United States' NATO allies increased the number of submarines in operation or under construction at the date of the signature of the agreement,

the Soviet Union would be entitled to increase the number of its submarines accordingly.

53. For verification of the agreements, the two texts made provision for exclusively national means (i.e. mainly satellites) but added that the parties undertook not to interfere with national technical means of verification of the other party nor use deliberate concealment measures which impeded verification by national technical means.

54. To sum up, the first SALT agreements imposed severe limitations on anti-missile defence systems. Conversely, the number of offensive missiles was not limited and improvements in the armaments of both parties were not slowed down. In particular, the introduction of multiple independent re-entry vehicles continued in the forces of both superpowers (with a five-year advance in the case of the United States), although such devices were not operational when the strategic arms limitation talks began.

55. The positive aspects of the first SALT agreements must not be misjudged. The efforts thus made by the United States and the Soviet Union to translate détente into disarmament terms, and even mutual understanding, can only be welcomed. Indeed, détente not based on a degree of political understanding and disarmament could be continually placed in jeopardy by the inevitable crises which the two great powers with world-wide interests have to face. Any event, even outside the areas covered by the two alliances, calls in question certain aspects of the world balance, even mutual confidence, and may provoke dangerous confrontations. Understanding between the two great powers to preserve peace is thus essential.

56. Second, the limitation of strategic arms was logical in any form of détente since the quantitative accumulation of weapons directed by each of the two parties almost exclusively against the other was a considerable financial waste and proof that neither side had confidence in the other's undertakings.

57. Again, the two powers wished to avoid accumulating strategic weapons beyond the needs of effective deterrence. They intended to avoid a build-up of strategic capability whose destructive power would become meaningless insofar as it went beyond the level required to raze not only the enemy's territory but the whole surface of the earth as well.

58. Finally, the development of talks and procedure for the mutual and concerted exchange of information between the great powers could but be beneficial to peace insofar as the risk of war by accident or surprise could thus be eliminated.

59. It must however be noted that the sacrifices made by the United States and the Soviet Union in SALT I were extremely limited.

60. ABM weapons did not guarantee totally-effective protection of the territory of the two great powers but might give one of them the feeling that a technological breakthrough in this field would allow it to seize the opportunity of threatening to use its offensive weapons whilst it had a lead in the deployment of ABMs. Both countries made worth-while savings under this agreement. Deterrence by mutual assured destruction remained intact — a result which Europe can but welcome.

61. The agreement freezing the number of ballistic missiles is more ambiguous. The freeze in no way put an end to the armaments race but guided it in a new direction. From quantitative it became qualitative. After SALT I, both sides scrapped obsolete weapons in order to attempt further progress in the miniaturisation, payload capacity, power, accuracy and MIRVing of the weapons deployed. The destructive capability of the two great powers has not therefore been limited, on the contrary, it has increased considerably since 1972.

IV. *The approach to SALT II*

62. The negotiations leading up to SALT II clearly lasted longer than either country expected when SALT I was signed in 1972. When the interim agreement came to an end in 1977, it had to be prolonged by a declaration, although it had initially been planned that a treaty on strategic offensive arms would be concluded before the agreement expired. The resignation of President Nixon and the subsequent replacement of the Democrat President by a Republican led to delays, partly because the Soviet leaders adapt rather slowly to new negotiators at the conference table.

63. In Moscow in July 1974 President Nixon signed a protocol to the 1972 ABM treaty, reducing from two to one the number of areas which each country might protect by such devices. President Ford subsequently reached agreement with Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok in November of the same year on guidelines for the future SALT II agreement : based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement was to allow each country an overall ceiling on numbers of delivery vehicles of all kinds, some of which might be equipped with multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). It was to be valid from October 1977 until 31st December 1985. At a press conference, President Ford subsequently specified that the global ceiling for delivery vehicles (bombers, ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles) would be 2,400, with a subtotal of 1,320 vehicles which might be equipped with MIRVs.

64. From a technological standpoint, three types of new development have hampered the pursuit of the negotiations :

(*i*) The Americans have developed the cruise missile, a very accurate and not very vulnerable subsonic device. The Soviets consequently asked that it be included in the SALT ceilings.

(*ii*) The Soviets for their part have deployed a new generation of surface-to-surface intercontinental missiles : the more accurate SS-19, and the heavier SS-17 and SS-18. These missiles have moreover been equipped with MIRVs.

65. Such progress is a threat to the credibility of the land element of the American triad because it may make Minuteman missiles in silos vulnerable. In the negotiations, the United States has therefore sought to reduce as far as possible the ceiling on MIRVed missiles and, more generally, to freeze surface-to-surface intercontinental ballistic missile technology.

(*iii*) Finally, the Soviet Union is deploying a new generation of supersonic bombers which NATO calls Backfire. These medium-range aircraft could in certain conditions carry out a nuclear attack on American territory. The United States has therefore tried to have them included in SALT.

66. When President Carter took office, however, United States aims changed considerably ; a reduction was sought in the global ceiling from 2,400 to 1,800 delivery vehicles of all sorts. This new trend seems to have held up the negotiations but the United States now appears to have accepted a compromise figure.

67. The strategic arms limitation talks have moreover been affected by the deterioration in American-Soviet relations following events in Angola and Ethiopia and the dispute over human rights. They have however been increasingly separated from the general context of political clashes between the two great powers.

68. According to the press, the SALT II agreements being prepared consist of three documents : (*i*) an eight-year treaty remaining in force until 1985 or 1986, incorporating essentially the Vladivostok agreement and reductions below these ceilings ; (*ii*) a three-year protocol temporarily limiting certain aspects of cruise missiles, new types of ballistic missiles and mobile ICBMs ; and (*iii*) a declaration of principles which will provide a framework for SALT III.

69. The eight-year treaty will provide for :

(*a*) an initial global ceiling of 2,250 strategic delivery vehicles, i.e. ICBMs, and bombers carrying nuclear bombs or nuclear cruise missiles, which will be reduced to 2,250 during the period of the treaty ;

(*b*) a sub-ceiling of 1,320 for MIRVed ICBMs (with multiple independent warheads), MIRVed SLBMs and aircraft equipped with long-range cruise missiles ;

(*c*) a sub-ceiling of 1,200 which concerns only MIRVed ballistic missiles (i.e. multiple-independent-warhead ICBMs and SLBMs) ;

(*d*) a sub-ceiling of 820 which concerns only MIRVed ICBM launchers.

70. The three-year protocol, the starting date of which is an important unsettled issue in the negotiations, will provide for :

(*a*) a ban on the deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and in-flight testing of ICBMs from such launchers ;

(*b*) a ban on in-flight testing and deployment of cruise missiles with a range of more than 2,500 km (aircraft-launched) and the deployment of cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km for versions launched from sea and land platforms ;

(*c*) limitations on in-flight testing and deployment of new types of ballistic missiles.

71. The declaration of principles for the SALT III agreement will, the United States hopes, provide for :

(*a*) a reduction in the total number of strategic vehicles to 2,000 or even 1,800 systems ;

(*b*) a reduction of the sub-ceiling for MIRVed missiles to 1,100 or even 1,000 ;

(*c*) a limitation of the number of Soviet "heavy" missiles, which would represent a reduction in the number of Soviet heavy ICBMs currently deployed ;

(*d*) limitations on the development, testing and deployment of new ICBMs and SLBMs ;

(*e*) additional limitations on strategic defence systems, including air and civil defence ;

(*f*) additional measures to strengthen verification of the SALT agreements.

72. It is noted that the number of Soviet vehicles now commissioned exceeds certain numbers provided for in the draft treaty, which is not the case for the United States. It would thus appear that one of the outstanding points to be settled between the two countries is the time-table for the dismantling of excess Soviet vehicles. Moreover, the United States wishes to have the Backfire bomber included in the vehicles covered by the ceiling. It still has to be determined what limitations are to be imposed on in-flight tests and

deployment of new types of missiles, but it would seem that the American Trident I SLBM will be commissioned shortly, as will the Soviet SSN-18 SLBM. It is reported that, subject to the limits described in paragraph 70 (*b*) above, the United States will retain full freedom to continue development of its cruise missiles described in paragraph 23 ; and each party will be free to deploy one new land-based and one new sea-based missile during the life of the treaty.

V. *SALT and Europe*

73. Since they seek to regulate the strategic rivalry between the two great powers, the strategic arms limitation talks may have serious consequences for Europe. Our states, whose security is very largely ensured by the American deterrent, cannot fail to be affected by the outcome of talks on the way in which this deterrence is exercised. The consequences of SALT may be twofold : first, the real and perceived balance of the strategic forces of the two great powers may take a new shape and thus indirectly affect Europe's security ; second, and more directly, the problem of the strategic cover of our states is liable to be put in new terms.

(a) SALT and the balance of strategic forces of the two great powers

74. The strategic arms limitation talks themselves have no concrete effect on the balance of forces. The difference between the respective structures of the forces on either side is a result of various decisions taken by military planners in the United States and the Soviet Union. However, a possible SALT II agreement will condone a given state of the ratio of forces and probably include commitments for the future (various bans on tests and deployment). It is therefore essential that Europe's future should not be mortgaged under this agreement. As Paul Warnke, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has written [1] :

> "What a SALT agreement can do is to preserve a situation in which, although we may not be able to claim that will-o'-the-wisp, strategic superiority, we can certainly know that we cannot be at a strategic disadvantage."

75. The following remarks may be made on the maintenance of the balance, SALT and the surrounding military context :

1. "Arms control: a global imperative", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1978.

(i) SALT II is liable to sanction a certain shift in the strategic balance to the advantage of the Soviet Union

76. The SALT II treaties have not yet been concluded or ratified. Some uncertainty prevails in this respect and, *a fortiori*, about SALT III, which makes final judgment impossible. Some assessment may be made however. First, it can be noted that on present reports the SALT II agreements appear definitely more satisfactory than SALT I. Primarily, the ceilings are quite clearly lower than those agreed at Vladivostok and they are being identified by types of arms ; the Soviet Union will have to make effective reductions, however small, in its existing arsenals. Second, for the first time a brake is being applied to technological competition, and in particular to the Soviet deployment of a new generation of intercontinental missiles.

77. However, although SALT II is to establish overall equality in respect of strategic launchers, there is no hiding the fact that *the recent build-up of Soviet forces has been far faster than that of the United States*. SALT II represents a statement of the ratio of forces but behind the situation reflected by these draft agreements is concealed a disturbing trend : since summer 1973, the Soviet Union has been deploying new intercontinental missiles whose accuracy, power and throw-weight have been considerably improved (SS-17, 18 and 19). These missiles are fitted with multiple warheads. The ceilings laid down in SALT II will in no way prevent the Soviet Union from increasing its lead in deliverable megatons and throw-weight. Some observers fear that by 1985 the Soviet Union may have acquired a lead of 7 to 1 in deliverable megatons and 5 to 1 in throw-weight. In particular, it should be noted that the ceiling in SALT II for MIRVed missiles (820) is far higher than the actual number of Soviet missiles so equipped. The Soviet Union can therefore continue to MIRV its intercontinental vehicles. The American lead in total number of nuclear warheads may diminish after 1982.

78. The United States will admittedly retain a substantial lead in nuclear loads carried on bombers and submarine missiles thanks to the deployment of cruise missiles and the introduction of the new Trident I MIRVed missile.

79. But generally speaking it is impossible to escape the conclusion that during the period covered by the draft SALT treaty there will effectively be a change in the strategic nuclear balance to the detriment of the West. Here it should be stressed that since the 1972 SALT agreements the Soviet Union has commissioned four new intercontinental missiles, two new submarine missiles (two others are still at the development stage) and a new bomber. The United States for its part has tested and then

abandoned one bomber, completed the deployment of one submarine missile and started tests on another.

80. This difference of rhythm in the strategic competition between the two great powers, although not affecting their approximate parity, nevertheless has serious consequences for Europe.

81. A number of experts in the United States and Western Europe think that SALT II and above all the progress which this agreement will not prevent the Soviet Union from making are liable to weaken the credibility of American deterrence on behalf of Europe. The fact that the American potential is visibly declining compared with the increasing strength of the Soviet Union does not in itself have serious consequences for the security of American territory proper, but it weighs heavily on the situation of Europe : will the latter be able to continue to place as much reliance as in the past on its American ally in a crisis seriously threatening its interests ?

(ii) SALT II does not guarantee the Atlantic Alliance against the possible vulnerability of the American Minuteman missiles

82. The Soviet-American balance of terror will obviously not be changed by the contents of the SALT II agreement. The Soviet Union and the United States will continue to have a more than adequate second or third strike capability of inflicting intolerable damage on each other. But although deterrence by mutual assured destruction would remain the top level of escalation, the credibility of lower levels of retaliation might in the medium term be compromised if the land element of the American strategic triad (Minuteman missiles in silos) were to become vulnerable. This is even more serious in that Europe's defence in the framework of the NATO integrated military structure actually depends on these intermediary levels of graduated response. The vulnerability of the Minuteman missiles would thus have very serious consequences for European security. The only explanation for the fact that the Soviet Union has developed SS-17, 18 and 19 missiles and replaced its obsolete ICBMs at a rate of 125 to 150 per year is that it wishes to have the ability to destroy a major part of American missiles in their silos in a first strike. If the Soviet Union fits its ICBMs with multiple warheads up to the maximum ceilings under SALT II and continues to improve the accuracy of its means of delivery as it has done in recent years, just before the mid-eighties it will have a reasonable capability for destroying the Minuteman silos.

83. The MX missile which might avert this threat cannot be tested or deployed during the three-year period covered by the SALT II protocol. In addition, it will be politically very difficult to start developing them when the protocol expires since public opinion would consider this a step backwards in the control of armaments.

84. Admittedly it is not certain that the Minuteman will become vulnerable. The very possibility of a Soviet counterforce attack, "a cosmic roll of dice", according to Mr. Harold Brown, United States Secretary of Defence, may seem totally unrealistic. The fact remains that at the beginning of the eighties the United States strategic cover of Western Europe is liable to be affected by an uncertainty factor.

85. Here too the consequences of such a situation for European security are serious.

(b) SALT and the nuclear defence of Europe

86. The foregoing paragraphs attempt to show that a change in the strategic balance to the detriment of the United States and the possible vulnerability of Minuteman missiles may indirectly weaken the nuclear protection of Europe.

87. According to the strategy of graduated response adopted by the integrated military bodies of NATO the American response in the event of a conventional and tactical nuclear defeat in the European theatre would not be massive. It would try to strike selectively a number of enemy military or industrial targets. It may be wondered whether the credibility of the United States selective strategic response will not diminish considerably the day it is clearly demonstrated that the land elements of its strategic forces are vulnerable.

88. In addition, other factors may also affect the nuclear protection of Europe.

(i) The technological transfer problem

89. The SALT agreements will include a so-called "non-circumvention" clause. It would appear that the two parties have agreed not to have recourse, through the intermediary of "other parties", to measures which might weaken the agreements. The United States Government has always stressed that this clause does not specifically exclude the transfer by the United States of arms, components or plans for arms to its allies. One point seems essential : insofar as the future situation of Europe may be one of less nuclear cover, it is of major importance that the British and French strategic weapons under national command retain and increase their own potential. From this point of view, it is essential for the United States to provide uninterrupted supplies of Polaris missiles to the United Kingdom. Further, it is recalled that the provisions of the agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States on exchanges of fissile material for nuclear weapons will have to be renewed in 1979. Finally, every possibility of

beneficial co-operation between Europe and the United States at strategic level must be preserved, *inter alia,* to quote only one example, for the development of a European arsenal of cruise missiles.

(ii) Limiting American capability in Western Europe

90. When SALT I was concluded, the American negotiators managed to resist Soviet pressure to include forward-based systems in Europe in the negotiations. Europe can but welcome this fact. However, as Richard Burt wrote in the July 1978 issue of *Foreign Affairs* :

> "... the Carter Administration... has not succeeded in minimising the potential impact of the new accord on future American contributions to NATO defence. This, of course, is because the Administration has accepted the concept of limiting long-range sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles. While the contribution these systems could make to NATO's theatre nuclear (and conventional) capabilities is still under study, there are strong reasons to believe that cruise missiles deployed in the European theatre would greatly enhance the survival and responsiveness of NATO's existing nuclear posture."

91. It would therefore appear that the United States has traded in a weapons system of direct interest to Europe (cruise missiles) in exchange for Soviet concessions in the field of intercontinental missiles which are a direct threat to American territory.

92. A parallel to this decision is the delayed deployment by the United States of the enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb). In the event of a fairly concentrated tank attack, this weapon provides a means of halting the offensive with minimum destruction in the surroundings. It is therefore particularly suitable for defending the European theatre. But in spring 1978 President Carter decided to interrupt their development without the matter having been negotiated with the Soviet Union, probably to improve the overall atmosphere of the strategic arms limitation talks.

93. Such attitudes can but weaken the nuclear protection of Europe. They should encourage Europeans to take their own defence more actively in hand, particularly where strategic weapons are concerned.

(iii) The problem of the reciprocal sanctuarisation of the territory of the two great powers

94. An analysis of the strategic arms limitation talks gives the impression that the essential aim of present or future agreements lies in the mutual guarantee exchanged by the two great powers not to devastate each other's territory by nuclear attack.

95. Here, it is significant that various agreements on the prevention of nuclear war have been concluded in the framework of SALT.

96. In spite of the positive aspects of such agreements, it may be wondered whether the stabilisation of strategic nuclear weapons alone, preserving the territory of the two great powers from attack to a greater or lesser extent, might not lead to less stability in local situations, particularly in Europe.

97. Europe's only possible answer to this question clearly seems to be the maintenance of its own strategic nuclear force at the level necessary for its security.

(c) The need to define a European approach to SALT

98. The foregoing considerations must not be taken as a disavowal of SALT. On the one hand, it is for the United States Senate and it alone to decide on the future agreements. Moreover Europe can but welcome a reduction in the level of strategic weapons, provided however this does not result in its own defences being weakened.

99. For the effects of SALT to be wholly positive, Europe itself must find an answer to the questions which will inevitably be raised by the new agreements.

100. An answer has to be found in two fields. First, in Atlantic co-operation Europe must make the United States pay greater heed to Europe's own interests and concerns than heretofore. Second, at European level Europe must draw all the conclusions from the possession by two of its states of nuclear forces under national command.

(i) Improving the Atlantic dialogue

101. The essential question facing Europe with regard to SALT is how far the United States is prepared to take account, in its direct negotiations with the Soviet Union, of the requirements of a defence policy planned and adopted by all the allied countries, or whether it considers that strategy and, in the end, the defence policy of the Alliance, must come after its agreement with the Soviet Union. This problem is all the more acute in that sooner or later SALT, in a third or subsequent stage, will come up against European nuclear weapons. There will then be very strong pressure for them to be integrated into the system of arms control, whereas they are an irreplaceable element in the protection of Europe's territory and strengthen the overall deterrence of the Alliance, as was underlined in the Atlantic declaration in Ottawa on 19th June 1974.

102. Moreover, Soviet weapons such as the SS-20 in the SALT grey area are a direct threat to Europe. The Atlantic Alliance must find an answer to this threat, without this involving agreement between the two great powers without European participation, to transform Europe into an area with a special nuclear status.

103. Here Europe must realise that any negotiations implying a search for a nuclear balance specific to the European theatre can but be negative and contrary to its interests.

104. Indeed, the concept of a European nuclear balance has no meaning : it depends on the assignment of targets, in particular for missile-launching submarines.

105. Moreover, such a concept would weaken the NATO deterrent in that it would imply recognition of American disengagement : to confer a special nuclear status on Europe would in effect mean making a radical distinction between European and American territory and depriving the American commitment to defend Europe with strategic weapons of much of its credibility.

106. Europe must therefore make itself heard in the North Atlantic Council, particularly to obtain a better definition of the conditions of its security in the context of strategic arms limitation. Moreover, a more active and more united European presence should also help to stress the true deterrent rôle of British and French nuclear weapons.

(ii) Designing a European security policy

107. SALT raises new problems for Europe which it must solve on its own. It has the wherewithal, i.e. the strategic nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom. It is therefore possible and desirable, particularly in WEU, that agreement be reached and consultations held on the use of such weapons, and especially on the strategy of deterrence which they make possible.

108. Already these weapons not only cover the national territory which they defend, they also contribute to the security of Europe as a whole, particularly by introducing an additional factor of uncertainty into the calculations of a would-be aggressor. The conclusions of this *de facto* situation must be drawn in terms of European political co-operation.

109. From this standpoint Franco-British nuclear co-operation would seem most timely both for the development of new systems and for the use of existing ones : two submarine fleets used jointly are obviously more effective than when they patrol separately.

110. But there are major obstacles to such co-operation. They are juridical insofar as the British are linked with the United States under the 1958 bilateral agreement [1] and the Nassau agreements. They are also political insofar as the British nuclear force is integrated in NATO's military structure and in particular in its targeting arrangements.

111. However, there is a possibility. If it were to materialise — and your Rapporteur personally is in favour — it would have to be in the next few years before the renewal of the British submarines and Polaris missiles.

VI. *Conclusion*

112. The strategic arms limitation talks thus concern Europe too. Your Rapporteur wishes our governments to realise this and not allow our states to find themselves, as the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* said on 8th October, in the grey area of the talks where its interests would be misunderstood and jeopardised. For the limitation of strategic arms to be truly beneficial and to foster peace and security, full account must be taken of the interests of each of our respective nations.

113. *This is the aim WEU must pursue first and foremost.*

1. See paragraphs 34 et seq.

Disarmament

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments [2]
by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Roper* (Chairman) ; MM. Bonnel, *Roberti* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Ahrens, Baumel,* Bechter (Alternate : *Bozzi*), *van den Bergh,* Boldrini, *Boucheny, Critchley, Dejardin,* Fosson, *Grant,* Handlos, *Hardy,* Konen, de Koster, Lemmrich, *Maggioni,* Ménard, Pawelczyk (Alternate : *Büchner*), Pecchioli, Péronnet, Hermann Schmidt (Alternate : *Vohrer*), Scholten, *Tanghe,* Whitehead (Alternate : *Banks*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on disarmament

The Assembly,

(*i*) Aware that world expenditure on armaments has now reached $400 billion per annum and that some of the poorest countries are devoting more than half of their public expenditure to defence ;

(*ii*) Noting that, apart from the biological warfare convention of 1972, no arms control agreement since the war has yet achieved any measure of disarmament ;

(*iii*) Believing that new impetus must be given to negotiating certain urgent and concrete measures of arms control and disarmament but that the ultimate objective must remain general and complete disarmament under effective international control ;

(*iv*) Welcoming the conclusions of the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly to the extent that it has focused world opinion on the urgency and importance of arms control measures, and transformed the Committee on Disarmament into a more effective negotiating forum ;

(*v*) Recalling its proposals of 1972 and 1974 for a United Nations satellite observation capability ;

(*vi*) Recalling further the expertise acquired by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and urging that it be placed at the disposal of any international disarmament organisation ;

(*vii*) Recalling the annual publications of the League of Nations : "Armaments Year Book" and "Statistical Year Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition" ;

(*viii*) Recalling the work under the diplomatic conference of 1975-77 of the ad hoc committee on inhumane weapons and the associated conferences of government experts;

(*ix*) Accepting the responsibility shared by WEU members with other major arms suppliers to seek agreements to reduce the world trade in armaments,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view :

1. To secure universal agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and arms control measures to be concluded in the next five years, including :

(*a*) a comprehensive test ban ;

(*b*) a chemical weapons treaty ;

(*c*) a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation régime with rigorous safeguards at all stages of civil nuclear fuel cycles, linked with appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear countries ;

(*d*) a substantial reduction to restore the balance of forces and armaments in Europe ;

(*e*) agreements involving both supplier and recipient countries to restrict the international transfer of conventional arms which recognise the special responsibility of the major arms-producing countries to exercise restraint in their arms transfer policy ;

(*f*) the extension to other areas of confidence-building measures of the type included in the CSCE final act ;

(*g*) agreements to restrict the development of new generations of inhumane conventional weapons and incendiaries ;

and, concurrently if possible with the first agreement providing for independent verification :

(*h*) the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations aegis equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with arms control agreements and peacekeeping arrangements, and responsible *inter alia* for publishing, on the basis of its own sources of information as well as mandatory reports by all countries, annual reports on the forces and armaments of all countries and arms transfers between countries ;

2. To secure the participation of all nuclear weapon powers and previous members in the transformed Committee on Disarmament and the negotiation in that body of agreements on the foregoing items 1 (*a*), (*b*), (*e*), (*f*) and (*g*);

3. To maintain the expectations of progress on concrete measures of disarmament engendered by the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, by the convening of a further special disarmament session in 1981 to review progress.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur)

Introduction

The Committee adopted the original version of this revised report on disarmament on 20th June, while the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly was in progress. The report was debated in the WEU Assembly on 22nd June, during the first part of the twenty-fourth session, when a number of amendments to the draft recommendation were discussed, two of which, supported by the Rapporteur, were adopted. But in the absence of a quorum the Assembly was unable to vote on the draft recommendation as amended, the text of which is reproduced at appendix.

The special session of the United Nations General Assembly ended on 1st July and adopted by consensus a final document which included, most notably, an agreement for transforming the Committee on Disarmament into a more effective negotiating body. The original report was therefore referred back to the Committee for revision to permit reference to be made to the conclusion of the special session. Paragraph (*iv*) has accordingly been added to the preamble of the revised draft recommendation and paragraph 2 of the operative text reworded, but the text now submitted to the Assembly remains otherwise the text as amended by it on 22nd June.

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1. World military expenditure in 1978 has been estimated at $400 billion, of which 70 % is accounted for by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and 18 % by the countries of the third world including China [1]. The greatest increase in expenditure over the last decade has come from the third world countries — excluding China their share of total world expenditure rose from 6 % to 14 %, whereas the expenditure of the two military blocs is estimated to have been roughly constant in real terms but to have decreased from 80 % to 70 % as a proportion of world expenditure. In 1976 total world military expenditure was estimated at $325 billion — as much as the world spent on health and more than was spent on education. In absolute terms at constant prices world military expenditure has increased by 13 % over the last ten years and by 77 % over the last twenty years.

2. Thus the early hopes of the United Nations — Article XI of the Charter of which empowers the General Assembly to consider "the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments" and to make "recommendations with regard to such principles" have not been fulfilled. Since the first meeting of the General Assembly in 1945 the level of armaments throughout the world has steadily increased and there has been no agreement on *dis*armament in the sense that none of the agreements so far concluded since the second world war (with the exception of the 1972 biological warfare convention) provides for existing levels of armaments to be reduced or for weapons to be destroyed. It is true however that in the last twenty years a number of arms control measures have been agreed which have had the effect of codifying an existing situation, and some of which may have imposed restraints on some of the signatories in the sense that they may have been inhibited from developing or deploying certain weapons systems that they might otherwise have done — four agreements are probably significant in this respect: the antartic treaty ; the partial test ban treaty ; the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ; and the seabed treaty.

3. The history of disarmament and arms control negotiations since the second world war can be considered in two phases — the first largely fruitless up to about 1958 when negotiations were conducted in subsidiary bodies of the United Nations Security Council — the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments, later merged into the Disarmament Commission, which had a sub-committee composed of the permanent members of the Security Council and Canada. By 1958 the membership of the United Nations had increased from the original fifty-one to over eighty, and the voting power of the non-aligned countries in the General Assembly was becoming predominant. The Disarmament Commission in that year was enlarged to include the whole membership of the United Nations and, true to Parkinson's law on committees, ceased to be an effective negotiating forum — since then it has met only twice in 1960 and in 1965.

4. In the course of 1958 a number of exchanges of letters between President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev led to a certain rapprochement between the views of the United States and the Soviet Union on approaches to disarmament which resulted in the setting up of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee (five NATO and five Warsaw Pact countries). This met for three months in 1960 and, with a year's interruption caused by the U-2 incident in 1960, led on 20th September 1961 to a joint statement by the Soviet Union and the United States on "agreed principles as a basis for multilateral negotiations on disarmament". While these stated that the

1. World armaments and disarmament yearbook 1978 — Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

goal of negotiations was a programme to ensure general and complete disarmament accompanied by procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes they contained a reference to efforts to ensure early agreement on measures of disarmament — i.e. limited measures of disarmament or "collateral measures". In December that year the General Assembly endorsed the agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States to establish new negotiating machinery known as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) which met for the first time in Geneva in 1962.

5. As originally constituted, the ENDC comprised five NATO countries: Canada, France, Italy, United Kingdom, United States; five Warsaw Pact countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union; and eight non-aligned countries; Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and Sweden (France however did not take up its place in the conference). The membership has been progressively enlarged over the years, still maintaining roughly the same balance between aligned and non-aligned countries, and its title was changed in 1969 to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Its present membership is as follows: western-aligned countries: Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States; Warsaw Pact and Soviet-aligned countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union; non-aligned countries: Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Zaïre.

6. The CCD which meets normally in two longish sessions each year in Geneva is not strictly speaking part of the United Nations machinery, but is in fact serviced by its secretariat, and a special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General participates in its sessions. The conference operates under the co-chairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union who reserve the right to determine the agenda and dates of sessions of the conference although in practice these are invariably settled through private negotiations with the other participants. The daily chairmanship of working sittings rotates among the membership. The CCD, like its predecessor the ENDC, reports on progress made each year to the General Assembly of the United Nations; they have been the forum where initial multilateral agreement has been reached on the partial test ban treaty, the non-proliferation treaty, the treaty banning weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, the convention banning biological weapons, and the convention on the prohibition of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.

7. Over the last eight years there have of course been important developments in strictly bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on arms control issues, in particular in the SALT talks, but also five others: limitation of armaments in the Indian Ocean (Berne, from March 1977, latest meeting 17th February 1978); agreement on radiological weapons — i.e. employing radiation from radioactive material in the absence of a nuclear explosion — (last meeting 4th May 1978); limiting international transfers of conventional armaments (Helsinki, from December 1977, latest meeting 4th-8th May 1978); a ban on anti-satellite satellites (Helsinki, 8th June 1978), and an agreement on chemical weapons. There are also the trilateral Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States talks on a comprehensive test ban in Geneva, and the negotiations between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the MBFR talks in Vienna. Except as they affect the issues discussed at the United Nations special session, these "bloc to bloc" negotiations are not discussed in this report, nor are the broader confidence-building measures agreed in the CSCE framework which include also the European neutrals.

8. There has always been a contradiction between the need for a restricted number of countries to participate in any forum where actual negotiations on disarmament can be conducted, and the desire of all members of the United Nations to discuss the subject — and the membership of the United Nations is now 149. There is also the often-expressed frustration of many non-aligned countries at the failure to reach any agreement at all on actual measures of disarmament as opposed to measures of arms control; moreover, since the non-proliferation treaty was concluded in 1968, in their view the agreements reached in the CCD framework have had little more than cosmetic value, meaningful negotiations on arms control have shifted to the restricted frameworks listed in the previous paragraph.

9. At the 1976 ministerial session of the non-aligned countries' groupings, held in Colombo, proposals were made by Yugoslavia for a special session of the United Nations General Assembly to be devoted specially to disarmament and the proposal was agreed to unanimously at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly in December 1976. Drawing on the experience of the 1974 and 1975 special sessions devoted to the "new international economic order" the special session is invited to agree on a declaration of principles and on a programme of action. A fifty-four-member preparatory committee has been discussing the agenda and other proposals for the special session since March 1977. While it is recognised that the special session will not be a negotiating forum for reaching an agreement on specific measures of disarmament, it is hoped by many of its principal

sponsors that it will be able to re-orientate the general approach to disarmament as conducted in other fora.

10. The special session opened in New York on 23rd May and is to continue until 28th June. From 6th to 9th June your Rapporteur was able to discuss with the heads of various delegations in New York their initial impressions of the special session. The present report deals with the main proposals that have so far been presented to the special session or preparatory committee.

United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament

General arrangements

11. It was agreed in the preparatory committee that after a general debate and a review of the present disarmament situation work will concentrate on three main areas — the adoption of a declaration on disarmament, the adoption of a programme of action on disarmament and a review of international disarmament negotiating machinery including the rôle of the United Nations itself. This report will summarise proposals already tabled in the preparatory committee, or so far presented to the special session, first by various WEU countries, and then by certain other significant countries or groups.

Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the United Kingdom

12. These five WEU countries, together with six other aligned countries — Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway and Turkey — tabled a draft declaration on disarmament on 13th December 1977, and with the exception of Turkey, a draft programme of action on 1st February 1978.

13. The *draft declaration* stated in its general objectives that the ultimate goal of disarmament is to ensure the survival of mankind through strengthening peace, security and stability. An integrated disarmament programme should ensure that disarmament is general and complete under effective international control and accompanied by procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security. Such disarmament would permit states to possess only those non-nuclear forces and armaments that are necessary to maintain internal order and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force. A further goal would be the release of resources a significant proportion of which should go to satisfying the economic and social needs of developing countries.

14. Principles governing disarmament negotiations should ensure the active participation and support of all states, particularly nuclear weapon states and militarily significant states, and for agreements to be effective it must be apparent to states that they serve their best interests, and agreements should be reached wherever possible on a basis of consensus. Disarmament measures must be balanced to provide undiminished security at lower levels of armaments and forces and progress will depend upon agreement on effective methods of verification. Negotiations on limited measures of disarmament should not preclude negotiations on a treaty of general and complete disarmament.

15. The draft declaration proposes by way of priorities that specific multilateral disarmament measures should contribute to progress towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. While the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons is the most important challenge, partial agreements, in particular universal adherence to the non-proliferation treaty, would be a vital contribution accompanied by measures to prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation[1] and the establishment where appropriate of nuclear-weapon-free zones. While recognising the right of all states to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes there must be international nuclear safeguards in particular those of the International Atomic Energy Agency which as a minimum must apply to international transfers of nuclear material, equipment and technology. The elimination of chemical weapons and any new weapons of mass destruction are of great importance. Lastly the declaration points out that most of the world's military expenditure is devoted to conventional military power. All states should make efforts in parallel to those in the field of nuclear disarmament to halt the diversion of resources to conventional weapons, the international transfer of conventional arms should be brought under control and the reduction of military budgets in all countries could provide undiminished security at a lower level of armaments.

16. The *draft programme of action* tabled by the same ten countries first reaffirms that the ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament and then sets out priorities in negotiations for the next few years with proposals for concurrent studies to prepare future negotiations towards general and complete disarmament. The immediate measures proposed are the halting and reversal of the nuclear arms race especially through a second SALT between the United States and the Soviet Union to be followed by further negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons ;

1. By "horizontal proliferation" is meant, in the disarmament negotiations, the spread of weapons systems to more countries ; by "vertical proliferation" is meant the acquisition of more and improved weapons by a country already possessing a weapons system.

it calls for the earliest conclusion of the comprehensive test ban treaty banning all nuclear explosions to be adhered to by all states ; it calls for further measures to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime based essentially on the non-proliferation treaty and IAEA safeguards ; it calls for the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones in suitable regions through agreement between all states in the region and the effective co-operation from nuclear weapon states.

17. Secondly the programme calls for appropriate assurances by nuclear weapon states to increase the confidence of non-nuclear weapon states in their own security from nuclear attack. In this connection your Rapporteur notes that the so-called "negative security assurances", whereby non-nuclear weapon countries are to be assured that nuclear weapons will not be used against them will of course require special conditions which exclude the present arrangements for ensuring the security of the allies and associates of nuclear weapon states. It is understood that this particular proposal may secure support from both the Soviet Union and the United States.

18. The third proposal dealing with other weapons of mass destruction calls for conventions to ban chemical weapons and radiological weapons and agreements to ban any new weapons of mass destruction that may be devised.

19. Fourthly in the field of conventional weapons there are proposals for bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements to restrict the production, transfer and acquisition of conventional weapons ; conventions to prohibit or limit the use of certain indiscriminate conventional weapons ; and lastly agreements on a regional basis to strengthen peace and security and urgent efforts to contribute to a more stable military relationship in Europe. The concept of regional disarmament is particularly favoured by Belgium.

20. The programme next proposes various measures to strengthen international security and confidence to be undertaken in addition to the specific disarmament measures. These include proposals for all countries to publish detailed information about their armed forces, the total value of their arms production and of their transfers of arms to other countries ; to supply full information on military budgets in accordance with the standardised scheme to be prepared by the Secretary-General on the basis of a present pilot study. This would be a step towards verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure. In this connection your Rapporteur understands that the United Kingdom has volunteered to participate. It is understood that in such a pilot study of national military budgets by the United Nations Secretary-General a representative sample of other countries would have to include both underdeveloped countries and "planned economy" — i.e. communist — countries. Lastly the section proposes that confidence-building measures of the type included in the Helsinki final act should be extended to other regions possibly with broader parameters — it proposes twenty-one days' advance notice of major military movements or manoeuvres ; invitations to observers from other countries to attend manoeuvres and improved communications between governments particularly in areas of tension by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods to reduce the risk of conflict due to miscalculation.

21. Among the studies proposed to facilitate future negotiations on further disarmament measures the proposals place emphasis on the need for the United Nations peace-keeping rôle and arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes to be regarded as complementary to disarmament. There should be studies of ways to limit the build-up of conventional weapons regionally taking into account the international transfer of conventional weapons and the possibility of a reciprocal limitation of the levels and types of conventional weapons ; and the establishment of a United Nations register of weapons transfers [1]. Your Rapporteur points out that as a general rule recipient countries have been opposed to proposals for publicising or controlling in any way the international transfer of conventional weapons, but that India which has been among the opponents may now be taking a more favourable view of such proposals. Other studies would include the relationship between disarmament and development on the basis of the report of the present *ad hoc* group of governmental experts — a subject in which the Nordic countries are interested, to include the conversion of armaments industry to other purposes — and studies of all regional aspects of disarmament designed to increase confidence and stability — an aspect in which Belgium is particularly interested. Lastly studies are proposed of various technical measures to contribute to confidence building such as demilitarised or limited force zones and early-warning systems. Such systems have been tried out effectively in the Sinai since the 1973 hostilities ; the United Kingdom proposes that the technical expertise should be acquired by a United Nations body and extended to other areas of the world.

Belgium

22. Speaking at the special session on 2nd June, Mr. Simonet, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, laid stress on regional aspects of disarmament. He said that parallel attention

1. It is recalled that such a register of arms transfers was mantained by the League of Nations up to the outbreak of the second world war.

should be devoted to conventional weapons and to weapons of mass destruction. In the latter case, the non-proliferation régime should be strengthened by the accession to the non-proliferation treaty of countries that were not yet parties and by strengthening the IAEA safeguards. But conventional weapons represented more than four-fifths of all world military expenditure and should be given equal attention ; here agreements between the countries of a particular region on desirable levels of armaments would have the effect of limiting transfers into the region, and Belgium would support consultations to control the transfer of weapons in the world. He also proposed a balanced and verifiable reduction in military budgets.

Denmark — and the Nine

23. Mrs. Ostergaard, Danish Minister without Portfolio, spoke in the special session on 25th May first on behalf of the nine European Community countries, by virtue of Denmark's chairmanship. (The countries sponsoring the western proposals outlined in paragraph 12 *et seq* above include six of the Nine, but not France, Ireland or Luxembourg.) She pointed out that the Nine were particularly interested in the strengthening of security in Europe by establishing a more stable relationship at a lower level of military potential ; a principle which involved the interrelationship between disarmament and national security including the inherent and balanced right of states to individual and collective self defence which the Nine hoped to see included in the declaration to be agreed by the special session. For the programme of action the Nine stressed that measures to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons were of fundamental importance, while parallel action should be taken on a regional and multilateral basis to limit and reduce the world-wide build-up of conventional weapons and forces. The Nine supported an in-depth study of the relationship between disarmament and development and also suggested that confidence-building measures of the type contained in the CSCE final act, including prior notification of military manoeuvres and invitations to observers to attend them, might be applied to other regions in the world. Finally, on behalf of the Nine, she mentioned further use of modern technology including observation satellites for the international verification of disarmament agreements, although she made no direct reference to the specific French proposal.

24. Turning to machinery, she recognised the need for a negotiating body of limited size and a deliberative body open to the whole membership of the United Nations, but made no specific reference to French or other proposals in this connection. The Nine felt however that the rôle of the United Nations should be strengthened in the disarmament field and effective follow-up to the special session might take the form of a second special session to generate continuing pressure for productive negotiations.

25. Speaking on behalf of Denmark, Mrs. Ostergaard noted the connection between international efforts to reduce military expenditure and the commitment to a new international economic order, and endorsed the Nordic proposal for an in-depth study of the relationship between disarmament and development. She gave very high priority to a strategy of nuclear non-proliferation, and referring to conventional disarmament, endorsed the objective of limiting production and procurement of conventional weapons and limiting international arms transfers.

United Kingdom

26. Mr. Callaghan, the British Prime Minister, addressed the special session on 2nd June when he mentioned in particular prospects of agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty, saying that the United Kingdom was about to put forward (unspecified) new proposals in the tripartite United Kingdom-United States-Soviet Union negotiations in Geneva with the aim of achieving a ban on all nuclear explosions in all environments. Inspection under agreed rules would be necessary and an international system of seismic stations was proposed which would enable some non-nuclear weapon countries to participate directly in the ban. Referring to strategic nuclear weapons, Mr. Callaghan welcomed clear references by the United States and the Soviet Union to their readiness to negotiate on the significant reduction of the numbers of strategic weapons systems and to constrain improvements in such systems which he saw as the objective for a third round of negotiations to follow the yet-to-be-concluded SALT II. But nuclear armouries in Europe would also have to be further restrained. He reiterated the western group's proposals for security assurances for non-nuclear states which the United Kingdom would be prepared to enter into with other nuclear powers, and would support the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones such as that established in Latin America by the Tlatelolco treaty. On the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons the United Kingdom hoped that more than the present one hundred states would adhere to the non-proliferation treaty, but recognised that countries could renounce nuclear weapons in other ways, in particular by accepting the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA.

27. On MBFRs the western powers were awaiting Warsaw Pact replies to the proposals put forward by the West in April, and the NATO countries had agreed with the United Kingdom that more

impetus should be given to the negotiations by proposing a meeting at the level of foreign ministers. Recognising that MBFR covered a limited area in Europe, he welcomed and called for careful consideration of the French proposal for extending the geographical scope of negotiations on military forces in Europe.

28. The United Kingdom had taken the lead in proposing that confidence-building measures of the type agreed at Helsinki — such as advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres, exchanging observers at manoeuvres, and exchanging military visits — should be adopted in other regions, and modern technical means of surveillance such as those installed in the Sinai peninsula after the 1973 cease-fire could also be applied in other regions of the world. Verification of arms control agreements was seen as another confidence-building measure and the United Kingdom had accepted voluntarily international inspection of civil/nuclear facilities and would play a full part in verifying a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons convention in which case the United Kingdom would accept inspection of relevant chemical manufacturing plants in Britain. Mr. Callaghan pledged the United Kingdom to accept on its territory whatever further measures of verification, including international inspection, were needed. Turning to the conventional arms build-up, Mr. Callaghan recognised the special responsibility of countries which supplied arms and said that the United Nations should consider ways of restricting the sale of conventional arms, possibly on a regional and multilateral basis, with the involvement on an equal footing of both suppliers and recipients. On military budgets, he said that some states published defence budgets which were known to be very incomplete and urged that the system of measuring and reporting military budgets devised under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General should be tested by a representative sample of states. (In reply to a question by the Chairman, it was stated in the House of Commons on 26th May that eight states, including the United Kingdom, had so far indicated their willingness to participate in a private test of the United Nations reporting scheme. An agreed standardised United Nations system of reporting military budgets was seen as an essential prerequisite of international agreement on the balanced and verified reduction of military budgets.)

29. Mr. Callaghan commended the United States proposals for the establishment of a stand-by United Nations peace-keeping force which the United Kingdom was very ready to examine. He also mentioned negotiations to control chemical weapons and the relationship between disarmament and development.

30. Turning to disarmament machinery, Mr. Callaghan said that the negotiating rôle belonged to the CCD in Geneva but its co-chairmanship system could be reformed and France and China, it was hoped, would participate. There might be a case for adding some more members to make the CCD more representative and there should be a close relationship with the United Nations and fuller arrangements for non-members to participate in the work of the CCD. He called for a more important rôle for the United Nations Secretariat, suggesting that the Disarmament Centre should be responsible for collecting data on disarmament.

31. In conclusion, Mr. Callaghan reiterated his belief that agreement on disarmament had to be reached by consensus and proposed that there should be a further special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1981 to review action that had been taken meanwhile.

Germany

32. The Federal Chancellor, Mr. Helmut Schmidt, addressed the special session on 26th May. He identified four elements for a more stable peace : a policy of political, strategic and military balance ; a policy of détente, conflict containment and reconciliation of interests ; a capacity for effective crisis management ; and lastly predictability of political and military conduct. Military balance implied parity over all in terms of security policy rather than arithmetical identity of all kinds of armed forces, but balance could not be confined to the military sphere, it must also be sought in foreign policy and in economic and social fields. Discussing arms control proper he said the non-proliferation treaty had been valuable in limiting nuclear armaments but it must not be an obstacle to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the growing use of which required strengthened international measures to prevent misuse, especially of plutonium. Broad international consensus was required to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. As for arms limitation in Europe the aim of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna was to establish parity by means of balanced reductions to result in common collective ceilings on both sides. The joint communiqué signed after Mr. Brezhnev's visit to Bonn on 6th May [1] stated for the first time that approximate equality and parity were sufficient to ensure defence — a statement that was also welcomed by Mr. Callaghan in his speech.

33. Chancellor Schmidt described specific German contributions to international security, recalling, although without specific reference to

1. "The two sides consider it important that no one should seek military superiority. They proceed from the assumption that approximate equality and parity are sufficient to ensure defence. In their opinion, corresponding disarmament and arms limitation measures in the nuclear and conventional fields meeting that principle would be of great importance."

the Brussels Treaty or WEU, that from 1954 Germany had renounced the production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Germany's experience of international control of the non-production of chemical weapons showed that it could be effective, without economic harm and at reasonable cost ; he invited interested states to visit the Federal Republic to see how it was possible to verify adequately a ban on the production of chemical weapons, an agreement on which he considered particularly urgent. Germany was also prepared to make its institutions available for seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban. He proposed further that the confidence-building measures agreed at Helsinki should be made binding upon all states in Europe and welcomed the proposals of the French President. Measures such as the notification of military exercises, exchange visits of members of the armed forces, invitations to observers to attend military exercises could be extended to other regions of the world and regional agreements could form the basis of a future world-wide convention on confidence-building measures. But beyond the sphere of military security, mistrust between peoples had to be eliminated and Germany would contribute to a United Nations programme to foster understanding among the young generation of all nations, and would be presenting specific proposals later.

34. The Chancellor mentioned the relationship between the limitation of armaments and development and agreed with Vice-President Mondale that efforts should be made to regulate the international transfer of armaments to achieve which both suppliers and recipients must agree to exercise restraint. He called for all exporting countries to undertake to disclose their arms deliveries. In this field Germany's policy was to refuse on principle to grant aid for the export of weapons and only very exceptionally to export weapons to countries outside its own alliance. None were exported to areas of international tensions. At the same time Germany had massively increased its development aid budget.

Netherlands

35. On 5th April 1978 the Netherlands submitted a paper to the preparatory committee proposing specifically that in the final document of the special session all countries should be invited to give their views on the establishment of an international disarmament organisation. The paper acknowledges earlier proposals advanced both by Sweden and the Netherlands in 1973.

36. The international disarmament organisation is envisaged as the operational framework for the implementation of disarmament treaties, responsible mainly for verification but also acting as a clearing house for disarmament information and for organising review conferences provided for in disarmament treaties. The paper notes that the pending conventions — to ban chemical weapons and to ban nuclear tests in all environments — will both require their own type of inspection and verification machinery, including seismic arrays in the latter case, and that the French proposal for a United Nations observation satellite capability is also relevant to the functions that could be incorporated into an international disarmament organisation. Among data such an organisation might handle could be information on stockpile destruction, seismic data and the results of inspections. Such an organisation might be set up in the first place for the implementation of a particular disarmament treaty, its member countries being parties to that treaty, and then given more functions to assume responsibilities provided for in further disarmament treaties as they are concluded. Its membership would therefore be open-ended.

Italy

37. In a paper presented to the preparatory committee on 18th April 1978 Italy made proposals concerning disarmament machinery. The General Assembly would remain the forum for universal consideration of disarmament matters with prior consideration in its First Committee but *ad hoc* committees could be set up for special issues. The rôle of the Security Council is recalled with the suggestion that it might establish a committee with regional sub-committees to control the international transfer of conventional weapons. The CCD is seen as the best forum for substantive negotiations but its rôle would be enhanced if the two absent nuclear weapon states (France and China) joined it. The following proposals for improvements are made :

- — limited increase in membership to provide better geographical and political balance ;
- — participation of any country interested as an observer empowered to submit written proposals and take part in their discussion;
- — plenary meetings might be open to the public.

The paper makes no recommendation about the present system of co-chairmanship by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Italian paper also proposes the establishment of a permanent international organ for verification employing technological verification methods such as sensing, sampling, recording, communicating and interpreting devices.

France

38. On 23rd February 1978 France submitted in the preparatory committee a paper containing

outline proposals for the declaration, the programme of action and the machinery for negotiations. The proposals were elaborated in President Giscard d'Estaing's address to the General Assembly on 25th May and in four specific memoranda. The French Delegation to the special session included among its members Mr. Jules Moch who had been leader of French disarmament delegations up to 1960 when France had participated fully in multilateral negotiations including the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee which met from 1959 to 1960. In 1961 when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was established, France decided not to take up its seat on that body, and has not since then participated in the multilateral disarmament negotiations which led to the conclusion of the partial test ban and non-proliferation treaties among others.

39. In his speech to the special session President Giscard d'Estaing described disarmament as having been a failure so far ; the world was over-armed — in reality at a level of wartime rather than peace. The ultimate objective of real disarmament, general and controlled, had to be based on reality and France approached it on the basis of three fundamental concepts : every state had the legitimate right to security ; disarmament was the affair of all countries, not the monopoly of the few ; approaches to disarmament must take account of special regional situations. Among concrete proposals for disarmament France introduced detailed memoranda on a world institute of disarmament research and on a United Nations observation satellite agency, and is to circulate a third on a special disarmament fund for development.

40. President Giscard d'Estaing considered the world in two separate headings — the non-nuclear regions where encouragement should be given to the conclusion of specific non-nuclear agreements such as that on the denuclearisation of Latin America (Tlatelolco treaty), and nuclear weapons powers should renounce the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against states party to nuclear-free-zone agreements. The conventional arms race should then be controlled by agreements between the countries of the region fixing armaments ceilings or successive levels for reductions. France would be ready to facilitate such agreements by adapting its policy on the sale of armaments accordingly. The rest of the world, largely the northern hemisphere, was covered by the nuclear deterrent, and controlling the nuclear arms race depended in the first instance on the two superpowers because there was considerable disproportion between their nuclear forces and that of France. If after successive reductions the disproportion changed, France in its turn would consider drawing its conclusions therefrom. But in the area covered by the nuclear deterrent the visible disproportion of conventional weapons was a hindrance to the reduction of nuclear weapons, and France was making specific proposals in a memorandum to the countries participating in the CSCE for a European disarmament conference covering the area from the Atlantic to the Urals.

41. The French memorandum on an *international observation satellite agency* observes that at present only two countries have military observation satellites which they use to gather information from any point on the surface of the earth that they determine, and which play an important rôle in verification of their bilateral arms agreements. France proposes that this method of verification should be made available to the international community as a whole. The agency would be responsible for collecting, processing and disseminating information from earth observation satellites and would participate in the verification of existing and future international disarmament and security agreements ; international security organisations could also apply to the agency for its services ; the agency could also act at the request of a state to investigate an alleged infringement of an international agreement by another state provided the consent of that other state was obtained. The Security Council, it is suggested, could also make use of the agency under the terms of Article 34 of the United Nations Charter which empowers it to "investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute...". The agency would be a specialised agency of the United Nations open to all members and specialised institutions.

42. The agency's technical resources could be developed in three phases : in the first, be responsible for interpreting and disseminating data from existing nationally-owned satellites ; in the second phase, the agency would have its own ground terminals for collecting data directly from nationally-owned satellites ; in the third phase, the agency would own its own observation satellites as well as the ground terminals and the necessary processing capability. Three sources of finance are suggested — compulsory contributions of members ; voluntary contributions including contributions in kind by way of technical services provided by states possessing observation satellites ; and finally, contributions for services rendered where states apply to the agency for verification of disarmament or security agreements concluded by them. France proposes that a committee of experts be established to submit to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly (i.e. opening in September 1979) detailed proposals for the establishment of the agency.

43. It should be noted that France has recently earmarked Frs. 700 million for a military observation satellite programme to be operational by

the end of 1983 or early 1984. These *"satellites probatoires d'observation terrestre"* (SPOTs) would be powered by solar panels and launched by the European Ariane launchers. It is no doubt envisaged that the satellite observation agency could draw on resources of these satellites as well as those of the superpowers.

44. The concept of a United Nations satellite observation capability in order to provide strictly independent data for the verification of international disarmament agreements was originally put forward by the WEU Assembly in Recommendation 227 adopted on 8th December 1972 on the report of the Committee [1] which proposed the establishment of an arms limitation verification agency under United Nations aegis — the report envisaged that such an agency might be equipped with its own technical means of external verification such as observation satellites and seismic arrays. Subsequently in Recommendation 254 adopted on 20th June 1974 on a further report of the Committee [2] the Assembly proposed a United Nations satellite observation capability as an adjunct to United Nations peace-keeping capability — a proposal made with particular reference to the need to verify positions of troops on particular dates when establishing the cease-fire line in the 1973 Middle East conflict.

45. In its memorandum on an *International Disarmament Research Institute,* France proposed the establishment of an autonomous institute similar to the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). The institute would be independent under an executive director appointed by the governing body which, in turn, would be composed of independent persons known for their contribution to peace and disarmament or their expertise in security matters. They would be appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Presidents of the General Assembly and of the Disarmament Committee. Research conducted by the institute while being useful for current negotiations would not necessarily be directly linked to them, subjects suggested include : military technologies ; comparative analysis of different systems of verification of disarmament agreements ; the concept of the right to security and its regional application. Initially the institute might employ some ten experts and would be financed through a contribution from the United Nations budget and voluntary contributions from governments, intergovernmental organisations, foundations and other private sources, provided the independence of the institute was conserved.

1. Document 587, East-West relations and defence, Rapporteur Mr. Destremau.

2. Document 637, Security and the Mediterranean, Rapporteur Mr. Jung.

46. The French proposals continue with the establishment of an *international disarmament fund for development* to be devoted in the first place to the economic and social development of the poorest countries. Initially a fund of $1 billion is proposed, through voluntary contributions — 50 % from the nuclear weapon countries in proportion to the numbers of nuclear delivery systems they possess and 50 % from wealthy and heavily-armed countries in accordance with criteria to be agreed. Contributions could be counted against the 0.7 % of GNP which has been fixed internationally as a target for industrial countries to devote to the development of the poorer countries.

47. In its memorandum to the twenty-three countries participating in the CSCE (the European countries plus the United States and Canada) proposing a *conference on disarmament in Europe,* it is understood that France proposed a conference of the CSCE countries giving priority to increasing security through confidence-building measures and the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons. The negotiations would apply to the European territories of all participating countries — thus extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. Negotiations would cover major conventional air and land weapons with a high offensive capability, the forces servicing these weapons, and their logistic support when within the zone covered by the negotiations. The definition excluded naval forces and nuclear weapons which could not be dealt with in a conference limited to European territory.

48. The conference could proceed by stages, first drawing up anti-surprise and stabilisation measures based on mutual information corresponding to the aims of the confidence-building measures agreed in the CSCE. In the second phase, when the first had made sufficient progress to increase confidence, the conference could turn to measures of limitation and actual reduction of conventional weapons and forces which would apply to all military powers attending the conference whether or not they were members of a collective defence organisation. Specifically the conference would not be an obstacle to more limited agreements with more far-reaching provisions — presumably therefore it is intended to work in parallel with the MBFR. After an exchange of views with the countries to whom the memorandum is addressed, France envisages the convening of a preparatory committee for the conference on disarmament in Europe and is prepared to make concrete proposals for its organisation, but its procedure could be based on that of the CSCE.

49. In annexes to the memorandum it is understood that France proposed the following confidence-building measures involving multilateral

mutual information measures: the exchange of data on command structure and the location of forces limited to major formations; exchange of data on military budgets using a Swedish proposal as a basis — this data could be collected and disseminated by the executive secretariat of the conference. Bilateral mutual information measures based on reciprocity could be the exchange of observers for manoeuvres in accordance with the rules agreed by the CSCE; visits and calls; the exchange of military instructors and lecturers; the development of facilities accorded to military attachés including freedom of movement. Secondly, anti-surprise measures would be based on one month's advance notification of manoeuvres and movements including air and land manoeuvres involving joint operations by land, air and amphibious forces, at a level of one to two divisions, notice to cover not only the forces involved but also the major equipment as defined in the second annex. Thirty days' notification could also be given of mobilisation exercises and movements of land and air forces covering movements of one to two divisions over distances greater than 200 kilometres. Notification could be accompanied by the designation of principal points of passage, especially for the crossing of frontiers. Thirdly, stabilisation measures more constraining than the foregoing might involve a ceiling on land-air manoeuvres of, for example, 60,000 men within defined conditions of space and time; and the establishment of air or satellite surveillance systems which could be covered by a European agreement.

50. In the second annex on the limitation and reduction of forces, it is understood that France suggested that they should apply to conventional equipment combining mobility with great fire power including medium and heavy battle tanks; infantry armoured vehicles; field artillery and multiple rocket launchers; combat aircraft (fighters, fighter bombers and reconnaissance aircraft); armed helicopters; and the forces associated with the foregoing equipment and their logistic support. Agreements on reduction should lead to the demobilisation of the units concerned. The verification measures necessary for such agreements could be carried out by the satellites of the international agency proposed by France, and by the system of air surveillance as well as observers for on-site inspections.

51. In its proposals for *disarmament negotiating machinery* the French paper submitted to the preparatory committee observes that the United Nations remains the natural framework for debates on disarmament, and that in the deliberating body all member states should be able to participate on a basis of equality. France proposes that the First Committee of the General Assembly (a committee of all members) should be enabled to sit as a disarmament commission [1] and thus constitute the universal deliberating body. There should then be a new negotiating body replacing the present CCD, which would be responsible directly to the Disarmament Commission. The new body entitled the "Disarmament Committee" would have from thirty to forty members including states with a particular interest in disarmament, the members of the Security Council and would be representative of all regions of the world. The chairman would be elected for two years from among any participating state other than the permanent members of the Security Council. Decisions of the Disarmament Committee would be taken by consensus and it would be the forum for disarmament negotiations based on recommendations from the Disarmament Commission to which it would report. Countries not members of the Disarmament Committee would be free to attend its meetings as observers.

United States

52. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has played a prominent rôle in the special session on disarmament. President Carter did not attend the special session in person, but Vice-President Mondale addressed it on 24th May when he stressed the unprecedented communist military build-up in Europe and the increased nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union which required the western allies to make moderate increases in their defence budgets. On disarmament, he forecast what he called two historic achievements: for the first time agreement could be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the combined total of delivery vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons; secondly, a comprehensive test ban would be produced controlling nuclear explosions by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. He proposed nine points for inclusion in the action programme to be adopted by the special session: reduction in the number of strategic weapons and increasingly stricter qualitative restrictions on their later development; a ban on nuclear tests; international co-operation to ensure that no further nuclear powers emerged; a ban on weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear weapons; reduction in the constant rise in conventional weapons; strengthening arms control agreements (and the United States offered to provide specialists for technological means of verification — what he called "the eyes and ears of peace" — understood to include aerial photography and early-warning devices); development of institutions and expertise on arms control; the creation of a United

1. There is an existing United Nations body known as the Disarmament Commission which last met in 1965 (see paragraph 3).

Nations reserve force for the maintenance of peace ; the release of new resources from armaments to economic and social development. He proposed a new extraordinary session of the General Assembly in 1981 to review progress.

Soviet Union and its allies

53. On 7th September 1977 the Soviet Union, together with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland submitted a working paper to the preparatory committee outlining basic provisions for the programme of action. It appears to include no new ideas but lists eleven well-known disarmament topics on which, it is asserted, agreement is essential : cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament ; measures to avert the danger of nuclear war ; complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon threats ; consolidation in every possible way of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ; prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles ; prohibition of the development of new types and systems of mass destruction ; establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace ; limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons ; reduction of military budgets ; complete demilitarisation of the seabed and the ocean floor ; and regional measures for military détente and disarmament.

54. It is significant that in its comments on negotiating machinery the Soviet paper says that the existing multilateral, bilateral and regional systems are suitable but continues its support for a world disarmament conference. Some countries feel that now that China has joined the United Nations and that indeed that organisation's membership is virtually universal, a world disarmament conference holds little advantage over the present special session of the General Assembly.

Fifteen non-aligned members of the CCD

55. On 4th April 1978 the fifteen non-aligned members of the CCD submitted a working paper on organisation and procedures of the CCD which made the following succinct proposals. To strengthen the existing link with the General Assembly, all member countries of the United Nations would be free to submit proposals on any subject being negotiated in the CCD and to participate in the proceedings when those proposals were discussed. The rôle of the United Nations Secretary-General's special representative and the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be enhanced ; the co-chairmanship system should be replaced by a system "to be agreed upon" — the following alternative proposals being listed — chairman by monthly rotation among all members of the CCD ; monthly rotation among all non-nuclear members of the CCD ; a bureau of four members comprising a chairman rotating either monthly or on a sessional basis and three vice-chairmen. Two members of the bureau would be selected from states belonging to the military blocs and two from non-aligned countries.

China

56. Mr. Huang Hua, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed the special session on 29th May when he implied that China was prepared to take part in future disarmament negotiations. The speech was otherwise devoted to criticism of the two superpowers for their "colossal military potential", but more particularly of the Soviet Union : "social imperialism, a lately arrived superpower, is undertaking a threatening offensive... the Soviet Union by the scale of its uncontrolled expansion of armaments, puts the other superpower in the shade". He said that disarmament had made no progress because the two superpowers were not sincere, and he condemned the partial test ban treaty and the non-proliferation treaty as having tied the hands and feet of many non-nuclear countries ; the history of SALT was one of a strategic arms race. He called first for the prohibition and complete destruction of all nuclear weapons and the convening of a world summit conference for that purpose. He called for the two superpowers to take the following measures : undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or denuclearised zones ; repatriate all their armed forces and dismantle their foreign military bases ; stop the nuclear and conventional arms race and begin the progressive destruction of nuclear weapons and a massive reduction of conventional weapons ; undertake not to station large forces or conduct military manoeuvres in areas close to the frontiers of other countries and undertake not to attack other countries ; undertake not to export arms to any country for the purpose of exercising control, provoking war, or threatening war.

57. China subsequently confirmed its commitment to participating in a disarmament negotiating forum and circulated a working paper calling for the abolition of the CCD in favour of a new negotiating body to be truly free from superpower control, composed on a fair and equitable basis.

Conclusions

58. The Committee concludes that there is a good case for trying to reach agreement in the special session on a medium-term programme of four to five years on practical proposals, designed to give impetus to realistic measures of disarmament, and possibly to modify slightly the existing

negotiating machinery which at present is the CCD.

59. Unfortunately all desirable features of a negotiating (as opposed to deliberating) forum cannot be reconciled — it is significant that the Soviet Union and the United States have so far been publicly silent on or have opposed any modification to the CCD. It is possible that these countries might now be prepared to give up the co-chairmanship, and the susceptibilities of many countries, including France, would be soothed if the system were replaced, for example. by a chairmanship rotating among all members on a fairly short-term basis (one month) supported say by a four-nation balanced bureau as proposed in the non-aligned paper quoted above. Membership cannot however be much increased : with thirty participating members it is already less effective than originally when it had only eighteen. It is however important that France should take up the vacant seat that has always been reserved for it, and that China, the only other absent nuclear power, should join. Consideration might be given to permitting other countries to submit proposals to the CCD, and possibly attend sessions as observers with the right of participation when their proposals are discussed. Such a body would be much the same as the "Disarmament Committee" proposed by France and a change of title and status would be a relatively small price to pay if the participation of France and China were thereby secured. It would however be important to maintain the consensus principle as far as decision-making is concerned.

APPENDIX

Draft recommendation on disarmament as amended by the Assembly at its sitting on 22nd June 1978 [1]

The Assembly

(*i*) Aware that world expenditure on armaments has now reached $400 billion per annum and that some of the poorest countries are devoting more than half of their public expenditure to defence ;

(*ii*) Noting that, apart from the biological warfare convention of 1972, no arms control agreement since the war has yet achieved any measure of disarmament ;

(*iii*) Believing that new impetus must be given to negotiating certain urgent and concrete measures of arms control and disarmament but that the ultimate objective must remain general and complete disarmament under effective international control ;

(*iv*) Recalling its proposals of 1972 and 1974 for a United Nations satellite observation capability ;

(*v*) Recalling further the expertise acquired by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and urging that it be placed at the disposal of any international disarmament organisation ;

(*vi*) Recalling the annual publications of the League of Nations : "Armaments Year Book" and "Statistical Year Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition" ;

(*vii*) Recalling the work under the diplomatic conference of 1975-77 of the ad hoc committee on inhumane weapons and the associated conferences of government experts ;

(*viii*) *Accepting the responsibility shared by WEU members with other major arms suppliers to seek agreements to reduce the world trade in armaments,*

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view :

1. To secure universal agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and arms control measures to be concluded in the next five years, including :

(*a*) a comprehensive test ban ;

(*b*) a chemical weapons treaty ;

(*c*) a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation régime with rigorous safeguards at all stages of civil nuclear fuel cycles, linked with appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear countries ;

(*d*) a substantial reduction to restore the balance of forces and armaments in Europe ;

(*e*) agreements involving both supplier and recipient countries to restrict the international transfer of conventional arms ;

(*f*) the extension to other areas of confidence-building measures of the type included in the CSCE final act ;

(*g*) agreements to restrict the development of new generations of inhumane conventional weapons and incendiaries ;

and, *concurrently if possible* with the first agreement providing for independent verification :

(*h*) the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations aegis equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with arms control agreements and peacekeeping arrangements, and responsible *inter alia* for publishing, on the basis of its

1. Amendments agreed in the Assembly are printed in italics.

own sources of information as well as mandatory reports by all countries, annual reports on the forces and armaments of all countries and arms transfers between countries;

2. To make such changes to the present principal disarmament negotiating forum as will secure the participation of all nuclear weapon powers without reducing its effectiveness;

3. To maintain the expectations of progress on concrete measures of disarmament engendered by the present special session of the United Nations General Assembly, by the convening of a further special disarmament session in 1981 to review progress.

Document 788 **20th November 1978**
Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14

Disarmament

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14[1]

tabled by Mr. Boucheny

1. After paragraph (*i*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

"Considering that to the danger created by the increase in existing military capabilities is now added that of the proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons ; ".

2. After paragraph (*i*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

"Stressing that the intensive arms trade now practised exerts its adverse effects on the economy, is immoral and increases the risk of armed conflicts breaking out ;".

3. After paragraph (*i*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

"Considering that any measure intended to slow or stop the quantitative and qualitative arms race must take account of the existing balances and the right of all states to security ;".

4. Leave out paragraph 1 (*d*) of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

"an effective balanced and controlled reduction, in conditions of equal security for all states concerned, of all forces and all arms, in particular, in a first step, foreign forces and arms stationed in the zone covered by the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of forces and armaments ;".

5. After paragraph 1 (*d*) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as follows :

"the balanced reduction of forces, armaments and military budgets in Europe ;".

6. After paragraph 1 (*e*) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as follows :

"the scrupulous and systematic application of measures provided by the CSCE final act to strengthen mutual confidence in the military field ;".

7. In paragraph 1 (*g*) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "restrict the development of" and insert "prohibit research, development or production of" ; leave out "conventional".

8. After paragraph 1 (*g*) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"the reduction at a uniform rate of military budgets of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, as well as those of other countries with large economic resources in the spirit of United Nations resolutions ;".

9. After paragraph 1 (*g*) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"the creation of denuclearised zones and zones free of military bases in various regions of the world ;".

10. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"2. To participate actively in the work of the transformed Committee on Disarmament in close liaison with the United Nations General Assembly and its Disarmament Commission in pursuit of the objectives listed in paragraph 1 ;".

11. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"To associate all nuclear powers with the United States-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war ;".

12. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"To associate all nuclear powers with the strategic arms limitation talks at the time appropriate to the state of the negotiations ;".

13. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"To make the Mediterranean a denuclearised zone, free of foreign military bases, where the United States and Soviet fleets stationed in this zone would be limited, with the aim of their being withdrawn ;".

14. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"To prohibit the sale of any weapon or war material to colonialist, racist and fascist governments, and in particular to those of the Republic of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Chile and Iran.".

Signed: Boucheny

1. See 10th Sitting, 21st November 1978 (Amendments 1 and 2 negatived; Amendment 3 withdrawn; Amendments 4 and 5 negatived; Amendment 6 agreed to; Amendments 7 and 8 negatived; Amendment 9 agreed to; Amendments 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 negatived).

Document 788
Amendments 15, 16, 17 and 18

21st November 1978

Disarmament

AMENDMENTS 15, 16, 17 and 18 [1]

tabled by Mr. Bozzi

15. In paragraph (*ix*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "other major arms suppliers" insert "and the main recipient countries".

In paragraph 1 (*e*) of the draft recommendation proper, after "major arms-producing countries" insert "and main recipient countries".

16. In paragraph 1 (*a*) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "a comprehensive test ban" and insert "a nuclear test ban if this does not jeopardise the security of the state concerned".

In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, delete "(*a*)".

17. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

"To have an all-European conference on disarmament convened with the participation of all signatory states of the CSCE final act with a view to ensuring the progressive achievement of a programme of confidence-building measures and controlled limitation of forces;".

18. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

"To introduce a development assistance fund in the framework of the United Nations formed by a tax on over-armament;".

Signed: Bozzi

1. See 10th Sitting, 21st November 1978 (Amendments 15 and 16 negatived; Amendment 17 amended and agreed to; Amendment 18 withdrawn).

Document 789 **31st October 1978**

New weapons and defence strategy

PRELIMINARY REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments [2]
by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur

Draft Order

on new weapons and defence strategy

The Assembly,

Aware that the present introduction of new theatre weapons systems, in particular precision-guided munitions, and the proposed introduction of others such as cruise missiles and enhanced-radiation nuclear weapons, have many implications for defence policy, strategy and arms control,

INSTRUCTS ITS COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS to continue its study of these questions and to report to the next part-session of the Assembly.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur)

1. This preliminary report is designed to introduce a discussion of the implications for allied defence strategy of the modernisation of existing tactical nuclear weapons through the introduction of enhanced-radiation warheads, and the implications of other new weapons systems.

2. Many recent events have drawn attention to the urgency of a comprehensive survey of all the issues involved before final decisions on certain options in the choice of new weapons are taken.

3. Considerable modernisation of Warsaw Pact theatre nuclear weapons systems has been reported, with improvement of existing missiles and the possible introduction of the new SS-21 and SS-22. President Carter having deferred production of an enhanced-radiation weapon in April has now approved preparatory production of components which could provide such a capability for Lance missiles and 203 mm artillery. Certain European countries are actively considering the merits of cruise missiles as well as ERWs. At the same time the greatly-increased accuracy of some modern conventional weapons permits them to perform military tasks previously beyond their reach.

4. The Committee has already taken evidence from five distinguished experts in these fields, and is aware of the diverging opinions that are held. It proposes that it should continue its studies in order to report fully to the next part-session of the Assembly on the following aspects : the conventional and nuclear balance ; the implications of new conventional and nuclear weapons technologies ; and the possible consequences for defence strategy.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Roper* (Chairman) ; MM. Bonnel, *Roberti* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Ahrens, Baumel,* Bechter (Alternate : *Bozzi*), *van den Bergh,* Boldrini, *Boucheny, Critchley, Dejardin,* Fosson, *Grant,* Handlos, *Hardy,* Konen, de Koster, Lemmrich, *Maggioni,* Ménard, Pawelczyk (Alternate : *Büchner*), Pecchioli, Péronnet, Hermann Schmidt (Alternate : *Vohrer*), Scholten, *Tanghe,* Whitehead (Alternate : *Banks*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Document 790 **2nd November 1978**

Europe's external relations

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee [2] *by Mr. Gessner, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mrs. *von Bothmer* (Chairman) ; *Sir John Rodgers,* Mr. *Sarti* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Abens (Alternate : *Spautz*), Ariosto, Beith (Alternate : *McNamara*), Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: *Channon*), MM. *Berrier, Brugnon,* Deschamps, Druon, Faulds, *Gessner,* Gonella, *Hanin,* Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank (Alternate : *Voogd*), Mangelschots (Alternate : *Van Waterschoot*), *Mende,* Minnocci (Alternate : *Treu*), Mommersteeg (Alternate : Mrs. *van der Werf-Terpstra*), *Müller, Péridier,* Perin (Alternate : *Van Aal*), Portheine (Alternate : *Schlingemann*), *Reddemann, Segre,* Urwin.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on Europe's external relations

The Assembly,

Considering that Europe can prosper only if peace is preserved;

Considering that the Western European countries share the common objective of promoting democracy and human rights universally and that this objective does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of other states;

Considering that Western Europe's foreign policy must demonstrate a readiness to co-operate with all parts of the world in order to assure the security and well-being of their peoples;

Considering that military security, which presupposes a stable balance of forces, can best be maintained through the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance;

Concerned at the intensification of the Soviet Union's armament efforts;

Considering further that an uncontrolled arms race between East and West cannot increase our security, but only precipitate new dangers;

Convinced that the continuation and extension of détente with the objective of arms control and balanced force reduction agreements serve the interests of peace and military security;

Considering that East-West co-operation in all fields is an essential element of security and should be continued on a stable basis;

Considering that the North-South dialogue should be intensified in order to overcome as soon as possible the gap between North and South;

Convinced that economic and social progress and hence internal security and stability are in the interest of industrial and developing nations alike;

Aware that Europe's dependence on imports of raw materials constitutes a high degree of vulnerability;

Considering that the restoration of democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain is a great achievement for Europe as a whole which must be consolidated through appropriate assistance measures by Western Europe;

Convinced that world economic recovery and hence the economic stabilisation of the western democracies require close international co-operation in the political and economic fields;

Considering that the activities of the WEU Council are based upon a treaty which grants it wide-ranging responsibilities extending into the economic and social area, even though these are effectively exercised through other international organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly, particularly at its ministerial meetings, all the problems raised by the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty with a view to ascertaining the extent to which the opportunities that this article offers have been fully exploited;

2. Examine regularly the military balance and state of East-West relations in Europe and maintain close co-operation between member countries in order to promote the progress of détente and negotiations on the reduction and control of armaments;

3. Study the security aspects of the North-South dialogue;

4. Investigate the problem of conventional arms transfers especially to third world countries with a view to developing a common policy for the control of weapon exports;

5. Promote close co-operation in all appropriate international organisations with the democratic nations of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean region and support these nations' early entry into the European Community and their share in the process of European integration.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Gessner, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. This report attempts to outline the external relations of Europe. The Rapporteur is aware that such an endeavour is extremely difficult and would require, to be in any sense complete, much greater length than is customary for reports of this Assembly. He must therefore limit his discussion to a few central aspects of European foreign relations and cannot treat even these in a systematic or comprehensive manner.

2. Security policy, the central responsibility of WEU, will provide the emphasis of this report; in this connection, however, the conditioning factors, goals, and interests of Europe's external relations will also be examined. For this purpose it is first of all necessary to select the definition of Europe most appropriate in the present context. Further, the internal preconditions of Europe's foreign relations must be discussed with candour. Only on the basis of such an analysis can one grasp Europe's contemporary position in the world with some degree of realism and precision and examine Europe's most important foreign policy interests and objectives in order to clarify the foreign policy options available to it in its present state.

3. In speaking of Europe one can refer to quite different geographical expanses, political entities, or international groupings. For the purpose of this report it would perhaps be most logical to select a definition of Europe which is as flexible as possible without, on the other hand, being so nebulous as to lose all practical meaning. An immediate limitation is given by the fact that Western Europe provides the starting point for our discussion. This concept of Europe embraces in the first instance the domain of the European Community and WEU, without, however, restricting itself to these two organisations. The European Community and WEU conceive of themselves as open communities, and the European Community is presently negotiating the enlargement to the south. This fact alone requires a definition of Europe more flexible than one limited to the existing institutional structures of the European Community and WEU. Moreover, on the level of security policy, an integral component of foreign policy, no less than thirteen European nations have bound themselves to an alliance with the United States and Canada.

4. For these reasons the Rapporteur prefers to use a different criterion of selection and speak of the European, western-type democracies, i.e. of those European states which share the common foundation of pluralist democracy. Such a definition would embrace the member states of the Council of Europe along with a number of smaller countries which have not, or not yet, acceded to that body. More important, however, than determining the precise number of states to be included in our examination of Europe's external relations is our definition of this community of nations on the basis of certain shared values, namely a common dedication to western pluralist democracy and a common concern for human rights. In this sense, Europe would thus refer to democratic Europe. This concept would not embrace the continent of Europe in all political and geographical respects, which would of course also include the Eastern European communist countries. Even if one regards the conference on security and co-operation in Europe as a first manifestation of this "pan-Europe", allusion to common external relations is hardly in place. But common foreign policy instruments are largely lacking as well for democratic Europe, the concept chosen by the Rapporteur. Such instruments are no doubt most fully developed in the European Community. Therefore great weight must be placed upon the initiatives developed here. In addition, however, one must examine a wide range of interests and objectives which extend far beyond the domain of the Europe of the Nine and of WEU and which can be numbered among the foundations of Europe's common external relations.

II. *Internal preconditions of Europe's external relations*

5. The democratic European states discussed in this report belong to different alliances and groupings. They maintain both joint and separate relations with the rest of the world, as is evident in their membership of various regional groupings. Only two such organisations, however, are responsible for the defence and security concerns of their member states : NATO, which includes the United States and Canada ; and Western European Union, which joins seven European nations in a collective defence pact with a guarantee of long-term validity. WEU does not, however, dispose of its own military forces but relies on those of NATO : thus there exists no autonomous European defence community. Rather, the European members of the Atlantic Alliance (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Turkey) are convinced that the maintenance of European security requires close co-operation with Canada and the United States to counter successfully the threat which the

Soviet military potential poses to Western Europe.

6. This European-American defence community must be regarded as a structural element of the European state system. In other words, the American presence in Europe must be regarded as permanent. In its core this community has remained essentially the same as it has developed since 1949, even though not all European nations maintain the same type of ties with the Alliance. Its Scandinavian members, for example, are careful to take the northern balance of forces into consideration in their relationship to the Atlantic Alliance. They allow neither foreign military bases nor the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory. France withdrew from the NATO integrated command structure in 1966. The relationship of Greece and Turkey to NATO has been altered as a consequence of the Cyprus conflict of 1974, Greece having withdrawn to a considerable extent from the military integration. Turkey's relations with the United States were burdened for several years by the American arms embargo but have been normalised following the latter's recent repeal. NATO remains weakened, nevertheless, by the unsolved Cyprus question on its southern flank.

7. A major gain for Europe and the entire Atlantic Alliance has been the elimination of dictatorial régimes in Portugal and Greece. With the domestic political transformations in Spain following the death of Franco, Western Europe can now be said to be composed entirely of democratic states. This important fact deserves to be emphasised, for it proves that democracy has not lost its attraction as a way of life. Spain has long been tied to the United States through a bilateral defence pact and is presently applying for membership of the European Community ; whether it will choose to join NATO as well remains an open question for the moment. The Rapporteur would emphasise that this decision lies entirely in the hands of the Spanish Government and the Spanish people.

8. Ten of the thirteen European members of NATO (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey) have informally joined together in the so-called Eurogroup within the Atlantic Alliance and have adopted common programmes, particularly in the years since 1970. France, Ireland and Portugal were also invited to join in this co-operative effort but chose not to participate. Portugal has since decided to join the group. The fact that the countries composing the Eurogroup have consciously avoided placing their co-operation on a formal basis proves that it is not an attempt to create an autonomous European defence community. The formation of a European programme group to harmonise defence and armaments proposals demonstrates, on the other hand, the need perceived in Europe for greater co-operation in matters of mutual defence. It should, however, not alter the existing foundations of the alliance. The precise forms in which defence co-operation could be organised presently constitute, in the view of the Rapporteur, an open question.

9. A number of observers have perceived possibilities of co-operation in defence and security issues within the European Community. Such proposals discussed among experts envisage among other things the creation of an integrated defence sector in the European Community similar to the existing European political co-operation. The Rapporteur regards such proposals with scepticism. He is convinced that, while European political co-operation has developed into an extremely useful and effective instrument of the European Community and has led to a considerable capacity for action, the defence of Europe can be effectively organised only within the Atlantic Alliance. The reasons for this are obvious. First of all, several member states of the European Community have openly declared their opposition to such military co-operation ; the attempt to expand the European Community into a new defence community nonetheless could create considerable dangers for the level of European integration already achieved. The Rapporteur is also of the opinion that Europe's strategic position does not permit such a solution. He is convinced that Europe's military vulnerability cannot in this manner be reduced. One cannot recognise in the proposals any increase in Europe's security as compared to the present alliance system. On the contrary, the United States could conclude that a common responsibility for Europe's military security no longer exists to the same degree as previously. Such a development would not promote the maintenance of a stable balance of power in Europe. The European Community has proved so successful in foreign policy precisely because it has not appeared as a military power and has made no claims to domination, but is rather a factor of conciliation and peace.

10. On the basis of European political co-operation, Europe has succeeded in making its voice heard and its weight felt in many cases :

— at the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, the European Community acted largely as a group, making its own contributions and proposals. The European Community member states presently share a common foundation for their positions on all essential questions of *Ostpolitik* and détente ;

— the European Community has similarly been represented as a community in international negotiations involving economic and energy issues, such as those sponsored by UNCTAD and the CIEC. The European Community also appears as a

community in the United Nations, and the country providing the current President of the Council is authorised to speak for the Nine as a group ;

— the European Community has conducted the dialogue with the United States begun in September 1973 on the basis of mutually-agreed positions. A practice of close bilateral consultations between the Community and the United States has now developed from these consultations ;

— with its declaration on the Middle East of 6th November 1973 the Nine adopted a joint position regarding the Middle East conflict and introduced a balanced common Middle East policy. They have subsequently repeatedly taken a position on this problem.

11. All in all, the European Community is today in a position to adopt common policies towards almost all significant international issues, including those relevant to international security. This contribution to Europe's foreign relations should not be underestimated, even if the voice of the Community cannot speak for the potentially much larger Europe beyond the borders of the Nine.

12. This larger Europe has in the Council of Europe an institution which now unites practically all the democratic nations of the continent and which, given sufficient consensus, can express the position of its members on international affairs. The Council of Europe exercises an indispensable bridge-building function between the members and non-members of the European Community. It has promoted and developed joint solutions for many problems beyond the borders of the European Community which affect all the democratic nations of Europe. Its contributions to the implementation of human rights are undeniable. It has proved useful and deserves praise in the area of cultural exchange, in the promotion of social rights, and in the struggle against international terrorism. The fact that neutral and non-aligned nations as well as states with specific foreign and defence policy ties are represented in the Council of Europe often prevents the formation of a foreign policy consensus, even though the Council of Europe's joint action, for instance in the United Nations and other international bodies, would be highly desirable. Both the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers concern themselves nonetheless with a large number of international questions and have made valuable contributions *inter alia* to the CSCE, the East-West relationship, questions of the third world, Africa and the Middle East.

13. Naturally, with such a diversity of members, the Council of Europe cannot take major steps in foreign policy or, *a fortiori,* defence matters. However, due emphasis must be laid on its importance as a forum, both at Committee of Ministers and at Parliamentary Assembly level, for discussions between democratic European countries which have so often proved extremely fruitful on such matters as respect for human rights, East-West relations and the North-South dialogue. Your Rapporteur is happy to associate himself with the Committee members who asked for this remark to be included in the report.

14. Even this brief examination of the internal preconditions of Europe's external relations demonstrates that almost all of the European international organisations combine a variety of partially overlapping ties and commitments which do not, however, evidence a homogenous structure. Even the most advanced European union, the European Community and its highly-effective European political co-operation, is comprised of members united simultaneously in a plethora of other significant international European organisations. It suffices to point here to the simple fact that members of the European Community, WEU and NATO belong at the same time to the Council of Europe, the OECD, the Nordic Council and other similar groupings, thus bringing their specific interests to, but also accepting additional responsibilities from, each of these organisations. Finally, the reality of national interests distinct from all attempts at international co-operation must not be denied or minimised. On this basis, the process of common foreign policy formation thus represents a tremendously complex task, which becomes more difficult to fulfil according to the number of states involved. This task places great demands on the willingness to compromise of all European governments and therefore often places results in an uncertain light.

III. *Europe's position in the world*

15. Europe exercised a dominant influence in world politics for many years in the past. This is no longer the case, for two world wars have left major traces and destroyed the traditional European state system. This insight is clearly expressed in the document on Europe's political identity published by the nine foreign ministers on 14th December 1973. This text reads :

> "Although in the past the European countries were individually able to play a major rôle on the international scene, present international problems are difficult for any of the Nine to solve alone. International developments and the growing concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a very small number of great powers mean that Europe must unite and speak increasingly with a single voice if it wants

to make itself heard and play its proper rôle in the world."

The combined potential of the European democracies is considerable. The potential of the countries of the European Community alone represents an order of magnitude comparable in respect to a series of factors of power to that of the two superpowers. Measured by its gross national product, its population, its monetary reserves and its share of world trade, the European Community is equal and in some respects superior to the superpowers. The European Community takes first place, for example, in world trade. Wide-ranging conclusions have been drawn from these facts, including the thesis that the European Community will "necessarily lead to a superstate and that this superstate will sooner or later ineluctably result in a superpower." [1]

16. The Rapporteur can hardly imagine, however, that the European Community will emerge as a superpower, at least in the sense in which this word is normally used. Decisive internal and external preconditions for such a development are lacking, for it does not suffice to point to economic potential and the illusion of a defence union as proof of the superpower quality of the existing European Community. Equally, if not more important is, in the view of the Rapporteur, the consideration of Europe's economic and military vulnerability, for this vulnerability determines how Europe defines its foreign policy and forms its relations with the rest of the world. Prime Minister Tindemans' report on European integration is based on the accurate assumption that Europe's strategic position, dependence on exports and raw materials and lack of a homogenous internal structure force it to find its way to a common foreign policy :

> "That which struck me in all my conversations was above all the widespread feeling of our impotence and vulnerability. This is a new experience for our peoples in recent history. The unequal distribution of material goods threatens the stability of the world economic system, the exhaustion of natural resources heavily burdens the future of industrial society and the internationalisation of economic activity increases the dependence of our productive apparatus. Our nations are too weak to accept this challenge by themselves. What importance do individual voices have today, aside from those of the superpowers ?...
>
> .....
>
> The reasons for a joint involvement of our nations in the world are, seen objectively, obvious : they arise from the correlation of forces and from the dimensions of the problems we face. At the same time they are, viewed subjectively, deeply felt by our peoples : our vulnerability and relative impotence are all too readily apparent. The combination of these two factors renders our external relations one of the most important motives for European integration and therefore the European union has to conduct a foreign policy."

17. The Rapporteur concurs with this view expressed in the Tindemans report. In his opinion the conclusion emerges that Europe's involvement in the world must be directed not at attaining the attributes of a superpower, but rather Europe should prove itself a factor of conciliation, cooperation and peace. Since Europe's character makes it primarily a civil power [1] based essentially on civil rather than military forms of power, its greatest foreign policy task is not to build a new centre of military might, but to contribute to political peace and to a civil world order through the example of its domestic order which aims at the implementation of social justice, democratic liberties and human rights.

18. The two world wars have largely destroyed the basis of Europe's previous military and political might ; the two superpowers today confront one another on its soil. In Eastern Europe this development at the end of the second world war led to a relationship of clear subordination according to the traditional logic of power politics. Western Europe, by contrast, has remained an important centre of world trade and, in political terms, has emerged as more than a mere junior partner of the United States. An imperial relationship was avoided, in good part because of close European-American cultural ties, although Western Europe's military security rests upon the alliance with America and especially upon the latter's nuclear guarantee. Thus, while Europe's capacity for military action has been decreased, the political, economic, social and cultural possibilities open to it remain considerable. This is due no doubt in part to the circumstance that in the atomic age the increasing destructiveness of nuclear weapons has if anything reduced the likelihood of their use. The former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed this paradox as early as 1965 : "Military might has never been so strong as today, but neither was it ever so useless as at present." [2]

19. Europe derives from this recognition considerable room for manoeuvre in the non-military

1. Johan Galtung, *Kapitalistische Grossmacht Europa oder Die Gemeinschaft der Konzerne ?*, Reinbeck bei Hamburg 1973, page 11.

1. François Duchêne, *Die Rolle Europas im Weltsystem : Von der regionalen zur planetarischen Interdependenz*, in : *Zivilmacht Europa — Supermacht oder Partner ?*, Frankfurt 1973, page 33.

2. Henry Kissinger, The troubled partnership, New York 1965, page 18.

field, even though it does not strive to establish a third force between the two superpowers. In the view of the Rapporteur, a series of opportunities present themselves for Europe's rôle in world politics :

20. (*i*) Regarding the relationship between the two major nuclear powers, Europe possesses sufficient independent political and economic significance to exercise a conciliating rôle. An essential objective of European foreign policy should thus be today to prevent renewed East-West confrontation and a possible return to the cold war. In the phase of Soviet-American bilateralism, as is developed in the early seventies with a series of comprehensive agreements between the two superpowers including the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war of 22nd June 1973, many Europeans feared that the Soviet Union and the United States would be in a position to decide the fate of Europe over the heads of the Europeans. This impression is, in the Rapporteur's opinion, inaccurate, for Europe can have no interest in a relationship between the superpowers marked by hostility and confrontation. Such confrontation would largely exclude any rapprochement between East and West and further cement the division of our continent. Europe's policy should instead be to promote its interest in stable and continuing co-operation between East and West through close consultation with the United States and corresponding contacts with the USSR.

21. The conference on security and co-operation in Europe, in which the United States and Canada as well as the Soviet Union took part, provides a successful example of how constructive co-operation between East and West can be arranged. This remains true even though undeniable difficulties became apparent at the CSCE follow-up conference in Belgrade in the spring of this year. The Helsinki final act opens up opportunities for the European Community as well as for individual European states to broaden their bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. The European Community is also presently conducting talks with COMECON in order to examine how far the two organisations can agree on mutual co-operation.

22. Co-ordination of European and American foreign policy takes place primarily within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, a permanent dialogue between the European Community and the United States has developed since 1973 which concerns especially economic affairs.

23. (*ii*) Japan offers another possibility of close co-operation with Europe. Europe shares with Japan a number of similarities with regard to its economic and strategic situation. Like Europe, Japan is extraordinarily dependent on foreign raw materials and export-oriented at the same time. The alliance with the United States is, as far as security is concerned, decisive for both partners. Both Japan and Europe number among the most important industrial centres of the world yet do not play any significant military rôle. The renunciation of a rôle as a military power has been elevated to a guiding principle of Japanese foreign policy. Japan and Europe share an interest in participating in decisions affecting the world economy. In some respects, such as the maintenance of export opportunities, Japan and Europe appear as competitors, yet this does not diminish their broad convergence of interests in the problems of the world economy.

24. Japan's export surplus with the European Community has risen dramatically in recent years, amounting to around five thousand million United States dollars in 1977. The European Community is therefore seeking, along with Japan and the United States, to limit the resulting dangers to the world economy. All three parties have committed themselves to fulfilling their common responsibilities in maintaining free international trade. Progress has already been achieved in economic discussions between the Community and Japan.

25. Japan is an important partner of Europe in all economic issues. The triangular relationship between Japan, Europe and the United States has been strongly emphasised in the latter country, particularly through the activities of the trilateral commission, one of whose founders is President Carter's current National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. This trilateral concept can prove quite useful in the opinion of the Rapporteur, as far as world economy is concerned, although he would emphasise that it must not lead to the formation of a bloc of powerful industrialised nations, which could lead to a hardening towards the third world and a stalemate in the North-South dialogue.

26. (*iii*) Europe's readiness to co-operate with all parts of the world should certainly not exclude China. Only recently, on 8th April of this year, the European Community concluded a commercial treaty with the People's Republic of China. It should really be self-evident that such a treaty is directed against no one, but serves the exclusive purpose of broadening international economic co-operation. The Rapporteur believes that security considerations that have attached to the Chinese-European relationship cannot be a decisive objective in the further development of Europe's ties to China. Co-operation between China and Europe could certainly take on a certain significance for Chinese domestic development as far as economic and technological matters are concerned, and Europe, as an economically highly-developed region, could certainly make a contribution. Europe could also help constructively to bring China into discussions of major international issues. A security alliance

with the People's Republic of China, however, is not, in the view of the Rapporteur, an object of discussion.

27. (*iv*) Europe can and must also play a conciliating rôle in the North-South dialogue. The European Community is already connected with fifty-three developing countries of Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean through the Lomé Convention. Other European nations, such as Sweden, are making major contributions to development policy. Europe's geographical proximity and traditional ties that many European states have with Africa should lead it really to declare its general solidarity with that continent's strivings for independence and so contribute to guaranteeing the peaceful economic and social development of the African continent. This does not exclude the careful examination and evaluation of the objectives and operating methods of the particular forces active in Africa.

28. As pointed out in Professor Hofer's recent report on the African situation to the Council of Europe, co-operation between these two continents must be the co-operation of equal partners. Democratic Europe, whose member states have granted independence to their former colonial possessions, can play a major rôle in strengthening the independence of the young African nations, some of which again face the danger of losing their independence through external intervention and the presence of foreign troops.

29. (*v*) Similar considerations apply as well to the Middle East. That region's conflict potential and geographical proximity demand a specifically European contribution to peace in this region. This contribution could not, of course, be of a military nature, but could well assume economic dimensions.

30. The European Community has worked, especially since 1973, for the restoration of peace in the Middle East and has repeatedly issued policy declarations concerning this area. Since 1974 it has conducted the so-called Arab-European dialogue with the Arab states, which is conceived as a long-range endeavour to intensify European-Arab co-operation. This dialogue should not, however, affect the continuing efforts to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East. The prospects for such a peace have brightened considerably since the signing of an outline agreement between Egypt and Israel on 17th September 1978. This agreement calls for the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries within three months. Europe could contribute to the achievement of the long-desired peace settlement by offering its comprehensive co-operation with all the nations of the Middle East. The preamble of the Camp David agreement states :

> "Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress towards that goal can accelerate the movement towards a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by co-operation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security."

IV. *External policy interests and objectives*

31. The Rapporteur will attempt in this section of his presentation to outline the most significant interests and objectives of Europe's foreign relations. As previously mentioned, he cannot provide in this limited space a comprehensive and systematic treatment of this subject ; nonetheless he considers it important to discuss a few essential goals and interests underlying Europe's relations, even though no complete consensus exists in all aspects of the opinions here expressed.

32. The Rapporteur is of the opinion that Europe's most urgent and inspiring objective must be the preservation and guarantee of peace. Without the maintenance of peace in freedom, neither Europe as a whole nor the individual European states and societies can thrive. Under contemporary conditions, a war in Europe would cause unimaginable destruction of political, economic, social and cultural values.

33. From this fundamental consideration arise for the Rapporteur five foreign policy goals which, in his view, form the essence of Europe's external relations. These are :

- — the preservation of European security ;
- — the continuation and strengthening of détente ;
- — the protection of raw material supplies and the achievement of economic security ;
- — the continuation of the North-South dialogue with the objective of a more equitable world economic order ; and
- — the preservation of stability in Southern Europe.

These goals and interests of Europe cannot, of course, be so sharply distinguished from one another as might appear at first glance. The Rapporteur will attempt to clarify the various interconnections between these five major objectives and interests insofar as this is feasible within the confines of this presentation.

(i) The preservation of European security

34. This objective presents, in the Rapporteur's analysis, four essential aspects :

— military security ;
— economic security ;
— social security ; and
— internal security.

(*a*) *Military security*

35. Most of the European nations considered in this report regard their security as best guaranteed through their membership of the Atlantic Alliance. These nations believe that in the age of nuclear weapons, national efforts alone cannot suffice to assure their security in the face of the military threat posed by the Soviet Union. As mentioned previously, there are various degrees of membership of the Alliance and a number of European states have chosen not to enter the Alliance at all. This is explained in some cases by a long tradition of neutrality (Sweden, Switzerland), in others by a freely-chosen neutral status (Austria), and in still others by concerns for national independence and because some states perceive less strongly an immediate threat through the Soviet Union. For Europe as a whole, however, a neutral stance would not be tenable : even armed neutrality would pose excessive dangers for the security of the European states.

36. In the judgment of the Rapporteur, the existence of a political and military balance between East and West in Europe forms the precondition for the preservation of peace in this region ; such a balance is possible only on the basis of an American commitment to and presence in Europe. As Chancellor Schmidt pointed out in his speech before the United Nations in May of this year, the military balance :

> "must not necessarily be expressed in a total arithmetic identity in all types of weapons and forces. An overall strategic parity, however, must exist. It must also be psychologically understood and accepted as such by the European peoples."

37. According to the most recent assessment of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, we can proceed from the assumption of a military balance of power in Europe which largely excludes the possibility of a military attack [1]. This balance of power arises from an assessment of the total military situation. The Warsaw Pact enjoys superiority or is catching up in certain fields, but the overall correlation of forces is at present so constituted as to render the possibility of an attack unattractive to it, according to The Military Balance 1978-79. The concept of the balance of power must, however, be understood dynamically. This means among other things that the military balance can be altered by new armament efforts and developments in weapons technology. In the light of this dynamic nature of armament developments, the organs of WEU must continue to play their part in upholding a military balance of power in Europe.

38. In the view of the Rapporteur, however, it is essential clearly to recognise that the military balance alone cannot suffice to preserve peace and security in Europe. Peace resting exclusively on a balance of forces and armaments would by its very nature remain precarious. The political willingness to negotiate and compromise is necessary as well. To quote Chancellor Schmidt once again : "He who is unwilling to compromise can accomplish nothing for peace." For Europe, this means that military security cannot, in the final analysis, be achieved without a political readiness for negotiation and détente with the leading communist power, the USSR, as well as with the other Eastern European states. The Rapporteur will comment further on this subject later in this paper.

(*b*) *Economic security*

39. Since the oil crisis of 1973 we have all become increasingly aware that an assured supply of raw materials and the ability to carry on uninterrupted economic activity are as essential to our security as military protection. The oil shock made clear that the withholding of vital supplies can strike at a society almost as hard as direct military pressure.

40. Many Europeans have perceived the oil crisis as a real threat, and some have introduced various proposals, including military scenarios, to deal with such a situation. The Rapporteur would maintain that Europe's vulnerability in this respect cannot be overcome, i.e. that we Europeans cannot take refuge in a new faith in autarchy. Rather, we must learn to live with this vulnerability and demonstrate our willingness to co-operate in an interdependent world economy.

41. As a rule, dependence is seldom one-sided. If this were the case, only capitulation before the demands of the other side would be imaginable. In this connection it appears essential to the Rapporteur to emphasise the political willingness to compromise in all efforts to reduce Europe's vulnerability and its dependence, as is presently being attempted, in the field of energy. Without such a willingness, a dependent region such as Europe would reel from one crisis to another, seriously endangering our economic and military security in the process. The Rapporteur will return to this subject at another point in his presentation.

1. The Military Balance 1978-79, page 113.

(c) *Social security*

42. This aspect of security concerns first of all the preservation of social peace. Poverty and unemployment can threaten a society from within. Social objectives such as full employment, price stability and balance of external accounts should therefore not be underestimated in respect to external security as well.

43. Europe has achieved a relatively high degree of social security and domestic peace in recent years. In comparison to most of the countries outside Europe, many of the European nations may be regarded as socially progressive and relatively stable economically. Significant disparities, however, still exist on our continent. A major long-range objective of European co-operation must be to eliminate or at least to reduce these disparities.

(d) *Internal security*

44. In the recent past we have all become increasingly aware that terrorism can threaten our societies from within. At the same time terrorism has proved to be an international phenomenon which must be fought at an international level. The Council of Europe has made a useful contribution to this effort, and the seven leading industrial powers which gathered in an international economic summit conference last July in Bonn found it necessary to issue a joint statement on the struggle against terrorism.

45. The conflict with terrorism has shown that this phenomenon is quite capable of endangering the bases of western pluralist democracy. A common interest thus exists in acting jointly and decisively against terrorism.

46. These new dimensions of security extend far beyond the competence of those European institutions concerned primarily with external security, namely NATO and WEU. They are of importance beyond the borders of the European Community as well, and can be properly understood and effectively guaranteed only in a wider context and in a new consciousness of global interdependence. The Rapporteur would maintain that the existing organisations and institutions in Europe and beyond are by all means adequate to address these new problems of European security.

47. These different institutions and organisations must, however, carefully harmonise and co-ordinate their respective activities in order to guarantee maximum success. WEU must provide its contribution, but it must also recognise that in many cases, more comprehensive institutions such as the European Community, NATO, the OECD or the Council of Europe can act more effectively in regard to the appropriate measures. It would be advisable to adopt a flexible attitude in dealing with these tasks in order to live up to the complexity of the security problems. As the Rapporteur hopes to have made clear, these problems involve not only external military security, but also numerous issues traditionally considered as domestic concerns.

(ii) The continuation and expansion of détente

48. Détente, along with military défence, constitutes the second pillar of European security policy, as the Harmel report has already recognised in principle. Recognition of détente's importance to international security opened, in the late sixties and early seventies, a rather large area of East-West negotiation through a number of agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States on the one hand, and the USSR and the European nations, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other. The most important of these agreements include :

— the quadripartite agreement on Berlin ;
— the SALT agreements ;
— the eastern treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany ;
— the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ; as well as
— a series of bilateral agreements between Eastern and Western European states.

49. These agreements have created a new framework for decreasing the conflict potential of Europe. The Rapporteur is aware that certain aspects of détente are understood differently in East and West. Détente cannot eliminate the fundamental political and ideological contrasts between East and West : these continue to exist. Understood as the process of gradual de-escalation of conflicts and agreement in areas where this is possible without abandoning vital interests, however, détente is a necessary element of western security policy to which there is no acceptable alternative. This concept of détente should really be undisputed, presuming as it does a balance of military power between East and West as its prerequisite. Its objective is the more effective assurance of peace through co-operation and the protection of security at a lower level of armaments.

50. Above all, the Helsinki final act constitutes in the opinion of the Rapporteur an extraordinarily useful instrument of co-operation between East and West whose provisions open up a wide range of practical collaboration among the European states. The CSCE follow-up conference in Belgrade two years after the signing of the final act allowed an assessment of the implementation of that document's provisions and of further measures of détente in Europe. A second follow-up conference is scheduled for 1980 in Madrid.

51. The Rapporteur is of the opinion that the WEU Assembly should contribute to the pre-

parations for this conference and concern itself with the pertinent topics by preparing a timely report. In his view, however, one should avoid overburdening the process of co-operation in the framework of the CSCE with new demands. The experience of Belgrade demonstrated that continuing differences in fundamental questions such as human rights do not have to preclude collaboration in vital areas such as the economic and humanitarian fields ; these latter areas should receive closer attention in Madrid than was possible at Belgrade.

52. The Belgrade CSCE follow-up conference took place in a period of uncertainty over the further progress of détente which arose as a result of uncertainties in the Soviet-American relationship. The complex reasons for this uncertainty cannot be discussed here in detail. They are very complex, but may perhaps be indicated by the following factors :

- intensification of the Soviet Union's military build-up combined with an increasing interventionary pressure in Africa ;
- new complications in the continuing arms control negotiations created by developments in military technology on both sides ; and
- a hardening of Soviet domestic policy in response to the protests and demands of Soviet civil rights movements.

53. The Rapporteur believes that this phase of uncertainty may now possibly have been surpassed and that more promising prospects for the development of East-West co-operation have again arisen. He draws this conclusion from recent encouraging developments in the SALT talks and, despite continuing difficulties, in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. As is now reported, a personal meeting between President Carter and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev may well be in the offing.

54. The SALT II negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union should be completed shortly. The success of these negotiations lies in the interests of Europe as well. The progress achieved in the Vienna MBFR negotiations has been above all the Warsaw Pact's acceptance in its reply of 8th June 1978 of the principle of conventional parity for the reduction area. This principle was previously acknowledged in the common declaration signed by Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on 6th May 1978. This text states :

> "Both sides deem it important that no one should seek military superiority. They proceed on the assumption that approximate equality and parity suffice to safeguard defence. They believe that adequate measures of disarmament and arms limitation in the nuclear and the conventional fields, which meet that principle, would be of major significance."

55. An important question, however, remains to be clarified, namely the discrepancy between NATO and Warsaw Pact figures concerning eastern military personnel in the reduction area. The Rapporteur is of the opinion that clarity in the question of data must be achieved to prevent the negotiations in Vienna from reaching an impasse. The Rapporteur would further consider balanced arms control agreements an extremely important component of détente.

56. The central objective of the MBFR negotiations remains a balanced level of forces at lower levels attained through reductions by East and West. The SALT talks aim at fixing a balance in strategic nuclear weapons by a treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States. This, however, could increase the significance of existing disparities between East and West in the conventional and tactical nuclear field. In addition, certain nuclear weapons which have been excluded from both SALT and the MBFR discussions cannot be excluded from consideration in a system of military balance. These nuclear weapons, such as the Soviet SS-20 rockets targeted at Western Europe, must also be included in negotiations.

57. Europe must also, in the judgment of the Rapporteur, accord decisive importance to economic co-operation between East and West. This co-operation is an element of détente which has been forced into the background somewhat because of the world economic recession. Europe must seek new initiatives in this area.

(iii) The protection of raw material supplies and the assurance of economic security

58. Experts do not presently reckon with a critical shortage of raw materials in the near future. The problems of inflation, recession, balance of payments imbalances and protectionist tendencies must apparently be taken much more seriously. Europe faces a serious problem with respect to its raw material supplies, nonetheless — unlike the other industrialised countries with the exception of Japan, which finds itself in a similar position, it is between 70 and 100 % dependent on imports from third countries. The United States, by contrast, imports only about 15 % of its raw material requirements.

59. It is understandable that this heavy dependence presents difficult problems for all of Europe's national economies. The foreign policy vulnerability resulting from this dependence would become immediately apparent in the event of another major crisis such as the 1973 oil embargo and subsequent quadrupling or quintupling of oil prices, since raw materials are indispensable for industrial production. It is quite conceivable that the success of the oil

cartel could exercise a kind of domino effect for other raw materials. In certain cases this has already taken place.

60. We must recognise, on the other hand, that the export of raw materials is a major source of monetary reserves for many third world countries and therefore assumes a key function in their growth and employment policies. This fact alone points up the connection between raw material policy and development policy, the North-South dialogue and the effort to create a more equitable international economic order, which will be further discussed later in this report.

61. The Rapporteur would especially emphasise here that Europe's dependence on foreign raw materials cannot, in principle, be eliminated. Partially, substitution possibilities may exist, perhaps combined with limits on consumption in the consuming countries, but one cannot completely put an end to the fundamental problem of raw material dependence. Europe has largely exhausted its own raw material reserves.

62. In this situation, economic security can be secured only by political means and this means that a solution to Europe's problems can be found only in conjunction with the raw material producers. Thus co-operation rather than confrontation must be the guideline for Europe's foreign policy. This requires due consideration for the needs and opportunities of the developing countries in the context of a raw material policy for Europe.

(iv) The continuation of the North-South dialogue with the goal of a more equitable international economic order

63. Closely connected with this last-mentioned objective is thus the continuation of the North-South dialogue and the construction of a more equitable international economic order. The demands of the developing countries in this respect have been well-known since the United Nations declaration on the establishment of a new international economic order of 1st May 1974. They include *inter alia :*

- — every nations's free choice of its economic and social system ;
- — complete and permanent sovereignty over natural resources and all economic activity ;
- — adoption of an integrated programme to stabilise raw material prices through arrangements patterned after the Lomé Convention and providing for buffer stocks under a common fund to stabilise the developing countries' income from raw material exports ;
- — promotion of producers' cartels in developing countries ;
- — industrialisation of the developing countries with the objective of assuring them at least one-fifth of the world's industrial production by the year 2000 ;
- — instruments and mechanisms for the transfer of technology under equitable conditions ;
- — granting of preferences to developing countries and non-reciprocal treatment in all areas of international economic co-operation ;
- — development assistance without conditions amounting to at least 0.7 % of the industrialised nations' GNPs ;
- — a link between development assistance and the creation of new special drawing rights in the IMF ;
- — a solution to the third world countries' problem of indebtedness ; and
- — a greater voice for the developing countries in the IMF and other international organisations.

64. The Rapporteur is of the opinion that Europe must not close itself to the legitimate demands of the developing countries, even though protection of their own vital interests is of course a legitimate right of the European countries as well. Europe should not acquire the reputation of a club of rich societies unwilling to meet the third world countries half-way. Rather, it should seek to find suitable compromises in appropriate international conferences and in the United Nations General Assembly.

65. The Rapporteur would point in this connection to the work of the international North-South commission under the chairmanship of Willy Brandt. He expects from this commission's report important initiatives for the policy of the European states. He believes further that the long-range interests of the industrial and the developing nations are not contradictory but complementary and reveal common perspectives as well.

66. With a certain apprehension we must also observe that the international weapons trade, particularly the export of weapons to third world countries, is increasing considerably. A growing demand for armaments on the part of countries in the third world, along with growing export pressures within the industrialised nations, could create a dangerous momentum. Global expenditures on armaments in 1977 are estimated at about $400 thousand million. The total value of weapon transfers to the third world has increased sharply. For so-called heavy weapons alone it amounted to around $7.3 thousand million in 1976, as compared to $2 thousand million in 1966 (expressed in constant prices).

67. Regrettable in this connection is the Soviet Union's apparent propensity to limit its relationship to the third world largely to the delivery of weapons. In the view of the Rapporteur, serious steps should be taken better to control arms exports in the future. The export of weapons is not an appropriate form of foreign aid. The European nations should contribute to developing effective international instruments of control and assist in transforming military into peaceful technology.

(v) Assuring the stability of Southern Europe

68. If Europe is to develop successful and stable foreign relations, it must also find convincing solutions for the problems which exist in its midst. The experience of the continuing crisis in Cyprus demonstrates that Europe can optimally exercise its function of assuring peace abroad only when it is able to overcome its own internal conflicts. Whether Europe possesses this ability will be borne out in no small measure by whether it will prove capable of providing an effective contribution to the stabilisation of Southern Europe. This task is directly related to its commitment of solidarity with less-developed Southern Europe.

69. It is now certain that Greece, Spain and Portugal are firmly committed to applying for membership of the European Community. This is a welcome step in the interest of stabilising democracy in these countries.

70. Moreover, the entrance of Spain and Portugal into the European Community means at the same time that both nations can assume a bridge-building function with respect to Latin America. Both nations have historically maintained close ties to Latin America which rest upon a common cultural tradition. Further, following the end of its colonial domination in Africa, Portugal can now play a very useful rôle in European-African relations as well.

71. The Rapporteur is particularly pleased that the governments of the Economic Community member states have agreed in principle to these countries' admission. He would, however, point out in this connection that the accession of these nations will not only make evident social and economic problems within the countries willing to accede which — for a solution — will require specific measures of assistance on the part of the European Community. Perhaps an even greater concern is the economic gap that could arise between the developed north of Europe and the entire southern region of the continent. The entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal into the European Community will create economic difficulties especially for Turkey, Cyprus, Malta and the other Mediterranean states which will likewise require Europe's attention.

72. A further question arises with respect to Yugoslavia. The Rapporteur believes that the problems of those countries in Southern Europe which, at least for the foreseeable future, are not able to join the European Community also urgently require solutions in order to prevent their estrangement from the rest of Europe, especially the European Community. He would therefore raise the question of whether Europe should commit itself to a special programme of economic solidarity for this region. The Rapporteur believes that such a solidarity programme would lie in the interest of the donor as well as of the recipient countries. Europe could thereby provide an important example of its capacity for effective foreign policy action and its determination to provide practical assistance.

V. *Summary*

73. It is certainly not yet possible at this point in time to speak of a unified, co-ordinated European foreign policy. Above all, a number of internal prerequisites for such a development are lacking. Nonetheless, in the Rapporteur's view a web of external relations has grown up among the democratic states of Europe which reveals a unified pattern and which, despite all variations in national interests, shows a series of common features. Outstanding among these is the high degree of Europe's dependence and vulnerability owing to its economic and military position. Europe can guarantee its security only within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Hence arises the common interest of preserving Europe as a force for peace, conciliation and détente and of developing a foreign policy characterised by a willingness to co-operate with all parts of the world. Europe can best develop its influence in the world not as a military but as a civil power.

74. Europe's most vital interests include :

— the maintenance of its security ;

— the continuation and expansion of détente ;

— the assurance of raw material supplies and the maintenance of economic security ;

— the continuation of the North-South dialogue with the goal of a more equitable international economic order ; and

— the assurance of stability in Southern Europe.

75. Without desiring to overestimate Europe's position in the world, one may observe that these objectives present a common challenge which demands of the democratic states of Europe considerable energy in maintaining their common security.

Europe's external relations

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2[1]

tabled by Mr. Antoni and others

1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Considering that military security in Europe is based on a stable balance of forces between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact;".

2. Leave out the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Concerned that the uninterrupted and uncontrolled arms race between the West and the East may upset the balance of forces and give rise to new dangers;".

Signed: Antoni, Bernini, Calamandrei, Corallo

1. See 8th Sitting, 20th November 1978 (Amendments negatived).

Europe's external relations

AMENDMENT 3 [1]

tabled by Mr. Roper

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, at end add:

", recognising that any effective agreement on arms transfers will require the participation of both supplier and recipient countries;".

Signed: Roper

1. See 8th Sitting, 20th November 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

Document 790 **20th November 1978**
Amendments 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9

Europe's external relations

AMENDMENTS 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 [1]

tabled by Mr. Valleix

4. In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "and that this objective" to the end of the paragraph.

5. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "military security" and insert "the security of Europe".

6. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "uncontrolled".

7. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "reduction and control" and insert "universal and controlled reduction".

8. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

9. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "integration" and insert "unification".

Signed : Valleix

1. See 8th Sitting, 20th November 1978 (Amendment 4 withdrawn ; Amendments 5 and 6 agreed to ; Amendment 7 amended and agreed to ; Amendments 8 and 9 negatived).

Document 791 **3rd November 1978**

Relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of member countries

INFORMATION REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments [2] ***by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur***

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Jeambrun* (Alternate for Mr. Visse) (Chairman) ; MM. Schlingemann (Alternate : *Portheine*), *De Poi* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Arfé, *Böhm*, Bonnel (Alternate : *Dejardin*), Delehedde, *Enders*, Hengel, Kershaw, *Roper*, *Spautz*, Stoffelen (Alternate : *Voogd*), *Tanghe*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur)

I. *Activities of the Committee*

1. The present report on the activities of the Committee covers the period May to October 1978. In this brief space of time, the following publications were issued :

2. (*i*) Collected Texts 28 relating to action taken in national parliaments in implementation of recommendations adopted by the Assembly ; the next edition will be published just before the November 1978 session. These editions have been published every six months since May 1963. Before then, the texts of interventions were included in the body of the Committee's report.

3. (*ii*) The booklet "Texts adopted and brief account of the session" relating to the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session, published in five languages. This booklet is sent to all members of parliament of member countries to keep some 3,000 persons informed of the work of the Assembly in their own languages and has been distributed after each part-session since June 1965.

4. (*iii*) The monthly information bulletin on European parliamentary activity in the seven member states of WEU. By the next session, some 172 issues of this bulletin will have been published since it started in July 1964. There is an index of the bulletin for the period 1964-70 which has been up-dated six times to cover the first ten years. A second index for the period July 1974 to June 1979 will be issued during the second half of next year.

5. At the close of the last session (19th-22nd June 1978), the Committee discussed the texts which had just been adopted, as it does every six months. In accordance with Rule 42*bis* of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, it selected the following recommendations which it felt should be discussed in the parliaments of member countries :

— 313 on security in the Mediterranean ;

— 314 on international terrorism ; and

— 318 on European security and African problems.

6. These three recommendations were officially transmitted by Mr. K.-U. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, to the Presidents of the parliaments of member countries who in turn refer them to the appropriate committees. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the three texts were reproduced in full in the German Delegation's report to the Bundestag (Document 8/1991 of 12th July 1978).

7. For several years, the German Delegation has submitted a report twice a year after each part-session, including the full text of speeches by members of the delegation, and the Italian Delegation once a year appended to the report by the Committee for European Affairs. In France, the Senate and the National Assembly both include in their weekly information bulletins on work in their respective chambers a brief report on each part-session of the WEU Assembly. Since these bulletins are sent free of charge to anyone requesting them, this procedure helps to make the WEU Assembly known to people in France who are interested in politics. Your Rapporteur suggests that the four other member countries do likewise : a report might be included in the *Chambre des Députés*, a Luxembourg review distributed free of charge throughout the Grand Duchy, and in the Weekly Information Bulletin of the House of Lords and its equivalent in the House of Commons which, since July 1978, have been keeping the public informed of the work of the British parliament (for an annual subscription of £24). The Belgian and Netherlands Delegations could certainly find similar solutions.

8. Following the selection of texts for transmission to the parliaments of WEU member states, the Chairman of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Mr. Jeambrun, wrote to all Committee members on 28th June 1978 sending model questions to be put on the three recommendations and a fourth question asking whether, further to the statement by Mr. Davignon to the European Parliament on 13th June 1978, the European Community was empowered to consider armaments questions. By 1st November questions had been put and answers received in six countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom).

9. Apart from these questions and answers, the Committee secretariat has been informed of other interventions since Collected Texts 28 was issued. They will all be included in Collected Texts 29 except the following :

— account of the work of the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (19th-22nd June 1978), in the Senate brief information bulletin 159 of 5th July 1978, page 18 ;

— international activities and parliamentary relations : WEU Assembly, in the National Assembly bulletin 10 of 27th June 1978, pages 73-75 ;

— government report on the activities of WEU from 1st October 1977 to 31st

March 1978, Bundestag document 8/1688 ;

— report by the German Delegation on the session of the WEU Assembly from 19th to 22nd June 1978, Bundestag document 8/1991.

10. A total of fifty-one interventions was recorded on 1st November compared with thirty-eight for the first half of 1978 and fifteen for the second half of 1977. Although the low level reached in the period 1972-74 seems past history, the total number of interventions is still below normal. Your Rapporteur urges members to use the work of the WEU Assembly in their own parliaments and not forget to keep the Committee Secretariat informed since it cannot record what is not reported.

II. *Replies by governments to questions relating to Recommendation 314 and on the defence responsibilities of the European Community*

A. *Fight against terrorism*

11. Questions relating to Recommendation 314 were put as follows :

> "Is the government prepared, together with the Western European countries which are members of the same alliances, to endeavour to co-ordinate the use of their respective internal defence and police forces to meet the challenge to democracy stemming from terrorist operations in many countries and to take concerted action so that states are effectively deterred from granting any form of assistance to terrorist movements ?"

12. Questions on the *two* issues of co-ordinating the use of internal defence and police forces and the fight against terrorist operations were put in :

— Luxembourg (30th June 1978) ;

— Belgium (20th July 1978) ;

— Italy (28th July 1978) ;

— Netherlands (28th August 1978) ;

— France (15th September 1978).

13. The secretariat has recorded replies from the Belgian Government (8th August 1978), the Netherlands Government (28th August 1978), the Luxembourg Government (2nd October 1978) and the French Government (10th October 1978).

14. These replies report that there is co-operation (close, according to the Luxembourg Minister) in the exchange of information on terrorist acts, police action and the protection of civil aircraft and nuclear installations. However, the French Minister specified that co-operation must not be interpreted as meaning forces from various countries being placed on a war footing and under a single command.

15. The meetings of Ministers of the Interior in June 1976, May 1977 and autumn 1978 and France's suggestions for the creation of a European juridical area, the European convention on the suppression of terrorism and, finally, a new convention governing relations between two member states, one of which has not acceded to the abovementioned convention, are all elements in the consolidation of this co-operation.

16. On the second point, Mr. Thorn, Luxembourg Minister, described the position of member states :

> "With regard to concerted action to deter effectively any state from granting any assistance whatsoever to terrorist operations, note should be taken of the declaration adopted at the summit meeting of the seven principal western powers held in Bonn last July. The states represented undertook to break off air links to and from any country refusing to extradite or put on trial those responsible for hijacking aircraft or refusing to return the aircraft in question."

17. Mr. Bonnet, French Minister of the Interior, while thinking that the wording used by the WEU Assembly, i.e. "to deter effectively any state from granting any assistance whatsoever", went too far, said that France had never spared its efforts to reach agreements on this subject and would continue to do so.

B. *Statement in the European Parliament by Mr. Davignon, member of the Commission of the European Community*

18. Mr. Davignon spoke during the debate on a report submitted by Mr. Klepsch, a member of the European Parliament and also an alternate member of the WEU Assembly since 1970 and Rapporteur of the latter's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in May and November 1974. The report submitted in Strasbourg on 13th June 1978 is entitled "European armaments procurement co-operation". According to the Rapporteur, such co-operation is due, *inter alia,* to "the military requirements of interoperability and or standardisation ; the need to maintain a European armaments industry" [1]. Here the European Community "can play an important part and make a vital contribution of a kind which is not possible for other organisations like NATO or WEU" [1].

1. Report of Proceedings, page 43.

19. Mr. Davignon said :

"I would therefore like there to be no misunderstanding. The Commission is in a position to formulate its views on the document as it stands and is interested in making proposals on the industrial sector as related to the programme of government purchases. It is perfectly clear that the Commission should retain, in this as in other matters, all its powers of judgement." [1]

20. Mr. Soury, a member of the European Parliament, said the aim of the debate was to "promote a European defence policy" [2].

21. Finally, Mr. Davignon said he "would like to preface [his] remarks by giving [his] view on the legality of the debate" :

"The first thing to be said is that a number of people consider that any question involving defence or security is outside the Community's competence. This is not our view, nor, moreover, was it that of the authors of the treaty, because it provides for certain customs duties on the importation of military material into the Community. This is ample proof that the Community is not *ipso facto* excluded from dealing with military matters." [3]

22. The position thus adopted provoked a number of reactions, and questions were put in several parliaments. For the time being, your Rapporteur can inform you of the opinions of only the Belgian and French Governments.

23. On 8th August, Mr. Simonet, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, said in answer to a question put by Mr. Tanghe :

".....

From these statements it can be seen that the Commisison has no intention of dealing with defence questions or matters relating to the choice of armaments but of concentrating on industrial data.

The government considers that the reorganisation of various industrial sectors in the Community, including those which occasionally or regularly produce armaments, is an important task and that it is desirable for the various Community institutions to devote attention to it."

24. Conversely, Mr. de Guiringaud, the French Minister, expressed a quite different opinion. Already, on 8th June 1978, during the foreign policy debate in the National Assembly and a few days before the debate in the European Parliament, he said :

"The powers of the assembly are laid down by treaty. They may be neither modified nor extended without a revision of the treaties. This revision would first require the unanimity of the nine governments and in France the constitutionality of the text would have to be scrutinised and its adoption, if necessary, made subject to a revision of the constitution.

These are major juridical guarantees, clearly set out moreover in the decision of the Constitutional Council of 30th December 1977.

Admittedly — as I said myself during the debate on ratification — no one can prevent members of the assembly discussing subjects not covered by the treaties and referring for instance to a specific topical political matter. These exchanges of views between representatives of the nine countries on problems in the world and in particular in Europe can help to shape opinions. If this is so, France can but welcome the fact.

It remains, and I again stress the fact, that when the assembly feels it should discuss questions which are outside its responsibility, such as the armaments problems mentioned by Mr. Valleix, it does so in conditions which could in no way commit governments for which any such positions are, as Mr. Couve de Murville recalled in quoting Article 2 of the law of approval, "null and void".

Do I need to recall that the member states are sovereign states pursuing a fully-independent external policy which respects national sovereignty ?"

25. Subsequently, answering two questions put by Mr. Krieg (21st June) and Mr. Debré (23rd June), he said :

"The resolution adopted by the European parliamentary assembly on the basis of a report tabled on behalf of the Political Committee on European armaments procurement co-operation referred to by the honourable member is outside the terms of reference of the assembly of the European Community and outside the field of application of the treaties. In this connection the government reserves the right to make the necessary remarks about the assembly's attitude at the appropriate time. Where the text of the resolution is concerned, the government specifies that it is of course null and void.

.....

1. Report of Proceedings, page 46.
2. Report of Proceedings, page 55.
3. Report of Proceedings, page 71.

> As for the European parliamentary assembly, the government has noted that the adoption of a motion on the armaments industry was outside the terms of reference accorded to that institution by the treaties ; it reserves the right to make the necessary remarks on this subject at the appropriate time..."

He further said that Mr. Davignon's interpretation of the Rome Treaty "might be criticised".

26. However, the report adopted by the European Parliament was studied by the armaments directors of member countries of the independent European programme group, which is believed to have described its contents as an "interesting proposal" [1].

27. The British Government regards armaments procurement as an essential part of defence policy and considers that the independent European programme group is the main European forum for discussion of co-operation in defence equipment matters.

28. The WEU Council for its part, expressing the views of the seven member governments, made the following reply on 14th August 1978 to written question 184 put by Mr. Forni :

> "The Council consider the WEU Assembly to be the only assembly responsible for defence questions. The Council are however of the opinion that it is not within their province to make a statement on the competence or non-competence of institutions or organs of institutions outside WEU itself, especially as their composition differs from that of WEU."

1. See *Atlantic News* 1062, 11th October 1978, page 2.

APPENDIX I

Table of action in the parliaments of member countries

(Totals by country for each session)

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	8	19	3	11	3	82
1976	16	40	13	14	2	3	8	96
1977	4	18	4	13	1	1	14	55
1978	12	18	2	6	2	6	8	54
Total	93	227	195	270	21	94	219	1,119
Annual average	9.83	8.48	3.96	11.74	0.91	4.09	9.52	6.91

APPENDIX II

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1976

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1976	Res. 59		2	4				2		8	49
	284									—	
	285	x	2	5	2	2				11	
	286									—	
	287			2	2	1		1	2	8	
	288	x								—	
	289	x	4	5	2	3				14	
	290	x	4	2		2				8	
Nov. 1976	291									—	47
	292									—	
	293	x	2	2		2				6	
	294									—	
	295	x			2	1	2			5	
	296			2		2				4	
	Res. 60									—	
Other action			5	15	5	1			6	32	
June 1977	297									—	22
	298	x				1				1	
	299	x				2			2	4	
	300					1			2	3	
	301					1			2	3	
	302		2			1			2	5	
	303									—	
	304					1			2	3	
	305					1			2	3	
	306									—	
Nov. 1977	307	x				1				1	33
	308	x				1	1			2	
	309	x				1		1		2	
	310	x				1				1	
	311	x		1		1				2	
Other action			4	15	4				2	25	
June 1978	312									—	54
	313		2	2					2	6	
	314		2	2		1	2	3	2	12	
	315					2				2	
	316									—	
	317		2			1				3	
	318		2	1		1			2	6	
	319									—	
	320									—	
	321					1				1	
Other action			4	13	2			3	2	24	

APPENDIX III

Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

22nd February 1963	Paris
10th October 1963	Rome
11th-12th November 1964	Bonn
28th-29th April 1965	The Hague
15th-16th December 1965	Brussels
30th October-1st November 1966	London
23rd-24th November 1967	Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin)
2nd-3rd April 1968	Luxembourg
26th-27th March 1969	Rome
27th-28th October 1969	Paris
14th-15th April 1970	Bonn
1st-2nd April 1971	Rome
4th-5th November 1971	Bonn
24th-25th February 1972	The Hague
18th-19th September 1972	Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany)
1st-2nd May 1973	St. Hélier (Regional parliament of the States of Jersey)
15th-18th October 1973	Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State of Bavaria)
8th-10th July 1974	Palermo (Regional parliament of Sicily)
27th-28th October 1975	The Hague
11th-12th May 1976	Luxembourg
25th-26th November 1976	Brussels
9th-10th May 1977	Rome
3th-4th November 1977	Bonn — Wiesbaden (Regional parliament of Hesse)
31st May-1st June 1978	Paris — Cergy/Pontoise
3rd November 1978	Rome

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 312 to 321

RECOMMENDATION 312 [1]

on strategic mobility [2]

The Assembly,

Noting the great increase in the strategic mobility of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the last decade;

Stressing the need for the armed forces of the Atlantic Alliance on routine NATO missions to be able to move freely throughout the area of the Alliance, but noting that as yet not all members offer sufficiently convenient arrangements;

Noting the significance for strategic mobility of decisions to be taken at the Conference on the Law of the Sea,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

That it urge member governments:

1. Through their representatives on the North Atlantic Council to call on all countries of the Atlantic Alliance:

   (*a*) to offer mutual overflight and staging rights for military transport and combat aircraft on exclusively routine NATO missions or agreed exercises, subject only to normal notice through air traffic control or military channels;

   (*b*) to permit routine port visits by warships of countries of the Alliance on normal NATO tasks at not more than two weeks' notice through military channels, and to waive charges on an agreed uniform basis, or consider multilateral funding;

2. Through their representatives at the Conference on the Law of the Sea to call for:

   (*a*) the high seas status, or a status no more restrictive for the operation of warships and military aircraft, of all waters beyond the territorial sea of a maximum breadth of twelve miles to be maintained;

   (*b*) the right of transit passage, as now defined in the informal composite negotiating text, through all straits linking two parts of the high seas as defined in paragraph 2 (*a*) above, to permit the overflight of aircraft and passage of warships, including the submerged passage of submarines, in normal operational mode.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (1st Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 758).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 312

1. The Council have considered the points raised in Recommendation 312 on strategic mobility which they have noted with interest.

2. The procedures relating to overflight and staging rights for aircraft and staging rights for ships are laid down in a series of agreements between allied countries. There would appear to be no need to change these arrangements which are in the main satisfactory.

3. The Council welcome the call for the maintenance of the high seas status of all waters beyond a territorial sea limited to a maximum of twelve miles except insofar as they are affected by national jurisdiction over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf resources. This is an important issue already widely appreciated and supported by the governments of the union. The Council believe that the present United Nations Law of the Sea Conference negotiating text protects this residual high seas status of waters beyond the territorial sea.

4. The Council welcome the call to support at UNLOSC the concept of transit passage as now defined in the informal composite negotiating text, through straits which are used for international navigation which would permit the unannounced overflight of aircraft, the passage of warships and the submerged passage of submarines.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th October 1978.

RECOMMENDATION 313 [1]

on security in the Mediterranean [2]

The Assembly,

(*i*) Recalling at the present time of economic difficulties that security will always be a condition of the political freedoms and economic well-being of the allied countries, and that accordingly an adequate defence effort must be maintained ;

(*ii*) Believing that the Soviet Union through its continued quest for military bases in the Mediterranean, its interventionist policy in Africa and its reiteration of the dangerously ambiguous "Brezhnev doctrine" presents the greatest military threat in the region ;

(*iii*) Aware that one of the greatest risks of major conflict through miscalculation arises in the Mediterranean area where the opposing interests of East and West merge with those of North and South ;

(*iv*) Believing therefore that every effort should be made through diplomatic channels to foster : a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East and the differences between allied countries in the area ; the continued independence and integrity of Yugoslavia and the continued denial of military bases to forces of the Soviet Union ;

(*v*) Believing that NATO provides for the foreseeable future the principal credible basis for the security of its members in the Mediterranean area and that its effectiveness depends on the full support and participation of all member countries ;

(*vi*) Believing in particular that the full and equal participation in NATO of both Greece and Turkey is vital to the security of each and to that of the Alliance as a whole ;

(*vii*) Reiterating its view that security in the Mediterranean would be greatly enhanced by the accession of a democratic Spain to NATO, but stressing that such a decision is for a parliamentary majority in that country after the adoption of the new constitution ;

(*viii*) Aware of the many conflicting considerations that must be reconciled in any policy on arms supply to non-NATO countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view :

1. To strengthen the collective position of the Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean :

   (*a*) by the more public identification of all member countries with NATO arrangements in the area ;

   (*b*) through the participation of forces of as many member countries as possible in exercices and contingency planning ;

   (*c*) by adjusting NATO command arrangements to reflect the reality of national contributions to NATO in the Mediterranean area ;

   (*d*) by taking full account of the respective special requirements of Greece, Portugal and Turkey for the supply of necessary defence equipment and assistance, and by calling on the United States to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey ;

   (*e*) by considering what joint armaments production projects can usefully be established in Greece and Turkey in the NATO framework ;

2. (*a*) To encourage Greece and Turkey to continue negotiations to settle their remaining bilateral differences ;

   (*b*) To urge the two Cypriot communities to resume their direct negotiations in the presence of the United Nations Secretary-General without further delay ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Grant on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 776).

3. To arrange closer links between the integrated military structure of NATO and the Spanish armed forces, and their participation in NATO exercises, while leaving a decision on the accession of Spain to NATO to democratic discussion in the Spanish parliament ;

4. To ensure that non-NATO countries in the Mediterranean continue to see their interests best served by denying base rights or facilities to the Soviet armed forces ;

5. To proclaim the unequivocal support of the West for the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia and its continued non-aligned status ;

6. To ensure that all aspects of policy on arms exports by NATO countries to any non-NATO country are fully reviewed in the appropriate allied forum.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 313

1. The Council welcome the call for more public support, by member countries participating in the integrated military structure, for the arrangements made in the Mediterranean, and to ensure their participation in exercises and contingency planning. Of the non-Mediterranean members of the union the United Kingdom contributes from time to time a ship to the naval on-call force in the Mediterranean, and all three United Kingdom services participate in exercises in the area. Furthermore the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands regularly participate in naval exercises in the Mediterranean. It should also be pointed out that ACE mobile force, which includes troops from several non-Mediterranean nations, regularly participates in exercises planned for the area. NATO make a point of drawing public attention to these exercises through the media. It is also significant that France has in recent years strengthened her naval forces in the Mediterranean.

2. It is the Council's view that command arrangements are primarily a matter for NATO.

3. Member states participate in the efforts of the Alliance to help Greece, Portugal and Turkey and indeed all allies to meet their legitimate defence needs.

4. The Council invite member nations to consider carefully what could usefully be done to develop co-operation with Greece and Turkey in specific areas of defence industry and individual projects.

5. The member countries of the Alliance have consistently encouraged Greece and Turkey to continue negotiations to settle their remaining bilateral differences.

They likewise urge the two Cypriot communities to resume their direct negotiations.

6. The Council believe that expansion of Soviet forces in the Mediterranean or the establishment of new facilities for them in that area would not be in the interests of peace generally.

7. The Council support unequivocally the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia and its continued non-aligned status.

8. The Council attach importance to the use of the consultative Co-ordinating Committee for reviewing certain aspects of policy on arms exports to certain countries outside the Alliance. Full harmonisation of policy, however, is not always within reach given the national interests involved.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th October 1978.

RECOMMENDATION 314 [1]

on international terrorism [2]

The Assembly,

Considering the use of terrorist methods by organisations of any denomination to be a challenge to the practice of democracy by Western European countries and liable to jeopardise their security ;

Considering that the growth of modern technology makes the more industrialised countries particularly vulnerable to terrorist organisations ;

Noting that the framework of terrorist action has widened beyond national frontiers ;

Considering therefore that terrorism constitutes a problem which can be tackled also in an international framework, as the Council of Europe did in preparing a European convention covering the matters within its competence ;

Deploring the fact that certain sovereign states have on a number of occasions granted passive and even sometimes active assistance to terrorist operations ;

Noting that these movements have become particularly active since 1970, compelling some governments of member countries to make large-scale increases in their internal defence and police forces ;

Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty gives the Council specific responsibility with regard to the fight against terrorism ;

Welcoming the fact that the Council, in 1970 and subsequent years, took the initiative of exercising its responsibilities with regard to the fight against piracy in the air and the protection of diplomats,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote the ratification by the member states of WEU of the convention on terrorism drawn up by the Council of Europe and already signed by the member governments ;

2. Examine, when approving the tables submitted by member countries on their internal defence and police forces, the reasons justifying variations in these tables ;

3. Seek thereby to co-ordinate the conditions in which such forces may be used to combat terrorism ;

4. Encourage political consultations between its members towards finding international solutions to problems liable to provoke terrorist activities ;

5. Study the means by which Western Europe can effectively dissuade any state from granting assistance to terrorists through asylum or otherwise ;

6. Ask member governments to demonstrate their solidarity towards terrorist threats by applying strictly all agreed measures ;

7. Report to the Assembly by appropriate means on the measures it has taken to meet the challenge of international terrorism.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (4th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Müller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 771).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 314

1. The Council have followed the drawing-up and noted the signing, on 27th January 1977, of the European Convention on the suppression of terrorism and stress the fact that the convention came into force on 4th August 1978.

2. When the Council examine the reports received from member countries on the organisation of their internal defence and police forces, they will also take account of the reasons given in support of the modifications introduced.

3. The Council believe it is proper to contribute to the co-ordination of police and security forces for the fight against international terrorism.

4. The Council are not unaware that, within the framework of European political co-operation, the member states of the European Communities discuss in depth the problems raised by the suppression of terrorism. The Council do not feel that they should initiate any special activity in WEU which might duplicate this work.

5. Reference is also made to the declaration on the hijacking of aircraft adopted at the economic summit in Bonn on 16th and 17th July 1978. The Council will watch subsequent developments in this field.

6-7. The Council feel that the governments of member states, in their fight against terrorism, have so far made all the joint efforts it was possible for them to make. These efforts will be continued in the light of future developments.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th November 1978.

RECOMMENDATION 315 [1]

on China and European security [2]

The Assembly,

Noting China's continuing determination to safeguard its own security and ensure respect for its fully independent nationhood and its frontiers ;

Considering that total resistance to external aggression from any source is a fundamental element in Chinese political thinking as it is in Western Europe ;

Welcoming and reciprocating the Chinese Government's continuing efforts to develop good relations with Europe ;

Considering that China is now a significant factor in the maintenance of global peace and security,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine attentively the rôle China may play in regard to European and global security and study carefully the views expressed by the Chinese Government on matters relating to threats to international peace ;

2. Encourage member governments both to develop their bilateral trade relations with China and continue to concert their approach especially within the framework of the EEC with a view to increasing trade between Europe and China ;

3. Favourably consider China's requests for increased industrial technology.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (4th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 770).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 315

The Council, having noted Assembly Recommendation 315, wish to make it clear that the governments of the member states remain willing to develop and strengthen both their political and their economic relations with China. They will continue their efforts to deepen their political dialogue with that country since they consider that no-one can be unaware of the impact of measures taken by such an important country and since the solution of a number of problems faced by the international community cannot be usefully sought and effectively ensured without China's being associated in it. Furthermore, these same governments will continue to give due attention to the strengthening of economic and technical relations, since the existence of a stable and confident China seems to them likely to be a propitious factor for the maintenance of stability in the world.

The Council are convinced that the policy thus defined, which can and must be followed with a view to improving the chances of world-wide détente, will be a positive contribution to peace and will benefit the security of the whole international community.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th October 1978.

RECOMMENDATION 316 [1]

on United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology [2]

The Assembly,

Considering that, notwithstanding the mutual European-United States interest in a common defence system, $10-15 billion is wasted each year on complicated military equipment either already produced or in service on this or the other side of the Atlantic;

Convinced that greater international co-operation in advanced technology projects is a necessity if the free world is to strengthen its posture vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc;

Noting the need expressed in industrial circles for more transatlantic co-operation to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance;

Considering that existing organisations can adequately and actively promote the necessary co-operation;

Aware of the strong influence the adoption of an American national energy plan will have on Europe's possibilities as regards oil and gas supplies and the dangers which will arise if the oil-producing nations are unable to meet world demand in 1985 by as much as 20 %;

Aware that several member countries and the United States are independently developing new methods for the gasification and liquefaction of coal and that large sums of money are needed to promote alternative technologies;

Convinced of the need to relay data from European satellites via the new tracking and data relay satellite system TDRSS;

Considering that member governments should pursue a policy whereby all Europe's space activities are integrated in ESA and that through ESA they should co-operate with the United States, and with NASA in particular, since there will shortly be new space developments in both communications and energy and both agencies have restricted budgets;

Considering that the United States Government's new aviation policy and liberal pricing system will have far-reaching repercussions for both the airlines and the aircraft industry;

Regretting the deplorably slow rate of progress in the Law of the Sea Conference now in its seventh session;

Noting that:

(*a*) marine scientists in the United States and elsewhere are inhibited by the 200-mile limit of the economic zone following the Law of the Sea Conference in their fundamental and applied research on mineral and organic resources of the oceans, and on energy which might be derived from tapping the natural flows of tides, waves and currents;

(*b*) fish supplies in the Mediterranean and oceans can be enhanced by the addition of organic wastes;

(*c*) measures to conserve or destroy certain species of sea fauna can disturb the balance of nature and cause a chain reaction of effects upon other species,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

A. To establish a high-level European-United States committee to promote European-United States co-operation in advanced technology projects in which the EEC would also participate on the Euro-

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by MM. Konings, Treu, Dr. Phipps and Mr. Jessel on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 773).

pean side, this high-level committee meeting at least once a year and submitting proposals to the governments concerned on :

(*a*) how to implement the two-way street policy in respect of advanced military equipment in order to make more efficient use of Alliance resources ;

(*b*) how to promote this policy at an early stage in research and development of new advanced weapon systems ;

(*c*) how to include military satellites and other military communications equipment in this co-operation whenever possible ;

(*d*) how to work together in research and development of alternative technologies such as gasification and liquefaction of coal, solar energy and other new sources of energy and how to improve the productivity of certain nuclear reactors ;

(*e*) how to co-operate in civil and military oceanographic activities, especially in seabed mining and the sharing of data on fish conservation, and promote the successful conclusion of the Law of the Sea Conference ;

B. 1. To initiate urgent consideration by the United Nations as to means by which fundamental and applied ocean research can continue without restraint whilst providing for the mineral and other rights of each coastal state by sharing and publishing the results of research ;

2. To adopt national fisheries and conservation policies which reflect scientific knowledge in respect of :

(*i*) the interrelationships between each species and its prey (e.g. porpoises and tuna) ;

(*ii*) the effect upon fish stocks of organic wastes which when sufficiently diluted are generally beneficial and inorganic wastes which are generally detrimental ;

C. To adopt a common policy in the EEC framework vis-à-vis the new United States aviation policy and not act in a dispersed manner with regard to the new aviation agreements now suggested by the United States ;

D. 1. To instruct ESA to study the possibilities either of participating in the United States tracking and data relay satellite system and building the required European ground station or of building its own TDRS system ;

2. To draw up guidelines for working with the United States authorities on the development of the space shuttle transportation system, with special reference to communications and solar power satellites ;

3. To participate in more of NASA's scientific space projects through ESA.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 316

1. The Council feel that they should draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that the Atlantic Alliance is concerned with United States-European co-operation and co-ordination in advanced technology and that in particular the long-term defence programme drawn up by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation meets the points raised in Section A of Recommendation 316.

A (*a*) Since work began on drawing up this programme, the United States has confirmed its acceptance of the principle of a more equitable balance in trade in advanced military equipment. Moreover, the aim of this programme is to achieve rationalisation and increased military efficiency through greater standardisation and interoperability.

A (*b*) The programme stresses the need to improve the NATO forces' means of defence in a number of fields, more especially the following: anti-armour units, modern air-to-surface weapons and defence against chemical weapons. The next generation of anti-armour weapons might be developed through inter-allied co-operation or co-ordination. Moreover, the programme provides for the development of common families of air-to-surface weapons.

The allies have also recognised the need for the mutual transfer of technology where this will help to increase the standardisation and interoperability of NATO defence equipment.

A (*c*) In the field of telecommunications, command and control, the programme provides for certain measures designed to increase the overall facilities of the Alliance, which are essential to political consultation in times of crisis, and make it possible to assume political authority over the forces through the high degree of interoperability in the field of tactical telecommunications which the programme will bring about. Co-operation and co-ordination will be directed to naval telecommunications, the interoperability of tactical networks, single-channel radio access, inter-linking of NATO and national sectors, automatic strategic data-handling and improvements to war headquarters.

In the light of all these facts, the establishment of a United States-Europe committee, as recommended by the Assembly, does not seem necessary because it might duplicate the work of the existing Atlantic Alliance bodies. It should further be pointed out that the independent European programme group (IEPG) is studying the aspects of Atlantic relations mentioned by the Assembly.

A (*d*) With regard to collaboration in research and development of alternative technologies, such as gasification and liquefaction of coal, a high degree of German-Belgian co-operation already exists in this field and is developing very satisfactorily. A procedure for obtaining support from the European Community has been set in motion. France is considering the possibility of joining in this agreement. Co-operation with the United States in this field has come up against technical difficulties arising from the difference in the depth of the coal seams.

The member countries which participate in the IEA attach great importance to the activities of that organisation with regard to research and development of other new sources of energy. The European Communities take part in this work.

In the nuclear field, collaboration between Europe and the United States takes place essentially within the framework of Euratom/United States co-operation.

A (*e*) The member states of WEU cannot but encourage collaboration in the field of oceanographic activities, especially in seabed mining and the sharing of data on fish conservation. To this end, they are doing their utmost to ensure that the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea shall come to a successful conclusion.

B. 1. The current negotiations at the Law of the Sea Conference include discussion of a régime to govern scientific oceanographic research. Efforts have been made in the negotiations to achieve an acceptable balance between the wish of coastal states to regulate and conduct marine scientific research and the need for researching states to proceed as freely as possible with scientific research to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment. Although the negotiations have not yet been completed, it is hoped that the eventual régime will protect the interests of both coastal and researching states.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th November 1978.

2. With regard to fishing zones and the protection of fish species, this is dealt with in the EEC, where full account is taken of the special scientific knowledge provided by each member state regarding its own areas and the corresponding marine flora.

In addition, studies are at present being made at UNEP on the effects of organic and non-organic wastes on fish stocks.

C. The European civil aviation authorities are endeavouring to co-ordinate their attitude towards questions of international civil aviation within the framework of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) to which all EEC countries belong. These efforts to co-ordinate apply in particular to north Atlantic air traffic.

D. 1. The European Space Agency has undertaken the Earthnet programme which is designed to set up a European network of receiving, processing and distributing stations for data and images transmitted by all tracking satellites. The network has stations in France (Lannion), Italy (Fucino), the United Kingdom (Oakhanger) and Sweden (Kiruna). In connection with the Earthnet programme, agreements have been concluded with NASA. The ESA is examining the need for European tracking satellites.

2. The possibility that European countries might work with the United States in the field of space transport, telecommunications and solar power satellites is basically governed by the manner in which NASA's programmes are run. However, a useful starting point exists in the current co-operation between the ESA and the United States Space Agency for the construction of Spacelab, which is to be put in orbit by the space shuttle.

3. ESA also co-operates with NASA in implementing its scientific programme. In this context, it may be noted that ESA has outlined a programme to use the space available in the Spacelab laboratory for scientific experiments.

RECOMMENDATION 317 [1]

on application satellites [2]

The Assembly,

Welcoming the Council's statement that Europe needs to develop and apply overall aeronautical, space and energy policies and that European industry's capacity and technical level should be maintained;

Considering that the ESA convention was signed on 30th May 1975 but that of the original ten members of the former ESRO only the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland have ratified it;

Regretting the unwillingness of several member countries' governments to adopt and finance an extended overall communications satellite programme as well as the Ariane launcher programme;

Aware of the need to enable the European aerospace industry to supply a satisfactory share of satellite systems intended for European countries, international organisations and domestic and regional systems in third world countries;

Noting the lack of a long-range European meteorological satellite programme and an earth resources programme apart from ESA's earthnet programme;

Considering that, although some member countries support their military forces, or realise the need to do so, through military application satellites, there are no plans for a proper European programme to terminate Europe's total dependence on United States satellites in spite of the fact that many European satellites are, technically speaking, on a par with American satellites;

Considering further that the European aerospace industry should be given a fair share of orders for military application satellites from NATO countries and the Alliance as a whole,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Urge the governments of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to accelerate ratification of the ESA convention and address a similar request to the Spanish Government;

II. Invite the governments of the member states of the European Space Agency to take appropriate steps to assure a substantive European presence in the exploitation of space and in particular:

(*a*) to adopt a three-year ceiling for compulsory expenditure;

(*b*) to adopt and finance an extended overall communications satellite programme;

(*c*) to decide on the production of a first series of five Ariane launchers;

(*d*) to make sure that Europe will be associated with future development of the United States space transport system as it has been associated with its present development in financing the spacelab;

(*e*) to ensure the pursuit and development of European activities in earth observation including meteorology and remote sensing by satellites;

(*f*) to promote the Europeanisation of the French project Spot (*satellite probatoire d'observation de la terre*);

(*g*) to offer European industry a fair share of NATO orders for military application satellites,

with a view to further strengthening Europe's industrial potential in aerospace matters and, in the light of the early prospect of world markets being opened, thus promoting Europe's position in application satellites which is of major importance for employment in this industry.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 766).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 317

The United Kingdom ratified the convention in March 1978 and Belgium in October 1978. The ratification process is following its normal course in member countries where it has not yet been completed and there is reason to believe that these ratifications will be forthcoming within a reasonable time.

The overall telecommunications satellite programme and the production of a promotional series of five Ariane launchers have already been agreed upon by the representatives of the countries represented in the European Space Agency.

The French earth observation satellite project (SPOT) was submitted to each of the member states of the European Space Agency within the time limit and in accordance with the procedures laid down by the ESA Convention. Although member states had the opportunity to participate in this new project, it emerged, in the course of debates in the Council of the Agency, that only one of them wished to do so. The French Government therefore decided to carry out SPOT as a national project, and France has stated that she would be prepared, if requested by the states concerned which are members of the European Space Agency, to permit, when the time comes, the use of the SPOT platform for future European missions.

In this context it should be mentioned that ESA member states are considering a programme for an ESA earth observation satellite to be launched by 1985.

During the 1977-81 period, two programmes (Ariane and Spacelab), of a size never before achieved in Europe, are due to be completed and a number of geostationary satellites (OTS, ECS, METEOSAT, MAROTS) have been or are to be launched. The success of these programmes will, from 1981 onwards, open for Europe the age of operational application satellites, especially in the communications field.

Member countries have noted the Assembly's interest in the pursuit of European activities in earth observation including meteorology and remote sensing by satellites.

Furthermore the Council recognise the need for European industry to receive a fair share of orders in connection with military application satellites.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 6th November 1978.

RECOMMENDATION 318 [1]

on European security and African problems [2]

The Assembly,

Considering that co-operation between Western Europe and the African countries is essential to the security of Europe and the necessary economic development of Africa ;

Welcoming the determination constantly expressed by African states to settle problems between themselves free from intervention by powers outside the continent of Africa ;

Noting nevertheless that unrest in the African continent has often provided an opportunity or pretext for external intervention ;

Considering that respect for the sovereignty of African states remains a basic goal of any European policy ;

Regretting that the political framework inherited from the colonial period is ill-adapted to ethnic, linguistic and religious realities ;

Considering that Europe should contribute fully to the economic, social and cultural development of Africa ;

Condemning the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms by some African governments ;

Condemning the policy of apartheid pursued by the South African Republic as contrary to the principles of democracy and human rights on which western civilisation is based ;

Welcoming the effort made by several African states to form a force with a view to maintaining peace on the African continent and defending it against any interference from outside ;

Encouraging the member countries to pursue the efforts made in Paris on 5th June 1978 by five western powers and in Copenhagen on 12th June by the members of the European Community to concert their African policies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that its members hold continuing consultations in the most appropriate framework with a view to co-ordinating their African policies ;

2. Co-ordinate the efforts of its members to assist in establishing peace and security in southern Africa in order to establish a just and democratic transition to majority rule in Rhodesia, induce the South African Republic to terminate apartheid and promote the independence of Namibia ;

3. Initiate steps to reduce the present level of arms sales from external countries to Africa ;

4. Study means of achieving a strict limitation of such sales, including enforcement of the embargo on arms supplies to the South African Republic ;

5. Approach other arms suppliers with a view to their participating in this undertaking ;

6. Reconsider policies of investment and technology transfer in South Africa and Rhodesia which might render ineffective the embargo on supplies of military equipment in that they strengthen the industrial potential of these countries ;

7. Relate the economic assistance extended by European countries to the African states to the development of human rights in those countries ;

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Müller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 772).

8. Promote through co-operation with African states their economic and social development, as well as their democratic development, with due respect for human rights ;

9. Foster the development of co-operation between Europe and Africa as defined in the Lomé Convention ;

10. Condemn the repeated military operations across the borders of Zaïre, South Africa and Rhodesia ;

11. Condemn any aggressive military intervention in Africa, particularly the present Cuban operations encouraged by the support of the Soviet Union ;

12. Promote the implementation by European firms operating in Africa of the code of conduct adopted by the EEC ;

13. Ensure that there are not created on the African continent, through the acts of the Soviet Union or its allies, in particular Cuba, military or strategic zones of influence because of the danger of encirclement that such situations would present for Europe and the Mediterranean ;

14. Encourage and provide where requested effective support for the steps taken by several African states to combine their efforts with a view to maintaining peace in Africa and defending the African continent against any interference from outside.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 318

1. The member countries of the Council will continue to play a full part in the discussions of African topics which take place regularly in European political co-operation, with the aim of co-ordinating the African policies of the Nine.

2. The Council fully support the efforts of the British Government, in co-operation with the United States Government, to achieve a genuine transfer of power in Rhodesia through a settlement involving all the parties and bringing about a cease-fire, and to call on all the parties to attend, and negotiate constructively at, an early round-table meeting in order to reach a settlement acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. They also endorse the view recorded by the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Khartoum in July that the choice of leaders in Zimbabwe is up to the people of Zimbabwe.

The Council share the Assembly's view that apartheid must be terminated in the Republic of South Africa. The institutionalised racism in that country is in total contravention of the western concept of human rights.

The Council note the concern expressed by the Assembly to bring about independence for Namibia. The Council fully support the proposal drawn up by the five western members of the United Nations Security Council for a peaceful settlement in the territory leading to early independence through free and fair elections under United Nations supervision. In this connection, the Council welcome the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolutions 431 and 435 on 27th July and on 29th September respectively.

3. The Council agree with the Assembly that steps should be taken to halt the build-up of conventional weapons throughout the world, which is creating a very worrying situation. The final document of the United Nations special session called for consultations between major arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons. It must be borne in mind that all states have an inalienable right to security and that there can be no question of imposing limitations on buyers in an authoritarian manner. The Council believe a possible solution might be to approach the problem on a regional basis as suggested by Belgium in the United Nations, through regional restraints in the form of agreements or understandings among recipients with which suppliers should be associated. In this respect, the arrangements now being considered by certain Latin American countries provide a good example which might be productive in Africa, perhaps in an OAU context.

4. The Council emphasise the determination of the member countries of WEU to fulfil their obligations under Resolution 418 on South Africa and Resolution 253 on Rhodesia.

5. As regards the economic assistance extended by member states to African states, the Assembly will have noted that the statement made by the EEC during the formal opening of renegotiation of the Lomé Convention on 24th July made clear the very great importance attached by the Community to respect for human rights.

6. The member states have very much in mind the need to maintain as one of the prime objectives of their co-operation with African states the promotion wherever possible of the economic and social development of those states.

7. The Community has made very clear in its statement during the formal opening of renegotiation on 24th July its intention to maintain its links with the ACP countries party to the Lomé Convention, and to develop co-operation with those states to the maximum extent possible under the successor convention.

8. The Council consider that the military operations referred to in paragraph 10 do not aid the cause of peace generally.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th November 1978.

9. All countries have the right to advance their interests by normal diplomatic, economic and political means. However, the Council support the position of the OAU in believing that African problems are best solved by African states themselves, without external intervention. They would therefore deplore the creation of military spheres of influence by foreign powers, which would jeopardise the prospects for peace, both in Africa and in the surrounding areas. In this connection, the Council also welcome the improvement in relations between Zaïre and Angola.

10. The Governments represented in the Council have undertaken to encourage companies of the Nine operating in the Republic of South Africa to implement the code of conduct.

RECOMMENDATION 319 [1]

on the political activities of the Council — reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council [2]

The Assembly,

Gratified that in the presentation of its annual report for 1977 the Council has in many respects reverted to the practice it followed prior to 1976;

Noting with satisfaction that the Council has met most of the commitments made on its behalf for improving its relations with the Assembly;

Regretting that there is still much ambiguity about the nature of the "informal meeting" with the General Affairs Committee in November 1977;

Noting that in several respects the Council falls far short of giving the Assembly sufficient information on the political aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by member countries;

Recalling that the Council's responsibilities are defined in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly, at whatever level it may be meeting, the questions connected with the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by other organisations;

2. Provide more extensive information on consultations between member countries on matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty;

3. Organise a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee during the second half of 1978;

4. Improve participation by Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of member countries in plenary sessions of the Assembly.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Treu on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 768).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 319

1. The Council will continue to ensure that the modified Brussels Treaty is applied and observed, both as part of their own political activities and in connection with consultations held in other frameworks, particularly within the machinery of European political co-operation and in the North Atlantic Council. They feel bound to observe that, by the frequency and pattern of its work, European political co-operation plays an important part in enabling the Nine to reach an agreed view on the most important foreign policy issues and to speak with one voice. In directing their own political activities, the Council must therefore take account of the results so achieved, believing, as they do, in the need to further European cohesion and to avoid all unnecessary duplication of activity as well as the possible delaying effect of differences between a narrower or a wider framework of European political consultation.

However, the Council at permanent representative level are still checking regularly that the application of the modified Brussels Treaty is in no way neglected. While this duty has not involved active or detailed consideration of issues forming the subject of consultations elsewhere, it nevertheless guarantees fulfilment of the responsibilities and undertakings set out in the modified Brussels Treaty. Moreover, the Council, meeting at ministerial level, consider a wide range of topical problems concerning European security and policy.

2. In this context, the duty which belongs to the Council alone of informing the Assembly on all aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty forms a major aspect of their political activities.

The Council therefore intend to meet the Assembly's request for fuller information on consultations between member countries on matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. They aim to expand and develop the information supplied in their replies to recommendations and questions, which cover a wide range of matters relating to European policy, in the annual report, which, as the Assembly was able to note, is now becoming fuller and more complete, and in speeches made by the Chairman-in-Office and Ministers at plenary sessions of the Assembly and informal joint meetings.

3. On this last point, it should be noted that a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee has already been arranged for 3rd November 1978. The Council consider that such political contacts with Assembly bodies should remain flexible and open in character, avoiding formal procedures which would involve lengthy previous consultations between members. Naturally, even within this informal framework, the remarks of both the Chairman-in-Office and of all other members of the Council take due account, through an established practice, of agreed positions and, so far as possible, of the views of other members.

4. In the same desire to keep the Assembly informed and to participate in its work, the Council will encourage as large a ministerial attendance as possible at Assembly sessions.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th October 1978.

RECOMMENDATION 320 [1]

on the application of the Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council [2]

The Assembly,

Recalling the procedure whereby NATO may in appropriate cases provide material for replies to recommendations;

Noting that the annual report of the Council still makes no mention of the level of British land forces on the mainland of Europe assigned to SACEUR although the basic figures are given in the British white paper on defence;

Noting that the armaments control provisions of the Brussels Treaty are incompletely applied;

Anxious to maintain and make the best use of the expert knowledge of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and of the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Indicate in future annual reports the number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe assigned to SACEUR in accordance with the commitment contained in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty;

2. Set up a European centre for defence studies at the disposal of intergovernmental defence bodies and the Assembly making use of the resources of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and its Standing Armaments Committee;

3. Delete the reference to naval auxiliary vessels from the list of conventional armaments which may not be produced on German territory.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 777).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 320

1. As stated in reply to Recommendation 299, the Council will continue to indicate in future annual reports the total number of United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe. With regard to the provisions of Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, comparison between the figures in the report and those in the British white paper on defence is misleading, as the figures are for various reasons not comparable. The Council will continue to receive from the British Government additional information from which they will satisfy themselves that the approved number of British forces assigned to SACEUR on the mainland of Europe is maintained. The Council must repeat that, in view of the security requirements of the governments concerned, additional information such as the Assembly has requested would not be suitable for inclusion in future annual reports to the Assembly.

2. The Council cannot accept the suggestion made by the Assembly in point 2 of its recommendation.

The duties of the ACA are defined explicitly in the limitative enumeration in Article VII of Protocol No. IV to the modified Brussels Treaty. This enumeration cannot be changed without amending the treaty itself.

The fundamental character of the ACA, which has a precise mission to carry out in clearly-defined security conditions, would be completely changed by the new rôle suggested for it by the Assembly.

Furthermore, the written material held by the ACA and the SAC relates exclusively to the highly technical matters within their particular competence, and the staffs of these two bodies are selected precisely for the specialised duties which they have to perform.

3. Annex III to Protocol No. III to the modified Brussels Treaty can be amended by the Council under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down in the treaty itself, in Article II of Protocol No. III.

If the required conditions were fulfilled, the Council would have recourse to the procedure laid down in the treaty.

4. With reference to the first clause of the preamble to the recommendation, the Council wish to state that they request the Secretary-General of NATO to provide information whenever they consider this to be necessary and, in particular, when the questions raised relate to matters within the competence of the integrated command structures of NATO.

As regards the third clause of the preamble, which refers to the problem of the fields where the Agency is not authorised to exercise its mandate, the Council can do no more than confirm their earlier replies and, in particular, point 4 of their reply to Recommendation 284.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th September 1978.

RECOMMENDATION 321 [1]

on scientific, technological and aerospace questions — reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council [2]

The Assembly,

Appreciating the continuing dialogue between the Council and the Assembly on Europe's energy supplies, European aviation and space questions ;

Noting with anxiety however the increasing tendency in Europe to side-step the Community approach and make bilateral or trilateral arrangements ;

Considering the declaration of the heads of state or of government of the European Community at their meeting in Copenhagen on 7th and 8th April 1978 underlining the urgent need to make Western Europe less dependent on imported energy sources and acknowledging that high priority must be given to large-scale investments in this sector ;

Agreeing with the Council that there is an urgent need for a common energy policy for Western Europe ;

Regretting that the state of European aviation has not improved since last year and that an overall civil and military aeronautical policy has not been formulated ;

Gratified that member countries' approach to ESA's programmes has been more positive recently ;

Gratified also at the Council's statement in its annual report that European nuclear fusion research must be pursued so that Europe can achieve a technological level comparable with that of the United States and the Soviet Union and that it wishes a European civil and military aeronautical industry to be developed capable of co-operating, on an equal footing, with the United States,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Invite member countries :

1. When defining their industrial policy, to take greater account of security requirements and in particular the need to :

— ensure Europe's energy supplies even in time of crisis ;

— maintain the level of employment which is essential for social peace ;

— guarantee the competitiveness of European advanced industries by a high level of research and investment and thus strengthen the industrial basis of European security ;

2. (*a*) To continue to strive for a common European energy plan up to 1990 ;

(*b*) To earmark a major part of their budgets for the development of conventional and new sources of energy and energy production as well as for energy conservation and environmental factors ;

II. Invite the Governments of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to seek the best means for the firms concerned in their countries to take part in the Airbus programme as full partners ;

III. Invite the governments of the member countries to discuss the communication of 31st May last from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council of Ministers of the EEC on concerted action on aircraft programmes so that they may take a decision on this matter at the next meeting of the European Council.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 774).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 321

I. 1. The member governments of WEU take great account of the need to ensure Europe's energy supplies even in times of crisis. Therefore several of them entered into the agreement on an international energy programme in 1975. This agreement includes detailed arrangements for sharing available crude oil and petroleum products in case of a supply shortfall. On the basis of this agreement, national administrations are each preparing a detailed programme of measures aimed at restraining demand and allocating petroleum products to the different sectors of national economy. This is an essential condition for the effective functioning of the IEA mechanism. In this programme special priority should be given to continuity in petroleum supplies to vital industries. On the other hand, regulations concerning strategic petroleum reserves, which are mainly based on international directives, enlarge the possibility to maintain industrial activities. The European Communities too have a mechanism which aims at limiting energy consumption in times of crisis and which offers opportunities to restrain trade in petroleum products within the Community should the need arise.

The policies defined and the considerable efforts made by all governments concerned clearly show that they consider maintaining the highest possible level of employment as their paramount task not only under conditions of co-operation and mutual understanding, but also in times of crisis.

Governments do recognise the need to guarantee the competitiveness of advanced industries by a high level of research and investment and thus strengthen the industrial basis of European security. By stimulating and supporting financially a number of research and development projects effectuated by advanced industries, governments endeavour to reach this aim.

2. (*a*) All governments are prepared to work towards a European energy policy and are concerned with prospects for 1990 and beyond. This addition is necessary because investments in the energy sector have in most cases long leadtimes, which have to be taken into account. Discussions on energy matters and the decision-making in this area are being held in several international fora, such as the International Energy Agency and the European Communities.

(*b*) All governments concerned consider the development of conventional and new resources of energy and energy production and energy conservation of great importance. As the industrialised countries are to a large extent dependent on energy imports especially oil imports, it is necessary for them to diminish this dependence by developing their own resources, by conservation of energy and by stimulation of research, development and demonstration. Although the incentive for energy conservation exists mainly at national level, there is a great deal to be achieved through international co-operation and through exchange of information and experience. Governments therefore favour an international co-ordinated approach. Many governments have already implemented a number of measures to promote energy conservation through good housekeeping and the improvement of efficiency in the use of energy in the industrial, transport, building, agriculture and domestic sectors. Several governments have decided to reinforce the efforts on research, development and demonstration of new techniques and new forms of energy. In the framework of general investment stimulation, special support will become available for industries which diminish their dependence on oil or on natural gas either by switching over in particular to coal or by achieving greater efficiency.

II. The governments are prepared to seek and promote the best employment of their respective industrial skills and production capacities in order to achieve a strong and competitive aircraft industry in Europe.

Any high-level political discussion about common civil aviation building programmes based on the communication of 31st May last from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council of Ministers of the European Communities has to await the outcome of discussions between industries and governments concerned on co-operation in civil aviation building programmes. Only after these deliberations have produced a result can the Council of Ministers and eventually the European Council successfully be seized of the question.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th November 1978.

Consequences of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Communities for the defence of Europe and for WEU

DRAFT ORDER [1]

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee

The Assembly,

Considers that it is not expedient to examine a report on the consequences of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Communities for the defence of Europe and for WEU at the Second Part of its Twenty-Fourth Session.

1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 5 with 0 abstentions.

Methods of voting

REPORT[1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges[2] by Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Draft Order

on methods of voting

The Assembly,

Considering that its decisions carry greater weight if they reflect clearly-stated and widely-supported political options;

Considering consequently that it is necessary to retain a strict obligation for a quorum for the adoption of the texts listed in Rule 34, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Procedure;

Considering however that practical steps must be taken to ensure the presence of the required number of representatives when votes are taken by roll-call and that the Presidential Committee should:

(*a*) ask national delegations to ensure that a sufficient number of their members are to be present;

(*b*) improve the organisation of roll-call votes, *inter alia* by audio, and if possible visual, announcement throughout the premises fifteen minutes beforehand;

(*c*) at the opening of each session, fix the dates and times of votes on texts on the agenda of the session;

Approving the conclusions of the present report,

INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To ensure that Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure is applied in full.

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Grieve* (Chairman); MM. *Bozzi*, Cornelissen (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Borghi (Alternate: *Treu*), Brasseur, Craigen (Alternate: *Lord Hughes*), Mrs. Faccio, MM. *Giust*, van Hulst, *Jessel*, *Konen*, Lagourgue, Lemaire (Alternate: *Péridier*), Marquardt, Dr. Phipps (Alternate: *McGuire*), MM. *Pignion*, *Schäuble*, Schmidhuber (Alternate: *Spies von Büllesheim*), Sgherri (Alternate: *Antoni*), Van Aal, Voogd (Alternate: *Stoffelen*), Zebisch (Alternate: *Scheffler*).

N. B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. In 1975, the Presidential Committee instructed the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to study possible means of solving the problems arising from the difficulty of obtaining a quorum in plenary sitting.

A report was prepared as a result of this study and the Presidential Committtee concluded after examining it that it was undesirable to modify the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly and that the practical measures suggested in the report submitted by Mr. Piket on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges should be adopted.

For various reasons, there was no follow-up to this recommendation.

There are therefore still ambiguities in the interpretation of the provisions of the Rules of Procedure relating to the method of voting which have sometimes led to incidents when votes were taken. In order to endeavour to prevent a recurrence of such incidents, the Presidential Committee has asked the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to prepare a further report.

2. Since the remarks made in the previous report are still valid and misunderstandings can be avoided only by strict application of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, as advocated by your Rapporteur's predecessor, Mr. Piket, the report which your Rapporteur has the honour to submit for your opinion makes extensive use of the text of the report submitted by the Committee on Rules of Procedure to the Presidential Committee and essentially approved by the latter.

I. *The quorum problem from the point of view of the Rules of Procedure*

3. The problem of the quorum varies according to the method of voting used :

(*a*) *In the case of anonymous votes* — particularly voting by sitting and standing, which is the usual method in the WEU Assembly — no reference is made to the quorum when the results are announced [1]. The vote is valid regardless of the number of voters, with the sole reservation — introduced to avoid surprise votes — that a member of the Assembly may always ask the President to ascertain whether there is a quorum before taking the vote.

(*b*) Conversely, the quorum is generally ascertained in votes for which a *roll-call* is held, i.e. :

(*i*) the votes on the draft reply to the annual report and the vote on a draft recommendation or opinion as a whole (simple majority) ;

(*ii*) adoption of an amendment to the Charter or a motion to disagree with the annual report of the Council or part thereof (absolute majority).

4. However, the quorum is not evident when there is apparent general consensus, i.e. in the absence of declared opposition or abstention, because in practice the Assembly then dispenses with the roll-call vote in the interests of efficiency, the result being assumed to be unanimous and announced as such. This practice has been progressively extended.

5. Thus, in December 1975, the President of the Assembly declared a draft recommendation, on which a member of the Assembly had announced his intention to abstain, to have been "adopted unanimously with one abstention". Immediately afterwards, the President considered another draft recommendation to have been adopted unanimously, the Assembly taking formal note of two abstentions, however. One representative then pointed out that the vote should have been by roll-call unless the Rules of Procedure were changed. However, this representative did not proceed with his request and the President merely acknowledged that such procedure amounted to a change in procedure hitherto followed. Following these precedents, this method of voting has become current practice.

6. A further step was taken the next year. It was in fact accepted that even opposition did not need to stand in the way of the application of the simplified procedure of "unanimous" adoption. However, such practice has sometimes led to complaints.

7. The Assembly has had to recognise that this new precedent has led to some uncertainty about voting procedure. Some members of the Assembly therefore now feel the simplified procedure to be in order when a vote by roll-call is not specifically requested. But others, referring to the provisions of the Rules of Procedure, have rightly considered that by announc-

1. The number of votes is not announced, the President merely announcing that a text is adopted or not adopted.

ing their opposition they made a vote by roll-call compulsory. This misunderstanding and uncertainty were at the origin of incidents during the last session.

8. The Committee therefore considers that there should be a return to the original practice, i.e. the simplified procedure which makes a roll-call unnecessary can be followed only if it is noted that the Assembly is unanimous. If there is the slightest doubt on this subject, normal roll-call procedure must be followed.

9. Generally speaking, the Committee considered it politically undesirable to make the obligation for a quorum less of a practical constraint. Unlike a national parliament, the WEU Assembly is a purely consultative body. It has no legislative powers and cannot overthrow a government. The value of a recommendation adopted by the Assembly thus lies in the force of the political conviction it expresses and the degree and genuineness of the support it receives. A recommendation adopted by a narrow margin and not an effective majority of the members of the Assembly would carry little weight. Moreover, absenteeism would soon become rife and there would be a risk of the Assembly's sessions appearing to be little more than social gatherings.

To postpone a vote for lack of a quorum is admittedly tiresome, but by leaving the matter open it at least has the merit of ensuring that the Assembly's political will is not misrepresented. If, on the other hand, all votes, even without a quorum, were declared valid, a minority might apparently obtain the rejection of a text by surprise when it might have been adopted by a large majority had its supporters been more watchful and present.

10. The Committee therefore considered that the Assembly should not relax the present requirements of the Rules of Procedure in respect of a quorum. All the same, if it is recalled that including full members and substitutes there are 178 members, it will be felt that it should be possible to achieve the required quorum of 45.

So, rather than considering how to allow the Assembly to vote in spite of absenteeism, appropriate practical measures of combating absenteeism must be sought.

II. *Practical means of ensuring a quorum*

11. Each member of the Assembly should be aware of his moral obligation to carry out the task for which he was appointed. Chairmen of national delegations might ensure that this moral obligation is borne in mind whenever necessary and moreover respected. Forms sent out by the Office of the Clerk asking members if they expect to attend a specific meeting should be channelled through the Chairmen of delegations, who should verify that sufficient members of their delegation are to take part. If not, they might ask members to make an effort to be present. If warned, some members might endeavour to free themselves from any other commitments they may have had.

12. A moral obligation may perhaps not be respected if there is no provision for appropriate sanctions. Suggestions have been made to impose financial sanctions and, even more important, to terminate the international mandate of parliamentarians who fail to attend the meetings they have undertaken to attend.

13. In point of fact, such specific and severe sanctions would be hard to apply because the delegations are not politically homogenous and the bureaux of the political parties to which members belong often have more authority than the Chairmen of delegations. However, the list of members absent without a valid excuse might be communicated to the Chairmen of national delegations and also to the Presidents of national parliaments, who would pass the list on to the Chairmen of the political groups. The authority of the Chairmen of delegations would thus be strengthened by pressure from the Chairmen of political groups on members not carrying out their mandates.

14. Since the presence of all members is particularly essential when votes are taken, those which could not be held for lack of a quorum might be grouped at an appropriate time, i.e. in practice on the last or penultimate day of the session. Discipline should be particularly firm when grouped votes are taken so that sufficient members are present. The day and time of grouped votes should naturally be announced to members before they leave their respective capitals.

Document 795 **22nd November 1978**

Right of substitutes who are Committee Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the Assembly

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges [2] by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur

Draft Resolution

to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

The Assembly,

DECIDES to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly by the addition of a paragraph 5 drafted as follows:

"5. A Substitute who is a Committeee Chairman or Rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not sitting in place of a Representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to vote."

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur)

At the last session, Mr. Reid, responsible for presenting the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, raised a point of order. He wondered to what extent he was entitled to speak considering the fact that he was a substitute and the difficulty of determining which representative's seat he could legitimately occupy.

Under Rule 7, any representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may arrange to be replaced by a substitute. Nevertheless, a substitute attending a sitting may not be certain which representative he is replacing, as shown by the question raised by Mr. Reid. Again, it would be incorrect to oblige a representative to be absent to allow his substitute to sit on the Committee bench as Chairman or Rapporteur.

Consideration might therefore be given to adding a paragraph 5 to Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in the same terms as Rule 39, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Hence the foregoing draft resolution.

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Grieve* (Chairman); MM. *Bozzi*, Cornelissen (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Borghi (Alternate: *Treu*), Brasseur, Craigen (Alternate: *Lord Hughes*), Mrs. Faccio, MM. *Giust*, van Hulst, *Jessel*, *Konen*, Lagourgue, Lemaire (Alternate: *Péridier*), Marquardt, Dr. Phipps (Alternate: *McGuire*), MM. *Pignion*, *Schäuble*, Schmidhuber (Alternate: *Spies von Büllesheim*), Sgherri (Alternate: *Antoni*), Van Aal, Voogd (Alternate: *Stoffelen*), Zebisch (Alternate: *Scheffler*).

N. B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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