



**Assembly of Western European Union**

# **PROCEEDINGS**

**FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION**

**FIRST PART**

**June 1994**

## **II**

**Minutes  
Official Report of Debates**

**WEU**

**PARIS**





**Assembly of Western European Union**

# **PROCEEDINGS**

**FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION**

**FIRST PART**

**June 1994**

**II**

**Minutes  
Official Report of Debates**

**WEU**

**PARIS**





The proceedings of the first part of the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.



**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

	Page
List of representatives and substitutes .....	8
Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings:	
First sitting .....	12
Texts adopted .....	16
Second sitting .....	20
Text adopted .....	23
Third sitting .....	25
Texts adopted .....	28
Fourth sitting .....	32
Fifth sitting .....	34
Texts adopted .....	37
Sixth sitting .....	42
Text adopted .....	44
Official report of debates:	
First sitting .....	48
Second sitting .....	67
Third sitting .....	87
Fourth sitting .....	111
Fifth sitting .....	131
Sixth sitting .....	154
Index .....	174

## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
KELCHTERMANS Lambert	CVP
KEMPINAIRE André	VLD
Van der MAELEN Dirk	SP
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
SARENS Freddy	CVP
SEEUWS Willy	SP

#### Substitutes

MM. De DECKER Armand	PRL
GHEQUËRE Ferdinand	CVP
LAVERGE Jacques	PVV
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
OTTENBOURGH Yvan	CVP
THISSEN René	PSC
WINTGENS Pierre	PSC

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOUCHERON Jean-Michel	Socialist
COLOMBIER Georges	UDF
COUVEINHES René	RPR
DUMONT Jean	Ind. Rep.
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GEOFFROY Aloys	UDF
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JACQUAT Denis	UDF
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KASPEREIT Gabriel	RPR
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
SCHREINER Bernard	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

#### Substitutes

MM. BONREPAUX Augustin	Socialist
BRANGER Jean-Guy	UDF
BRIANE Jean	UDF
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DANIEL Christian	RPR
DECAGNY Jean-Claude	UDF
DENIAU Xavier	RPR
Mrs. DURRIEU Josette	Socialist
MM. EHRMANN Charles	UDF
HUNAUULT Michel	RPR
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LE JEUNE Edouard	UCDP
de LIPKOWSKI Jean	RPR
MASSON Jean-Louis	RPR
MIGNON Jean-Claude	RPR
PROPRIOL Jean	UDF
ROGER Jean	RDE
VINÇON Serge	RPR

### GERMANY

#### Representatives

Mr. ANTRETTER Robert	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
Mr. BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU

MM. BÜCHLER Hans	SPD
BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MEYER zu BENTRUP Reinhard	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TERBORG Margitta	SPD
MM. VOGEL Friedrich	CDU/CSU
WOLFGRAMM Torsten	FDP

#### Substitutes

MM. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. JUNGHANNIS Ulrich	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUCYGA Christine	SPD
MM. LUMMER Heinrich	CDU/CSU
MAASS Erich	CDU/CSU
MARTEN Günter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. MASCHER Ulrike	SPD
MM. MICHELS Meinolf	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
PROBST Albert	CDU/CSU
REIMANN Manfred	SPD
SCHAEER Hermann	SPD
SCHLUCKEBIER Günter	SPD
Mrs. von TEICHMAN Cornelia	FDP
Mr. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

### ITALY

#### Representatives

MM. AGNELLI Arduino	Socialist
ANDREOTTI Giulio	Chr. Dem.
BENVENUTI Roberto	PDS
BOSCO Rinaldo	Northern League
De CAROLIS Stelio	PRI
COLOMBO Vittorino	Chr. Dem.
FERRARINI Giulio	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
LECCISI Pino	Chr. Dem.
MANISCO Lucio	Ref. Com.
MANNINO Calogero	Chr. Dem.
PAIRE Giacomo	PLI
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	PDS
PIZZO Pietro	Socialist
POLLI Mauro	Northern League
RODOTA Stefano	PDS
TATARELLA Giuseppe	PDS

#### Substitutes

MM. BATTISTUZZI Paolo	PLI
CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
CALDORO Stefano	Socialist
CICCIOMESSERE Roberto	Radical
COVI Giorgio	PRI
FAVA Claudio	Rete
FERRARI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
GOTTARDO Settimo	Chr. Dem.
GUZZETTI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
LECCESE Vito	Verdi

MM. LIBERATORI Vittorio  
MESORACA Maurizio  
De PAOLI Paolo  
RUBNER Hans  
TABLADINI Francesco  
TRABACCHINI Quarto  
VINCI Luigi  
VISIBELLI Roberto

Socialist  
PDS  
PSDI  
SVP  
Northern League  
PDS  
Ref. Com.  
MSI-DN

**LUXEMBOURG****Representatives**

Mrs. ERR Lydie  
Mr. GOERENS Charles  
Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle

Soc. Workers  
Dem.  
Soc. Chr.

**Substitutes**

Mrs. BRASSEUR Anne  
MM. DIMMER Camille  
REGENWETTER Jean

Dem.  
Soc. Chr.  
Soc. Workers

**NETHERLANDS****Representatives**

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN  
Elisabeth  
MM. EISMA Doeke  
De HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob  
van der LINDEN René  
STOFFELEN Pieter  
van VELZEN Wim  
VERBEEK Jan Willem

Labour  
D66  
CDA  
CDA  
Labour  
CDA  
VVD

**Substitutes**

MM. DEES Dick  
EVERSDIJK Huib  
JURGENS E.C.M.  
LEERS Gerd  
Mrs. SOUTENDIJK van  
APPELDOORN Marian H.J.  
Mr. TUMMERS Nicolas  
Mrs. VERSPAGET Josephine

VVD  
CDA  
Labour  
CDA  
CDA  
CDA  
Labour  
Labour

**PORTUGAL****Representatives**

MM. AMARAL Fernando  
BRITO Raul Fernando  
CANDAL Carlos  
FERNANDES MARQUES  
Joaquim  
MACHETE Rui Manuel  
PINTO Carlos  
ROSETA Pedro

Soc. Dem.  
Socialist  
Socialist  
Soc. Dem.  
Soc. Dem.  
Soc. Dem.  
Soc. Dem.  
Soc. Dem.

**Substitutes**

Mrs. AGUIAR Maria Manuela  
MM. ALEGRE Manuel  
CURTO Abilio Aleixo  
MARTINS Alberto de Sousa  
POÇAS SANTOS João Alvaro  
REIS LEITE José Guilherme  
RODRIGUES Miguel Urbano

Soc. Dem.  
Socialist  
Socialist  
Socialist  
Soc. Dem.  
Soc. Dem.  
Soc. Dem.  
PCP

**SPAIN****Representatives**

MM. ALVAREZ Francisco  
CUCO Alfons  
FABRA Juan Manuel  
HOMS I FERRET Francesc  
LOPEZ HENARES José Luis  
LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO  
Santiago  
MARTÍNEZ Miguel Angel  
de PUIG Lluís Maria  
ROMAN Rafael  
SAINZ GARCIA José Luis  
SOLE-TURA Jordi  
VAZQUEZ Narcis

People's Party  
Socialist  
People's Party  
C.i.U.  
People's Party  
People's Party  
Socialist  
Socialist  
Socialist  
People's Party  
Socialist  
United Left

**Substitutes**

MM. BOLINAGA Imanol  
BORDERAS Augusto  
GRAU I BULDÚ Pere  
Mrs. GUIRADO Ana  
Mrs. MORENO Carmen  
MM. OLARTE Lorenzo  
PALACIOS Marcelo  
RAMÍREZ PERI Carlos  
ROBLES FRAGA José  
ROBLES OROZCO Gonzalo  
Mrs. SANCHEZ DE MIGUEL Ana  
Mr. ZAPATERO Virgilio

Basque Nat.  
Socialist  
C.i.U.  
Socialist  
Socialist  
C. Canarien  
Socialist  
People's Party  
People's Party  
People's Party  
Socialist  
Socialist

**UNITED KINGDOM****Representatives**

MM. ATKINSON David  
BANKS Tony  
COX Thomas  
Dame Peggy FENNER  
Lord FINSBERG  
Mr. HARDY Peter  
Sir John HUNT  
Sir Russell JOHNSTON  
Lord KIRKHILL  
Mr. LITHERLAND Robert  
Lord NEWALL  
MM. RATHBONE Tim  
REDMOND Martin  
Sir Dudley SMITH  
Sir Keith SPEED  
Sir Donald THOMPSON  
MM. THOMPSON John  
WARD John

Conservative  
Labour  
Labour  
Conservative  
Conservative  
Labour  
Conservative  
SLD  
Labour  
Labour  
Conservative  
Conservative  
Labour  
Conservative  
Conservative  
Labour  
Conservative

**Substitutes**

Mr. ALEXANDER Richard  
Sir Andrew BOWDEN  
MM. CUMMINGS John  
CUNLIFFE Lawrence  
DAVIS Terry  
DICKS Terry  
Earl of DUNDEE  
Mr. DUNNACHIE Jimmy  
Sir Anthony DURANT  
Sir Peter FRY  
Dr. GODMAN Norman  
Baroness GOULD of POTTERNEWTON  
Baroness HOOPER  
MM. HOWELL Ralph  
HUGHES Roy  
Lord MACKIE of BENSHE  
MM. MARSHALL Jim  
TOWNEND John

Conservative  
Conservative  
Labour  
Labour  
Labour  
Conservative  
Conservative  
Labour  
Conservative  
Conservative  
Labour  
Labour  
Conservative  
Conservative  
Labour  
SLD  
Labour  
Conservative



**I**

**MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS**

# FIRST SITTING

Monday, 13th June 1994

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Opening of the first part of the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly.</li><li>2. Examination of credentials.</li><li>3. Election of the President of the Assembly.</li><li>4. Address by the President of the Assembly.</li><li>5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.</li><li>6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (Doc. 1407).</li></ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>7. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.</li><li>8. The European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee</i>, Doc. 1419).</li><li>9. Address by Mr. Haekkerup, Minister of Defence of Denmark.</li><li>10. The European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (<i>Resumed debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation</i>, Doc. 1419).</li></ol> |
|--|---|

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Ehrmann, Provisional President, in the Chair.*

### **1. Opening of the session**

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### **2. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

### **3. Address by the Provisional President**

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

### **4. Examination of credentials**

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes had been ratified by that Assembly.

### **5. Observers**

The Provisional President welcomed the permanent delegations of parliamentary observers.

He welcomed the observers from Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Malta, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden and Turkey.

### **6. Election of the President**

Only one candidate was proposed for the post of President, namely, Sir Dudley Smith.

In accordance with Rule 10 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Sir Dudley Smith was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Sir Dudley Smith took the Chair.

### **7. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The President addressed the Assembly.

### **8. Election of five Vice-Presidents of the Assembly**

Five candidates were proposed for eight posts of Vice-President, namely, Mr. Foschi, Mr. Machete, Mr. Péciaux, Mr. Steiner and Mr. Valleix.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.



Mr. Valleix, Mr. Foschi, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Péciaux and Mr. Machete were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

**9. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session**

(Doc. 1407)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business.

The draft order of business for the first part of the session was adopted.

**10. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU**

Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by MM. Bieringer (*Observer from Austria*) and Rathbone.

*The sitting was suspended at 4.10 p.m. and resumed at 4.25 p.m.*

Mr. van Eekelen answered a question put by Mr. Soell.

**11. Address by Mr. Haekkerup, Minister of Defence of Denmark**

Mr. Haekkerup, Minister of Defence of Denmark, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Haekkerup answered questions put by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr. Lopez Henares.

**12. The European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council**

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1419 and amendments)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Borderas, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Mrs. Blunck.

*Mr. Steiner, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speaker:* Mr. Baumel.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Borderas, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mrs. Blunck:

1. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Document the regulations on arms exports in force in the member states and provide information on its methods for their standardisation as well as the time schedule previewed for realising harmonisation;”

*Speaker:* Mrs. Blunck.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mrs. Blunck:

2. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Ensure and document parliamentary control, either through national parliaments or the parliamentary assembly, over defence procurement as well as arms exports;”

*Speaker:* Mrs. Blunck.

An oral amendment to the amendment was moved by Mr. Borderas on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, at the beginning to insert the words “insist on the need to”.

*Speakers:* Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Lopez Henares (point of order).

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

Thus amended, the amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 557)<sup>1</sup>.

**13. Changes in the membership of committees**

In accordance with Rule 40 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

<sup>1</sup>. See page 18.

*Standing Committee**Germany*

- Mr. Wolfgramm as a titular member;

*Netherlands*

- Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr. Verbeek as titular members;
- MM. Eisma and De Hoop Scheffer as alternate members.

*Defence Committee**United Kingdom*

- Mr. Townend as an alternate member.

*Political Committee**Netherlands*

- Mr. Leers as a titular member.

*Technological and Aerospace Committee**Germany*

- Mr. Wolfgramm as a titular member;
- Mrs. von Teichmann as an alternate member;

*Netherlands*

- Mr. Leers as an alternate member;

*United Kingdom*

- Mr. Marshall as a titular member.

*Committee for Parliamentary  
and Public Relations**United Kingdom*

- Baroness Gould of Potternewton as an alternate member.

*Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges**Germany*

- Mrs. Lucyga as an alternate member.

*14. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting*

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 14th June 1994, at 10 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 5.35 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance<sup>1</sup>:

Belgium	Italy	Spain
MM. <i>De Decker</i> (Biefnot) Kelchtermans Péciaux Seeuws	MM. Agnelli <i>Ferrari</i> (Andreotti) Benvenuti <i>Covi</i> (De Carolis) <i>Liberatori</i> (Colombo) Ferrarini Foschi Leccisi <i>Trabacchini</i> (Manisco) <i>Gottardo</i> (Mannino) Paire <i>Visibelli</i> (Tatarella)	MM. Cuco Lopez Henares de Puig Roman Sole Tura <i>Borderas</i> ( <i>Vazquez</i> )
France		United Kingdom
MM. <i>Ehrmann</i> (Alloncle) Baumel Jeambrun Valleix		MM. <i>Alexander</i> (Atkinson) <i>Davis</i> (Cox) Dame Peggy Fenner Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Mr. Litherland Sir <i>Andrew Bowden</i> (Lord Newall) MM. Rathbone <i>Cunliffe</i> (Redmond) Sir Keith Speed Sir Donald Thompson Mr. Thompson Lady <i>Hooper</i> (Ward)
Germany	Netherlands	
Mr. Antretter Mrs. Blunck MM. Böhm Büchler <i>Marten</i> (Bühler) <i>Probst</i> (Kittelmann) <i>Zierer</i> (Meyer zu Bentrup) Müller Reddemann Soell Sprung Steiner Mrs. Terborg MM. Vogel Wolfgramm	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. van der Linden Stoffelen <i>Leers</i> (van Velzen) Verbeek	
	Portugal	
	MM. Amaral Brito <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal) <i>Curto</i> (Fernandes Marques) Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Machete) MM. Pinto <i>Reis Leite</i> (Roseta)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Germany	Netherlands
MM. Kempinaire Van der Maelen Sarens	MM. Schreiner Seitlinger	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
France	Italy	Spain
MM. Birraux Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Dumont Galley Geoffroy Gouteyron Jacquat Jung Kaspereit Masseret	MM. Holtz Irmer von Schmude	MM. Eisma De Hoop Scheffer
	Luxembourg	
	Mrs. Err	MM. Alvarez Fabra Homs I Ferret Lopez Valdivielso Martinez Sainz Garcia
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Banks Sir John Hunt Lord Kirkhill

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## RECOMMENDATION 556<sup>1</sup>

### *on the evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU<sup>2</sup>*

The Assembly,

- (i) Emphasising the importance of the NATO summit meeting reaffirming its attachment to transatlantic links on the basis of a substantial presence of United States forces in Europe and the direct engagement of the North Atlantic allies in the security of Europe;
- (ii) Welcoming the WEU Council's readiness to offer an enhanced status of association to those member states of the WEU Forum of Consultation which have or are likely to have "Europe Agreements" with the European Union, but regretting that the term "*associate partnership*" may be used for this arrangement;
- (iii) Endorsing the partnership for peace programme offered by NATO to the countries taking part in the work of NACC and other interested CSCE countries;
- (iv) Noting nevertheless that the Atlantic Alliance has not yet managed to define in a coherent manner the nature of its relations with Russia and the CIS, nor the shape of a security system including the countries of Central Europe that will satisfy the aspirations and appease the concerns of all sides;
- (v) Emphasising consequently the importance of WEU's rôle with a view to helping to maintain stability and security in the East;
- (vi) Also emphasising the importance of the greater rôle played by WEU in the framework of its co-operation with NATO with regard to peace-keeping and crisis-management missions;
- (vii) Strongly welcoming the decision of the heads of state and of government of the Atlantic Alliance to uphold the strengthening of the European pillar of that alliance through WEU and their readiness to make the collective assets of the alliance available to WEU;
- (viii) Recalling at the same time that since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty WEU has become an integral part of the development of the European Union and is required to work out and implement the decisions of the Union that have defence and security implications;
- (ix) Consequently recalling that the Council has to take as a matter of urgency a series of important decisions to make WEU a truly operational organisation and to respond to expectations and the increased responsibilities entrusted to it;
- (x) Convinced nevertheless that the WEU Council now needs special political impetus to overcome its difficulties in reaching the necessary decisions;
- (xi) Considering that the intention of the ministers to reduce to six months the duration of the Chairmanship-in-Office of WEU in order to facilitate the harmonisation of the presidencies of the European Union and of WEU calls for new measures to ensure the continuity of WEU's political planning in order to accelerate the process of decision-taking and to ensure a better hearing for WEU's voice in alliance and European Union bodies;
- (xii) Insisting on the need to associate the Assembly to a greater extent in the Council's thinking before the latter takes decisions or decides not to take them in the absence of the necessary unanimity;
- (xiii) Hoping that the new European Parliament to be elected on 12th June next will refrain from adopting resolutions that seek – contrary to the spirit and the letter of Maastricht – to hinder WEU efforts to contribute to the definition of a European defence policy,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. At its next ministerial meeting, grant simultaneously to all the member countries of the Forum of Consultation an associate status in WEU enabling them to participate to the greatest possible extent in the work of the Council and of its subsidiary bodies without prejudice to the status of associate member accorded to Iceland, Norway and Turkey as members of NATO;

1. Adopted by the Standing Committee in Paris on 3rd May 1994.

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1410).

2. Employ the term “ associate member ” for the relationship already being established with Iceland, Norway and Turkey and choose “ *associate* ” to describe the new status of the Central European and Baltic states which are members of the WEU Forum of Consultation and which have or are likely to have “ Europe Agreements ” with the European Union;
3. Conclude its work on strategic mobility and inform the Assembly of its conclusions;
4. Decide before the end of this year:
  - to establish a European system of space-based observation in accordance with the results of the feasibility study;
  - to move from the feasibility study phase to the conclusion of a contract with European industry for building the European military transport aircraft;
  - to create a European air-maritime force reinforced by ground components;
  - to agree on the conditions for the use and command of the European corps which is to be placed under the political direction of WEU in conformity with the agreements already concluded with SACEUR;
  - to make arrangements for associating with the European corps the other forces answerable to WEU so as to allow a European rapid action force to be created;
  - to create a European armaments agency with effective responsibilities and powers in order to achieve true co-operation between member states and their industries on questions of matériel;
5. Increase the means and enlarge the field of action of the Planning Cell by giving it a true rôle of operational co-ordination between WEU and NATO based on overall guidelines, including contingency plans and the planning of joint manoeuvres of forces answerable to WEU;
6. Harmonise with NATO the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) with its own concept of forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);
7. Harmonise its working relationship with the European Union in matters that might have repercussions on its co-operation with NATO;
8. Show greater determination in its relations with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to possible missions by offering them its operational capabilities in peace-keeping and crisis-management questions;
9. Draw up political guidelines for meetings of chiefs of defence staff and specify forthwith a structure of relations and the sharing of responsibilities between:
  - chiefs of defence staff;
  - military delegates belonging to national delegations;
  - the Planning Cell and
  - the WEU Secretariat-General;
10. Ensure the continuity of its political planning by giving the WEU Secretary-General political powers including:
  - the right of initiative;
  - the right to convene and to chair meetings of the Council of Ministers;
  - primordial responsibility for making WEU’s voice heard in alliance and European Union bodies;
11. Take the appropriate measures to transform the Planning Cell into a powerful operational centre for WEU co-ordination and planning, with all the resources in equipment and staffing required to achieve this;
12. Ensure in particular the participation of the Secretary-General of WEU in meetings of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) authorities of the European Union in the same spirit of transparency, complementarity and reciprocity that already exists between WEU and NATO;
13. Ratify the decisions set out in paragraph 4 above and give the political impetus necessary for WEU to take its place as the European defence organisation and as a credible player in its areas of responsibility by convening before the end of the year an extraordinary meeting of heads of state and of government of the member countries.

**RECOMMENDATION 557*****on the European armaments agency – reply to the  
thirty-ninth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Taking account, on the one hand, of the declaration of the member countries of WEU annexed to the Treaty on European Union, which, with reference to WEU's operational rôle, provides inter alia for examination of "enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency" and, on the other hand, the Petersberg declaration which follows the same direction;
- (ii) Welcoming the decisions taken in Bonn in December 1992 by the Defence Ministers of the thirteen IEPG countries to transfer the functions of that group to WEU and the decisions taken at the meeting in Rome in May 1993 on the practical measures relating to this transfer, in particular the new name for the IEPG which has become the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG);
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction the report on armaments co-operation prepared by the National Armaments Directors and submitted for examination by the WEAG Defence Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993;
- (iv) Similarly welcoming the creation of an ad-hoc working group for the purposes of identifying the tasks of a European armaments agency and determining the legal grounds on which it should be based;
- (v) Welcoming the transfer to WEU of certain activities of Eurogroup, specifically the information activities, EUROCOM, EUROLOG and EUROLONGTERM;
- (vi) Considering furthermore that a European armaments agency should be based on a common European industrial and defence policy, an integrated armaments market and a common export policy for such armaments;
- (vii) Noting that the ultimate objective of a common defence policy involving agreement on political guidelines in military and armaments matters is far from being achieved;
- (viii) Considering that in present circumstances a European armaments agency must be regarded as a point of departure for an undertaking that will be developed until it achieves its full capability as European positions converge in security and defence questions;
- (ix) Convinced nevertheless that the creation of a European armaments agency, initially with a minimum of specific tasks, meets a clear need, as testified by the present dispersal of the armaments sector in Europe, the many bodies responsible for various co-operative programmes, the need to make the most of diminishing resources, to increase industrial trade, to improve and widen co-operation in the research sector and to continue work on the principles of harmonisation and standardisation including in particular their political, administrative and legal aspects;
- (x) Bearing in mind that the increasingly multinational composition of armed forces in Europe implies interoperability of military units, which must be accompanied by a firm move towards armaments co-operation;
- (xi) Welcoming the decision of the French and German authorities to create a joint armaments agency;
- (xii) Considering the importance of a European armaments agency in securing a competitive presence for Europe in the world armaments market;
- (xiii) Regretting that the Kirchberg declaration in no way tackles the question of creating a European armaments agency,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Have a study made for the harmonisation of the political and administrative structures of the bodies responsible for armaments in the WEU member countries;
2. Document the regulations on arms exports in force in the member states and provide information on its methods for their standardisation as well as the time schedule previewed for realising harmonisation;

3. Insist on the need to ensure and document parliamentary control either through national parliaments or the Parliamentary Assembly over defence procurement as well as arms exports;
4. Examine fiscal and employment legislation governing the defence industries of the member countries, with a view to their possible harmonisation;
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of the report by the ad hoc working group on the tasks to be assigned to the European armaments agency and the legal grounds on which it should be based;
4. Complete the integration of the armaments secretariat into the Secretariat-General in order to promote synergy between WEU's armaments activities and the other activities of the organisation;
5. Strengthen the means of the armaments secretariat so that it might afford more active support to the work of WEAG panels and working groups;
6. Establish forthwith a European armaments agency as a subsidiary body of the Council, initially tasked as follows:
  - (a) management of co-operative programmes;
  - (b) management of the EUCLID programme;
  - (c) management of joint research and testing facilities;
  - (d) technological and operational studies;
  - (e) establishment of information and data services and a register of patents relating to innovation in the defence sector;
  - (f) research into and evaluation of the world armaments market; the agency would be assisted in this task by industrial groups such as EDIG, which already has extensive experience in this sector.

## SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 14th June 1994

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>1. WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee</i>, Doc. 1417 and amendments).</p> <p>2. Address by Mr. Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.</p> | <p>3. WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (<i>Resumed debate and vote on the draft recommendation</i>, Doc. 1417 and amendments).</p> |
|---|---|

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **3. WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee,  
Doc. 1417 and amendments)*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Ferrari, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Rodrigues and Steiner.

*Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* MM. Müller, Ferrarini, Pahor (*Observer from Slovenia*), Antretter and Pastusiak (*Observer from Poland*).

The debate was closed.

*Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

#### **4. Address by Mr. Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom**

Mr. Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Hurd answered questions put by Dame Peggy Fenner, Mr. Ferrarini, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Valleix, Antretter, Lopez Henares, Wolfgramm and Sir Peter Fry.

#### **5. WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council**

*(Reply to the debate on the report  
of the Political Committee  
and vote on the draft recommendation,  
Doc. 1417 and amendments)*

Mr. Ferrari, Rapporteur, and Mr. de Puig, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

*Speakers:* Lord Finsberg (point of order) and Mr. Stoffelen.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Ferrari:

1. At the end of paragraph (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation add “and welcoming therefore the decision of the Council to task the WEU Permanent Council to start work now on the formulation of such a policy;”.

*Speaker:* Mr. Ferrari.



The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Ferrari:

2. After paragraph (xiv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add two new paragraphs as follows:

“ Welcoming the fact that the Council’s Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994 recognises the significant contribution of the three associate members of WEU to European security and stability;

Convinced however that the Council’s wish to reinforce the relationship of these three countries with WEU in order to strengthen its position as the defence component of the European Union and as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance could be achieved better if the Council invited them to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty; ”

*Speaker:* Mr. Ferrari.

An amendment to the amendment was moved by Mr. Stoffelen to leave out the second paragraph.

*Speakers:* Mr. Stoffelen, Lord Finsberg and Mr. de Puig.

The amendment to the amendment was negatived.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Ferrari:

3. Leave out paragraph (xvi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“ Welcoming therefore that by its Kirchberg declaration, the Council is following paragraph 1 of Recommendation 556 in granting simultaneously to all the member countries of the Forum of Consultation a status of association with WEU; ”

*Speaker:* Mr. Ferrari.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. De Decker:

4. Delete paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Speakers:* Mr. De Decker, Lord Finsberg, Mr. de Puig.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 558)<sup>1</sup>.

#### ***6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 12.20 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup>. See page 23.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance<sup>1</sup>:

**Belgium**

MM. *De Decker* (Biefnot)  
Kelchtermans  
Kempinaire  
Van der Maelen  
Péciaux

**France**

MM. Baumel  
*Briane* (Birraux)  
Dumont  
Valleix

**Germany**

MM. Antretter  
Böhm  
Büchler  
*Zierer* (Kittelmann)  
*Probst*  
(Meyer zu Bentrup)  
Müller  
Reddemann  
Soell  
*Marten* (Sprung)  
Steiner  
Mrs. Terborg  
Mr. Wolfgramm

**Italy**

Mr. Agnelli

**MM. Benvenuti**

*Covi* (Bosco)  
*Caccia* (De Carolis)  
*Caldoro* (Colombo)  
Ferrarini  
Foschi  
*Battistuzzi* (Leccisi)  
*Liberatori* (Manisco)  
*Trabacchini* (Mannino)  
*Ferrari* (Pecchioli)  
*Visibelli* (Tatarella)

**Luxembourg**

Mrs. Lentz-Cornette

**Netherlands**

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman  
MM. van der Linden  
Stoffelen  
Verbeek

**Portugal**

MM. Amaral  
Brito  
*Martins* (Candal)  
*Curto* (Fernandes Marques)  
*Rodrigues* (Machete)  
Pinto  
*Reis Leite* (Roseta)

**Spain**

MM. *Ramirez Peri* (Alvarez)  
Cuco  
Lopez Henares  
Lopez Valdivielso  
Martinez  
de Puig  
Roman  
Sole Tura  
*Bolinaga* (Vazquez)

**United Kingdom**

MM. *Alexander* (Atkinson)  
*Dunnachie* (Banks)  
*Davis* (Cox)  
Dame Peggy Fenner  
Lord Finsberg  
Mr. Hardy  
Sir John Hunt  
Sir Russell Johnston  
MM. *Cunliffe* (Lord Kirkhill)  
Litherland  
Lord Newall  
MM. *Townend* (Rathbone)  
Redmond  
Sir *Peter Fry* (Sir Keith Speed)  
Sir Donald Thompson  
MM. Thompson  
Ward

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

**Belgium**

MM. Sarens  
Seeuws

**France**

MM. Alloncle  
Boucheron  
Colombier  
Couveinhes  
Galley  
Geoffroy  
Gouteyron  
Jacquat  
Jeambrun  
Jung  
Kaspereit  
Masseret

**MM. Schreiner**  
Seitlinger**Germany**

Mrs. Blunck  
MM. Bühler  
Holtz  
Irmer  
von Schmude  
Vogel

**Italy**

MM. Andreotti  
Paire  
Parisi  
Pizzo

**MM. Polli**  
Rodotà**Luxembourg**

Mrs. Err  
Mr. Goerens

**Netherlands**

MM. Eisma  
De Hoop Scheffer  
van Velzen

**Spain**

MM. Fabra  
Homs I Ferret  
Sainz Garcia

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 558*****on WEU in the process of European Union  
– reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that the Assembly of WEU, as part of the organisation of Western European Union under the terms of the agreement on the status of WEU signed in Paris on 11th May 1955, is an integral part of the development of the European Union as provided in Article J.4, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on European Union;
- (ii) Underlining that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty obliges the Council to keep the Assembly better informed than hitherto about developments in the CFSP and other sectors of the Union in all matters which come within the competence of WEU in accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (iii) Disapproving the Council's delay in transmitting Annex IV, on the links between the Union and WEU, to Chapter IV of the document on the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty;
- (iv) Deploing also the poor information contained in the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council to the Assembly on the new working relations between WEU and the Union;
- (v) Considering that the wording of Article J.4, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on European Union gives reason for doubts about the sharing of responsibilities between WEU and the Union;
- (vi) Considering also that the hitherto agreed " practical arrangements " contained in Annex IV on the links between the Union and WEU restrict the areas of action for WEU in a way which is not compatible with WEU's far-reaching obligations stemming from the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (vii) Deploing in fact that these arrangements and the lack of political will are some of the many factors which contributed to WEU's marginalised rôle in international crisis-management particularly regarding the conflicts in former Yugoslavia;
- (viii) Underlining the important rôle WEU has to fulfil on behalf of the Union in maintaining transatlantic solidarity and co-operation in security and defence matters;
- (ix) Welcoming the successful outcome of the negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden regarding their accession to the European Union;
- (x) Welcoming also the firm commitment of all the acceding states to include in their accession, in full and without reservation, the provision of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the establishment of a common foreign and security policy;
- (xi) Expressing the hope that the referenda to be held in Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden will be positive;
- (xii) Recalling the important contribution and experience of the four EFTA countries in peace-keeping operations within the United Nations;
- (xiii) Convinced that defining a common European defence policy should now commence even though all members of the European Union are not yet full members of WEU and welcoming therefore the decision of the Council to task the WEU Permanent Council to start work now on the formulation of such a policy;
- (xiv) Noting that the countries called upon to accede to the European Union have not applied for membership of WEU with the exception of Norway which seeks full membership of WEU once it becomes a member of the European Union;
- (xv) Welcoming the fact that the Council's Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994 recognises the significant contribution of the three associate members of WEU to European security and stability;
- (xvi) Convinced however that the Council's wish to reinforce the relationship of these three countries with WEU in order to strengthen its position as the defence component of the European Union and as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance could be achieved better if the Council invited them to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty;

- (xvii) Recalling that the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994 did not agree to the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of any of the member countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation;
- (xviii) Welcoming therefore that by its Kirchberg declaration, the Council is following paragraph 1 of Recommendation 556 in granting simultaneously to all the member countries of the Forum of Consultation a status of association with WEU;
- (xix) Earnestly desiring the progressive integration of all the states of Western and Central Europe in a system of co-operation ensuring security, stability and peace for Europe as a whole;
- (xx) Hoping that the necessary conditions can be created for other countries, such as Slovenia and Moldova, to acquire the new associate status in the future, on the basis of the same historical, geographical and political considerations which allowed this status to be granted to the countries of the Forum of Consultation;
- (xxi) Considering that the devolution of the exercise of matters within the competence of WEU to other international institutions or to countries which are not members of WEU or NATO might paralyse any steps towards joint action on defence and security in Europe ;
- (xxii) Recalling the importance of maintaining, in any future parliamentary system required to supervise a common foreign security and defence policy, the possibility of bringing together delegations from the parliaments of member countries in an Assembly which represents the will of the peoples of Europe in this particular area,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Carefully prepare the intergovernmental conference planned for 1996 in line with its declaration I D8 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty;
2. Fully associate the Assembly with the Council's reflection on its preparation for the 1996 conference;
3. Retain the modified Brussels Treaty so that all the members of the European Union will be able to accede to its provisions;
4. Seek, in conjunction with the authorities of the European Union, to clear up the ambiguities of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty with a view to obtaining a general mandate to elaborate and implement decisions and actions on behalf of the Union in WEU's area of responsibility;
5. Reconsider the WEU declaration II annexed to the Maastricht Treaty with a view to allowing the European members of NATO which are not members of the European Union the right to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty;
6. Encourage all member countries of the European Union and those acceding to it to become full members of Western European Union;
7. Study the possibility of creating a WEU peace-keeping training centre on the basis of experience gained in this area by the Nordic countries and especially Finland;
8. Improve the information communicated to the Assembly on developments in the CFSP and the Council's activities in the framework of the Union.

## THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 14th June 1994

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>1. European security: crisis-prevention and management<br/>(<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1418 and amendments</i>).</p> <p>2. Address by Mr. Olechowski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.</p> <p>3. European security: crisis-prevention and management<br/>(<i>Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee</i></p> | <p><i>and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1418 and amendments</i>).</p> <p>4. Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order and draft recommendation, Doc. 1414</i>).</p> |
|--|--|

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### 2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### 3. European security: crisis-prevention and management

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1418 and amendments)*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. de Puig, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Mr. Hardy.

The debate was adjourned.

#### 4. Address by Mr. Olechowski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland

Mr. Olechowski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Olechowski answered questions put by Mr. Ward, Lord Finsberg, MM. Soell and Alexander.

#### 5. European security – crisis-prevention and management

*(Debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1418 and amendments)*

The debate was resumed.

*Speakers:* Mr. Müller, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Soell, Ward, Sole-Tura and Sir Peter Fry.

The debate was closed.

Mr. de Puig, Chairman and Rapporteur, and Lord Finsberg, Vice-Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. de Puig:

1. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Concerned by the Council’s silence regarding the continuation of the civil war in Yemen and the terrible massacres perpetrated in Rwanda; ”

*Speaker:* Mr. de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. de Puig:

2. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Concerned at North Korea’s nuclear policy and its threatening attitude towards South Korea; ”

*Speaker:* Mr. de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. de Puig:

6. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Maintain a dialogue on a permanent basis with the Mediterranean states which are not members of WEU;”

*Speaker:* Mr. de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. de Puig:

3. Draft paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper as follows:

“Support the United Nations’ call for the cease-fire in Yemen to be respected immediately;”

*Speaker:* Mr. de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. de Puig:

4. After paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Examine at the earliest opportunity the rôle that WEU might play in terminating the killings in Rwanda and establishing order and peace in that country;”

*Speaker:* Mr. de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. de Puig:

5. After paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Hold consultations on the consequences for European security of North Korea’s nuclear policy and inform the Assembly of its conclusions.”

*Speaker:* Mr. de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 559)<sup>1</sup>.

## ***6. Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation***

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft order and draft recommendation, Doc. 1414)*

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Hardy, Rockenbauer (*Observer from Hungary*), Vacaru (*Observer from Romania*), Necas (*Observer from the Czech Republic*) and Philipov (*Observer from Bulgaria*).

The debate was closed.

Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 90)<sup>2</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 560)<sup>3</sup>.

## ***7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 15th June 1994, at 10 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 5.50 p.m*

1. See page 28.

2. See page 30.

3. See page 31.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>MM. Roman</b>
MM. Kelchtermans	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	Sole Tura
Péciaux		<i>Olarte (Vazquez)</i>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Antretter	MM. Stoffelen	MM. <i>Alexander</i> (Atkinson)
Böhm	Verbeek	<i>Dunnachie</i> (Banks)
Büchler		<i>Cummings</i> (Cox)
<i>Reimann</i> (Holtz)	<b>Portugal</b>	Lord Finsberg
<i>Michels</i> (Kittelman)	MM. Brito	Mr. Hardy
Meyer zu Bentrup	<i>Rodrigues</i> (Machete)	Sir John Hunt
Müller	Pinto	Sir Russell Johnston
Soell	Mrs. <i>Aguar</i> (Roseta)	Mr. <i>Cunliffe</i> (Lord Kirkhill)
Steiner		Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i>
Vogel	<b>Spain</b>	(Litherland)
<b>Italy</b>	MM. <i>Ramirez Peri</i> (Alvarez)	Lord Newall
MM. Agnelli	Cuco	Lord <i>Dundee</i> (Rathbone)
<i>Ferrari</i> (Andreotti)	Lopez Henares	Mr. Redmond
<i>Caccia</i> (De Carolis)	Lopez Valdivielso	Sir <i>Peter Fry</i> (Sir Keith Speed)
<i>Caldoro</i> (Colombo)	Martinez	Sir Donald Thompson
Foschi	de Puig	MM. Thompson
Pecchioli		Ward

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Biefnot	Mrs. Blunck	Mrs. Err
Kempinaire	MM. Bühler	Mr. Goerens
Van der Maelen	Irmer	
Sarens	Reddemann	<b>Netherlands</b>
Seeuws	von Schmude	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman
<b>France</b>	Sprung	MM. Eisma
MM. Alloncle	Mrs. Terborg	De Hoop Scheffer
Baumel	Mr. Wolfgramm	van der Linden
Birraux		van Velzen
Boucheron	<b>Italy</b>	
Colombier	MM. Benvenuti	<b>Portugal</b>
Couveinhes	Bosco	MM. Amaral
Dumont	Ferrarini	Candal
Galley	Leccisi	Fernandes Marques
Geoffroy	Manisco	
Gouteyron	Mannino	<b>Spain</b>
Jacquat	Paire	MM. Fabra
Jeambrun	Parisi	Homs I Ferret
Jung	Pizzo	Sainz Garcia
Kaspereit	Polli	
Masseret	Rodotà	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Schreiner	Tatarella	Dame Peggy Fenner
Seitlinger		
Valleix		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 559*****on European security: crisis-prevention and management***

The Assembly,

- (i) Deploping the powerlessness of the European institutions to avoid the outbreak of a bloody war between the components of former Yugoslavia and their inability to find joint ways and means of bringing it to an end;
- (ii) Concerned by the Council's silence regarding the continuation of the civil war in Yemen and the terrible massacres perpetrated in Rwanda;
- (iii) Concerned at North Korea's nuclear policy and its threatening attitude towards South Korea;
- (iv) Stressing the urgency of implementing co-ordinated operational mechanisms between the United Nations, the CSCE, NATO the European Union and WEU capable of preventing conflicts and managing future crises constituting a threat to peace and security;
- (v) Stressing that any measures to maintain and re-establish peace in any region where it is threatened must be authorised by the United Nations;
- (vi) Stressing also that reliance should be placed on the crisis-prevention mechanisms of the CSCE;
- (vii) Welcoming paragraph 1 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 549 and paragraph 6 of its reply to Recommendation 548 recognising the need to develop joint assessment of risks and threats;
- (viii) Recalling nevertheless that the Assembly does not make " suggestions " to the Council but recommendations that have been formally adopted;
- (ix) Noting with interest of the work of the Council on;
  - WEU's rôle in peace-keeping;
  - anti-missile defence;
  - intelligence policy;
  - missions by WEU forces in humanitarian aid, peace-keeping and restoring peace;
  - WEU policy on exercises;
  - the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty;
  - progress in the feasibility study for a WEU space-based observation system;
  - air and naval co-operation in WEU;
- (x) Wishing sincerely that these studies will rapidly lead to actions that will make WEU truly operational in crisis-prevention and management;
- (xi) Perturbed nevertheless by information received from the Council to the effect that most of the WEU member countries have responded negatively to the request to make troops available to protect the safe areas in former Yugoslavia;
- (xii) Consequently recalling the wide-ranging obligations placed on all the member countries under the modified Brussels Treaty to preserve peace and security;
- (xiii) Believing that a fully operational WEU will be capable in future of preventing the development of a conflict such as that in former Yugoslavia,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Make a regular assessment of risks and threats in the world liable to affect peace and security and draw the consequences therefrom for Europe;
2. Take an initiative in the context of the common foreign and security policy to define a crisis-prevention and management policy taking account of the lessons drawn from the crisis in former Yugoslavia;
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of the work on " mutually reinforcing institutions " carried out by the CFSP working group on security and of the Council's own contribution to this study;



4. Play an active part in the conference on the pact for stability in Europe, by offering its good offices, in the framework of this conference, to the associate partners of WEU and future associate partners, insisting in particular on the principle of the inviolability of present frontiers;
5. Establish a permanent dialogue with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on crisis-prevention and management;
6. Maintain a dialogue on a permanent basis with the Mediterranean states which are not members of WEU;
7. Complete the development of the measures referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 of Recommendation 556 necessary for WEU to become fully operational in the framework of crisis-management and relating to:
  - the space-based observation system;
  - strategic means of transport;
  - the European corps and the European air and naval force and other forces answerable to WEU so as to enable a European rapid action force to be created;
  - armaments co-operation;
  - interaction between the chiefs of defence staffs, military representatives, the Planning Cell and the WEU Secretariat-General;
8. Co-ordinate with NATO the means available and the sharing of responsibilities in crisis-management, particularly in the area of restoring peace;
9. Establish direct co-ordination with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to permanent representation in these two organisations;
10. Take the necessary steps to ensure that, in the event of a given crisis, member states increase their efforts to seek the necessary political consensus;
11. Pursue its dialogue with the Maghreb countries and with Egypt and keep the Assembly informed;
12. Establish a dialogue with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN);
13. Support the United Nations' call for the cease-fire in Yemen to be respected immediately;
14. Examine at the earliest opportunity the rôle that WEU might play in terminating the killings in Rwanda and establishing order and peace in that country;
15. Hold consultations on the consequences for European security of North Korea's nuclear policy and inform the Assembly of its conclusions.

**ORDER 90*****on parliamentary co-operation with the countries of  
the WEU Forum of Consultation***

---

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Order 86 instructing the Presidential Committee:
  - (a) to encourage visits by Assembly committees to Central European countries, particularly when they prepare reports concerning that region;
  - (b) to promote the Assembly's participation in symposia and any other type of meeting at which parliamentarians are present that might be organised by those countries;
  - (c) to send Assembly documentation and other publications to the largest possible number of interested persons and institutions in Central European countries;
  - (d) to arrange for parliaments, governments and specialised institutions and associations in those countries to send the Assembly any documents and information they consider useful in order to ensure a better knowledge and greater understanding of their opinions, aims and decisions;
- (ii) Stressing the importance of the maintenance and development of relations with the parliaments of the countries of the Forum of Consultation;
- (iii) Conscious of the economic difficulties faced by these countries which are hindering more active co-operation with the WEU Assembly;
- (iv) Considering that more intensive co-operation between the WEU Assembly and the Central European parliaments constitutes an important element in the process of integration of these countries in the structures of European political and defence co-operation,

**INSTRUCTS ITS COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION**

To include in the Assembly's budget for the 1995 financial year a provision for setting up an Assembly support fund for parliamentary co-operation work with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation.

**RECOMMENDATION 560*****on parliamentary co-operation with  
the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation***

---

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Recommendations 528, 547 and 548 requesting the Council to:
  - (a) Fulfil the expectations of the Central European states by regular and relevant dialogue, duly organising discussions on topical questions, and including the states of Central Europe in appropriate seminars to provide an opportunity for debate on subjects of mutual interest;
  - (b) ensure that consultations held with the Central European states at Ministerial Council and WEU Permanent Council/Ambassador level and meetings of senior officials or seminars organised by the Institute for Security Studies are included in the annual report to the Assembly;
  - (c) establish WEU information points in the capitals of the Central European states;
  - (d) develop WEU's relations with the countries of the Forum of Consultation by seeking greater cohesion with the work of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe and intensify the work of the Forum of Consultation giving it a structured programme of work, encompassing inter alia, joint development of risk and threat assessment;
- (ii) Stressing the importance for peace and stability in Europe of the consolidation of democratic structures and the success of economic reforms in the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation;
- (iii) Warmly welcoming the Council's decisions to associate the consultation partners more closely in the work of WEU;
- (iv) Welcoming the signature by several countries, members of the Forum of Consultation, of Europe Agreements with the European Union and wishing all members of the Forum of Consultation to become party to such agreements;
- (v) Stressing the importance, repeatedly confirmed in the Council's declarations, of the development of relations and co-operation between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the member states of the Forum of Consultation with a view to integrating these countries into European political and security structures,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Keep the Assembly regularly informed on the activities of the Forum of Consultation and of decisions taken at meetings of the latter at ministerial and Permanent Council level and in the Counsellors' Group;
2. Invite the Assembly to participate on a regular basis in symposia and seminars on subjects of common interest to WEU and the Forum of Consultation, organised by WEU or by the Institute for Security Studies;
3. Ensure that the Assembly has adequate means to develop relations and co-operation with the states of the Forum of Consultation, in accordance with the Council's own expressed wish.

## FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 15th June 1994

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>1. The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee</i>, Doc. 1421 and amendments).</p> <p>2. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (<i>Presentation of the second part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the</i></p> | <p><i>Council</i>, Doc. 1411); Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.</p> <p>3. Address by General Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.</p> |
|---|---|

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **3. The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1421 and amendments)*

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Baumel and Lopez Henares.

The debate was closed.

#### **4. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council**

*(Presentation of the second part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1411)*

**Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Minister of Defence of Luxembourg,  
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxem-

bourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Poos answered questions put by Lord Finsberg, MM. Soell, Davis, Lopez Henares, Baumel, Hardy and Pastusiak (*Observer from Poland*).

*The sitting was suspended at 11.30 a.m. and resumed at 11.40 a.m.*

#### **5. Address by General Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe**

General Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, addressed the Assembly.

General Joulwan answered questions put by MM. Baumel, Hardy, Borderas, De Decker and Kittelmann.

#### **6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 12.35 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance<sup>1</sup>:

**Belgium**

MM. *De Decker* (Biefnot)  
Kelchtermans  
Kempinaire  
Péciaux

**France**

Mr. Baumel  
Mrs. *Durrieu* (Boucheron)  
MM. Dumont  
*Proriol* (Gouteyron)  
*Branger* (Jacquat)  
Masseret  
*Hunault* (Schreiner)  
Seitlinger  
Valleix

**Germany**

MM. Antretter  
Böhm  
Mrs. *Lucyga* (Büchler)  
MM. *Marten* (Bühler)  
*Reimann* (Holtz)  
Kittelmann  
Meyer zu Bentrup  
Müller  
Reddemann  
Soell  
*Michels* (Sprung)  
Mrs. Terborg  
MM. Vogel  
Wolfgramm

**Italy**

MM. Agnelli  
*Liberatori* (Andreotti)  
Benvenuti  
*Covi* (Bosco)  
De Carolis  
*Caccia* (Colombo)  
Ferrarini  
Foschi  
*Battistuzzi* (Leccisi)  
*Fava* (Manisco)  
*Trabacchini* (Mannino)  
*Ferrari* (Parisi)  
*Mesoraca* (Pecchioli)  
Pizzo  
*Visibelli* (Tatarella)

**Luxembourg**

Mrs. Err  
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette

**Netherlands**

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman  
MM. van der Linden  
Stoffelen  
Verbeek

**Portugal**

MM. Amaral  
Brito  
*Rodrigues* (Candal)

Mrs. *Aguiar*

(Fernandes Marques)  
MM. *Poças Santos* (Machete)  
*Curto* (Pinto)  
*Reis Leite* (Roseta)

**Spain**

MM. *Ramirez Peri* (Alvarez)  
Cuco  
Lopez Henares  
Lopez Valdivielso  
Martinez  
de Puig  
Roman  
Sole Tura  
*Borderas* (Vazquez)

**United Kingdom**

MM. *Dunnachie* (Banks)  
*Davis* (Cox)  
Dame Peggy Fenner  
Lord Finsberg  
Mr. Hardy  
Sir Russell Johnston  
MM. *Cunliffe* (Lord Kirkhill)  
Litherland  
Lord Newall  
MM. Rathbone  
Redmond  
*Alexander*  
(Sir Dudley Smith)  
Sir Keith Speed  
Sir Donald Thompson  
Mr. Thompson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

**Belgium**

MM. Van der Maelen  
Sarens  
Seeuws

**France**

MM. Alloncle  
Birraux  
Colombier  
Couveinhes  
Galley  
Geoffroy  
Jeambrun  
Jung  
Kaspereit

**Germany**

Mrs. Blunck  
MM. Irmer  
von Schmude  
Steiner

**Italy**

MM. Paire  
Polli  
Rodotà

**Luxembourg**

Mr. Goerens

**Netherlands**

MM. Eisma  
De Hoop Scheffer  
van Velzen

**Spain**

MM. Fabra  
Homs I Ferret  
Sainz Garcia

**United Kingdom**

Mr. Atkinson  
Sir John Hunt  
Mr. Ward

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 15th June 1994

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Reply to the debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1421 and amendments).
2. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation (*Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee*, Doc. 1415).
3. Address by Mr. de Marco, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta.
4. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation (*Debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1415 and amendments).
5. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision*, Doc. 1416).
6. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1994 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1425).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **3. The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council**

*(Reply to the debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1421 and amendments)*

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur, and Mr. Baumel, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Baumel:

2. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Assign to the Planning Cell more important and specific tasks so that it can play a wider and more important operational rôle than hitherto, in particular by strengthening its co-operation with other political/military organisations of WEU members;”

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Baumel:

1. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Provide the Planning Cell with more equipment and technical resources for data processing and communications;”

*Speaker:* Mr. Baumel.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 561)<sup>1</sup>.

#### **4. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation**

*(Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1415 and amendments)*

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Sir Keith Speed, Rapporteur.

#### **5. Address by Mr. de Marco, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta**

Mr. de Marco, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta, addressed the Assembly.

<sup>1</sup>. See page 37.

Mr. de Marco answered questions put by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Rathbone, Sir Keith Speed, Sir John Hunt, Lord Mackie of Benshie and Mr. Foschi.

#### **6. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation**

*(Debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1415 and amendments)*

The debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Mr. Rathbone.

*Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* Mr. Pavlidis (*Observer from Greece*), Dame Peggy Fenner and Mr. Pold (*Observer from Estonia*).

The debate was closed.

Sir Keith Speed, Rapporteur, and Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Three amendments (Nos. 1, 2 and 3) were tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares:

1. Draft paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper as follows:

“Establish a working relationship on maritime matters with the European Commission’s Directorate for Maritime Transport. Develop links in order to exchange information with appropriate international maritime agencies such as the International Maritime Organisation and the International Hydrographic Organisation, as well as with maritime-orientated member countries in strategic areas;”

2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “and maritime”.

3. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “merchant ship construction and specialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant ship as well as safeguards for recruiting and training appropriate crews;”.

The amendments were withdrawn.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published at No. 562)<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 39.

#### **7. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Doc. 1416)*

The report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur.

*Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* Mrs. Aguiar, MM. Pastusiak (*Observer from Poland*) and Davis.

The debate was closed.

Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur, and Mr. Thompson, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote by roll-call on the draft decision was postponed.

#### **8. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1994**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1425)*

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Covi, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Mr. Hardy.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Covi, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur, and Mr. Rathbone, Chairman, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 563)<sup>2</sup>.

#### **9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 16th June 1994, at 10 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 5.50 p.m.*

2. See page 41.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

**Belgium**

Mr. Péciaux

**France**

MM. Baumel  
*Branger (Jacquat)*

**Germany**

MM. Böhm  
*Reimann (Holtz)*  
Kittelmann  
Reddemann  
Vogel

**Italy**

MM. Agnelli  
*Ferrari (Andreotti)*  
*Covi (Bosco)*  
De Carolis  
Foschi  
Pizzo

**Netherlands**

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman  
Mr. Verbeek

**Portugal**

MM. Amaral  
Brito  
*Curto (Candal)*  
Machete  
*Poças Santos (Pinto)*  
Mrs. *Aguiar (Roseta)*

**Spain**

MM. *Ramirez Peri (Alvarez)*  
Cuco  
Lopez Henares  
Roman  
*Borderas (Vazquez)*

**United Kingdom**

MM. Atkinson  
*Dunnachie (Banks)*  
*Davis (Cox)*  
Dame Peggy Fenner  
Lord Finsberg  
Mr. Hardy  
Sir John Hunt  
Lord *Mackie of Benshie*  
(Sir Russell Johnston)  
MM. *Cunliffe (Lord Kirkhill)*  
Litherland  
Sir *Andrew Bowden*  
(Lord Newall)  
MM. Rathbone  
Redmond  
*Alexander*  
(Sir Dudley Smith)  
Sir Keith Speed  
MM. *Townend*  
(Sir Donald Thompson)  
Thompson  
Lord *Dundee (Ward)*

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

**Belgium**

MM. Biefnot  
Kelchtermans  
Kempinaire  
Van der Maelen  
Sarens  
Seeuws

**France**

MM. Alloncle  
Birraux  
Boucheron  
Colombier  
Couveinhes  
Dumont  
Galley  
Geoffroy  
Gouteyron  
Jeambrun  
Jung  
Kaspereit  
Masseret  
Schreiner  
Seitlinger  
Valleix

**Germany**

Mr. Antretter  
Mrs. Blunck  
MM. Büchler  
Bühler  
Irmer  
Meyer zu Bentrup  
Müller  
von Schmude  
Soell  
Sprung  
Steiner  
Mrs. Terborg  
Mr. Wolfgramm

**Italy**

MM. Benvenuti  
Colombo  
Ferrarini  
Leccisi  
Manisco  
Mannino  
Paire  
Parisi  
Pecchioli  
Polli

MM. Rodotà  
Tatarella

**Luxembourg**

Mrs. Err  
Mr. Goerens  
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette

**Netherlands**

MM. Eisma  
De Hoop Scheffer  
van der Linden  
Stoffelen  
van Velzen

**Portugal**

Mr. Fernandes Marques

**Spain**

MM. Fabra  
Homs I Ferret  
Lopez Valdivielso  
Martinez  
de Puig  
Sainz Garcia  
Sole Tura

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.



**RECOMMENDATION 561*****on the WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty and the decision contained in the declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Considering the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992 on strengthening WEU's operational rôle through the establishment of a Planning Cell with a number of operational tasks;
- (iii) Welcoming the fact that in the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, the Council of Ministers of WEU has confirmed the importance which they attach to the continued operational development of WEU;
- (iv) Welcoming the decisions taken at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10th-11th January 1994 giving full support to the development of a European security and defence identity and to the strengthening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance through Western European Union as the defence component of the European Union;
- (v) Welcoming the NATO summit meeting's decision to endorse the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) which will provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or WEU;
- (vi) Considering that the abovementioned decisions will make sense only if the Council attaches the highest priority to strengthening WEU's operational rôle;
- (vii) Noting, however, that a clear definition of WEU's requirements for the implementation of the CJTF concept will have to be accompanied by the establishment of a clear command and control structure providing the indispensable political-military interface for WEU operations in view of the vital importance of the CJTF concept for the relevance and effectiveness of future WEU activities and operations;
- (viii) Considering that in order to be able to operate in a satisfactory way, WEU will have to benefit from NATO and national intelligence;
- (ix) Stressing that the Planning Cell should have appropriate infrastructure and communication links with NATO which would allow WEU to perform its tasks as stated in the final communiqué of NATO's January 1994 Brussels summit meeting,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Attach the highest priority to the formulation of a common European defence policy in order to provide a clear reference framework for the activities of the Planning Cell and all other organs of WEU;
2. For the time being, allow the Planning Cell to concentrate on the three main tasks as formulated in the Petersberg declaration:
  - keeping an updated list of units and combination of units which would be allocated to WEU for specific operations;
  - preparing contingency plans for employment of forces under WEU auspices;
  - preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected;while ensuring that it can fully participate in, and furthermore work on, the implementation process of the CJTF concept which is vital for WEU's operational rôle;
3. Provide the Planning Cell with more equipment and technical resources for data processing and communications;
4. Ensure that national capitals provide full co-operation with the Planning Cell and urgently settle the remaining shortcomings in relations between the Planning Cell and NATO in order to help the Planning Cell implement its basic tasks;

5. Further promote the extension of existing contacts and exchanges of information between WEU and the United Nations and, in particular, between the WEU Planning Cell and the United Nations Secretary-General's Military Adviser in New York;
6. For the planning and possible implementation of peace support operations, adopt the terminology employed in the United Nations Agenda for Peace;
7. Avoid the multiplication of mandates given to the Planning Cell, if this is not accompanied by a corresponding enlargement of its staff;
8. After assessing the Planning Cell's activities and its internal organisation by 1st October 1994, make the basic choice between maintaining the present military liaison group with limited capability or establishing a military planning centre which should be able to carry out the numerous planning tasks and other activities which the Council may have in mind;
9. Ensure that the rotation of Planning Cell personnel will be achieved with a minimum of discontinuity;
10. Promote the internal coherence of the Planning Cell by ensuring that all staff members are remunerated in accordance with standards similar to those used for all other WEU staff.

**RECOMMENDATION 562*****on an operational organisation for WEU:  
naval and maritime co-operation***

The Assembly,

- (i) Convinced of the importance of a WEU capacity to carry out naval and maritime operations, given the fragile nature of international relations in many parts of the world where European interests may be at stake;
- (ii) Pleased that, as forecast, the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994 confirmed WEU's position as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and formally recognised the European defence identity;
- (iii) Regretting therefore that the North Atlantic Council should choose now to downgrade the single major NATO Commander's post occupied by a European and effectively abolish the Channel Command which, created by the Western Union, antedates NATO;
- (iv) Welcoming the willingness of the WEU Council to establish pragmatic arrangements for current naval, maritime and riverine operations;
- (v) Recalling previous recommendations of the WEU Assembly to:
  - “...create a European standing naval force with organic naval aviation including air defence, airborne early warning, attack, anti-submarine and heliborne assault assets for deployment under single command and unified control to areas outside the NATO theatre where Western Europe's security interests are at stake in emergency or war;” (1988);
  - “...give practical expression to the European pillar of defence:
    - (a) encourage more multinational units such as the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force and the Franco-German brigade;
    - (b) take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult;” (1989);
  - “...examine for the longer term the idea of creating a WEU naval on-call force for external operations, together with a possible pooling of appropriate national air mobile assets into a European rapid action force;” (1990);
  - “Establish in co-operation with the United Nations and especially with the relevant Gulf states, a WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty with as many member countries as possible contributing assets at least on an occasional basis, to help maintain peace and stability in the region and support diplomatic efforts directed towards the same ends;” (1991);
  - “Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to use it to distinguish their military forces – ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel – taking part in WEU operations. Personnel serving in the Planning Cell should be among the first recipients of such a badge.” (1992);
  - “Re-examine the respective tasks and rôles of the United States and its European allies in the maintenance of peace and security on the European continent and take the appropriate measures to ensure that under no circumstances will it be possible for a security vacuum to develop for lack of appropriate preparation, co-operation and co-ordination;” (1993),

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Actively encourage member states to maintain and develop naval and maritime assets, co-ordinating national capabilities in line with a defined WEU naval and maritime policy and ensuring compatibility with NATO's naval doctrine wherever possible;

2. Establish a working relationship on maritime matters with the European Commission's Directorate for Maritime Transport and develop links with appropriate international maritime agencies such as the International Maritime Organisation and the International Hydrographic Organisation as well as with maritime-orientated non-member countries in strategic areas;
3. Consult the North Atlantic Council to review the abolition of the Channel Command so that the European dimension in the new NATO command structure is not neglected – establishing WEU liaison teams with NATO major and major subordinate commanders is a possible initial solution;
4. Consider the expansion of the Channel Committee to include all WEU full and associate members from the Atlantic seaboard and also the establishment of a "Mediterranean Committee" to encompass all Mediterranean full and associate members;
5. Give, via the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee, the Heads of European Navies forum a formal status and a specific mandate to contribute to the development of a WEU naval and maritime policy in conjunction with the Planning Cell;
6. Staff the Planning Cell with adequate numbers and levels of naval personnel, including marines and representatives of the other maritime services as required to develop forthwith co-operation in the following areas:
  - joint task force planning;
  - command and control for naval operations (including naval intelligence gathering);
  - logistics (including transport by sea);
  - merchant ship construction and specialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant ship as well as safeguards for recruiting and training appropriate crews;
  - policy for the effective employment of both naval and merchant marine reserves;
  - a coherent naval exercise policy and programme;
7. Give priority to practical aspects of aero-maritime and amphibious co-operation such as the need to co-ordinate the operational availability of at least one carrier amongst appropriate member nations and to maintaining and furthering amphibious capabilities as a component part of a European rapid action force;
8. Encourage the co-ordination of operations, using existing naval assets, especially in the Caribbean and notably with the United States authorities, to combat the drug trafficking which undermines European security;
9. Seek to develop co-operation in the domain of naval procurement – hulls as well as systems – through the Western European Armaments Group and emphasise the naval and maritime dimension of satellite observation when developing WEU's Torrejón Satellite Centre and the WEU Earth Observation Satellite programme;
10. Create and award, in conjunction with national authorities, a WEU campaign medal to those who participate in operations under the aegis of WEU.

**RECOMMENDATION 563*****on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union  
for the financial year 1994***

---

The Assembly,

(i) Considering that:

- (a) the Council has communicated to the Assembly the budgets of the ministerial organs for the financial year 1994;
- (b) the budget of the Secretariat-General comprises five sections, of which section D relates to the study on medium- and long-term studies on space and section E to the Planning Cell;
- (c) the Torrejón Satellite Centre has entered its second experimental phase and the Ministerial Council is proposing to discuss the future of the Centre towards the end of 1994;
- (d) the Council has allocated WEAG an operating budget for the financial year 1994 under a special procedure and that this budget is financed by thirteen countries;
- (e) the Council still has not undertaken the study recommended earlier by the Assembly leading to possible approval of a private health insurance scheme instead of the French social security system;

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Communicate to it any decisions that are taken on the operation of the Torrejón Satellite Centre after completion of the experimental phase at the end of 1994;
2. Communicate to it the final arrangements for the preparation and management of WEAG's budget;
3. Take the necessary measures for WEU staff in Paris to be affiliated to a private health insurance scheme upon termination of the current agreement with the health insurance branch of the French national social security scheme.

## SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 16th June 1994

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>1. The rôle and future of nuclear weapons (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee</i>, Doc. 1420).</p> <p>2. Address by Mr. Kukan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia.</p> <p>3. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure in</p> | <p>view of the creation of a status of associate member (<i>Vote by roll-call on the draft decision in the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges</i>, Doc. 1416).</p> <p>4. The rôle and future of nuclear weapons (<i>Resumed debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation</i>, Doc. 1420).</p> |
|---|---|

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly**

A candidate had been proposed for one of the three remaining posts of Vice-President, namely, Mr. van der Linden.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. van der Linden was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

#### **4. The rôle and future of nuclear weapons**

*(Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1420)*

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur.

#### **5. Address by Mr. Kukan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia**

Mr. Kukan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Kukan answered questions put by Lord Finsberg, MM. Atkinson, Thompson and Gusenbauer (*Observer from Austria*).

#### **6. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member**

*(Doc. 1416)*

The President of the Assembly declared that a quorum had not been attained and that the draft decision stood referred to the Presidential Committee.

#### **7. The rôle and future of nuclear weapons**

*(Debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1420)*

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Rodrigues, Boucheron, Thompson and Lord Finsberg.

The debate was closed.

Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur, and Mr. Baumel, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 564)<sup>1</sup>.

#### **8. Adjournment of the session**

The President adjourned the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly.

*The sitting was closed at 12.15 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup> See page 44.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b> MM. <i>De Decker</i> (Biefnot) <i>Ghesquière</i> (Sarens)	MM. Foschi <i>Fava</i> (Manisco) Paire <i>Mesoraca</i> (Pecchioli) Pizzo	MM. <i>Bolinaga</i> (Homs I Ferret) Lopez Henares Lopez Valdivielso Roman
<b>France</b> MM. Baumel Boucheron	<b>Netherlands</b> Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. Stoffelen Verbeek	<b>United Kingdom</b> Mr. Atkinson Dame Peggy Fenner Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir John Hunt Sir Russell Johnston Sir. <i>Andrew Bowden</i> (Lord Newall) MM. Rathbone Redmond Sir Keith Speed Lord <i>Dundee</i> (Sir Donald Thompson) MM. Thompson Ward
<b>Germany</b> MM. Antretter <i>Reimann</i> (Holtz) Steiner	<b>Portugal</b> MM. <i>Poças Santos</i> (Amaral) Brito <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal) <i>Reis Leite</i> (Roseta)	
<b>Italy</b> MM. Agnelli <i>Liberatori</i> (Andreotti) Benvenuti De Carolis <i>Caccia</i> (Colombo)	<b>Spain</b> MM. <i>Ramirez Peri</i> (Alvarez) Cuco	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b> MM. Kelchtermans Kempinaire Van der Maelen Péciaux Seeuws	MM. Büchler Bühler Irmer Kittelmann Meyer zu Bentrup Müller Reddemann von Schmude Soell Sprung Mrs. Terborg MM. Vogel Wolfgramm	<b>Netherlands</b> MM. Eisma De Hoop Scheffer van der Linden van Velzen
<b>France</b> MM. Alloncle Birraux Colombier Couveinhes Dumont Galley Geoffroy Gouteyron Jacquat Jeambrun Jung Kaspereit Masseret Schreiner Seitlinger Valleix	<b>Italy</b> MM. Bosco Ferrarini Leccisi Mannino Parisi Polli Rodotà Tatarella	<b>Portugal</b> MM. Fernandes Marques Machete Pinto
<b>Germany</b> Mrs. Blunck Mr. Böhm	<b>Luxembourg</b> Mrs. Err Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	<b>Spain</b> MM. Fabra Martinez de Puig Sainz Garcia Sole Tura Vazquez
		<b>United Kingdom</b> MM. Banks Cox Lord Kirkhill Mr. Litherland

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 564*****on the rôle and future of nuclear weapons***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the large reductions in both the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals as a consequence of the START I and START II treaties and the end of the cold war;
- (ii) Conscious that START I and START II will not be fully implemented before the year 2003;
- (iii) Noting that the United States is at present making a full reassessment of its nuclear posture and is showing true political determination to prepare a new reduction in strategic arsenals in the framework of a future START III treaty;
- (iv) Noting, however, that Russia, for its part, is increasingly tempted, mainly due to the decline of its conventional forces, to make its strategic nuclear capability the centrepiece of its defence policy;
- (v) Assessing present political instability in Russia and the former Soviet republics and the ensuing dangers;
- (vi) Noting that there are still doubts about whether Russia really wishes to ratify and implement the START II treaty;
- (vii) Noting that, notwithstanding the end of the cold war and the signing of the historic nuclear arms reduction treaties, the mutual relationship of deterrence between Russia and the western nuclear powers is still topical, including the possibility of first-use of nuclear weapons which is still the keystone of the doctrine of deterrence everywhere;
- (viii) Noting that, notwithstanding recent efforts to establish confidence between the former cold war adversaries at the level of political leaders and experts, there is still an astonishing lack of reciprocal confidence, wish for transparency and mutual understanding in many other circles;
- (ix) Conscious that if greater account is not taken of lingering suspicions, prejudices and fundamental differences in military doctrines and diverging interests in foreign policy, the establishment of new relationships of security, stability and confidence between the members of the Atlantic Alliance on the one hand and of the Russian Federation on the other may be jeopardised;
- (x) Hoping, in this respect, that Russia will agree to join the partnership for peace proposal proposed by the Atlantic Alliance;
- (xi) Welcoming the bilateral agreements reached between the United States and Russia and the United Kingdom and Russia to detarget nuclear arms, even if the value of these agreements is symbolic rather than intrinsic;
- (xii) Believing that other measures, such as taking most strategic missiles off alert status and separating nuclear warheads from their missiles should be envisaged;
- (xiii) Expressing in general the wish that the theory of mutual assured destruction (MAD) should be replaced by a policy of mutual assured co-operation (MAC);
- (xiv) Noting that it would be totally illogical to start the implementation of a European common foreign and security policy (CFSP) including the framing by WEU of a common defence policy “ which might in time lead to a common defence ” without closely examining the rôle of the French and British nuclear forces in the definition of a common defence policy of the European Union;
- (xv) Welcoming the work of the permanent Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine which among other things has confirmed that there are many points of convergence in the assessments made by the two countries;
- (xvi) Aware that the existence of a formidable nuclear arsenal in Russia continues to determine the structure and deployment of the nuclear forces of France, the United Kingdom and the United States;
- (xvii) Noting that, regarding proliferation, there are doubts about whether the possession of nuclear weapons by the official nuclear weapon states plays a rôle in deterring third countries from procuring their own nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction;



(xviii) Recognising that, particularly in the United States, the weight of nuclear deterrence as a means of preventing war tends to diminish while extended nuclear deterrence is also losing credibility;

(xix) Noting that the 700 United States B-61 nuclear gravity bombs remaining in Europe after NATO's October 1991 decision play a purely political and symbolic rôle;

(xx) Noting that, increasingly, nuclear deterrence in circumstances today is truly credible only if the vital interests of a nation or group of nations are under direct threat from the power to be deterred;

(xxi) Noting that, in regard to the common security policy of the European Union and in the framework of WEU, a study should be made on what France and the United Kingdom consider to be their vital interests which are protected by their nuclear means;

(xxii) Regretting that there is not sufficient cohesion in the defence policies of European countries and, despite bold general declarations, there is not yet cohesion and understanding between our countries regarding the development and future of their strategic relationship with Russia, although this would be indispensable for introducing any lasting system of security in Europe;

(xxiii) Welcoming the granting of associate status to the Central European countries of the Forum of Consultation;

(xxiv) Emphasising, however, that WEU's policy of stronger security links with its Central European partners will contribute little to Europe's security if it is not accompanied by frequent political and military consultations with Russia and the other European republics of the CIS aiming at the establishment of a strategic relationship based on a thorough understanding of, and respect for mutual interests;

(xxv) Noting that it is of the greatest importance to intensify and further improve international co-operation in the struggle against proliferation, in particular by extending the non-proliferation treaty in 1995, improving the missile technology control régime and establishing a follow-up organisation with extended membership as a successor to Cocom;

(xxvi) Aware that none of these existing or future non-proliferation régimes can guarantee that a country with sufficient financial resources and zeal will not acquire ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction;

(xxvii) Noting that there is an urgent need for a coherent and co-ordinated policy among official nuclear weapon states to cover contingencies in which a proliferant third country might threaten to use a nuclear weapon;

(xxviii) Recognising that there is a need to define a coherent European counter-proliferation policy, drawing inspiration from the discussions which are already being held in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance following the recent United States initiative;

(xxix) Recalling the results of the Assembly's Rome symposium on anti-missile defence for Europe (20th-21st April 1993) and in particular the Assembly's recommendation that the Council decide on the basis of a careful risk assessment whether and to what extent it will be necessary to mandate European industry to conduct a feasibility study regarding the requirements for a cost-effective anti-missile protection system for Europe;

(xxx) Taking note of the fact that the WEU Council, in its reply to Recommendation 540, has pointed out that nuclear questions are not, at the present time, on its agenda;

(xxxi) Insisting, however, that the preceding considerations should be an incentive to redefine the rôle of nuclear weapons for the security of Europe, realising that they cannot be disinvented and, if only for that reason, they will continue to be deployed and will continue to play an important rôle in the foreseeable future in international relations,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

##### 1. Establish a strategic study group within WEU:

- to examine the rôle and future of nuclear weapons for European security including the different aspects of intra-European extended nuclear deterrence;
- to examine the rôle all the WEU member states might play in defining a future European nuclear strategy;
- then to study the possibility of creating a nuclear co-ordination body within WEU;

- to examine the military aspects of an active European counter-proliferation policy;
  - to examine the possibilities of Europe helping the CIS to dismantle its excess nuclear warheads following the bilateral agreements and unilateral decisions reached between the United States and the republics of the CIS which possess nuclear weapons;
2. Take steps to intensify relations with the European republics of the CIS, in particular Russia and Ukraine, in particular to ensure that the definition of a European defence identity does not arouse new suspicion or provoke reactions which might run counter to the final goal of creating a collective European security order;
  3. Ensure that the abovementioned initiatives are pursued in an atmosphere of absolute transparency with Western Europe's North American allies in order to make certain that they support the development of a European security and defence identity.

**II**  
**OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES**

# FIRST SITTING

Monday, 13th June 1994

## SUMMARY

1. Opening of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Address by the Provisional President.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Observers.
6. Election of the President.
7. Address by the President of the Assembly.
8. Election of five Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
9. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 1407).
10. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.

*Replies by Mr. van Eekelen to questions put by: Mr. Bie-ringer (Observer from Austria), Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Soell.*

11. Address by Mr. Haekkerup, Minister of Defence of Den-mark.

*Replies by Mr. Haekkerup to questions put by: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Lopez Henares.*

12. The European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1419 and amendments*).

*Speakers: Mr. Borderas (Rapporteur), Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Borderas (Rapporteur), Mr. Lopez Henares (Chairman), Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Borderas, Mr. Lopez Henares (point of order).*

13. Changes in the membership of committees.

14. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Ehrmann, Provisional President, in the Chair.*

### 1. Opening of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### 2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings <sup>1</sup>.

### 3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The results of the European Parliament elections on 12th June reflect an unease in the minds of the voters which could lead to unexpected results in the German legislative election in October 1994 and particularly the French presidential election in the spring of 1995 when anything could happen.

1. See page 15.

The euphoria which marked the EEC's first twenty years on account of the three-fold rise in the standard of living and trade among the Six, Nine and Twelve community countries and the need felt by all for a united Europe in the face of the American giants, Canada, the United States and Mexico, and those of Asia, China, Japan, and the Four Dragons explain why no major party dared run on an openly anti-European platform, even though certain undertones fundamentally hostile to Europe could at times be detected. In France we are very much aware of this.

However the euphoria has now subsided.

Over the last ten years or so many have come to forget these positive results – the half-full glass referred to by Mr. Delors – and see only the pessimistic side, the glass half-empty. They accuse the European Union of being responsible for the economic recession, unemployment, immigration and insecurity and fail to understand that if every state turns in upon itself, this will herald the start of a major decline. France, for example, has nearly a third of its workforce employed in the export trade and ranks as the fourth trading power in the world. It owes this position primarily to the European Union.

All this has nothing to do with WEU.

However, when nations accuse the European Union of being unable to resolve the problem created by the breakdown of Yugoslavia into six

*The President (continued)*

republics and in particular the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, devastated by the ethnic fury of Serbia, WEU feels concerned.

Obviously WEU could recall that with the meagre resources it has been given, it has done its duty in the Adriatic and the Danube; however it is acutely aware that the European Union has no common foreign policy and has not provided WEU with the necessary military means. The European Union has been overly reliant on support from NATO, which itself depends primarily, when acting in a peace-keeping capacity, on the United Nations Security Council and its Secretary-General.

Decision-making and implementation by such bodies is slow, hence the war between Serbs, Croats and Bosnians. It is virtually certain that if the European Union had had a common foreign policy and WEU the necessary military means to implement it, peace, rather than war, might have carried the day and Bosnia would not have been devastated for the past three years by the most appalling of ethnic crimes.

It was with this in mind that certain members of the European Union created the European corps, which is to march on parade through Paris on 14th July of this year.

Only very recently in the French National Assembly I pressed Mr. Alain Lamassoure, Deputy Minister for European Affairs, in the following terms. I quote: "Nothing has been done to provide WEU, the defence component of the Europe of the Twelve, with the military means that could have prevented the crisis in Bosnia."

This past failure to act and the violence and wretchedness of the present, from which a means of extrication is now being sought through diplomatic negotiation, where agreements are broken no sooner than they are made, are obliging WEU to consider a different future taking account of the changed circumstances.

The breakdown of the Soviet Union, having supposedly reduced the danger represented by that region, will induce the United States, whatever Mr. Clinton says, to withdraw a part of its forces from Europe: these are to be reduced sharply from their former strength of 300 000 to 100 000 and this alone will cause NATO's rôle to shrink. Moreover, despite the celebrations for the fiftieth anniversary of the D-Day landings, many Americans – scarred by the Vietnam war – have no longer any desire to come and liberate Europe a third time.

It was all very fine no doubt that the European states should have met in Paris three weeks ago at the request of the French Prime Minister to pre-

vent war by accepting the principles of border inviolability and respect for minority rights. However, we are enjoined by the ancient Romans: "si vis pacem para bellum" (if you would have peace, prepare for war), to which the twentieth century, at once idealistic and pragmatic, might add "si vis pacem para pacem" (if you would have peace prepare for peace).

Who better than WEU – the defence component of the European Union – can contribute to maintaining peace in Europe, now that it has expanded from ten to twenty-four countries with the advent of the new members whose delegations I am pleased to welcome to this Assembly.

However to make such a contribution WEU requires the means in the form of space-based resources and satellites so as to be informed about progress in arms reduction, forces deployment and the operational capabilities of neighbouring countries, a Planning Cell to co-ordinate actions and ensure that NATO places its headquarters staffs and troops at its disposal when necessary, the creation of a European armaments agency to ensure all forces are uniformly equipped and manoeuvre jointly under a single command and participation in all conferences on controlled disarmament.

Sadly the meeting held in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994 serves to demonstrate that we are still far from achieving these results and that the solutions proposed time and time again by the WEU Assembly have fallen on deaf ears.

In spite of all this, as I stated in the National Assembly on Wednesday, 1st June, when Europe gets its second wind, some of its energy must serve to revitalise WEU. Its parliamentary Assembly and committees must again begin to make proposals and bring pressure to bear on governments, if necessary using the media to influence public opinion to oblige them to take notice. WEU will be more useful than ever since the European Union, as it enlarges, will find that its institutions, whatever transformations are wrought, become less effective. The United States, and consequently NATO, will also be less in evidence.

The oldest member of your Assembly remembers well that his own father died in the 1914-1918 war, and therefore asks you with all his heart and mind to make every effort to ensure that WEU acquires the means necessary to become the key factor in a peace profoundly desired by all the peoples of Europe.

#### *4. Examination of credentials*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of credentials.

In accordance with Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure, the credentials of representatives and sub-

*The President (continued)*

stitutes have been attested by a statement of ratification from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and formally communicated by the President of that Assembly.

**5. Observers**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I should now like to welcome the permanent delegations of parliamentary observers from those countries to which this status has been accorded.

I also welcome parliamentary observers from Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Malta, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden and Turkey.

May I welcome them to our debates, together with members of the Permanent Council and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CSCE who are present at this part-session.

**6. Election of the President**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

Rule 7 (1) lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

Under Rule 10, paragraphs 2 and 10, of the Rules of Procedure, no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives, and representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

I have received only one nomination, that of Sir Dudley Smith.

This candidature has been correctly submitted in the form prescribed by the Rules of Procedure.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that we should elect Sir Dudley Smith President by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I accordingly declare Sir Dudley Smith President of the Assembly of Western European Union, and invite him to take the chair.

*(Sir Dudley Smith then took the Chair)*

**7. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT. – Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for that vote of confidence, which is much appreciated. We do these things in

a formal way, but I would like to thank the Provisional President, who has just spoken, for his kind words and for doing the job so efficiently.

We meet here again after a year that has been extraordinary in some ways. A very great deal has happened, and it has affected the operations of Western European Union to a large extent.

I hope that you will bear with me for a few minutes – although I do not intend to make a long speech – while I go over some of the things that have happened directly to us, and their implications for the future. They are both relevant and important for the people whom we all represent, as democratic representatives in our own parliaments and our own countries.

A year ago, I stressed the changes which were taking place, although then none of us could envisage exactly how radical some of those changes might be. Six months ago we were preparing for the January NATO summit – a summit which laid the ground rules for the future shape of relations between the Western European Union and NATO.

It is true that we still have to determine many of the practical aspects of the relationship. This was emphasised in the report on the evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU which our colleague Jacques Baumel presented to the Standing Committee in May. His report and the recommendations urged our ministers to develop the organisation in certain very practical terms and especially to extend an offer of an enhanced status of association to our partners in the WEU Forum of Consultation: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

I am very pleased to report that such an offer was made to the nine countries in Luxembourg on 9th May and accepted. You will remember that a year ago I said that one of my immediate personal priorities was to develop contacts with the Central European and Baltic states to bring them “on side” as quickly as possible. It was therefore particularly happy for me, and significant for our Assembly, that our Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, who will be addressing us on Wednesday, should have invited me to represent the Assembly at the ceremony held to mark the event at the Kirchberg in Luxembourg.

As it happens this is the first plenary session when we have the pleasure of welcoming permanent delegations from Central Europe. Now of course, given the enhanced status of associate partnership, the Assembly must decide on revised arrangements. The matter will be referred to the Political Committee and to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges so that decisions may be made in accordance with the Assembly's legal basis, the modified Brussels Treaty.

*The President (continued)*

There are of course wider material implications to this enlargement which concern the Council as well as the Assembly. The Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Mr. Rathbone, has already submitted a comprehensive report to the Presidential Committee as a basis for discussion. I am pleased to say that the Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary-General – I had the opportunity of discussing the matter even further with him at lunchtime today – are conscious of the situation and have suggested setting up a joint Council-Assembly committee to propose a practical solution. That may well be on an informal basis, but we can make some very good progress; we certainly need to.

In passing it is worth mentioning that a number of our colleagues in Central Europe perceive this development in WEU – the associate partnership – as much more significant than the partnership for peace programme being offered by NATO. I would stress however that the NATO and WEU arrangements are complementary: neither precludes the other.

I should also mention one reservation I and a number of colleagues have, about the Council's decision to suspend the Forum of Consultation in the light of the new association agreements. In practice this means that WEU has now no clear means of including those other European states which might otherwise have been invited to join the Forum, which is unfortunate. I am sure however that the Assembly will continue to pioneer relations in the future as in the past and I would urge the Council to reconsider its future use of the Forum.

Part III of the Kirchberg declaration from the Luxembourg meeting also redefines the relationship with the three original associate members – Iceland, Norway and Turkey. While Iceland and Norway are comparatively satisfied with the present situation, Turkey has severe reservations. I can certainly understand such sentiments and sympathise – Turkey is a loyal and proven ally in NATO. However, I must stress that it is up to the WEU Council rather than the Assembly to change its attitude in the matter. That is why the specific recommendation on the subject contained in Mr. Ferrari's report on WEU in the process of European Union is of particular significance and worthy of special attention in the debate tomorrow. I hope that there will be a number of useful contributions.

While discussing WEU's relations with individual countries I should draw your attention to two recent events. Firstly, I should like to applaud the Russian Government's reasonable reaction to developments in WEU and its call for a bilateral relationship – something we in the Assembly have

been urging very strongly. I am therefore particularly pleased to welcome the delegation from the Russian Parliament to this session and we look forward to further discussions with them at the special meetings we have convened in the autumn.

The Government of the United States has been particularly positive in its attitude to WEU and President Clinton's encouraging remarks here in Paris last Tuesday, supporting WEU and the European defence identity are certainly appreciated. I shall do my utmost to develop our relations with the United States Congress when I visit Washington later this year, and I hope colleagues will use every opportunity to do the same.

We are about to enter a new era in the European Union, with the imminent expansion to include four new countries. There are obvious implications for WEU.

Yesterday's referendum in Austria was the first of the four remaining hurdles for such expansion and I welcome the result wholeheartedly. Next month in Vienna I shall be meeting the Austrian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to explore the possibilities now for greater co-operation.

During this first year as your President, I became increasingly aware that the countries of Western Europe have not done enough to consult the other nations of our continent to try to work out our joint approaches to current problems.

This feeling has been confirmed by many of those I have met officially on your behalf in the past few months, at the highest level. In April I had the honour of being received by President Zhelev in Sofia and ten days ago by President Havel in Prague.

The individual contributions of several Central European countries to try to help solve the Yugoslav conflict, for example, is most praiseworthy – whether it is through implementing the United Nations embargo on the Danube, in the case of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, or by direct support of United Nations operations “on the ground” where the Czech, Polish and Slovak Republics are concerned. I believe however that there is room for more collective action, and that we should co-operate in the widest possible forum to ensure a more equal sharing of responsibilities.

The Czech Republic's initiative in currently organising courses in United Nations peace-keeping, which I saw for myself a fortnight ago, is admirable. The military of seventeen nations, including Switzerland, are presently training together in southern Bohemia. In addition, our Nordic friends have a long tradition in organising such joint training and we have a vested interest in comparing our ideas and experiences to ensure effectiveness and cost efficiency for future operations.

*The President (continued)*

The young men and women who are currently serving in WEU and other operations under United Nations auspices deserve our unreserved praise and every encouragement, because they are proving excellent ambassadors for our countries. I was impressed to hear from the Mayor of Roussé in Bulgaria when I visited the WEU German and Spanish contingent based on the Danube, just how much good will is being generated with the local population. We must make sure that our representatives know that we all appreciate their efforts however because they are working in trying, frustrating and often dangerous circumstances and sometimes feel forgotten.

Closer to home I know that similar frustrations are experienced by the military men of our Planning Cell in Brussels as they try to prepare contingency plans for future operations by WEU, such as the current planning for the administration of Mostar when peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina always seems to be just around the next corner, but is never quite reached.

There are some signs now that the various sides there are at last realising that there must be an end to the bloody carnage which has torn and maimed so many people. We must redouble our efforts, therefore, to convince all concerned to find a political compromise; no other solution appears possible to my mind. Lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia would be sure to lead to complete mayhem, as all our nations with troops there supporting United Nations operations are well aware.

In this Balkan context and as a complement to the documents on action by the Presidential Committee which the Clerk of the Assembly has distributed, I must report on the Presidential Committee's visit to Athens in March. Members were in agreement with the Greek authorities, who are, of course, currently presiding over the European Union, on a number of subjects. But on one particular issue – the unilateral embargo imposed on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – members were adamant in their opposition.

It is obvious that this action is having a particular effect on the ratification process for Greek membership of WEU and I urge all colleagues to try to bring pressure to bear so that an early solution is found to allow us to make positive progress towards a coherent security structure for Europe.

One of our major aims over coming months as we come closer to the 1996 review of the Maastricht Treaty, is to define the parameters for the security structure we must develop to take us into the new millennium.

I am fully aware that there have been some, especially in the European Parliament, who would like to usurp the competence of others. However in the light of yesterday's European election results and with a new and much altered European Parliament I believe we should be prepared to seek at least a *modus vivendi*.

At the same time, I am sure that a majority of colleagues in our parliamentary Assembly would wish to safeguard national prerogatives in the defence domain. Hence the reason why the Presidential Committee has decided to hold an important colloquy on the subject of organising our security, which is scheduled for 17th October here in Paris and to which we are inviting the chairmen of national parliamentary defence and foreign affairs Committees, not only from WEU member countries, but from Greece and the associate and observer states, and a delegation from the Russian Parliament.

As I have said, I am convinced that we have to go forward as Europeans and accept greater responsibility in the future for our own security.

I listened with interest to what our doyen Mr. Ehrmann had to say a few minutes ago and agree entirely with his observations and sentiments regarding the state of European security in general and the rôle of WEU in particular.

Our debates here this week and the recommendations we adopt are important and must be taken seriously by our Council and our member governments, because we represent a unique European forum with a mandate to discuss both security and defence *per se*.

We shall listen with interest to the ministers we have invited to address us and, of course, in a moment or two, to our Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen. I hope that you will not hesitate to ask them as many questions as you wish, to ensure that they appreciate the depth of commitment we all feel to the subjects under discussion.

Thank you again for your support. We have quite a challenge to face together over the coming months, but I am certain that we can make very good progress.

### **8. Election of five Vice-Presidents of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the election by secret ballot of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure provides that proposals for candidatures for Vice-Presidents shall each be sponsored in writing by three or more representatives. Representatives who are



*The President (continued)*

members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

Also, Rule 7 (1) lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

Five candidates have been properly sponsored.

In alphabetical order they are: Mr. Foschi, Mr. Machete, Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. Steiner and Mr. Valleix.

I propose that these nominations be approved by the Assembly by acclamation and that the three remaining places be filled later.

If this is done, the order of seniority of the Vice-Presidents will be determined by age.

Is there any objection to the election of these Vice-Presidents by acclamation?...

I take it that there is no objection.

I accordingly declare the following elected Vice-Presidents, in this order of precedence: Mr. Valleix, Mr. Foschi, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Pécriaux and Mr. Machete.

### ***9. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session***

(Doc. 1407)

The PRESIDENT. – We now turn to the draft order of business for the first part of the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly.

Is there any opposition to the draft order of business contained in Document 1407?...

The draft order of business for the first part of the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly is agreed to.

As you will have seen, we have a very full programme of business for the week, including a large number of guest speakers.

So that we might rise at a reasonable hour, I should like to propose in accordance with Rule 34 that we observe a time limit of five minutes for all speakers in debates.

Is it agreed?...

It is so agreed.

In response to a number of requests, I should like to announce that all speakers, I am advised, have agreed to answer questions. It would be very helpful if you would let the Sitings Office know if, ladies and gentlemen, you want to ask a question of any of our speakers in this session. One of the officials will direct you to the right place. We shall then have some idea of how many questions there are and who the questioners are.

### ***10. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU***

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.

I welcome you, Secretary-General. You are an old friend of ours and we look forward to your address.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, members of the Assembly of Western European Union, Ambassadors. Five years ago, on Monday 5th June 1989, Mr. Charles Goerens paid me the honour of inviting me to address you for the first time as the Secretary-General of WEU.

At the time, WEU was in the throes of an initial enlargement to include Portugal and Spain, a development which already posed a problem of the reorganisation of its Paris premises. At that time too, neither the WEU Institute for Security Studies nor the Satellite Centre existed, although the first steps had been taken which were to lead to their establishment in 1990 and 1991 respectively. An operational rôle for WEU seemed improbable in the short term despite some early mutterings about military co-ordination. A network of contact points had been set up between capitals for operations designed to ensure freedom of navigation and mine clearance in the waters of the Gulf.

To have spoken then of the need for a Planning Cell would have met with scepticism or warnings about the risks of duplication.

Europe had not yet shaken off the effects of the cold war even, although negotiations on arms control were uppermost on the East-West agenda. We were welcoming the conclusions of the Brussels summit meeting of the Atlantic Alliance and the adoption of the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament. We were welcoming the appeal by President Bush for free elections in Eastern Europe and the dismantling of the Berlin wall. The Brussels summit meeting also underlined the vitality of Atlantic solidarity and recognised the achievements of WEU reactivation. The sixteen Heads of State and Government “welcomed the evolution of an increasingly strong and coherent European identity, including in the security area”. Our work on the implementation of The Hague platform affirmed the willingness of the Europeans to assume a growing share of the responsibilities and needs of their common defence.

The very subjects of the reports which you are to debate during this session clearly illustrate what our organisation has achieved in five years. Before coming back to some aspects of that progression, I should like to dwell for a moment on a

*Mr. van Eekelen (continued)*

series of symbolic events which I believe can guide our thinking within WEU on the future of Europe.

This month of June has begun with the commemoration of a decisive victory by an alliance which was created to uphold freedom and democracy. Speaking to the Permanent Council, I recalled the four freedoms defined by President Roosevelt: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, freedom from fear everywhere in the world. Four years later, the Brussels Treaty paved the way for the signing of the Washington Treaty and the formation of another alliance pledged to uphold the same values, one which Italy and Germany were soon to join. As part of the recent commemorations, we have seen German and French young people joyfully celebrate on German soil the reconciliation of Western Europe. On 14th July, the European corps will parade down the Champs-Élysées.

It is to the Paris Agreements that we owe WEU, the first, regional, stage in the grouping together of states whose ties and interests have grown ever closer. Together these same states have created the European Union open both to the centre and the east of our continent from which forty years of cold war had separated us. Today I particularly welcome the Austrian people's massive support for their country in joining European Union.

The emancipation of the countries which formed the other Europe has created a tremendous need for solidarity, placing heavy political and economic responsibilities on Western Europe as it searches for peaceful solutions to simmering conflicts. It is, indeed, the only pole of stability, the very idea of war ever again erupting on its soil being unthinkable. To counter the risks of chaos, the resurgence of intolerance and violence and even the reappearance of unacceptable spheres of influence on the European continent will demand political courage on the part of WEU countries. It is up to our countries to continue demonstrating within WEU the exemplary values of the Union so that they are shared by all Europeans. The course is now set and any going back would have tragic implications.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

The Council decided to strengthen its relations with the nine central European partners by offering them the status of association. The status of associate partner which those countries have accepted puts WEU in the forefront of the European construction process by showing those countries that they belong to the process of European integration and opening up a substantial part of our activities to them. I am sure that Minister Poos will return to that important initiative on Wednesday.

It seems that the granting of that new status virtually defines the political frontiers to the east of the European Union for the end of this century. At the same time, it complements not only the co-operation now being shown in the alliance with the bilateral partnership for peace programme, but the initiative taken by the European Union for a pact on stability in Europe, which was launched here in Paris at the end of May.

We also welcome close contacts with other countries involved in European security, particularly Russia and Ukraine. But those relations will not be developed in the same multilateral framework and will, by our European logic of parallelism, have a bilateral character. WEU and the European Union are offering a framework within which action can be taken in pursuance of effective preventive diplomacy. But such action will be effective only if two conditions are met: first, that new ground is broken in relation to methods and secondly, that the member states demonstrate a strong political will so that crises such as the one in former Yugoslavia never occur. I have no doubt that your Assembly will agree on the best way of welcoming the representatives from the parliaments of countries. I also hope that you will define the participation of our associate members in this present week of debates. I am sure that the Council will provide the necessary material resources to enable you to meet your new obligations.

For WEU, enlargement is not an end in itself but a response to the demands of the moment. From Petersberg to Kirchberg in under two years, our organisation has taken on a dimension somewhat at variance with its title. I think that a running-in period is now needed to enable it fully to exploit the new potential offered by a Council meeting in different configurations.

WEU has reached a stage at which it must start defining what a common European defence policy will entail. The Maastricht Treaty has not imposed any binding timetable in that respect, but the development of our operational rôle requires a conceptual framework. Therefore, it is necessary gradually to put in place the building blocks of a new European defence policy. In Luxembourg, ministers asked the Permanent Council to begin work on that long-term assignment. Now, seven years after The Hague platform was adopted, it will fall to the Netherlands presidency again to present preliminary conclusions at the next Ministerial Council in November.

I pay tribute to the overall coherence of the reports presented by MM. Baumel, Ferrari, de Puig, Borderas and De Decker and by Sir Keith Speed, all of which address essential aspects in general, but also essential aspects of what a future common defence policy will have to take into consideration.

*Mr. van Eekelen (continued)*

As to peace-keeping operations, various scenarios for WEU participation may be envisaged: intervention of a select number of member states, co-ordination by WEU of member states' contributions to an operation, operational control of WEU action with the assets made available to it by the member states, including the contribution of units from other countries, and the execution of an operation in co-ordination with another organisation. That is what is happening with the embargo monitoring operation in the Adriatic. At the end of May, I was able to see for myself, on a visit with members of the European Council to the joint headquarters in Naples, just how successful was the co-operation between WEU and NATO under the political control of both organisations.

Those scenarios are the subject of planning studies, as is the preparation of WEU's contribution to the European Union's mandate to restore and maintain order in the district of Mostar in Bosnia. The rationale for those activities is based not only on a prospective common European defence policy but on the likelihood of specifically European interests. In this respect, the Maastricht Treaty has already been overtaken, and the emphasis is shifting from defence to the use of military capabilities and even to a more general operational dimension, as is shown by our police and customs officers on the Danube.

The combined joint task force concept, the aim of which is to facilitate the use of the alliance's collective assets by WEU, is of great value in the planning of WEU missions and joint WEU-NATO operations. The Council's politico-military working group is defining what assets will be most useful to WEU and the criteria and procedures for their use by WEU. The aim is to prepare for the timely introduction of WEU joint positions into NATO consultation mechanisms so as to achieve effectiveness by harmonising the forces of the CJTF and WEU that are answerable to WEU, and at the same time to define the meaning of the famous phrase "separable but not separate forces".

Access to the alliance's collective assets is of particular importance as regards intelligence, space observation, AWACS and communications, for instance. The concept of CJTF does not provide for their automatic availability, which will continue to be subject to a prior decision by the North Atlantic Council. WEU must, therefore, retain its independent planning capability and develop its operational rôle with a view to acting on its own or – and this is the more probable – responding to requests from the European Union.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

(Translation). – The Union's future autonomy of action depends on the setting up of joint programmes in the fields of space intelligence and strategic mobility. Technical and operational studies have been launched on these two subjects within WEU. In the field of space intelligence, a preliminary conceptual study on a European observation satellite system has just been produced by an industrial consortium. As regards long-haul air transport, an industrial consortium, EUROFLAG, is conducting a feasibility study on a plan for a future large transport aircraft which might meet European needs for force projection in outside theatres.

WEU's operational capabilities, however, will depend more and more on reinforcing European armaments co-operation. Successful industrial co-operation calls for a common definition of possible collective intervention scenarios, future types of armaments and timetables for implementing the corresponding programmes. That success will depend above all on the European formulation of a military policy, something that has not yet been done. The temporary absence of any one of these elements makes it all the more necessary to place armaments questions in the political framework of the Maastricht Treaty.

In the short term, WEU can help to define joint methods geared to the European requirements in this field, whether these are technical standards or statutory regulations, the creation of subsidiary bodies or the setting up of a European planning bureau. All this calls for considerable reorganisation of national structures and working methods; new bilateral or multilateral initiatives and the continuance of feasibility studies on a European armaments agency are all steps in the right direction.

The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty has paved the way for attaining an ambitious objective: the full commitment of all member countries of the European Union to the development of a common foreign and security policy, including a policy on defence. The year 1994 will go down as the year in which the European security and defence identity was unreservedly endorsed by the Atlantic Alliance. Cohesion among Europeans is reinforcing its integrity and effectiveness. Europe must take advantage of the active support of the United States if it is to become the strong and united Europe for which President Clinton is constantly pleading. WEU will help to bring that about by defining – in the CFSP framework – conceptual doctrines for a common defence policy.

The shortcomings indicated by your rapporteurs point to the need to bring forward the deadlines and expedite the realisation of a European defence. At stake is its very credibility in the eyes of our North American allies and all our partners who are committed to join the European Union.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. van Eekelen has kindly said that he will answer questions, but because of the time between my announcement of that and his speech there has been little opportunity for representatives to prepare questions. I have one from Mr. Bieringer, from Austria, and if, after that, anyone wishes to ask a question from the floor, I shall take it.

I call Mr. Bieringer, observer from Austria.

Mr. BIERINGER (*Observer from Austria*) (Translation). – Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure and an honour for me to speak to you today in this forum as the representative of the Austrian Federal Council.

Yesterday was an historic day for Austria; by a majority of two thirds of all votes, by exactly 66.4% – with a turnout of more than 82% – the people of Austria voted for accession to the European Union. I am extremely grateful to the President for his words of welcome.

So the people of Austria are certainly not half-hearted but very emphatically in favour of playing their part in Europe. We are assuming that Austria will be a member of the European Union by the beginning of 1995.

In practical terms this means that we in Austria now have a chance to participate in the peaceful process of European integration, to become part of the European Union's community of stability and security, and to be given a place and a voice in the institutions that shape the future of Europe.

When Austria applied for accession to the European Community in the summer of 1989, it did so chiefly for economic reasons. In the course of time, however, political and security policy considerations came increasingly to the fore.

Today the people of Austria are fully aware that we need to become a member of the European Union primarily for the sake of our security and a peaceful future.

The security of Europe is inextricably bound up with the security of Austria. A glance at the map will convince anyone that it is in Austria's vital interest to co-operate actively and with solidarity, in framing and operating the European security system.

Pursuant to the letter and objectives of the Maastricht Treaty, WEU has an important part to play in the architecture of European security. That is why Austria took the political decision to apply for observer status in WEU when it joins the European Union.

We shall establish even closer relations with WEU in the light of developments within the European Union, with particular reference to the 1996 intergovernmental conference, and to the basic conditions of security policy, and we shall

do so with a strong sense of responsibility and commitment.

Ladies and gentlemen, the outcome of yesterday's referendum in Austria shows you all with what enthusiasm Austria intends to participate and co-operate in Europe. We hope this optimism and enthusiasm will also act as a stimulus for the other partners in the Union and the other applicants for membership.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. That was hardly a question, but we appreciate the sentiment.

I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – It is an honour to follow an Austrian colleague in the opening stage of this debate of the Assembly. Secretary-General, you and the President before you referred to the forum and the need to encourage membership of it and participation within it. How do you see that developing both from the ministerial side and from the aspect of the Assembly? You will be aware, as many other members of the Assembly are aware, of the administrative difficulties that we face in embracing the new membership and ensuring that new members can be entirely active and support our joint aim, which is to maintain security in Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. van Eekelen.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – I, too, am impressed by the figures in the Austrian referendum. I hope that the population of Austria will maintain the enthusiasm for European integration which it has shown and, indeed, that in 1996 it will be able to take the next step. In considering the process of European integration, it is difficult to envisage that we shall always have many observers of WEU activities as the foreign and security policy of the European Union develops. However, it is, of course, a decision for each sovereign country to take and Austria clearly will have the choice between observership and full membership of WEU once it has become a full member of the European Union.

In response to Mr. Rathbone's question, I should first like to say, that of course, a distinction will be made between our associate members and our associate partners. Both have the status of associates, but they are a little different. The associate members – Turkey, Norway and Iceland – have that status because they are members of the North Atlantic alliance and they participate fully in our activities.

With our associate partners we are at the beginning of the process, but we have already opened some of our council meetings to them. One week we meet with fifteen members and the next we meet with twenty-four. Then we meet again with fifteen and then again with twenty-four. That

*Mr. van Eekelen (continued)*

means that our associate partners can participate in an uninterrupted process of consultation.

Consultation on questions of peace, security and stability in Europe is not a problem with us because our associate partners can prepare with us for the meetings of the Permanent Council every other week and can make their views known and participate in a consensus-building process. It is up to the Assembly to judge what opportunities it gives to our associate members and associate partners, but it does so in both cases with considerable generosity. The whole idea of our enlargement is based on the fact that our associates are linked either into the process of the Atlantic Alliance or with the European Union. As I have just explained, Austria will become a full member of the European Union and will be able to join WEU according to conditions to be agreed and ratified. Countries of the European Union are in principle entitled to the new status of associate partner. I hope that the Assembly will give that opportunity to countries of Central and Eastern Europe and take appropriate similar steps with regard to Turkey, Norway and Iceland. I hope that those countries will participate in the consensus building which is essential in our organisation.

The PRESIDENT. – The sound system is not working. I am sorry ladies and gentlemen. There is something fundamentally wrong. I shall suspend the sitting for ten minutes and ask that the problem be investigated.

*(The sitting was suspended at 4.10 p.m. and resumed at 4.25 p.m.)*

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Soell to ask his question. We are now up against time limits. If he could make his question reasonably brief, it would be appreciated. I hope that you will be kind enough, Mr. van Eekelen, to take this one question. The other questioner has generously withdrawn because of the time element.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, I have a very practical question. You spoke of strengthening this dialogue with the new states of Eastern and Central Europe. But anyone concerned with the continuity of our Council of Ministers will notice that in future the presidency of the Council is to change every six months. That would have made sense if the presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Union were the same as the presidency of the Council of Ministers of Western European Union. As we can see, however, this change will mean that the presidencies of the European Union and of WEU are held by different countries. How can we maintain a continuous dialogue with the new member states and tackle the many tasks facing us if we have different presidencies within the Euro-

pean Union and WEU Councils of Ministers every six months?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. van Eekelen.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, full member states can hold the presidency of Western European Union. We have now come to the end of the Luxembourg presidency, which lasted a year. Then comes Holland and then Portugal, for six months each. It will be Spain's turn in a year's time. At that point Spain will hold the presidency of both the European Union and Western European Union. We have not yet decided who is to come next. But I would consider it only logical for the presidency of Western European Union always to coincide with that of the European Union and for us to agree on the dates of the presidency of the countries that are not yet full members of WEU. That would give us the same presidencies every six months. At any rate, we will take account of your views.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – In any case it is not yet certain whether next year, after the Spanish presidency, both presidencies will be held by a representative of one and the same state.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – We stated in the Maastricht Treaty and the WEU declaration that we would endeavour to synchronise the presidencies. We have not yet taken a formal decision as to what we will do after the Spanish presidency. But we are thinking along those lines. The decision remains to be taken. I presume it will be taken towards the end of this year or perhaps in the spring of next year.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. van Eekelen. I apologise for the unwarranted interruption in the questions to you, which was beyond the control of the platform. With your professionalism, you did not let it disturb you. It is always a pleasure to see you here, both listening to our debates and making speeches; we are very grateful to you. Thank you very much.

## ***II. Address by Mr. Haekkerup, Minister of Defence of Denmark***

The PRESIDENT. – In welcoming you, Mr. Haekkerup, may I say that I hope that you do not think that our proceedings are usually conducted in this shambolic way. You have hit us on a difficult afternoon. We are delighted that you are here.

Mr. Haekkerup is no stranger to the WEU Assembly. Before he became a Minister, he was a frequent visitor to us as an observer from the Danish Parliament. It is, therefore, a particular pleasure for us to welcome him in his present capacity. All our countries are experiencing diffi-

*The President (continued)*

culties in restructuring forces and coping with reducing defence budgets; Denmark is no exception. Under Mr. Haekkerup's guidance, Denmark is making the transition more easily than some others are. In particular, Denmark has a tradition of support for the United Nations, which is presently being reinforced. I anticipate that we shall hear about that in a moment.

Mr. Haekkerup appears today wearing two hats. He is also the Chairman of the Western European Union Armaments Group, which was formed last year by bringing the Independent European Programme Group and parts of Eurogroup under the aegis of WEU. In the light of the current debate on the European armaments agency, we shall be doubly interested in hearing what he has to say. Mr. Haekkerup, we are delighted to see you. Would you please come and address us? I shall keep my fingers crossed that the microphones do not go on the blink.

Mr. HAEKKERUP (*Minister of Defence of Denmark*). – First, I should like to thank you for your kind welcome. I had the chance to participate earlier in the meetings of the WEU Assembly, but it is a special honour this time to have a chance to address the Assembly. It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to discuss various aspects of European security here today.

By way of introduction I should like to underline that the fight for ideals and values matters – whether in the fight for human rights, for democracy or other essential principles that the world community praises.

The allied invasion on the beaches of Normandy took place fifty years ago. Had D-Day not taken place we would have been unable next year to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the final liberation of Europe. The most difficult days of the lives of the allied forces on D-Day brought us fifty years of freedom. President Mitterrand expressed that very well in his speech on 6th June at the Omaha beach. In his speech to the veterans and leaders of the fourteen war-time allies, he said: “Je vous remercie pour la liberté du monde qui vous doit tant”.

After the liberation of Europe in 1945 there was a chance to build a new Europe – a free and democratic Europe. Unfortunately, our forefathers did not succeed fully. After the end of the cold war we now have a new chance to build a whole Europe, where stability and peace prevail. It is not going to be easy, as we all realise, but we shall not miss the opportunity this time.

We have, I believe, identified the road to security and stability in Europe. It is equally important that the states in Europe seem willing to embark in the same vehicles in order to achieve that goal. One of those vehicles is the partnership for peace

and another is the combined joint task forces. There is still some uncertainty over the speed with which we should be travelling but a shared sense of direction is emerging.

The partnership for peace initiative is becoming a solid success and will thus contribute to increased stability and will diminish threats to peace. PFP has set in motion a process where expansion of NATO is both foreseen and welcomed. As President Clinton said in Prague after the summit: “It is not a question of if the alliance will be expanded, only a question of when and how”. So far, twenty states have signed the framework document and thereby expressed the will to join in a common endeavour to forge new security relationships with the alliance. The process of implementation of PFP is well under way. Russia has still not signed the framework document. However, at the recent NACC ministerial meeting in Istanbul, Mr. Kozyrev gave a clear indication of Russia's intention to join PFP. I am sure that everyone will appreciate Russia's participation in PFP. Surely everyone recognises the important contributions that Russia can make to the stability and security of Europe on a wide range of issues. Good co-operative relations between the NATO states and Russia will be a key element in order to bring forward the Russian contribution. We wish to develop a constructive relationship with Russia based on mutual respect and friendship.

I shall now turn to WEU and its rôle in the new security architecture in Europe. Denmark had a referendum in June 1992 which rejected the Maastricht Treaty and thereafter in May 1993 there was a new referendum on the Edinburgh declaration. Part of the changes agreed to in Edinburgh was that Denmark should not participate in the defence dimension of the European Union and thus not join WEU as a member.

Since the second Danish referendum there have not been such changes. That makes it necessary once again to ask the Danish electorate to reconsider Denmark's status in WEU. I should like to underline the fact that the Danish Government feels comfortable as an observer to WEU, where it has the opportunity to participate in the meetings of the Council and its subordinate organisations. We have the opportunity to follow the political decisions being made by WEU and to participate in discussions.

If WEU should some day become the central forum in the European security architecture, and Denmark loses its influence, we would, of course, have to reconsider whether our present status was sufficient for our security needs. But that has not been the case up to now.

I wish to say a few words about the Western European Armaments Group. At Kirchberg in May the WEAG defence ministers considered the first report on a European armaments agency and

*Mr. Haekkerup (continued)*

agreed that the study group should continue its work under the direction of the national armaments directors. We accepted that conditions do not yet exist for the creation of an agency conducting the full range of procurement activities on behalf of the WEAG nations, but agreed that there may be scope for improvement in individual areas of co-operative business through a body such as an agency, with a legal personality under the Brussels Treaty. We look forward to considering this autumn the second report by the study group. We will then decide what the next steps should be.

It is clear that the relationship between NATO and WEU needs some elaboration in order to achieve the transparency and co-operation foreseen in the NATO summit declaration. The CJTF concept might well be seen as a vehicle to improve the relationship between NATO and WEU in terms of implementing the notion of complementarity and transparency.

It is, however, important to note that the perspectives of the CJTF concept are far-reaching; much beyond what some have termed putting more flesh on what others have described as the "WEU bones". The CJTF concept is multi-faceted and multi-functional. The rôles that I can envisage for the CJTF include at least four equally important ones in addition to a structure developed to accommodate the availability of resources of WEU operations without duplication of NATO structures.

First of all, the CJTF elements should have a function for the common defence. It is for pragmatic reasons undesirable to have one structure for the common defence and one for other contingencies. Two different structures mean two different sets of rules. I also find it highly unlikely that any nation is prepared to designate forces and resources solely for CJTF purposes.

Secondly, the CJTF concept should be structured and developed within the NATO context in order to enhance NATO's capabilities for crisis-management purposes and participation in Article 4 operations under a United Nations mandate.

Thirdly, it is the prime instrument for the practical integration of Central and Eastern European countries in a European security and defence context. Living in a former front-line nation we know that this is a very important aspect for simple reasons of security. One should also note that participation of Eastern and Central European countries, and presumably also other nations, will provide the necessary legitimisation of employment of military power.

Fourthly, the CJTF concept is an expression of NATO's readiness to make the collective assets of the alliance available, on the basis of consultation

in the NATO Council, for WEU operations undertaken by European allies in pursuit of the common foreign and security policy. In other words, the NATO states support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to alliance security. What is unique about NATO co-operation is the common command language, common procedures and technical facilities for command and control and so on. At the moment, WEU has none of those capabilities, so that is why CJTF is important for it. It is important that we build upon our existing structure and that all countries participate along the same lines. We have to realise that no European nation can fill out the holes that will be left if North American participation is excluded, unless, of course, the level of ambition is very limited.

Please allow me now to turn to some of the other challenges we face in relation to prevention and management of tension and conflict in Europe. Throughout the cold war, the rôle of the United Nations regarding peace and security on the European continent was limited. Today we face a situation in Europe that is sometimes characterised as "hot peace". The number of armed conflicts is higher than it was during the cold war. At the same time, we have a Europe with far more co-operation in, for instance, peace-keeping efforts.

Denmark has a long tradition of contributing to the United Nations peace-keeping operations. In total, today we have close to 1 500 soldiers serving in different peace-keeping operations. As the Assembly will know, that is a substantial number for a small nation like Denmark with only five million inhabitants.

I would also like to inform the Assembly of the establishment of the Danish Reaction Brigade which will be operational by the end of 1995. The unit's authorised strength will be approximately 4 500. Depending on the situation, all or parts of the brigade may be made available as a brigade to NATO, primarily its rapid reaction corps, or it may participate in peace support operations under the auspices of the United Nations or the CSCE.

Parts of the brigade may also be made available for United Nations so-called stand-by forces. Denmark believes that it is important to support the United Nations' efforts to establish that stand-by force. Events in the years behind us have shown clearly that it would have been very useful if the United Nations had, with short notice, the ability to deploy forces to an area of tension. That would be far better, as it is easier to prevent conflicts from breaking out than it is to solve a conflict once the atrocities have been started and people have been killed.

For her part, Denmark sees no alternative to participating actively in changing the harsh realities



*Mr. Haekkerup (continued)*

of life in Europe today. The reason is simple: international security and not least European security is more than ever a matter of interdependency. Today, humanitarian, moral and security-related considerations are inseparable. If we were to go back on our international principles and commitments, and for instance, to withdraw our peace-keeping troops from the former Yugoslavia, we would undermine security for ourselves and for our children. Denmark attaches great importance to the dialogue and co-operation taking place on a multinational level within the United Nations, the CSCE, NATO and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council. However, we also believe that multilateral co-operation can successfully be supplemented by activities and initiatives on a bilateral basis or at a regional level. That consideration has been the basis of a string of initiatives between Denmark and the countries bordering the Baltic sea. Since October last year, Denmark has concluded bilateral defence co-operation agreements with Poland with each of the three Baltic countries. We are currently negotiating a similar agreement with Russia. I hope to sign that agreement with Mr. Grachev in Denmark before the end of this summer.

The recurrent themes for co-operation are United Nations peace-keeping training, co-operation between civilian and military authorities, the rôle of defence in a democracy, the rôle of defence in relation to environmental clean-up and so on. Denmark gives special priority to the three Baltic countries, to Poland and to the St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad regions of Russia. That is well illustrated by our bilateral agreements. In addition to those and in the same spirit, co-operation around the Baltic sea is also taking place between Denmark, Germany and Poland. This autumn, we shall be holding two trilateral military exercises between our countries. We have invited the three Baltic states to participate in those exercises as observers.

Allow me to draw your attention to a most remarkable example of voluntary sub-regional peace-keeping co-operation. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have recently decided jointly to establish a Baltic peace-keeping battalion. We Nordic states have taken upon ourselves over the next couple of years to provide the battalion with the necessary peace-keeping training before its actual deployment to United Nations peace-keeping missions. Other western states, for instance, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany and the United States are also contributing to that ingenious project. That project is a unique example of concrete co-operation within peace-keeping. Furthermore, it will enable the Baltic states to take an active part in peace-keeping co-operation under the United Nations or CSCE auspices. Finally, let me underscore the point that

Baltic co-operation on establishing the battalion will be an important step for active Baltic participation in partnership for peace.

Let me conclude by returning to D-Day. I think that there is a direct line from the soldiers on the beaches in Normandy that morning and the men and women in the resistance movement to our young soldiers in the service of the United Nations today. The common denominator is the belief in our democratic ideals and the will to stand up for them. D-Day took place fifty years ago. Denmark, Europe and the world have changed but the D-Day, and the heroes who secured the foundation for our free and democratic societies today, are still worth celebrating. Last week, President Clinton said in Normandy, "As freedom reigns from Prague to Kiev, the liberation of this continent is almost complete". I wholly agree with President Clinton. Let me just add that Denmark is willing to take upon herself a fair share of the burden to make that liberation complete.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Haekkerup.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President. The Danish Minister of Defence told us in his speech that his government did not intend to ask the Danish people in a further referendum whether Denmark should join Western European Union. Governments have a responsibility not only to carry out the will of the people, but also to guide them towards what they believe is the right way. If the Danish Government now believes that Denmark should join WEU, does it intend, within the foreseeable future, to ask its members of parliament, or the Danish people by means of a referendum, whether the time for accession has not in fact arrived?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. HAEKKERUP (*Minister of Defence of Denmark*). – Thank you for the question. As you will know, we had two referendums. The first was on Maastricht and the second was on Edinburgh. The Maastricht agreement included a defence dimension of the European Union, but as that was rejected in the Danish referendum, we had to take it out. In Edinburgh we negotiated some exceptions, one of which was that we would not participate in the defence dimension. We subsequently managed to obtain a majority in favour of the Edinburgh agreement. That referendum was on 18th May last year. It would be bad to ask our people just one year later the same question. If something had changed dramatically and we could say that Denmark would be marginalised if we did not become full members of WEU, we might consider the position, but that is not the case.

As an observer nation we receive good treatment in WEU and we can follow what is going on



*Mr. Haekkerup (continued)*

and participate in the discussions. Of course, I cannot say what will be the position in the future. In 1996 we shall have a new intergovernmental conference. We shall see what comes out of that conference and then consider whether to say yes or no to it. If the new agreement includes something that goes beyond the Edinburgh agreement, we shall have a new referendum. Let us have the intergovernmental conference first. Denmark will participate in that.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I had intended to put a question similar to the one put by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, but I will expand on it a little. In fact, the Danish Government might decide, probably in 1996, to call a referendum on the question of joining in a common European defence system.

My question is this: does it not seem to be something of a contradiction that if the present situation is maintained for any length of time, Denmark will participate in the proposed combined forces, yet remain outside the European security system represented by WEU? It is a contradiction, and my question is similar to the one our colleague put so intelligently a short time ago. Although public opinion has ultimately to be taken into account, in defence matters it is the leadership shown by politicians which is decisive in guiding that opinion on such an important subject. This is why I am again asking whether there is not a certain contradiction in accepting the security system while keeping Denmark outside WEU?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. HAEKKERUP (*Minister of Defence of Denmark*). – I shall try to tell you how I see things. First, we are full members of NATO and we participate in all integrated NATO structures. Secondly, we are a full member of the European Union, with the two exceptions that I mentioned. We also participate fully in the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. So we shall be where the decisions are made. Denmark also participates in implementing decisions where we have participated in taking them. Today, that applies in particular to the position in former Yugoslavia. Denmark is participating in those efforts. The number of troops that we have there is second to no other country in the world in relation to our size. So when we talk about European structures we should start by looking at what we are doing where things really matter.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Minister, not only for your courtesy in coming to see us but for speaking frankly. We have some intriguing thoughts about the status of Denmark,

but we know you as a friend and we see you around. We wish you well with all your endeavours because you have exactly the same aim as us – the peace and security of our European continent. I am so glad that the wonders of modern technology allowed you in the end to deliver your speech. We are grateful for that and we thank you for your speech.

## ***12. The European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council***

*(Presentation of and debate on the report  
of the Technological and Aerospace Committee  
and vote on the draft recommendation,  
Doc. 1419 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Borderas of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on the European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council, debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1419 and amendments.

I call Mr. Borderas to present his report.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, before I present the report on the European armaments agency, I would like to express my gratitude to all those individuals and institutions we interviewed during the first few months of 1994 during the preparation of this report and, in particular, to the Armaments Directorates-General of Spain, Germany and France.

I would also like to thank the Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. van Eekelen, who very kindly saw us in Brussels and completed part of this report and, finally, the services of the Assembly and especially Mr. Pedregosa, the Secretary of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, for his constant assistance in the preparation of this report.

I would like to commend this report on the European armaments agency, which is a plan for co-operation and joint effort with a view to future initiatives and projects. The report is also closely involved with the European armaments industry, with its sights set on the needs of an efficient European army in the near future. In short, Mr. President, it is a European plan for Europe. Is this the right time to be talking of such a plan? Are we in a position to start putting this intention into operation? In the words of our leaders, including the Spanish President Felipe González, in our present situation we sometimes talk of Eurosepticism and sometimes of Euro-optimism when referring to the situation with which we are dealing in Europe: economic recession, unemployment, enlargement of the Community, German

*Mr. Borderas (continued)*

reunification, serious problems in many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in adapting to western ways, a reduction of defence budgets in most of our countries, transformation of the armed forces, the war in Bosnia, etc.

With all this taking place at the same time, will we be able to direct, focus, co-ordinate and resolve our policy, or policies, on armaments in each of our countries? But this is not the only concern. The central issue is the construction of a common foreign, security and defence policy for the European Union. And yet – especially on the day after the elections for the European Parliament which took place yesterday in many of our countries, which are undoubtedly an expression of the sovereignty of our European Union – it does little for our credibility that we are not making progress towards union and integration and towards a single, defined policy as regards foreign affairs, defence and security.

On the other hand, demands are beginning to be heard that we should act as a single power in our attitude to foreign policy. We often hear the question: “What is Europe doing in Bosnia?”, or “What is the European view on this or that problem?”. The answer is that we have no answer, because we are not yet a political unit. Yet look how much progress we have made over the years. There is a feeling that we are, after all, part of an irreversible process. So we must promote the institutions, decisions and plans which will speed up the European Union and, of course, Western European Union itself, which is the instrument upon which our common security and defence are based.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this report is the result of intensive work, expressing facts, ideas and aspirations. The European armaments agency is a project based on the text of the Maastricht Treaty, the decision of the Defence Ministers in December 1992 on transferring the Independent European Programme Group to WEU, the report on armaments co-operation of the National Armaments Directors in Luxembourg in November 1993 and it is also the transfer of the activities of Eurogroup, EUROCOM, EUROLOG and EUROLONGTERM to this WEAG.

What is the significance of a European armaments agency? If we have a common policy for defence and security, a common policy for dealing with the problems affecting our armed forces, a common policy for dealing with the problems of military needs, we must also have a common policy for dealing with our common needs in armaments matters, with common programmes as regards these armaments, with the common use of European armaments, and also with the subject of

common exports, especially in view of the magnitude of arms and defence equipment manufacture in countries such as the United States, Japan and Russia itself, compared with Europe.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

Mr. President, this year France is commemorating the centenary of the Dreyfus Affair, a serious conflict between France and Germany on matters of military espionage.

However, on 14th July next, the European corps with its German, French, Belgian and Spanish troops will be parading on the Champs-Élysées and that is the difference. It is also our future and the reason for our Euro-optimism.

Ladies and gentlemen, I look to you to approve this report.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is open.

I call Mrs. Blunck.

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I want to extend my very warm thanks to Mr. Borderas for his excellent report, which is both necessary and timely.

Ladies and gentlemen, peace is not everything. But without peace there is nothing. Millions of people in the heart of Europe, in African states and Central America learn this every day. Our vulnerable little world is on fire from end to end.

People are fleeing on a massive, unbelievable scale and although we in Europe are really only in contact with a fraction of them, we are still scared to death. In their panic and with no prospects in sight, many people, all too often full of violence, are trying only to save their own lives.

And yet the 1990s began so hopefully. With the end of the cold war we believed we could begin to resolve our real problems: relieving the hunger and inconceivable misery that prevail in large parts of the world.

We wanted a little more justice, we wanted a little more social peace, because these are the conditions not just for domestic security but also for external security. We also wanted to make peace with nature before nature declared war on us.

But unfortunately the end of the cold war did not give us more political stability. On the contrary, sabre-rattling is on the increase and the spread of weapons and weapons systems – conventional and nuclear – is creating the risk of further armed disputes.

Moreover, our arms exports outside NATO, often to the poorest regions of the world which really need anything but weapons, powerfully inflame the potential for violence. One day the violence escalates. That is hardly surprising.

*Mrs. Blunck (continued)*

However much sense it makes to have a European armaments agency in times when there is a shortage of public funds, this agency cannot exist unless we have uniform arms export regulations. We are not interested in obtaining new markets for our weapons but in restricting the arms trade. That is why I ask you to adopt my first amendment.

The day after the European elections I find – yet again, I must say – that it is we parliamentarians who will have to pay the price if we do not uphold our rights vis-à-vis the executive, in particular our right of control, which will ensure that government activities are transparent.

I am aware that we have limited powers, but at least no one should be able to reproach us with failing to demand and sue for these powers of control, to which we are, after all, entitled.

That is why I also ask you to adopt my second amendment, to the effect that the Council must ensure parliamentary control – over defence procurement as well as arms exports – either through the national parliaments or through the Parliamentary Assembly, and must document this too, to ensure that we can exercise our right, regardless of what the structures look like, regardless of whether this has implications for our national budget or is documented or described elsewhere.

I hope you will adopt the amendments.

*(Mr. Steiner, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Baume.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – I first have a comment which I would thank you, Mr. President, to convey to the ambassadors representing the Council of Ministers.

The Assembly meets only a few days every year yet I am sorry to see that the benches of the representatives of the Council of Ministers are practically empty. Once the Danish Minister of Defence had finished his address there was something like a flight of sparrows escaping through the two doors and leaving just the few of us on our own. In my view, this is both discourteous and irresponsible behaviour on the part of the members of the Council of Ministers. Will you, Mr. President, please make known my deep indignation at what has happened. Rather than going off somewhere in Paris, ambassadors ought to stay here working with us.

My other comment is about the way we should go about debating this very important report, on which I congratulate Mr. Borderas. It seemed to me that the last speaker was confusing the parlia-

mentary Assembly of WEU, which is a defence organisation, with a conference on pacifism or progress in humanitarian operations. The nature of the subject has to be kept to in each particular case. There is no question whatsoever of our interfering in the war against exports; our concern is whether united Europe will or will not have a European defence industry. The issue is clear.

For ten years now we have been working on this question. We proclaimed the need for member states to have an arms co-operation policy in Rome in 1984. Today the sad truth is that we are still only at the beginning, the first rough outline. Why?

First, there are the facts of the situation which have to be faced objectively. Europe unfortunately has very serious employment problems. Each country is trying to preserve its national industry's market share and each government to keep activity as much as possible within the national sphere, but the way tomorrow's strategic requirements are taking shape, it is clear that in the case of armaments, we are reaching the end of national programmes. Even the most powerful and richest of our countries can no longer afford the whole range of weaponry necessary for future wars. France is already at the uttermost limit of its possibilities. We are very well aware that the famous Rafale will very probably be the last all-French plane and that in future we shall have to design and produce our aircraft in co-operation with other countries.

Second, a European arms policy obviously means the end of rivalry and competition between Europeans, as is at present only too frequently the case. In this problem of European preference in arms contracts, I am shocked by what I see happening: to begin with, there are the countless expressions of solidarity by various states at the different European summit meetings and then, when the summit is over and ministers or delegations have gone home, we find that instead of buying European, one or another country loses no time in signing a sales contract with a major American arms producer. In my view there is something ludicrous in professing European solidarity in a plenary session and a few days later disregarding the possible signature of a European agreement by accepting a kind of American preference.

The report before us is very important since it raises a vital point often overlooked concerning the effort to improve the conditions in which WEU works. I think we should attach more importance to this question. We should ask the representatives of the Council of Ministers – when they are here – to go a little further with these projects because, from now on, we have no alternative but to promote defence co-operation on the European scale.

We are already beginning to set up operational

*Mr. Baumel (continued)*

multinational contingents, but what about the totally unrealistic situation of the European corps? Its troops have three different types of rifle, using different ammunition incompatible with the weapons of their partners, and contingents are only allowed to buy one specific set of weapons.

It is fortunately obvious, as we gradually move towards a multinational view of our European security missions and are deliberately committed to a policy of European unity which is as it were the beginning of a European army, that this should naturally be followed by a European industry, rationalisation of programmes and harmonisation of weapons, all of which we say but do not do. On the contrary, I have found that for many years now, instead of progressing, arms co-operation has in fact declined.

The co-operative agreements between France and the United Kingdom produced excellent examples, including the Jaguar aircraft. Today, there are many difficulties.

The excellent Franco-German co-operation which had worked so well before is also encountering problems.

We must try to overcome these obstacles, not because we wish at all costs to export a specific category of arms throughout the world, as the previous speaker said, but because Europe must have its own arms for its own defence, a requirement made all the more necessary by the growing competition throughout the world and the fact that the United States, Russia and many other countries are highly competitive producers.

I therefore agree with the report as presented.

I should like, however, to express my surprise at one paragraph in the explanatory memorandum. Paragraph 45 on the future European armaments agency reads: "In the short and medium term, one cannot expect to create a European armaments agency with wide-ranging responsibilities; on the contrary, if starting positions are neither reasonable nor achievable, this project might well come to grief and it would be difficult to find the necessary consensus to launch that body". Fortunately, the paragraph continues: "It would appear necessary, however, to begin work ...".

Yes, indeed, Mr. Rapporteur, ladies and gentlemen, it is necessary not only to begin work but actually to establish this European armaments agency without delay. If we do not do so, our countries will be tempted to enter into bilateral agreements. Probably, to begin with, a Franco-German armaments agency would be set up. This would be a first step, but it would need to be superseded very quickly since for European co-operation to stop there would be very serious.

What I am saying, therefore, is that we must have a European armaments agency.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker was to have been Mr. Bieringer of Austria, but he is not here.

That concludes the list of speakers.

Does the Rapporteur, Mr. Borderas, wish to reply?

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – Yes, Mr. President. I agree with Mrs. Blunck that it does of course seem necessary for the various parliaments of WEU countries to be able to control the problem of arms production. And if the European armaments agency is eventually created, it will, like other institutions within WEU such as the Torrejón Satellite Centre or any other of Western European Union's activities, be controlled by this Assembly when, at the end of the year, this Assembly is informed of the activities that have taken place and the decisions that have been reached in the Council of Ministers. I believe that in this respect, we could change one or two words, particularly in Amendment 2 where it says "ensure" – and Mrs. Blunck agrees with this – we would be in favour of replacing the word "ensure" by the phrase "insist on parliamentary control"; however, this will be discussed when the amendments are presented at the end of the debate.

As far as Mr. Baumel's comments are concerned, I am in complete agreement with what he said, certainly now that we are aware of the implications of the development of the arms industry, the defence industry, research programmes, co-operation programmes such as the EUCLID project, and programmes involving two or three countries for the manufacture or production of different defence components, of which the Eurofighter 2000 is a good example. Indeed, faced with all of this, we can see that either we have a system for integrating the European defence industry, a rôle which could be played very adequately by a European defence agency or European armaments agency within WEU, or this European industry will certainly be dominated by other countries which currently account for around 70% of world armaments production; I am referring to the United States of America and the former Soviet Union. This leaves 30% for all the other countries. Of this 30%, approximately 10% is accounted for by the production of armaments and defence components by France, and all the other countries, including my own, account for very insignificant amounts.

Clearly, the armaments industry is extremely complex, involving considerable research and the search for new materials such as alloys and other elements which a high technology industry such

*Mr. Borderas (continued)*

as military electronics almost inevitably demands. I agree with all of this; the problem is that these are also situations which require considerable financial input, at a time when the majority of these countries are reducing their defence budgets. As a result, we believe that the future of this industry lies in co-operation, association and integration. These are the interests, ideas and conclusions we have arrived at as regards the content of this report on the European armaments agency.

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation).— This report is of vital importance, because without the armaments industry there would be no defence, and this matter is dealt with by the Treaty on European Union, which specifically refers to the creation of an armaments agency, the declaration of Western European Union member states attached to the Treaty on European Union, and subsequent declarations at the NATO summit and at other meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers. With this in mind, the Technological and Aerospace Committee has given careful consideration to Mr Borderas's excellent report.

I must tell the Assembly that this report was approved almost unanimously, with only one vote against it. It is an extremely prudent report, as you will appreciate if you analyse the wording of the recommendation, which is where the fundamental question lies. All that is intended at the moment is to create the agency in order to co-ordinate the management of study programmes and to gather information on armaments policy. It goes no further than that, but I should like to point out that I do not support this view. I am definitely in favour of going further. However, in a spirit of caution, Mr. President, the Rapporteur and the committee have adopted a draft which we are submitting for your approval with extreme prudence, to avoid provoking the resistance referred to in the paragraph to which Mr. Baumel so rightly refers, in which the Rapporteur points out the difficulties implicit in trying to be more ambitious at the present time, in view of the apprehension felt by different countries and administrations.

It is important to keep this in mind, because in the debate on the very pertinent matter of the construction of Europe, even today, after the stance taken by voters in the elections yesterday, one of the criticisms of the Treaty on European Union, and consequently of defence policy, is that as a result of the way in which it is implemented, it constitutes a weakening of European defence.

What I am saying is that if we do not take the appropriate steps to integrate defence and make progress, if all we do is to create obstacles or set

conditions, then it is likely that rather than fostering an integrated defence system, we are obstructing the defence of Europe. This is relevant to Mrs. Blunck's comments, to which with the greatest respect I would like to refer.

Mrs. Blunck said that peace is necessary, without peace there is nothing. Well, to say this with regard to defence – obviously armaments and the defence industry are not all that is involved – but for those of us who have to take a political view, defence and security must be implemented with a view to avoiding conflict effectively. At the same time it is true to say that without a defence industry, no defence is possible. If the question now is to set up a defence policy, responsibility for which was given to this organisation by the Treaty on European Union, then the integration, however slow, of policy on the defence industry is absolutely necessary. This is the aim of the report.

It is likely, therefore, that to try to introduce other elements involving control, which is the responsibility of other bodies, rather than concentrating on studying this subject, would hamper the establishment of the agency conceived with such caution in the report and in the draft recommendation; once it has been set up, problems can be addressed as they are encountered.

For this reason, Mr. President, I would once again like to congratulate Mr. Borderas on his report and ask the Assembly to give it, and the recommendation to the Council of Ministers, their support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Amendments 1 and 2 have been tabled by Mrs. Blunck. They read as follows:

1. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“ Document the regulations on arms exports in force in the member states and provide information on its methods for their standardisation as well as the time schedule previewed for realising harmonisation; ”

2. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“ Ensure and document parliamentary control either through national parliaments or the parliamentary assembly over defence procurement as well as arms exports; ”

I call Mrs. Blunck to speak again briefly on them and tell us what her view actually is at this point.

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*) (Translation).— Mr. President, I understood the Rapporteur, Mr. Borderas, to mean that he agrees to the amendments as modified. I am, of course, very glad.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That means Mrs. Blunck agrees with the proposed amendments, i.e., with the wording just explained by the Chairman of the committee.

I call Mr. Borderas.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – The whole of Amendment 1 is acceptable and Amendment 2 should be amended to start with the words: “insist on the need to”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Point of order, Mr. President. Is it the procedure of this Assembly to defend the amendment and then give the floor to anyone who wishes to speak against it?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your comment, Mr. Lopez Henares. If everyone agrees now – which appears to be the case – I will put the two amendments to the vote with the agreed wording, taking them in numerical order. Both amendments will then be incorporated into Mr. Borderas’s draft recommendation. I believe both sides agree to this. You accepted the first amendment with no change. The second is to be modified slightly. Mrs. Blunck agrees to that.

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

I now put Amendment 2, as amended, to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2, as amended, is agreed to.*

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does anyone wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

### ***13. Changes in the membership of committees***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 40(6) of the Rules of Procedure I invite the Assembly to agree to the proposed changes in membership of committees contained in Notice No. 1, which has already been distributed.

Is there any opposition? ...

The changes are agreed to.

### ***14. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 14th June 1994, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1417 and amendments).
2. Address by Mr. Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
3. WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (Resumed debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1417 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 5.35 p.m.)*

1. See page 18.

## SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 14th June 1994

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.

2. Adoption of the minutes.

3. WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1417 and amendments).

*Speakers:* Mr. Ferrari (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Müller, Mr. Ferrarini, Mr. Pahor (*Observer from Slovenia*), Mr. Antretter, Mr. Pastusiak (*Observer from Poland*).

4. Address by Mr. Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

*Replies by Mr. Hurd to questions put by:* Dame Peggy Fenner, Mr. Ferrarini, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Wolfgramm, Sir Peter Fry.

5. WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Reply to the debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1417 and amendments).

*Speakers:* Mr. Ferrari (*Rapporteur*), Mr. de Puig (*Chairman*), Lord Finsberg (point of order), Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Ferrari, Mr. Stoffelen, Lord Finsberg, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Ferrari, Mr. De Decker, Lord Finsberg, Mr. de Puig.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

#### *1. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### *2. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### *3. WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council*

*(Presentation of and debate on the report  
of the Political Committee,  
Doc. 1417 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Ferrari of the report of the Political Committee on WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual

report of the Council, debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1417 and amendments.

I call Mr. Ferrari to present his report.

Mr. FERRARI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The title of the report I was asked to produce is WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I believe that it has never been truer than it is now to speak of a decisive moment in the almost fifty-year life of Western European Union. We are faced with a number of vital problems which have to be resolved and a number of challenges to be overcome during the next few years which will be anxious ones for us. These are major challenges.

The first is to implement the practical arrangements between WEU and the European Union, particularly in the light of Article J.4 of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty. The second is to define exactly the relationship between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance having regard to the integration of WEU into the Union. The third challenge concerns the consequences of the enlargement of the Union to include Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway. The fourth challenge concerns the nature of the relationships linking WEU and the European Union with the countries of Central Europe on the one hand and with the countries of the Community of Independent States on the other. The fifth and final challenge is our timely preparation for the detailed definition of our atti-

1. See page 22.

*Mr. Ferrari (continued)*

tude as Western European Union at the inter-governmental conference of 1996.

These are the major subjects covered by the report submitted to you which I shall now summarise under these main headings.

The first concerns the consequences of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty for Western European Union. For this subject I have drawn on the conclusions reached by Mr. Goerens in Document 1308 of May 1992 (Europe after Maastricht), Document 1342 of November 1992 (European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht) and Document 1369 of May 1993 (Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty).

Regarding the future rôle of WEU, as you will have seen from the report, I have avoided the two extreme positions, namely that of Mr. De Gucht, who says the fate of WEU is sealed and that it will unavoidably be swallowed up into the European Union, and the equally radical view, which has supporters here in our Assembly, that we can continue to regard ourselves as a completely autonomous organisation whose powers are defined in our Charter, the modified Brussels Treaty.

As I say, I have avoided the extremes, that is, I regard WEU as an integral part of European Union but still retaining its independence at least until all members of the Union declare their willingness to commit themselves to military activities.

It is always difficult to make forecasts but I do not think this will happen all that soon. My view in any case is that we shall be continuing well beyond the intergovernmental conference in 1996. Even so, there is no doubt that a close reading and above all a literal interpretation of the part of the Maastricht Treaty which concerns us tells us that WEU's rôle is reshaped by it.

When the treaty distinguishes in Article B of Title I and Article J.4 of Title V between common foreign and security policy, common defence policy and common defence and then stipulates that "the Union will request Western European Union – which is an integral part of the development of the Union – to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications" the only possible conclusion is that the Maastricht Treaty limits the competence of WEU to defence matters leaving the Union responsible for the management of common foreign and security policy. It is equally clear that the Council of WEU is required to base the future activities of the organisation solely and exclusively on requests from the Union and no longer on its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty.

A further point is that the Maastricht texts no longer refer to the modified Brussels Treaty. What does this omission mean? Some argue somewhat mischievously that everything is being done to ensure that the treaty and the obligations under it can at times be disregarded if not completely forgotten. I do not go that far but I think the time has come to ask the Council of WEU to deal once and for all with the problem of harmonising the new obligations imposed by the Maastricht Treaty with those deriving from the modified Brussels Treaty.

Co-operation between WEU and the European Union. Here again we are looking at a difficult relationship, at least that with the European Parliament. To start with, things seemed to go well. It was decided to set up a joint working group of WEU and the European Parliament with a programme of work comprising the exchange of first drafts of reports, regular contacts between rapporteurs and joint meetings of committees. Unfortunately, none of these commitments were met by the time we reached 24th February 1994 when the European Parliament approved the so-called De Gucht resolution, Resolution A3-0041, which emphasises *inter alia* "... that the primacy of the European Union should be confirmed unambiguously with the European Union taking the political decisions concerning security and defence with WEU implementing the decisions which have defence implications ...; ... that the European Parliament may address questions and recommendations to the WEU Council ...; ... that in the third stage the European Parliament should replace the WEU Assembly in its entirety at plenary and committee levels".

Since this resolution, relations between WEU and the European Parliament have been strained. Our only hope lies with the new Parliament just elected.

The De Gucht resolution also deals with the problem of relations between the European Union, WEU and NATO which is another heading in my report. This resolution abruptly states that the European Union should become responsible for defining the European position in the Atlantic Alliance and consequently, in addition to the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty which should lead to the full incorporation of WEU in the Union, De Gucht also looks for a revision of the present Washington Treaty in order, as he says, to formalise relations between the European Union and the United States.

Without wishing to exaggerate the significance of this declaration, which throws into confusion the prospects for the development of WEU within the alliance and having regard also to the conclusions of the January NATO summit I believe that it should be made clear at once that the Maastricht



*Mr. Ferrari (continued)*

Treaty which institutes the European Union gives no indication as to how the Union should develop its relations with the United States and NATO but simply demands that co-operation between the members of the alliance should not conflict with the objectives of the Union.

This brings us to the question of the enlargement of the European Union and its implications for WEU. We are of course bound to express our satisfaction that four EFTA countries are joining the Union. Following the successful but hard-won conclusion of the negotiations and the approval of enlargement by the European Parliament, the people of Austria gave the first yes to the Union yesterday. This was a clear and decisive vote which offers hope for the results of the referendum in the Nordic countries. With the accession of four new countries, the centre of gravity of the Union is shifting to the north. The west is drawing closer to the east and, with Norway and Finland, the European Union will have a 2 000 km frontier with Russia.

So far as concerns WEU specifically, some aspects of the enlargement of the Union are a matter for satisfaction but others are not. The first of the latter is that during the negotiations the package concerning the common foreign and security policy was approved more easily than the other packages such as those for agriculture, fisheries, the environment and regional policies. Another is the fact that, with the exception of Norway, which as a member of NATO finds no difficulty in joining WEU as a full member, the option in the case of Austria, Finland and Sweden, which all have a tradition of neutrality, will almost certainly be that of joining WEU as observers thus swelling the numbers of those countries within the Union which are more reticent about moving towards a common security and defence policy.

With regard to the referendum, it was fortunately ruled that the countries favouring Europe were to be the first to vote. So, following Austria it will be the turn of Finland where there is a very small majority in favour of Europe, followed by Sweden where the result of the referendum will depend largely on the outcome of the parliamentary elections in September and finally Norway, the most anti-Europe of the four where the only possibility of a yes vote for Europe depends on a favourable decision in Finland and Sweden.

The Central European countries. The first impression gained on visiting these countries – the four Visegrad countries, Romania, Bulgaria and the three Baltic states – is that they want at all costs to join the European club without caring too much about what the initials stand for and the obligations of membership. As the Russian threat

and the so-called near abroad policy of the leaders in Moscow is felt strongly in those countries – in the Baltic states they even speak of the Russian nightmare – the failure to gain entry to NATO has caused serious disappointment and their re-emergence in the partnership for peace has not aroused great enthusiasm. They feel happier, however, in the WEU Forum of Consultation, because Russia is not included, so that the Council of Ministers did well at their Kirchberg meeting last month to grant all the new countries joining the Forum a kind of enhanced status as associate partners.

In this connection I should like to draw the attention of the Assembly and Council of WEU to countries such as Moldova and Slovenia which, despite their different histories, feel themselves closely bound to Europe. Quite clearly the principle of parallel policy with the Union applies, as confirmed *inter alia* by the Kirchberg declaration.

The intergovernmental conference of 1996. For a series of reasons which I shall not list the 1996 deadline is a vital date for the future of Europe and WEU. When this deadline comes we must be ready with clear ideas and well thought-out plans. I should like therefore to call on the Council and the Secretariat-General to collaborate with this Assembly to the full in preparation for 1996.

I should like to conclude by expressing the hope that as happened ten years ago on the thirtieth anniversary of the signature of the modified Brussels Treaty, the fortieth anniversary may be celebrated this year with a special conference on Western European Union to examine in detail the reasons for our existence.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Ferrari.

The debate is open.

The first speaker is Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would describe the report we are currently discussing as melancholy, not because of any lack of quality – on the contrary, Mr. Ferrari has produced an excellent, thoroughly researched document – but because of the picture this reply to the Council paints of the situation of our Assembly and the rôle of WEU.

On the face of it, the Maastricht Treaty accorded WEU a more prominent rôle, defining the organisation as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. This view was subsequently reinforced by the NATO summit meeting in January which declared that co-operation between NATO and WEU was entering a new phase, with the assignment of key operational rôles to the European pillar.

The fact is however, as Mr. Ferrari's excellent report confirms, that the more prominent rôle sup-

*Mr. Rodrigues (continued)*

posedly accorded to WEU by NATO is mostly a façade.

Without any reliable data to go on, it is not easy to see exactly what the Council's objectives for the future of WEU actually are.

It is not easy because, despite Europe's apparent desire for militarisation, which is evident from the policies adopted by the major European powers, we still have not reached a consensus on the fundamental issue of the precise rôle of NATO in the run-up to the third millennium.

Relations between WEU and NATO have been the subject of detailed reports by our Assembly, the latest being that of Mr. Baumel, but a number of problems remain.

It is not surprising therefore that analysts have drawn contradictory conclusions from the Brussels declaration. For some, the Brussels summit paves the way for closer and more extensive co-operation between NATO and WEU, with a transfer of powers from the former to the latter. For others, it is simply a media exercise whose principal aim is to cover up the decision to increase the military dominance of the United States in Europe, through NATO in particular. For them, the simultaneous announcement by President Clinton of the partnership for peace initiative is just another feature of the White House's strategy.

Mr. Ferrari's report addresses a number of issues which call into question not only the part played by our Assembly but also the real rôle of WEU.

The Council's reaction to certain written questions and the lack of response to Assembly recommendations reveal a *sui generis* interpretation of the modified Brussels Treaty.

The Rapporteur demonstrates, with the help of convincing examples, that the Maastricht Treaty verbally enhances the rôle of WEU but in practical terms reduces its responsibilities and spheres of activity. The thirty-ninth annual report of the Council confirms this conclusion.

Mr. Ferrari frankly believes that WEU's rôle is to be reduced to little more than that of a subordinate organisation and subcontractor, awaiting instructions from the European Union. Thus, it is anticipated, for example, that requests for a European contribution from the United Nations and the CSCE would be addressed only to the European Union which would decide what kind of contribution WEU should make.

WEU's relationship with the European Parliament is also far from normal. As the Rapporteur recalls, in a resolution of 24th February 1994 the European Parliament emphasised "that the pri-

macy of the European Union over WEU should be confirmed unambiguously, with the European Union taking the political decisions concerning security and defence [and] WEU implementing the decisions which have defence implications...".

In the explanatory memorandum attached to that resolution, the rapporteur also proposed an amendment to the modified Brussels Treaty to the effect that "the WEU Assembly shall be composed of the representatives of WEU member countries elected to the European Parliament".

Ladies and gentlemen, these extracts from Mr. Ferrari's report highlight countless ambiguities, points of tension and contradictions.

Personally, I find policies for the militarisation of Europe disconcerting. As we know from experience, strengthening military blocs, far from contributing to a continental security policy and helping to reduce tension, has the opposite effect.

So I am not in favour of the European pillar or any steady increase in WEU's rôle in operational policies in conjunction with NATO and using the forces placed under its command. What we need to go for is the road to disarmament rather than a strategy culminating in military intervention.

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Ferrari's report prompts an awkward question: what is the function of WEU? What is WEU today?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rodrigues.

I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report by Mr. Ferrari is the first in a well co-ordinated series of reports up for debate this week in our Assembly.

This report and the reports by Mr. de Puig, Sir Russell Johnston, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Lord Finsberg and Mr. De Decker form a network, the meshes of which are beginning to emerge although they are still not very well defined. I think it would be useful to reinforce these meshes that are emerging. They need to be reinforced quite considerably if Western European Union is to take up the position that we assign to it, and that is expected of it. The weaknesses are obvious, weaknesses that give rise to concern and critical questions, such as those which the Rapporteur rightly asked.

We should not be like rabbits hypnotised by a snake. We in the Assembly of Western European Union should not be staring at the European Parliament to see what is happening there. We should carry out our intended task, regardless of how quickly or slowly Western European Union is brought into the European Union.

*Mr. Steiner (continued)*

We must steadily maintain our task, our commitment, and our activities, or even intensify them. We know that, following Maastricht, we have to go on developing Western European Union on a practical basis. We are aware of the urgent need for this practical development.

We must also continue to urge more emphatically that the common security policy for Western and Central Europe should now be clearly defined, regardless – as I said earlier – of the speed at which Western European Union or the European Parliament jointly assume this responsibility.

At present, security policy is still in the hands of the national parliaments. As long as that is the case, it is up to us as the representatives of the national parliaments here in this Assembly to make our contribution, on the basis of our responsibilities in the national parliaments, so that matters can proceed, and proceed quickly.

We need to have definite prospects, which can be achieved only if we define the cases in which Western European Union is particularly called upon to act. Indeed, we must set out clear political guidelines, for instance for the work of the military Planning Cell of Western European Union. Without clear political guidelines, the activities of the military Planning Cell in combination with NATO will remain patchy. At the moment, in any case, Western European Union's crisis-management abilities are not particularly distinctive.

We need building blocks that are plainly visible, that can be used to build the structure we need if we really want to expand the guarantees of peace, or at least the hopes of peace that we all cherish. That is expected of us. The new states of Central and Eastern Europe that are travelling the road to democracy share these hopes.

I hope that we will not stop by the wayside on our common travels but will forge ahead in the swift accomplishment of this task despite the problems involved in the distribution of powers between the European Union, the European Parliament and ourselves.

*(Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is quite by chance that one German delegate is speaking immediately after another, both coming from different political camps. But let me say at the outset that much of what Mr. Steiner has just said stems from political convictions we both share.

Mr. Rodrigues, the first speaker in this debate, described Mr. Ferrari's report rather decoratively as melancholic. I want to spread a little more melancholy.

We can only describe the state of Europe today as melancholic. We had the European elections a few days ago. If we look at the electoral turnout and results in the various countries we must feel melancholy about European politics. It is becoming clear that the great enthusiasm of the early days has died down and that new difficulties have arisen because of the attempt to go a step further with the Maastricht Treaty without having the courage to make definite statements in that treaty. Some of the major difficulties in relations between WEU and the European Union are due to the fact that Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty is deliberately worded vaguely, so that it can be interpreted in very different ways. It is precisely because of this risk of misinterpretation that we are more likely to encounter further difficulties, rather than achieve clarity, if we want to have an active WEU that is integrated in the European Union's common foreign and security policy. Let me give an example, in parenthesis so to speak.

Yesterday we listened to the highly enthusiastic speech of an Austrian observer in this Assembly. He described Austria's political enthusiasm for taking part in the process of European integration, for becoming a member of the European Union, for being an observer in WEU. Since my constituency lies on the border with Austria, I spent quite some time in Austria during the week before the elections. And I clearly heard it being emphasised again and again during the electoral campaign for accession to the European Union that Austrian neutrality would remain unchanged and that people should certainly have no illusions about WEU, and so on. This example alone shows the problems the European Union will be facing with its new member states and their relations with WEU.

In this context, the European Parliament's claim that in future it should act as a kind of spokesman on these matters and that the WEU Assembly should be absorbed into the European Parliament is totally counterproductive. That would result in the kind of European Parliament we had in the past, that adopts a great number of resolutions – on matters ranging from single-sex marriage to the action against the Brazilian Indians – but has no real power because it does not have the rights of a genuine parliament, like the national parliaments as we know them.

That is why I think – and here I am supporting what Mr. Steiner said – that it is certainly more rational for the WEU Assembly to be composed of representatives of the national parliaments than having things referred to a so-called parliament

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

that is not really a parliament at all. As in the past, the difficulties we are facing stem from the fact that because the European Union does not manage to adopt a unanimous position, treaties are deliberately worded in such a way as to leave many points open. This does not help us to achieve what we want, which is to strengthen WEU, and for WEU to assume responsibility in the changed European political climate following the collapse of the communist hegemony in Eastern Europe. It all remains vague. No clear decisions are taken. We can get by with this for a few more years, but it will not resolve the problem in the long term.

To conclude, there can therefore be only one outcome. If Europe still wants to have some chance of a common foreign and security policy, it will have to have the courage to do the job properly at the 1996 conference. It cannot get by for ever by using woolly formulas, in the hope that everyone can accept them. Even in football there are certain rules, and in the end a team can only win by scoring goals. If the players agree that no goals are to be scored, there can be no match. And if politicians believe they have to find formulas that can be accepted by everyone, even those with extreme views, they may bluff their way through, but they will not be making real policies. Hence my warning: 1996 will be the last chance to do the job properly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ferrarini.

Mr. FERRARINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to congratulate Mr. Ferrari on his very full and interesting report. Western European Union is certainly a linch pin in the process of European integration.

We cannot yet foresee what Europe of the future will be. Will it be a federal but unitary state on the model of the United States or a kind of Europe of the "patries" with national elements dominating? Will it be a sixteen, twenty or even forty power Europe? We know the western boundary which coincides with the Atlantic but where will the eastern boundary be?

The process of integration is under way but we do not know how fast or how strongly. There are some who argue that the bigger Europe becomes, taking in new states and new realities, the more will the spirit of Europe be lost and watered down.

This too may be true. Personally, I favour a process of integration aiming at a united states of Europe which, while recognising internally the separate cultures and nationalities, ethnic groups and traditions will be able, as a single power, to

meet the great world challenges and to put an end internally to the ethnic and religious contradictions which so often lead to war and open conflict.

But no process of unification can make progress unless the integration of security and defence policy goes ahead at the same pace as economic and political integration. I therefore believe that WEU's rôle is essential and will be even more so in future. Even now some countries belonging to the European Union are not members of WEU and with new states expected to join the European Union in the very near future, the position will, as already noted, get worse.

Again, it is not right and perhaps not even possible to force the issue in the individual countries and make people think that logic requires the imposition of European unity whereas in fact it is a matter for free and responsible choice. WEU will therefore have an important rôle to play, beyond the planned deadlines, in promoting an effective security and defence policy for the old continent.

There are of course "black holes" and serious shortcomings and contradictions as in the case of events in former Yugoslavia but it is also true that WEU has played a very important rôle in relations between Western and Central and Eastern Europe in the years since the Berlin wall came down.

Taking a consistent and strategically correct view of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU has succeeded in making best use of its special strengths and variety in seeking to defeat the challenge from a Russia with re-surfacing super-power ideas.

In my view, the proposal under which conditions should be sought for a possible amendment of the Maastricht agreements to allow European members of NATO not belonging to the European Union to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty is also opportune. Such a decision would recognise the community of interests and the identical strategic views of NATO and WEU and would at the same time certainly reinforce Europe's potential for an effective security and defence policy. In this respect, it is to be hoped that the new European Parliament just elected will be more flexible and farsighted than its predecessor on this subject.

The dialogue with the Central European countries has been conducted intelligently, starting with the creation of the Forum and followed by the new associate status for former members of the Forum. This is not a matter of establishing a new cordon sanitaire around Russia. Instead a policy of collaboration and possible integration should be followed with this country targeted at shared objectives of development and peace. Nor is it possible, therefore, to accept new more or less disguised iron curtains or the resurrection of the

*Mr. Ferrarini (continued)*

spirit of Yalta changed though the conditions might be. We have to understand the mentality and aspirations of the former communist countries which for almost half a century had not only to suffer under a terrible dictatorship and disastrous economic policy but also had to interrupt or break off centuries-old trade relations and co-operation with the countries of Western Europe. To these countries, already in the throes of sweeping internal changes to their social, civil and economic legislation and the inevitable contradictions resulting from the changes taking place, Western Europe must be able to offer collaboration for their security and for a peace policy which will stifle any re-emergence of racism and ethnic and religious intolerance. In this respect, I believe that the idea of further additions to the number of member countries is sound, as are the references to Slovenia – here I hope that a positive solution will be found to the dispute between that country and Italy – and to Moldova which is often forgotten but has deep historical roots in European culture and tradition. In substance, therefore, I support a dynamic and organised approach to the process of European integration with no closed minds or prejudices of any kind but with strong support for unity as proposed by Mr. Ferrari.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pahor, observer from Slovenia.

Mr. PAHOR (*Observer from Slovenia*). – I should like to offer my sincere thanks to you, Mr. President, and to your Assembly for giving me this opportunity to speak. In my speech, I shall give particular attention to the third part of Mr. Ferrari's report, which considers the enlargement of the European Union and the implications for WEU. I am glad that Mr. Ferrari, as the Rapporteur of the Political Committee and in his capacity as an Italian senator, has mentioned Slovenia.

As you know, Slovenia is endeavouring to achieve full integration into the European Union. We have no illusion as to the dynamic of that integration, but we nevertheless believe that Slovenia may sign the Europe Agreement with the Union by the end of this year. The negotiations are to start soon. In this regard, Slovenia also sees her place within WEU. For that reason, Slovenia, as a Central European country in transition, some time ago expressed an interest in co-operation with the Forum of Consultation.

At the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, held last month in Luxembourg, Slovenia was not included within the group of Central European countries to which WEU is offering the status of associate partners. The Defence Committee of my parliament has made a detailed report on Luxembourg's documents and passed a

resolution in which we stress the great interest that exists in my country for gaining the status of an associate partner with WEU. We believe that this would contribute to a further strengthening of our co-operation and mutual trust. It would also serve to reinforce the peace and stability in this part of the world.

Slovenia is a member of the partnership for peace initiative, while at the same time endeavouring to become an associate partner of this Assembly and WEU. We are well aware that, in both instances, that does not involve the provision of security guarantees. Nevertheless, Slovenia understands the exceptional political significance that such a status represents for the reinforcement of the democratic and reform processes taking place in the countries in transition. With its successful reform policy, Slovenia ranks among those countries, which is why our efforts towards closer co-operation with WEU and its Assembly should be understood in that light. I extend my best wishes for the successful work of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your wishes are noted and will be considered with great interest.

I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, however far apart their seats in their national parliaments, Mr. Steiner and Mr. Müller largely agree in their evaluation of European security policy. I fully endorse their view and can therefore save myself some of the speaking time to which I am entitled.

But I would like, in this connection, to refer to an aspect of our European co-operation which I believe should be seen more positively than the politicians and diplomats have managed to present it in the past. It is the need for consensus, for compromise, for interdependence in the structure of Europe. Europe tends to be described as a house. But we would be wrong to see Europe as a house built from the foundations up, ending with the top floor and the roof. Europe is not a house built by bricklayers and architects; it has to consider a variety of individual interests, individual characteristics and different cultures.

My question is whether Europe has been following the wrong road until now, or whether, all in all, the road it chose has been a success. It all began at the end of the 1940s with the ECSC, i.e., with the coal and steel community, and the firm resolve of the French and Germans in particular at that time to exercise international control over these two raw materials that have enabled terrible wars to be waged. Then came the European Economic Community in 1957, linking the economies of the European member states. This was followed by the Single European Act in the late 1980s,

*Mr. Antretter (continued)*

which brought even closer integration. And each of them produced more prosperity, and peace on our continent became more secure. Maastricht gave us the European Union, which will bring even more security and peace and also prosperity to all the member states concerned.

In this context, there are those who say that Europe has failed miserably in former Yugoslavia. Most of us were in Finland for the mini-session of the Council of Europe when it all began, three years ago. Every one of us who is seated here was deeply shocked to the core. But should we not also consider what the alternative would have been? For what classical form of disaster would have befallen us if the countries of Europe had behaved differently? There are examples in this century. Great Britain and France would have sided with Serbia, and Germany and Italy would have stood by the Croatian and Slovenian policy. It was only the necessity to co-ordinate, co-operate and consult that finally enabled much of the barbarity, terrible as it is, to be contained, preventing the sparks from flying further, so that Europe has remained a secure structure.

That is also the background to WEU's task of making peace even more secure through its integration in the European Union, in that Europe will soon also have a uniform foreign policy and instruments of security policy. That Western European Union will need courage here is obvious. But the well-informed also realise that without WEU it will become more difficult to travel this road successfully.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Antretter.

I call our last speaker, Mr. Pastusiak, an observer from Poland.

Mr. PASTUSIAK (*Observer from Poland*). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it was a great pleasure for me to read the text presented on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Ferrari. The draft recommendations of the committee clearly identify the factors of greatest importance to Europe's future security and stability – factors on which action is imperative.

Speaking as a representative of Poland – a state associated with the European Union and, following the adoption on 9th May of the Kirchberg declaration, with WEU – I wish to note that we follow with great attention the on-going processes within the European Union and WEU as organisations to membership of which we aspire.

We perceive the decision on association with WEU of the nine consultative Forum member states as a logical follow-up to present or future links between those states and the European

Union. In Poland's case, association with WEU should be perceived as an element in a chain of actions designed to bring us closer to the structures of the European Union. We believe that this decision will be instrumental in overcoming the view of Central Europe as a grey zone. We also believe that it underlines the determined and irreversible nature of the process in which those countries will be integrated with western structures.

I emphasise that the status of associate partner fails to meet Poland's expectations. Nonetheless, it offers the basis for our practical participation in the work and efforts of WEU within its structures.

In our opinion, the decisions taken on 9th May in Luxembourg mark entry on to the road leading to full membership of WEU. We expect that process to proceed in step with the interests of our western partners and with advances in our integration into the European Union.

Polish members of parliament have often suggested that a strictly political body within the WEU Assembly could keep one step ahead of the WEU Council in the process of establishing relations with countries in our region. A similar suggestion was made by our delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly during the recent spring session in Oslo on 30th May. We believe that establishment of closer contacts between the WEU Assembly and parliaments of the WEU associate partners will be highly beneficial to both sides. In the broader context, more comprehensive inclusion of states such as Poland in the work of the WEU Assembly will allow for the working out of procedures and methods of dialogue as well as for our gradual and smooth incorporation into all aspects of WEU activities, beginning with the parliamentary aspect.

In view of what I have just said, it would be advisable to consider granting full membership of the WEU Assembly to our states, ahead of membership in the Union itself. To upgrade the status of our parliaments in the WEU Assembly would lead to consolidation of our rôle as a stabilising factor in the political situation in our part of Europe. By including us – I am speaking here on behalf of the Polish Parliament – within WEU Assembly structures, WEU will gain a partner and ally which is reliable and stable and obeys democratic rules.

In consideration of all these factors, one cannot but be somewhat disappointed that the Rapporteur devoted such little attention in both the draft recommendations and the explanatory memorandum to issues pertaining to East-Central Europe, which incidentally was limited to the Baltic republics.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to conclude with an appeal that we should do

*Mr. Pastusiak (continued)*

everything possible to ensure that our children experience no vestiges of the present divisions in Europe. May they live in a common, secure European home without divisions. I think that that is something that we can all wish each other.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Pastusiak, your distinguished compatriot the Minister for Foreign Affairs will no doubt have more to say on this matter this afternoon.

The debate is closed.

*(Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

**4. Address by Mr. Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom**

The PRESIDENT. – Ladies and gentlemen, we now welcome our special speaker. May I say by way of introduction that it is almost impossible nowadays to switch on a television set and see negotiations, diplomatic and political, taking place, whether they be about former Yugoslavia, the future of Europe or the defence implications of the European concept, without seeing the familiar features of Mr. Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, who is with us this morning.

Mr. Hurd has established an enviable reputation as a wise man, not only, clearly, in his own country's terms but as a man whose opinions and guidance are given full respect by people of different parties and different countries. He is one of the more senior statesmen on our stage at the moment, which is why we are especially pleased to have the opportunity of having him here to address us today.

Typically, Mr. Hurd has said that he will be happy to answer questions afterwards. Like all ministers, Mr. Hurd is on a tight schedule but he will certainly find time for that. He totally understands some of our anxieties as an assembly about the future, and he looks seriously at the future of security and defence in Europe, and at the rôle of WEU vis-à-vis the other organisations. He is a man with all the information. I ask him to address us.

Mr. HURD (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Sir Dudley, distinguished members of the Assembly, I thank you for your invitation and for your courtesy in being present. I count it an interesting privilege to be able to come here once again to discuss briefly with you some of the questions of European security on which, rightly, we spend so much time.

We spend so much time among the details, the details of the organisations and their relationships, that we sometimes may forget the historical background. Just over a week ago I was in Normandy for the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day. It was a moving occasion and brought home to me how easy it is, fifty years on, to take for granted the peace and prosperity that we now enjoy.

However, that peace rests on a lot of hard work. It rests on a strong and longstanding commitment to mutual defence, not least on the part of the United States. Everybody here will have noticed the speech by President Clinton to the Assemblée Nationale a few kilometres from here, last week. Speaking here in Paris, the President pledged again to maintain about 100 000 United States troops in Europe as part of a continuing determination to maintain the vigour of the transatlantic alliance. Some minds will have gone back to the previous American President to talk to the Assemblée Nationale – President Woodrow Wilson in 1919. He, too, had a vision, but tragically that vision crumbled when the Americans withdrew from Europe. That was a stupid and dangerous error, for which both Americans and Europeans bear part of the blame. We must not repeat that. Therefore, the case in which all of us here believe – the case for greater European coherence on defence – does not, must not, rest on any assumption that the Americans are on their way home.

In Western Europe since 1945 we have had the protection of a successful alliance, probably the most successful defensive alliance in history. But that is not the end of the story. We are now at the beginning of a new chapter. We have to maintain our alliance following the end of the cold war; we have to adapt it to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Since those challenges constantly change, the way in which we respond to them has to change too. That means, crucially, European countries working together more closely and more effectively.

There was a time, in one or two places, when that idea was regarded as anti-American. That, of course, is clearly nonsense. Indeed, President Clinton made it clear here last week that he expects and hopes for that greater European co-operation. No one who talks to United States politicians of any variety can doubt their support for Europeans doing more to defend their own interests. If we fail to do that the Americans will find it increasingly difficult to justify carrying their share of the burden of a large military presence on our soil.

So that is one thing – greater European coherence in our own defence. The other aspect, on which I know that you have spent a good deal of time, is reaching out to our neighbours in the East. I am delighted to see some of those here today. Among



*Mr. Hurd (continued)*

the debris of the Berlin wall, we are building, and have to build, bridges to the East. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are looking for new structures and new certainties; so, indeed, are the Russians. We have to be there to respond.

You, and we, Western European Union, lie at the heart of those new challenges. WEU is developing from a little-known acronym to a proof of European readiness to contribute more effectively to our own defence. Your Assembly is unique. It is the only European parliamentary assembly to concentrate its efforts and its studies on defence matters. Therefore this is a very good place in which to carry the discussion a bit further and to spend a few minutes on the different aspects that I have mentioned – the effectiveness of NATO, Europe's own defence capability, and windows opening to the East.

We have all these instruments at our disposal, and in a way the variety of instruments makes the discussion a complicated one. We have the United Nations, the CSCE, NATO, WEU and the European Union – all of which are sometimes dismissed by critics. But we have to make sense and coherence of these organisations.

NATO lies at the heart of European defence and security. It is central to the task facing all European governments – how we are to maintain and enhance security throughout Europe. It is the bedrock of our collective security. It embodies the transatlantic link that I have already mentioned, which is vital to our freedom and prosperity in Europe.

Earlier this year the NATO summit fully endorsed the development of a European security and defence identity as something that would strengthen the alliance, not weaken it. NATO is extending security eastwards.

The partnership for peace programme, launched at the Brussels summit in January, is designed to enhance everyone's security without constituting a threat to anybody. I think that it is a very ingenious idea; it is very well put together. It helps us to build a defence relationship between NATO and each partner – not NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or the ex-Warsaw Pact, but NATO with each partner. The flexibility of that arrangement means that each partnership agreement will be tailored to meet the particular needs of that partner.

The partnership for peace has caught on very fast. It was launched in January and already twenty countries have signed the partnership. We decided at the NATO Council in Istanbul last week to press ahead and develop a relationship with each partner, so that the forces of each partner could work with, and get used to, the procedures and

habits of NATO, and to encourage them on such crucial matters as democratic control of the military and transparency in defence budgets.

Then there is Russia. We underlined again last week the importance of supporting the reform process in Russia and our wish to develop relations and to promote a broad dialogue. We welcome Russia's decision to join the partnership for peace on the same basis as other partners. The Russian partnership will lead to a very far-reaching programme of co-operation, I would expect, corresponding to Russia's size and importance.

A lot of work has been done and a lot of ink has been spilled on the question of the relationship with Russia; it is crucial. I worked out a phrase, which I tried first on my Russian colleague Andrei Kozyrev, "No vetos". In other words, Russia has no right to veto the decisions of WEU, NATO or any other western organisation. There are to be no surprises. In other words, we will not launch exercises or do things that catch the Russians unawares and make them feel apprehensive. There should be growing co-operation. I tried out that phrase on Andrei Kozyrev and then on President Yeltsin in the Kremlin and it was accepted by both. No vetos, no surprises, growing and substantial co-operation. As a summary, that is not a bad one.

Meanwhile NATO is adapting its own structures and practices. It is building on its decades of planning and exercising together so that it can better support peace-keeping and crisis-management. It is doing essential work on non-proliferation. In this and other ways, NATO is carrying out its rôle as the indispensable foundation for stability in the wider Europe and beyond.

At Maastricht, European leaders decided that WEU should be developed as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the alliance as well as the defence component of the European Union. In May in Luxembourg, ministers launched a new status in WEU of associate partnership for the six Central European countries and for the three Baltic states which had previously been part of your Forum of Consultation. So WEU has grown over the two years since the Petersberg declaration from an organisation with nine members to one in which the Council, in its fullest form, consists of twenty-four countries from all parts of our continent. This is precocious growth; it is fast and needs to be underpinned by institutional planning.

I hope that this new framework set up in Luxembourg meets the needs of today. It will enable the European allies which are not members of the European Union, and the Central, East European and Baltic states all to take a suitable part in the work of WEU. We British worked hard to establish the new associate partnership status,



*Mr. Hurd (continued)*

distinct from and not in any way prejudicing the position of existing associate members.

The WEU evolution runs alongside NATO's partnership for peace and complements it. In WEU, our partners will see at first hand the will for genuine collective security and multinational defence in a forum where Europeans seek to take more responsibility for their own decisions. We British proposed and warmly welcomed the even closer association at the same time offered by WEU to the three NATO allies that are already associate members here – Norway, Iceland and Turkey.

Surely the essential point is that there is no contradiction between our wish as Europeans to contribute more coherently to our common defence and security and the maintenance of NATO as the essential framework. Those are two sides of the same coin. That is now accepted; it is no longer a matter of controversy. The NATO summit showed the way forward. WEU will be able to call on common assets of NATO, the military capabilities of NATO, in consultation with the alliance for operations launched on the initiative of WEU or following requests from the European Union.

The assumption here will immediately be obvious to you already, ladies and gentlemen. It is familiar to you already. WEU operations using NATO assets will have to command political support from all NATO allies. This close working relationship between NATO and WEU has to be maintained. It includes the double-hatting of representatives, such as Sir John Weston here. It includes contacts between the secretariats and military planners. These links are building well since WEU moved to Brussels, but we need a further push to ensure complete transparency and complementarity between the two organisations.

Work is continuing in NATO on the combined joint task force concept, which is at the heart of the concept I have just outlined because, as agreed at the summit, the combined joint task forces can be used under WEU auspices as well as in NATO-led operations. WEU can also draw on a range of other forces and headquarters staff who have been declared available for its use. We all know of the multinational formations under this heading, such as the European corps, the United Kingdom-Netherlands amphibious force, and the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgian, and German multinational division. Here we have a wide range of assets from which we can select according to the needs of a particular situation and from which we can select the right combination of military capability and the right political label.

How does that fit with what we are doing inside the European Union, building the common foreign

and security policy? This co-operation under the Maastricht Treaty will now grow in strength. It is not something that descends from heaven as a ready-made and beautiful palace. The common foreign and security policy is something that we build gradually, brick by brick, case by case, and decision by decision. These decisions have to rest more effectively than up to now on common analyses of foreign and security policy issues and they need to lead to effective action by consensus. This work of strengthening the common foreign and security policy will be added to when the four new members join the European Union – Norway, Sweden, Finland and Austria. It is already clear that each of them will bring to our work a particular experience and a particular relevance. These are all important players on the wider international scene. I am delighted by the result of the referendum in Austria; that is a real encouragement for all of us who believe in the vocation of the European Union to expand. It is not sensible for us to claim in Western Europe the title of Europe without being willing to expand our membership towards the centre and the East.

We want closer links with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on the full range of foreign policy and security issues. That is why the previous Italian Foreign Minister, Beniamino Andreatta and I launched last December an idea that has been adopted since then by the European Union for involving Central and Eastern European countries more closely in the work of the two pillars of the Maastricht Treaty on inter-governmental co-operation that is, foreign policy – and what in British terms we call home affairs or Home Office matters such as the struggle against international crime and drugs, and other internal, interior matters. The concept of identifying the Central and Eastern European countries with this intergovernmental work is going ahead well.

They are complex matters with which we in the hemicycle wrestle day by day – NATO, the foundation of our security, and new ways of associating WEU, CFSP and CSCE with NATO. Britain's wholehearted participation in the European Union is the foundation of our prosperity and it reinforces our diplomatic influence in the world. The European Union has to find new, flexible and imaginative forms of co-operation if it is to ensure the prosperity and influence of its members.

The Europe of Monnet and Schuman played an essential rôle in burying the old enmities of Western Europe and restoring the wealth and confidence of our countries. The next stage is perhaps even more ambitious. The ex-communist countries have suffered economic stagnation and political stultification. That sapped the natural energies of their peoples. We must find the right ways of encouraging their dynamism and their political self-confidence. We must help them develop their

*Mr. Hurd (continued)*

economies through the Europe Agreements and the partnership and co-operation agreements. We can involve them in the intergovernmental activities set up under the Maastricht Treaty. We should also find forms of co-operation which do not figure in the *acquis* of the European Community, but which are valued by the countries involved. We shall then have a continent with different tracks and different degrees of co-operation and integration, where no one need feel threatened by the progress made by others because everyone has a stake in the success. That is what has happened inside the existing European Union and will increasingly happen as we open the windows and doors towards the centre and East of our continent. For example, the countries putting men into the field in Bosnia have done that under the auspices of the United Nations, WEU and NATO.

We have been driven, as is natural, by our own national traditions and circumstances. The initiative to bring peace to Bosnia is no less European because we have done it under different labels. The European Union has provided the negotiating framework as well as a huge humanitarian effort. We have helped contain the war. We have relieved the human suffering wherever we can and our co-operation has prevented European powers involving themselves on different sides, as they did so disastrously in earlier generations.

The Europe that I am describing and in which we are all involved is more complex than the old Europe, the Europe of the cold war or the Europe in which the founding fathers worked in the 1940s and 1950s. The new Europe is more complex and more difficult to grasp. But it is realistic, pragmatic and encourages effective work between governments wherever that is helpful and in line with what the peoples of Europe want.

We have to construct – we are constructing – a Europe based on consent. This is a difficult time for idealists in Europe. The debate that followed the Treaty of Maastricht and, to some extent, the elections held in the past few days in Europe, show the dangers of a gap – sometimes a huge gap – between those of us who are part of governing establishments and the people we represent. We must bring the policies and institutions that we are forming into line with what our countries are ready and willing to do. The post-war generation was successful in relaunching Europe after the awfulness of war. We must build effectively – with consent – on the peace that it created.

WEU has a particular contribution to make. Its members sit at the heart of the institutions and deal with the most important of all issues – the security of our continent. We need, in WEU, to build on the flexibility of our structures and the

variable geometry of our membership. I hope that over the past year we have, between us, successfully steered the WEU towards the further enlargement and development of its operational capabilities including closer links with NATO.

Now as we move ahead under the Dutch presidency, with the policy debate and its practical development, we must keep our heads out of the clouds. It is not a matter of a minuet of theories. We seek practical agreements for practical good. We aim to create real planning options and operational possibilities that add to the range of security and defence instruments available in pursuit of shared European and Atlantic objectives.

This must be a rigorous, tightly managed, practical enterprise, not a windy talk shop. We have successful operations in the Adriatic and the Danube. I compliment the Secretary-General on the way that those have been constructed and organised. We now have a new one that is limited in scope but is important in its novelty, in the help that we give to the proposed European administration of Mostar. We look for new practical chances to contribute where we have something of value to give. I know that we can count on your support, Sir Dudley, and the support of the Assembly in seeking to build Western European Union in that practical and useful way.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Secretary of State, for that most interesting survey. There are a number of questions and I propose that we group the first three from Dame Peggy Fenner, Mr. Ferrarini and Sir Russell Johnston. If you, Secretary of State, are in agreement perhaps you would reply to them jointly.

I first call Dame Peggy Fenner.

Dame Peggy FENNER (*United Kingdom*). – Foreign Minister, I know that you are well aware of the publicly expressed view of the European Parliament that it should take over this organisation and assume its responsibilities in the European Union. What is your view on that?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for being admirably brief, Dame Peggy.

I call Mr. Ferrarini.

Mr. FERRARINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – From the standpoint of security and defence the process of European integration is very difficult and complex. One of the most difficult points discussed in this Assembly and elsewhere, is the problem of the members of NATO which are not members of the European Union – Turkey, Norway and Iceland.

In the case of Norway, the problem will be resolved by its hoped for early accession to the European Union.

*Mr. Ferrarini (continued)*

As regards Turkey and Iceland, do you think that they will one day be able to sign the modified Brussels Treaty and do you therefore consider an amendment of the Maastricht Treaty to be a realistic possibility?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Ferrarini.

I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – The Foreign Secretary referred to windows opening to the East. It has been remarked that this afternoon the Assembly will debate the report on parliamentary co-operation with countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation. In my opinion by far the most important recommendation in that report is the third one which recommends that the Council:

“Ensure the Assembly has adequate means to develop relations and co-operation with the states of the Forum of Consultation, in accordance with the Council’s own expressed wish.”

Does Mr. Hurd anticipate that the Council will make a tangible response to that question? Will he assure us that he will do everything he can to ensure that it does? Rhetoric may be gratifying but it does not pay air fares.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Foreign Secretary.

Mr. HURD (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – In answer to Dame Peggy Fenner, I am not in favour of the European Parliament eating up this Assembly or taking it over. It has sufficient work on its plate already and its appetite should not be encouraged in that way.

On the question of our Italian colleague, which is particularly important, I do not myself see the likelihood of Turkey and Iceland becoming full members of the European Union in the immediate future.

Theoretically, it is perfectly possible, as he said, for countries to join WEU without being members of the European Union, but the practical difficulties of that are quite substantial. It would add to the complications with which we already wrestle. Again, I do not think that is likely, in practice, to be done. Therefore, what is important and what, in recent months, I have spent a good deal of time on, is to assure the three countries – as he rightly said, the Norwegian problem may well solve itself, so to assure the two remaining countries – that their rôle as associate members of WEU is meaningful and enhanced and is not reduced or qualified by the fact that we are creating a different associate partnership for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

As regards the budget, I would have been amazed, Sir Russell, if I had not been questioned on that point. The 1993 budget for the Assembly showed real growth over 1992. I entirely accept that the work of the Assembly is expanding with enlargement. I also accept – I have it rammed down my throat all the time at home – that budgetary restraint remains a necessity. The Council has to balance those two, and we shall seek to do so with our customary wisdom.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hurd. The next three questions come from Mr. Valleix of France, Mr. Antretter of Germany and Mr. Lopez Henares of Spain.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, your comments are most interesting but, as you rightly point out, the gap between our governments, ourselves as members of parliament and public opinion is sometimes very wide, witness last Sunday’s vote in several member states. There have, however, been a number of interesting developments.

I welcome President Clinton’s address to the National Assembly just one week ago in which he said he was pleased to see that NATO had recently approved a United States proposal allowing Western European Union to use its assets. This was good to hear.

We were also glad to hear you say that WEU should retain its autonomy within the European Union.

My question is this: what budgetary resources will be available to WEU in 1996 for the institutional changes called for under Maastricht? Our members are all cutting their defence budgets while France is trying to maintain the present level. Resources apart, what authority shall we, as members of parliament or government, have to talk with those we are representing if they are not aware of defence-related issues? Do you have any suggestions?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Hurd, it was thanks to the resolute action by NATO that the advance of the Serbian units into the protected zones declared by the United Nations could be halted. But the command chain between the United Nations and NATO and the rôle a European organisation might be able to play in it have still not been clearly defined.

I wanted to ask you about your views and those of your government on this question, with special reference to the rôle of a European organisation.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, this meeting of the Assembly has begun on the very day on which we have received news of the recent European elections. In every country there have been many domestic issues which have determined the voting trend, but at the same time we have had a recurrence of the debate on “Euroscpticism” or the different ways of interpreting integration.

In view of this, Minister, I would like to have your opinion on the following three points.

One, given the difficulties and doubts which exist concerning certain economic matters such as monetary union, etc., do you not think that the time has come to intensify the move towards integration in the areas of defence and foreign policy? One of the very things which has been responsible for slowing down the European impetus has been the neglect of political objectives, such as peace between the countries of Europe and the maintenance not merely of a defensive alliance, but rather, of a union to guarantee peace among the countries of Europe.

Two, in the event of your reply being positive, as an organ of defence WEU still does not have the appropriate military implements of integration to be able to carry out an effective foreign policy, yet without such implements it is impossible for a community of three hundred and forty million inhabitants to carry any weight as far as its foreign policy is concerned. It therefore seems to us that some of the decisions regarding the combined forces are little more than symbolic.

Three, if this is the case, what would be the view, with regard to the 1996 conference, of maintaining WEU as a powerful body for integrated European defence, since it is the only organ in which the representatives of the different national parliaments participate?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Foreign Secretary.

Mr. HURD (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*) (Translation). – On the question of European defence, the Maastricht Treaty sets up a system which is a compromise between those who emphasise the European identity and those who emphasise the importance of NATO. As I explained, and as you all already know, our governments, and we ourselves as members of parliament, are doing everything we can to make this compromise a success. It is early days yet but it is working! Things are taking shape and we now have a clearer view of how to make it work successfully.

So at the intergovernmental meeting in 1996 we will review the progress that has been made, consider any changes which may be required and check that everything is going according to plan.

Clearly, however, we cannot tell now what we are going to find out then.

(*The speaker continued in English*)

On the question of the United Nations and NATO, the position in Bosnia is not one that one could conceivably imagine in theory – it just happened. We have an international effort on the ground to which many of us contribute troops, which is under the flag and the helmets of the United Nations. We have an international effort in the air and on the sea, to which many of us contribute, which is under the label of NATO or the WEU. When one has such inter-service efforts – air, land and sea – they are normally under the auspices of one country, one headquarters, one staff – a shared intelligence analysis. It was clear to me a few weeks ago that we were lacking something and that there were divergences in intelligence and analysis, simply because our ground effort was under different auspices from our air and sea efforts. I hope that that has been corrected.

Obviously it is essential that if military action is being taken it takes account of the views of the people on the ground, otherwise the air action risks being either futile or, worse, dangerous. Therefore, what is called the dual key – the consent both of the United Nations commander and of NATO – is essential. That must be true. The important thing is to make the dual key work effectively and I hope that that is now happening.

I answered in part the question from Mr. Lopez Henares of Spain in answering the question from Mr. Valleix of France. Yes, I see scope for building up increased work together on defence and foreign policies.

I have already answered on defence. On foreign policy, I hope that we can be more effective as Europeans in finding practical ways of taking joint action vis-à-vis Ukraine and Russia and in other respects under the heading of a common foreign and security policy. Work together in that field avoids some of the difficulties that we encounter within the WEU structure.

On the question of assets, we obviously have to avoid duplication. NATO possesses huge assets of infrastructure which it would be very foolish for the European allies to seek to duplicate simply for the sake of it. That is why we are concentrating on the concept of using assets declared to NATO for WEU purposes under the procedures that I have described.

The PRESIDENT. – I have just two other questioners, Mr. Wolfgramm and Sir Peter Fry.

I call Mr. Wolfgramm.

Mr. WOLFGGRAMM (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Hurd's former American colleague Henry Kissinger gave an interview today in which he

*Mr. Wolfgramm (continued)*

said that in his view, after a period of chaos, Russia would revert to the old Tsarist foreign policy and try to expand its hegemony again, which would exert pressure on Western Europe.

He added that in his view – as Mr. Hurd also said in his address – co-operation was necessary, but so was great vigilance. May I ask Mr. Hurd where he would draw the line between co-operation and vigilance?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Peter Fry.

Sir Peter FRY (*United Kingdom*). – Foreign Secretary, perhaps one of the most embarrassing incidents for European powers that has arisen recently has been the attitude of the Greek Government to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The trade embargo has caused enormous hardship to Macedonia and may be a cause of political unrest in that particular part of the Balkans which we can do without.

Do you agree that although a machinery exists for dealing with such incidents, it seems to take a long time to put into effect? Is there not a case for examining whether we might discover new means whereby embarrassing situations such as this can be avoided? Perhaps there could be greater united action to prevent governments taking unilateral decisions such as that of the Greek Government, particularly in view of the implications in that part of south-east Europe?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Foreign Secretary.

Mr. HURD (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – In reply to the first question, Henry Kissinger is right in this respect; one cannot foretell what the policy or leadership of Russia will be in ten or fifteen years. That is one important reason why we have to be concerned about the defence of security of Europe. I can speak only about the position that I find now.

Some Russian policies give me anxiety. I was anxious for a time about the apparent wish of the Russians to remain in the Baltic states with their troops after 31st August this year. It seemed to me that that was not a matter that should be used as a bargaining counter in our discussions with the government. That anxiety has been to some extent relieved by recent progress with all three of the Baltic states.

As regards Bosnia, I must say that in recent months I have found the way in which the Russians have acted to be positive. So there are different influences at work in Russian policy and for co-operation with the West. The doctrine that I set out of no vetos, no surprises and substantial co-operation is apt for the present situation. How-

ever, we have to be vigilant. We have to be understanding of the anxieties of our immediate neighbours in the centre of Europe and to the east of us.

In response to Sir Peter's point, anyone who has been to Greece knows that anxieties about Macedonia are widely and deeply felt there. They go back to questions of the name, the constitution and the flag. Those may seem trivial matters to people outside Greece, but it is a statement of fact that they are deeply felt by a wide range of Greek opinion – almost the whole of Greek opinion inside Greece.

In my view and I think in the view of most of my partners in Europe, that anxiety does not justify the action that the Greeks have taken in the economic measures which Sir Peter mentioned. That is why we strongly support the European Commission in the legal action that it is taking against Greece. As Sir Peter said, that legal action is a slow matter. It grinds pretty slowly. That is perfectly true. Efforts are being made by Cyrus Vance in New York to remove the dispute, but I hope that in any case and whether those efforts succeed or not, we shall be able in the months that lie ahead to persuade and press the Greeks to remove the measures. As Sir Peter said, they create instability rather than stability in an area of the world which, God knows, is sufficiently unstable already.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen, I am always impressed by the enviable ability of the British Foreign Secretary to put matters into perspective. They have certainly been put into perspective for us today. Mr. Hurd, you have given us in less than an hour a masterly tour de force. Anyone with any judgment to bring to bear can understand exactly the way in which to approach the subject on behalf of us all. As always, you have been very frank with us and answered questions frankly as well. It was a great pleasure to have you here. It is a signal honour for the Assembly to have leading politicians of all countries and parties. We thank you very much indeed for finding time in your busy schedule to come to see us.

##### ***5. WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council***

*(Reply to the debate on the report of the  
Political Committee and vote on the draft  
recommendation, Doc. 1417 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now resume consideration of the report of the Political Committee on WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 1417 and amendments.

*The President (continued)*

Will the Rapporteur, Mr. Ferrari, kindly sum up the debate. Then I shall ask the Chairman of the committee whether he wishes to voice an opinion.

Mr. FERRARI (*Italy*) (Translation). – My reply to members who have spoken on the report, whom I thank, will be very brief, particularly as there seem to have been no objections on points of substance but rather different shades of opinion.

Referring to Mr. Rodrigues's speech, Mr. Müller said the report was melancholy. I cannot share this view. The fact is that, starting from an assessment made on several occasions by Mr. Goerens in 1992 and 1993, the report seeks to highlight what Mr. Hurd referred to as the ambiguities of the Maastricht Treaty. The wording of the Maastricht Treaty undoubtedly suffers from the lack of uniform, common positions on a number of problems. Some countries were determined to move faster towards integration but others were less decided. The result is that some chapters of the Maastricht Treaty are markedly ambiguous.

So far as we are concerned, I think that the time has come for the Council of WEU to try to harmonise WEU's commitments and obligations under the Maastricht Treaty and under the modified Brussels Treaty. I believe that this is the way to clear up the various ambiguities. On the subject of relationships between WEU and the European Union I referred to the De Gucht resolution and emphasised that the Political Committee expressed the wish to establish collaboration and find a solution. Unfortunately, in February this year we unexpectedly found ourselves faced by a resolution giving a unilateral interpretation to the Maastricht Treaty.

Regarding the countries of Central Europe, I repeat what I said in my speech. I believe that, quite correctly, the Council responded positively to the requests from the nine countries for a more incisive rôle in the Forum of Consultation; I can therefore only welcome the Council's choice.

Regarding the problem of Slovenia, I drew the attention of both the Assembly and the Council to the problem of Moldova and Slovenia and of other countries which the Council should take into consideration. I am well aware that in the case of the problem of Slovenia there is a dispute with Italy. In the Council of Europe I was able to put a number of questions to the Slovenian Foreign Minister and he agreed with me in declaring that the Treaty of Osimo should not be revised but applied because a number of points have been neglected. It is clear, therefore, that in the discussions about entry to be started between the Slovenian Delegation and the European Union, this

very real problem must be cleared up. I mentioned Moldova and Slovenia but I could have named other countries to which WEU should direct its attention. I will stop here because I do not think I should say more. I have tried to cover the points raised with some added details.

The PRESIDENT. – I now call on the new Chairman of the Political Committee, Mr. de Puig, whom we congratulate.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Thank you very much, Mr. President. I was elected Chairman of the Political Committee only this morning, so I would like to start by saying that I was not the person responsible over the past weeks and months for directing the work on the report which Mr. Ferrari is presenting. This was the responsibility of Mr. Stoffelen, and I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to him and to thank him for the work he has done in recent years in the Political Committee, culminating in the extraordinarily pertinent reports which we present to this Assembly.

The quality of Mr. Ferrari's work is noteworthy, and I would like to congratulate him, because he has presented a full report in a sensitive and truly complex situation.

We all know that in recent years WEU has undergone radical change, a change experienced by Europe itself, if we think what the situation was ten years ago and what it is today, in the context of European security and the great security issues. But if we also think of this in relation to the rôle of WEU ten, or even five, years ago and its present rôle, then we must acknowledge and accept that there has been a kind of revolution, a fundamental, radical change which presents our organisation, WEU, with new challenges; these concern its future rôle, its internal organisation, its need for planning and the need to link it to other European and world bodies, the need for it to have a greater presence in the area of security, the challenge of enlargement, the entry of new members, new associates, new observers and, finally, the need to reform internal structures.

In addition to those challenges, we have the Maastricht mandate which charges us with constructing, conceiving and organising not only a European defence policy, but a common defence for Europe, no less.

In view of this, and the rôle which WEU must play in this area, which is the central theme of Mr. Ferrari's report, I can see three positions.

There is the position of the lukewarm Europeans, as I would call them, those people who have little interest in, or enthusiasm for, the European process, who would perhaps like WEU to continue without becoming too involved in the European process or, at least, without close co-

*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

operation and final fusion with the process of European Union.

Opposed to this lukewarm position would be the almost Utopian enthusiasts, represented by the report of Mr. De Gucht of the European Parliament who, quite unrealistically and without any political sense or discipline, are capable of proposing nothing less than the immediate absorption of WEU by the European Union although this is not a practical possibility. Nevertheless, that is their position.

Somewhere between these two positions is the Europeanism that I would call realistic, which seems to me to be epitomised by Mr. Ferrari's formulation. It is a concerned, but not dejected Europeanism. Dejection is the result of futile effort, as has been said many times before, and I do not believe that the European project and the effort to construct Europe is futile. It is costly, difficult and slow, but by no means futile. I do not believe that the problem is one of dejection, but rather of concern, because this is a delicate and difficult matter, but we should not bring in negative elements. Dejection is definitely a negative position.

As the report demonstrates, Mr. President, this concerned Europeanism enables us to carry out reliable, careful and rigorous work, giving detailed attention to the type of relations which should exist between WEU and the European Union, in their parliamentary dimension, in the area of European security, of WEU with NATO or with the CSCE, and which should prevail throughout the process of enlargement of the European Union and its relations with WEU. This is the stance adopted by Mr. Ferrari's report, and by previous speakers. Mr. President, this is a timely report, one of a series being discussed this week to define the future rôle of WEU.

I congratulate the Rapporteur and would like to conclude, Mr. President, by saying that the Political Committee voted unanimously in favour of the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. de Puig.

Four amendments have been tabled to the draft recommendation. The amendments will be taken in the order in which they relate to the text – Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4. In addition, Mr. Stoffelen has tabled an amendment to Amendment 2.

We now come to Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Ferrari:

1. At the end of paragraph (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation add “and welcoming therefore the decision of the Council to task the WEU Permanent Council to start work now on the formulation of such a policy;”.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order. The normal custom is for amendments to be considered by the relevant committee. When the Political Committee met this morning, there were only three amendments. Was the fourth amendment tabled in time under the rules? If so, why was it not available for the Political Committee to consider?

The PRESIDENT. – I am advised that the amendment is in order, Lord Finsberg. It was tabled last night. If it did not reach the committee, there must have been a fault of distribution.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Further to that point of order. I tabled an amendment to Amendment 2. This morning, a meeting of the Political Committee took place and we discussed the three amendments. I then tabled the amendment to Amendment 2 at the committee meeting and it has now been printed. It was adopted by the Political Committee. I am, therefore, merely reflecting the opinion of the Political Committee in my amendment. It is as simple as that.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen. I think that the sensible thing is to proceed. Members will obviously bear in mind the fact that Amendment 4 was not considered by the Political Committee. We shall deal with that when we get to it.

I ask Mr. Ferrari to speak in support of Amendment 1.

Mr. FERRARI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Amendment 1 should be regarded as an extension to paragraph (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation which seems to me to reflect the desire for an early definition of a common defence policy. Hence the call on the Permanent Council to start work.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Ferrari.

I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

We now come to Amendment 2:

2. After paragraph (xiv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add two new paragraphs as follows:

“Welcoming the fact that the Council's Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994 recognises the significant contribution of the three associate members of WEU to European security and stability;

Convinced however that the Council's wish to reinforce the relationship of these three countries with WEU in order to strengthen its position as the defence component of the European



*The President (continued)*

Union and as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance could be achieved better if the Council invited them to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty; ”

I ask Mr. Ferrari to speak in support of Amendment 2.

Mr. FERRARI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The amendment takes account of the Council’s Kirchberg declaration of 9th May last and refers to the anomalous position of the three associate members of WEU.

The second paragraph of the amendment expresses the hope that the three members which belong to NATO – that is Norway, Turkey and Iceland – may become full members of WEU. The reasons are obvious in view of the close relationship acknowledged at the summit meeting held in January by NATO for which WEU is the European pillar of the organisation.

The second sentence of my proposed amendment is based on these considerations.

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the amendment to Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Stoffelen:

In Amendment 2, leave out the second paragraph.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – It is clear that Amendment 2 is sympathetic. There is no doubt about that. It deals with a problem discussed many times in this Assembly. I remember well that, two or three years ago, we discussed the same item. By a great majority, the Assembly expressed the wish that Greece and Turkey, for example, would become members of Western European Union. Afterwards, there were animated discussions over the Maastricht Treaty.

A few minutes ago, Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, said that we all knew that there was a compromise. People tried to square the circle and to a certain extent, they succeeded. They tried to combine WEU’s links with the European Union and its links with NATO. Later, in the Petersberg declaration – in the second appendix – it was decided that member states of the alliance that were not members of the European Union would have to become associate members. I was not very happy with that, but it is a fact of life, as Mr. Hurd said. That position will not change. Repeating the wish that those countries should become full members of WEU shows a zero degree of reality.

It will not happen. As I am a pragmatic politician I usually try to face the facts. The decision has been taken that these countries must be associate members. Mr. Douglas Hurd said that in that rôle the Council is willing and able to offer all the

opportunities possible. Therefore, my amendment reflects the opinion of the majority of the Political Committee and, more importantly, reflects the reality of political life. I therefore recommend my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment or the amendment to the amendment?...

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I want to oppose the sub-amendment very strongly. What Mr. Stoffelen is saying is out of context. The document is the reply to the thirty-ninth annual report. We should comment on its contents. In addition, what Mr. Stoffelen is saying to us is that if we have believed in something for a long time, have pushed it forward and are then rebuffed by ministers, we should sit down, shut up and accept it. That is not a democracy. A democracy means that if one believes in something – we did – one should continue to press that.

The report that I have to produce tomorrow is complicated just because some people have failed to remain consistent with what the Assembly said. I hope that the Assembly will accept Mr. Ferrari’s amendment in full and reject the well-meaning but – if I can put it as gently as possible – strange sub-amendment of Mr. Stoffelen.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – This sub-amendment was adopted by the Political Committee by majority.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Mr. Stoffelen’s amendment to Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The amendment to Amendment 2 is negatived.*

I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

We come now to Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Ferrari which reads as follows:

3. Leave out paragraph (xvi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“ Welcoming therefore that by its Kirchberg declaration, the Council is following paragraph 1 of Recommendation 556 in granting simultaneously to all the member countries of the Forum of Consultation a status of association with WEU; ”

I ask Mr. Ferrari to speak in support of Amendment 3.



Mr. FERRARI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Amendment 3, which is designed to replace (xvi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, takes account of the Kirchberg declaration and refers to the granting of the new status of association to the member countries of the Forum of Consultation.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 3 is agreed to.*

We now come to Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. De Decker which reads as follows:

4. Delete paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

I ask Mr. De Decker to speak in support of Amendment 4.

Mr. De DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The amendment I tabled involves the deletion of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation which reads as follows: “Reconsider the WEU declaration II annexed to the Maastricht Treaty with a view to allowing the European members of NATO which are not members of the European Union the right to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty;”.

This matter has just been addressed by my friend Mr. Stoffelen who also has considerable experience of this Assembly in which he has major responsibilities. We are all well aware of the importance for European security of the presence of the member states of the Atlantic Alliance which are not members of Western European Union. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that to invite countries which may not become full members of NATO to become full members of Western European Union is illogical and could seriously damage the coherence of our institution. The Maastricht Treaty and its appendices define Western European Union as the military component, the defence component of the European Union. When questioned by Mr. Ferrarini on this subject this morning – and we know how much importance the British Government attaches to this matter – Mr. Hurd replied that it was not possible for countries which were not members of both NATO and the European Union to become full members of WEU.

That is why I am asking you to withdraw paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation in order to safeguard the coherence of our institution and its rôle within the framework of the European Union.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Decker.

I believe that Lord Finsberg wishes to object.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – This is an exact re-run of Mr. Stoffelen’s sub-amendment. I hope that when we vote, those who voted

against Mr. Stoffelen’s sub-amendment will remain consistent.

Mr. De Decker talked about illogicality. It is illogical for this Assembly to stand on its head over such an important issue. The words may have come through differently in translation. Mr. Hurd did not say that it was not possible; he said that it had not been agreed – there is a great difference. It was not agreed for reasons that some of us know. The phrase “not possible” is, in some senses, a different quote. But even if I accepted what came over in translation as “not possible”, it was not possible at that time. But as I repeat – I regret having to do so – we are giving our response to the thirty-ninth annual report. It is the first time that we have had a chance to say, gently, that we believe that ministers may have got it wrong. I think that they have and I ask my colleagues to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Finsberg.

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – This amendment was not discussed in committee and has therefore not been put to the vote. The fact that the committee adopted Mr. Stoffelen’s sub-amendment by a majority may indicate its views on the matter but that is all I can say at this point.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 4 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 4 is negatived.*

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does anyone wish to propose a vote by roll-call? ...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

## **6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. See page 23.

*The President (continued)*

1. European security: crisis-prevention and management (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1418 and amendments).
2. Address by Mr. Olechowski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.
3. European security: crisis-prevention and management (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1418 and amendments).

4. Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft order and draft recommendation, Document 1414).

Are there any objections? ...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 12.20 p.m.)*

## THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 14th June 1994

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. European security: crisis-prevention and management (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1418 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. de Puig (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy.
4. Address by Mr. Olechowski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.  
*Replies by Mr. Olechowski to questions put by:* Mr. Ward, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Soell, Mr. Alexander.
5. European security: crisis-prevention and management (*Debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1418 and amendments*).

*Speakers:* Mr. Müller, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Soell, Mr. Ward, Mr. Sole-Tura, Sir Peter Fry, Mr. de Puig (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Lord Finsberg (*Vice-Chairman*), Mr. de Puig.

6. Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft order and the draft recommendation, Doc. 1414*).

*Speakers:* Sir Russell Johnston (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Rockenbauer (*Observer from Hungary*), Mr. Vacaru (*Observer from Romania*), Mr. Necas (*Observer from the Czech Republic*), Mr. Philipov (*Observer from Bulgaria*), Sir Russell Johnston (*Rapporteur*).

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 3.03 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

### **1. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments? ...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

### **3. European security: crisis-prevention and management**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1418 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the presentation by Mr. de Puig of the report of the

Political Committee on European security: crisis-prevention and management, debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1418 and amendments.

I call Mr. de Puig to present his report.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it happens that all of my speeches in this plenary session have been tabled for today, and although it is not my wish to bore you, I clearly must speak in favour of the draft recommendation and the report I have been preparing over the past months.

In the introduction to my explanatory memorandum I state that the founding fathers of Europe, those who created this institution, did so to prevent crises, assure international peace and security, oppose all policies of aggression, defend basic human rights, democratic principles, civil and individual liberties and the rule of law. This is not simply an interesting, positive venture: we know, as did those who founded Europe, that the creation of organisations such as ours to defend these principles is both a need and a duty. In defending a draft recommendation on European security, and very specifically on crisis-prevention and management and how we should organise ourselves to prevent and manage crises, and to create a real policy for peace, I would like to mention an event which has just taken place in Europe and which in my view does not coincide with the principles and ideas which we in this organisation uphold.

<sup>1</sup>. See page 27.

*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

As you know, a referendum was held in Switzerland a few days ago, which produced what I consider to be a most regrettable result. I believe it is a duty to defend peace; it is also a necessity, but it is a duty which affects us all – including the citizens of Switzerland. I would like to be fair. I know that many Swiss citizens voted “yes”; however a majority voted “no”. I find it neither good nor acceptable – and I would like to make this public – that a country such as Switzerland should turn its back on the problems of peace, as the results of this referendum demonstrate. The reason may be that Switzerland is able to enjoy peace and tranquillity because we other Europeans have already seen to it that organisations for peace and security exist, and in our countries we other Europeans did vote in favour of intervention and actively defending peace.

Mr. President, every country and every citizen must think matters through in this way, including our organisation. This is particularly true now, when we are redefining the rôle of the European Union, the rôle of NATO and the rôle of WEU, and when we have to show our people that our organisations really have and will continue to have a purpose. Our electors often question us as to the effectiveness and necessity of continuing with these organisations, because they hear and see that, at times, we are unable to meet the challenges which face us, that we are ineffective, or that we are incapable of solving the problems we set ourselves.

Especially where instruments for crisis-prevention and management are concerned, this being the central theme of my report, I believe that our organisation should once and for all define its competence, its capacity for intervention, both in policies aimed at prevention and in its capacity for military action in the event of crisis-management, in the same way as other international institutions. In this respect, in the first part of my report, I criticise our organisation; I criticise the Council of Ministers because, unlike NATO or even the CSCE, we have been very slow to define possible conflicts, possible dangers and possible threats to peace and security in Europe. This organisation has almost no tradition of serious studies or in-depth analyses of potential threats and dangers.

More recently, the Council of Ministers has begun to open the door to this type of analysis. In addition to the fact that they have initiated studies in the area of prevention and possible threats, I would like to ask the Council of Ministers to inform the Assembly of the results of these studies. Nor should important intergovernmental studies be carried out, without being reported to the Assembly.

And yet, ladies and gentlemen, the only means of implementing a real crisis-prevention and management policy must be based on two elements: identifying risks and threats, whether actual or potential, and creating and specifying our instruments for crisis-prevention and management.

On the subject of threats and risks, in my report I set out a general view of those which might affect peace and tranquillity in Europe. You will notice that I often use the word peace in association with the word tranquillity. In this respect I am an Augustinian. You will recall that it was St. Augustine who defined peace as *tranquilitas ordine*. This idea of a peaceful order, an order which goes far beyond the mere absence of war, is the kind of peace we should be, and are, defending.

The list of threats and risks is extensive. You will find it in detail in the report. First there is the proliferation of weapons, the most dangerous being nuclear weapons. I say that countries such as China and North Korea are exporters at the present time, and that countries such as India, Pakistan and other countries, which are probably not friendly to Europe, are the customers for such exports: Iraq, Iran and Libya. I state that the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kinkel, and the American Defence Secretary, Mr. Aspin, have put forward proposals to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In my view, our organisation ought to support these programmes so as to extend the non-proliferation treaty and have it signed by as many countries as possible. WEU ought also to exercise a degree of control and vigilance which makes clandestine proliferation and low-altitude missiles impossible, and also, of course, impose the kind of sanctions or dissuasive action which would avoid this monstrous danger.

In addition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, there is the proliferation of conventional weapons. We have signed many treaties. Progress has been made recently on disarmament agreements, conventional disarmament and control, as with the Open Skies Treaty. In fact, there are at the present time nine disarmament projects on the table but there is no doubt that we must also be vigilant in the area of proliferation of conventional arms, and where chemical or biological weapons are concerned, we must quite simply reject these completely.

Proliferation is a potential problem for European security, but there are other, more political issues such as the problem of population increase in the countries of North Africa, without a corresponding increase in living standards, and the problem of massive immigration into Europe, which has been dealt with in other reports and which constitutes both a risk and a threat for the future of Europe. Then there are the rise of nationalism, the

*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

problems of minorities, religious fundamentalism and the rise of Fascist tendencies in Europe. We should concern ourselves with all of these phenomena as movements which need to be monitored, inasmuch as we see them as potential risks to stability in Europe.

Finally, as regards this range of threats, there are the actual conflicts, which I will not go into in any detail. These are the conflicts in the countries of the former Soviet Union and the still unresolved conflicts in the Mediterranean; the case of Cyprus; the Middle East, which is moving towards a political solution, but still involves obvious risks; and there is the biggest drama experienced in Europe in recent years, the drama of open war in former Yugoslavia. Other potential conflicts are very close at hand. There is the case of the Kurds in Turkey, the case of Macedonia and the other Balkan states, which have yet to be resolved. Then there are conflicts further afield, to which my report refers, which are not directly related to peace in Europe, but which, nevertheless, do have some influence in that these days geostrategy is a global matter, and the problem that if issues in North Korea – mentioned in the report and in the draft recommendation – are becoming complicated, this will clearly have repercussions for peace and security throughout Europe. So, there we have an idea of regional conflict in its many manifestations.

The second part of this policy, to which I referred earlier, Mr. President, is the creation of instruments for crisis-prevention and management. The first instrument is to have a policy, of that there is no doubt; it should be a policy for peace and understanding between different peoples, for co-operation – both economic and political – for agreements of military significance, in any case for disarmament, for support and participation in multilateral institutions of all the countries concerned, whether of European, non-European or neighbouring countries. These are legal and political commitments to guarantee peace and security on the political level.

And then we come to means of coercion, which I would call operational. This is what I propose in the draft recommendation. Mr. President, I must state quite clearly that I have not attempted to present to the Assembly a great WEU operational programme of military organisation. I believe that this is a subject which will have to be dealt with in the coming months and years. But inasmuch as our organisation has already initiated a process in the operational area for the construction of some defence elements, I have grouped these together: I refer to the subjects of space-based observation, strategic means of transport, the whole subject of the European corps and the European air and

naval force which are in the process of creation, armaments co-operation, interaction between the chiefs of defence staffs, military representatives and the whole subject of planning; I have grouped all of these together to give some indication of the fact that in the operational field there is still much to be built and many tasks to be completed.

Of course, when we talk of the possibility of being able to manage a crisis, we should not forget, as I mention in the report, that there are other institutions both in Europe and beyond it which also have this capacity. Our work in the area of crisis-management must also involve co-operation with other institutions: first, with the United Nations, which is not only legally entitled to request our involvement, but in some cases, as our Secretary-General has indicated, it may be that WEU could act with a direct mandate from the United Nations. Then there is NATO, which has its own resources and its own competence and can at any time decide to act, although it is true to say that NATO, too, has its limitations. The same is true of the CSCE, an organisation which can intervene and which has its Planning Cell for crisis-management as well, but which nevertheless, by its nature, may not be able to intervene in many situations. It could be, however, that an intervention on our part could prove positive.

This is why, Mr. President, I would ask you to approve the draft recommendation, which deals with the possibility of Western European Union becoming operational in this area.

I would like to point out that in the draft recommendation and in the report I refer to certain distant conflicts – distant from a geographical point of view. I refer to Yemen, to Rwanda and to North Korea. Mr. President, my reason for doing so – and there was some debate about this in the committee – is that I feel that these current conflicts are so topical that it would be a mistake for our organisation not to show its awareness of and concern about them. Since it is our contention that any event anywhere in the world concerning peace, or any problem threatening peace, affects us, we should at least acknowledge such conflicts, although we are obviously aware that our organisation is not in a position to intervene directly in Rwanda, Korea or Yemen. This was my reason for making these references.

Mr. President, we support the position of our Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, when he defines the opportunities for WEU action in certain cases: by mandate of the United Nations, jointly with NATO, apart from NATO. Both in my report and personally, I, of course, support this proposal and I would point out that the remaining recommendations constitute merely an indication of what this organisation could achieve in the future in crisis-management and prevention.

*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

I trust the report I am presenting will have your support.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. de Puig.

We now move to the debate; the first speaker is Mr. Hardy of the United Kingdom.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I approve of the report, which provides evidence that this organisation's approach to its rôle of crisis-prevention – or certainly of crisis-perception – is becoming increasingly important and may be the most vital aspect of its future rôle. However, I say to the Rapporteur that it is all very well to perceive a crisis; that does not solve it. If we fail to demonstrate that we have a capacity to respond to that perception, that perception itself may have remarkably little value.

The Yugoslavian tragedy is evidence of that suggestion. The huge destruction there and the large-scale killing may contribute to future killing fields, and barbarism may increase. That suggests the most appalling failure of Europe for half a century. Although things may have settled down at the moment, no one in this Assembly can be absolutely confident that the slaughter will not resume. If Europe is not prepared to do anything other than care for the starving and wounded, do we not need to devote a great deal of attention to enhancing our capacity to perceive crises?

I accept that there is much in the report that is commendable. It is correct for the Rapporteur to spell out in the preamble the work of this organisation in a number of areas. To be fair, those things that WEU has sought to do have generally been done well. To go back a few years, there was the example of clearing mines in the Gulf and contributing to the enforcement of the embargo at sea. Those contributions were successful and we should certainly make it clear that we appreciate the efforts of those involved.

However, the skill of our operational activities has not matched the crises that have been perceived, to which the response of Europe has been grossly inadequate. We are still enjoying the benefits of the cold war, yet we still have not recognised the instability in our continent which has been generated by the end of the cold war. Our defence priorities – indeed our defence capabilities – may have been reduced to a point at which we are unable to do anything in response to any crisis that we perceive.

I doubt whether any government can honestly say that it can not only contribute adequately to its own security, but fulfil the promises that many governments and many parliamentarians – many of them in this Assembly – have been eager to offer as security guarantees to countries in the

East with which we are establishing cordial relationships. It is not responsible for parliamentarians or governments to offer security guarantees and to talk about responding to as well as perceiving crises unless governments have the capability to respond adequately to the crisis-prevention mechanisms that we are eager to establish. That is the basic point of my comments.

Members will be aware that the other day, President Clinton made a specific and favourable reference to WEU. Members may have been most appreciative of President Clinton's comments. However, the Assembly should consider one aspect of them. Why was President Clinton making a favourable reference to European defence organisations? Perhaps the reason was that the Americans will inevitably look more to the West – to the Pacific – and to Asia and will not be prepared very much longer to maintain their guarantees and their contribution to European security, which have long sustained and subsidised our efforts. That contribution was necessary in the cold war when planetary destruction seemed a possibility. However, American politicians and the American people are now likely to say to Europe, "The crisis is in your backyard so you must do something about it".

Merely perceiving the crisis will not necessarily suffice. Indeed, merely to perceive the crisis and then not to respond to it at all may make crises more likely. If we demonstrate an inability to do anything other than send stretcher bearers – some of our member states during the first year or so of the Yugoslav crisis were eager to send stretcher bearers and ambulances, but to do nothing else – Europe will not survive crises. It will not survive them if all that our member states are prepared to do is to send first-aid kits and a few paramedical auxiliaries. Let us, therefore, recognise that if we perceive a crisis, we shall be irresponsible if we deny the will, the wisdom and the capability to provide a proper response to it.

The PRESIDENT. – We now interrupt the proceedings to hear an address by Mr. Olechowski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.

#### ***4. Address by Mr. Olechowski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland***

The PRESIDENT. – I welcome Mr. Olechowski. WEU has had a growing number of contacts over recent years with Poland. It was Mr. Olechowski's predecessor in office who was one of the first ministers from Central Europe to address us at an extraordinary session of the Assembly held at Luxembourg in March. In July 1992 our Defence Committee, over which I was then presiding, visited the Polish armed forces at the invitation of the Minister of Defence.

*The President (continued)*

In February 1994 we participated, as an assembly, in an excellently timed seminar which brought together the members of WEU and the Forum of Consultation in Warsaw. I had the great advantage of a long, private discussion about Poland's affairs and WEU in particular. On those occasions, particularly when you, Sir, addressed the seminar, your observations were both clear and direct. We welcome you as a friend and as a representative of a country that has shown enormous interest in WEU.

I invite you to address us.

Mr. OLECHOWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*). – Mr. President, distinguished members, I feel honoured, pleased and comforted by your kind reception and to have been asked to speak to the Assembly of WEU and to share with you Poland's views on some security issues. The timing is perfect; the Union and Central Europe are both going through a process of deep change, albeit of a different nature. I am sure that we can all agree that there is a common future ahead of us.

Five years ago elections in Poland opened the way for a rebirth of democracy in my country and in Central Europe. For five years now Poland has been putting in place, successfully, but not without difficulties, a programme of fundamental structural change. Its core, and objective, is that of democracy, respect for human rights and market economy. That core has not changed despite the changing parliaments and cabinets. Our accomplishments are undeniable. We have proved the democratic maturity of my country and the region. We have revealed our economic potential and confirmed our strong desire for peace and security. We need peace and security to complete our transformation. We need a stable, peaceful and friendly international environment. Much has already been done in this respect.

I shall limit the focus of my observations to the developments and challenges facing us in three major sectors of our security-building efforts – transatlantic relations, a pact on stability and WEU. The NATO summit in January marked a new stage in the evolution of the alliance. Poland notes with deep satisfaction the reconfirmation of the validity of the alliance and the continued commitment of North America to security in Europe. We also welcome the clear definition of co-operative links between NATO and WEU. The partnership for peace provides for a new relationship between the alliance and the democracies of the East, and introduces a new and challenging way of thinking on security issues at the end of the twentieth century.

Poland responded to this programme with determination, confidence and trust. We are close to an

agreement on the individual partnership programme. Our representatives will soon take up their duties at the partnership cell in Mons. We are looking forward to the first joint PFP activities on Polish soil. We want to make the best use of the PFP. We see it as a framework for making our defence system inter-operational and compatible with the alliance. We also perceive it as a means of enhancing good partnership with our eastern neighbours.

We must move further; we need to maintain the current momentum. I shall repeat our position presented to the NACC on the three issues that require frank consideration and imaginative response. The first issue is that of relations between the alliance and Russia. The process of democratic reform in Russia is and will remain a key prerequisite for the construction of a secure and co-operative Europe. Poland strongly supports that process. We are aware of the need for a solid partnership between NATO and Russia. The decision of the former Soviet Union not to participate in the Marshall Plan, aimed at economic rehabilitation after the second world war was one of the factors that clinched the division of Europe. We hope that that mistake will not be repeated and that Russia will join the PFP – the programme for the rehabilitation of European security after the period of confrontation. A co-operative relationship between NATO and Russia inside and outside PFP is important for both sides, for Europe and for the world.

It would be a paradox of history if the ties to be established between NATO and Russia were stronger and closer than those between NATO and the countries whose determination and efforts made the new relationship possible, and if the new partnership led to the marginalisation of smaller states, thus undermining their confidence in NATO.

Therefore, we must face the second challenge. The results achieved by Poland and some other countries called into question the rationale for maintaining unchanged the present membership of the alliance. The new democracies fulfil, or will soon fulfil, the criteria for NATO membership set up in the Washington Treaty. Membership of NATO should be considered not only as a response to their legitimate security aspirations, but as an important condition for European stability.

Thirdly, Poland believes that the gradual expansion of the alliance and the growing co-operation between the alliance and Russia should be accompanied by the further development of all European links. It should be reflected in further strengthening of the CSCE and in the expansion of the network of all European arms control agreements and closer co-operation between NATO, WEU, CSCE and other European organisations. It would give

*Mr. Olechowski (continued)*

each and every European nation a rôle in the process of security on our continent. Poland is convinced that a balanced and parallel progress along those three paths is what we need today.

So much on NATO – I shall now say a few words about the pact on stability made here in Paris three weeks ago. Poland has welcomed the idea. We regret that the first action commune involves the countries that are to join the European Union. It is only natural that the Union turns first to those states with which it is linked, not only by common roots but by a common future. It is a good portent for our joint effort to bring Poland and other associate countries into the Union as soon as possible.

We are also glad to note the similarity to the approach to stability in Europe represented by the European Union and Poland. The best testimony to that is given by the treaties that we are concluding with all our neighbours, even before the idea of the pact was put forward. We regard the treaties as a great common accomplishment of Poles, Byelorussians, Czechs, Germans, Lithuanians, Russians, Slovaks and Ukrainians. It was not always easy to reach an agreement. Hard diplomatic work, imagination and willingness to compromise were required. But the effort was worth it. The treaties constitute a solid block of durable rules based on international law in a region of major importance for the security of the continent.

We offer that accomplishment as a block, wholesome and complete, in terms of the principles and objectives of the stability pact, as our contribution to that project launched in Paris. We shall continue to spare no effort to consolidate good-neighbourly relations through the full implementation, in spirit and letter, of the treaties. We shall soon ask our neighbours to consider bilateral military measures for the purpose of strengthening mutual confidence and security. Such measures will significantly complement political agreements. They will also supplement, bilaterally, pan-European solutions to arms control and confidence-building. We shall propose a discussion of measures at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Now, Mr. President, let me turn to the relations between Poland and Western European Union. They are among the top priorities of Polish security policy.

We are following carefully the transformation of Western European Union. The Treaty of Maastricht has given the Union a new dimension and increased importance; WEU has been defined as the defence component of the European Union.

At its last summit, the North Atlantic Alliance supported the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance through Western European Union. The alliance also welcomed the close and growing co-operation between NATO and WEU. Poland noted those decisions with satisfaction. We have always seen the structures as complementing each other rather than competing against each other. Thus, we look at the relations with Western European Union as an important part of our links with both the European Union and NATO. Let me recall here some facts.

The agreement establishing association between the European Union and Poland entered into force on 1st February this year. At the beginning of April, Hungary and Poland applied for full membership in the European Union. Of course, we are aware that it will take some time before Poland becomes a member of the Union. However, with that application we wanted to stress that we are serious about it and that we feel ready to start negotiations. The membership is also an objective of the Union, as declared in Copenhagen in June 1993. We understand that this applies to the defence component of the Union as well. Therefore we want to ensure that our relations with WEU are broadened and deepened in step with our relations with the European Union.

I am afraid that, after lunch, and the warm welcome that I received, I am melting. Please excuse me while I have a drink of water.

As I have already mentioned, Poland acceded to NATO's partnership for peace and is now close to an agreement on the individual partnership programme. We believe that our rapprochement with NATO and the establishment of close military co-operation should apply to NATO as a whole, as well as to its European pillar.

As we look at the progress of relations between Poland and other countries of our region with WEU, we can say that much has been already done. I am sure that we can single out as a success the growth of interparliamentary contacts, which were established in 1989, and which are expanding dynamically. We welcomed the decision of the WEU Assembly to grant parliaments of the states taking part in the Forum of Consultation the status of permanent observers. We were glad to note the Assembly's position, restated on several occasions, on the issue of WEU's greater opening to co-operation with the states of Central Europe. The recommendation made by the Assembly to grant a status of association to the states of Central Europe already associated with European Union corresponded to our aspirations and expectations. We believe the opinion of the Assembly had an important impact on the Council decision taken in Luxembourg. Poland welcomed this decision with particular satisfaction. In May 1993



*Mr. Olechowski (continued)*

in Rome, my distinguished predecessor, Minister Skubiszewski, in his statement to the Forum of Consultation had suggested that the idea of "a more formal relationship" between WEU and countries associated with the European Communities "deserves serious and positive consideration". He concluded his statement by saying: "We will be awaiting the WEU response with hope and attention". Last November, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, of Germany and of Poland, in a joint declaration after their Warsaw meeting, expressed the hope "for the adoption by WEU of a status of association which should be open to those consultation partners who have already signed the agreement on association with the European Union" and "to those who will sign it in the future". Poland is particularly pleased that this hope was made reality. The May decision of the WEU Council is a notable achievement in our striving for peace and security. It is important to us for several reasons.

First, with this new type of association, as the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Mr. Poos, stated, a *de facto* solidarity on security matters has been established between WEU and the nine associate partners. It will make it possible for us to participate together with full members in discussions on European security and to co-operate with them in joint actions.

Secondly, it was a significant and logical step in including Poland into the process of European integration.

Thirdly, we have entered the new relationship with WEU with the conviction that it not only meets our aspirations but serves WEU and European Union interests as well. We hope to reinforce WEU with our material and human potential and to expand our co-operation with the European Union on foreign policy and security issues.

Not all the suggestions that Poland offered in the debate on the enhanced status of Central European states in WEU are reflected in the May decision of the Council. However, we believe that it provides a good beginning and basis for practical involvement of Poland and other associate partners in the activities of WEU. It is our intention to put the best substance to this new relationship. We look at our new status as a dynamic and evolving process leading towards the implementation of one of the objectives of the Brussels Treaty which is "... to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe; to associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination ...".

We need imagination and courage to pursue that objective. The provisions of the Brussels Treaty

create possibilities for further steps. Let me just remind the Assembly of Article XI which provides that the parties to the treaty may invite any other state to accede to the treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited. The formulation of this article seems to contain flexibility which could allow us to search for new arrangements, acceptable to all countries and enhancing security and stability in Europe.

When we try to define our present and future co-operation with WEU it is obvious that the interparliamentary pillar should be addressed. We remain thankful for the WEU Assembly ideas and support in our efforts towards closer ties with the organisation. But now, after the Luxembourg meeting, we need even stronger encouragement and support. The Assembly has already proved to be more far-sighted than the executive bodies, with the exception of the Secretary-General. We look forward to further Assembly incentives. We hope they will also take into account the need for a new character of the parliamentary representation of the associated countries in your chamber.

One of the natural obstacles in human efforts is conservatism, reluctance to change. It also applies to international institutions and is demonstrated by their fear of opening up, their aversion towards the challenge of recognising and integrating new members. But, on the other hand, life creates new facts and developments. Central and Western Europe are becoming more and more truly interdependent and not merely as a result of political initiatives or declarations but as a consequence of the elimination of the iron curtain, increased western investments in Central Europe, the physical presence of western companies, the rapidly growing movement of people, the exchange of information and ideas. Those concrete links are based on the joint foundation of democracy, market economy, shared values, common interests and common destiny. The growing participation of the nations of Central Europe in European and Euro-Atlantic security structures reflects not only their historical roots and today's aspirations but the new realities of this region.

We trust that those facts of life will have a decisive influence on our thinking about the future of Western European Union. And, with this optimistic expression of faith, let me conclude my remarks.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Olechowski. Members would like to put one or two questions.

I call Mr. Ward.

Mr. WARD (*United Kingdom*). – As the first questioner, may I say how much we enjoyed what the Minister said to us and how realistically he introduced us to the subject. He referred to the

*Mr. Ward (continued)*

nine countries mentioned in the Kirchberg declaration. Does he see that as a first step? Could it be extended further? More particularly, would he like to speculate on the development of relations between Russia and former members of the USSR? Will that result in a tendency to rearm against each other? Could such a tendency spill over into a threat to the new associate members and ourselves?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. OLECHOWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*). – I referred to conservatism and reluctance to change, which we regret. However, I certainly would not propose that western security institutions should open themselves to a specific number of named countries such as mine and then close up again and become exclusive. Therefore, I foresee the extension of the security institutions as an ongoing process that will include eventually all those countries which gain the necessary democratic competence and military fitness.

Of course, I cannot answer the distinguished member's question about the future of our relations with Russia. That is a multi-billion dollar question. I wish I knew the answer to it. Of course, I do not. Poland receives, as all member states of WEU do, signals from Russia. We are not much more expert at analysing them than other states. However, one item that we follow with close attention is Russia's policy towards the former members of the Soviet Union. Its tendency to reintegrate those countries are a revealing feature of current Russian policy. We believe that we need to watch on the one hand the tendency to reintegrate at all costs and on the other hand ideas that the costs should be calculated. We believe that the agreements concluded between Russia and Belarus show that more and more people are asking about costs. More and more people inquire about the eventual cost of broadening Russia.

I am optimistic about Russia, but I say often that the foreign ministers of all countries have to be optimistic about Russia. If they are not, they should lead their nations out of Central Europe because it would not make sense to leave them in. I am optimistic. I believe that Russians are thinking more and more in terms of costs and not so much in terms of heritage, historical theories and the past. Therefore, the integration process that will take place in the former Soviet Union will not be so different from what we have seen in Western Europe. I hope that that answers the question.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Would the Minister like to say something about the rela-

tionship between Poland and Ukraine and how he sees Ukraine fitting into the picture? Does he agree that up to now most of us have neglected Ukraine? Does he agree that that was, perhaps, a mistake?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. OLECHOWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*). – As I have mentioned, Poland was the first country to recognise the independence of Ukraine. We often stress that an independent Ukraine is of strategic importance to Poland for very obvious reasons. Therefore, we would like to support, help and encourage Ukraine to remain a strong, independent state. We help Ukraine to the extent that we are able to do so. We undertake modest economic projects, provide technical assistance and encourage international recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty and of its needs.

I shall not attempt to analyse the situation in Ukraine, which is complicated. The economic situation is particularly complicated. It is at a difficult stage. However, at the same time I am sure that that country, which is rich in resources and in able people, can be prosperous if only it is led by its leadership through the type of reforms that Poland has experienced.

What more could the world do for Ukraine? The world did not provide Ukraine with any vision of the place that it could take in Europe. The only vision that the average Ukrainian can have of that country's future place is within the Commonwealth of Independent States, a world which Ukrainians imagine as a world apart from the rest of Europe.

Europe did not provide a credible vision of a place for Ukraine. It is too early, of course, to talk meaningfully about membership of the European Union. Those two worlds are too far apart. We are very much encouraged by the negotiations and talks between Ukraine and the European Union about some sort of relationship such as a trade agreement and the possibility of becoming part of the free trade area agreement, which I would personally encourage very much.

On the security front, we are delighted that Ukraine is progressing very well on the nuclear agreement. Therefore, it is a country of which we certainly are not fearful. We maintain intense bilateral security talks and discussions with it.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Olechowski, as you will have gathered, our debates also cover the question of the security of the Central and Eastern European countries. Would you agree with my view that many Western European politicians, and public opinion in Western Europe, are not yet fully aware of the fact

*Mr. Soell (continued)*

that the accession of Finland, for instance, to the European Union – which I hope will happen on 1st January 1995 – will mean that Western Europe will have a direct border with the Russian Federation, which is not the case for all the Visegrad group of states? And would you agree with me when I say that over the next few years we will be concerned not so much with formal security guarantees but, as your former Czech colleague Juri Dienstbier once said, with seeing a light at the end of the tunnel in the social and economic sector too, and with creating an integrated security area which demonstrates that any threat to the security of Central and Eastern Europe is a threat to the security of Western Europe as well.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. OLECHOWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*). – Two issues have been raised. It is not realised that if Finland votes to join the European Union – I hope that it does – the European Union will have a long border with Russia.

So much of the talk about being afraid of moving east simply does not make sense. Finland, for example, is much further east than Poland. It is very good that the European Union should gain such a border with Russia. Russia is not different from us. There is no genetic difference between Russians and us, or between them and the Spanish and Portuguese people, who are from the westernmost part of Europe. I hope that that common border will be an important border – not a line, not a division but an important friendly border in Europe.

The second issue touched upon was the matter of guarantees; that word was mentioned. We stress, and I repeat, that given our pre-war experience, we do not believe in guarantees. We do not think that we need them. We think that what forms an effective guarantee today is participation, and the ability to participate, in a community of nations that implements joint projects. It is not that somebody should give me a guarantee; I shall never sleep well if I just have that. But I know that if I participate in a joint effort, that is a completely different story. That is how we understand it, and that is what explains our striving for membership of NATO. If not, other ideas have been launched, such as joint guarantees by Russia and NATO for Poland and other Central Europeans. The perfect thing: a double arrangement. If not, our historical experience is that guarantees have often not been worth much more than the paper that they were written on, however expensive it was.

We wish to participate in a community of nations. It is not enough to participate for one day. That does not work either. Joint projects must be

extended to other areas. Therefore, the European Union, the broader community, is where we think we belong, and where we want to find our place. Indeed, I should sleep well and securely if eventually I got into a European Union in which I would participate, and which attacked the very root of the conflict and insecurity in Europe, in which countries, many of which have been adversaries in the past – France and Germany, for example – have been made partners in the joint venture and the common project. That is very much our aim.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. The final question is from Mr. Alexander of the United Kingdom.

Mr. ALEXANDER (*United Kingdom*). – As you may know, Mr. Olechowski, my constituency of Newark, in Nottinghamshire, has close ties with Poland and with the Polish people. Everyone in this hall remembers the Solidarity movement, in 1980, as a reform movement that captured the imagination of the world. I heard your earlier comments in your address, but I wondered what precise direction the reform movement is now taking in your country, and, secondly, whether it still captures the imagination of, and has the support of, the majority of the Polish people today.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. OLECHOWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*). – I often have difficulty in describing what reform is these days. We are talking about a country which, as I have said, has surprisingly mature democratic institutions. They were solid enough to sustain a very dramatic change of government, a transfer of governmental powers between sharply differing political options. That transfer took place undisturbed, very smoothly.

We need to enhance, stabilise and mature our democracy still, but we do not have to reform much in it. We have institutions that relate well to our historical pre-war tradition and to European aims. We shall have debates, probably hundreds of them, about electoral law – about how we should shape this and that, and about constituencies – but we do not need to reform our principles of electoral law and so on.

In the economy things are different. We still need to make our economy and our system more similar to that which has proved effective and rational. I believe that we are past the threshold. Almost 60% of our employment is now in the private sector; there are about two million private companies registered in the non-agricultural sector; 92% of agriculture is private; about 50% of national income is produced by the private sector; about 40% of assets are in private ownership. That tells you that we are not talking about further fun-

*Mr. Olechowski (continued)*

damental reform in that area any more, but about continuing the tendencies that we already have.

In the second half of this year the government will launch and implement a mass privatisation project, which should increase the privatisation which I have already mentioned. Only 37% of assets in private ownership seems a low figure to me. That is a freshly unveiled medium-term government economic programme. It indicates the reform of the public sector, especially of the public social security programme, as the main area for reform and for bringing it closer to market principles, making it more effective.

The third area that I would like to mention, after the privatisation reform of the public services, is the priorities for further reform, including decentralisation of the administration of government and of democracy. We shall have an election on Sunday, after four years of remarkable success in local democracy. One only has to go through the smaller villages and towns to mark the importance that local democracy has for our country, and how enhanced, developed and expanded I know it will become. The successful local government bodies and the people who are happy with their performance, will not let that experiment go away. They will make sure that they have more power than that.

The PRESIDENT. – Minister, you said that you were melting in this underventilated hemicycle. I assure you that you are not the only one – but I also assure you that your judgments about Western European Union and the context of defence and security were ice cold. We appreciate your having taken the time to come here and talk to us, especially as, as has been said already, your country has been in the vanguard of the Central European countries that have come in with Western European Union and are willing and anxious to play an important rôle in the future.

You said earlier, Sir, that you sought a strong, stable and friendly international environment. So do we, and all the countries associated with us. We are very glad indeed that you have joined us. That is our aim, and that is what we shall work towards. We are glad indeed to have you on board. Thank you for coming here and representing your country today.

##### **5. European security: crisis-prevention and management**

*(Debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1418 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now resume our debate on the report of the Political Committee on European security: crisis-prevention and management.

Our next speaker is Mr. Müller of Germany.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I think nothing makes the changed situation clearer than the fact that our debate was interrupted so that we could listen to an address by the Polish Foreign Minister. This would certainly not have been possible at the Assembly of Western European Union in former years.

We can also see how much the geopolitical environment has changed. I doubt whether that means it has become less complex; the fact is that the good old days – if I may put it that way – when you knew who was your friend and who your enemy are gone with the collapse of the wall and of the iron curtain. The fact is that new kinds of threats may certainly arise in the future.

We know how uncertain the political situation is in some of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. We know that there is a brisk trade in dangerous goods. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, they include mountains of plutonium formerly used for making weapons.

That is why it is most important for us in WEU to receive information in good time and co-operate well with the CIS states and the other states on what you might call our eastern flank, so that we can find out what is happening in good time, avoid conflicts and stamp out any sparks quickly, to ensure we are not faced with the kind of situation we have had in the Balkans, in former Yugoslavia.

Mr. de Puig referred to several areas of crisis. There is no doubt at all that the southern part of the former Soviet Union and the adjacent states are among them. They extend as far as the Middle East. But we saw, in the case of Yemen, how quickly new conflicts can break out.

I might add that conflicts can even arise in the NATO member states. Let me remind you of the statements made in the past few weeks by the Turkish and Greek delegates on the question of extending the territorial waters round the Aegean islands. The tabloids are already printing the war-cries.

Our situation has become more complicated rather than simpler. Nor should we look down our noses at countries that are not prepared to take joint measures. I would like to contradict Mr. de Puig on one point. He mentioned the Swiss, who decided by referendum that they were not prepared to make troops available to the United Nations. That is correct. But I read in his report that the majority of member countries of Western European Union are not ready to make forces available for the protection of safe areas, as the pacified areas are called, in former Yugoslavia.

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

There is not a great difference between Switzerland and the WEU member countries in this respect. In one case the people decided, in the others, the governments. Neither showed much courage, if I may say so.

Let me turn to two other aspects. Mr. de Puig explained that it was also very important to provide or increase the funding for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in some of these countries.

I would like to go a little further and say that this is also important in the case of conventional weapons. A few months ago I had occasion to take part in a CSE inspection in Belarus. There I discovered that this country, which has a large number of tanks and tracked vehicles to destroy, no longer has the money to do so; to destroy a tank costs between \$1 500 and \$2 000 in energy alone, which Belarus has to pay in foreign currency because, having no energy stocks of its own, it has to import them.

The country is no longer in a position to continue the disarmament process. There are also political difficulties, because a population that is hungry, in which a pensioner receives a monthly income of the equivalent of \$10, cannot understand why so many dollars are being spent on destroying beautiful tanks. So we must also recognise and be aware of the potential psychological dangers that could arise.

Let me say a few words on a further area of conflict that Mr. de Puig mentioned, the North African Mediterranean. He referred specifically to Egypt and the Maghreb countries. I think there is no doubt that we must observe developments in the south very closely and do our utmost to establish good relations with the governments of these countries. Thanks to religious fundamentalism, the decisions taken there could in the end affect us and have implications for the territory of Western European Union.

I want to make a final point. Is Western European Union even capable in military and logistical terms of preventing a conflict from spreading and of carrying out any tasks that may arise, if the instruments of conflict avoidance or early intervention fail? I have my doubts.

We all know the situation as regards rapid intervention troops and transport capacity. I think this is where we face a real challenge to co-operate more closely in the arms sector. At their recent meeting, the President of the French Republic and the German Chancellor agreed to develop a joint transport aircraft, which is very necessary for those particular purposes.

I would like the invitation which they issued to other countries to participate to be extended to the WEU countries in particular, because I believe this is a genuine opportunity jointly to achieve something that may one day jointly benefit us all.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Müller.

The next speaker is Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (United Kingdom). – I congratulate Mr. de Puig on his report and I mean that sincerely. Those are not conventional congratulations. It is an admirable report and it brings out a number of essential features, of which I shall highlight three. I refer to co-ordination with NATO, the means available and the sharing of responsibility in crisis-management. That is vital. Mr. Müller has just highlighted the fact that troop transport, transport using large aircraft and all other forms of transport are available through American sources far more than is the case here. Such co-operation is, therefore, vital.

Recommendation 5 is immensely important and concerns establishing a permanent dialogue with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. It is noticeable that after the Russian minister had taken part in negotiations with the Serbs, he came away saying that he had never met such a lot of lying brutes in all his days. Russia's whole attitude towards the question seemed to change after that. Co-operation is absolutely vital.

I shall concentrate on Recommendation 2, which refers to taking account of the lessons drawn from the crisis in former Yugoslavia. There are an enormous number of lessons for us which we must not forget. There is a tendency in speeches from ministers, including our own ministers, to say that they hope that we are moving towards a peaceful solution and that we have a month or so in which to do something. However, we must remember our total failure so far.

The United Kingdom, France and many other countries have put much of their effort into humanitarian aid. It would have been far better, despite the admirable work done by the troops and all the volunteers, to make brutal threats which we meant and which the Serbs believed would be carried out, with the use of air power to stop the killing. That would have been better than trying to alleviate the crisis, as we did, by humanitarian efforts. That is the first lesson and everyone talking about the crisis seems to agree that if the action that we are prepared to take now had been threatened three years ago, the whole thing could have been stopped without the enormous loss of life, the brutality and, even worse, the release of brutal emotions, initially among the Serbs, which were then reacted to by those against whom the brutality was practised. That is one lesson that we must learn.

*Lord Mackie of Benshie (continued)*

The other lesson that we must learn is an old one. I am probably one of the few people here who served in the last war. I was politically active as a young man before the war and I remember the Spanish civil war and what happened there. There, the western powers – certainly the United Kingdom – adopted the attitude that they would embargo the sale of arms to the combatants. The fascist powers took no notice and poured in arms to Franco's forces. Eventually, the proper, civil government of the country was overwhelmed. That appears to be what we have done again in former Yugoslavia.

It is no use saying that we shall put an embargo on arms when a big, powerful section of the country – the Serbs – possess the arms of former Yugoslavia, the federation, and the factories to back them up, while the Bosnian Serbs possess none. That has been an extraordinary lesson and from it we must learn that if one says one will do something, one must be prepared to do it; it is not enough just to say it. That is a vital lesson for the future.

We must also identify the source of the trouble. It is all very well for us to blame Karadzic and his generals in Yugoslavia, but the core of the greater Serb movement lies in Belgrade with Milosevic. We have on hand an insuperable air power and should not hesitate to use it to stop a conflict and save lives. If we are to impose sanctions, they should be imposed with every means in our power. It is appalling to think that there is no rationing of petrol in Belgrade now. That is ludicrous and makes our efforts appear ridiculous. We must learn that lesson.

If we do achieve a settlement, let us remember with shame that our negotiators started by telling us here in this very amphitheatre that there would be no question of the Serbs holding on to their brutal gains. But now they are proposing a settlement that will give the brutal aggressors large gains in territory and take territory away from those who were attacked.

For goodness' sake, let us in WEU take all the measures necessary to obtain the machinery, but remember that it is the political will to act and to use forces at our disposal that matters. That is what we must learn from the shame of Yugoslavia.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we are in a situation in which we need to become familiar with new patterns of crisis. We are in these difficulties because we remember the old crisis patterns of East-West confrontation very clearly. As a rule we had a lot

of time and a specific ritual – I am thinking of Berlin and Cuba. Certain plans would be drawn up, which were secret at first and then became public knowledge. Then the opposition would become aware of the plans and protest. The plans would still be carried out. The opposition would issue threats. There would be ultimatums. There would be negotiations, perhaps at the same time, and a whole system of conferences. The ultimatums would expire or be extended. There would be further negotiations. Finally, there would be a face-saving settlement.

In recent years, we have been taken by surprise by conflicts and crises following less recognisable patterns, leaving us much less time. We will have to develop the appropriate instruments to deal with them. We will have to reduce substantially the time between early warning and early action.

To that end, we must make use of every kind of general early warning system that is institutionally available, not only in WEU but also in the CSCE and the Council of Europe. The first step is to observe elections, and for election observers to be trained by experts and specialists who are familiar with the domestic policy of certain countries and can teach them, to some extent at least, how to recognise election rigging. That is one important means of avoiding crises. The observers' training must not be confined to military aspects but must also enable them to see through the subtle methods used to oppress minorities, whether economic, religious or ethnic. Here too it is important also to make use of information from outside WEU, NATO and the CSCE and in addition to that provided by the United Nations. Once we have acquired this wide range of information, we can make governments aware at an earlier stage of crises that could develop into open conflicts.

That is why it is important to encourage co-operation within the institutions. Our Assembly, which, of course, has largely the same membership as the Assembly of the Council of Europe and to some extent as that of the CSCE, should take an active part in the creation of these instruments.

Mr. de Puig's report forms a valuable foundation for that task.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Ward.

Mr. WARD (*United Kingdom*). – I start by adding my congratulations to Mr. de Puig on his thoughtful and forward-looking report. He will not be surprised that a number of us want to comment on it further, although he patiently listened to our comments in committee. I very much agree with what he said about Switzerland. I also agree with Mr. Müller that it is all very well talking about Switzerland, but some members of the

*Mr. Ward (continued)*

European Union still cling to their neutrality while they are willing to be protected by other members of this body. Others, for constitutional reasons, make suggestions but are not able to commit troops on the ground. Surely Bosnia has shown that we cannot leave the work to just a few members of the European Union.

I agree with Lord Mackie that if one is to make threats, one makes them only once and then carries them out. The second time that one makes them, one is not believed and the third time one makes them, one is laughed at. All the outrages and atrocities being committed in former Yugoslavia cannot now be solved by air attack, but could well have been solved by drastic action against the Serbs earlier on. It is ironic that we deny one side weapons, because we say we shall protect them, and so as not to escalate the war, when they are the ones who are coming off worst. I find myself more in sympathy with the philosophy put forward by some colleagues earlier that, if we were not to take effective action, we should have got out and let them get on with it. Half measures benefit only half the people.

If we are to avoid a repeat of the humiliation – let us use the word because that is what it is – of NATO, WEU and the United Nations, we must look for new guidelines, at least in the area that we control – Western European Union – from the Council of Ministers. The report is realistic but it is depressing and the recent record of Europe, whether one calls it the European Union, WEU or something else, is depressing in itself.

We have had reference to North Korea and China and the use of nuclear weapons. Other countries, such as India, Israel and Pakistan, have well-known nuclear capabilities but have refused to receive representatives from the non-proliferation treaty organisations. Others are likely to ignore it – Iraq and North Korea come to mind. The break-up of the Soviet Union could well lead to a spread of nuclear materials and know-how beyond the controls that exist at the moment. Part of our forward thinking, in the broader context, is that the non-proliferation treaty needs to be extended to all nations, but we must also bear in mind that we need more effective inspection of chemical and biological weapons.

The report is thought-provoking. I hope that it will not be left to gather dust on shelves, but will provoke enough thought so that some forward planning and action can be taken to ensure that we never see a repeat of the events in the former Yugoslavia. Unless action is taken fairly soon, we could see that in other areas. A thin line of international troops between nations that are arguing, put in earlier on, can often defuse a situation

before it reaches the point at which we have to bring in mass weaponry to deal with it. I welcome the report. I wish it well and I hope that the Council of Ministers will take it to heart.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Sole Tura.

Mr. SOLE TURA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I, too, would like to begin by congratulating Mr. de Puig on the splendid report he has presented. I think it is a good example of how this type of document should be drawn up. Apart from its excellent structure, it shows realism in its approach to the major problems confronting our organisation at the present time.

In fact, what we see today, as witnessed in all the debates, and in the speeches by Mr. Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, and Mr. Olechowski, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, is that we are facing a situation where we must take action, while trying to operate on terrain inherited from an earlier phase. In fact, we are not organising our institutions, but reorganising existing institutions, in a situation which is truly complex, because the parameters which gave rise to the creation of various institutions in the previous phase of a Europe divided into blocs and a world defined in East-West terms, no longer exist. So we have to adapt the existing institutions to this new situation, rather than concentrating on creating new ones alongside them.

This is why the main theme running through all the debates this week is the redefinition of the rôle of Western European Union among these institutions, in order to carry out the mandate for a common foreign and security policy, as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty.

The second problem, which stems from the first, and which is nicely resolved in the report, is to try to find a solution to one of our major problems, which is the impossibility of identifying the enemy on a global scale in advance. In the previous phase, the enemy was easily identified, because the blocs could be clearly seen as friends or enemies. Nowadays we do not know where the enemy is; he can only be identified after the event, as conflicts arise. When we attempt to deal with these conflicts, we begin to see exactly who the enemy is, but we can see this case by case, with no possibility of a global view.

The third problem, which also follows on from the other two, is that we need something which is also new – a definition of Western European Union's own sphere of activity, plus a programme of defence and security for conflict-prevention and management.

We have talked about the Mediterranean, for example. Yet the Mediterranean is a complex area which partly corresponds to what we mean by Europe and partly does not. Former Yugoslavia is



*Mr. Sole Tura (continued)*

also a Mediterranean country, but the Mediterranean has a north and a south and we need to know whether our defence and our conflict-prevention policy should extend over a specific area or can go beyond it. And if so, on the basis of what principles?

This also applies, for example, to Russia, because Russia is not only the Russia of the West, the Russia bordering on the traditionally accepted European area. Russia is a vast country with very serious domestic problems in the Caucasus, in Moldova and the Crimea, for example. More particularly, Russia shares a border in the East with China, extending almost as far as Japan. The area has not been defined, and this is a great problem.

This is why I think that the report makes a realistic attempt to find partial, concrete solutions to these problems, rather than global ones, which would not be possible. In my view the amendments presented by Mr. de Puig as a means of updating his report accurately reflect these issues.

It is, therefore, a considerable step forward, trying to identify the actual area and organisation of Western European Union in the context of some other, varied organisations, and trying to define criteria for the prevention of, rather than intervention in, conflicts, and to define specific areas of action, given that it is not possible to define a global area.

Let me note that this problem of defining a global area confronts us in all institutions; in the Council of Europe, for example, we have still not defined with any precision what constitutes Europe, because we still have no uniform criteria to meet this general problem.

I will conclude, Mr. President, by reiterating my congratulations to my colleague and friend, Mr. de Puig, for his excellent report, which will be very useful.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Sir Peter Fry.

Sir Peter FRY (*United Kingdom*). – I join in congratulating Mr. de Puig and his committee, mainly because I believe that the report is very well timed. That it is needed is clear from the increasing mixture of horror and guilt that many of us in Western Europe feel, not only that events in former Yugoslavia have unfolded in the way that they have but that we have witnessed on our television screens how helpless civilians have been murdered merely because of minor ethnic differences with some other people in that unfortunate part of Europe. We also feel guilt because the rest of the world, and most particularly the rest of Europe, has been unable to stop the slaughter

quickly enough and has proved powerless, despite months after months of diplomatic activity aimed at producing a peaceful solution.

The memorandum to the report bravely points out in its section on regional tensions and conflicts that there are at least two conflicts in which NATO member countries are directly involved. One is the Greek quarrel with the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, on which we heard Mr. Hurd's views this morning. I contend that the problems are such that they can no longer be brushed aside or quietly ignored. If we wish to produce a solution, we must be aware that we are powerless in the case of Greece and Macedonia, in which a NATO country and European Union member is involved, and that clearly we must take some sort of action to avoid the situation occurring again.

When a country which is to become a member of this Assembly is clearly acting against international agreement by implementing sanctions on Macedonia, we really should question the way in which the mighty framework made up of international organisations such as WEU, NATO and the EU is working. A mechanism may well exist to censure an offending state, but it is a mechanism that grinds exceedingly slow. In the case of Macedonia, the Greek trade embargo is causing increasing hardship on a new country and one that has already suffered very much. The embargo creates a danger of possible internal instability that some outsiders would like to encourage for their own nationalistic reasons. We really do need to find a better way to deal with such problems. That is why I sincerely hope that the report is to be proved right when it says, "a fully operational WEU will be capable in future of preventing the development of a conflict such as that in former Yugoslavia".

I have two reservations about some of the wording of the report. One is the assumption which reads, "Stressing that any measures to maintain and re-establish peace in any region where it is threatened must be authorised by the United Nations". I am concerned that that may run the risk of unavoidable delay and, worse, a failing to obtain effective consent for action which will be sufficiently robust. Surely, the EU, NATO and WEU can produce mechanisms for easily taking some kind of early action rather than having to wait for the United Nations to make up its mind.

We have to ask ourselves certain basic questions. Would the situation in Yugoslavia have been improved by earlier action? As Lord Mackie clearly indicated, the answer is yes. Furthermore, I believe that if some such machinery existed in Africa we would not have seen thousands and thousands of innocent people slaughtered in Rwanda, as they have been in recent weeks.



*Sir Peter Fry (continued)*

My other reservation is about the total commitment in the recommendation to the principle of inviolability of present frontiers. I understand why that has been included. As a general principle, I entirely endorse it. But – it is a considerably big but – in practice it might hinder rather than hasten a solution in some cases. For example, in former Yugoslavia, the frontiers were somewhat artificial. They were imposed by the former communist régime and they included far too many minorities in most of the republics. Whatever solution is eventually produced to bring that conflict to an end, I very much suspect that there will be no final peace until there has been some redrawing of boundaries.

In contrast, the inviolability of present frontiers means that Kosovo remains entirely within the province of the Serbian republic. Sooner or later, that issue will have to be dealt with. If not, a further potential cause of conflict will undoubtedly arise.

With those reservations, I should like to say how much I agree with what Mr. de Puig and his committee have proposed. The report is overdue. It is needed and it must be supported. However, we must be clear in our minds. It is only a step in the direction in which we need to move to ensure that effective action and policies to maintain peace in Europe and preserve our national security are maintained.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. de Puig to reply to the debate.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I must first express my thanks for all the speeches we have heard, mainly in support of the report, and also for all the extremely generous praise because, as the debate this afternoon has shown, after the enrichment contributed by the reflections, thoughts and comments of my colleagues, the report has turned out to be very modest compared with the analysis and reasoning of which the members of this Assembly are capable with regard to a subject such as we are dealing with today. However, thank you very much.

Mr. Hardy was rather critical of our organisation's activities, and I think he was right. If he has read my report thoroughly, he will see that the observation I make in the first part of the report corresponds exactly with Mr. Hardy's observation on Europe's failure to respond to the crises that have been perceived, and the living example of this lack of capacity to prevent or manage a crisis is clearly former Yugoslavia. The second part of the report, however, attempts to correct the previous situation, because what I propose in my

report is that we should organise ourselves so that we can intervene, in other words so that we have the capacity to respond to the challenges of our time.

As Mr. Hardy says, it is not simply a question of perceiving problems, or of society perceiving that we are considering existing problems, but rather of society observing that we are prepared to intervene and resolve problems. Thus far, Mr. Hardy and I are in agreement. However if we are also to infer from what he says that our organisation should be asked to intervene in every case *urbi et orbi*, then I could not agree. I think that statements of this kind have to be very specific, and, in any event, I have restricted myself to what I believe our organisation is capable of achieving at the present time in the area we have been discussing.

Mr. Müller quite rightly told us that the cold war is over, but that the situation is possibly even more dangerous because of its complexity. Indeed, it is much more complicated and delicate, as another speaker has also commented. It is more difficult to identify instability, the problem, the enemy, the culprit, the perpetrator or the potential crisis. He went on to speak of some of the events now taking place in parts of Europe, in addition to the serious problem of Yugoslavia, referring, for instance, to the countries of the Caucasus to the south of Russia. He made an allusion which we might call critical to my reference to the Swiss referendum. I have to say that I might agree with him, inasmuch as I am prepared to criticise any country which neglects problems of security and demonstrates its desire not to intervene when others are doing so. That is certainly true. Here I must clarify a point in my report. When I say that some countries refused to intervene, I am not referring to a refusal to join the blue berets or take part in humanitarian action. They were being asked specifically to participate in the protection of safe areas. And on this specific point some countries of Western European Union said they were not in agreement. It is another thing to vote in a referendum not to participate in the blue berets, which might also involve military action and humanitarian aid, and it is on this point that I believe we cannot agree and I am not in agreement with the Swiss vote.

Mr. President, I am grateful to Lord Mackie for the extremely interesting speech in which he set out the lessons we must learn from the case of Yugoslavia. He is right, without a doubt. We failed because we were incapable of avoiding conflict, although while I agree with the whole of his speech in general, I see the question of air strikes at the present time as rather more complicated. On this point I must agree with Mr. Ward. I believe that to propose this now is much more difficult. It would have been altogether different at the start of the conflict, which is obviously

*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

when we should have acted, but failed to do so. The decisions which could have avoided this tragedy were not taken, partly because we did not have at our disposal the instruments I am requesting today in this report, instruments to be created so that, in future, we will have this capacity to respond to crises.

Mr. Soell made a comment which numerous speakers have taken up. We are faced with a new situation, with new models which completely change the geostrategy of recent years, with new problems such as those of ethnic and religious minorities, with problems of radical economic, social and political change in neighbouring countries, and I agree with him that our great problem is that neither in theory nor in practice are we in control of these problems and we are a long way from finding solutions to them. I think he will agree with me – and he has said as much – that proposals such as those contained in my report will lead to our one day having the ability to respond to the challenges we face.

Mr. Ward also spoke about Yugoslavia. He is right: simply making threats is not enough. We must make threats if necessary, but with a real deterrent capability, because what happened was something of a mockery. We made threats, but no one took the slightest notice and the disaster has continued without our being able to stop it. We must not simply rely on a moral authority which may or may not exist, but on military authority, which has real deterrent force when we are faced with a conflict of these dimensions. In the committee Mr. Ward told me that what had happened recently in our organisation had depressed him a little and I agreed with him. However, I think that although we can be critical of the recent performance of WEU and the other international organisations in Europe, there is no room for defeatism. We may be concerned, but I believe that given the direction of my recommendation and our desire to create and build a new security system with genuine capability, we should proceed actually to build it, so that these recommendations and others contained in other reports presented this week do not merely become worthless pieces of paper.

I am also grateful to Mr. Sole Tura for his comments. In my country, when Mr. Sole Tura takes up the political debate I find it very difficult, if not impossible, to disagree with him. Here again, I have to express my complete agreement. His speech was very interesting: he spoke of the complexity of the task of identifying even the enemy at the present time, and of the problem of global space, which is one of the key issues, and naturally he spoke of the Mediterranean and of Russia, that vast country whose co-operation we need if we really wish to have a crisis-prevention capacity,

because Russia is one of the important issues in terms of future security.

I should also like to thank Sir Peter Fry for his contribution, although I must tell him that the statement in the draft recommendation should not have been so emphatic, stating that we could only intervene with a mandate from the United Nations. The word I used, and I am referring to the French word I used in my report, is “*enteriné par les Nations unies*” which is not quite the same as “*autorisé*”. You are aware that at times action of various kinds has been taken only with a mandate from, or on the initiative of, the United Nations Secretary-General himself. This has occurred without the need for the matter to go before the Security Council. I used the word “*enteriné*” because I feel it is more flexible than the word “*autorisé*”.

As far as borders are concerned, the situation is as follows: I spoke of inviolability, but inviolability is not the same as intangibility and I think this is an interesting distinction. I remember that once in this chamber we approved a report which stated that it would be possible to intervene in a third country to defend human rights in a particular case, without great difficulty, when the issues were clear.

There is much to be said on the subject of borders; much remains to be defined and the position must be clearly established. We are on the knife-edge of the difficult and complex legal concept of setting limits, but the truth of the matter is that I phrased it in the way I did because I believe that inviolability and intangibility are not the same thing.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to say that the basis of my report and, as I have observed, the basis of the speeches, is the idea that we are capable of constructing the instruments which would avoid new Yugoslavias in the future. I believe that if we approve this report, we will be progressing in that direction.

The PRESIDENT. – May I make an appeal to the Assembly? We have some amendments to deal with now, and then another debate. Tonight we are to be the guests of the Speaker of the Assemblée Nationale, and the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of France will be there. It would be extremely discourteous of us not to be there promptly at about 6.30, when the event starts. I therefore ask for the co-operation of all members so that we can complete our proceedings by 6 o'clock. Does the Vice-Chairman of the committee wish to speak?

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Words, Mr. President, that will last no more than a minute. I add to the overwhelming praise of Mr. de Puig that has been voiced. His report

*Lord Finsberg (continued)*

clearly endorses what the Polish Foreign Minister said: in so many cases the Assembly is ahead of its masters. Perhaps his report will help to solidify that.

I endorse what Mr. de Puig said, especially about Switzerland. Also, as he says both in the report and in his speech, it would be nice if we could read about the many studies being undertaken by the Council, and see where we could contribute.

Finally, Mr. de Puig talks about the CSCE and WEU. Somebody has to put all those institutions under a microscope and see which really works – but Mr. de Puig's report indicates firmly that it is WEU that is doing a practical job of work.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your co-operation, Lord Finsberg.

Six amendments have been tabled to the draft recommendation, and we shall take them in the order in which they relate to the text – that is, 1, 2, 6, 3, 4, and then 5.

I call Mr. de Puig to move Amendment 1, which is as follows:

1. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Concerned by the Council's silence regarding the continuation of the civil war in Yemen and the terrible massacres perpetrated in Rwanda;”

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, would you prefer me to speak to the amendments one by one or may I speak to them all in the same speech, to save time?

These are amendments which I do not anticipate will pose any problems because the text already reflects the content of these amendments.

The PRESIDENT. – You may speak to all the amendments, Mr. de Puig, and then move them separately. You may speak to all of them, but we have to take the votes separately on each one.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is the amendment which refers to the civil war in Yemen and to the massacres in Rwanda. It responds to the desire that our report should contain a reference to these problems, so that it does not look as if such terrible and topical events are forgotten and underestimated by this Assembly. They are presented in the form of a criticism of the Council because our Council has not produced any declarations on these matters. This is the point of the first amendment, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. de Puig.

Does anyone wish to oppose Amendment 1?...

I will now put the amendment to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

We now come to Amendment 2:

2. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Concerned at North Korea's nuclear policy and its threatening attitude towards South Korea.”

I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – This is a reference to the problem of North Korea and the current threat to South Korea. It is an amendment which would form part of the preamble, but we would not want a report which sets out the range of current conflicts to omit such an inflammatory subject as the present situation in Korea.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

We come now to Amendment 6:

6. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Maintain a dialogue on a permanent basis with the Mediterranean states which are not members of WEU;”

I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Amendment 6 was not presented this morning at the committee meeting, but, as Rapporteur, I have taken the liberty of adding it for discussion in this session. It refers to the need for a permanent dialogue with the Mediterranean states which are not members of WEU. The remainder of the draft recommendation refers to dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and also the Mediterranean countries of North Africa. It would be too serious an omission not to mention those countries which border the Mediterranean, and are not members of WEU, but with whom we must have a dialogue.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I will now put Amendment 6 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 6 is agreed to.*

*The President (continued)*

We now come to Amendment 3:

3. Draft paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper as follows:

“Support the United Nations’ call for the cease-fire in Yemen to be respected immediately;”

I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – As we made reference to the situation in Yemen in this recommendation, we would ask the Council to support the United Nations’ call for a cease-fire in Yemen. That is all.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 3 is agreed to.*

We come now to Amendment 4:

4. After paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Examine at the earliest opportunity the rôle that WEU might play in terminating the killings in Rwanda and establishing order and peace in that country;”

I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – In this case we are asking the Council to examine the rôle that WEU might play in trying to assist the cease-fire in the killings in Rwanda. This is a question of taking action, as implied in our initial remarks in the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I will now put Amendment 4 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 4 is agreed to.*

We come now to Amendment 5:

5. After paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Hold consultations on the consequences for European security of North Korea’s nuclear policy and inform the Assembly of its conclusions.”

I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as everyone is aware, the great powers and everyone else are very concerned about the war-

mongering attitude and nuclear policy of North Korea. In this amendment, we are asking the Council to hold the necessary consultations in order to have a thorough knowledge of the situation as regards North Korea’s nuclear policy and the consequences this policy could have for Europe and, in particular, to inform the Assembly of its conclusions.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I will now put Amendment 5 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 5 is agreed to.*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1418, as amended.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call? ...

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

You must be gratified that the draft recommendation has been carried unanimously, Mr. de Puig. You have our congratulations. I thank you for your co-operation in getting through the amendments so expeditiously.

## **6. Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft order and draft recommendation, Doc. 1414)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Sir Russell Johnston of the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, with debate and vote on the draft order and the draft recommendation, Document 1414.

I call Sir Russell to make his report from the tribune.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I sense an undercurrent of excitement bubbling like lava on the red benches in front of me. Sadly, it has rather more to do with the impending end of the day and the reception at the Assemblée Nationale than with anticipation of the debate. I am afraid that one must be realistic about these things. Nevertheless, it is very much a pleasure to

1. See page 28.

*Sir Russell Johnston (continued)*

lay the report before you on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

First, I should like to thank Nic Tummers, the Chairman of the committee, who encouraged me to undertake the report. Secondly, I should like to thank the members of the committee who made constructive comments on the report's content. Thirdly, I should like to thank Paulo Brito, secretary of the committee, upon whom fell the main burden of the work and who tackled it with his usual calm, unassuming competence and thoroughness. I also wish to refer to the similar report produced in 1993 by Mr. Kempinaire, Document 1365, on the experience of which we drew.

The fact that this is not a controversial report is evident both from the absence of amendments and the absence of speakers – I think that there are only four. In many ways, the latter is regrettable. As members heard me say to the British Foreign Secretary this morning, I consider paragraph 3 of the recommendations to the Council to be centrally important. The reports states that we recommend that the Council: "Ensure that the Assembly has adequate means to develop relations and co-operation with the states of the Forum of Consultation, in accordance with the Council's own expressed wish."

That is centrally important, and unless it is responded to in terms of the provision of additional resources much of the desiderata spelt out in the draft order and recommendations will not come about. A series of speeches from across the political spectrum in the Assembly – there is no division on the matter – stressing that fact would have given strength and credence to the importance that we attach to the issue. As I am sure the Assembly will have noted, Mr. Hurd's reply was a bland deflection without any commitment – rather like a friendly family doctor dealing with questions about a predicted flu epidemic – "I would be surprised if someone did not ask about the budget". It is worrying because I do not think that any other Foreign Minister of our Council would have said anything different. Without additional support, the instruction to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, which is also contained in the report, would end up as no more than a possible reshuffling of priorities and there would be hardly any scope for manoeuvre.

We can quote decisions – as I do in paragraph 6 of the explanatory memorandum, which states: "Ministers advocated the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the states concerned".

Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 set out the other powerful arguments as to why, in developing policies in the countries of the Forum of Consultation,

parliamentary contact can be not only as, but often more, important than governmental contact. I urge members to read that section because it is particularly important in making the argument.

We know that the Forum of Consultation exists no more, in that following the Kirchberg declaration, we now talk about associate partners. But that declaration does not mention the Assembly. That is not quite true. Under the heading of "Modalities" – not a word commonly used in English – and under the subsequent sub-heading of "Miscellaneous", it states: "While its autonomy is acknowledged, the parliamentary Assembly is encouraged to reflect on a possible participation of associate partners in its work".

That is not exactly a ringing call to arms.

The statement itself contains no mention of the Assembly. I do not propose to lead the Assembly through the explanatory memorandum – people can read it for themselves. But I should underline briefly one point that arises from the description of the evolution of the forum, and the nature and variety of the contacts made. The basic issue worrying me – I think that everyone will understand why when they look at the report – is that of overlap and duplication. We must consider that issue. It is obviously impossible to rationalise individual state parliamentary contacts because individual parliaments will do what they want to do and there is no way that we can do anything about that. But there must be an argument where multi-lateral institutions are involved, or at least some informal agreement to have a lead institution, which should surely be the WEU Assembly.

Paragraphs 73 and 74 of the report clearly state that "the WEU Assembly alone has an area of responsibility for defence and security matters based on texts that are legally binding".

That refers to the modified Brussels Treaty of October 1954 and Article I of the Charter of the WEU Assembly.

In paragraph 74 I set out my concern about the issue of overlap and duplication. To quote one long sentence: "This lack of co-ordination, and the fact that they are at times in competition, makes setting up effective parliamentary co-operation on a European scale more difficult and piecemeal and hinders the integration of these countries into existing European structures, because of the large number of these institutions and the lack of co-ordination between them."

The same point is made in a slightly different way in paragraphs 108 and 109 of the conclusion of the report. I shall not read them out, but members should give them their attention.

I shall return to the draft recommendations as a means of highlighting what I described at the

*Sir Russell Johnston (continued)*

beginning of my speech as the key issue. The draft recommendations pick out two points. Paragraph (a) states that we should "fulfil the expectations of the Central European states by regular and relevant dialogue, duly organising discussions on topical questions" and appropriate seminars and so on.

Paragraph (c) states that we should "establish WEU information points in the capitals of the Central European states".

The Polish Foreign Minister spoke about the need to open up our Assembly to them. We want to, but we cannot. We do not have room here; we do not even have the facilities. As Mr. Hurd said, we are talking about twenty-four countries, including the existing members of WEU and those others associated in various ways. Without additional resources, we cannot handle so many.

When we talk about appropriate seminars and information points, we should realise that none of that can be achieved unless paragraph 3 of the recommendation to the Council is accepted. It is not enough for our governments to make friendly remarks about us or to come here and say that we are doing well and produce interesting reports which they read. What we do – and more importantly, what we can do – is inevitably related to the amount of resources made available to us.

The Assembly has already made a notable contribution to developing thinking about the nature of defence and security matters between the core members of WEU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It has much more to contribute, but can do so only if the Council responds to what is proposed in the report. I recommend it to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – It would be wrong for me to speak at length, but I believe that I should repeat the major point that I made in the earlier debate this afternoon. As I did then, I can make it briefly, but I should like to add to my words the welcome that the report deserves and the congratulations that the Rapporteur should receive. I do not dissent from his report, nor offer criticism of its content, particularly not of its endorsement of co-operation and consultation with Eastern Europe.

Paragraph (v) of the preamble to the recommendation says that if we will the structures, we must accept the implication of those structures and the obligation that then is created. That obligation will inevitably accompany the integration into European political and security structures of those

member states in the Forum of Consultation. We must understand that, by pursuing that course, we are automatically and inescapably accepting the obligation that integration creates. It is no good any member of the Assembly, or any member state within the organisation, failing to perceive that that obligation is created, or failing to understand the implications that that must have for defence planning and security considerations, both within the organisations and within our national parliaments. For that obligation to be accepted, for the implications of integration not to be fully perceived, would be an act of irresponsibility. One hopes that the Council of Ministers will pay full attention to the report and to the implications that it therefore presents.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy and in particular, thank you for being so commendably brief.

I now call Mr. Rockenbauer, an observer from Hungary.

Mr. ROCKENBAUER (*Observer from Hungary*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, last month's legislative elections in Hungary marked a turning point in the country's internal policy. Since I have recently often been asked how this will affect the future foreign policy of Hungary, allow me, an opposition member of parliament, to confirm the statements made by the new majority party. Hungary's external policy will continue to be governed by its commitment to the principle of European integration. This is particularly true as regards the country's security policy.

You may well be tempted to ask me why I am so sure about this, since negotiations to set up a government coalition are still under way. The reason I am so sure is that in recent years the Hungarian Parliament has based all its decisions on national defence and security policy on consensus. In addition, during the electoral campaign, all the political parties represented in parliament committed themselves to European integration. There is no doubt at all that the new Hungarian Government will continue to regard its relations with Western European Union as a matter of great priority.

Ladies and gentlemen, we Hungarians welcome the adoption of the document in Luxembourg on 9th May last by the WEU Council of Ministers and the Forum of Consultation. The fact is that we had already firmly supported the joint declaration issued in Warsaw on 12th November last by the German and French Ministers for Foreign Affairs. Clearly, the Franco-German declaration gave new impetus to the relations between WEU and the Central and Eastern European countries. Later, the Kirchberg declaration on granting association status to the countries of the Forum of Consulta-

*Mr. Rockenbauer (continued)*

tion – i.e. including Hungary – constituted from the historical point of view an important stage in the process whose final objective is, in our view, full membership. The declaration also confirms how right we were in our unceasing efforts in recent years to demonstrate that co-operation in the field of security policy between the Twelve and the Central and Eastern European countries must not lag behind development in economic relations. We see integration as a succession of steps up a flight of stairs. We have always considered that the conclusion of the Europe Agreement must necessarily have an impact on the relations between Hungary and WEU.

We believe it highly desirable for the principles set out in the Kirchberg declaration to be put into practical effect as quickly as possible. We are convinced that this will be of the best possible service to the cause of security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

Obviously, the Kirchberg declaration cannot fail to have an effect on the work of the WEU Assembly. Document 1414, prepared by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur, came out shortly before the Kirchberg declaration and does not therefore take account of the results of that declaration. However, both the draft order and the draft recommendation reflect the results of the process which I have just said received new impetus last autumn. Thanks to this new development, our delegation now has more and more opportunity to participate in the work of the Assembly. We are particularly pleased with the way Document 1414 spells out the details of certain practical aspects.

As we understand it the spirit of the Kirchberg declaration means there can be no further delay in the enlargement of our relations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rockenbauer.

I now call Mr. Vacaru, an observer from Romania.

Mr. VACARU (*Observer from Romania*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this year – the fortieth anniversary of the signature of the modified Brussels Treaty – and given the latest progress in collaboration between the WEU member states and their Central European partners including Romania, this act setting up Western European Union represents even more than before a specially useful instrument for strengthening co-operation between member states in the parliamentary, political, military and scientific fields. It is an essential component in the shaping of a European security and defence identity.

In this spirit the delegation of parliamentary observers from Romania congratulates Sir Russell

Johnston for the report submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. It also greatly appreciates the draft order on parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation proposing the inclusion in the Assembly's budget for 1995 of an amount enabling an Assembly fund to be set up to pay for parliamentary co-operation activities with the six countries of Central Europe and the three Baltic countries.

Further to the decision adopted at the Council's meeting in Luxembourg on 9th May, the granting of the status of associate partner to the nine member states of the WEU former Forum of Consultation sends out a major political message in support of European co-operation and integration. We should not forget that WEU is the first western institution to welcome these countries to its organisation, and to give them the opportunity to participate directly in its planned activities, initiatives and missions. On this subject I should point out the importance of the special rôle of promoter and pioneer played by the WEU Assembly in developing relations with the new Central European and Baltic democracies.

The delegation of parliamentary observers from Romania wishes to underline the special importance of the draft recommendation submitted by Sir Russell Johnston on parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation. This recommendation opens the way to a narrowing of the democratic deficit still to be found in the rôle assigned to the Assembly as regards WEU's activities and decision-making.

Allow me to express our complete satisfaction at the way the Presidential Committee and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations have welcomed the Romanian decision to set up a WEU Information and Documentation Bureau in Bucharest, in the framework of the Romanian Parliament and under the auspices of the WEU parliamentary Assembly. The Bureau will be for use by parliamentarians from Romania and neighbouring countries, scholars, political scientists, researchers and diplomats. It should cover the full range of our co-operation with the organisation and help to spread knowledge of the activities and objectives of WEU.

In connection with the official opening of this Bureau, planned for 7th and 8th November in Bucharest, the Romanian Parliament will also hold a round table on security in Central Europe. The Presidential Committee and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations have already been invited to attend, and invitations to our colleagues, the other parliamentary observers, will be sent out in the near future.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, through its strengthening of the democratic institutions of a



*Mr. Vacaru (continued)*

law-abiding state, through its firm and irreversible decision to develop a market economy and through the pragmatism of its foreign policy – committed to the essential need to maintain and consolidate peace in Europe and throughout the world – Romania reiterates its firm will for integration in Euro-Atlantic structures. Romania is determined to assume the rôle of a reliable partner in all fields, including that of parliamentary co-operation, and is prepared to discharge fully the responsibilities incumbent upon it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Vacaru.

I now call Mr. Necas, an observer from the Czech Republic.

Mr. NECAS (*Observer from the Czech Republic*). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to express my great pleasure at being here. I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to address this distinguished audience – the Assembly of WEU. It is necessary to make several remarks about the report of the committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

The Czech Republic has declared many times that a main goal of its foreign policy is integration in NATO and the EU. WEU, as a defence component of the European Union and as a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, has also played a great rôle in our foreign policy.

The nations of Central Europe have made a strong effort to transform their economies and societies. As we read in paragraph 22 of the explanatory memorandum, they are trying to integrate into the structures of the West, which they feel offer them the best guarantee of their security and development. Those structures are NATO and the European Union. However, I believe that the problem is not so simple. We have the same system of values as you have. We should like to take our part of the common responsibility for protecting that system of values. That is the main reason why we wish to integrate into NATO, WEU and the EU. For the Czech Republic, the question of security guarantees is secondary to the main reason why we wish to integrate.

We are aware that the creation of political stability, economic prosperity and internal security is more important to our integration into NATO, WEU and the EU than never-ending and persistent knocking at the door of those structures.

It is not possible to consider the countries of Central Europe as one bloc. There are countries in Central Europe which do exist without armed conflict, ethnic fighting, instability, great economic problems or the persistence of 19th century nationalism. We can read that in paragraphs 4 or

106 of the explanatory memorandum. On the contrary, there are countries in Central Europe which do have stable governments and the stable support of their citizens for those governments' reforms. It is necessary to take those facts into account.

Ladies and gentlemen, the WEU Assembly has the task of setting up association partnership status at the parliamentary level. As Sir Dudley said, the status of association with WEU reaches further than a partnership for peace. For that reason, I believe that the participation of Central European parliaments in the work of the Assembly of WEU could be at least at the same level as their participation in the North Atlantic Assembly. That means participation in committees – of course, without the right to vote.

The main slogan of the Czech Republic in economic co-operation with the EU is not aid but trade. That means that in our pragmatic policy we prefer concrete steps to great and bombastic words. Therefore, we prefer concrete steps in the political area as well. As we can see from paragraph 46, in order to be effective, co-operation with the parliaments of the consultation partners should be more than a simple exchange of documents, information and visits. It should have practical outcomes.

Ladies and gentlemen, it would be very useful to reason out a plan of concrete steps towards co-operation between the Assembly of WEU and Central European parliaments. The appropriate way of doing that might be a common meeting of a Standing Committee with representatives of our parliaments. Such a committee could draw up a concrete plan. We can offer for that meeting our wonderful capital of Prague. We could also have appropriate meetings with the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. We can offer financial participation in setting up an Assembly support fund for parliamentary co-operation, about which we can read in the draft orders.

Mr. Willem van Eekelen said in his address that countering the risks of chaos, the resurgence of intolerance and violence and even the reappearance of unacceptable spheres of influence on the European continent would demand political courage on the part of WEU countries. Ladies and gentlemen, I should like to wish you political courage in creating a concrete association status at the level of the WEU Assembly. Thank you for your kind attention.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Necas.

The next speaker is Mr. Philipov, an observer from Bulgaria.

Mr. PHILIPOV (*Observer from Bulgaria*). – Mr. President, before I make my short but positive remarks on the report of Sir Russell Johnston,



*Mr. Philipov (continued)*

I should like to refer to your introductory speech. You mentioned that in April you met the Bulgarian President, Mr. Zhelev. According to our delegation, the most important thing was not your meeting with Mr. Zhelev but your speech to the Bulgarian National Assembly, which was broadcast live on television and radio. It gave Bulgarian parliamentarians and Bulgarian society a good impression of the powers of WEU and what it intends to do in respect of Central European countries.

The development of closer and more efficient relations between Bulgaria and WEU is one of the main long-term priorities of Bulgaria's strategic policy of full integration in European institutions.

Three years ago the Forum of Consultation allowed progress to be made in the dialogue and co-operation on security issues with Central European countries. It was one of the first bridges extended to our part of Europe from the western security zone. The Forum contributed to a great integration of political contacts and co-operation, as well as to a better understanding of our concerns and security policies.

I should like to mention the successful practical co-operation between Bulgaria and WEU in the implementation of United Nations sanctions and the embargo on the Danube river. That is a solid political and practical basis on which to enhance further our relationship.

It is in this context that we see that the creation of the status of associate partners with WEU for the nine Central European states, following the Kirchberg declaration, comes at the right time. Our delegation is pleased to state that the Parliament and Government of Bulgaria welcome that new development. We view the status not as a gift but as a clear expression of the strong political will of WEU.

New possibilities will be open for constant dialogue and consultation on security issues. I assure you of our full commitment to make full use of those opportunities to be a reliable and valuable associate partner of WEU in our region, with the ultimate objective of becoming a full member. I believe that common efforts with other associate partners will make a real contribution to meeting the present challenges, and to consolidating security and stability in our common land – the European continent.

Finally, one could say that the Forum of Consultation of WEU may be passing into history, but it has started something remarkable for today's and tomorrow's Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Philipov, for your kind remarks about my visit to Sofia.

Does Sir Russell want to make a brief response?

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President. I shall not detain the Assembly, but I feel obliged to make some reference to the comments that have been made.

Peter Hardy spoke first, and rightly stressed the implications of integration for our defence and security. I am grateful to him for what he said, and I hope that the greybeards on the Banc du Gouvernement have been listening carefully, and will report to their masters with the requisite emphasis.

Secondly, Mr. Rockenbauer of Hungary spoke. I am pleased by his support for the report, and also because he indicated from the opposition side that he did not think that Hungary's foreign policy and approach would change with the change of government. As I have already said, although the Kirchberg declaration, as Mr. Rockenbauer said, is certainly very positive in an intergovernmental sense, I do not think that it produced much advance in terms of the rôle of this Assembly. That is what I criticised when I was speaking, and also in the report.

Mr. Vacaru of Romania referred favourably to the idea of the support fund. That is a practical and good idea in that it would make financial needs and available finance more transparent, but it does not make any difference to the realities, which remain the same. On the question of promotion, I congratulate Romania on the establishment of the Information and Documentation Bureau in Bucharest.

Mr. Necas of the Czech Republic referred to paragraph 22, in which he felt that I was being a bit negative. That paragraph says that "countries of Central Europe are trying, each in its own way, to integrate to the best of their ability, in the structures of the West which they feel offer them the best guarantees for their security and development." Of course, he is perfectly correct in saying that not all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are the same, and that some, such as the Czech Republic, have made remarkable progress. I recognise that. I am sure that we all recognise and admire it.

However, I suppose that in composing a report of this nature one tends to concentrate on difficulties. I do not think that we are guilty of using bombastic words. On the contrary, we stress the practical obstacles, which in the end only the Council can remove. After all, Mr. President, this is much more than the traditional moan about money. We are expected to embark on a wide area of activity, to which we can make a unique contribution – and we want to do so, but we may not be able to do so.

We have noted Mr. Necas's generous offer concerning what might be done in Prague, and I am sure that in the first instance the Committee

*Sir Russell Johnston (continued)*

for Parliamentary and Public Relations will consider carefully what he said.

Finally, Mr. Philipov of Bulgaria spoke positively about the report and supportively about the former Forum of Consultation. I am grateful for what he said, and I again recommend the report to the Assembly for its support.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Russell.

Does the Vice-Chairman of the committee wish to speak? No.

We now come to two votes. We shall first vote on the draft order in Document 1414. I sense from the small attendance that nobody wants a roll-call vote, so we will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft order is adopted*<sup>1</sup>.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1414 to which no amendments have been tabled. We will vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted*<sup>2</sup>.

Many congratulations, Sir Russell. Although the attendance is thin, the subject matter is of enormous importance, as has been underlined by some of the observers who have spoken.

### ***7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 15th June, at 10 a.m., with the following orders of the day:

1. The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Document 1421 and amendments).
2. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (Presentation of the second part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 1411); Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
3. Address by General Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day for the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 5.50 p.m.)*

1. See page 30.

2. See page 31.

## FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 15th June 1994

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.

2. Adoption of the minutes.

3. The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee*, Doc. 1421 and amendments).

*Speakers:* Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (Rapporteur), Mr. Baumel, Mr. Lopez Henares.

4. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (*Presentation of the second part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council*, Doc. 1411); Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime

Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

*Replies by Mr. Poos to questions put by:* Lord Finsberg, Mr. Soell, Mr. Davis, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Pastusiak (*Observer from Poland*).

5. Address by General Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

*Replies by General Joulwan to questions put by:* Mr. Baumel, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Borderas, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Kittelmann.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

#### 1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### 2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### 3. The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1421 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the presentation by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman of the report of the Defence Committee on the WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council and debate, Document 1421 and amendments.

I should like to remind the Assembly that at about 10.30 a.m. we shall interrupt this debate to hear an address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence of Luxembourg who is the present Chairman-in-Office of WEU; and at about 11.30 a.m. we shall hear an address by General Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

I should be grateful if members wishing to put questions to either of our guests this morning would notify the Sitings Office at the entrance to the Chamber.

I think that it would be for the convenience of members, and that of our two distinguished guests, if the moment Mr. Poos has finished answering questions I adjourn the sitting for about five minutes to enable me to collect General Joulwan and bring him in. We can then hear his address.

We shall now proceed with the debate on the WEU Planning Cell. I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman to present her report.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as we have been discussing a European security policy for so long now, this early hour may well be the most convenient time. Before we move on to the other business for the day, perhaps we could consider for a moment what we actually mean by a European security identity, given that the member states of Europe are by no means fully in agreement over how the policy associated with this security identity should be implemented.

1. See page 33.

*Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)*

At the NATO summit meeting in Brussels back in January, President Clinton said once again that – to put it in a homy way – he would not be cross if the Europeans implemented their own security policy and that they would not lose American support as a result. This will probably make it slightly easier for those who felt they were being disloyal to their transatlantic allies to formulate a better and clearer European position.

In my view, the fact that the United States has made its position clear with regard to Europe is extremely significant. President Clinton has assured the Europeans that on no account will he let them down, that the transatlantic link will not be broken and that thousands of troops will continue to be stationed in Europe in the future.

Now that President Clinton has given his blessing, the time is ripe for the Europeans to define a clear European security policy. So far, all we have done is to talk about a European security and defence policy and issue statements, which in my view is simply paying lip-service to Europe and its security.

The Maastricht Treaty was the first document to refer directly to a common foreign and security policy under the auspices of the European Union. For the first time it was made clear that no security policy would be formulated outside the European Union, outside Europe. In other words, security policy and defence fall within the competence of the European Union.

The first steps towards the development of a European security policy were taken in the Petersberg declaration of June 1992. I will not go into any further details on its content at this point. You will find a summary of the Petersberg declaration in my report.

The first time positive action was discussed was at Petersberg in Germany, where the decision was taken to set up the Planning Cell. As you will undoubtedly be aware, this Planning Cell is the subject of my report. As we were unclear as to the exact nature of the Planning Cell's activities, the Defence Committee felt it necessary to carry out an initial evaluation of the work that was to be done. The documents establishing the Planning Cell outline not only its principal tasks, but also its terms of reference. In my report I tried to indicate how the Planning Cell was faring in relation to these tasks.

At the NATO summit meeting in January it was emphatically stated, in the presence of President Clinton, that the European Union must have a clear policy on European security. It was at this same meeting that WEU was designated as the defence component of the European Union.

However, true to form, the European governments changed their minds almost immediately on the way in which their ideas should be put into effect.

The Kirchberg declaration, which was signed a few weeks ago in Luxembourg, referred once again to the enhancement of WEU's rôle as the defence component of the European Union. In my opinion, the Maastricht Treaty, the Petersberg declaration, the NATO summit meeting and the Kirchberg declaration all make it clear that the member states of the European Union must not only define their own security policy but must also work towards its implementation.

If the Planning Cell set up for this purpose does not fully live up to expectations, let us be quite clear that this is not because of its staff or the Planning Cell itself, but because of the lack of a clear policy statement. What, for example, should a security component of the European Union consist of, and how should the defence component evolve? In my view, to date there has been no effective, uniform foreign policy and no effective security policy. This should be the ultimate framework of the Planning Cell's activities. However, as there is no such framework the blame, if blame there is, should be attributed to the political leadership, not to the Planning Cell.

Yesterday, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Hurd, said in his speech: "we must keep our heads out of the clouds. We aim to create real planning options and operational possibilities that add to the range of security and defence instruments available in pursuit of shared European and Atlantic objectives. This must be a rigorous, tightly-managed, practical enterprise, not a windy talk shop".

Mr. President, Mr. Hurd has taken the words right out of my mouth, although I am surprised that he should utter these words in this Assembly of parliamentary representatives. You see, I feel that, generally, when Mr. Hurd and his European colleagues, sit round a table somewhere in Europe, they too lack clarity. Most members of parliament constantly urge their governments, through their national parliaments, to make themselves clear so that there is consistency as to what is meant by a common foreign and security policy. So, I was glad to hear what Mr. Hurd had to say.

Mr. President, I started with President Clinton, and that is where I want to finish. Not only did President Clinton attend the D-Day commemorations in Normandy, he also travelled around Europe, where he made some impressive speeches. We were all highly impressed by the commemorations of our liberation from Nazism, but we should also be heartened by President Clinton's promise not to let the Europeans down. He did, however, remind us of our own responsibility. Mr. Hurd said the same thing yesterday. We can-

*Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)*

not always rely on the Americans. We have a joint responsibility within the NATO alliance, but where Europe is concerned we must take responsibility for ourselves, and this means primarily financial responsibility. If you want to defend yourself, you cannot keep running to your neighbours for money.

I hope the Planning Cell will be given a clear mandate for the development of a European security policy. On 1st October we will see the outcome of the initial evaluation of the Planning Cell's activities. I hope therefore that the governments will give it a clearer mandate than they have done so far, that the Planning Cell can in particular continue to work on the targets that have been set for it, and that the Council does not keep on coming up with ad hoc requests. This small organisation which, unlike NATO's Planning Cell, consists of only forty people has no capacity for such demands. I hope that after October the Planning Cell will be given clearer mandates, so that in a subsequent debate we can be somewhat more positive on this matter and on the prospects for an integrated European security policy.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Baumel to start the debate.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, after Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman's remarkable presentation of her report there are few comments left for me to make. Like our Rapporteur I would stress in particular the rôle which the Planning Cell should play in enhancing WEU's responsibilities and strengthening its structures. It will be a vital contributor to WEU's greater rôle in the future in terms of the operability of European forces. To bring this about I must point out three things that are necessary.

Firstly, as our Rapporteur quite rightly said, this small Planning Cell must be given more staff and resources. It is made up of some thirty officers drawn from many countries and has totally inadequate resources, particularly as regards electronic communications and equipment so that it has difficulty in fulfilling its assigned rôle. The automatic consequence should be additions to the Cell. There is a happy medium between some thirty officers in this case and a thousand at NATO. One of the first things we should ask from the Council of Ministers and the few ambassadors who are good enough to attend our meetings is additional staff and equipment.

Secondly, as I have been told by highly-qualified experts on these questions, there should be a

little less paperwork and a little more real work. For study and research in particular this Planning Cell needs to have greater authority and more freedom to establish channels of communication less under the control of political authorities. At the moment, it works to order and the staff can only produce reports when asked. They have no independence. I know of no general staff in the world which does not have some degree of independence for study, research and other work. The officers and particularly the heads of this Planning Cell must be allowed to work on scenarios without waiting to be given permission like good little schoolboys doing what their teachers tell them.

Thirdly, the Planning Cell must be given more work. I have a number of documents here which I will spare the Assembly but unquestionably if this Planning Cell is to play a rôle it must have a genuine permanent organisation, with staff always on duty so that situations can be monitored round the clock. At the moment there is no provision for such monitoring. The Cell must be able to arrange for the production of studies, reports and documents on its own initiative without awaiting permission.

Furthermore, it must be able to communicate its documents to all kinds of people who do not receive them at present. This is a very important point. The creation and work of this Planning Cell are to be welcomed. It is in the interests of WEU and our defence identity policy to provide it progressively with more resources in both staff and equipment, in particular for its strategic responsibilities.

I would add that here and now studies should be started on several scenarios. What our Rapporteur has announced in the way of measures to be taken October onwards is a step in the right direction. That is why I approve all the conclusions of the report presented to us.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ-HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, first I would like to offer my congratulations to Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman on this splendid and very thorough report which analyses in depth the reasons for and the problems of the Planning Cell.

Above all, Mr. President, with Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union, and the attached declaration of the WEU member states, our organisation has entered a new phase, having been declared an integral part of the construction of Europe, with the task of formulating a common defence policy to provide a common system of defence.

In the past, Western European Union has been the subject of much criticism because of its lack

*Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)*

of an operational rôle, and it would be regrettable if now, having been given the task of formulating and preparing a common defence policy, the organisation did not proceed with sufficient speed, because this would be one more reason for criticism. However I must say, Mr. President, for the satisfaction of this Assembly, that the Assembly has been very sensitive to this problem, even prior to approval of the treaty, and being aware of its objectives, has prepared reports and proposals designed to reinforce Western European Union's operational rôle. It is one of our constant concerns in the various committees. During this very session, we have approved or will approve very important reports to this effect.

In conclusion, what we have to do is to rise above the usual criticism, so that our organisation has the necessary operational resources at its disposal, and to this end a planning centre, or what we call the Cell, is essential.

Mr. President, once again I have to say that I do not agree with the name the Council has given this organisation. Mr. Baumel has just said that there can be no organisation for defence if there is no general staff. In fact, what we have here is a general staff which, for reasons of modesty or caution, we call by another name. Mr. President, a cell is a very small biological unit made up, according to the dictionary, of microscopic elements. If a community of 340 million such as ours wishes to have a common defence policy, it is only natural that we should have the appropriate instruments for it, always taking into account our involvement in the Atlantic Alliance.

The report of the Defence Committee and specifically the report drawn up by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, whom I would like to congratulate once more, reflects this view, and as a result its conclusions are extremely important. However, one conclusion in particular which needs to be taken into account is the review at the end of 1994, to see whether it is possible to promote and empower the mandates which the Cell is supposed to carry out. Consequently, Mr. President, I think that the reference in the final conclusion, to which Mr. Baumel referred in his speech, concerning the need for a European defence doctrine is very sound and in this respect the meeting on 17th October will be extremely useful.

The Treaty on European Union sets out the principles of this defence. I must say that they are commendable: defending the interests of the Union and defending independence – but what are these interests, where can our independence be attacked, when and how should we react? This must be the essence of a defence doctrine, and we are requesting the Council to formulate this task

appropriately. I am certain that our proposals after the October meeting could be very useful in this respect.

Finally, Mr. President, I would simply like to say that in order to carry out the function assigned to it of formulating a common defence policy, this Cell must have adequate personnel and material resources; as Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman's report says, one need only consider the organic sections of the Cell and the very important tasks assigned to them. It will be very difficult, with only forty members of staff and with problems connected with the means of communication with different countries, to carry out this task unless there is an increase in appropriate resources.

Now that we have the honour to have with us the President of the Council and the Council itself, we would like to stress that care must be taken to ensure the satisfactory organisation of this Cell which we hope will soon be called the WEU Centre for Defence Planning and Co-ordination.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is closed.

#### **4. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council**

*(Presentation of the second part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1411)*

**Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Minister of Defence of Luxembourg,  
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

The PRESIDENT. – I have great pleasure in welcoming Mr. Poos, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Defence Minister of Luxembourg. On this occasion, more importantly for us, he is the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Once again, WEU has made great strides under the Luxembourg aegis and your personal presidency, and I should like first and foremost to express the Assembly's appreciation to you. On this occasion, the enlargement of WEU to take in nine new countries, which was decided at the Kirchberg conference in Luxembourg on 9th May, has been the essential element of such progress. The following day, you met the Presidential Committee and two committees of the Assembly to inform them of the decisions taken and on that occasion we started the dialogue that is to continue today.

We are heartened by the fact that there is a seemingly higher profile for the WEU Assembly. Last night, we had a special reception, given by the President of the Assemblée Nationale, which was attended by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary of France. I must tell my French

*The President (continued)*

friends that that was much appreciated by the members of the Assembly.

As you know, Sir, the Assembly is primarily concerned with the political and military consequences of this major enlargement of WEU, which we believe will make our organisation the centrepiece of the European collective security system – the aim to which we all aspire. The Assembly is, however, also impelled to consider how the very large number of legal, financial and logistical problems raised by the transformation of our organisation might be resolved. However much good will it brings to bear upon these, it cannot resolve them alone. To resolve them, it needs to intensify its dialogue with the Council on those many issues.

We know that you are well aware of that, Mr. Poos, and we are grateful for all that you have done to initiate the changes that have taken place. We welcome the fact that we always know that, in you, we have someone who is especially committed to ensuring that the Assembly is able to play a proper rôle in the manifestation of Western European Union.

We are mindful, Mr. Poos, that this is a day when there are considerable matters of national importance in your country, where there was a general election only last Sunday. Therefore, we are even more grateful to you for sparing the time to be with us this morning. I invite you to come to the platform to deliver your speech.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great privilege for me to be able to address the parliamentary Assembly after the second and final Council of Ministers held under the Luxembourg chairmanship. I am therefore very pleased to thank the Assembly and its President for their kind invitation as another move towards enhancing political relations between the Assembly and the Council to which the Luxembourg chairmanship has attached very great importance.

I should also like to thank Sir Dudley Smith for his kind words to me and the Luxembourg chairmanship. I welcome his unanimous re-appointment as President of the Assembly. We all greatly appreciate his practical and constructive approach and his friendliness which has contributed so much to the progress of relations between the Council and the Assembly.

On the day following the Council meeting, I discussed the results with the Presidential Committee and the members of the Political and Defence

Committees. This well-established tradition reflects the importance which we attach to briefing the Assembly on the work of the Council and our concern that the Assembly should be first to receive our information.

How far have we advanced between The Hague platform and the Kirchberg declaration? While The Hague was the culmination of the first stage of the reactivation of WEU, the Kirchberg declaration marks a stage at which WEU's responsibilities, as Mr. Baumel remarks in his report on WEU and NATO, are upgraded as never before.

For me, this upgrading applies to WEU's dual vocation as defence component of the European Union and part and parcel of the Union's development and stiffener of the European pillar, of the Atlantic Alliance or, in fact, the pillar itself.

Over the past few years, therefore, WEU has thus started to respond to the new challenges arising after the end of the cold war.

At the Paris conference on stability in Europe, Chancellor Kohl and the French Prime Minister, Mr. Balladur, identified one of the major challenges of our times when they agreed that our historic duty was to help the states of Central and Eastern Europe now engaged in the process of reforms rejoin the European family and to involve them in the current process of unification in order to ensure lasting peace and stability in Europe.

Step by step the European Community followed by the Union has taken on these responsibilities. Practical evidence of this is to be found in the Europe Agreements geared to the objective of membership of the Union and the associated prospects opened to the Baltic states and by the stability pact in Europe.

What WEU had to do was to match in security and defence the political action of the Twelve. This process included the successive creation of the Forum of Consultation and then the consultation partnership.

The agreement reached last May at the WEU Ministerial Council in Luxembourg on a status of association for all partners in the Forum of Consultation delivered a clear and powerful message to the same effect. As my colleague Alain Juppé observed, the agreement on associate partner status is both a success for WEU and an important step forward in the organisation of the European family.

This major political initiative, which this Assembly had demanded several times, originates directly as you will remember from the joint declaration of the ministers for foreign affairs of Germany, Poland and France issued in Warsaw on 12th November 1993. On that occasion, Mr. Kinkel and Mr. Juppé declared their support for a closer

*Mr. Poos (continued)*

association of the Central European countries with the European and transatlantic security structures through a status of association with WEU.

The Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993 instructed the Permanent Council to reflect on an enhanced status and its content for those consultation partners who had already concluded or would be concluding a Europe Agreement with the European Union. Six months later in their Kirchberg declaration, the WEU ministers and their colleagues from the countries concerned, endorsed this development by offering and accepting the new status of association.

This significant advance forms part of the links now being forged between these Central European countries and the European institutions particularly as regards the Europe Agreements. It will therefore be a practical contribution to preparing these states for their integration into and possible accession to the European Union and offers the prospect of accession to WEU.

This initiative complements in large measure co-operation within the alliance through the partnership for peace and the stability pact which it was decided to draft a month ago in Paris.

This is the natural endorsement of a logical WEU policy designed to increase WEU's contribution to stability in Europe in particular through closer arrangements for consultation on security questions and the deepening of relations with the countries in question.

Before going into details of what the new status means, I should like to deal briefly with the scope of the associate partnership. This status involves no change to the modified Brussels Treaty.

The document on associate partner status was not signed but was agreed by ministers. This does not lessen the significance of the new status, its strong point being that it allows for close and frequent consultation at Permanent Council and Council level.

The fact is that the best guarantee for security lies in the constant determination of the western countries to make known political solidarity with their partners in Central Europe. It is acts much more than pacts which create stability and security. I would add that over and beyond pacts and treaties it is economic relations which create the necessary solidarity for political and military stability.

What does the new status offer? In practical terms the associate partners can regularly attend meetings of the Permanent Council. It is expected that half of these meetings will be at twenty-four

power level. I shall return shortly to the principles governing this arrangement.

The new associates will be regularly informed concerning the working groups which they may be invited to attend on an ad hoc basis, that is, according to the agenda. Furthermore, they are to be offered a liaison arrangement with the Planning Cell.

Several meetings of the WEU Council at twenty-four power level have already taken place. The constructive approach of all delegations and the frankness of discussions augur well for the future.

The associate partners can take part in discussions but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the member states. They can also associate themselves with decisions taken by member states concerning the tasks listed in the Petersberg declaration such as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis-management missions including peace-making.

The associate partners will be able to participate in the implementation of these decisions as well as in relevant exercises and planning unless a majority of the member states or half the member states including the presidency decide otherwise. They will also be able to offer forces for specific operations.

When it is agreed that they can join in such WEU operations by committing forces, they will have the same obligations as other participants as well as the right of involvement in the command structures and in the Council's subsequent decision-making process. The precise modalities of their participation, including their rights and obligations in each such WEU operation will be agreed on a case-by-case basis.

I should like to mention two final points also concerning attendance at Council meetings.

The terms for associate partner status take account of the need to maintain the effectiveness of our organisation. Thus, in the case of decisions to be taken or prepared under the terms of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty or on the substance of our dual rôle as defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance, we have reserved the right to convene Council meetings on the basis of the existing provisions that is, at fifteen or, if necessary, nine-power level.

This will keep our organisation working effectively. The associate partners have in fact expressed their complete understanding on this point.

Finally, I must say how pleased we are that this status will extend to all the partners in the former Forum of Consultation. Non-distinction is a good sign for public opinion in the countries concerned



*Mr. Poos (continued)*

and even beyond. It also meets a claim of the Assembly which has frequently stressed the importance of including the countries concerned in an appropriate manner in the only specifically European institution where security and defence questions are debated.

I must also observe that as an integral part of the European Union, WEU's new security initiative clearly forms part of the logic of European integration. At the same time the enhanced dialogue on security between the Central and Western European countries represents a major advance in establishing the future structure of security for our continent as a whole.

In this context I welcome the positive outcome of the negotiations for the accession of Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden to the European Union and also the fact that these countries have committed themselves *inter alia* to accept the progress made by the Community in common foreign and security policy, with its potential for the future.

I would recall here that in the run-up to accession, WEU is available for increased contacts if these countries so desire.

By voting yes in the referendum on the accession of Austria to the European Union, the people of Austria have decided to join the Union by two-thirds majority. This vote is of great significance for Europe. I am very pleased to note that Austria is already interested in observer status with WEU.

As part of WEU's growing rôle in promoting peace and security, on 9th May WEU ministers agreed on the importance of increased dialogue and exchanges of information between WEU and Russia on questions of common interest.

In this context I must stress the political importance for the stability of Europe of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic states. The WEU ministers would like to see the early conclusion of negotiations between Russia and Estonia on the same lines as the recent agreements between Russia and Latvia.

When the Ministerial Council met at Kirchberg, the ministers decided to reopen the dialogue with the Maghreb countries. It will first be extended to Egypt and then to the other Mediterranean countries not belonging to WEU.

At the beginning of my speech I mentioned the upgrading of WEU. Here an essential feature is the establishment of closer and more frequent links between our organisation and NATO. These two-way links are now in practical form and have a political and military content which future chairmanships will need to develop and reinforce.

The alliance summit of 10th and 11th January 1994 was a political first. As Mr. Baumel points out in his report, NATO for the first time in its history confirmed unambiguously its support for a European security and defence identity and agreed that WEU should be given greater responsibility as the European pillar of the alliance.

Admittedly, in its new strategic concept made public after the Rome meeting in November 1991, NATO stated that the development of a European security identity and defence rôle reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance would not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the alliance as a whole.

This is a rather vague and more ambiguous formula. A further step was taken at the Brussels summit on 10th January. It is therefore fair to say that at that summit the identity of WEU and the rôle it will have to play in Europe were formally recognised by our transatlantic allies.

The Luxembourg declaration of 22nd November recorded WEU's willingness to enter into wide military co-operation with NATO and specified a number of cases in which such an approach would be possible. This should give practical effect to the emergence of a European security and defence identity in the alliance and should strengthen its European pillar.

The Luxembourg declaration was reflected to a large extent in the decisions taken by the heads of state and government on 10th and 11th January. The heads of state and government supported the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance through Western European Union thus enabling the European allies to take on greater responsibility for their common security and defence. The alliance's organisation and resources will have to be adapted to further this process.

In this context I should like to stress the historic nature of the step whereby the alliance's collective resources are made available, on the basis of consultations within the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations carried out by the European allies in application of their common foreign and security policy. The heads of state and government stressed that the alliance's command structure and forces would have to be adapted to the need for speedy, flexible reaction. They endorsed the concept of multinational inter-army force groups – MIFG – better known in English as combined joint task forces, CJTF. This concept offers a means of speeding up the necessary operations including operations which may include countries not belonging to the alliance.

The Atlantic Alliance is developing this concept and, in co-ordination with WEU, will further its implementation so that separable but not separate

*Mr. Poos (continued)*

military capacities can be used by both NATO and WEU. This mutual undertaking by WEU and NATO is a vital step forward towards a common European defence concept. WEU appreciates the importance of co-ordination with the alliance through the use of the CJTF and the definition of separable but not separate military capacities. When the time comes it will only be through close co-ordination that WEU will be able to use CJTF under its command where appropriate.

To this end, the Permanent Council of WEU has set up a working group of military and political representatives. This group has the following tasks: first, to follow progress within the alliance, and identify and examine all aspects which may be of direct interest to WEU and more specifically the formation of the CJTF; second, to make recommendations for the presentation in due time of joint positions within the process of consultation with the alliance; third, to define procedures and machinery enabling WEU to use the resources of the alliance.

In parallel, the politico-military group will evaluate operational requirements in detail in order to work out the necessary capacities and resources. This group's work has so far gone ahead satisfactorily. WEU therefore intends to seize the favourable political occasion offered by the new political set-up which influenced the summit decisions. Indeed, the enhancement of WEU's operational capacities demonstrates our determination to establish ourselves as the European organisation for common security and defence and as a credible participant in military matters.

The Planning Cell is continuing its work on forces answerable to WEU. It has been instructed to continue producing an inventory of force groups enabling WEU to take on any tasks which may be entrusted first to it such as humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks and in case of major crises, peace-making tasks.

At Luxembourg ministers also took note of a basic document on peace-keeping. In this context, WEU accepted the request from the European Union asking our organisation to help in the administration of the city of Mostar, through the Union, by organising and supervising a single police force in that divided city and, for certain tasks, working with police seconded by WEU member states.

This integrated contribution to the administration of Mostar taken up by the Union is a practical example of co-operation between the European Union and Western European Union as provided in the Maastricht Treaty. It also demonstrates WEU's willingness to take on responsibilities under decisions of the Union having implications

for defence and the capacity for practical action by an upgraded WEU.

At the end of the tripartite meeting between the European Union and the Croats and Bosnians, a memorandum of understanding was approved ad referendum by the Croats and Muslims last Thursday. It was agreed that WEU should speed up its plans for sending what we estimate should be about 130 to 200 police.

Quite clearly, the question of the European administration of Mostar cannot be isolated from the general context of the Bosnian conflict. Despite the failure of the parties to agree at this stage, the situation on the ground has improved slightly as a result of the firm intervention by the Atlantic Alliance for the granting of access to Sarajevo and Gorazde.

Last week a cease-fire was agreed to last one month. This time should be used to work out the terms of a final cease-fire agreement, including arrangements for the separation of forces and disengagement. Political negotiations should also be started yet again on the basis of the Geneva ministerial declaration of 13th May which was signed by the European Union.

I am glad to be able to say that the new approach by the international community repeats most of the terms of the European plan of action of November 1993.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, when Luxembourg took over the presidency of WEU it was well aware that the organisation was embarking upon a key and perhaps decisive period in its history. A year later, Europe's security and defence structure is far from complete, but its components are now in place. With the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union a step has been taken towards the construction of Europe and the establishment of a European security and defence identity.

As an integral part of the European Union, Western European Union is prepared to play its part in areas where it has competence. This is demonstrated by its willingness to help with the administration of Mostar by the European Union.

Working relations with the European Union have now been established. Similarly, this year has seen the establishment of formal relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. WEU must now grasp with both hands the opportunity to become an operational organisation capable of fulfilling increased expectations and discharging the greater responsibilities entrusted to it.

To this end it must work hard in two directions: to complete without delay the development of its own operational resources and to start work on the definition of a common European defence policy.

*Mr. Poos (continued)*

The Assembly has many times drawn attention to the lack of a security concept in Europe and has placed all its hopes for the formulation and implementation of such a concept in the Council of WEU.

In Luxembourg on 9th May, the ministers instructed the Permanent Council to begin work on the formulation of a common European defence policy and with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at the next ministerial meeting to be held in the Netherlands in mid-November. This exercise will be decisive both for the future of WEU as an independent institution and for the stability and security of Europe as a whole. I would add that this WEU report will be of vital importance for the intergovernmental conference due to open in 1996.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, over the coming months WEU will have to respond to great and demanding expectations. It is my profound personal belief that with the help of the Assembly the Netherlands presidency will be able to meet them in full.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Poos, for that very wide-ranging review of our activities.

I have been notified that four people wish to ask questions.

First, I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – In the resolution on future relations between the European Union, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, which was adopted by the European Parliament – the so-called De Gucht report – in February, it was recommended, inter alia, that the European Parliament should scrutinise the relevant decisions of the WEU Council, address questions and recommendations to the WEU Council and regularly invite representatives of the WEU Council to report on its activities. What is the reaction of the Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council? How do those demands fit in with the fact that under the Brussels Treaty, WEU has the sole legitimate powers to deal with defence matters? Will he, therefore, unequivocally reject those demands?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I did not quite grasp the point of this question but it is one for the European Union rather than WEU. The presidency of the Council of the European Union is prepared to supply the Assembly with all the information it may require on documents. Clearly, decisions will have to be

taken case-by-case. Some documents are confidential while others come from organisations other than our own, so that we do not control transmission to the Assembly. A *modus vivendi* which will give you full satisfaction could be worked out with the presidency. I will support your request and will press for sympathetic consideration.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Poos, since it was decided at Kirchberg to create the status of association for the Central and Eastern European countries, I would like to ask, firstly, what legal implications flow from this partnership, and in particular what legal effects and potential financial consequences the Kirchberg declaration will have for the associate partners, given that it calls for the parliamentarians from associate member countries to participate in the activities of our Assembly, and when this partnership will enter into force. That was not clear from your statement.

My second question follows on from what Lord Finsberg said, but in relation not to the EU but to WEU. How can we ensure in future that the Assembly plays a greater part, even at the opinion-forming stage, in the activities of the working parties and bodies that have been created in WEU – including the Planning Cell – so that it can respond more satisfactorily to the rights and duties under Article 10 of the Brussels Treaty? In so doing we will certainly ensure respect for the confidential nature of these working documents, as in the national parliaments. There must be procedures we can learn from. It is important for appropriate procedures to be formulated, not just under your presidency but also under that of your successor as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, so that we may benefit from them. That is acutely necessary.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I made it clear in my speech that this new association agreement with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states has no legal implications. It has a moral value. These countries now feel they are members of our family and can take part in half our meetings. WEU has given them a status that goes further than NATO's partnership for peace.

It will certainly have financial consequences. One of the presidency's tasks will be to persuade the member states' governments to provide the finance for carrying out these political obligations. I also see it as the task of every member of this Assembly to urge their government, and in particular their minister of finance, to ensure that

*Mr. Poos (continued)*

their country's financial contributions to WEU are increased in next year's budget.

As for when the declaration enters into force, let me emphasise that the association came into force immediately. The new partners have already attended Permanent Council meetings. They will also attend the next Council of Ministers meeting.

On the question of the Assembly's participation, I have said on several occasions that it is up to the relevant presidency to ensure that the procedures are pragmatic and to consult the Assembly at an early stage of decision-making. That will also be possible within the new group set up by the Council to consider the common European defence policy to be put before the 1996 intergovernmental conference. This task is expected to take eighteen months. It will be quite possible in that period for your Assembly to offer its own input to the Council, for the Council to refer back to the presidency of the Assembly and for this to result in very effective co-operation.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS (*United Kingdom*). – Let us consider the operations of WEU within the former republic of Yugoslavia. You are Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Will you tell us which countries have allowed sanctions against Serbia to be broken? If it is not your job to tell us, whose job is it?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Not a single country of Western European Union or the European Union has allowed sanctions to be broken. If you have precise information you can give it to the authorities, but I know of no facts to allow you to conclude that any government has allowed sanctions to be broken.

The PRESIDENT. – I misled the Assembly by saying that there were four questioners. We have two late runners, but the list is now concluded.

I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, I should first like to congratulate you on your speech and your wise words. As you know, this morning we are discussing a report on the WEU Planning Cell. We were pleased to note what you had to say about this institution and its importance in making the organisation of WEU operational; this is what it should naturally be because we now have associate members and other countries will be joining us. The report submitted by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman states in particular that the Planning Cell's questions as to

which forces could be provided by member states mostly met with negative replies, and further planning had to be given up. A little further on the report says: "In the framework of the planning for the protection of safe areas the Planning Cell was also asked to prepare a study on the possibility for the establishment of multinational formations". As the replies were confused and hardly supportive, work was again stopped in this case. I should like to know your own reaction as Chairman-in-Office of the Council and that of the Council itself too. I presume that the intention is not to abandon such planning, which is interesting, but to analyse the reasons for the situation and take measures to avoid its repetition.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – As its name indicates, the Planning Cell's work is mainly concerned with the future. At this stage at least there has never been any thought of setting up a single military command structure. Such structures will be created case-by-case and operation-by-operation. It could also be imagined that a limited number of countries will take part in a given operation and that non-member countries, associated countries and associate partners will all contribute. Each operation will have to be mounted from scratch and the Planning Cell will have to confine itself to thinking generally about case-by-case personnel and equipment requirements.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – I believe that the Luxembourg presidency of WEU was requested by the Council security group to submit two draft studies to WEU, one on security in Central and Eastern Europe and the other on security in the Mediterranean, to help the Council arrive at a decision.

What has happened to the draft study on security in the Mediterranean? As we all know, the changing political situation in the Maghreb and the growing threats on the horizon should make these studies and a decision by WEU matters of priority. I would welcome some details.

Now that you are handing over the presidency I should like you to know, Mr. President, that many of us here hold you in high esteem and wish to thank you for the major rôle you have played and the relations you have established with our Assembly which are very different from what they have been at other times.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxem-*

*Mr. Poos (continued)*

*bourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I should first like to thank Mr. Baumel for his last remark. Luxembourg presidencies have always tried, by establishing close relations, to give first place to the body which they regard as of prime importance namely, the parliamentary institution. Before becoming Chairman-in-Office of the Council I was on the opposition benches in parliament and I can assure you that I always read the reports published and adopted by the Assembly most attentively. These reports go deeply into the subject of security and defence in Europe and the ideas expressed have in truth shaped the European identity of which we speak so often. This reference to the work of the Assembly is therefore vital. I trust that my successors will make it their business to follow in the same direction.

The preparatory work on the two drafts is well advanced. The Council is well aware that side by side with eastern security there is southern security. More and more is heard of this in the European institutions, not only in the Council of WEU but also in the councils of the European Union.

It is now quite certain that we shall have to add a southern dimension to our thinking on security. Successful enlargement of the Union over the last few months to include eastern countries should be repeated with the southern in a form – association, collaboration or consultation – to be decided.

The Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Shimon Peres, yesterday repeated a suggestion originally discussed here some years ago for the creation of a CSCM to match the successful example of the CSCE. We should remember that the CSCE was set up at the height of the cold war when we regarded the Soviet Union as a potential enemy. Despite this we were able to sit down at the same table with the Soviet Union and its satellites to discuss several baskets covering economic questions, security and disarmament and human rights.

Why not repeat this exercise with the Mediterranean countries, embracing all the countries of the Mashrek and the Maghreb? We could create a forum and little by little achieve a result. This will perhaps take about twenty years as in the case of the CSCE but progress could be made on questions concerning economic relations, human rights and disarmament, and security relations could be forged with a greater element of trust than at present.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – May I refer to the answer that you gave to my colleague, Mr. Davis? A year or two ago, I asked the then

President of the Council of Ministers about the breach of sanctions and he replied that, yes, the Council of Ministers had a great deal of information but that it would remain confidential. In my question, I referred to the resources of the organisation being used to tighten up the sanctions arrangements.

The problem is that – I hope that the Minister will respond to the point – at the moment, there may be a bit of a breathing space in former Yugoslavia, but no one can be sure that the killing will not resume. If we have allowed that breathing space to provide further opportunity for the re-arming of the military forces in that unhappy area, we shall be guilty, shall we not, of serious irresponsibility. Does the Minister accept that there are members of the Assembly who believe that we should not only ensure that member states continue to observe the embargo but that we should use what influence we have to deter and prevent the re-arming of the factions that have been responsible for so much of the killing that is destabilising Europe as a whole?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I have not the slightest difference with the honourable parliamentarian about the importance of sanctions and of the aim of maintaining them as tightly as possible, at the level of manpower that we have at our disposal on the Danube and in the Adriatic. It is of the utmost importance that no arms and ammunition flow into the territory of former Yugoslavia, especially during this period when there is a glimmer of hope after the Geneva decision and the cease-fire. In the name of the Council, let me say that we should invite all our governments to be very strict on that and not to allow any flow of goods, especially military goods, into the region.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pastusiak.

Mr. PASTUSIAK (*Observer from Poland*). – Thank you for your interesting presentation on the status and obligations of the new associate partners. We consider that to be a step in the right direction, although we hope that, some time soon, it will be followed by an even longer step. You stressed the importance of the military co-operation between NATO and WEU. Are you satisfied with the present organisational structure of that co-ordination of military co-operation, or would you like to see a revision and improvement?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I should like to welcome members from the asso-

*Mr. Poos (continued)*

ciate partner countries. I am glad that they take the opportunity to pose questions to the Chairman-in-Office and other speakers. It is an extraordinary moment for me.

Mr. PASTUSIAK (*Observer from Poland*). – And for us, too.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Our relations with NATO are new; we are just starting the procedure and we have not yet acquired experience, so we are not speaking from the basis of knowing how those relations could develop. Given what has happened in the past month, we are entirely satisfied with the way that those relations are operating.

The PRESIDENT. – You will have gathered from the variety and number of questions, Mr. Poos, and the intense interest in so many different subjects and the widened activities of WEU, that there is an enormous interest, growing all the time, among members. I think that we shall be returning to many of those questions. I was interested to hear two of my British colleagues asking about sanctions, which exercise us considerably. There is also a strong undercurrent of feeling about the alleged predatory aspirations of the European Parliament towards us.

I am sure that we shall be returning to all of those issues although, alas, you will not be Chairman-in-Office because, as you rightly reminded us, the post passes to the Dutch. However, we know that you will be around with us, as you have been for a long time. All your activities have been much appreciated. We have always regarded you as a friend and as a supporter of the Assembly. Long may that be so. We look forward to seeing you again, representing your country.

Ladies and gentlemen, I now adjourn the Assembly for five minutes.

*(The sitting was suspended at 11.30 a.m. and resumed at 11.40 a.m.)*

### **5. Address by General Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe**

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by General George Joulwan, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. I welcome him on your behalf to the Assembly. We also have here the Commander-in-Chief Channel, Admiral Sir Hugo White. He is here for a ceremony which we hope to hold immediately after General Joulwan's address. All members will be welcome to watch the short but significant ceremony.

When I met General Joulwan for the first time last November at the inauguration of the European corps in Strasbourg, shortly after he took over, I was struck by his strong knowledge of Europe. Of course, I had neglected to realise that he had spent half his military career in Europe and, therefore, to note that there could be no one better suited to the rôle in which he had been cast. However, he is no paper-working, planning general such as we sometimes meet in the military nowadays.

General Joulwan is a professional soldier who has seen active combat duty and served with great distinction in Vietnam. He has held many posts in the United States and has held significant posts in Europe. He has the most important and timely task of developing his command to meet the new challenges and in implementing the North Atlantic Council's decision to make NATO assets available to WEU. The combined joint task force concept is also giving his staff much cause for original thought.

Colleagues will remember in this very chamber the address made last December by Manfred Wörner, the Secretary-General of NATO. It is logical and sensible that SACEUR should follow on and address us about how he sees things. Therefore, I have great pleasure in asking General Joulwan to address us. He will be happy to answer questions afterwards.

Sir, the tribune is yours.

General JOULWAN (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – Thank you very much, Sir Dudley, for that warm introduction. Secretary-General van Eekelen, Mr. Poos, and distinguished members of the WEU Assembly, I am deeply honoured to be at the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly. For me it is indeed a privilege. Thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts about the relevance of NATO and its relationship to WEU.

I shall diverge from my text briefly to welcome again my comrade Admiral Sir Hugo White, who will be leaving the Channel Command at the end of this month, but will still remain an integral part of operations, both as an MSC for SACLANT and a PSC for Allied Command, Europe. It is good to have my good comrade and friend here with us.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is a time of great importance in Europe – both for NATO and Western European Union. Less than two weeks ago we commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the Normandy D-Day landings. I was privileged to participate in those ceremonies and in doing so was reminded again of the horrors of war, and of the price that must be paid for the lack of vigilance and preparedness.

I am here just a week after the President of the United States addressed the French National Assembly here in Paris, and urged continued

*General Joulwan (continued)*

allied unity as we face the new challenges of Europe.

I come here today as an alliance officer as well as an American officer – and as the eleventh Supreme Allied Commander Europe, since General Eisenhower. I am here not only to address you, but to listen to you on the challenges ahead, and to learn your views on how NATO and WEU can best complement one another in realising peace, freedom, and justice for all nations in Europe.

As I address this distinguished group today, I am reminded of General Eisenhower's remarks at the newscast announcing his appointment as SACEUR in 1951. Eisenhower said: "Our hope remains the achievement of peace based on understanding and forbearance, the only sure foundation for peace... We should examine our current situation fearlessly and clearly, neither shutting our eyes to obvious dangers nor permitting fear to warp our judgment." He concluded by saying: "One of the great questions before us is the will and capacity of Europe to co-operate effectively in this aim. Unless there exists in Europe a will to defend itself, no amount of outside help can possibly make it secure. A nation's defence must spring from its own soul; and the soul cannot be imported."

General Eisenhower would be pleased since his inaugural speech as SACEUR with the results of the past four decades. Europe has met the challenges of the post-world war two period with the same commitment and determination demonstrated on the beaches of Normandy fifty years ago. Today NATO and Western European Union represent the continuing will of Europe to defend itself.

In the half-century since D-Day, there have been impressive successes for the allied brotherhood called NATO: the end of the cold war; the collapse of the Berlin wall and the iron curtain; the defeat of communism; the unification of Germany; and the spread of democracy.

I have been privileged to witness most of these successes. For over thirty years I have been coming back and forth to Europe. I have commanded troops at every level from platoon leader to corps commander and now SACEUR. I was a young lieutenant platoon leader when the Berlin wall went up and a lieutenant-general corps commander when it was torn down. I remember that day extremely well. It was a clear sunny autumn day. There was great uncertainty about exactly what would happen, so I flew to the inter-German border to be with my troops of the famous 11th Armoured Cavalry Regiment. It was an unforgettable sight! Lined up at each crossing site in the corps sector for as far as the eye could see were thousands of Trabant automobiles or "Trabis".

As East Germans crossed over to freedom, thousands of West Germans greeted them with flowers, hugged them and openly wept. It was an unforgettable day!

Two of my soldiers on patrol along the border in an army HUMMV vehicle – that is our new jeep – got caught in a traffic jam or "stau" with hundreds of East Germans in their Trabis. Everything was at a standstill. The two soldiers saw me later at an observation post near the border and excitedly told me what happened.

"General," one said, "We were caught in this traffic jam with thousands of East Germans. As we were stopped, hundreds of East Germans got out of their Trabis, hugged us, and thanked us for their freedom". The other 18-year old GI quietly said to me, "General, now we know why we are here".

"Now we know why we are here". I shall remember that response for a long time. For nearly four decades, millions of American GIs came to Europe – for two or three years at a time – as a clear sign of United States commitment and resolve. They joined millions of allied soldiers united in a common cause against a clear threat – Soviet communism. These soldiers walked their post, kept the watch, did their tour of duty for two or three years, and returned to civilian life. The threat was clear, many served, and most understood why they were here.

But today how would the troops answer the question? Why are we here? What is the vision for the new Europe and the new NATO? How can NATO and WEU co-operate in this new environment to promote stability, peace, and prosperity?

That is what I intend to discuss with you today – as a soldier who has spent over fifteen years in the alliance; as one who sees great opportunity to consolidate the gains of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe; and as a father and grandfather who wants to build a better life of peace and prosperity for his children and grandchildren.

So my intent today is to provide you with my views, based on an assessment of the past eight months as SACEUR. As a simple soldier, I will not attempt to discuss the political or economic dimensions in detail. Others more qualified than I can address those issues. But, up front, let me give you the points I want to make.

First, NATO is as relevant today as it was in the past. Second, a new NATO is emerging – flexible and adaptable and built on the firm foundation of past successes. Third, Western European Union is emerging as the strong European pillar within the alliance. And NATO is adapting its structure and will provide assets to WEU in order to ensure success whenever committed. Fourth, I am optimistic and excited about the future of Europe.



*General Joulwan (continued)*

As I look around this noble Assembly today, I am reminded of the reasons that brought about our collective success. I am reminded that the collapse of communism was brought about not solely by the strength of our arms, but by the strength of our common commitment. Our shared values and ideals were as fundamental to freedom's victory as were our ships, planes and tanks. It is on this foundation, built on the valour at Normandy and the vigilance of the past forty years – that a new Europe is emerging.

Clearly the collapse of the wall and the defeat of communism were not the end of the struggle. There is still work to be done. Now is the time to consolidate the gains for democracy; to promote stability with progress towards democracy; to enhance the dignity and worth of the individual; to create a climate for investment, economic growth and prosperity for all the peoples of Europe.

What an opportunity we have. A Europe free and whole, democratic and peaceful from the Atlantic to the Urals. Such an opportunity comes seldom in one's lifetime. We cannot, we must not fail. Now is the time for optimism, not pessimism! For imagination and innovation, not gloom and doom! For pro-active, not reactive policies; for co-operation and understanding, not petty on-upmanship.

We must act together in this historic time as one team with a clear vision of the future. Our deeds must continue to complement our words, no matter how large our democratic neighbourhood becomes.

A genuine partnership among all the nations of Europe will promote the mutual trust and confidence, the solidarity and, above all, the friendship, that has bound Western Europe together and allowed it to mature into the democratic bastion we live in today.

For forty years, Western Europe remained stable and developed as a prosperous region with strength derived from the transatlantic alliance. These transatlantic bonds helped create a powerful alliance with common procedures, methods, goals and doctrine. NATO's commonality, like its commitment, was indispensable for building a prosperous Western Europe.

I say that, with these same principles of commitment and common effort, NATO has adapted its programmes to promote the same growth in Central and Eastern Europe. Through its adaptation, NATO is meeting the challenge to build a true partnership for peace.

NATO's partnership for peace programme is clearly one of the ways to extend bonds of strength

and stability throughout Europe and to fulfil Europe's great potential. Partnership for peace provides to interested nations the opportunity to work with NATO and build common procedures, common doctrine, and common understanding on civilian and military matters. The concept of interaction with each other involves the militaries of Central and Eastern Europe countries not only in the democratisation process but in peace-keeping activities, training and operations.

Partnership for peace begins an evolutionary process to build mutual trust and confidence beyond the structure of NATO. My conversations with Eastern European leaders, civilian and military, has led me to conclude that they understand the benefits of this approach. With commitment, common understanding, and common goals comes stability, and the atmosphere for the growth of democracy and prosperity.

That is why I am proud to report that our partnership for peace is moving forward. Twenty nations have already signed up and we have opened a PCC building near my headquarters in Mons. I invite you to come there. In the entrance way, there is a stained glass window with a symbol of this co-operation. In the entrance way, there are now thirty-five flags, not NATO on one side and partners on the other, but all thirty-five flags integrated alphabetically from left to right. It is a great symbol of the new NATO and of the new Europe. Soon liaison officers from our partnership nations will join NATO officers in the partnership co-ordination cell. Later this year, we will see the first partnership military exercises developed by this cell take place in Poland followed by one in the Netherlands and one maritime operation, by SACLANT.

PFP is already a success, and our joint activities in peace-keeping and exercises are the best route to exploit this success. It will bring our best military assets together, that is, our young officers and service men and women and the relationships we hope they develop. Their common understanding and commitment are a wise investment in the future security posture of Europe.

But, partnership for peace is a two-way street. The extent of co-operation will be largely up to the partner countries and will depend on their individual requirements and contributions. We in NATO want to learn from our partners, and NATO will adapt in the process. Our commitment to the integrated structure and to a common defence will continue, but we will be open to learn how to use innovative, new tools to advance stability and progress.

It is my hope that Russia soon will join the partnership for peace programme. Russia is a great power, and Russia is key in determining future stability in Europe. Therefore, we must continue



*General Joulwan (continued)*

to engage Russia and the republics of the former Soviet Union. We should not isolate Russia nor move the former iron curtain a few hundred kilometres to the east. Likewise, it is important to realise that Russia is in a transition period and there will be difficult times ahead. But we must stay engaged with Russia and not let this important opportunity to build a Europe at peace escape us.

Today, we face a set of concerns totally different from those we confronted during the cold war. To adapt to the new environment, NATO developed its new strategic concept and agreed to support, on a case-by-case basis, United Nations and CSCE peace-keeping activities. NATO has changed.

We drastically modified our forces and command structures, including the restructuring of our headquarters in the central and north-western regions. We also most recently developed the concept of combined joint task forces.

In these ways our new NATO has been reshaping itself to engage in a wider spectrum of possible taskings, some in concert with United Nations mandates and actions. However, if the alliance is to employ military forces to implement United Nations Security Council resolutions, it must clearly understand the United Nations political objectives. What is more, the United Nations must appreciate the limits and requirements associated with military operations.

Over the past months, we have come a long way in clarifying our views, but we still need to refine our relationship with the United Nations in order to operate more effectively.

The next imperative in NATO's new crisis-management responsibilities is that of the political-military interface. In time of crisis, we must plan and execute our military options under clear, concise and timely political guidance.

Nowhere has such clear and timely guidance driven the success of multinational operations and United Nations-NATO co-operation more than in former Yugoslavia. Operating in conjunction with WEU forces, NATO is doing everything asked of it, and we are doing it well.

In discussing operations in Bosnia, it is important to remember that there is a theatre of operations in former Yugoslavia – not just Sarajevo or Gorazde. In this theatre of operations, NATO is in support of United Nations Security Council resolutions in command and control, of air denial and maritime embargo operations. The ground operations in former Yugoslavia, however, are under the command of the United Nations or UNPROFOR. The important point here is that there is no unity of command. However, we are trying to develop a unity of purpose and a unity of effort.

NATO operations in the air over Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the maritime embargo are being executed to a high standard. In Operation Deny Flight, NATO aircraft have flown over 35 000 sorties in support of UNPROFOR forces and prevented fixed wing aircraft from attacking Bosnian civilian and military targets. The shootdown of four Galeb aircraft which violated the no-fly zone on 28th February is indicative of the high state of training of NATO fighters and AWACS crews.

Likewise, Operation Sharp Guard has been a great success. Over 30 000 vessels have been challenged in the Adriatic in support of the United Nations-imposed embargo. The recent incident with the Lido II attests to the co-operation and skill of the WEU-NATO team in the Adriatic.

Both operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard are non-Article 5 missions being executed within NATO's proven command and control structures. NATO is flexible. NATO can adapt.

NATO has, in response to the United Nations request, passed ultimatums this year creating exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Those ultimatums are being complied with and thousands of lives have been saved. The agreement between the Croats and the Bosnians is also a positive sign as is the recent cease-fire among all warring factions. Again, while there is not unity of command in operations in former Yugoslavia there is a unity of effort and purpose with the United Nations. Such co-operation is essential for success.

The point I want to make is that good command and control remains vital to success in all future types of military operations. I would urge this Assembly to consider carefully this aspect in future WEU operations. NATO can provide a combined joint task force headquarters to WEU but clear command and control lines and rules of engagement are absolutely vital for success.

Ironically, at a time when nations are drastically downsizing their militaries, we face the highest probability of military forces being committed. My plea to you today is to help me with your member nations to continue to support adequate defence forces for Europe. The world is still a dangerous place and the best peace dividend continues to be peace.

I am an advocate of a strong Europe and a strong European security and defence identity. After all, NATO and WEU share the same aims – security and stability in Europe – as well as for the defence and advancement of democracy.

At the same time, I am convinced that even a strong European pillar cannot and should not carry the total burden. I believe, as President Clinton said here just two weeks ago, that transatlantic solidarity remains a pillar for managing security

*General Joulwan (continued)*

as well. Accordingly, NATO remains the only instrument that enables Europe and America to consult, and when necessary, to act together. NATO is still the glue which binds the two continents together.

As Secretary-General Wörner stated, when he addressed this Assembly last fall, "It is important that on both sides of the Atlantic a greater European rôle is not regarded as a threat but as a precondition for our common long-term security".

With this said, I see WEU as the bridge between NATO and the European Union. I see WEU as the European pillar in NATO. We have much in common. Our aim of stability, peace and democracy in Europe is the same. We must co-operate to the maximum extent and to complement one another in the attainment of our goals.

We are on the right track. Our joint arrangements for operations in the Adriatic were important milestones in co-operation. The agreement making the European corps available to NATO in certain contingencies is on the mark.

In addition, SACEUR has long had a cordial and active relationship with WEU. The Assembly's Political and Defence Committees and your President, Sir Dudley, are no strangers to SHAPE. Within the first months in my command, I invited his Excellency, Minister Poos, to SHAPE and I visited your Council and your Planning Cell in Brussels. My aim is to achieve full transparency between our organisations through regular liaison. That transparency will be necessary with regard to forces answerable to WEU, as these forces largely come from NATO-assigned forces.

I therefore welcome the proposal in the report of your Political Committee on the evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU. It calls for increasing the means and enlarging the field of action of your Planning Cell by giving it a true rôle of operational co-ordination between WEU and NATO based on overall guidelines.

I also wholeheartedly endorse the combined joint task force concept as a means to facilitate contingency operations with participating nations outside the alliance. We can do this in a manner that provides separable but not separate military capabilities to be employed by NATO or WEU.

Just last week in Istanbul, the NAC ministerial meeting said in its communiqué, "Close co-operation and co-ordination between NATO and WEU will continue to be developed. The summit decisions have set the course for our co-operation, including the readiness of the alliance to make its collective assets available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in

pursuit of their common foreign and security policy".

Based on our experience in crisis-management operations and on continuing political guidance, we at SHAPE have, in co-operation with SACLAN and CINCHAN, developed a concept for a combined joint task force headquarters and have forwarded this concept to our military and political bodies in Brussels.

The concept envisages the creation of a flexible CJTF headquarters. It allows the organisation and size of the headquarters to be decided when the mission, composition of the force, and its area of operation are known. I would like to see this concept become a reality in 1995.

Unfortunately, the WEU Planning Cell was unable to participate in the development of the concept. We, of course, maintained an informal exchange of views, but it was only in early May that your Council authorised the WEU Planning Cell to sit in as observers on our forum for handling the military aspects of the CJTF headquarters concept.

From my perspective, the sooner we get together regarding CJTF, the better. It is to our mutual benefit to share a common view about CJTF's very complex task and its resource implications.

Moreover, it is my personal opinion that there cannot be separate command structures for Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. All our assets must be available for our common defence, which remains the central purpose of our alliance.

Despite these various considerations, the bottom line regarding all of what NATO and WEU do is really, very simple: when the political decision is made, we will field headquarters and forces that must be well trained and capable of doing the mission assigned. The people of our nations expect us when called upon to execute our military tasks successfully and to take care of their sons and daughters in the process.

I am confident that drawing upon the same spirit of co-operation and commitment that has made Operation Sharp Guard such an unqualified success, we, together, can tackle the tough issues.

Together, we can make a truly significant contribution to European security and defence and become a strategic partnership which will serve generations to come.

The future is not only challenging but filled with great potential. We know why we are here. I am excited and optimistic about the future because we have laid a solid foundation in the past. Our relationship is built on solid rock and constructed of good concrete and mortar. We are not only allies and partners, we are friends. And as we enter these uncharted waters at the end of

*General Joulwan (continued)*

this decade and into the twentieth century, I am reminded of Ike's command in launching the D-Day invasion fifty years ago, when he simply said, "OK, let's go".

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, General Joulwan. I shall thank you formally at the end of proceedings. You have kindly agreed to answer questions, so without further ado I shall call the questioners – first, Mr. Baumel from France.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – You have referred, General, to the making available of NATO command structures and troops to WEU in the CJTF framework, which is new. Which authority will be taking this decision? What procedures – NATO or WEU – will the forces be subject to? Who will decide on their scale and on their withdrawal when necessary?

Some very important work is currently being conducted on this subject in highly technical working groups. Would you be kind enough to give us a little information about it.

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Joulwan.

General JOULWAN (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – Thank you for that question. Let me be clear. We, the military, are still awaiting further political guidance on the CJTF from NATO and the NAC. We have been working on a narrow set of instructions to develop the concept within the NATO framework. We are anxious to get the requirements from WEU and other organisations so that we can begin to have that dialogue. Let me speak candidly. As I said earlier, the sooner that we do that, the better. We operate under political guidance and we are still awaiting that guidance. I am sure that all the questions that have been asked about what would be made available and how it would be made available will be answered in the political guidance that we receive.

In Istanbul, the phrase used was that it would be in consultation with the North Atlantic Council. That is important because that body will approve the giving of those assets to WEU. From the military standpoint, we can make those available. We have done some work that sets the broader framework of what the high end of the spectrum would look like. If we had to commit a large task force to a theatre operation, that could be scaled back for disaster relief or any other lower operation. All assets would be made available, but that would have to be approved by the North Atlantic Council. I tried to stay within the guidance that I have been given, but I have not yet received all the political guidance necessary to answer that as clearly as I would like.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome the General's reference to the sacrifice at Normandy. Does he accept that the lesson of that sacrifice is the need to develop effective international authority? One welcomes his comments about the United Nations.

Let me refer to NATO and WEU operations to deny the supply of arms to the warring factions in former Yugoslavia. The General said that that was a resounding success, and the reports that the Assembly has received have shown how successful it was. However, does he accept that one consequence, which may not be so welcome, is that those exercises have been so successful that they have persuaded those who wish to sell arms in former Yugoslavia that they have to find other routes? Is it not the case that both WEU and, in this case NATO, have information about the supply of arms into former Yugoslavia which, regrettably, has remained confidential for the past three or four years and has therefore been conducive to the encouragement of maintained conflict in the area? Is it not time that NATO and WEU were a great deal more open about those matters, as those matters have led to many people being killed?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Joulwan.

General JOULWAN (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – I will try to answer that portion of the question that lies within my professional competence – the military side. You have rightly brought up many political and diplomatic issues that need to be addressed by others more qualified than me. One ought not to say that, because of the success of WEU and NATO working effectively together, which has prevented the flow of arms, other problems have arisen. It has had a clear impact, to the point where the embargo has become a strategic issue for a settlement. That is why it is important to refer to what is occurring in former Yugoslavia as a theatre of operations. We have been adaptable, in NATO, to twenty kilometres around Sarajevo and around Gorazde. NATO's credibility is also in the embargo, to the point where one side, in particular, wants it lifted as a concession for a peace settlement. What is important is understanding all of that.

I am so proud of the operation that is taking place down there, not only in the sense of the embargo. Let me share with the Assembly one incident. Five days after I assumed command – as was pointed out, I have been raised in this alliance, through every echelon of command – I flew to Italy, went out on a ship and talked to a British commodore who had WEU and NATO forces working for him. He had just been illuminated by a Styx missile from a former Yugoslav boat. His action was extremely brave. He did all the right things. I said to him, "Commodore, do you understand your mission?" "Yes, sir." "Do you

*General Joulwan (continued)*

understand your rules of engagement?" "Yes, sir." "Do you know that you have the authority and responsibility to execute those rules of engagement?" "Yes, sir."

Some forty years of effort went into that. For forty years, we have worked together. WEU is integrated into that. That process must continue. Regardless of where you put that spotlight of operation, whether it is in the Adriatic or some other place, or whoever is involved – WEU, NATO or the United Nations – I urge that we maintain those procedures and that command and control.

I will leave the other points to be answered by politicians who are better qualified than me.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Borderas.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – General Joulwan, I hope to have the pleasure of meeting you personally next week when the Defence Committee of the Spanish Senate visits Brussels.

You have spoken of the disappearance of the opposing blocs at the end of the cold war and told us some interesting anecdotes relating to the dismantling of the Berlin wall.

At this very moment we are witnessing the integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in NATO's partnership for peace. Yet in each of our countries and in this Assembly, too, there is concern about the stock of nuclear weapons in Europe. Mr. De Decker's excellent report, which is to be debated tomorrow, deals with just this subject of the future of nuclear weapons.

What, in your view, is to become of the stock of nuclear weapons which western armies and NATO continue to maintain in Europe, and what future do you see for the existing stocks of nuclear weapons?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Joulwan.

General JOULWAN (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – Muchas gracias. I hope that I understood correctly that question about nuclear arms, but let me use the broader term, weapons of mass destruction. I think that the trend is in the right direction. The alliance has dramatically reduced the number of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons. We are engaged bilaterally with some countries – for example, Russia and former republics of the Soviet Union – in doing the same thing. Secretary of Defence Perry, after a recent visit to Russia and those former republics with nuclear weapons, gave a good report on the progress being made in trying to get those weapons under control and to reduce their number.

We need to proceed in that direction, and one of the discussion points from the summit included

counter-proliferation and non-proliferation measures. The NATO summit gave that some impetus, which is important. I hope that WEU does likewise. The challenge will come with proliferation. We must understand where we are going with regard to those states that may have a form of government that would make the use of nuclear weapons probable.

We need to understand where that may take place. Then we need to come to grips with the theatre missile defence as a way of trying to protect some key installations. But, at the diplomatic level, a clear statement needs to be made about the reduction of weapons of mass destruction. NATO has made that very clear and many nations have done likewise bilaterally. So, things are moving in the right direction. They may not be moving as fast as we would like, but we need to continue to keep the pressure on.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. De DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – General Joulwan, you wisely reminded us in your speech that while the end of the cold war brought down the Berlin wall and probably made the risk of general conflict far more remote, it did not take us into a world of peace for we are still at threat from a number of dangers.

Several new threats are developing. Though little is said about it, destabilisation, particularly in North Africa, can seriously affect security in Europe.

While this is happening we see what is happening to national defence budgets particularly in European countries which find it extremely difficult to maintain adequate forces over long periods as for example in former Yugoslavia.

Could you enlarge on your views regarding trends in defence budgets and military strengths in Europe?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Joulwan.

General JOULWAN (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – I am concerned. Let me be clear again. I have served in the alliance for more than thirty years. I watched us build robust forces and a high state of readiness for forty years to deal with a real threat. It was very unlikely that those forces would ever be committed, but now, at the very time when it is highly likely that our forces will be committed – indeed, we are committing forces – we are reducing the robustness of our forces and our state of readiness. That is the challenge that your current SACEUR finds himself facing.

I am trying to make the point that in peace-keeping-type operations, which are an area that we must get into in some depth, the requirements are greater. When we commit one battalion to,

*General Joulwan (continued)*

say, Sarajevo, Somalia, Rwanda or some other location, three battalions are required because they must be rotated every six months. So we have this dilemma. I am trying, as you are. That is why I said in my remarks that you needed to help me to tell member nations that we must look at our force structure and requirements. In my research as SACEUR I have found that one of my tasks is to bring that point to the attention of heads of government, both civilian and military, within the member nations of NATO. I am doing that. I am concerned with both force structure and readiness. I am now in the process of developing in my own way a report that will go to the Council in which those concerns will be expressed.

Sometimes peace-keeping is not always peaceful, as we have found out. It requires highly-trained, highly-motivated troops and leaders, and support from the populace. We need to find ways to continue to do that. I am concerned and I have made my concerns known. It is very sound that President Clinton has said that he will maintain 100 000 troops here in Europe. We shall try to keep those troops robust and in a high state of readiness. Likewise, other nations need to make that same commitment and meet that requirement. I need your help in getting that message across.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I said that that was the last questioner, but my attention has been drawn to Mr. Kittelmann from Germany. As he has just been elected to the European Parliament, we must give him the chance to say one final word here.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Germany*) (Translation). – General, I have taken it as a very positive sign that in terms of your responsibilities you see no difficulty about closer co-operation between WEU and NATO but regard this more as a political decision. We who have been working in this field for many years have been endeavouring for some time to secure this closer co-operation. At a time of enormous risk, you are asking us to exert pressure to ensure that our defence budgets are not cut. In Europe, we still have twelve different armies within WEU with twelve different types of equipment, and the United States and Europe also have different ideas regarding equipment. What interests me is whether from your experience you do not think it would be possible to make substantial savings by co-operating more closely in the armaments sector and attaching less weight to egotistical national interests than in the past?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Joulwan.

General JOULWAN (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – That is another speech I give. I would hope so. Again, let me be candid. I speak this way because I have spent so much time in

Europe. I consider myself half European. I believe that in the alliance we have subordinated national goals to alliance objectives. That is absolutely necessary as we go forward. I hope that we shall continue to be able to maintain some degree of interoperability. As we open up with new partners in Central and Eastern Europe, that needs to be one of the considerations.

Let me share with you some personal thoughts. Let us consider what is the intent in working with our partnership nations – those who want to do so. If they might want to join with NATO and WEU in peace-keeping operations at some point, does it not make sense in that engagement in partnership for peace to use exercises, seminars or whatever to train to common standards, and adopt common procedures and common doctrines so that if those forces provided by the partnership nation are committed with NATO or WEU, they will have been trained to common standards and can perhaps come under a combined joint task force? Think of that simple diagram that I make. That is a new Europe and a new NATO. That to me is very exciting. It is where we are going.

However we return to the question of interoperability and how we can talk to one another. Those issues need to be worked out. If we can develop a dialogue with Central and Eastern European nations, we can use the partnership for peace for those nations who want to be part of it to train to common standards and adopt common procedures and doctrines. But remember what I said. It is a two-way street. We cannot go in and dictate. We ought to be willing to listen and learn. We are partners in this endeavour. If we do that and if we generate forces trained to common standards and with common procedures and doctrines, we shall be able to work together in an out-of-area peace-keeping operation under a CJTF. That could be exciting.

I agree with the idea that we cannot go back into national bunkers with blinkers on and lose the forty years of important effort that we have put in.

One of my tasks is to try to prevent that, because as SACEUR – your SACEUR, I shall say – any time that we get involved in an operation – I do not say Article 5 or non-Article 5, but in any mission or operation – my task is to ask how we can create the best conditions for success. If, as in former Yugoslavia today, there are more than thirty nations, many of whose personnel are trained to different procedures and different standards with equipment or communications, that is not creating the conditions for success. We can do better than that. We are better than that.

As we go forward in this new NATO and this new Europe, working with WEU and other organisations, we need to keep that in mind. If we do, I really think that peace and prosperity, and a

*General Joulwan (continued)*

Europe free and whole from the Atlantic to the Urals, is possible. We have a great opportunity in our lifetime to make that happen, and to make it a better world for our children and our grandchildren.

The PRESIDENT. – General, the Assembly would wish me to thank you most sincerely for an admirable and forceful speech. Some years ago I was an army minister in my country. I was a very unprofessional soldier, but it gave me a unique opportunity to view our forces and to see the professionalism of so many of our soldiers, especially those who commanded them with enormous ability, often unsung. Your speech today has underlined strongly your own professionalism. You reminded us that you were the eleventh SACEUR since Eisenhower. Obviously, from what we have heard today, the post is in good hands.

I am glad that you devoted many of your comments to the awful situation in former Yugoslavia. It is awful, too, that the media, which are always so critical about so many things, do not take any real note of the enormous amount of work going on – the drudgery, the dangerous drudgery, by which the forces of all of our countries are still preserving the peace, mounting patrols and ensuring that the flying is very restricted. That is an item of its own, and we shall eventually have to take full recognition of it in our future planning for all the defence and security of our nations.

When you quoted Eisenhower, Sir, you said that Europe needed the will to defend itself. I think that I am right in saying that practically everybody in the Assembly, indeed, probably everybody, has that will that Europe should defend itself. We are parliamentarians and we represent our own people from our own countries. It is our duty to see that those people themselves recognise the issues, and that in the years to come they have the will to defend themselves. With respect, with people such as yourself there to guide us and to implement the procedures of SHAPE, I believe that we need not worry too much about that. Thank you very much for coming. We are delighted to have a very senior officer here; it makes a great change from having politicians.

Ladies and gentlemen, for those of you who would like to see the short ceremony that is to be

held now, I inform you that it will take place immediately, outside. Thank you for your attendance.

### ***6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (Reply to the debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1421 and amendments).
2. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation (Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee, Document 1415).
3. Address by Mr. de Marco, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta.
4. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation (Debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1415, and amendments).
5. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Document 1416).
6. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1994 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1425).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day for the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 12.35 p.m.)*

## FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 15th June 1994

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.

2. Adoption of the minutes.

3. The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Reply to the debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1421 and amendments).

*Speakers:* Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Baumel (*Chairman*), Mr. Baumel.

4. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation (*Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee*, Doc. 1415 and amendments).

*Speaker:* Sir Keith Speed (*Rapporteur*).

5. Address by Mr. de Marco, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta.

*Replies by Mr. de Marco to questions put by:* Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Rathbone, Sir Keith Speed, Sir John Hunt, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Foschi.

6. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation (*Debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1415 and amendments).

*Speakers:* Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Pavlidis (*Observer from Greece*), Dame Peggy Fenner, Mr. Pold (*Observer from Estonia*), Sir Keith Speed (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (*Vice-Chairman*), Mr. Lopez Henares.

7. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*, Doc. 1416).

*Speakers:* Lord Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Aguiar, Mr. Pastusiak (*Observer from Poland*), Mr. Davis, Lord Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Thompson (*Chairman*).

8. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1994 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1425).

*Speakers:* Mr. Covi (*Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Covi (*Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Rathbone (*Chairman*).

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

### *1. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### *2. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments? ...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

<sup>1</sup>. See page 36.

### *3. The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council*

*(Reply to the debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1421 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the resumed consideration of the report of the Defence Committee on the WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth report of the Council and vote, Document 1421 and amendments.

We concluded the debate on the WEU Planning Cell this morning before we had our two guest speakers.

I think that the Rapporteur, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, would probably like to reply to the debate.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President. Perhaps because of the early hour, not many people have asked to speak on the subject of my report this morning.

*Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)*

I would like to thank the two speakers who did take part in the debate for their contributions. They said in their speeches that they supported my recommendations for the Planning Cell. They also emphasised what would be desirable with regard to a European security component of the European Union. The speakers asked me no questions, so I can be very brief. I am glad of the speakers' comments.

The Assembly will be aware that the report was adopted unanimously by the Defence Committee. It met with no problems at all. I hope therefore that the Assembly will endorse the recommendations set out in my report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Does the Chairman of the Defence Committee wish to speak?

I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – After the debate on Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman's excellent report, I can only say how pleased I am at the reception it has been given. I hope the Assembly will approve this report which is a very important positive element for WEU.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. The Defence Committee has tabled a draft recommendation to which two amendments have been tabled, both in the name of Mr. Baumel.

I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – I shall be extremely brief because Amendment 2 was withdrawn with the agreement of the Rapporteur when the committee met this morning.

The PRESIDENT. – We come now to Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Baumel:

1. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Provide the Planning Cell with more equipment and technical resources for data processing and communications;”

I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – As I said at the start of the debate, we agree absolutely with the Rapporteur that the structures, staff and, in particular, the material resources of the Planning Cell must be strengthened. The purpose of this amendment is simply to add what I consider to be a useful point to the report, namely that the Planning Cell should be provided with more equipment and staff.

I shall not speak any further on this amendment particularly as the committee approved it unanimously this morning.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. I presume from what you say that the Rapporteur is in agreement; she indicates that she is.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment? ...

I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

We now come to the vote on the amended draft recommendation. There is obviously no wish for a roll-call vote. I do not want to have to repeat the point about a roll-call vote. As I have said before, if anyone wants a roll-call vote, he or she will, I am sure, indicate that wish. If we move forward too quickly I shall always return to accommodate people's wishes. But to save time in the proceedings I shall on occasion assume that there will not be a roll-call vote.

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, you have the congratulations of the Assembly on your good report and the Assembly's unanimous acceptance of it.

#### **4. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation**

*(Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee,  
Doc. 1415 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Sir Keith Speed of the report of the Defence Committee on an operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation, Document 1415. The debate on the report and vote on the draft recommendation and amendments will be held after the address by Mr. de Marco, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta.

I now call Sir Keith Speed to present his report.

Sir Keith SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President. It gives me great pleasure to present this report. I should particularly like to thank the Defence Committee, its Secretary, Mr. de Gou, and Mr. Cameron, who have been of great assistance to me in preparing the report.

<sup>1</sup>. See page 37.



*Sir Keith Speed (continued)*

As has been mentioned by a number of distinguished speakers in the Assembly, in recent years the maritime aspects of Western European Union have been of great importance. In the original Iran-Iraq war there were WEU mine counter-measure forces in the Gulf. Following that, there was the Gulf war itself, where WEU forces played a significant rôle. More recently, we have had the blockade in the Adriatic by WEU ships, which you, Mr. President, the Chairman of the Defence Committee and I visited last October. Those engagements, important as they are, show the prime rôle of our navies and our maritime assets in dealing with particular problems and operations that may occur from time to time. I hope that the report will be helpful because whatever happens – in saying this I do not diminish the rôles of the army and air forces – on the seas WEU is well established and has been working extremely well. That does not mean that there is not room for improvement or fresh initiatives that might be constructive and imaginative.

My explanatory memorandum goes into some detail on Operation Sharp Guard, the major operation in the Adriatic which enforces the arms embargo against the former countries of Yugoslavia. In addition, there is an information paper that updates not only Operation Sharp Guard, but a number of other maritime affairs, particularly in the Yemen. It goes into greater detail about drug enforcement in the Caribbean, about which I shall say a little more later.

It is quite clear that the main recommendations in the report are in line with the remarks made by the Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, and the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Hurd, yesterday, that WEU should complement and not in any way supplant NATO. That is certainly the case in the recommendation for command and control, and the different aspects of the headquarters and the collaboration between the heads of the naval staff in our various countries.

I regret that the Channel Command in Northwood is apparently to be closed in two weeks' time, although the staff will continue in a different environment. As I mentioned in the report, I think that there is an opportunity for Western European Union to play a significant part. I certainly hope that there will be significant WEU elements in Northwood whatever structure there may be in future, just as there are now significant WEU elements in the NATO command in Naples.

I mentioned the Channel Committee, which is a long-standing committee. I hope that there can be an expansion to include associate members, perhaps the new members. In view of the various remarks made by different people at different

times, including in this Assembly, I think that we should have a similar committee to cover the Mediterranean for both full and associate members of WEU. In that regard, I am delighted that the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Malta is to follow me this afternoon because Malta has, for a considerable period, been involved in maritime affairs. It plays a key strategic rôle in the Mediterranean and I hope that it will welcome the formation of a committee for the Mediterranean along the lines of the Channel Committee, which has served us so well for those more northern European countries.

I make a number of other suggestions for the Planning Cell, and other matters that it can and should be considering within the naval and maritime sphere. My suggestions are complementary to Elisabeth Baarveld-Schlaman's excellent report that we have just passed. I mention the fact that we should be considering the merchant fleets and merchant ship building of our countries. One or two colleagues have expressed fears that there might be some national or supranational direction on how our merchant shipping is to be constructed and organised. It seems sensible that those in the Planning Cell who are looking at future possible operations have at their fingertips information on our merchant fleets and what is being planned and built.

We do not need to go very far back – in the case of my country, the Falklands war and more recently, the Gulf war – to realise that sea lift capacity, the tanks, heavy weapons, artillery and ammunition, are critical. There could be operations in the future – I shall not name those specific types, but we all know what I am talking about – or another amphibious operation where more landings will be required with heavy ammunition. That would require merchant ships of the appropriate type, whether tankers, bulk carriers or container ships. It is pointless to try to plan operations unless one knows that one has the transport capability.

It is sad that most of our countries have allowed their shipping capacity to decline substantially to the benefit of countries in the Far East. Our merchant navies, officers and seamen have also been allowed to decline substantially. That was why I mentioned the merchant naval reserve in my recommendations.

I assure the Assembly that my recommendations are in no way intended to override the individual decisions of individual countries in planning the best ways to help their merchant fleets and merchant ship building.

Recommendation 7 refers to ensuring that we plan refits and operational capability of our main units, such as carriers. Within Western European Union the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain operate naval aircraft carriers. It surely

*Sir Keith Speed (continued)*

makes sense to formalise the arrangements so that at any one time all the aircraft carriers are not being refitted in harbour so that if an emergency arose none were available. The appropriate naval staffs within WEU framework should take sensible precautions and plan carefully.

Recommendation 9 is important. I have expanded it in my explanatory memorandum and in the additional information memorandum published on 10th June.

We all know that, in all our countries, drugs are a major problem not only to our society but to our security. In particular, our young people can be undermined by the drug traffic, particularly the hard drug traffic, and we know that a great deal of this starts in Central and Southern America and comes to our country via the Caribbean. It so happens that in the Caribbean we have permanently WEU ships – Dutch, French and British – all going about their duties and all, in their individual ways, helping to combat that hard drug traffic.

It is clear to me from the discussions that I have had with American authorities that the United States Coastguard is involved in similar work in the Caribbean, intercepting drugs delivered by high-speed boats, helicopters and other forms of transport, which push the drugs from Colombia up through either the Caribbean islands or into Florida, and then on to Europe. As three countries of Western European Union have ships in the region, they should be able to work together with the United States Coastguard so that we can show the Americans that we have both their security and our security very much in mind. We can work closely with them in trying to combat this desperately evil traffic, which is undermining and killing so many of our young people. It could be a practical example, in the United States' backyard, of what we can do about it.

The final recommendation in the report is for a WEU campaign medal. That may sound like a bit of candy floss on top of our serious recommendations. This morning we presented a medal to Admiral Sir Hugo White, Commander-in-Chief, Channel, in appreciation of the tremendous things that Channel Command has done. The WEU campaign medal should not be reserved just for admirals, important and deserving though they are, or for generals or air marshals. Many thousands of our soldiers, sailors and airmen have worked with great distinction in WEU operations in the Gulf, the Adriatic and elsewhere. It is time that, in co-operation with our national countries, we recognise that by striking and issuing a WEU campaign medal, obviously subject to certain rules and regulations, for those who take part in such operations.

There is nothing new in having an international medal. The United Nations has had a medal for well over forty years, as I know because I wear it with pride, having been awarded it for work in the Korean war and various other activities that have taken place under the agency of the United Nations. It is both to project our organisation and to have a way of saying thanks to all those who have worked so well, and in some cases have died, in the cause of WEU, that we should strike that medal and issue it.

I hope that the report as a whole will be welcomed. It deals with both the different command structures and the complementarity with NATO, and tries to foresee the future, making sure that WEU is alongside, as well as NATO and other commands, to enhance the practical possibilities of ensuring that the Planning Cell can be even more effective in the maritime area. It aims to ensure that we can properly look at what is happening to our merchant fleets, we can properly balance matters to make sure that our refitting programmes make sense, so that we have important ships available, and that, in a practical and real way, we can do a great deal of work in the Caribbean for all our countries in combating drugs. I commend the report to the Assembly.

THE PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Keith. As I explained earlier, the debate will be continued after the coming statement. As there were not so many present in the hemicycle earlier, let me repeat that there may be difficulties over the next item. Therefore it is important that those who did not sign in properly do so, so that they can have their opportunity of voting once the debate is concluded because there are questions about majorities and the quorum.

**5. Address by Mr. de Marco,  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta**

The PRESIDENT. – We now move on to the next item, which is the statement from Mr. Guido de Marco, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malta and the Minister for Foreign Affairs for Malta. Some years ago, I had been invited to a not-very-important committee or conference in Malta. I decided to take with me my wife, who had never before been to Malta. We arrived a couple of days early with a view to having a bit of a holiday. When we got to Malta airport – that was before the new one, so it was quite small – we were waiting for our luggage. She said to me suddenly, “There is somebody over there waving his arms and calling ‘Dudley’.” In public life we are all capable of throwaway, one-upmanship and name dropping. I was able to say to my wife, “Oh, that is the Deputy Prime Minister. He

*The President (continued)*

has obviously decided to give me an informal welcome”.

We are delighted to see you here, Mr. de Marco. You are the first representative of your country's government to come to address the Assembly of WEU. We know that the Mediterranean occupies an increasingly important place for all of us. It is concerned very much with the security of Europe. The Assembly was the first to advocate extending to the Mediterranean the collective security system gradually being established on the continent of Europe and derives great satisfaction from the ever-widening impact of its proposals, both to the north and south of the Mediterranean.

I do not need to remind the Assembly that Malta lies in the centre of that region, and that once again in the course of history – it has a long and distinguished history – it is being called upon to play an essential rôle in the development of a system to promote peace and co-operation in the Mediterranean. It has shown that it is aware of the responsibilities and has made known its desire to strengthen its links with the European Union. As I know, you, Sir, are a persistent advocate of your country's interests and of the interests of Europe generally. You are an inveterate traveller, going around making contacts and establishing a good rapport on behalf of Malta.

Although this is the first time that a Maltese representative is here, and although Malta is not a member of WEU, nor has associate membership, we are delighted to see you here. We look forward very much to what you have to say to us. Let me welcome you and invite you to the tribune.

Mr. de MARCO (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta*). – This welcome opportunity to address the parliamentary Assembly of WEU permits me to share with you some thoughts, from Malta's perspective, about developments regarding security and co-operation in the Mediterranean as a dimension of the unfolding security component of the European integration process, and about Malta's rôle in that process.

Considerations of security in the Mediterranean need to respond to two underlying geopolitical realities. From one perspective, the Mediterranean region can be seen as essentially a geographical unit marked by deep-rooted political, cultural and socio-economic diversity. From another perspective, the Mediterranean region is, in security terms, an inseparable extension of Europe.

An enclosed sea like the Mediterranean is not simply a substitute for land frontiers between nations. Where a land frontier constitutes a point of demarcation between two states, an enclosed sea provides a frontier for shared responsibility

among many states. No other sea illustrates this reality so extensively and yet so intimately as the Mediterranean.

It is with this scenario in mind that one has to consider the security and stability aspects of the Mediterranean region.

The first aspect is relative to the population explosion. The population of North Africa at 67 million today will double by the year 2025. The population of the Mediterranean, today 325 million, will increase by then to 550 million, with this growth substantially in the southern flank of the Mediterranean.

The second aspect is that relative to economic development. The economic growth in the southern Mediterranean is limited: the foreign debt is around \$100 billion. Unemployment is on the rise.

There is a fundamentalism which finds a breeding ground in misery, unemployment, slums, insanitary surroundings, with roots not limited to any specific country, which has, with subtlety, spread a message from the Atlantic coast to the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, instrumentalising religion for emotive political purposes.

There is the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has, over the decades, served as a catalyst for making the region one in which the escalating armament flow is never curtailed.

The end of the cold war has removed from the Mediterranean the bipolar exploitation which created a two-way traffic in shifting alliances and blackmailing situations. This has not created, however, a new international order based on peace, but has been substituted by radical nationalism, explosive political forces, a further arms escalation and a lack of sense of direction, bringing to the fore the prides and prejudices of the past, even though wrapped up with new tags on.

Democracy as understood on the European side of the Mediterranean is of limited application in the southern part.

A contradiction arises in the cultural cross-fertilisation with a strong influence from the European side in the southern rim of the Mediterranean and an elitist approach to the great Islam Arabic culture which several in the northern rim cultivate in learning. And yet, the cultural impact from Europe, tainted with the colonial past whilst acting as an excellent bridge of understanding at the human level, at the mass level, gives rise to xenophobia and radical nationalism.

On the European side of the Mediterranean, the war in former Yugoslavia and the ethnic cleansing, perpetrating the feeling of isolation and persecution which the Muslim majority in Bosnia has suffered and undergone, have not only accentuated

*Mr. de Marco (continued)*

ted the instability of the region, but have created a kinship of suffering with the rest of the Muslim world. A Mediterranean sea, a waterway of civilisation, can be turned into a great divide.

The cumulative effect of these issues coupled with terrorism, the transfer of fundamentalist approaches into Europe, through the strong presence of migrants from the southern rim of the region, two sets of sanctions directed by the Security Council, against Libya and against Serbia-Montenegro and a tribunal sitting at The Hague with the objective of determining responsibility for genocide and ethnic cleansing, has made of the Mediterranean a time bomb with an ever-shortening fuse.

But it is wise to heed the words of Shimon Peres in his statement to the United Nations General Assembly last September: "As the 20th century comes to a close we have learnt from the United States and Russia that there are no military answers to the new military dangers, only political solutions".

It is with this scenario and within these parameters that the need for collective action at the Mediterranean level, on security as well as in other respects, would therefore appear self-evident. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the most fundamental problems of the Mediterranean region exclusively lend themselves to a full-scale process of consultation and co-operation on the pattern of other, perhaps more homogeneous, regions.

If we think of such problems as those of the Middle East, of ex-Yugoslavia and of Cyprus, of the economic imbalance between the northern and southern shores of the region, of the issues which arise out of the fact that the Mediterranean sea is a major strategic waterway, in both economic and security terms, it has to be recognised that the notion of a collective approach to these problems, purely at the regional level, can be a dangerous illusion.

It is the case that the shared responsibility of Mediterranean littoral states over their common frontier enriches, but does not replace, their other commitments and responsibilities which arise out of their history and culture, and which are conditioned by their political and economic choices.

This point touches upon a fundamental irony that in the Mediterranean there is in fact no Mediterranean state. We therefore believe that a Mediterranean dialogue has to be examined with a pragmatic approach, and with a great sense of realism. Despite the fact that the Mediterranean is the great crossroads of history, religions, cultures and civilisations, there is no Mediterranean identity.

The European littoral states have a European identity in their diversity. They belong, or aspire to belong, to the European Union which contemplates, in the Maastricht Treaty, a common foreign and security policy. The Arab states bordering this sea have their own identity strengthened by a common language, a common culture and, by and large, a common religious experience. They find in the Arab League, the custodian of the Arab nation.

Israel, in discovering its semitic origin, has, through its diaspora, a dimension which goes beyond its geographical expression. But in spite of the absence of a Mediterranean identity, we have in this *mare nostrum*, common interests, common concerns and a common heritage. It is on these three common factors that we have to find our political solutions.

Malta has been in the forefront in promoting a Mediterranean dialogue. Malta has through the centuries lived a great contradiction: that of its limited geographical dimension in contrast with its strategic relevance. Within this context, allow me to brief you on Malta today and its goals for the future.

As a European state, Malta's primary objective is firmly to anchor itself in Europe through early and full membership of the European Union. This objective is rooted not only in economic but, more importantly, in political considerations. A preponderant part of our economy is already well integrated with that of members of the European Union, be it in terms of trade flows, investment, the provision and receipt of services, the movement of people, financial management or the application of business and commercial regulations, practices and procedures.

Malta's history and culture form an integral part of European history and culture. As a consequence, the political structures and social conditions which we have inherited and continue to develop are European in the basic values which constitute their inspiration and direction – namely, the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the enhancement of freedom, justice, prosperity and peace through democracy.

The political dimension of Malta's entry into Europe has, as its essential corollary, our active participation in the reinforcing as well as the safeguarding of those values which we most cherish. The evolving security component of the European Union, as envisaged in Maastricht, is therefore for us a vital responsibility of membership. We are ready to accept this responsibility not only as another element of the *acquis communautaire* to which all EU members are bound, but also as part of the *finalité politique* which we intimately share with the rest of our European partners.

*Mr. de Marco (continued)*

It is in this spirit that we look forward to developing appropriate working relationships with the European institutions, which, in the thinking of the 1992 Helsinki declaration, have a mutually reinforcing rôle in the shaping of European security. My presence here today forms parts of this evolving relationship, hitherto largely focused in our active rôle within the CSCE, but which henceforth increasingly has to encompass the other institutional components of European security. We see our growing participation in the various institutions, in general terms, as a continuing manifestation of Malta's direct interest and involvement in European security and, in more specific terms, as a necessary component of the process of entry into the Union.

In this context, Malta is participating in the Conference for Stability in Europe and is taking an interest in the partnership for peace programme.

It is from the standpoint of its particular location at the southernmost part of Europe – right in the centre of the Mediterranean – that Malta believes that it has its own particular contribution to make to European security. It is the contribution of a country, strategically placed in the centre of the Mediterranean, which brings to the very heart of Europe those Mediterranean perspectives which have had and will continue to have, a direct impact on the security of the entire continent.

At the same time, as an integral part of Europe we shall be in a better position, together with other European countries in the Mediterranean, to promote stability and co-operation in the Mediterranean region – that stability and co-operation which, in turn, will contribute directly to the security of our country and that of the whole European region.

With the disappearance of the cold war, considerations of security have moved from the sphere of confrontation to that of co-operation. Experience has taught us that the new world order is still fraught with dangers. Today's security challenges do not, however, arise from global strategic considerations. They are mostly localised conflicts which, while not directly threatening general catastrophe, very often constitute an insidious threat to stability, immediately at a regional level, but also in a wider context at an international level. Very often, as we see in such different cases like those of Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda, today's conflicts also pose an unacceptable challenge to some of our most deeply held values, both in terms of respect for the dignity of the human person as well as that for the rule of law.

It is these various considerations that are largely shaping the nature of the new initiatives which are being promulgated for dialogue in the Mediterra-

nean. In one direction we have those with the broadest scope, such as the Maltese idea for a council of the Mediterranean and the related Egyptian idea for the setting up a Mediterranean forum. What primarily characterises these initiatives is their aim to generate a flexible dialogue which could operate at different and interfacing levels – governmental, parliamentary and others, without imposing any predetermined definition of terms of reference and formal structures.

In another direction we have a series of ideas and initiatives, such as those being developed by Italy and Egypt and whose principal aim is to generate a more structured process of expert consultations on set topics, but mainly at non-governmental levels. An attempt to bring these two processes together will be made at the Gymnich meeting which will be held in Alexandria this July.

It should be noted that these new ideas are not necessarily intended to supplant or replace the other initiatives, such as the CSCM or the 5 + 5, whose time, for one reason or another, may not be ripe. Rather, the new ideas and initiatives should be seen as an attempt to keep alive the momentum towards dialogue during a period of fast and largely unpredictable transformations, at both the regional and the international levels. They are at the same time ideas and initiatives which would permit those participating in them also to pursue in other forums those immediate objectives arising from their own national political, economic and other commitments and priorities.

Basing ourselves on past and current experience, a number of basic considerations may be identified as relevant to the successful launching of a Mediterranean dialogue. One of these is the question of participation. It stands to reason that as many of the regional states as possible should have the fullest opportunity to participate, on an equal basis, and from the very outset, in any effective process of regional consultation. This is clearly easier said than done, especially in the Mediterranean context of the present day, where direct or indirect conflicts still prevail. Furthermore, one cannot ignore the utility of initiatives at the sub-regional level, as in the case of the 5 + 5.

If, however, there have to be some initial exclusions at the outset of a particular initiative, the criteria of selection must be politically sound as well as objective. They have to be clear, transparent and logical. Otherwise, the sense of exclusion will generate suspicions and create negative reflexes.

Closely linked to the issue of participation is that of content. There has, in the past, been an understandable tendency to link the concept of a Mediterranean dialogue with specific regional problems, especially those of the Middle East. There is no denying that developments in the

*Mr. de Marco (continued)*

Middle East have had and continue to have a deep impact on Mediterranean life in its various aspects, especially those relating to security. It is, however, necessary to circumscribe, at least in the initial stages, the content of a Mediterranean dialogue to more manageable subjects. The welcome recent progress in the Middle East has, in one sense, reduced one of the major constraints on Mediterranean dialogue. In another sense, it has also underlined the point that, at least in the Mediterranean, issues of such a complex nature should be tackled separately and directly.

In the matter of co-operation, the Mediterranean countries are, of course, not starting from scratch. In the area of functional co-operation, especially that relating to the protection of the marine environment, the Barcelona Convention and action plan have long provided a model of co-operation at a regional level.

Diversity – of cultures, of beliefs, of political orientation and of economic potential – is at the same time, the liability as well as the asset of our region. In the context of functional co-operation, diversity is largely an asset. There is, in the Mediterranean, a wealth of human and material resources unevenly but widely distributed, which could readily lend itself to useful projects and programmes of co-operation. In this context, each country in the region may have its own special contribution to offer. In the case of Malta, our location at the crossroads of the region, historically a strategic factor in military planning, is today an equally strategic factor in economic activity in the region – in communications, in air services, in sea routes, in ship repairing, in finance and in commerce.

The experience gained, as well as the recognised potential, in the area of functional co-operation at the Mediterranean level can serve as catalyst to the broader initiatives, including those relating to security. It is in this framework that the increasing interest demonstrated in recent months by the European institutions to develop the Mediterranean dimension of its activities is to be examined.

It is noteworthy that both the recent WEU Kirchberg declaration and the earlier declaration in January by the North Atlantic Council make specific reference to the promotion of dialogue with Mediterranean countries. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, through its Mediterranean chapter of the Helsinki document, has had an open window on to the Mediterranean since its inception. This window is being increasingly developed with those non-participating Mediterranean states that wish to share CSCE values and aspirations.

Last March I had the privilege of addressing the Cairo Institute for Diplomatic Studies. I spoke of the wind of change in the Mediterranean. But we have to master this wind in the right direction. We have to ensure that this wind drives off the old and brings in the new, abandons the poverty pattern and make the best use of the region's prime resource – the human resource. We have through a common dialogue a substitute for the prejudices of the past – the prosperity of the future. For the Mediterranean has a potential which, given the right political will, can ensure its stability, can further co-operation, and can envisage for the region a rôle for peace which can be determining not only in the region itself, but in its global efforts.

It is in this concept of change that we have to re-examine the link between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean, believing as we do that through mutually reinforcing institutions and forums, we can promote dialogue and provide political solutions to this Mediterranean to which the destinies and future of millions of mankind are bound.

The PRESIDENT. – Many thanks, Mr. de Marco. As you can imagine, your statement has prompted a number of questions.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman of the Netherlands to ask the first question.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President. I have listened with great interest to the Minister's address. It is good that a representative from a country that is not directly part of Western Europe has approached the Assembly.

It was extremely interesting to hear the Minister's thoughts on developments in the Mediterranean. May I ask the Minister how he sees the position of his own country, Malta, in the context of the political changes which have taken place in recent years and are still taking place, developments which have changed the entire aspect of the world? History teaches us that Malta, lying in the Mediterranean Sea, occupies a strategic position. This probably also explains the country's rich history. What I would like to know is how the Minister sees Malta's position in the light of developments as a whole. I would like to ask him in particular what rôle he sees Malta playing in the development of the CSCM. The Minister said in his address that crucial political events were currently taking place and that it was important for Europe that satisfactory solutions be found to the problems in the Mediterranean, so that everyone in the region could look forward to a bright future. Does the Minister have any practical suggestions to make to the Assembly concerning the CSCM?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. de MARCO (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta*). – I thank Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman for her interesting question. I tried to explain Malta's political objective in my statement. Our political objective is to join the European Union. We applied to join almost four years ago. At the end of June last year, the Commission issued an opinion. The opinion was that Malta had all the requisites for joining the European Union. The Commission also stated that, in terms of the structural transformation of our economy, there had to be in-depth dialogue between Malta and the Commission to determine the changes necessary to bring our economy into line with the single market economy.

Malta has a standard of living that is comparable to the best in the southern part of Europe and higher than that of some members of the European Union. Malta has 4% unemployment and economic growth of 5% plus per annum. That is Malta's current economic situation.

As a result of the Commission's opinion, Sir Leon Brittan and I invited a commission to carry out in-depth dialogue to determine what important changes needed to be carried out so that Malta could fit into the single-market economy of the European Union. The commission met three times – in November, in December and in January last. In March, Sir Leon and I exchanged letters to the effect that we had programmed the changes required and had set up a time frame in which the changes would take place.

Our objective is to join the European Union and, as a member of the European Union, to bring to the European Union Malta's relevance, strategic and otherwise, in the Mediterranean region.

Although we are not looking to the past, I think that many here in the hemicycle will remember Malta's rôle in the second world war. We have been celebrating D-Day in the past few days. D-Day was possible because of Malta's heroic resistance in the Mediterranean region which made it impossible for Rommel's army to link its forces with those in southern Russia and thus to make the Mediterranean into an axis lake. That did not happen, which underlines Malta's strategic relevance. That was true in the past but, as has been rightly pointed out, we have to think in terms of the future.

I tried to explain that the Mediterranean region, both because of events in former Yugoslavia and even more because of events in North Africa and the Middle East and fundamentalism that breeds unemployment and misery, has a lifeline that is not limited to one state or two or three states in the Maghreb. It is spreading in Egypt and the occupied territories in Palestine, where Hamas may obliterate the hard work that Presidents Shimon Peres and Arafat are trying to carry out in order to bring peace to that troubled region.

Our view is, and always has been, that we should try to form a dialogue. Malta has always been in the forefront of the dialogue process. If we can manage to achieve a dialogue, it will be the first time that the countries of the Mediterranean region have met to discuss their problems, common concerns, interests and heritage. If we do not form a dialogue, we shall have a time bomb with an ever-shortening fuse. We cannot risk that for the future. That is why NATO, the European Union and WEU, in focusing on the Mediterranean region, are focusing precisely on an area that can present many problems for millions in Europe and elsewhere. That is why I thank Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman for her question and have tried to explain Malta's rôle in the events.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to add my welcome to the Foreign Secretary, particularly as I was honoured to represent this Assembly at a meeting on Mediterranean security in Spain only two years ago. It seems most appropriate that we should have the Foreign Secretary's speech during our consideration of my colleague Sir Keith Speed's report and recommendations as the maritime influence within the Mediterranean is essential.

I wish to ask the Foreign Secretary a question on his opening comments, when he suggested that the population explosion in the Mediterranean basin was part of the time bomb with the ever-shortening fuse. Can he give a reassurance that his country will give a greater lead in future than it has in the past on population control?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. de MARCO (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta*). – Malta's lead on population control is inspired by two principles. The first is Malta's belief that over-population – a population explosion – unless properly managed, can bring problems that we have experienced and are experiencing in the southern Mediterranean. Malta's population growth is modest – the proof of our statements can be seen within the country itself.

We have taken a stand on another issue. I think that Mr. Rathbone was referring to the issue of abortion. If that was the issue that Mr. Rathbone had in mind, I must say to him that we are for life. We cannot accept abortion because it goes against the important principle of the right to life. One can stop the start of life, but once life has started, we do not believe that anyone has the right to interrupt that life. That is our firm belief. We believe that there are other excellent methods to control population explosion. It is one thing to control population growth by acceptable means, but ano-



*Mr. de Marco (continued)*

ther thing to kill. We believe that no one has the right to kill.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Keith Speed.

Sir Keith SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – As someone who first visited Malta in 1952 as a young midshipman in the Royal Navy, I was delighted to hear Mr. de Marco's interesting address this afternoon. As my colleague, Mr. Rathbone, has just said, I am the Rapporteur of the Defence Committee. Just before you, Mr. de Marco, came into the Chamber, I paid tribute to Malta and the rôle that it played in the Law of the Sea and other important maritime aspects. I mentioned the great strategic importance of Malta in the Mediterranean.

One of the recommendations in the report is that the Channel Committee, a naval committee, should be expanded to include some of our member and associate member countries from the Atlantic seaboard. I also suggested that we should consider the possibility of setting up a Mediterranean committee, a naval committee, composed of full and associate members of WEU to study the possibility of co-ordinating naval matters in the Mediterranean, perhaps as a precursor to a full-blown conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean that I think many people want to have. Will you, Mr. de Marco, comment on that?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. de MARCO (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta*). – Thank you, Sir Keith. I read your report, which I thought was interesting and showed great foresight. The CSCM to which you referred has so far not materialised because many people are shy of discussing security. In terms of the Mediterranean, that applies not only in Europe, but beyond Europe. Perhaps at Corfu the CSCM initiative will receive an added push which could provide the link that Malta foresaw many years ago between the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the CSCM.

When we met in Malaga at the Inter-Parliamentary Union conference the decision was taken by the members present that our parliaments should approve a motion calling for the setting up of a CSCM. I do not know whether any other parliament has done so, but the Maltese parliament unanimously passed a resolution calling for the setting up of a CSCM. What you, Sir Keith, are suggesting can happen in a wider context. There is a link between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean region. With the passage of time it may come about.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir John Hunt.

Sir John HUNT (*United Kingdom*). – As apparently one of the few members of the Assembly who has not yet visited Malta, may I also express my thanks to the Minister for his splendid address, which we enjoyed. He has clearly indicated Malta's wish to join the European Union. Will such a move, particularly in respect of a common foreign and security policy, require an amendment of the Maltese Constitution? If so, does he feel that the required three-quarters majority will be forthcoming?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. de MARCO (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta*). – Thank you, Sir John. The answer is no, the move would not require any constitutional amendment. The reason for that is simple. Austria is a neutral country and its national day is neutrality day. Austria's neutrality arises out of the situation after the second world war. Austria made neutrality a particular issue when it applied to join the European Union.

Within that context, the Commission has already given its opinion, some time ago, and the Council of Ministers has confirmed that Austria, in spite of its neutrality clause, is in a position to abide by all the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty, in particular the common foreign and security policy.

We are all glad to see that position in Austria confirmed by the strong result of the referendum held over the past few days. The clause in its constitution about neutrality does not neutralise Malta's full commitment to a common foreign and security policy.

Perhaps the main reason why Malta wants to join the European Union has not so much to do with any economic benefit deriving from that but because we are sensitive to the lessons of the past and the possibilities of the future. We want to anchor Malta strongly to Europe. We believe that compatibility with our constitution is possible. Sweden and Finland are about to join the European Union despite their neutrality, and we have not yet mentioned Ireland, which has been in the Union for many years but whose policy of neutrality does not hinder its belonging to the Union.

As I have said, we do not require any constitutional amendment. We are good as we stand. Our constitution speaks about neutrality and non-alignment. On the latter point, we have been overcome by historical events. A week ago, I was addressing the non-alignment movement and I asked what non-alignment meant – non-alignment as to what, or to whom? We must search for some identity. The name has become anachronistic in the light of today's events.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Mackie of Benshie.



Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (United Kingdom). – I must join the majority, Minister, as the earliest visitor to Malta. I arrived in 1941 in the middle of an air raid and I left in the middle of an air raid. I greatly admire the constancy and valour of the Maltese people, which was recognised by the award of the George Cross.

My question has, to some extent, been answered, but perhaps you will comment on what I think you said. I think that you said that Malta fully accepted her position as an important strategic centre in the Mediterranean and the responsibilities thereafter in terms of defence, peace-keeping and so on, in spite of the little local difficulty of the constitution imposed by the previous government.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. de MARCO (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta*). – As I was trying to explain, Malta has a responsibility to carry. We have done our best, and will continue to do our best, to shoulder our responsibilities in our rôle in the Mediterranean. Our constitution was approved in the circumstances of events in the House. It is worded in a way that reflects the state of affairs that pertained then. Since then, some of it has become anachronistic. For example, it says that Malta cannot accept the fleets of the two superpowers. I do not know where one of those two superpowers now is.

It is perhaps an irony of history that the end of the cold war happened in December 1989 in Malta, when President Bush and President Gorbachev met there. There is a fine book by Shevardnaze, entitled “The Future is for Freedom”, in which he says, “in the impetuous waters of Malta, we buried the cold war”. By coincidence, that event, which happened in Malta, made part of its constitution anachronistic. That is recognised by other countries in the European Union.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Foschi.

Mr. FOSCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, as an Italian I have long been wholly convinced of Malta's strategic rôle not just in the Mediterranean but for Europe as a whole. Through its government, Malta's history, culture and international links have, in recent years in particular, formed a point of reference for the most important subjects of discussion as recalled here by many members. The way Malta becomes a focal point for the most pressing problems of the moment and the future – as you recalled in your important speech – seems to me to show clearly that this occasion has quite a different significance from that normally attaching to meetings with ministers for foreign affairs in WEU if only because questions and answers ultimately give a new dimension to terms such as strategy, defence and promotion of peace.

You started your speech appropriately by referring to the population explosion. I may say that many members are taking greater interest in subjects not normally discussed here because they show how the concept of defending peace is itself evoking a series of complex responses which give a new meaning to strategic co-operation in the Mediterranean as a problem, when it comes to discussing the future, for Europe as a whole and not just the south. In this respect I am more convinced than ever that, in practical recognition of Malta's geopolitical rôle, Malta's accession to the European Union as a full member should be speeded up, by removing obstacles which are not always easy to understand. I myself, on an official occasion in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, asked why there were no plans to speed up Malta's accession to the European Union. Unfortunately I obtained no reply.

Minister, can you suggest what we can do, as representatives of the member countries of WEU to speed up this formal recognition of the rôle which Malta already plays? So far, there has only been moral recognition for that country as a place where cultures and political ideas meet and no granting of full rights to participate in every way in the European institutions, where the new government of the Republic of Malta has earned great credit in recent years for initiatives of value to all the countries of Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. de MARCO (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Foschi for your question which involves a number of principles.

What are the principles we have in mind? We believe first and foremost in our Europe. For us this is not a poetic conceit but has a precise significance. We want to belong to this continent which is the cradle of civilisation and the origin of so many principles on which human dignity is based. Why? Because Malta, which for centuries has lived with the contradiction between its small geographical size and its strategic importance, has been present in every problem of Mediterranean history. All the sacrifices made by the Maltese people to defend our and others' freedom have convinced us that if the island wants to go on living in freedom and not become a matter for regret it must join with Europe. This is the principle we have believed in in the past and we still think of our island's present and future in the same terms. The lessons of history have taught us that this strategic island can be made into a system for going forward to anyone who can offer a little more – or a lot more – than others. This is what we want our island's future to be. That is why, when I say that we want to be part of this Europe, I do so in the conviction that this should not be one-

*Mr. de Marco (continued)*

way but two-way traffic in the sense that it is in Malta's interests to be part of united Europe but at the same time it is in the European Union's interests that Malta should join it.

Very often we want a little more because the political will essential for Malta to become part of the European Union is not always expressed as strongly as we would like.

We are convinced, too, that with the support of so many European representatives here and elsewhere the governments of member states can continue to be pressed more strongly to ensure that the European Union does not become a European Union that has no regard for the Mediterranean.

In an interview given to the newspaper *Libération*, Mr. Delors expressed a similar idea; there is an island which we sometimes forget – but it is a symbol; it is Malta. The European Union is right to enlarge to the north and the east but it would make a terrible mistake if it did not also extend towards the Mediterranean where so many things that are happening could create so many difficulties for us in Europe if we ignore the area.

I think these words of Mr. Delors answer your question.

The PRESIDENT. – Phrases such as collective security and collective approaches trip very easily off the tongue. You reminded us graphically, Sir, in your address that the Mediterranean is a melting pot and that your country is right in the middle of the melting pot, but that with the right approach and the right ideas about harmonising and carrying forward the interests of the countries in the Mediterranean region, as well as increasing their economic success, we can make sure that there is a collective security that affects all of us. We cannot allow that security to slide away because the Mediterranean is part of southern Europe which might eventually incur some kind of trouble.

Malta has aspirations to membership of the European Union, which were made largely on your initiative. Malta has tried hard and it looks to me as if it might well eventually be successful. You are an old European campaigner – I use the word old in the best sense of the word. You were formerly a member of the Council of Europe on behalf of your country. You made valuable contributions. You learnt your trade there to a large extent and that has stood you in excellent stead, as we have seen today. What you said was very significant, if I may say so, and very interesting. It was a great pleasure for us to hear from someone from a country which is not closely associated with us but which we hope will in future have

some form of association with us. Thank you very much.

## **6. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation**

*(Debate on the report of the Defence Committee  
and vote on the draft recommendation,  
Doc. 1415 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now start the debate on the report of the Defence Committee on an operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation and the vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1415 and amendments.

I notice that several people are moving towards the entrances, not because of Sir Keith's report but, I suspect, because of the humidity in the Chamber, which is reaching record proportions. May I draw it to the attention of members that the draft decision on associate member status contained in Lord Finsberg's report which is to be considered after Sir Keith Speed's report, and which seeks to modify the Charter of the Assembly, must be voted on by a roll-call vote and receive an absolute majority of the votes under Rules 35 and 36. No such vote can take place unless more than half the representatives of the Assembly or their substitutes have signed the register. So if you are in the hemicycle and have not signed, please do so. Even more importantly, if you know of colleagues who are around and could come in at least for that vote, will you please ask them to be good enough to do so? Thank you.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – May I begin by congratulating Sir Keith Speed on his report. In the same way that the Maltese Foreign Minister's address fitted in with Sir Keith's speech, Sir Keith's report fitted in with the address. They were happy sister ships.

I should like briefly to deal with three points in the draft recommendation. The first relates to a subsection of paragraph 6. Sir Keith recommends that there should be better co-ordination within the Planning Cell on merchant ship construction and specialist requirements for numbers and types of merchant ships. I think that I see precisely what Sir Keith is getting at. A crucial element in our defensive abilities is a vibrant and sufficiently large merchant fleet crewed with a sufficiently professional crew. However, as the draft recommendation is written, it can be read as encouraging untoward governmental intervention. I think that Sir Keith did not mean that. It would be helpful to have further elaboration of that.

*Mr. Rathbone (continued)*

The second point relates to paragraph 8. You will know, Mr. President, that one of my interests in the British Parliament and the Council of Europe is the tragic and escalating problem of drug misuse. I should like to endorse most strongly Sir Keith's recommendation in paragraph 8 that there should be greater co-ordination, particularly with the United States authorities, in combating drug trafficking which undermines European security. Drug trafficking and misuse undermines everything – international and national security, domestic peace and quiet and, only too often, tragically, the composition of families.

I believe that this contribution to the interception of drug traffickers in the Caribbean basin, which so often provides the bridge from the drug producing countries in South America to the countries of North America and Europe, is absolutely crucial. I am delighted that that comes into the report, and especially delighted that we are considering it at the very moment when the King of Spain and members of the Spanish Government are on their way to Colombia to talk specifically about those problems. Of course, Spain is now often the point of entry for those drugs both directly from South America and from South America via North Africa. I endorse the suggestion and ask all colleagues to endorse that part of the report.

My third short comment has to do with paragraph 10. I believe that it contains an ideal suggestion – that there should be a WEU campaign medal for those who participate in operations under the aegis of WEU. Indeed – I say this not in any sense of fun – I believe that it should not be confined to the people involved in the operations. Sir Keith himself, because of his present contribution, his past service in the Royal Navy and his past ministerial responsibilities, should be one of the first to receive such a medal. I know that that idea was in no way in Sir Keith's mind when he made the suggestion, but I hope that the authorities that decide on the recommendation will give the idea serious consideration. I am delighted to welcome and endorse the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Pavlidis.

*(Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

Mr. PAVLIDIS (*Observer from Greece*). – Mr. President, the draft recommendation includes some instructive ideas, which are certainly an attempt to form an organisation for naval and maritime co-operation within the framework of WEU. But I believe that the organisation could be more effective if some necessary modifications

were made to the draft recommendation. I refer to two points, the first of which is in paragraph 2, which refers to the establishment of a direct link between WEU and the International Maritime Organisation and some other organisations.

I am thinking of what happens with NATO. In this case we have no direct links between NATO and the IMO. We do not overpass the appropriate ministries – the ministries of merchant marine. That is why, in order to avoid misunderstandings and other confusion, I propose that we modify paragraph 2 so that it reads: "Establish a working relationship on maritime matters with the European Commission's Directorate for Maritime Transport and develop links in order to exchange information with appropriate international maritime agencies", and so on. That clarification is absolutely necessary.

The second point that I would like to underline has been mentioned already by Mr. Rathbone, but let us start at the beginning. The Rapporteur is trying to combine two separate subjects, naval and maritime policy. On the first, the report suggests that we give the possibility to the heads of European navies forum to form naval policy. I agree with that, but – permit me to let you know that I have experience as a former minister of merchant marine – I cannot agree with the idea of the heads of European navies forum contributing to the development of WEU maritime policy.

There are two different cases. If we really want to form an instrument to cover that scope, I suggest that we specify, next to the heads of European navies forum, the heads of competent services of maritime ministries. Having that body at the top, we could say that it would be able to contribute to the development of a naval and maritime policy. Otherwise, I do not believe that shipowners and seafarers will accept the idea of being under the heads of the European navies forum.

This is a question of finding a practical way. Of course, like Mr. Rathbone I would like to underline the idea in paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation that in merchant ship construction there are specialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant ships, as well as safeguards, and creating and training appropriate crews, and that those must be elaborated in order to give the clear meaning that the Rapporteur had in mind. In general, I stress the fact that co-operation between naval and maritime forces is a very sensitive issue for WEU. In the recent example of the Gulf crisis, the final performance was most successful, with the participation of merchant ships in the whole operation.

The PRESIDENT (*Translation*). – Thank you, Mr. Pavlidis, but I must remind you that only members of the Assembly can submit amendments which must be tabled in writing before the

*The President (continued)*

sitting opens. As you unfortunately still have only observer status, under the rules of the Assembly, your comments, however interesting, cannot constitute amendments unless they are tabled by other members of the Assembly.

Mr. PAVLIDIS (*Observer from Greece*). – I thank you for your advice. I know the rules well. I am waiting for an opinion from the Rapporteur. We are a political body here. If the Rapporteur will accept my proposal, there will be no problem about modifying the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will hear the Rapporteur's opinion in due course.

I call Dame Peggy Fenner.

Dame Peggy FENNER (*United Kingdom*). – I rise to make a brief contribution on the excellent report by my colleague Sir Keith Speed. I do so with a certain humility because I shall be commenting on a report on naval and maritime matters which has been produced by a former naval man and a former navy minister, which my colleagues may think shows a bit of nerve.

I have had the honour to represent in the United Kingdom Parliament since 1970, with a very small break, one of the great naval towns of the United Kingdom – the town of Chatham – where Lord Nelson's ship the *Victory* – if I dare mention it in this Assembly – was built. Sadly, we hit the earliest peace dividend and our dockyard was closed in the early 1980s. My colleagues will now see why I regard worrying about naval and maritime matters as very much a problem of mine.

I guess that I also have a nerve to give my opinion to Mr. Pavlidis, who is a former navy or shipping minister. However, I do not agree with what he suggested. The report is timely and comprehensive in its lists of European co-ordination and co-operation in maritime matters.

I have served on the all-party committee on maritime affairs in the United Kingdom Parliament. Over several years it has been extremely concerned about the rôle of the merchant navy. There are declining patterns of trade using surface shipping. The merchant navy in my country has shown a keen interest in being regarded as part of our maritime strength.

I support the recommendation in paragraph 6, in which my colleague refers to merchant ship construction and specialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant ship as well as safeguards for recruiting and training appropriate crews. The latter point has been very much emphasised by the merchant shipping community in the United Kingdom. It sees the need to ensure proper recruitment and training for crews, bearing

in mind that the merchant shipping community believes and wishes – it has fervently assured the parliamentary committee of this – that it is part of the maritime defence of Britain.

In the presentation made to the admiral just before lunch the President emphasised the value in recent years of naval co-operation in WEU. We need think only of the Gulf and the work in the Adriatic to which the Rapporteur referred. We recognise that we have a great naval tradition in WEU. We are well aware that in times of action and emergency, when we are called on, we would need the supplement of the merchant navy for our countries' navies.

The Rapporteur has also wisely concluded in paragraph 6 that we should have a policy for the effective employment of both naval and merchant marine reserves. We have these policies for the partnership of nations in WEU in naval, army and air force matters. How much more important it is that we should not exclude in this naval policy the contribution that has been, can be and, sadly, undoubtedly will be made again in one form or another, as it was in the Gulf and the Adriatic, by our merchant navy reserves.

The Rapporteur has made it clear in paragraph 172 that he has tried to demonstrate in the present report that WEU naval and maritime operational co-operation is already alive and well. I agree, but that does not exclude room for improvement and greater efficiency.

The report has shown great wisdom in highlighting the fact that the merchant navy and merchant shipping are part of our marine arm, both in defence and in other respects.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pold, observer from Estonia.

Mr. POLD (*Observer from Estonia*). – I thank Sir Keith Speed for his excellent and meaningful report. On behalf of Estonia, I should like to make the following observations.

After more than fifty years of foreign occupation, we are now restoring our own naval fleet. We are aiming to become a maritime force in the Baltic region, both to protect our coastline and to defend our commercial and trading interest. However, in organising our maritime forces, we need to start at the beginning; we need to walk before we can run. We have been able quickly to restore our merchant fleet and we are striving to improve our ports and their facilities and infrastructure.

However, we have almost no meaningful maritime defence capability, but thanks to the assistance given by Finland, Germany and Sweden, we have a minimum coastal patrol capability. It is essential that we improve our capabilities in these

*Mr. Pold (continued)*

areas because apart from national security, we face a potential problem of drug and arms smuggling on a significant scale as a result of our exposed geographical position.

We are looking for support and co-operation from WEU to augment our already positive maritime co-operation with our Baltic neighbours. Sir Keith's report gives a thorough overview of WEU's naval co-operation and it points the way to closer co-operation among neighbouring states.

Today, Estonia is not able to take part in WEU naval operations. However, in planning our future maritime capability we must take into account the wider interests of regional security. What gives us hope and confidence for our future is wider co-operation within an overall concept of European security.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is now closed.

I call Sir Keith Speed to reply to the speakers.

Sir Keith SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I thank all who have taken part in the debate. I especially thank Mr. Pold of Estonia. I understand that Anders Bjork, the Swedish defence minister, whom many of us know, recently sent a sea patrol craft to Estonia, and I know that Finland and Germany have given considerable help. I am delighted to hear about maritime developments in Estonia, and if the report and WEU countries can supplement the work by Finland, Sweden and Germany, I shall be absolutely delighted. I am sure that we all wish to see such a development.

Mr. Rathbone spoke kindly about me both in terms of medals and in terms of my proposals on the drug interdiction in the Caribbean which is critical. All my colleagues know Mr. Rathbone, particularly in relation to his work for the Council of Europe and more generally as an expert on the problems of drugs throughout the western world. I very much appreciate his wise words and his support on the subject.

I hope that I can lay to rest the concerns of Mr. Rathbone and Mr. Pavlidis. Paragraph 2 talks of developing links, meaning an exchange of information, which is different from a full working relationship. I am sure that Mr. Pavlidis is not arguing that our respective navies and naval efforts should not have links with the International Hydrographic Office or the International Maritime Organisation and other such international organisations. It is important that we are now looking at the future developments of WEU and our various maritime forces, and links should be developed. That does not mean that we shall automatically override them or be subordinate to them, but we should have a sensible exchange of information.

I dealt fairly extensively in my opening remarks with the fact that all the heads of defence staff, in particular the heads of navies and, I hope, the Planning Cell, must have a clear sign of what assets are available and what assets are being built, if they are to make any contingency plans for operations. It would be no good in five or ten years' time waking up to the fact that WEU has no bulk carriers, tankers or roll-on/roll-off vessels. I am not saying that that would happen, but it would be a seaman-like precaution for us to know precisely what is happening. If it appears that there is a major deficit in one ship category or another, it must be drawn to the attention of the appropriate ministers in the appropriate countries – the Greek minister of shipping in Greece, the transport minister in the United Kingdom, and so on.

On the specialist nature of merchant shipping, it surely makes sense, if one is to have merchant shipping that can be used in security operations, to ensure initially that they are fitted, when built, with, for example, replenishment at sea points for fuel or for jackstay transfer of stores alongside or astern. It is no good waiting until the ships are built and sailing the seven seas only to find that the merchant tankers or freighters must be used for replenishment at sea, but do not have the kit. They would then have to be sent home to be fitted. Similarly, roll-on/roll-off vessels and freighters should have reinforced decks that can take heavy artillery or tanks when they are being transported. Those specifications have to be planned and fed in at the appropriate stage – the design and building stage – rather than when the ships are at sea and a crisis arises, which would prove more expensive and perhaps even too late.

There is nothing sinister in my remarks. I think that perhaps one or two of my colleagues read too much into them. They are sensible precautions so that those of us trying to plan for possible emergencies in the Planning Cell in Brussels or in our respective ministries of defence have the information and are able to feed it to the ship owners and, if necessary, subsidise them if it costs more to incorporate the strengthened decks, the facilities for replenishment at sea or other specialised rôles that they may be called upon to undertake.

I say to Mr. Pavlidis that, as regards the heads of defence staff, particularly the naval staff and their forum, I understand that the Greek chief of naval staff has taken an active and positive rôle in that forum without detriment to Greece or Greek shipping interests.

I very much appreciated Dame Peggy Fenner's remarks. She is an expert on the subject, having represented for a considerable number of years an important naval and maritime constituency. I appreciate her support; she is an important mem-

*Sir Keith Speed (continued)*

ber of the parliamentary maritime group in my country. One of the organisations that Mr. Cameron and I visited a little while ago when we were considering the subject, particularly the merchant shipping aspect, was the British Chamber of Shipping under its director, Admiral Sir James Hunt. It gave us positive information that we have tried to include in the report. Its views are not totally at variance with the views of the other merchant shipping chambers throughout WEU.

I hope that my remarks will allay the fears of my colleagues and that the Assembly will be able unanimously to adopt the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*). – The response that we have just heard from Sir Keith shows that he is the most competent man in the Assembly to deal with not only defence issues, but all naval matters. The Defence Committee was happy to have him in its midst and is grateful to him for producing the substantial report in such a short time.

There is nothing more to say about the report than that already said by my colleagues. It is a high quality report with good recommendations. The Defence Committee adopted the report unanimously. I hope that the Assembly will do the same.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly now has to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1415.

I have three amendments to this text, numbered 1 to 3, tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares.

Amendment 1 reads as follows:

1. Draft paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation as follows:

“Establish a working relationship on maritime matters with the European Commission’s Directorate for Maritime Transport. Develop links in order to exchange information with appropriate international maritime agencies such as the International Maritime Organisation and the International Hydrographic Organisation, as well as with maritime-orientated non-member countries in strategic areas;”

Amendment 2 reads as follows:

2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation, leave out “and maritime”.

Amendment 3 reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation, leave out “merchant ship construction and specialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant ship as well as safeguards for recruiting and training appropriate crews;”.

I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*). – As I have already said this morning in committee, I do not want to move the three amendments so I ask you, Mr. President, to consider the three amendments withdrawn. My reason is clear: Dame Peggy Fenner has just given more articulately than I can the reason why I have withdrawn the amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The amendments are therefore withdrawn.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1415.

In accordance with Rule 35, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the Chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five representatives who request a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously<sup>1</sup>.

### **7. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Doc. 1416)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of the status of associate member and the vote on the draft decision, Document 1416.

I call Lord Finsberg to present his report.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Colleagues have had this report in their hands for some time. It is a revised version of the report under discussion in an earlier session. In its present form, it has the unanimous support of the

1. See page 39.

*Lord Finsberg (continued)*

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. It has tried to accommodate the guidelines set down by the Council of Ministers to deal with associate members, within the framework of the decision taken in this Assembly in the light of the last presentation of the report, when an amendment was made to it. We have tried to live within those guidelines, and I think that we have produced a document that satisfies everybody. I should particularly like to thank Mr. Burgelin, as always, for his competent assistance.

The one thing that seemed to worry people on the last occasion was the question of the votes of associate members. It is clear that there cannot be the same full vote for associate members as there is for full members, so we have found what I hope is a practical compromise. The associate members will be able to have an indicative vote. That is basically in accordance with the line adopted by the Council of Ministers – that is, associate members are not able to veto decisions of ministers. The ministers operate on a consensus basis. Therefore, one vote against would cause complications. We have said that associate member colleagues who want to express a view can vote, and that will be noted in the report, but will not influence the number of votes for and against. It will be purely an indicative vote. We cannot go further than that because of the restrictions and the need to have a difference between full members and associate members.

In the past couple of days, one or two colleagues have said that, because there is in addition the new status of associate partners, we should perhaps not consider the report today. I hope that they will not take that point of view now. Nobody is suggesting that the rights and responsibilities of associate members will be reduced. Therefore, this will provide what I call the foundation if – as I am sure that it will be – the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges is asked to produce a proposal to incorporate in one form or another associate partners. The committee will then find a formula and produce it for the Assembly, but it will have to provide something less than that which is provided for associate members.

Thus, there would be three categories. First, full members with totally unrestricted rights. Secondly, associate members who would have the right of participation and an indicative vote. Thirdly, associate partners, who might have the right to participate but no indicative vote. I cannot tell the Assembly what the committee will actually decide.

One particular point arose out of the interesting speech made by Mr. Poos earlier today. The Assembly may recall that he said that the minis-

ters had decided on the new form of membership – associate partners – and agreed to incorporate them into the system, and would now have to go back home to their respective countries to try to get the money for that. I have never heard of anything so ridiculous. If individual members in their private lives took a decision, promulgated it to the world and then said that they would go to their banks to see whether they would pay, they would be laughed at. In our national parliaments, if ministers pass a law, that incorporates the provision of the money that is needed. However, apparently the Council of Ministers of WEU works in a different world. It has not taken into account and provided the extra money that will be needed both on the ministerial side and by the Assembly when it decides how to accommodate the associate partners. They will need accommodation. They will be a cost on the Assembly because there are quite a few of them, but nobody has thought about the provision of funds.

It may be that when the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges produces a report, it will have some fairly tough remarks to make on that subject, perhaps with the aid of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. Somebody must bring a sense of sanity into such ministerial activity. When Spain and Portugal became members, at the behest of ministers, it took us nearly two years to get money for the Assembly to fulfil its obligations. When our friends from Greece eventually ratify, nobody has provided the proper money to accommodate them. Some of you may have read Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland*. That is the Mad Hatter's tea party, but at least the Assembly cannot be blamed for that.

With that slight digression – although it is relevant because it is the next stage – I commend the report to my colleagues.

*(Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is open.

I call Mrs. Aguiar.

Mrs. AGUIAR (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to begin by congratulating Lord Finsberg on his excellent report.

As a result of previous decisions of this Assembly, the range of solutions available to give more positive substance to the status of associate member has become very limited, so I feel that the proposals contained in the report are a step in the right direction.

This is why I voted for it in the committee and shall do so in this plenary session.

My preferred option has been rejected: namely that, for the purposes of voting rights of associate



*Mrs. Aguiar (continued)*

members, a distinction be made between general policy matters and matters concerning the functioning of WEU, with associate members having no voting rights with regard to the latter.

This has had the effect of dashing the expectations aroused by earlier proposals. I was a member of the Defence Committee which recently travelled to Ankara and I witnessed the deep disappointment which the development of this process caused in political circles in Turkey, particularly among Euro-enthusiasts, of whom there are many.

This does not, of course, mean calling into question the future of Western European Union within the European Union, namely full members of one or the other belonging to both. But that aim must not stand in the way of our recognising a status which, while not necessarily equal, must be as egalitarian as possible for associate members who are our allies in NATO; this has advantages for them and possibly even more for our own organisation.

I believe that we should concern ourselves less with a perfectly geometrical constitutional framework for the institutions of the emerging Europe, because it is always preferable to start pragmatically from the existing situation, and from the desires which are in fact an expression of forms of European solidarity.

In fact, there is in Europe an institutionalised solidarity in the area of defence, in which Turkey has played an outstanding and loyal rôle, just like the other European members of NATO, who are the only ones discussed here.

Let us also look at the other side of the question, the case of those countries of the European Union which, for many different reasons, both old and new, cling to their tradition of neutrality and do not wish to be admitted as full members of WEU. With the forthcoming and welcome enlargement of the European Union, the number of such countries can only increase, as we know.

Let us respect their timing and wait sympathetically for them to change their attitude to our organisation, because without them we are a long way away from the symmetrical WEU-EU membership which is one of the aims of the Maastricht Treaty. At the same time let us not discourage the new associate members' clearly expressed desire to participate.

To give such members a consultative vote, enabling them to express their disapproval after the event, or their approval in the event of inaction in such circumstances, is a compromise between a wide range of positions. It is a good example of the art of the possible, practised by both legal experts and politicians.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Pastusiak.

Mr. PASTUSIAK (*Observer from Poland*). – Thank you, Mr. President. May I use this occasion to commend you on what you said during the first sitting of the Assembly, when you welcomed the permanent delegations from Central Europe. You said: "Now of course, given the enhanced status of associate partnership, the Assembly must decide on revised arrangements. The matter will be referred to the Political Committee and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges so that decisions may be made in accordance with the Assembly's legal basis, the modified Brussels Treaty." I was also happy to hear Lord Finsberg say a moment ago that the issue would be taken up by the Committee on Rules of Procedure.

May I also use this occasion to make some technical suggestions, which perhaps do not require a vote. First, we sit here on the back benches. We are permanent representatives. I have had the pleasure and honour of working with the Assembly for three and a half years and will do so for my remaining term, as designated by the Polish Parliament. Yet we sit here faceless and anonymous. I suggest that we should be assigned numbers, perhaps in a different colour or perhaps starting at 200 so that the clerks do not have to run up the forty-two steps. I have counted them myself because I always have to run down to give my name to the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. I think that the reaction to your comments means that they were well and truly noted. I shall see that they are conveyed to the Presidential Committee. There are problems, but we intend to overcome them. The first problem was overcome when we brought in the nine new members. So progress is being made. I appreciate your desire to hasten us along.

I call Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President. First, may I congratulate Lord Finsberg on his report and his ingenious solution to the problem of votes and the question of votes for associate members. I should also like to associate myself with his remarks about the finances of the Assembly, in particular in connection with the address this morning by Mr. Poos on behalf of the Council of Ministers. Although I come from a different part of the political spectrum, I agree entirely with the remarks of Lord Finsberg in that part of the introduction.

Indeed, I believe that Lord Finsberg was very restrained. This morning, in answer to questions, we heard Mr. Poos urge members of the Assembly to go back to our parliaments and ask for the



*Mr. Davis (continued)*

money to enable the Assembly to do its job. Mr. Poos and the Council of Ministers seem to have a different doctrine from that which we are used to in the United Kingdom. We do not come to this Assembly to go back to our parliaments to represent WEU to them. We come to WEU to represent our countries' parliaments and the people of Europe. It is perhaps time that we discussed our philosophy and doctrine with the Council of Ministers. Clearly it does not understand the rôle of a democratic assembly.

My other point, which is particularly for the consideration of Lord Finsberg, relates to the question of associate members and more particularly associate partners. I suspect that the Committee on Rules of Procedure will be asked to consider the rôle of associate partners in the future. I, and I am sure members of the Assembly, support in general the expansion of membership of WEU and, therefore, of the Assembly. We support expansion, whatever guise it may take. It enables other countries to be associated with our work.

Although we support expansion in general, some of us are inclined to be suspicious about particular instances. We worry about the desire of the Council of Ministers to expand and perhaps in that way to achieve quantity and lose quality. We want to ensure that those people who become involved in the work of WEU subscribe to all the policy decisions and procedures of WEU and their implementation by WEU and by the countries themselves. My suspicion in that regard is particularly heightened by the answers that we received this morning from Mr. Poos.

It will be within the memory of members of the Assembly that Mr. Poos was asked a direct question about which countries had allowed sanctions against Serbia to be broken. He gave what I can only describe as a most evasive reply. He told the Assembly that he knew of no member of WEU which had broken sanctions. He suggested that the question did not concern members of WEU and was not restricted to members of WEU. He said that members of WEU trusted each other to observe decisions of WEU.

By giving that deliberately evasive answer, Mr. Poos showed that he was unwilling to identify those countries which are not members of WEU but which are allowing sanctions against Serbia to be broken. Sanctions are a necessary weapon in our attempts to shorten the fighting in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Every day that fighting continues, the citizens of that country, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, are dying. From time to time, there are deaths among soldiers from members of WEU who are serving in

the former Republic of Yugoslavia. By adopting that attitude, the Council of Ministers does not serve the interests of those soldiers whose lives are at risk.

Dame Peggy Fenner referred in an earlier debate to a British admiral called Nelson. Many members of the Assembly will know that Nelson was blind in one eye. He had the habit of putting his telescope to his blind eye whenever he received orders that he did not like so that he could say truthfully, "I have not seen those orders". This morning I felt that we had the Poos doctrine, which follows the Nelson doctrine. It says that he puts the telescope to his blind eye so that he does not see anyone breaking sanctions.

Many of us had great reservations about the answers that we received from Mr. Poos. I shall not say any more about Mr. Poos because he has left. However, the Secretary-General is present for our debate this afternoon. I hope that he will take back the message to the Council of Ministers that members of the Assembly do not do the bidding of the Council of Ministers and that we shall put questions at future meetings. We shall ask questions particularly about the issue of sanctions-breaking and the unwillingness of members of the Council of Ministers to identify those countries responsible for prolonging the conflict and putting the lives of our soldiers at risk.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Davis, for that spirited contribution.

Does Lord Finsberg wish to say a few words?

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – First, I should like to thank Mrs. Aguiar for what she said. We have this problem only because the Council of Ministers rejected our advice to make both Turkey and Greece, as members of NATO, full members of WEU. The Council of Ministers ignored us. That is why we have the problem of associate members. The ministers have not got away with it. In the report by Mr. de Puig we call again for the ministers to consider the matter. We hope that this time they will act in a more sensible manner and decide to make the change. They so often say that they value our advice. They so often take it only when it suits them.

I have immense sympathy with my friend from Poland. I greatly admire what has happened in Poland in the past four or five years. As I said, the associate partners cannot have the same rights as full members. It is unlikely that they could have identical rights because the ministers made the distinction in the Kirchberg declaration.

They have some meetings with associate members and associate partners; others will not have associate partners present. So there is the need for a distinction. I am sure that we shall look for the best way in which we can give the opportunity for

*Lord Finsberg (continued)*

a sensible voice to Poland and the other countries that have been permanent observers, and to the new intake, who are our associate partners. The words of our Polish colleague fall on very receptive ears.

The comments of my friend Terry Davis take me back to 1983, when he and I took a piece of legislation through the House of Commons just before a general election. Terry was free to say what he wanted, and my senior ministers had all disappeared to fight the election. The civil servants were not really interested, so Terry and I rewrote the legislation, both thinking on our feet. As a result, it was a jolly good bit of legislation.

Thank you, Terry, for what you said. I endorse your point completely. However, there is one thing to remember. You spoke about ministers being greedy to expand – but the associate partners come because they have applied, not because they have been invited. I am perfectly certain that the ministers would not admit as an associate partner any country that did not subscribe to those parts of the Brussels Treaty that are applicable to associate partners.

On the question of sanctions, we must not be too unfair to Mr. Poos, who was following the example of at least two of his predecessors, both of whom, especially in response to questions by Peter Hardy, have given the same non-answers. At least, a non-answer was given to Peter Hardy earlier today, when a minister said that that was a matter for the United Nations, not for WEU. We cannot get round that one – at least, I have not yet thought of a way. So we should not blame Mr. Poos too much for the problem.

Mr. President, I believe that those remarks cover the comments of those who have participated in the debate. I again commend the report to my colleagues.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Finsberg.

Does the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Thompson, wish to say anything?

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to comment on the report, just to say that when we discussed it in December, Lord Finsberg was absent because of illness. We considered the report and found nothing serious to criticise in it. At the meeting this morning the committee had a short discussion about the report to allow Lord Finsberg to make any further comments. No amendments were suggested, and the committee decided fully to support the report, to endorse it and to hope that the Assembly will do the same.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Thompson.

We shall now vote on the draft decision contained in Document 1416. The Assembly is aware of the problem, and we shall meet it as we go along. As I explained earlier, as part of this draft decision proposes an amendment to the Charter of the Assembly, under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure an absolute majority of the Assembly's membership is required. A roll-call vote is therefore necessary. The absolute majority of the Assembly is fifty-five.

Under Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure no decision by roll-call can be taken unless more than half the representatives or substitutes have signed the register of attendance. I ask that the bells be rung now, so that any stray people outside will come into the hemicycle.

*(The bells were rung)*

I am advised that only forty-two members have signed the attendance register. It does not require a degree in mathematics to realise that we are some way short of the number required. That is most regrettable. There is, therefore, no point in going through the charade of having a roll-call and registering the forty-two members who are here.

I declare that less than half the representatives or substitutes have signed the attendance register and therefore a quorum has not been achieved. I therefore propose that the vote be postponed until tomorrow, immediately after the address by Mr. Kukan.

Is that agreed?...

Thank you very much. That will be done.

### ***8. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1994***

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the  
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and  
vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1425)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Covi of the report by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1994, debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1425.

Before I call Mr. Covi to present his report I should like, on behalf of the Assembly, to extend our warm good wishes to Mr. Rocco Cannizzaro, who has been masterminding our financial affairs for quite a number of years. Many of you will know that he is due to retire – next week I believe, or immediately after this session. He has been a good friend to many of us; we have always appreciated seeing him around. He comes from a distinguished Italian background and has made a

*The President (continued)*

notable contribution to the efforts of the WEU Assembly. Mr. Cannizzaro, we send you our very best wishes.

I call Mr. Covi to present his report.

Mr. COVI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the Assembly is required to give an opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1994. The report which was approved yesterday by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration looks at the various headings of the budget and makes a number of suggestions on the subject on which I will comment later.

I should like to start with the preliminary observation that any opinion on the budget should take account of the special circumstances surrounding WEU at this historic point in time; it is involved in transition or rather adaptation to the new tasks which will devolve upon WEU with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, because of the close organic links it will then have with the European Union and the stronger relations it will enjoy with the Atlantic Alliance and the countries of the Forum of Consultation.

The fact that transition and adaptation are taking place seems to me to have emerged very clearly from this first part of this fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly where the problems debated concern the actual identity of WEU both subjectively as regards the participation of new geographically European states in various ways and objectively as regards the targets to be met. The basic question put forward in the recommendation adopted this morning on the proposal of the Defence Committee – Rapporteur, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman – is symbolic in this respect, because its first point stresses the absolute priority which must be given to formulating a European defence policy in order to provide a clear framework for the work of the Planning Cell and the other organs of WEU. The speech made this morning by the Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, currently Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Western European Union, is particularly indicative of the special stage of development through which WEU is passing.

Over and above this general point, however, there is another more immediate reason why the 1994 budget can be regarded as reflecting a phase of transition and adaptation. This relates to the first experience during 1993 of the new organisation of the Secretariat-General after the move of the headquarters from London to Brussels, the innovation of sharing general administrative costs between the Secretariat-General and the Planning Cell in the ratio 70%:30% and lastly, the need to provide a specific budget for a new ministerial

organ, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) set up by the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Rome on 4th December 1992.

I shall dwell briefly on these three points. The budget for the Secretariat-General provides for expenditure, net of expenditure on pensions for retired staff and on the Planning Cell, amounting to BF 242 157 469, which is a reduction of 6.7% on 1993. The reduction is explained by the fact that, to allow for the transfer of the headquarters from London to Brussels, an increase of 76.83% on 1992 was estimated for 1993 but this exceeded requirements which it was possible to evaluate and estimate better after the first year's experience of operation in Brussels. In any case, the substantial rise in expenditure over the two years is due to increases in staff and the higher costs of occupying bigger premises and improving telephone, computer and security services in the office building.

In addition, the 70%:30% split of general administrative costs between the Secretariat and the Planning Cell is only a first step towards giving the Cell the budgetary independence called for by the Assembly in Resolution 550 last year but which will require a change in the regulations and in particular Article 6 of the Financial Regulations regarding the rôle of the director of the Planning Cell, as already announced by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on 28th June 1993 but not yet implemented. This is quite apart from the new and more important tasks which the Cell will have to handle.

As to the new budget for the WEAG – Western European Armaments Group – it should be noted that, as for the Secretariat budget, contributions will be paid to it by thirteen countries instead of nine, including, that is, Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey. Total expenditure is estimated at BF 15 500 000.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, before concluding I should like to refer briefly to items in Resolution 550 approved by the Assembly last year but not yet implemented. These include the question of the future of Torrejón Satellite Centre on which the Council of Ministers reserved any decision until the end of the experimental phase due to conclude in 1994. There is still no solution for the problem of health insurance for Assembly staff who, as we know, are covered by the French social security scheme on the basis of an old agreement. The staff consider that they have to pay too much and want a private pension scheme which would cost less, in line with that already agreed for the staffs of other international organisations such as the OECD with headquarters in France and as is happening for the staff of the Secretariat-General serving in Brussels.

In conclusion, the committee recommends that the Assembly express its opinion in support of the

*Mr. Covi (continued)*

draft recommendation to the Council of Ministers which urges it to communicate to the Assembly any decisions taken on the Torrejón Satellite Centre, and the final decisions for the preparation and management of WEAG and to take the necessary measures to resolve the problem of health insurance for Assembly staff.

Mr. President, I would like to add a few words to those of Lord Finsberg this morning in reply to the statement made by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers of WEU, when he spoke about the funding of the Secretariat and Assembly by the new members which will have a new status within the Assembly.

All this seems to me to confirm my initial statement to the effect that the 1994 budget can only be regarded as an interim budget because the new tasks falling to WEU and the new composition of the Assembly are bound to have financial consequences for all the members of this organisation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Covi.

I call Mr Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I intend to support the argument advanced by my colleague, Mr. Terry Davis. I make it clear that I do not challenge the report. Mr. Covi should command our good wishes and grateful thanks for his report and for his presentation this afternoon.

My concern is less with ministerial organs than with ministers. I do not seek to imperil the provision of funds for the Planning Cell, and I do not seek to keep satellites on the ground or to refuse money to those who should benefit from health or security payments. I am concerned about ministers.

My colleague, Mr. Davis, told the story of Admiral Nelson who put his telescope to his blind eye when he saw the flags on the masts of his superiors' ships giving him orders that he did not wish to accept. We have now reached a point in the Assembly at which ministers are happy for us to have telescopes as long as the lens caps are kept permanently in place.

This morning – I do not attack the Luxembourg minister in particular – we heard Mr. Poos say to Mr. Davis, in answer to a question about information on breaches of the embargo, that he invited him to provide ministers with information. Lord Finsberg referred to an answer I received two years ago in which the minister concerned evaded the issue by saying that it was a matter for the United Nations.

The year before that, when I raised the matter with the then Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Italian Foreign Minister, he agreed with

us enthusiastically, but then added, "All the information is in the hands of the Council of Ministers, but it will remain confidential". Again, my colleague, Mr. Davis, did a service to the Assembly by pointing out that the bombs and explosives taken into former Yugoslavia were threatening not merely the indigenous people, who had suffered barbarism for far too long.

I have constituents in former Yugoslavia and the son of one of my closest friends is there. They are in an extremely vulnerable position. I do not take it kindly – when my constituents' sons and my friend's son are serving in real peril, despite the present quieter period in former Yugoslavia – for so-called democratic nations, which wish to be involved in our Assembly, to make a fortune either for themselves or their citizens from exporting armaments that could kill my constituents serving a proper and humanitarian cause. I am not prepared to see that risk continuing because it is convenient for ministers.

As a very experienced Westminster parliamentarian, Mr. President, you are well aware that the conduct of business in the House of Commons is often sharper and cruder than it is in the Assembly. It is right that the Assembly should not adopt our parliament's approach at all times. But from time to time in the House of Commons, if a minister is incompetent, evasive, or dishonest, he is the subject of blistering attacks.

We have been put off for the past five years on this very matter. Ministers and ministerial organs are well aware of the nature and sourcing of the flow of arms into former Yugoslavia, but it is not convenient for them to face that serious problem head-on.

It is about time that ministers understood that some of the more blistering approaches available to members of parliament at Westminster could rightly be displayed in this Assembly.

I am sorry to refer again to the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence of Luxembourg who spoke this morning because it is not just him, but all ministers. However, he should understand that if ministers come here and fob us off in the way that they have been, some of us – perhaps all of us – will make it clear that it is not good enough. We shall pursue a course of harrying, chivvying and, if necessary, verbal assault until ministers who address us adopt a more responsible approach.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy. I am sure that it will be recorded that you have thrown down the gauntlet, and we shall see what comes of that.

The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Covi.

Mr. COVI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have nothing to add to what I have already said. I remember that the last time I was in England I attended a sitting of the House of Commons and was greatly impressed by the very lively atmosphere of debates. I think, however, that this outburst – which is understandable – has no real connection with the matter under discussion.

The PRESIDENT. – Sir, you are unlike some of my constituents who are appalled at what they see on television being relayed from the House of Commons, but that is another issue.

I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to congratulate our colleague, Mr. Covi, on his excellent report which received unanimous support in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and on his excellent explanation of various other points raised this afternoon. I believe that the report deserves the support of the Assembly and I am sure that it will receive it.

I add my best wishes to Mr. Covi. I believe that it will be his last appearance as a member of the Assembly as he is retiring from it. I am sure that my colleagues would want to join me in wishing him well in the future.

Mr. Covi's emphasis on the fact that these budgetary matters are of an interim nature was extremely important. In times of enormous change and developments in responsibility it is imperative that all the various parts of WEU, whether the Secretary-General, the Assembly, the Institute or the Planning Cell should plan together how best to meet the requirements of today's developing situation and the demands that are so often made of us by the ministers responsible to our own national parliaments. I believe that we shall return to that subject when we put forward for the Assembly's consideration the proposals for the 1995 budget request.

I should like to add to the remarks that have been made about Admiral Dr. Rocco Cannizzaro, who has been a mainstay of the Assembly for many years, particularly to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. Our Assembly would not run as smoothly as it does and we would not have the money to run it as we have without his considerable help over many years. I should like to add my own and my com-

mittee's commendation to him for all that he has done and give him our best wishes for a happy retirement.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Rathbone. I am sure that your words will be supported by all members present and, indeed, members who are not present, this afternoon.

No amendments have been tabled to the report, which is crystal clear.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1425.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*The draft recommendation is adopted*<sup>1</sup>.

### ***9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 16th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The rôle and future of nuclear weapons (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Document 1420).
2. Address by Mr. Kukan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia.
3. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure in view of the creation of a status of associate member (Vote by roll-call on the draft decision in the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Document 1416)
4. The rôle and future of nuclear weapons (Resumed debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1420).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(*The sitting was closed at 5.50 p.m.*)

1. See page 41.

## SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 16th June 1994

### SUMMARY

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Attendance register.</li><li>2. Adoption of the minutes.</li><li>3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.</li><li>4. The rôle and future of nuclear weapons (<i>Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee</i>, Doc. 1420).<br/>Speaker: Mr. De Decker (<i>Rapporteur</i>).</li><li>5. Address by Mr. Kukan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia.<br/><i>Replies by Mr. Kukan to questions put by:</i> Lord Finsberg, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Gusenbauer (<i>Observer from Austria</i>).</li></ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>6. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member, Doc. 1416.<br/><i>Speaker:</i> The President.</li><li>7. The rôle and future of nuclear weapons (<i>Debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation</i>, Doc. 1420).<br/><i>Speakers:</i> Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Boucheron, Mr. Thompson, Lord Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (<i>Rapporteur</i>), Mr. Baumel (<i>Chairman</i>).</li><li>8. Adjournment of the session.</li></ol> |
|---|--|

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

#### **1. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments? ...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### **3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT. – I have received the nomination of Mr. René van der Linden for one of the vacant vice-presidential places.

The nomination has been properly made and in the form prescribed by the rules.

If there is no objection I propose that the election of Mr. van der Linden as a Vice-President should be by acclamation in accordance with Rule 10 (7).

Is there any objection to the nomination?...

I believe the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare our colleague, Mr. van der Linden, duly elected a Vice-President, and his seniority will, as required by Rule 10 (7), be determined by his age.

#### **4. The rôle and future of nuclear weapons**

*(Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1420)*

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the presentation by Mr. De Decker of the report of the Defence Committee on the rôle and future of nuclear weapons, Document 1420, and debate.

I should like to remind the Assembly that at about 10.30 a.m. we shall interrupt this debate to hear an address by Mr. Kukan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, and that immediately after questions to Mr. Kukan have been concluded, we will hold the roll-call vote on the decision contained in the report from the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, postponed from yesterday's sitting. No such vote can take place unless more than half of the representatives of the Assembly or their substitutes have signed the attendance register.

1. See page 43.

*The President (continued)*

I therefore urge members to sign the register. I also ask them to get their colleagues who are in the building, but who may not be in the chamber, to do likewise.

I should be grateful if members wishing to put questions to Mr. Kukan would notify the Sittings Office at the entrance to the chamber or the secretariat on the podium.

I now call Mr. De Decker to present his report.

Mr. De DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I first thank the Assembly and the Defence Committee under its Chairman, Mr. Baumel, for asking me to produce this report. I consider it a privilege for two reasons.

The first is that studying the question of nuclear deterrence is always an absorbing intellectual exercise. The second is that the occasion is specially well-chosen: with the cold war over and the confrontation between the power blocks at an end, we are seeing a virtual revolution, or what in my view could at least be a welcome change in the field of nuclear deterrence.

We all remember that during the cold war the hostility between the superpowers and the availability of nuclear weapons in the hands, first, of the United States and later of the Soviet Union, followed later still by the United Kingdom and France, led to a crazy arms race.

A look at nuclear capability statistics for the late 1960s and early 1970s makes the head reel. The United States and the Soviet Union then had stocks of over 30 000 nuclear warheads, equivalent to two and a half million times the power of the Hiroshima bomb – facts that merit our looking back and pondering on man's ability to amass such senseless arsenals.

This having been said, nuclear weapons exist, and the committee is of course quite clear that no one will invent them out of existence.

One positive aspect is that since the end of the cold war a great change has taken place in people's minds, especially in the United States.

As Rapporteur I visited Washington a little over two months ago, and met everyone in a position of responsibility in the Pentagon, the State Department, the Security Council and Congress. As you know, at the end of the cold war the Clinton Administration decided to conduct a nuclear posture review, that is, to take a look at the nuclear weapons situation in the United States.

There is something very impressive in the fact that after the signing of the INF agreements on intermediate-range forces by Mr. Reagan and

Mr. Gorbachev and the conclusion of the START I agreements, the level of nuclear weapons fell steeply: in September 1990 the United States and the Soviet Union held stocks of 12 000 and 10 000 nuclear warheads respectively, but when START I came into effect these figures fell to 7 620 and 5 694. As you know, the START I agreements led on to the conclusion of the START II agreements bringing these figures down still further, that is, 3 500 for both countries.

These are obviously fundamental reforms. I have referred to a kind of nuclear cultural revolution in the United States which would like to see an even bigger cut in the number of nuclear warheads, the hope being to negotiate a START III agreement keeping the number of nuclear warheads down, not to four, but to three figures. This would really be a revolution and I am sure it is the right way to go.

If this trend continues it will give *a posteriori* justification for the French nuclear doctrine, which has always been based on sufficiency and not numerical superiority or over-arming.

The problem that this change will come up against obviously lies in Moscow. The big question is whether, in its present basic state of political and social instability, Russia is capable of espousing this policy of massive nuclear de-escalation sought by the United States.

Unfortunately I fear, after my visit to Moscow, that we are faced with entrenched conservatism on the part of Moscow and the Russian Government and all the more so in that, since the demise of the communist régime, the army and the general staff have much greater freedom of movement than they had when the USSR communist party was exercising strict control. In addition, the serious economic crisis, obviously due to the difficulty of switching from the Soviet economy to a market economy, has had the effect, among others, of making conventional Russian weapons and armed forces specially vulnerable. However this may be, it is my opinion that Russia feels itself fundamentally weakened as regards conventional weaponry.

This being the case, the army and the politicians in Moscow tend to cling to nuclear weapons, even more tightly than in the past, for several reasons. First come those I have just given: weakness in the conventional field, combined with the fact that nuclear weapons give Russia its world prestige and political clout. Unfortunately, politicians of all colours – I repeat of all colours – tend to lean towards over-nationalism, not towards the openness that one might have hoped for.

The problem of balance and disarmament agreements is fairly well understood at the summit of the Russian political hierarchy but it

*Mr. De Decker (continued)*

becomes more and more complicated the lower one descends the different levels of government administration. My great fear is that the START agreements signed by Russia which provide for a reduction to 3 500 nuclear warheads will never be ratified by the Duma, thus blocking us at START I level. This would obviously be a deplorable outcome, with major political consequences both for East-West relations in Europe and for the new Russian political régime, which we are at present watching with great caution, interest and also concern.

So much for developments at the level of relations between the two superpowers.

As regards European nuclear forces, since these are unquestionably on a more modest scale, there is obviously no reason to expect rapid large-scale changes. A first point here is that the United Kingdom nuclear force is being reduced, the emphasis today being solely on nuclear warheads carried in nuclear submarines. The United Kingdom is thus on its way towards a nuclear deterrent confined to that consisting of its four new nuclear submarines, the first of which will become operational at the beginning of next year, I believe.

A next important fact, as regards European security policy, is that the United Kingdom strike force is, as you know, integrated in the Atlantic Alliance and its military command. It is therefore subject to the decisions of the Atlantic Council, so its rôle is to protect both the United Kingdom's security and that of its allies. Mr. Rifkind noted this again in recent speeches.

We should therefore recognise that the United Kingdom contributes on a major scale to collective European security.

As regards France – a country to which I have just referred in paying tribute to the French nuclear doctrine – it has to be remembered that this doctrine continues to be based on two principles: the independence of the French deterrent and sufficiency. These are the two basic principles. When looking at the way things have developed one can see that it is the independence of the French strike force which will probably enable Europe in the years to come to acquire an enlarged European nuclear deterrent. It is this principle of sufficiency, in other words the lowest possible level, which has led developments in nuclear deterrence towards what is gradually becoming the general rule, namely minimal nuclear deterrence.

It is in fact my hope that the key principles of a European nuclear deterrent will be based on the concept devised by France, even if there is the additional complication of the Russian question.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are the considerations facing Europe at a time when, against a background of major political instability in Europe, our governments have signed the Maastricht Treaty and agreed on the objective of adopting and creating a common foreign and security policy with, as a corollary, the framing by WEU of a common defence policy which should lead one day to a common defence.

The only thing we have to emphasise today is the fact that it will not be possible to frame a common European foreign and security policy, and a European defence policy, as long as we lack the political will to deal with the nuclear issue and to settle it among ourselves, in terms of knowing exactly what nuclear deterrence will be required by the European Union to ensure its independence in the world of tomorrow.

I am well aware that this is by definition a tricky problem, as it affects the most sensitive areas of national sovereignty. It cannot therefore be settled in a few months, or even in two or three years. However, it is vital that we should be aware that no progress is possible so long as the WEU Council of Ministers has not realised that it is wrong. Some months ago WEU stated that, as things were, the nuclear question gave it no cause for concern. In this it is basically and totally mistaken. The fact is that there will be no common foreign and security policy, no common defence policy, so long as we have not discussed and sketched out the broad outlines of a European nuclear deterrent. This, ladies and gentlemen, is the challenge, with which we are faced. Personally, I am highly optimistic about this question, even though some strange ideas are held on the subject and it frightens many politicians.

There is no great difficulty in working out an enlarged minimal European nuclear deterrent. At least I do not think so, for the following reasons.

First, from the political point of view, neither the United Kingdom nor France – as recognised moreover by President Mitterrand in his latest address on this subject – can claim to continue participating in the drafting of a common foreign and security policy if they do not agree, in complete harmony with their allies, to define what they consider to be their vital interests over and above their own security as such.

With the United Kingdom the situation is clear, since it has made its strike force available to its allies within the Atlantic Alliance. In the case of France, a final clarification is still lacking, but the question is in everyone's mind, whether that of the President of the Republic or of any future President of the Republic, and in the minds of the members of the French Government.



*Mr. De Decker (continued)*

My second reason for optimism is that I consider that what has been possible within the Atlantic Alliance should be possible within WEU. Within the Atlantic Alliance, the Athens Agreements signed at the end of the 1960s were followed by the constitution of the Nuclear Planning Group, on which not only the two nuclear powers of the integrated command, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, but also the other NATO countries which have accepted nuclear missions since the 1960s have served.

In all the independent nuclear powers, the United States, Russia, France or the United Kingdom, there is only too frequently a tendency to underestimate the collective rôle that these other countries, for example, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Turkey, have played in nuclear deterrence on behalf of collective security.

In the Nuclear Planning Group these countries helped define the deterrence policy of the Atlantic Alliance, even though, as is obvious, the President of the United States retains ultimate responsibility for the use of American weapons. This did not and still does not prevent the United States from agreeing to discuss the subject with its European allies with regard to how we decide on the objectives and levels of nuclear deterrence in Europe.

I have two last comments. Once it is a country's wish and, in fact, duty to follow the path of maintaining a nuclear deterrent and then defining a European nuclear deterrent and lastly defining a minimal nuclear deterrent, that is to say at the lowest possible level, and without necessarily having to invent new weapons, the question of nuclear proliferation naturally arises. Here too, unfortunately, we cannot at present be highly optimistic, given the number of countries from the China seas to the Atlantic ocean which are now trying to acquire nuclear weapons – Pakistan, India, Iran, Iraq. You all know that these countries are making great efforts in this direction. In the China seas, or in North Korea, this could bring major conflict in its train not many months from now. These are the comments I wished to make on proliferation and the containment of proliferation.

I shall conclude with a brief reference to the tricky problem, particularly in France, of nuclear testing. The aim being to achieve non-proliferation, there is general agreement on the need to reduce the risks of proliferation by a complete test ban.

North Korea has recently carried out a nuclear test, and you all know that in France testing is the subject of major political debate.

The President of the French Republic is convinced that nuclear tests must be abandoned, while

the parliamentary majority holds the opposite view. I share the opinion that we must try to move one day towards a ban on real nuclear tests, substituting for them laboratory tests as carried out in the United States, and also as planned by France, which has just voted a budget of ten billion francs for this purpose. Unfortunately, we have to bear in mind the consideration that if Europe wishes one day to acquire its own nuclear deterrent, it will probably be forced to carry out preliminary tests. This means that we should bear in mind the fact that when the United States and Russia urge us to give up testing, their reason may be to persuade us not to embark on a policy of an independent and specifically European deterrent.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are the broad outlines of the report before you today. I shall simply conclude by repeating my profession of faith, or political hope. I am convinced that we shall make no progress in defining a common foreign policy and a common defence policy unless we have general agreement, among all the countries which constitute Western Europe, on the question of an enlarged European nuclear deterrent.

The PRESIDENT. – We now interrupt this order of the day for the address by Mr. Kukan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia.

#### **5. Address by Mr. Kukan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia**

The PRESIDENT. – On behalf of the Assembly, I welcome Mr. Kukan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia. We are pleased to see him here this morning. Sir, you are the first representative of the Government of Slovakia to come to address our Assembly, and we welcome the opportunity that you are offering us to learn more of your country which is, by its very location, at the heart of Europe and which will be playing a substantial rôle in any organisation of European security.

It was not without some misgivings that we witnessed the rebirth of a Slovak state, not because we challenged the right of the Slovak people to self-government but because we feared that the peoples of Central Europe, in regaining their freedom, might call into question the regrouping of peoples and states into the much larger units that we view as a condition for peace and stability on the continent of Europe.

However, we appreciated the calm and reasonable way in which you dealt with the range of issues arising from the dismantling of the former Czechoslovakia and we are following attentively how your country is tackling the problems raised by relations with its neighbours. Let me say that there was no definite order of precedence – it was

*The President (continued)*

merely a question of the difficulty that I, as a parliamentarian, found in getting my dates right that meant that, a fortnight ago, I visited the Czech Republic. I have every hope of visiting Slovakia officially in a fortnight. Having been to the Czech Republic, I found nothing but good will, understanding and camaraderie towards your country. As far as I can judge, in a superficial way, change has taken place successfully and your country is making good progress.

We are particularly delighted that you are able to speak to us today and we look forward to having your views on the integration of Slovakia and the establishment of the system of peace and security where you are concerned, right at the heart of Europe. I ask you to come to the podium.

Mr. KUKAN (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia*). – Allow me to say first a few words of thanks, Mr. President, for your kind words about Slovakia and the recent development of my country. I appreciate them and we are sincerely looking forward to your visit to Slovakia.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure and honour to attend and address the first part of the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union and to be thus given an opportunity to present the opinions and views of the Slovak Republic concerning European security. I welcome this possibility, particularly in connection with the recently granted status of associate partner of Western European Union for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which have already signed an association agreement with European Union and also for the Baltic states. We consider this significant step a concrete contribution by Western European Union towards preparing those states for their integration and accession to the European Union.

Forming a secure and prosperous Europe appears to be one of the most important challenges of today. We are aware that such a demanding task requires an enormous amount of our effort, but it would be a fatal mistake to slow down those strivings. If we declare sincere willingness to remove the consequences of an artificially divided Europe, at the same time we should not admit the existence of its heterogeneously secure parts.

Being aware of our co-responsibility for the future of this continent, the Slovak Republic intends, together with other peaceful and democratic countries in Europe, to participate actively in building a reliable European architecture. The Slovak Republic sees its contribution to security in Europe, despite its size, in a broader perspective.

At the regional level, the Slovak Republic is striving to contribute to European stability especially through good relations with its neighbours based on bilateral treaties, on good neighbourly relations, friendship and co-operation. We wish to be a reliable and co-operative partner and we expect the same from our neighbours – the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Austria and Ukraine. Concerning Ukraine, with which we share an 80 km border, the Slovak Republic is deeply interested in a peaceful and democratic outcome of the current developments in this very important European country. The same applies for Russia. We are very concerned to see a successful transition in both countries. However, the success of on-going democratic and economic reforms in Russia and Ukraine is unthinkable without a mutually acceptable framework of their relations, including those with NATO. Therefore, we support any positive steps aimed at strengthening stability and prosperity in this area.

With regard to our security situation, I would like to emphasise our adherence to the Visegrad countries. The Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarians and the Slovaks launched the Visegrad process in order to co-ordinate their definite withdrawal from the former Soviet Union sphere of influence. All these nations consider their inclusion into the Euro-Atlantic structures as the basic priority of their foreign policy. Weakened regional co-operation could threaten the fulfilment of our integration goals.

It is very important to find partners and friends for a small country like Slovakia in order to define a common goal which can then be asserted by their common will. In this respect, we understand the significance of the pact on stability, which meets the intentions of the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic mentioned above. Simultaneously, the pact on stability provides a chance for Slovakia to enhance, together with other interested countries, our effort to integrate ourselves into the European structures. The realistic and flexible approach of the European Union to the proposals submitted by the Slovak Republic during the negotiations on the final version of the pact on stability's basic document deserves our acknowledgement. We are convinced that the pact on stability will serve as a useful mechanism contributing to the security, stability and economic development of our region. We believe that the pact on stability will once again confirm the principles of inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity and respect of existing borders. At the same time, we are confident that the principles of the national minority rules to be applied within the all-European framework will be acceptable to the Slovak Republic as well.

As I have already mentioned here, we want to participate in the creation of a new security archi-

*Mr. Kukan (continued)*

ture in Europe through which the national security of the Slovak Republic would be guaranteed as well. At present, several structures are participating in this process. However, none of these security institutions can cope alone with the complex security problems in Europe either in their current or in their prospective rôles. The individual institutions deal with different questions and comprise only a small sector of the extensive security spectrum.

The CSCE in its present form represents an appropriate forum for the definition of new political principles to govern coexistence among countries in our region and undoubtedly has great potential, especially in view of its extraordinarily wide scope.

Today, NATO and its European pillar, Western European Union, are the most important factors in the European security situation, the more so because NATO has a transatlantic dimension. NATO is a pacemaker in the European security process, capable of adapting itself to changed circumstances. Therefore, the basic direction of Slovakia's security orientation is defined by our effort to become a member of NATO and, in parallel, a member of Western European Union. I should like to stress that this orientation is based on a political consensus among all the relevant political partners and backed by the wide support of the public. Such decisive support only reflects the natural adherence of the Slovak Republic to the principles upon which all modern and democratic societies are founded. Slovakia's interest in Western European Union and NATO membership is an expression of our desire to contribute to the upholding of these principles.

The Slovak Republic welcomed the partnership for peace programme, offered to NATO's co-operation partners at the alliance's summit in January 1994. The main objective of the participation of the Slovak Republic in this programme is to create gradually, in close co-operation with NATO and its member countries, the necessary conditions for fully fledged membership. By submitting the presentation document which has been positively evaluated by our partners from the alliance, the Slovak Republic has proved its intention to approach the whole project in a reliable and responsible way.

The latest acts made by European organisations – the entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the adoption of the declaration of the heads of states and governments at the Brussels NATO summit, the adoption of the status of association with Western European Union – have greatly strengthened the rôle of Western European Union and thus confirmed Slovakia's view of WEU as a

meaningful and viable structure with a promising future.

We are fully aware of the importance of the further development of the European security and defence identity and we understand the rôle of Western European Union in this process. The strengthening of the rôle and global responsibility of Europe in the security area is in conformity with our idea of building an integrated Europe founded upon common historic, civilisation and cultural values.

Relations with Western European Union belong to the priorities of the foreign and security policy of the Slovak Republic since Europe is still confronted with a great number of tensions and disputes, of crises and conflicts. We are convinced that Western European Union, in a new, more balanced relationship between NATO's European and North Atlantic members, will be another very important element of a new European security architecture.

Slovakia again declares its readiness to take an active rôle in the proceedings and initiatives of Western European Union that would outline a clear perspective of membership of the Slovak Republic in Western European Union. Simultaneously, the Slovak Republic's efforts towards Western European Union should be perceived not only in the security context but within the framework of our active participation in the process of European integration as well.

Economic success is vital for the advancement of democracy, and vice versa. Prosperity and security are inseparably linked to each other. Therefore, fulfilment of necessary reforms must take place within a secure Europe. We believe that a close co-operation with both NATO and Western European Union and a clear perspective of future membership of Slovakia in these structures would provide a significant impetus for us. We are confident that closer co-operation of the countries of Central Europe with NATO and Western European Union would extend the area of stability and democracy in Europe.

In contemporary Europe, one of the outstanding features is the emergence of numerous structures of multilateral co-operation. Today, our common objective is to make these structures more operational and effective. They should become our joint tools to prevent emerging threats and crises, to protect the rights of all nations and to prevent the resurgence of obsolete imperial thinking. Thus the Slovak Republic's offer to provide its training facilities to the international peace-keeping and humanitarian forces can be considered a good step in a good way.

Finally, I would like to remind you that the Slovak Republic supports an image of Europe built

*Mr. Kukan (continued)*

on the best and most progressive European traditions and ideas of the ongoing process of integration. We are deeply interested in a successful continuation of this process, at the end of which we see a prosperous, secure and powerful Europe.

Our vision of Europe, and Slovakia's place in it, is a vision of a multinational and multi-ethnic community. Individuals must have equal rights and opportunities for self-realisation and an expression of their own identity, based on the same rules everywhere, regardless of nationality, religion or ethnic background. The road to a unified Europe should lead through unification based on respect for individuals and the creation of a climate of trust in international relations. Borders will then no longer stand in the way of human understanding.

Successful politics require thinking that transcends the present moment. We must act today if we want to win the future. I consider this a principal issue for our Euro-Atlantic community. For there is one thing the twentieth century has taught us: our destinies are linked; and our security is indivisible.

Thank you for your attention.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Minister. You have kindly agreed to answer questions.

I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – May I ask you a question, Minister? Would you agree that one of the problems facing Slovakia and Europe, which could lead to outbreaks of unpleasantness, is the issue of minorities? Will you look a bit more closely at the issues in Slovakia concerning minorities and the rights of minorities – for example, the right to have street signs in their language as well as in the Slovakian language? Also, because you want to be part of a new set-up in Europe, I ask you what precisely the Slovakian Parliament has done to begin restitution of property stolen first by the Nazis and then by the communists since 1939.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KUKAN (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia*). – Thank you very much for that question. Yes, there are national minorities in Slovakia. There is a Hungarian national minority, there are some Poles, and some Ukrainians, Ruthenians and Germans living in our country. The most numerous minority is the Hungarian national minority, consisting of 600 000 people – 11 or 12% of the whole population. There are some Bulgarians, too, but in small numbers.

When we speak about the position of national minorities in Slovakia, we hear that in practice there are some issues and programmes for the Hungarian national minority. I come from the region of Slovakia in which that minority lives, so I can tell you how things are, not from reading newspapers or reports but from my own experience. Yes, there are street signs in Hungarian. Yes, the stores have signs in Hungarian. There are Hungarian schools in the villages and the cities and Hungarian newspapers are published in Slovakia. Slovak radio transmits in Hungarian and there are Hungarian theatres in Slovakia. There are three political parties from the Hungarian national minority, two of which are represented in parliament. They both have seven deputies. In our opinion, the standards that minorities enjoy can be compared to those in other European countries.

When Slovakia joined the Council of Europe, two recommendations were given by the Council concerning the position of the national minorities – that the names of people could be written in their own grammar and that bilingual signs should be placed outside villages and cities. After that, the Slovak Parliament passed legislation to deal with the writing of names in accordance with the recommendation by the Council of Europe. That is fully acceptable to the Hungarian national minority.

The other issue with which we are dealing is bilingual signs. The new government prepared legislation in that respect and it was debated in parliament. After heated debate, a vote took place and the proposal was rejected by parliament. One more vote was needed if the legislation was to be adopted. Three Hungarian deputies did not vote for the legislation. That was not the only reason why it was not adopted; quite a number of coalition deputies were not present when the vote took place. We intend to try again. The way in which to achieve the proposal is being discussed by the coalition parties in the government and we shall try again to deal with the issue.

There is another matter that is much more complex and much more difficult – the administrative divisions of the country. We are discussing the new scheme – the new pattern – of administrative divisions, but it will take more time. We need to discuss the matter in depth and we are using the services of experts from the Council of Europe. We are not in a hurry because the issue is too serious to be rushed and we want to introduce proposals that really take care of all the possible problems that we could otherwise meet in future.

After the recent elections in Hungary and the formation of the new government there, we realistically expect that the issues will be dealt with in a far more positive and constructive atmosphere. That will help us to deal with the issues.

*Mr. Kukan (continued)*

When the new government took office in the middle of March this year, they stood in front of parliament with their policy statement. The priorities in foreign policy were clear-cut. First, there was integration into the European structure and secondly, there was an emphasis on good relations with neighbours. As I said, we really believe that good and constructive relations with neighbours are a very important issue and can contribute significantly to the stability of the region. Our contribution is that this government has managed to introduce a business-like rather than an emotional atmosphere into relations with neighbours and that is conducive to solving even the most complicated issues.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Restitution?

Mr. KUKAN (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia*). – Slovakia has a good record in that respect. The restitution law was passed by parliament. It covers individuals whose property was stolen from them after 1948, when the communist party took power in Slovakia. The property of all the religious societies will be returned to the churches. That is the extent to which the legislation deals with restitution. It is wide and we think that it deals with the issue.

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I thank the Minister for his most positive address to us this morning. Is he aware that this Assembly, some two and a half years ago in December 1991, debated a report on the defence industries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in which we acknowledged in particular the difficulties that would be faced by his country with the dominance in its economy of the defence industries and the difficulties of converting them into manufacturers for the civilian market?

In the recommendation, we urged member states to respond positively to any requests from his government for special help for self-employment, the establishment of small businesses, retraining and the acquisition of new skills. Is the Minister fully aware of the recommendation, which was passed unanimously by the Assembly two and a half years ago? Has his country sought advice from member states of WEU and if so, what has the response been? What progress has his country made towards civilianisation of its defence industry?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KUKAN (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia*). – Yes, I am aware of the discussion and the recommendation. It is true that the issue of the defence industry proved to be one of the most dif-

ficult for the independent Slovakia in 1993. The arms and armaments-producing industries in Slovakia form a huge complex with quite modern equipment. We produced the arms for the old Warsaw Pact countries. The reason is geographical. Under the old régime, the attack was expected to come from the West so all the armaments industries were built in the East – in Slovakia. The newly independent country has inherited this bad structure.

We know well that to convert military production into civilian production is difficult, time-consuming and money-consuming. That is why WEU recommended that countries should give us advice. We got quite a number of pieces of advice. Some said that we should scrap the defence industry completely and start building from scratch, and that that might be a less expensive method. Seriously, in the meantime, the problem is an acute one in Slovakia.

There is a high rate of unemployment in the area, where there are factories producing arms. We now produce 9% of the arms produced in 1989 – a dramatic drop. We managed to introduce some civilian lines of production, but not enough. The government deals with the problem all the time and is leaning towards taking the decision to restart production on a limited scale for a limited time with strict control over the export of arms. That will earn some financial benefit that can be used for the conversion of the industry. I repeat that the government strictly supervises the export of armaments. We will not export them to any area or country of conflict; we are fully aware of the political sensitivity of that subject. Progress has not been quick and we are still combating the problem.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – I thank Mr. Kukan for his presentation.

Slovakia is a new republic. If I were a Slovakian who had been living in that country for the past twelve months as an ordinary man in the street I would tend to look inwards and to the problems that were created when the country became a republic. There were economic and administrative problems, a new parliament was set up, elections were developed.

You, Mr. Kukan, mentioned in your speech Slovakia's relations with its immediate neighbours. When you talk about the greater Europe, organisations such as this, the European Union and other European organisations, you talk about the broader Europe. Are the people of Slovakia beginning to look beyond their own boundaries and neighbours towards the greater Europe? I realise that some parochialism would exist for a period after Slovakia became a republic. If Slovakia begins to

*Mr. Thompson (continued)*

participate in the European Union – I speak as a Briton knowing the arguments that we had over the Maastricht Treaty – it will have to concede a little of its sovereignty. Slovakia has just received its sovereignty. Do you feel that the people – not the politicians – will be prepared to concede some of their sovereignty and become part of the greater European organisations?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KUKAN (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia*). – It is correct that, having lived for forty years under a totalitarian régime, the population of Slovakia need to change their mentality. Certain methods of governing society have been used in Slovakia for a long time, and to change them requires time, experience and new vision – it will be particularly difficult for older people.

We face the introduction of the market economy and a new way of life in which every individual is more responsible for his standing in society. People are finding that difficult to cope with. The market economy means taking decisions and risks, and there is uncertainty among the population. You, Mr. Thompson, are right in saying that the mentality of the people must change. That is happening, but it is happening slowly and needs time.

There were two parts to your question. We are a newly independent republic and you are right to say that integrating into the European structures means giving up some of our sovereignty to become part of the bigger institution. All the political parties, even the opposition, are in favour of that foreign policy and marching towards European integration. We have no difficulty about that.

The people are trying to look beyond the region. They understand that it is necessary to have good relations with Slovakia's neighbours. We are going through a difficult economic period and life is difficult, but we are still coping with the new situation. Perhaps because of that the population is looking towards the European Union as something that is better and that provides a better future for them.

We have been asked many times, even more bluntly than you have asked us today, why we wanted to enter the European Union. We have many problems and we are dealing with them. The movement of Slovakia towards Europe is important. Our people say that they have always felt that they were part of Europe. When I say that we are going into Europe I am always reminded that we have always been in Europe. I say that perhaps the other Europeans do not know that and we must persuade them that we are part of Europe.

Slovakia was sometimes ignored by some politicians in Western Europe when they spoke of those countries that were on their way to becoming integrated into Europe. They mentioned Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, but somehow Slovakia was omitted. We felt frustrated because we were in the same position and striving towards exactly the same goals as our friends in other free countries. There was some – to use a mild diplomatic word – perception that Slovakia was somewhere to the east of the Balkans. We felt badly about that. Slovakia has culture, historic traditions and the values of other western European countries. There should be no misgivings about Slovakia's place in Europe. People are looking forward to Slovakia's integration into the European Union and regard it as the natural place for Slovakia. They want to be in the European Union even if it poses some problems.

Slovakian people fully understand that we first have to solve the problems of our relations with our neighbours. We know that the European Union would not want to take in a country with problems, as that would bring more problems for the Union. We are fully aware of that and the Slovakian people understand that they must deal with the problems with Slovakia's neighbours first.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Gusenbauer.

Mr. GUSENBAUER (*Observer from Austria*). – Vienna and Bratislava are not only geographically close but have strong historic links. In the light of the referendum in Austria on Sunday, which showed the overwhelming support of the Austrian people for the idea of European integration, not only in economic but political and security terms – we hope that the referendum gives momentum to the idea of integration and will help the Scandinavian countries to enter a consequent process – the European Union is opening up a door to Central and Eastern Europe. There is a certain historical creativity in that process.

You mentioned a target for integration of your country into Europe. What is the time frame within which you envisage Slovakia becoming a member of the European Union?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KUKAN (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia*). – We were all very relieved about, and welcome the result of, the referendum in Austria. We followed the development closely. In the days before the referendum we heard that the difference would be slim, so we were worried. There was a big sigh of relief, even in Slovakia, that the result was so good and the margin so wide. Given the constructive co-operation that we have with your country, that result will be even more important for us because now we shall be bordering the European Union. We hope that we shall benefit

*Mr. Kukan (continued)*

from Austria's experience in becoming a member of the European Union.

We know that the process by which one becomes a member of the European Union is long and difficult. I have visited several countries and talked with my counterparts in Spain and Portugal. They reminded me of the complexity of the process and said that we should be aware that it would take a long time – something like seven or eight years. We also understand that it does not depend on us alone, but on the other members of the European Union. We know how important will be the intergovernmental conference in 1996, which will consider the ways of expanding the European Union.

We are now waiting for our agreement on associate membership to be ratified by the parliaments of the twelve member states. We shall then present our official application for full membership. We could be a member of the Union by the year 2000, although that may be a little optimistic. We should like to use the psychological moment of the number 2000 to finish the process and start a new millennium with everything settled. We expect to be adopted into the Union within that time frame, although it may take until the year 2002.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Kukan, thank you for your comprehensive comments about the situation in your country and for assuring us of Slovakia's responsible rôle in Central Europe. We were extremely interested to hear it because, as I said in introducing you, there were one or two gasps when the separation took place. From what you have been saying and from your visionary approach to the first years of the next century – after all that is not very far away – we realise all too well that Slovakia is serious in its intention to play a formidable rôle in Central Europe and to play its part along with others. You were sensible to refer to the Visegrad countries, to what is being attempted by that bloc and to what will emerge from it.

Let me pick one phrase from your interesting address – that security and prosperity are inseparably linked. I would say aye to that strongly. I have been making the point, as have others, that a prosperous Europe is one that will probably be at peace with itself and will probably be able to secure a defence system of common security that will keep at bay any malign thoughts from other countries outside the broader European countries. It was appropriate to have you address the session at this point. I am sure that there will be increasing links between Slovakia and WEU and we look forward to developing that friendship even further.

Mr. KUKAN (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia*). – I should like again to thank you all

for giving me this opportunity. We in Slovakia appreciate the work that you are doing. Allow me to wish all of you personally all the best in your professional and personal life. Thank you once again.

#### ***6. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member***

*(Doc. 1416)*

The PRESIDENT. – Before we resume the debate on nuclear weaponry, I shall take the order of the day dealing with the vote on the draft decision contained in the report from the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure in view of the creation of a status of associate member, Document 1416, postponed from yesterday afternoon's sitting, as we did not have a quorum.

As part of the draft decision proposes an amendment to the Charter of the Assembly, under Rule 36 – which I need to explain – of the Rules of Procedure, there is a need for an absolute majority of the Assembly's membership to carry it. A roll-call vote is therefore necessary and the absolute majority is 55.

Under Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure, no decision by roll-call can be taken unless more than half of the representatives or substitutes have signed the register of attendance. I am afraid that fewer than half of the representatives or substitutes here have signed the attendance register and a quorum has not been achieved. We need 55, but only 38 have signed. In accordance with Rule 37 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the draft decision stands referred to the Presidential Committee which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or referred back to the committee. I am afraid that that is not debatable so that is the procedure that will take effect.

#### ***7. The rôle and future of nuclear weapons***

*(Debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1420)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now start the debate on the report of the Defence Committee on the rôle and future of nuclear weapons, Document 1420.

The first speaker in the debate is Mr. Rodrigues of Portugal.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the end of the cold war has banished the nuclear nightmare. Nuclear arsenals have been reduced, and there is



*Mr. Rodrigues (continued)*

no longer talk of a holocaust after the break-up of the Soviet empire.

Nevertheless, the fact that we are met here to discuss a draft recommendation on the rôle and future of nuclear weapons faces us with a harsh reality. We have accumulated on this earth stocks of weapons on our planet that are powerful enough to destroy everything man has created, and sadly no one has even any thought of scrapping the new nuclear weapons now being produced. Yet the debate on the possible use of these monstrous weapons continues.

Mr. De Decker's masterly and skilled report gives us a comprehensive insight into every aspect of the problem. His knowledge, intelligence and sense of responsibility are obvious on every page. However, the conclusions I draw from the report are different from those in the draft recommendation to the Council.

Ladies and gentlemen, even on the most favourable assumptions, the START I and START II Treaties will not be fully implemented before the year 2003. The excuses are not just difficult to understand; they are also inadequate, because of the total lack of sincerity in the arguments advanced to explain why disarmament is so slow; what is still worse is that the arguments are based on strategies which envisage and propose the use of nuclear weapons.

As regards WEU and its position with respect to nuclear deterrence, the ambiguities begin with the text of the Maastricht Treaty and the rôle it ascribes to WEU.

Relations between WEU and NATO have always been marked by misunderstandings and contradictions. Far from being dispelled by the decisions of the Brussels summit, these misunderstandings and contradictions are increasing. I am one of those who see WEU as a kind of appendix to NATO. The idea of the European pillar set out in the Maastricht Treaty, returned to and deepened at the Brussels summit by the heads of state and government of the NATO countries, is beginning to look more and more like a figure of rhetoric used to qualify the political and military hegemony of the United States. The address given to the Assembly yesterday by General Joulwan did nothing but reinforce that impression.

It is once again accepted that nuclear weapons may be the response to an unescapable need when used in a rational way. The excuses put forward to avoid destroying nuclear weapons are many and varied. The one most frequently used is the unstable situation in Russia, yet the fact is that even in the Pentagon the most respected military leaders do not believe in the possibility of war

with Russia, plunged as it is in a vast social and economic crisis.

Discussions in the United States on this subject have very little to do with security in Europe. For example, there are those who propose that we produce low-yield smart nuclear weapons which might be used in case of need against third world countries recognised as irresponsible and dangerous.

Mr. De Decker notes in his report the paradoxical rôle sometimes assigned to nuclear weapons. The United States has promoted certain third world countries to the rank of implacable enemies. Step by step the imaginary threat posed by these countries is being transformed into the main argument for preserving the United States nuclear deterrent. Countries are now classified into ethnic categories. There is already talk of perverse states, and states which, as suggested by Mrs. Madeleine Albright, Ambassador to the United Nations, should be placed in trusteeship.

Everyone knows that the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by WEU member countries – France and the United Kingdom – puts the organisation in a difficult situation. Since these two countries' strategic concepts of nuclear deterrence are highly different, it is in practice impossible to formulate a common doctrine. The United Kingdom, a very Atlantic-minded country, has placed its forces under NATO command, as noted by Mr. De Decker. In the event of war, basic decisions would be taken by the United States. France takes no part in the work of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. The only mission of France's nuclear force is the defence of national territory. Germany, which is not a producer of nuclear weapons, is naturally excluded from any direct participation in the nuclear field. Yet Germany is the economic driving force of the continent of Europe.

The independence which Washington seeks to preserve in the nuclear field relegates to almost negligible proportions the significance of the debate on the rôle and future of nuclear weapons. Mr. Anthony Lake, President Clinton's influential adviser on security affairs, made it very clear when addressing the John Hopkins University that only one factor should determine the multilateral or unilateral nature of action by the United States: the interests of America. The United States should act on a multilateral basis where this would further its interests, but on a unilateral basis where its own aims were concerned. This statement reveals the secondary position in which the United States rank its European allies in security questions.

Mr. De Decker notes that today several countries, even those that signed the Maastricht Treaty, cannot share the nuclear deterrent policy in the



*Mr. Rodrigues (continued)*

absence of a homogeneous political union and a common political authority.

Unlike Mr. De Decker, in my view history shows that a form of political convergence opening the way to a common strategy with a nuclear component would be a factor making for new dangers, sources of tension and a real threat to peace.

We cannot have real security in the world until we have once and for all stopped the sale of heavy weapons to countries with no need whatsoever for them. Rwanda is a case in point. Yet there is no project to do so. Hypocrisy, ambition and selfishness prevent us from seriously combating this sordid and criminal trade.

I therefore approve neither the draft recommendation to the Council nor the conclusions. Progress towards disarmament, hopefully awaited by mankind, necessarily implies the total dismantling of all the nuclear arsenals that have been built up. The continuing existence of civilisations created by man is incompatible with any kind of recourse to nuclear weapons, old or new. It is my hope that the future awaiting them will be their elimination from this earth.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Rodrigues.

I call Mr. Boucheron.

Mr. BOUCHERON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this is a very important debate and I am glad we are having it. It proves that the idea of a common European defence and that of a common security foreign policy are both gaining ground. We shall eventually have a European defence, for two structural historical reasons.

The first is that, whatever else happens, the European identity is going to grow stronger. It is taking clearer shape each day, and events point the same way. If European identity has any meaning, one day there must be European defence.

The second, equally structural from the historical point of view, is that America will gradually disengage from our continent. Though Mr. Clinton may have repeated in Paris that the American presence was here for good, it is certain that disengagement makes future historical logic.

Now that the communist bloc has disappeared, American foreign policy is looking towards the vast horizons of the Pacific. On the domestic policy front, too, the United States is under pressure from public opinion and the Senate. A common European foreign and security policy is therefore part of history in the making.

Our Rapporteur, Mr. De Decker, has put several very important questions, including the nuclear question. I should like to comment on the French nuclear deterrent and its rôle in relation to European security. To that end I would like to make things clear.

The first specific feature of the French deterrent is that it is a matter of national consensus. The military programme act proposed by the French Government a fortnight ago was passed unanimously by the National Assembly, with the exception of the communist group which voted against it, and has the general support of the French public. Its second feature is that it is technically self-dependent. It was designed to be independent and its operational system is wholly autonomous and national. The last, and not the least, of its features is that it is designed as a deterrent, and in no way a tactical nuclear weapon. It relies on the strange gamble of deterrence: the two-fold suicide of the attacker and the attacked. It is what we call a non-use weapon. I would remind you that we do not exclude a first strike. If our vital interests are affected, there will be a nuclear response, whether the aggression be nuclear or not. These are the three main features of our deterrent.

But can this deterrent serve European security? The principles I have just listed have several implications. The first is that the decision to use it is entirely centralised in the hands of one individual, who has firm political authority to make the decision, so the question clearly is whether there is a similar individual at the European level entrusted with the same political authority by all the peoples of Europe. Obviously there is not. Institutionally, we are a very long way from this situation. We may perhaps one day have a president of Europe elected by universal suffrage and invested with this defence rôle. But as you are all well aware, this is not a possibility in the short term. So, with the highly centralised decision-making it requires, nuclear decision-making cannot be shared. It can only be national.

The second reason why this is so is the problem of retaliation. The very principle of the deterrent is the fear of a nuclear response to any major attack: the attacking country exposes itself to extremely powerful retaliation within quarters of an hour. This feature on its own determines the strictly national and non-sharable nature of the deterrent.

This being the case, it may be asked whether the only country the French nuclear force is of use to is France. My answer is no. If an aggressor country – any aggressor country – wished to attack Europe, it would not be attacking just one or two European countries: all the other European countries would be against it. To attack Europe, it

*Mr. Boucheron (continued)*

would be forced to invade the continent as far as Dublin and Lisbon. And on the way it would encounter the French deterrent, and incidentally the United Kingdom deterrent too. Anyone wishing to take on the European continent, which for the time being is our Western Europe, would have to reckon in his battle plans with the French and United Kingdom deterrents. Thus we see – and it is no paradox – that the French deterrent does not lend itself to sharing as regards decision-making and utilisation, but it makes a powerful contribution to the security of the Western European countries.

As regards Mr. De Decker's report, let me say that I do not share his pessimism on proliferation. Iraq and North Korea, which have violated the non-proliferation treaty, are today very much isolated at the diplomatic and international level. It is obvious that when Kim Il Sung dies, North Korea will return to the fold. Iraq and North Korea already have great difficulty in resisting international pressure whether it be economic, diplomatic, political or even military.

In my view all countries should sign the non-proliferation treaty and we should do everything we can to get it signed. I am sure that the economic pressure brought to bear on countries intent on disregarding the treaty will be effective and prevent nuclear proliferation.

Lastly, on the question of nuclear testing, it is clear that the new nuclear tests are intended only to develop low-yield devices for use as tactical battlefield weapons. We are opposed to the principle of such weapons, since the escalation they would cause would eventually wipe out the human race.

I wholly agree with our Rapporteur's conclusions on this subject, and I am pleased to note that our European partners also agree. The adoption of a position such as that of our Rapporteur is a really good sign, and clears the ground in our debate.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Boucheron.

I now call Mr. Thompson of the United Kingdom.

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I congratulate Mr. De Decker on his report, but may I use what one would identify as a British expression, which others may find difficult to understand, and describe the report as something of a curate's egg. That means that there is some good and some bad in it. But most of what I find in the report is good. So in general it is right that the Rapporteur be congratulated on it.

Next year many organisations will be celebrating certain things, and in 1995 I shall celebrate

fifty years of having been a supporter of unilateral nuclear disarmament. That stemmed from the time when the two bombs were dropped in Japan. Anyone alive at that time – I was a teenager then – will recall that. It has been in my mind ever since. The dropping of the bombs had a significant effect on people's attitudes. During the second world war we were conditioned; 1 000 lb bombs were dropped and we had to learn what that really meant. At the beginning of the war people of my generation talked about virtually dropping bombs by hand from planes, yet by the end that was the sort of progress that had been made. When the atom bombs were dropped in 1945 that changed people's attitudes towards warfare and towards the horrors that followed from dropping bombs such as those. It coloured my views on the issue from that time forward.

What concerned me over that period was not only that we should not have buttons to press to explode such devices; the other question of importance was: who had their fingers on the buttons? Over the fifty years the fingers have changed, but the buttons are still there. There has been some relaxation of tensions in the past few years, which is fine.

Having said that I support unilateral nuclear disarmament I have another problem, which creates something of a dilemma for me, because I also claim to be a realist. The reality, as Mr. De Decker's report says, is there are huge stocks of nuclear weapons in various parts of the world. Those are being reduced in some places, but both in Europe and in other parts of the world there is still a great deal of instability. That encourages risk-taking in terms of reducing stocks of nuclear weapons.

I understand nations being reluctant to reduce their stocks until European stability begins to be more of a reality. Even when we consider small countries such as former Yugoslavia, we see that although that is not involved with nuclear weapons at all, it could nevertheless become a flash-point, causing other things to happen. We must be very careful on that issue.

One of the good parts in Mr. De Decker's report suggests that we ought to maintain the impetus of the disarmament programme, and suggests some interesting new ideas which, if implemented, will reinforce the aim of at least bringing nuclear weaponry down to recognisable and tolerable levels – if nuclear armaments can ever be described as tolerable – and levels that we could identify to some degree, which would improve confidence in the whole programme.

The quantities of nuclear weapons available to the world, as shown in the report, are horrific. There are far more than any nation of any size would require to resolve any problems of conflict.

*Mr. Thompson (continued)*

Certain aspects of the report are particularly interesting. Paragraph (xxi) is of interest. It suggests that there should be a study of the attitudes of the United Kingdom and France towards the possible use of their nuclear weapons. I was interested to hear a colleague from France giving us his thoughts on the French view of the nuclear situation. The United Kingdom is in NATO so the use of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom relates to its rôle in NATO whereas France, although it participates in some NATO activities, is outside NATO. It would be useful to study the rôle of the two countries which are the only two in WEU that have nuclear weapons.

I recognise the views expressed in paragraphs (xxx) and (xxxi). I was not aware before of the apparent lack of interest by the Council of Ministers in nuclear disarmament. Paragraph (xxxi) points out that nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. As with so many other of man's innovations, such as chemical and biological weapons, there must be sensible international controls. It may be that the issue of nuclear disarmament has faded from the scene somewhat in Europe, certainly in the past few months. Nevertheless, situations such as the one in North Korea show the potential problems. It would be useful if WEU became involved, as the Rapporteur suggests, in a series of studies and discussions to help to form opinion on the issue. That would be one of the benefits to come from the report.

I am not so sure about the suggestion that we might have a European nuclear deterrent. The United Kingdom would not concede control of nuclear weapons to anybody and I cannot imagine that France would concede control either. Such a European deterrent is a concept for a long, long time ahead.

Another thought that has come to my mind about nuclear weapons may seem facetious. I believe that we should try to persuade the big nuclear countries, such as the United States and Russia which are presently involved in talks to reduce their weaponry, to consider, while they dismantle their weapons, retaining the services of a sculptor. A sculptor could take parts of the weapons as a symbol of the fact that they had been discarded and could design sculptures. One could be erected in Washington, made from part of a Russian missile, and one could be erected in Moscow, made from part of an American missile. That is the level of aggression that the weapons should always have had. Such sculptures would be a symbol. I would like to see one in London made from part of a Russian weapon. We could look at such a sculpture and think that that was the only shape and form in which we wanted to see Russian missiles in London.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Thompson, for an interesting idea which is well worth pursuing.

Our final speaker is Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – My friend Jack Thompson always makes a most interesting speech. I did not think that he would suggest the erection of a phallic symbol, which is basically all one could make out of nuclear weapons. As he rightly said, he has been consistent in his advocacy of unilateral disarmament. What I like about Mr. De Decker's report is that he has got away from what I believe is an idea that is long past its sell-by date. No one in any country talks about unilateral nuclear disarmament. As Mr. Thompson said, we cannot disinvent the wretched things. As long as we cannot disinvent them, we have to decide how to keep them as a proper deterrent.

One remark that I heard Mr. Rodrigues make, which was totally wrong, is that the British nuclear weapon in time of war is under the control of the United States. That is 600% wrong. I hope that he will not say that again because it misrepresents my country's position.

Let us consider the whole question of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the opportunities under the START treaty for the destruction of nuclear weapons. There are those who would like to see the total abolition of nuclear weapons by the great powers. However, there has never been an accurate stock check of the Soviet tactical missiles and we know of the equipment that has been sold by Russian soldiers. I believe that it is possible that some tactical nuclear weapons could be sold and they could fall into the hands of individuals or organisations anywhere in the world. Whatever happens, therefore, we come back to what Mr. De Decker referred to in his good and interesting speech – the need for a European nuclear weapon.

However, echoing what Mr. Thompson said, I do not believe that the United Kingdom is likely to go along with that idea and I do not believe that France is likely to either, as we heard from one of the French speakers. It is clear, however, that in the case of the United Kingdom, our nuclear weapons, apart from being of use in the event of a national problem, are also allocated to NATO. That is very important and I hope that it may be the basis of some sort of understanding in future.

Someone made the comment – I think that it was a French colleague – that there was not quite as much need for pessimism because the situation in North Korea might change when Kim died. I fear that that is probably not true because Kim's son will take over and he is very much in the

*Lord Finsberg (continued)*

spirit of his father, but far less intelligent. I am worried about that particular dynasty.

Realistically, we shall not have a common European defence policy this side of the year 2000 at least. How do we proceed to organise ourselves so that we can be safe and secure, with a deterrent which is required because of the odd nuclear weapons floating around, and yet try to find a way in which to reduce to the barest minimum the stock of these horrible weapons? They may be horrible, but in the case of Hiroshima, they saved tens of thousands of lives of allied soldiers who were living under the most barbaric conditions. I for one have no regrets about the dropping of those two bombs.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Finsberg.

That concludes the debate, but I am sure that Mr. De Decker wishes to respond. Also, I think that the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Baumel, would like to make a contribution.

Mr. De DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – First of all, I would like to thank the speakers in the debate for their interest in the report and the work it involved.

In reply to Mr. Rodrigues, may I say that we are well aware of your party's position and its idealism. I would like to deal with two basic items in your speech. Firstly, you are in fact opposed to the Maastricht Treaty, the reasoning behind it and the application of a common foreign and security policy. Secondly, you are opposed to nuclear weapons, which is clearly your privilege. It is your opinion, but you will understand that a rapporteur, whose job it is to represent a realistic, majority analysis, clearly cannot go along with you in this view.

Nevertheless, I perceive a certain contradiction in your words. At one point you referred to a speech by Mrs. Albright, who, defining the interests of the United States at a recent symposium, stressed that it would intervene only if those interests were at threat.

You are right to draw attention to this political fact but you have to draw the relevant conclusions. If the United States' extended nuclear deterrent only works when that country's interests are at stake – which I believe to be the case – we Europeans must recognise the need to develop our own nuclear deterrent as a measure of prudence. However, I say, and repeat, that I am in no way advocating over-arming. On the contrary we must clearly continue on the road to nuclear disarmament and numerical de-escalation, and pursue our efforts to control nuclear proliferation; whether we like it or not, however, we will need an extended European nuclear deterrent to defend Europe's vital interests.

I would like to thank Mr. Boucheron, though he has already gone, for his address and for his European optimism. Clearly, I share his view that a European defence policy will inevitably come into being because that is where history is going. I also share his view about American disengagement from Europe. As you know, before the Gulf war there were over 400 000 American conventional troops stationed in Europe. Of these, only 100 000 are to remain. It is important to remember that the United States has withdrawn all its nuclear weapons from Europe, all its ground-to-ground missiles and all its tactical nuclear weapons, with the exception of seven hundred gravity bombs deployed in various European countries. These are airborne but not missiles. They are vertical drop bombs carried by aircraft. Consequently, you only need to know the range of the Atlantic Alliance's aircraft to measure the real geographical and strategic reach of these weapons.

In actual fact, if these weapons are still in Europe it is purely for political reasons. Militarily speaking, these seven hundred gravity bombs are unusable, or rather, useless. The only reason they are here is to justify the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces in Europe is an American – the general in charge of the American nuclear deterrent in Europe. That is what these weapons are for and that is why the Americans will not withdraw them. This is something we have to realise.

Mr. Boucheron reminded us of the fundamental principles behind France's nuclear strategy. He explained, and he is quite right, that according to the French doctrine the nuclear deterrent must basically be a weapon of non-use and political deterrence that works. If the deterrent does not deter, the response is a massive one. France will not play the game of gradual nuclear escalation which, incidentally, the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance allowed for during the era of graduated response when, if conventional weapons were not enough, you moved on to tactical battlefield nuclear weapons, followed by Euro-strategic and finally strategic weapons. France has always rejected this logic and was basically right to regard nuclear weapons as weapons of non-use.

This is why I share Mr. Boucheron's opposition to the idea of the European countries developing low-yield nuclear weapons, because if you entertain that idea you also entertain the possibility of using low-yield nuclear weapons. And if you entertain the possibility of using them, you throw overboard the whole concept of basic deterrence.

There is one point on which I of course would disagree with Mr. Boucheron. It concerns something that is, at the moment, a fact: he said that deterrence, that is, France's nuclear deterrent, is

*Mr. De Decker (continued)*

the central decision of one man. What I wonder is whether central decision by one man will always be legitimate. One can imagine several situations where the legitimacy of one man deciding whether to use French nuclear weapons or not would be questionable.

What matters, as far as France is concerned, is how the country perceives its vital interests. This reminds me of a story from the cold war period. I once asked Mr. Giscard d'Estaing a question when he was no longer President and when I therefore felt at liberty to put it to him: "Mr. President, Article V of the WEU Treaty provides that if a member country of WEU is subject to aggression, the other countries must come to its aid with all the resources available to them, both military and otherwise". I asked him whether these military resources included the nuclear strike capability, which also appeared to me to be obvious. President Giscard d'Estaing's reply – and do not forget that this was in 1984-85 during the cold war – was this: "The only thing that matters is what the Russians think we will do". At first I thought he was making fun of me but the next morning I realised he was quite right. In the concept of deterrence, the only thing that mattered, and still matters, is how the potential adversary at the time perceives the prospect of France deciding to use its weapons within the framework of this concept.

The problem is that today we are no longer in a situation of bloc-to-bloc confrontation. Today we are faced with many different threats scattered over a far wider geographical area than ever before. So now in this context and in the context of the Europe we are building, we have to ask ourselves whether it is conceivable that France and Great Britain should alone continue to decide what their vital interests are. If we really want to build a new Europe, if we really have the political will to do so, we must, for one thing, bring Germany into the equation. I can no longer remember which speaker said so, but clearly Germany cannot remain indefinitely excluded from a problem which is so important not only to Europe as a whole but also to the small European countries which, in the past, have always performed nuclear missions and indeed still are performing them today.

I would like to thank Mr. Thompson for his comments. I do not of course share his goal and his faith in unilateral nuclear disarmament. I even believe such a step would be suicidal on Europe's part at a time when nuclear proliferation is still unchecked. Saddam Hussein is still working on atomic weapons and it could be that tomorrow even nearer countries than Iraq will be developing their own missiles and nuclear weapons.

I do, however, share his concern over stocks of nuclear weapons. This is a serious problem. I reminded you earlier that for years Russia and the United States had more than 30 000 nuclear warheads deployed at the same time. Most of these weapons are now obsolete. But what has happened to all the fissile material? What has happened to the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads that can no longer be used? They have been stored, but we do not really know where or how. In my view, these nuclear weapons which are now obsolete and therefore no longer operational, should be reprocessed by Europe to make them safe.

As for what Lord Finsberg said, I would of course like to thank him for supporting my report. I respect and understand his saying that Great Britain will not yet allow its nuclear decision-making to be shared. As for myself, I remain optimistic. I repeat that what has been possible within the Atlantic Alliance, that is the joint management of a large part of the nuclear dossier within the Nuclear Planning Group, should one day be possible within an equivalent European group. The only thing that I aim at in the recommendation I have presented is that a strategic think-tank be set up within WEU to look at these issues and one day present its thinking and propose a decision which will naturally be in step with the progress made by the European Union at the time. The two go hand in hand.

Personally, I do not think we will progress very quickly along the road to political union unless we first solve the nuclear problem. Others believe it can be done later, that is, the two together. I believe that they will be closely interrelated and that, as Mr. Boucheron said, at the time Europe will be faced with institutional problems. The question will therefore be linked with that of whether the European Union will then have a president at its head elected by universal suffrage and with the authority to decide on Europe's vital interests.

Like it or not, I fully respect the integral sovereignty of Europe's two nuclear powers. I am glad that these two nuclear powers exist and I am heartened by the progress we have made towards a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. But I am convinced that one day – and far more quickly than we think because the problem is far less complicated than we believe, even if we fantasise a great deal about nuclear weapons – political developments will force the European Union to define its vital interests and how they should be defended.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Baumel, Chairman of the Defence Committee.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – It is usual in our debates to congratulate the rapporteurs on their work. This is one of the courtesies we practise in this Assembly and it is an extremely pleasant custom. In the case of Mr. De Decker's report, there are, in addition to the niceties of courtesy and politeness, a number of specific points I have to clarify.

This report is an essential document, not only for WEU, our own institution, but for Europe's defence problems as a whole. It comes at a very worrying time with China resuming nuclear tests and North Korea trying hard to develop nuclear missiles. Dashing the hopes of many people throughout the world and the illusions of those who believed in sharing peace and in the contribution that disarmament might make, terrifying arsenals still exist in many places. The report sees all this very clearly and Mr. De Decker has put a great deal of work into it. In all my experience of debates in this chamber rarely have I known a report taken to such precise detail. I wish to thank Mr. De Decker very much for his work.

It is also a bold report in that, after stating the situation in which Europe finds itself today, it jumps ahead several stages and considers prospects of European co-operation which, as at least two speakers before me have already said, are probably desirable but are clearly out of the question for some time yet. Indeed, as the great strategists at the origin of the nuclear deterrent both in the United States and in Europe defined it, nuclear power is at the moment a national weapon. It demands such responsibility that only the one authorised person can be at the controls. As yet there is no legitimate executive power at the European level and it is therefore difficult to see how any European organisation could use this terrifying weapon. We have to advance cautiously towards a certain kind of European co-operation, without hoping for a European power that could use nuclear weapons. As Mr. Boucheron said very plainly, we have to realise the consequences of using nuclear weapons, namely the danger of the country that first used them being completely vitrified within the next half hour. I very much doubt whether many countries in Europe would be prepared to run such a risk. Given the opinion we know neighbouring countries to have on this question, it is not something to be raised for some time yet.

The report is also extremely detailed in the documentation it contains. It is true that the strategic context in which we find ourselves today is completely new. The nuclear duopoly which had prevailed in Europe for thirty years is quietly being replaced by a different strategic picture. While the North is cautiously trimming its nuclear capability, the South is desperately trying to build one up. The apocalyptic threat of nuclear attack

by a certain country in the East is being increasingly replaced by the risk of strikes from other continents or countries which, though far less powerful and using a small number of wild missiles, would nevertheless pose a threat to civilian populations exposed to nuclear blackmail by certain terrorist states.

That is a new factor whose consequences must be taken into account and which throws doubt, and I mean this quite seriously, on the traditional argument of non-use deterrence. The term has been used a lot. It expresses perfectly the philosophy on which deterrence is based: the match which is useful until it is used; once it has burnt out it is no longer any use and it is thrown away. Nowadays, however, the worldwide change in strategy means that we have to adapt to a different context, and rather than the expression non-use, which means that these weapons will never be used, it would be better to employ the expression threaten to use.

After all, what we hold is a threat to use; we hope not to have to use it but we may possibly have to. Non-use, on the other hand, means putting weapons of terror aside knowing that they will never be used, which is not likely to give the deterrent sufficient credibility.

We must consider very carefully how such a strategy could be applied on a European basis. I think we are right to talk about it. We are right to devote a major report to the subject, if only because we now have an excellent study which will certainly remain in WEU's archives. It also allows us to draw some useful conclusions about the future, although we realise that in the immediate future it will not be possible to go as far as Mr. De Decker proposes, particularly in the case of the nuclear co-ordination group. From what other people have been saying, this seems to be a reservation a number of us would like to make. It is perhaps more of a distant goal at which we should aim. It would be quite wrong for the European defence identity to marginalise or dismiss the idea, but given the current state of affairs in both London and Paris, I do not think it would be reasonable to hope to set up this nuclear co-ordination group for some time yet.

I would like to conclude by telling Mr. De Decker that not only is his report well thought out and bold, it also shows a great sense of responsibility. This is a man who has studied the various aspects of the issue which, whether we like it or not, impacts both Western and European defence issues, in depth and with a high degree of objectivity. He must be congratulated on it.

Moreover, in my capacity as Chairman of the Defence Committee, I am pleased to say that the committee adopted the report unanimously. I would like to offer my special congratulations to Mr. Armand De Decker.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Baumel.

No amendments have been tabled so we shall go straight to the vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1420.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted*<sup>1</sup>.

That was carried almost unanimously. Congratulations to Mr. De Decker and to the committee.

### ***8. Adjournment of the session***

The PRESIDENT. – That completes the schedule of the business that was placed before us at the beginning of this week. I thank you for your attendance and co-operation, particularly as it was under two severe difficulties. I think you will agree that it has been a worthwhile and useful part-session on this occasion. The two difficulties were the communications system, which I shall certainly see is attended to in the few months before our next gathering, and the complete lack of any air conditioning. I have observed only too well from up here, suffering myself, how others have suffered in the chamber. Thank you for coming.

I declare the first part of the fortieth ordinary session closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 12.15 p.m.)*

<sup>1</sup>. See page 44.





**INDEX**

# INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS

	Page		Page
<b>A</b>		<b>E</b>	
Address by:		European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council	
The Provisional President . . . . .	48-49	Presentation of the report . . . . .	61-62
The President . . . . .	50-52	Debate on the report . . . . .	62-65
Mr. van Eekelen . . . . .	53-55	Amendment 1 by Mrs. Blunck . . . . .	65
– Questions and answers . . . . .	56-57	– Adoption of the amendment . . . . .	66
Mr. Haekkerup . . . . .	58-60	Amendment 2 by Mrs. Blunck . . . . .	65
– Questions and answers . . . . .	60-61	– Amendment to Amendment 2 . . . . .	66
Mr. Hurd . . . . .	75-78	– Adoption of the amended amend- ment . . . . .	66
– Questions and answers . . . . .	78-81	Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation . . . . .	66
Mr. Olechowski . . . . .	91-93		
– Questions and answers . . . . .	93-96	European security: crisis-prevention and management	
Mr. Poos . . . . .	115-119	Presentation of the report . . . . .	87-90
– Questions and answers . . . . .	119-122	Debate on the report . . . . .	90, 96-103
General Joulwan . . . . .	122-127	Amendment 1 by Mr. de Puig . . . . .	103
– Questions and answers . . . . .	127-130	– Adoption of the amendment . . . . .	103
Mr. de Marco . . . . .	135-138	Amendment 2 by Mr. de Puig . . . . .	103
– Questions and answers . . . . .	138-142	– Adoption of the amendment . . . . .	103
Mr. Kukan . . . . .	158-160	Amendment 3 by Mr. de Puig . . . . .	104
– Questions and answers . . . . .	160-163	– Adoption of the amendment . . . . .	104
Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member		Amendment 4 by Mr. de Puig . . . . .	104
Presentation of the report . . . . .	146-147	– Adoption of the amendment . . . . .	104
Debate on the report . . . . .	147-150	Amendment 5 by Mr. de Puig . . . . .	104
Referral to the Presidential Committee	163	– Adoption of the amendment . . . . .	104
An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation		Amendment 6 by Mr. de Puig . . . . .	103
Presentation of the report . . . . .	132-134	– Adoption of the amendment . . . . .	103
Debate on the report . . . . .	142-146	Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation . . . . .	104
Amendment 1 by Mr. Lopez Henares	146		
– Withdrawal of the amendment . . . . .	146	<b>M</b>	
Amendment 2 by Mr. Lopez Henares	146	Minutes	
– Withdrawal of the amendment . . . . .	146	Adoption of the – . . . . .	67, 87, 111, 131, 154,
Amendment 3 by Mr. Lopez Henares	146		
– Withdrawal of the amendment . . . . .	146	<b>O</b>	
Vote on the draft recommendation . . . . .	146	Observers . . . . .	50
Attendance lists . . . . .	15, 22, 27, 33, 36, 43	Opinion on the budgets of the ministe- rial organs of WEU for the financial year 1994	
<b>C</b>		Presentation of the report . . . . .	151-152
Committees		Debate on the report . . . . .	152-153
Changes in the membership of — . . . . .	66	Vote on the draft recommendation . . . . .	153
Credentials		Order of business	
Examination of . . . . .	49-50	Adoption of the – . . . . .	53
		Orders of the day . . . . .	12, 20, 25, 32, 34, 42

	Page		Page
<b>P</b>			
Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation		- 561: The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council . . . . .	37-38
Presentation of the report . . . . .	104-106	- 562: An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation . . . . .	39-40
Debate on the report . . . . .	106-110	- 563: The budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1994	41
Vote on the draft order . . . . .	110	- 564: The rôle and future of nuclear weapons . . . . .	44-46
Vote on the draft recommendation . .	110		
President		Order	
Election of the – . . . . .	50	- 90: Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation . . . . .	30
<b>R</b>			
Report of the Council, Thirty-ninth annual (second part)		<b>V</b>	
Presentation by Mr. Poos . . . . .	115-119	Vice-Presidents	
- Questions and answers . . . . .	119-122	Election of - . . . . .	52-53, 154
Rôle and future of nuclear weapons		<b>W</b>	
Presentation of the report . . . . .	155-157	WEU in the process of European Union	
Debate on the report . . . . .	163-170	- reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council	
Vote on the draft recommendation . .	170	Presentation of the report . . . . .	67-69
<b>S</b>		Debate on the report . . . . .	69-75, 81-83
Session		Amendment 1 by Mr. Ferrari . . . . .	83
Opening of the – . . . . .	48	- Adoption of the amendment . . . . .	83
Adjournment of the – . . . . .	171	Amendment 2 by Mr. Ferrari . . . . .	83-84
<b>T</b>		- Amendment to Amendment 2 . . . . .	84
Texts adopted:		- Rejection of the amendment to the amendment . . . . .	84
Recommendations		- Adoption of the amendment . . . . .	84
- 556: The evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU . . . . .	16-17	Amendment 3 by Mr. Ferrari . . . . .	84
- 557: The European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council . . . . .	18-19	- Adoption of the amendment . . . . .	85
- 558: WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council . . . . .	23-24	Amendment 4 by Mr. De Decker . . . . .	85
- 559: European security: crisis-prevention and management . . . . .	28-29	- Rejection of the amendment . . . . .	85
- 560: Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation . . . . .	31	Vote on the amended draft recommendation . . . . .	85
		WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council	
		Presentation of the report . . . . .	111-113
		Debate on the report . . . . .	113-114, 131-132
		Amendment 1 by Mr. Baumel . . . . .	132
		- Adoption of the amendment . . . . .	132
		- Vote on the amended draft recommendation . . . . .	132

## INDEX OF SPEAKERS

	Page
<b>A</b>	
Mrs. Aguiar ( <i>Portugal</i> ):	
Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member . . . . .	147-148

Mr. Alexander ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. Olechowski . . .	95
Mr. Antretter ( <i>Germany</i> ):	
WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. . . . .	73-74
Question put to Mr. Hurd . . . . .	79
Mr. Atkinson ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. Kukan. . . . .	161

<b>B</b>	
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman ( <i>Netherlands</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. Haekkerup . . . .	60
The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. . . . .	111-113, 131-132
Question put to Mr. de Marco . . . . .	138
An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation . . . . .	146
Mr. Baumel ( <i>France</i> ):	
The European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council . . . . .	63-64
The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. . . . .	113, 132
Question put to Mr. Poos . . . . .	120
Question put to General Joulwan . . .	127
The rôle and future of nuclear weapons . . . . .	170

Mr. Bieringer ( <i>Observer from Austria</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. van Eekelen . . .	56
Mrs. Blunck ( <i>Germany</i> ):	
The European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council . . . . .	62-63, 65

Mr. Borderas ( <i>Spain</i> ):	
The European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council . . . . .	61-62, 64-65, 66
Question put to General Joulwan . . .	128

	Page
Mr. Boucheron ( <i>France</i> ):	
The rôle and future of nuclear weapons . . . . .	165-166

<b>C</b>	
Mr. Covi ( <i>Italy</i> ):	
Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1994. . . . .	151-152, 153

<b>D</b>	
Mr. Davis ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. Poos . . . . .	120
Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member. . . . .	148-149

Mr. De Decker ( <i>Belgium</i> ):	
WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. . . . .	85
Question put to General Joulwan . . .	128
The rôle and future of nuclear weapons . . . . .	155-157, 168-169

<b>E</b>	
Mr. van Eekelen ( <i>Secretary-General of WEU</i> ):	
Address by - . . . . .	53-55
Replies to questions . . . . .	56-57

Mr. Ehrmann ( <i>France</i> ):	
Address by the Provisional President	48-49
Examination of credentials. . . . .	49-50
Observers . . . . .	50
Election of the President . . . . .	50

<b>F</b>	
Dame Peggy Fenner ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. Hurd . . . . .	78
An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation. . . . .	144

Mr. Ferrari ( <i>Italy</i> ):	
WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. . . . .	67-69, 82, 83, 84, 85

	Page
Mr. Ferrarini ( <i>Italy</i> ):	
WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council . . . . .	72-73
Question put to Mr. Hurd . . . . .	78-79

Lord Finsberg ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
Point of order . . . . .	83
WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council . . . . .	84, 85
Question put to Mr. Olechowski . . . . .	94
European security: crisis-prevention and management . . . . .	102-103
Question put to Mr. Poos . . . . .	119
Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member . . . . .	146-147, 149-150
Question put to Mr. Kukan . . . . .	160
The rôle and future of nuclear weapons . . . . .	167-168

Mr. Foschi ( <i>Italy</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. de Marco . . . . .	141

Sir Peter Fry ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. Hurd . . . . .	81
European security: crisis-prevention and management . . . . .	100-101

G

Mr. Gusenbauer ( <i>Observer from Austria</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. Kukan . . . . .	162

H

Mr. Haekkerup ( <i>Minister of Defence of Denmark</i> ):	
Address by – . . . . .	58-60
Replies to questions . . . . .	60-61

Mr. Hardy ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
European security: crisis-prevention and management . . . . .	90
Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation . . . . .	106
Question put to Mr. Poos . . . . .	121
Question put to General Joulwan . . . . .	127
Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1994 . . . . .	152

Sir John Hunt ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. de Marco . . . . .	140

	Page
Mr. Hurd ( <i>Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom</i> ):	
Address by – . . . . .	75-78
Replies to questions . . . . .	78-81

J

Sir Russell Johnston ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. Hurd . . . . .	79
Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation . . . . .	104-106, 109-110

General Joulwan ( <i>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</i> ):	
Address by – . . . . .	122-127
Replies to questions . . . . .	127-130

K

Mr. Kittelmann ( <i>Germany</i> ):	
Question put to General Joulwan . . . . .	129

Mr. Kukan ( <i>Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia</i> ):	
Address by – . . . . .	158-160
Replies to questions . . . . .	160-163

L

Mr. Lopez Henares ( <i>Spain</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. Haekkerup . . . . .	61
The European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council . . . . .	65, 66
Question put to Mr. Hurd . . . . .	80
The WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council . . . . .	113-114
Question put to Mr. Poos . . . . .	120
An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation . . . . .	146

M

Lord Mackie of Benshie ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
European security: crisis-prevention and management . . . . .	97-98
Question put to Mr. de Marco . . . . .	141

Mr. de Marco ( <i>Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta</i> ):	
Address by – . . . . .	135-138
Replies to questions . . . . .	138-142


# INDEX

	Page		Page
Mr. Müller ( <i>Germany</i> ):		European security: crisis-prevention and management. ....	87-90, 101-102, 103, 104
WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. ....	71-72		
European security: crisis-prevention and management. ....	96-97		
		<b>R</b>	
<b>N</b>		Mr. Rathbone ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
Mr. Necas ( <i>Observer from the Czech Republic</i> ):		Question put to Mr. van Eekelen ...	56
Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation. ....	108	Question put to Mr. de Marco ....	139
		An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation. ....	142-143
<b>O</b>		Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1994. ....	153
Mr. Olechowski ( <i>Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland</i> ):		Mr. Rockenbauer ( <i>Observer from Hungary</i> ):	
Address by - ....	91-93	Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation. ....	106-107
Replies to questions. ....	93-96		
		Mr. Rodrigues ( <i>Portugal</i> ):	
<b>P</b>		WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. ....	69-70
Mr. Pahor ( <i>Observer from Slovenia</i> ):		The rôle and future of nuclear weapons. ....	163-165
WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. ....	73		
Mr. Pastusiak ( <i>Observer from Poland</i> ):		<b>S</b>	
WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. ....	74-75	Sir Dudley Smith ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. Poos. ....	121	Address by - ....	50-52
Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member. ....	148	Election of Vice-Presidents. ....	52-53, 154
Mr. Pavlidis ( <i>Observer from Greece</i> ):		Adoption of the draft order of business. ....	53
An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation. ....	143-144	Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member. ....	163
Mr. Philipov ( <i>Observer from Bulgaria</i> ):		Mr. Soell ( <i>Germany</i> ):	
Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation. ....	108-109	Question put to Mr. van Eekelen ...	57
Mr. Pold ( <i>Observer from Estonia</i> ):		Question put to Mr. Olechowski ...	94-95
An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation. ....	144-145	European security: crisis-prevention and management. ....	98
Mr. Poos ( <i>Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council</i> ):		Question put to Mr. Poos. ....	119
Address by - ....	115-119	Mr. Sole-Tura ( <i>Spain</i> ):	
Replies to questions. ....	119-122	European security: crisis-prevention and management. ....	99-100
Mr. de Puig ( <i>Spain</i> ):		Sir Keith Speed ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. ....	82-83, 84, 85	An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation. ....	132-134, 145-146
		Question put to Mr. de Marco ....	140
		Mr. Steiner ( <i>Germany</i> ):	
		WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. ....	70-71

INDEX

	Page		Page
Mr. Stoffelen ( <i>Netherlands</i> ):		V	
WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council . . . . .	83, 84	Mr. Vacaru ( <i>Observer from Romania</i> ):	
		Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation . . . . .	107-108
		Mr. Valleix ( <i>France</i> ):	
T		Question put to Mr. Hurd . . . . .	79
Mr. Thompson ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):		W	
Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member . . . . .	150	Mr. Ward ( <i>United Kingdom</i> ):	
Question put to Mr. Kukan. . . . .	161-162	Question put to Mr. Olechowski . . .	93-94
The rôle and future of nuclear weapons . . . . .	166-167	European security: crisis-prevention and management. . . . .	98-99
		Mr. Wolfgramm ( <i>Germany</i> ):	
		Question put to Mr. Hurd . . . . .	80-81

---

IMPRIMERIE  ALENÇONNAISE  
Rue Édouard-Belin : 3<sup>e</sup> trimestre 1994  
N° d'ordre : 29919

---

PRINTED IN FRANCE