



# Assembly of Western European Union

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## FORTY-SECOND SESSION

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### **The eastern dimension of European security**

#### **REPORT**

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee  
by Mr Antretter, Rapporteur



*The eastern dimension of European security*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr *de Puig* (Chairman); Mr *Roseta* (Vice-Chairman); MM *Antretter*, de Assis, Blaauw, Sir *Andrew Bowden*, MM *Buhler*, *Caputo* (Alternate: *Arata*), MM *Cioni*, *Dias*, *Ehrmann*, *Eyskens*, Mrs *Fischer*, Mr *Fassino* (Alternate: *Benvenuti*), MM *Irmer*, Sir *Russell Johnston*, MM *Jurgens*, *Kaspereit* (Alternate: *BaumeI*), Lord *Kirkhill* (Alternate: *Marshall*), MM *Liapis*, *van der Linden*, *de Lipkowski*, *Van der Maelen* (Alternate: *Staes*), Mr *Martínez Casan* (Alternate: *Martínez*), MM *Pottakis*, *Pozzo*, *Puche Rodríguez*, *Recorder*, *Rippinger*, *Rokofyllos*, *Rodeghiero*, *Scitlinger*, Sir *Keith Speed*, MM *Urban*, *Vinçon*, *Zierer*, N... (Alternate: *Davis*)

*Associate members:* MM *Godal*, *Kamhi*, *Kulahli*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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*Draft Recommendation**on the eastern dimension of European security*

The Assembly,

- (i) Concerned that almost seven years after the end of East-West confrontation, there is still no agreement on an outline for creating a comprehensive order of peace, justice and security for Europe as a whole;
- (ii) Underlining, therefore, how important it is for the OSCE summit in Lisbon on 2 and 3 December 1996 to succeed in making considerable progress towards developing a pan-European security model for the 21st century,
- (iii) Convinced, however, that such a security order can only be achieved if outdated thinking in terms of spheres of influence is replaced once and for all by a concept of cooperative security giving every country the freedom to join the international institutions and defence alliances of its choice,
- (iv) Seriously worried by the continuing unstable political situation in the Russian Federation,
- (v) Deploring that the East-West security debate is almost wholly dominated by the question of NATO enlargement, in which persisting fundamental differences between NATO and Russia are not only preventing any substantial progress from being made but are also making it difficult to reach agreement on the definition of Russia's role in the Euro-Atlantic security framework,
- (vi) Seriously concerned by the fact that the Russian State Duma has still not ratified the Start II Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty and that Russia is seriously considering linking NATO enlargement with requests for fundamental changes in the CFE Treaty provisions;
- (vii) Strongly regretting that NATO has been far too hesitant about presenting a concept on "who" and "when" in relation to its planned enlargement, and maintaining that the reasons it has given in answer to "why" will not be convincing until the new nature of security risks and the future political and military role of the Alliance in the new security environment have been clearly defined;
- (viii) Regretting that, even though it is highly desirable, it is unlikely that the central European countries will be admitted to the European Union in the immediate future
  - (a) because admission depends to some extent on the uncertain outcome of the internal reforms of the European Union which are to be agreed in the intergovernmental conference on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty, and
  - (b) because the European Union has made enlargement dependent on so many conditions that they cannot be met by the applicant countries within a relatively short period;
- (ix) Fearing that this process might be subject to further delays on account of differing views on the kind of congruence there should be between NATO, WEU and the European Union in relation to enlargement and the priorities to be set for its time-frame;
- (x) Convinced that WEU has far more than only a complementary role to play in stabilising the eastern dimension of European security;
- (xi) Warmly welcoming the decision of the WEU Council to admit Slovenia as the tenth associate partner country of WEU;

- (xii) Regretting however, the absence of any specific effort by WEU to draw up a concept for enhancing the status of the associate partner countries,
- (xiii) Disappointed that WEU's planned cooperation with the Russian Federation in the specific areas proposed by the Assembly has so far not been taken any further,
- (xiv) Impressed by Ukraine's strong political resolve to be integrated in European structures and by its readiness to intensify cooperation with WEU with the aim of becoming an associate partner;
- (xv) Underlining the importance for European security of the peaceful settlement of all remaining controversial differences between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and of the establishment of friendly, stable relations between the two countries;
- (xvi) Regretting that many European and American politicians are neglecting developments in Belarus and are not paying enough attention to the anti-democratic and autocratic tendencies within the country's present regime or to the importance of its independence and the need to maintain a permanent dialogue with it;
- (xvii) Recalling the importance of the future tasks WEU is to carry out pursuant to the decision taken by the North Atlantic Council on 3 June 1996,
- (xviii) Stressing the importance of granting the associate member and associate partner countries the possibility of full participation in any operations conducted on the basis of the CJTF concept and under the political control of WEU,
- (xix) Convinced, therefore, that the enlargement concept established by WEU member countries in the framework of the Maastricht Treaty needs to be amended by adopting a more flexible approach which abandons strict application of the principle that full WEU membership should be conditional on full membership of NATO and the European Union;
- (xx) Recalling in this connection paragraph 4 of Assembly Recommendation 589:
- (xxi) Pointing to the importance of Turkey's position as a major factor for stabilising NATO's south-eastern region, particularly with regard to the various troublespots and conflicts in the Caucasus and other adjacent regions;
- (xxii) Strongly advocating that Denmark should decide that it wishes to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty,
- (xxiii) Emphasising how important it is to strengthen the role of the Nordic Council as a factor for stabilising the north-eastern region of Europe,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take advantage of the OSCE summit, bearing in mind its limited powers, to elaborate a common concept of the 28 WEU countries on WEU's contribution for enhancing security and stability in central and eastern Europe;
2. Establish, in the framework of such a contribution, a common position on the issue of deploying nuclear weapons in central and eastern European countries,
3. Make arrangements with NATO allowing all associate countries of WEU to participate fully in actions implementing the CJTF concept under the political control of WEU;

4. Prepare a flexible approach to its enlargement policy, making provision for
  - (a) an invitation to all European member countries of NATO which so wish to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty;
  - (b) the possibility of upgrading the status of associate partner countries to that of associate member countries provided that the interested European states settle any bilateral problems they may have with neighbouring countries;
5. Leave no doubt that all ten WEU associate partner countries should be considered as potential candidates for accession to NATO;
6. Urge the European Union not to slow down the process of its enlargement to central Europe and to continue to consult all nations affected either directly or indirectly by any future enlargement of the European Union;
7. Urge all member countries of the European Union which have not yet ratified the cooperation treaty with Ukraine to expedite the ratification process;
8. Intensify the political dialogue with Ukraine and give it a constructive answer to its request to cooperate more closely with Western European Union;
9. Intensify the dialogue, and indeed cooperation, with the Russian Federation, seeking in any event to eliminate any misunderstanding and speculation as regards the enlargement of WEU,
10. Make it clear, however, to the Russian authorities that early ratification of the Start II Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty will facilitate more intensive cooperation between WEU and Russia in all areas of mutual interest,
11. Maintain a permanent political dialogue with Belarus and Moldova.

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr Antretter, Rapporteur)**I. Introduction*

1 A first working paper of the present report was discussed at a meeting of the Political Committee on 1 April 1996 which your Rapporteur was unable to attend for reasons beyond his control. He is grateful for the various comments and suggestions Committee members made during that meeting. The Committee subsequently decided to postpone the presentation of the report until after the presidential elections in Russia, which took place on 4 July 1996.

2 The clear victory of Boris Yeltsin over his main rival, the communist leader Gennadi Zyuganov, has not however stabilised the political situation within the Russian Federation. On the contrary, the deterioration in the state of health of the Russian President, who was facing a heart operation, led to an internal power struggle which culminated in the middle of October 1996 in the dismissal by Boris Yeltsin of the head of the National Security Council, Alexander Lebed, considered by many people as a hero because he managed to put an end to the Chechnya conflict. The real reasons for his dismissal are not wholly clear, but the Minister of the Interior, for instance, accused General Lebed of trying to seize power in Russia by force.

3 Whereas the political situation in Russia continues to give serious cause for concern and nobody can predict how it will develop, a number of other events have to be taken into account when assessing the eastern dimension of European security. One of them is the outcome of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 3 June 1996 in Berlin, which took the important decision to establish the European security and defence identity within NATO and give WEU a decisive role in implementing the CJTF concept. Even more important is the possibility the Berlin decisions opened up for the participation of countries that are not members of NATO in missions carried out in the framework of the CJTF, and thus possibly under the political control of WEU.

4 The Berlin decisions were made possible by France's decision to return to NATO's integrated

structures on condition that the establishment of the European security and defence identity within the Alliance does in fact lead to Europe having a greater say in the transatlantic partnership.

5 The third factor which must be taken into account is the development of the intergovernmental conference on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty, in which the creation of a real common foreign and security policy (CFSP) for Europe and future relations between the European Union and WEU continue to be the most difficult problems. The reluctance of the "neutral" countries belonging to the European Union to participate in a common defence, and the associate membership of WEU of three NATO countries that are not members of the European Union make it unrealistic in the foreseeable future to envisage any plans for early integration between WEU and the European Union. Furthermore, the decisions taken by NATO in June 1996 make it impossible to entertain any idea of giving the European Union, which has four neutral or non-aligned member countries, authority to issue general political guidelines to Western European Union. Any kind of subordination of WEU to the European Union is inconceivable as long as WEU remains a treaty-based organisation.

6 However the Franco-German idea of creating a sort of flexibility clause should be carefully examined by the WEU Council. WEU should take advantage of such a clause to become the European forerunner in security and defence matters, without waiting for the agreement of the four hesitant "neutral" countries, at the same time allowing all the European member countries of the Alliance to participate fully in WEU's activities and giving all central European countries wishing to cooperate more closely with the Organisation an upgraded associate status.

7 There is uncertainty as to what concrete results will be achieved by the intergovernmental conference in reforming the second pillar of the European Union and also as to how, and according to what timetable, the Atlantic Alliance will achieve (a) its political reform and structural reorganisation, (b) implementation of the CJTF concept in conjunction with WEU, and

(c) its enlargement concept, and this will have important consequences for the question of how and when a comprehensive security architecture for Europe as a whole can be established. This question is of major interest to all the central European countries which are pressing for admission at the earliest possible opportunity to the European and transatlantic security structures.

8. It is also a major concern for Ukraine and may well have an influence on the future policy of the Russian Federation although many observers say that domestic developments in Russia are subject to their own exclusive rules. In this context one should not forget what is happening in Belarus, to which the West does not pay enough attention, because too many politicians are convinced that this country has only one objective: reintegration with the Russian Federation. But the West does not know enough about the domestic situation in Belarus and many people equate President Lukashenko's dictatorial policy with the political will of the rest of the country, underestimating the existence of strong political opposition to the President. In any event, European politicians should not forget Belarus and should maintain a permanent dialogue with all the various political forces in the country.

9. Finally, two further factors will play an important role in the establishment of the security architecture referred to above: the first will be the future status of Turkey with regard to WEU and the European Union – and this also applies (although to a lesser extent) to Norway and Iceland. Secondly, the arrangements for bringing the successor states of former Yugoslavia and of Albania into this architecture, once the conflict has finally been settled, have to be worked out

## *II. The unresolved problem of creating a comprehensive pan-European security model*

10. Nothing can better demonstrate the unresolved fundamental security problems facing Europe as a whole than the ongoing discussion in the framework of the OSCE on developing a common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the 21st century. Work on this project, based initially on a Russian proposal, will be one of the main subjects on the agenda of the next OSCE summit which is to take place in Lisbon on 2 and 3 December 1996

11. In fact, almost seven years after the end of the period of East-West confrontation, it has not been possible to agree even the outline of a comprehensive order of peace, justice and security in Europe in which each country could feel genuinely secure. In view of the complexity of the problem and the divergent interests involved, it is doubtful whether any final results will be achieved at the OSCE summit referred to. However, the OSCE seems to be an appropriate framework for developing such a comprehensive security model, embracing as it does all the countries of Europe, North America and central Asia.

12. Nevertheless, appropriate solutions cannot be found exclusively in the forum of the OSCE given that its tasks are limited, that it is not based on international treaties and executive means and that its powers are fairly weak. It is not possible to conceive of a comprehensive security architecture for Europe without defining the respective functions and roles the Atlantic Alliance (with NATO as its political and military instrument), WEU and the European Union should assume within that architecture, and without reaching agreement on the conditions under which interested countries can establish their relationships with these organisations.

13. Neither is it right that the OSCE should be given the task of defining the relevant responsibilities of NATO, WEU and the European Union, or that there should be any sort of subordination of these organisations to the OSCE. All the organisations referred to, including the OSCE, should make complementary contributions with a view to achieving a common and comprehensive security order for Europe.

14. However, when leading politicians spell out the advantages of regarding all relevant European and transatlantic security organisations as interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions, what is effectively lacking is harmonisation and coordination of their work and planning processes. For instance, as regards the problem of enlargement – one of the subjects of greatest controversy between NATO and Russia – no overall concept of how to approach it has been developed between NATO, WEU and the European Union. On the contrary, the idea of the three organisations proceeding in parallel without specifying the criteria for so doing has led to a vicious circle, which threatens to block any further progress in the foreseeable future.

### *III. The disadvantages of limiting the security debate to the problem of NATO enlargement*

15. In September 1995 NATO published a study on its enlargement which examined primarily the question of "why and how" to enlarge but did not answer the question of "who and when". The European Union, on the other hand, faces the challenge of first seeking agreement among all its member countries on the comprehensive institutional reforms to be discussed in the intergovernmental conference on the review of the Maastricht Treaty before being able to settle the question of enlargement.

16. According to the NATO study, "enlargement of NATO is a parallel process with and will complement that of the European Union". At the same time the study emphasises that "the two organisations will proceed autonomously according to their respective internal dynamics and processes". The enlargement of both organisations should be mutually supportive and "while no rigid parallelism is foreseen, each organisation will need to consider developments in the other".

17. As far as Western European Union is concerned, the problem of its enlargement is closely linked with the results of the intergovernmental conference which has to define its future role and the character of the relationship and cooperation between WEU and the European Union. NATO, on the other hand, has set out very clearly in its study on enlargement how it wishes WEU to tackle the question of enlargement:

"All full members of WEU are also members of NATO. Because of the cumulative effect of the security safeguards of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the maintenance of this linkage is essential. Both enlargement processes should, therefore, be compatible and mutually supportive. At the same time, WEU is being developed as the defence component of the European Union, which strengthens the relationship between the two organisations. An eventual broad congruence of European membership in NATO, the European Union and WEU would have positive effects on European security."

18. However, bearing in mind the specific character of the three organisations, the desire to establish broad congruence in their enlargement procedures has so far simply slowed down the process as a whole. Additional factors are contributing to a situation that is again consigning the central European countries to an ante-chamber.

19. It is true that, at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin on 3 June 1996, ministers reaffirmed their commitment to open the Alliance to new members. But no specific decisions were taken.

20. On that occasion, the North Atlantic Council again reaffirmed its

"determination that the process of opening the Alliance to new members should not create dividing lines in Europe or isolate any country. Our goal remains ever-closer and deeper cooperative ties with all NACC and PfP Partners who wish to build such relations with us. The enlargement of the Alliance is consistent with a wider process of cooperation and integration already under way in today's Europe involving the EU and WEU as well as the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other European institutions. Our strategy is to help build a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe."

21. However, after visiting Moscow in September 1996, Chancellor Kohl told Parliament that agreement had been reached with the French and the United States Presidents as well as with the British Prime Minister to postpone the debate on NATO enlargement until spring 1997<sup>1</sup>. According to other press reports<sup>2</sup>, a first decision is to be taken at a NATO summit meeting which might be held in early summer 1997. This information was confirmed by NATO officials during the Political Committee's visit to NATO headquarters on 16 October 1996.

22. But even through NATO officially denied the existence of a list of countries that might be admitted to NATO in a first wave, it has become

1 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 September 1996.

2 *Die Welt*, 27 September 1996

clear that there is a tendency in the United States Congress to name specific countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, as being among those that will be included in the first wave of NATO enlargement

23 According to other sources of information<sup>3</sup> a group of five countries has been identified consisting of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania, whereas Slovakia is not included. The question of how to proceed with enlargement, on a case-by-case basis, choosing several groups of states in different waves or admitting all the relevant candidates together at the same time, is a fundamental issue which has to be settled not only by NATO but also by WEU and the European Union. All three organisations also have to solve the problem of what kind of relationship they intend to establish with those countries that will not be invited to join

24. However, one has the strong impression that the present discussion is totally dominated by NATO. The effect of this is that the whole security debate is being reduced to a controversial dialogue between NATO and Russia, with very little chance of differences being settled. During his visit to Moscow, your Rapporteur had an opportunity to detect strong mistrust of NATO on the part of almost all his interlocutors, the only exception being Mr Stepashin, security counsellor to Mr Chernomyrdin the Prime Minister, who said that NATO enlargement was not one of the main issues in the presidential election campaign. The American proposal of a security charter between the Atlantic Alliance and Russia has been given a cool reception by the Russian authorities. According to the Russian approach, the first step should consist of substantial NATO adaptation. As the next step, NATO and Russia should conclude a legally binding agreement on their relations and only as the third step should the question of enlargement be discussed. Conversely, according to the NATO concept, enlargement comes first accompanied, in a second phase, by a procedure to enhance the PfP process, leaving the question of NATO-Russian relations to be settled as the third step.

3. *Die Welt*, 25 September 1996, *International Herald Tribune*, 21 October 1996.

25 At the moment it is difficult to see how these different approaches could be harmonised. Indeed, the Russian position seems to have hardened given that the Russian State Duma still refuses to ratify the Start II Treaty despite efforts made by the Russian and American defence ministers to persuade it to do so. Some members of the State Duma link the issue with the problem of NATO's enlargement, while others argue that the efforts being made by Republicans in the United States Congress to build a national missile defence system would undermine the anti-ballistic missile Treaty (ABM) concluded in 1972 between the United States and the then Soviet Union<sup>4</sup>

26. Another concern for a number of Russia's neighbours are the concessions made to the Russian Federation according to the final document of the Conference reviewing the CFE Treaty which took place from 15 to 31 May 1996 in Vienna. A major problem was created by Russia making a request to scale down its military commitments to reduce troops numbers in its flank regions. Russia asked to be allowed to deploy more troops on its southern flank than are permitted by the Treaty in relation to the various conflicts in the Caucasus and in particular in Chechnya. Furthermore, it asked for the regions of Pskov and St Petersburg to be exempt from the northern flank regulations. These regions border directly on Estonia, Latvia and Finland

27. Initially, the North Atlantic Council had stressed very clearly at its meeting on 5 December 1995 "that compliance with legally binding obligations is a necessary foundation for good overall relations... We welcome the 17 November 1995 decision by the Joint Consultative Group, in which the 30 CFE states reconfirm their commitment to the Treaty and agree to find a cooperative solution to the flank problem. In this context, we specially urge all States Parties who have failed to comply with their obligations, to intensify their efforts to reach as quickly as possible such a cooperative solution acceptable to all".

28. However, at the Vienna Conference a concession was made to the Russian Federation by giving it until May 1999 to fulfil its obligations regarding armaments limits in the regions of

4 *International Herald Tribune*, 16 October 1996

St. Petersburg and the north Caucasus. The partners conceded furthermore that the relevant flank areas, in which Russia has to reduce its troop numbers, will be scaled down in geographic terms. These concessions have given rise to major concern in the Baltic countries as well as in the southern region. If the West's concessions were intended to soften Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement, they apparently failed to do so.

29. During his visit to Latvia in September 1996, your Rapporteur was told by the Latvian Defence Minister that Russia's military potential near the Latvian border had been considerably reinforced as a consequence of the CFE review conference. Paratroop units, tank units with T-80 tanks and "frontier protection troops" some 80 000 strong were deployed near the Latvian border. According to Latvian information, Russia had also deployed border troops in Belarus and had reached an agreement with Belarus on joint border protection.

*IV. Giving immediate priority  
to identifying the main problems affecting  
the eastern dimension of European security*

30. The new settlement of the southern Russian flank problem has to be seen in a broader framework in which strong economic interests, particularly regarding the exploitation of Caspian petroleum and natural gas where several countries are involved, have to be taken into account. One of the major players in this context is Turkey: a NATO member country and a WEU associate member country situated on Europe's south eastern flank. The other is Iran.

31. Your Rapporteur went on an initial visit to Turkey on the first of a number of visits he made to various central and eastern European countries to gather information for this report. In view of that country's geographic position, bounded by regions engaged in conflict in the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East, its economic and geopolitical interests in the Caucasus, and its politically close relations with the Turkish-speaking countries on the southern flank of the Russian Federation, Turkey's position is still a key one in European security terms. Its views and positions with respect to the issues remaining to be resolved in order to create a common and comprehensive security model for Europe cannot therefore be ignored and may have important consequences for the attitude member

countries of the European Union and WEU should adopt as regards its future role and place in European security structures

32. Another important factor for European security is Norway. Norway, like Turkey, is a NATO member and WEU associate member. The Russian Ground Troops Commander, Vladimir Semyonourov, seemed to be speaking an entirely new language when he stated at the end of February that NATO exercises under way in Norway were a threat to Russian national security and that Russian forces would be put on alert to monitor them.

33. On a number of other outstanding matters the Russian Federation's attitude will be decisive in paving the way for enhancing peace and security in central and eastern Europe. One is compliance with the condition, imposed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for Russia's entry into that organisation, that Russia should ratify the agreement with Moldova on the withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army and its equipment from Moldovan territory within six months of its accession to the Council of Europe. The other is the request that the Russian concept of the "near abroad" should no longer be used to suggest that certain of Russia's neighbours fall within a special Russian sphere of influence.

34. These issues have practical consequences first and foremost for future Russian relations with the Baltic states, with two of which there are still a number of territorial and other bilateral questions outstanding, and as regards Lithuania and Poland in relation to the future status of the district of Kaliningrad. The strong Russian military presence in this enclave and the problem of Russian military transit through Lithuanian territory are permanent concerns for Lithuania and Poland even though these countries avoid public discussion of the issues.

35. A further crucial element in terms of future European security will be the development of relations between the United States and Russia. It is well known that both superpowers were often tempted in the past to negotiate agreements and arrangements on matters relating to European security over the heads of the European countries, but there are also bilateral issues between the two countries which have important consequences for Europe, such as the future application of the ABM Treaty which has been called into question on several occasions by the Republican-dominated American Congress.

36. Conversely, the arrangements arrived at for Russian participation, within the Bosnian United States sector, in implementing the Dayton peace accords on the conflict in the Balkans are regarded by many politicians as a possible model for future cooperation between NATO and Russia in Europe.

37. There are a number of additional important factors affecting the eastern dimension of European security which should be carefully studied before the question of enlargement is taken any further. Among them, the following are topical issues

- (a) developments in Russia and its place and role in a pan-European security architecture, in particular its future relations with NATO, WEU and the European Union;
- (b) the future development of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and its various member countries, paying special attention to Ukraine;
- (c) the various conflicts in the Caucasus and other areas of the territory of the former Soviet Union;
- (d) possible consequences for European security of conflicting interests between Turkey, Russia and Iran but also between western countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the exploitation of Caspian petroleum and natural gas resources;
- (e) possible consequences for European security of conflicting Turkish-Russian interests as regards their impact on countries on Russia's southern flank that are under Turkish influence,
- (f) current problems regarding the implementation of East-West disarmament and the control of armaments agreements.

In this connection one major achievement has been the transfer of nuclear warheads from Belarus and Ukraine to Russian territory and it is crucial that they should now be destroyed.

However, it is still not known when the Open Skies Treaty will enter into force and when the Russian State Duma will ratify the Start II Treaty.

38. To round off the description – albeit not exhaustive – of problems that may affect the eastern dimension of European security, it should not be forgotten that a number of bilateral differences still exist between some central European countries and are as yet not fully resolved. After long-standing differences, Hungary and Romania have managed to sign a bilateral treaty settling the arrangements governing their relations and in particular the rights of strong Hungarian minorities, without giving them collective autonomy. It is to be hoped that this treaty will work better than the treaty concluded earlier between Hungary and Slovakia under the auspices of the Conference on the European Stability Pact. About 600 000 ethnic Hungarians are living in Slovakia and want collective ethnic autonomy, which Slovakia is not ready to grant. But the Hungarian minority also accuses the Slovak authorities of passing legislation restricting their minority rights.

39. The question of the status of Moldova has not yet been definitively settled, and there are still problems between Turkey and Bulgaria over minority issues. Conversely, there is considerable reason to hope that any remaining differences between Italy and Slovenia are in the process of being settled. Your Rapporteur was particularly pleased to visit the governmental and parliamentary authorities of Slovenia on the very day when Slovenia was granted the status of the tenth WEU associate partner country. He was impressed by the Slovene authorities' determination and willingness to be fully integrated in all the western security structures. It is also to be hoped that the planned joint declaration by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czech Republic on the principles of their future bilateral relations will finally be agreed by the two countries.

*1. The importance of future developments  
in the Russian Federation and  
the Commonwealth of Independent States*

40. Even if it is rarely stated clearly in public, it is obvious that the principal reason why the central European countries are so keen to join

western security structures, and first and foremost those of NATO, is their fear that they might once again fall prey to Russian domination or to its sphere of influence and might risk losing the freedom and independence they gained as a result of the break-up of the Soviet empire. Even though the United Nations Charter and the December 1995 OSCE summit confirm the right of every country to choose freely whether or not to join a defence alliance, Russia's strong opposition to any NATO enlargement is an important factor in the western decision-making process, in spite of western politicians affirming over and over again that no country can veto any decision taken by NATO to admit new member states. But so far it has not been possible to provide convincing western answers to the Russian arguments that NATO's enlargement is not necessary because, with the end of the East-West conflict, any threat has disappeared. Conversely, the Russian side has never been able to come up with a valid argument against the West's assertion that NATO is a purely defensive alliance and that enlargement does not constitute a threat to Russia.

41. However, the main Russian argument for replacing a defence alliance in Europe by a pan-European collective security system, possibly under the auspices of a reinforced OSCE, has recently been greatly undermined by Russia's own behaviour. The growing influence of political forces in the country that wish to reunite the former components of the Soviet Union in one way or another has become evident, particularly in the results of the December 1995 State Duma elections. The appointment of Mr Primakov as the minister for foreign affairs was seen by many observers as a further indication of a shift in Russian foreign policy towards regaining its sphere of influence in its "lost" territories.

42. The resolution adopted on 15 March 1996 – three months before the Russian presidential elections – by the Russian State Duma to annul the agreement to disband the Soviet Union, concluded on 12 December 1991 by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, was a strong political signal even though it has no legally binding effect. Of even more importance was the public declaration by President Yeltsin, one day before the aforementioned Duma vote, affirming that Russia and Belarus were close to arriving at a

political association which might lead to the possibility of a confederation between the two countries. It is not difficult to imagine the consequences any unification between Belarus and Russia will have not only for the security situation of Poland and the Baltic countries but also for Europe as a whole.

43. If one also takes seriously the Russian President's further statement that a reinforced Russian partnership with former Soviet central Asian republics such as Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan is also under way, all the other member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States – in particular Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasian republics such as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – must be asking questions about the future of their independence.

44. This also applies to Bulgaria, which was invited by President Yeltsin in April 1996 to participate in the agreement on special cooperation between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan. During his visit to Moscow, your Rapporteur's interlocutors tried to play down Boris Yeltsin's statement regarding Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the matter led to a major political crisis in that country.

45. During his talks with members of the Russian State Duma, your Rapporteur was particularly impressed by the strong opposition expressed by members of the Defence Committee to ratification of the Start II Treaty. According to some of the members, this treaty is depriving Russia of its entire strategic capability, while its anti-missile defence capability has broken down completely since the break-up of the Soviet Union. At the same time, they say that NATO intends to expand to the borders of Russia and claim that the United States is violating the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, there was great mistrust about the United States really being willing to destroy its nuclear warheads and general opposition to an American military presence in Europe.

46. Regarding ratification of the Open Skies Treaty, replies were more or less evasive. Some members of the Defence Committee said that all initiatives enhancing confidence should be supported but nobody should try to dupe the other partners. But the Russians also had economic problems concerning the provision of

the necessary aircraft for implementing the treaty. In the end, however, the Russians again used NATO enlargement as an argument for calling ratification of the Open Skies Treaty into question

47. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr Lukin, also expressed strong opposition to the idea of NATO enlargement because none of the central European countries was threatened by Russia. The West had been contaminated by the anxiety psychosis of a number of central European countries. The first response to NATO enlargement was the creation of a union between Russia and Belarus. If the majority of Russians living in the eastern part of Ukraine were to realise that such a union would increase living standards in Belarus, they too would try to follow this course of action.

48. With regard to possible alternatives to NATO enlargement, Mr Lukin deplored the fact that Russia had no voice in most of the relevant international organisations apart from the OSCE, a very big organisation including many countries outside Europe. The Americans would never agree to WEU playing a major role as a European security and defence structure because they were determined to maintain their leading position in Europe. Policy-making should not be dominated by an anxiety psychosis.

49. Mr Shokin, Vice-Chairman of the State Duma, confirmed the strong opposition to NATO enlargement of all factions represented in Parliament. However, he understood that Russia could not veto decisions taken by NATO, and advocated the establishment of a common pan-European security system in the framework of the OSCE. But if NATO was enlarged, Russia would have to react by creating a new defence bloc, a possibility he did not favour. WEU should participate much more actively in the elaboration of common security structures.

50. According to Mr Shokin, the decision of the State Duma to annul the agreement to disband the Soviet Union had no effect since such a decision fell within the competence of the Federation Council. Furthermore, by adopting such a resolution, the State Duma had called itself into question since the Soviet Union had not had a State Duma. The agreement between Russia and Belarus, as well as special cooperation with Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan, mainly concerned the creation of a customs union and possibly an economic and

monetary union. It might be possible to create a joint Parliamentary Assembly in 1998.

51. Regarding relations with the Baltic states, the Vice-Chairman of the State Duma said relations were normal with Lithuania but very bad with Estonia because that country discriminated against the Russian minority. Consequently Russia would not grant Estonia the most-favoured nation clause. Furthermore, there were problems with the Orthodox Church in Estonia. The problem of the military transit of Russian troops to and from Kaliningrad through Lithuanian territory had been settled. But other plans for transit through Belarus and Poland had come to nothing because of strong Polish mistrust. It was planned to declare the zone of Kaliningrad a free-trade area and Russia did not wish to pursue any strategic goals with the presence of Russian troops in this area. All the naval units had to be withdrawn from the Baltic states and there was no alternative other than to station them in the ports of Kaliningrad.

52. Developments in connection with the Tashkent Treaty were not moving towards a new alliance but were instead concentrated on bilateral and multilateral cooperation, mainly in peacekeeping missions in the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and on military/technological cooperation. The Constitution of the CIS did not allow any greater military cooperation.

53. During his talks with various Russian representatives, your Rapporteur observed that they held different views on the usefulness of strengthening OSCE structures. A number of them realised that the proposal for the OSCE to be the leading international security structure is not realistic. Some of them praised Russian cooperation in the peace process in former Yugoslavia and considered it set a good precedent for future cooperation. They advocated a special treaty between NATO and Russia on the basis of the Washington Treaty but with looser arrangements. According to these interlocutors, the first task should be to harmonise military doctrines. Whereas the United States was previously considered its most important partner, Russia's objective now was to move closer to Europe.

54. Your Rapporteur was impressed by the frankness with which the Chairman of the Committee for Internal Security described the great danger posed by criminality in Russia.

radioactive pollution in the Murmansk area, nuclear terrorism and the illegal proliferation of nuclear materials. The need for new legislation and international assistance was clearly stressed.

55 Whereas almost all your Rapporteur's contacts had major reservations about NATO, many of them were interested in intensifying contacts and cooperation with Western European Union and were particularly keen to know more about the Organisation. None of them expressed any reservations about WEU enlargement but there was some reluctance when they were asked if this was a realistic alternative.

56 The most impressive statement regarding the importance of the role of WEU was made by the deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Afanjewski, in talks with your Rapporteur. He stressed in particular that the former Soviet Union had agreed to German reunification and to the former German Democratic Republic coming under NATO on condition that NATO structures did not expand further to the east. If that happened, a new iron curtain would be created near Brest. Russia could not agree to NATO having a system in Europe in which the United States requested the leading role with Russia left out altogether. According to the minister, NATO enlargement to take in central European countries was unnecessary because Russia did not pose a threat to those countries. A partnership with NATO would only be meaningful if it led to real consultation. Such cooperation could be achieved much more easily with WEU and there was some disappointment in Russia that all the concrete proposals it had put forward had not been taken up in practice. In contrast, Russia's relations with the WEU Assembly were much better and the holding of a parliamentary seminar in Moscow was important to give the dialogue fresh impetus.

57 Regarding relations between Russia and Ukraine, Mr Chernomyrdin's special adviser was very optimistic that the differences outstanding between the two countries, especially with regard to the status of Sevastopol and the Black Sea fleet, would be settled soon.

58. Your Rapporteur's visit to Russia took place before the presidential elections. Nevertheless he is convinced that since his visit there has been no major shift in the direction of Russian security policy. This policy cannot be described as threatening but, as the main

successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia remains one of the mightiest nuclear powers and is still searching for its place in the European and international security architecture. The most important danger, however, lies in the uncertain outcome of the internal power struggle taking place in the country.

## *2. The position of Ukraine*

59 The importance of an independent Ukraine for European security and the strong interest the country has in moving much closer to western European structures have been highlighted by a number of events this year. First, the new direction being taken in Ukrainian foreign policy objectives was clearly expressed in President Kuchma's address to the WEU Assembly in Paris on 5 June 1996. Secondly, the WEU Institute for Security Studies held a seminar in Paris on 4 and 5 July 1996 on "Ukraine and European Security" and, at the end of August, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister wrote a letter to the Belgian Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Ministerial Council requesting that his country be granted the status of an associate partner of WEU.

60. At first sight, one might be tempted to consider that the Ukrainian President's assertion before the WEU Assembly that "full European Union membership is the priority for us" is not in line with the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine approved by its parliament in 1990 prior to Ukrainian independence, which proclaimed that "Ukraine would strive to become a nuclear-free, non-aligned, and permanently neutral state". However, the Ukrainian President declared that.

"These provisions of the Declaration were aimed at creating political and legal foundations for peaceful secession from the USSR, for the intention proclaimed in the Declaration was incompatible with the USSR status of a nuclear power and that of the state heading the Warsaw Treaty. So it was principally important that the Declaration determined not the status of Ukraine, but her intention to obtain it. The intention was to be brought into life by concrete deeds, approval of respective normative acts. Taking into account her special geopolitical position and under-

standing her responsibility for maintaining security and stability on the continent, Ukraine has implemented the intention as far as it concerns nuclear-free and non-aligned status "

61. The Ukrainian President then took the opportunity to remind the Assembly that the last strategic nuclear warhead was brought out of Ukraine on 1 June 1996. He reiterated the proposal Belarus had also made to implement the concept of a nuclear-free central and eastern Europe. According to the Ukrainian President "the establishment of such a zone between the Baltic and the Black Seas would promote confidence and reduce the threat of having new dividing lines on the continent".

62. Again according to the President, Ukraine's non-aligned status was not an obstacle to it taking part in international organisations and cooperating with them. This also included participation in politico-military structures and here he referred in particular to the participation of Austria, Finland and Sweden in WEU activities as observers

63. Your Rapporteur took the opportunity to visit Kiev from 1 to 5 October 1996 in order to have comprehensive talks with the relevant governmental and parliamentary authorities of the country. During his visit he had an extremely interesting exchange of views with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Udovenko, which had not originally been planned in the official programme. During this meeting, the minister repeated Ukraine's particular interest in the activities of Western European Union and its readiness to become an associate partner

64. According to the minister, it was more appropriate for Ukraine to approach western security structures via WEU than via NATO, which was still regarded as a former enemy by a large proportion of the population. It was Ukraine's objective to become part of those structures whereas in relation to Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States only some types of loose cooperation arrangement were envisaged by Ukraine.

65. In the aforementioned letter to the Belgian Presidency, the minister had also proposed a joint declaration with WEU envisaging the following specific areas of cooperation:

- peacekeeping
- airlift
- Ukrainian support in reinforcing WEU's operational capabilities
- participation of Ukrainian representatives in WEU exercises
- nomination of liaison officers at WEU headquarters
- cooperation between the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón and the Ukrainian Cosmic Agency.

66. According to a communiqué issued by the WEU Secretariat-General on 20 September 1996, the Secretary-General, Mr Cutileiro, and the Ukrainian Foreign Minister met on 19 September in Kiev. There was no mention in the text of Ukraine's wish to become an associate partner of WEU. However, the communiqué stated the following *inter alia*

"2. The visit of the WEU Secretary-General to Ukraine is yet another step in the process of the development of relations between Western European Union and Ukraine

3. The comprehensive and open exchange of views during the visit between the Secretary-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs testifies to the constructive dialogue between WEU and Ukraine, which the two parties are willing to develop further.

The Secretary-General expressed his satisfaction with the regularity and the substance of the meetings he and the Presidency had had with the Ambassador of Ukraine in Brussels.

4. The Secretary-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine emphasised the major importance for stability and security in Europe of Ukraine as an independent, democratic, sovereign and economically strong country.

5. The Secretary-General also expressed appreciation for recent democratic

progress achieved by Ukraine, particularly the adoption of the country's new Constitution by the Verkhovna Rada

6 The Secretary-General also paid tribute to Ukraine's policy aimed at building good-neighbourly relations with all her neighbours

7. The Secretary-General warmly welcomed Ukraine's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation through its accession as a non-nuclear weapon state to the NPT

He also acknowledged the historic importance of the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine, a process which was completed on 1 June 1996

The Secretary-General welcomed Ukraine's efforts to achieve its denuclearisation and the Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomed the support given by WEU states to achieve this goal.

8 The Secretary-General expressed recognition for Ukraine's practical contributions to European security and stability in crisis-management operations such as IFOR and UNTAES

9 The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine stressed the importance Ukraine attaches to its rapprochement with the European institutions and to the enhancement of its relations with trans-atlantic security structures. The Secretary-General expressed appreciation for Ukraine's aspirations in this respect.

10. Ukraine is an important European partner of WEU. Taking into account the WEU Permanent Council's decision of March 1995 and the progress achieved since then, the parties agreed that they will look for concrete ways in which a practical cooperation process can be pursued.

Secretary-General Cutileiro confirmed that the proposals in Minister Udovenko's letter of 27 August to the WEU Presidency would be studied within WEU, in the context of existing arrangements, as

possible forms of practical cooperation" in the abovementioned areas, but without providing definitive replies.

67 Your Rapporteur also had an opportunity to hold detailed discussions with the various authorities and especially with Mr Horbulin, Secretary of the National Security Council of Ukraine. On 18 September 1996 Mr Horbulin had given an interesting speech to the United States Congress in which he addressed some important outstanding issues regarding Ukraine's specific situation, which were also at the centre of discussions your Rapporteur had with his Ukrainian contacts. He told Congress that "the existence of political forces, mainly of the extreme left, should also be noted as one of Ukraine's realities. Such factions try to use the complicated economic situation, and display interest in the failure of reforms, in order to restore the former USSR, with its integrated political and economic systems and foreign political orientation"

68 Mr Horbulin also stressed that Ukraine "was the first nuclear power to voluntarily give up its nuclear arsenal, the third largest in the world". He also recalled Ukraine's proposals "to establish a nuclear-free zone as well as a zone of peace and stability in central and eastern Europe and to work out confidence-building measures for security and cooperation in the naval activities of the Black Sea countries"

69. In this context some uncertainty still surrounds Ukraine's position regarding NATO enlargement. It would seem that Ukraine is not seeking full membership at the moment and Mr Horbulin explained Ukraine's position as follows:

"Ukraine's relationship with NATO has reached a qualitatively new level, one of "profound and extended" collaboration. Ukraine's vision of security risks, evaluation of their nature, and some other points are similar to NATO's to a great extent. At the same time, we believe that gradual evolutionary enlargement of the Alliance should be parallel to the development and extension of ties between NATO and Ukraine on the basis of special partnership principles. Such partnership relations would embellish the existing forms of cooperation in the framework of

NACC and the Partnership for Peace. These institutions, in our opinion, can become important elements of European security."

70. In order to understand Ukraine's position on NATO enlargement and its proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in central and eastern Europe, one has to take into account its very difficult geographic position between Russia and the central European countries, particularly Poland, which are constantly pressing for admittance as full members of NATO. Ukraine is no longer opposed to NATO enlargement but fears that if it meant that nuclear weapons were deployed in the new member countries, for instance in Poland, Russian pressure on Ukraine, which has wholly renounced its nuclear capability, would be considerably stepped up. However, during President Kuchma's last visit to Poland, his Polish interlocutors clearly rejected the idea of a nuclear-free zone, an idea that is, incidentally, also supported by Belarus. This puts Ukraine in a very difficult position when it comes to explaining its policy in this area because in its relations with Moscow, Ukraine takes a wholly different line from that of President Lukashenko of Belarus who has already declared that if nuclear weapons were deployed in central European countries that had joined NATO, Minsk might ask Moscow to redeploy nuclear warheads and carriers in Belarus. Ukraine is at the moment totally opposed to such an approach.

71. In his address to the United States Congress, Mr Horbulin stated the following:

"The geopolitical position of Ukraine requires reasonable, consistent, and balanced relations with both the West and the East in economic and political matters. In this context, relations between Ukraine and Russia are of particular importance, which we consider the most sensitive component of our national interests. One priority is to advance our bilateral relationship to a stable, good-neighbourly partnership, and to agree finally on the division of the Black Sea fleet, with fixed conditions and terms for basing the Russian part of the fleet on the territory of Ukraine."

72. When your Rapporteur met Mr Horbulin, the latter explained that Ukraine was not a party to the Treaty of Tashkent and had no intention of

participating in any sort of military integration within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, in his talks with members of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees, your Rapporteur heard different explanations and views regarding the interpretation of Ukraine's relationship with the CIS. Some members said that although Ukraine was a founder member, it did not participate in most of its activities. Others said it was only an associate member and some defended the view that Ukraine was not a member of the CIS at all since it had not signed its statutes.

73. It was most interesting to be told by parliamentarians that the Ukrainian Supreme Rada is divided over the question of what direction Ukraine's foreign and security policy should take. According to them, one third of its members are in favour of seeking NATO membership, one third advocate stronger integration with the structures of the CIS, including military cooperation in the framework of the Tashkent Treaty, and one third would opt for integration with European structures while maintaining a non-aligned status. So while it is obvious that the majority of parliamentarians are clearly in favour of western integration overall, there are several nuances which make it difficult for the Ukrainian Government to adopt a clearcut policy. One parliamentarian summed up the situation by saying that Ukraine was clearly moving towards Europe despite the fact that Ukrainians were not wholly European because they also had some Asian characteristics.

74. Nevertheless, your Rapporteur had the clear impression that there is no indication at present of any risk to the internal cohesion of the country. What is important is that the present Government led by President Kuchma – who like many of his governmental team comes from the eastern (Russian-speaking) part of Ukraine – follows a clearcut policy of maintaining independence in respect of Russia.

75. As regards Ukraine's relations with Russia, your Rapporteur was able to gather some important supplementary information. Many politicians are worried about the state of health of the Russian President as they would prefer to settle all outstanding differences with him rather than with any of his potential successors. It was not until after your Rapporteur's visit that, at the end of October, the Russian State Duma gave a

clear warning that Russia would never cede control of Sevastopol, the Black Sea fleet's Crimean port, and passed a draft law which seeks to prevent the division of the fleet<sup>5</sup>. Nevertheless, although it would appear that the problems of the status of Sevastopol and the division of the Black Sea fleet are about to be settled following President Kuchma's visit to see President Yeltsin in Moscow, Ukraine's dependence on Russia for petroleum and natural gas supplies plays a major role in bilateral relations between the two countries. In contrast, Russia depends to a large extent on the well-developed Ukrainian space industry. Military transit through Transdnier does not seem to be a major problem but Ukraine's relations with Romania are still difficult

76 Ukraine is ready to ratify the Open Skies Treaty but many of your Rapporteur's interlocutors expressed disappointment that the Cooperation Treaty between Ukraine and the European Union has so far been ratified only by very few European countries. A number of them therefore proposed to settle Ukraine's relationship with WEU separately from its relationship with the European Union

77 Your Rapporteur's strong impression after his visit was that the political debate within Ukraine has now reached a critical stage in which the pro-western forces are making every effort to take a decisive lead over those political forces in the country which still want to restore the former communist order. Many Ukrainian politicians expressed disappointment about Europe's reluctance to help the leading force in Ukraine move closer to European structures and they have concentrated their efforts on obtaining the support of the United States. Europe, and in particular WEU, is now faced with the great responsibility of deciding how to respond to Ukraine's ambitions and concerns.

### *3. Turkey, the Caucasus and the central Asian region*

78 Your Rapporteur's visit to Turkey enabled him to make a first assessment of an important number of further elements which have to be taken into account in describing the eastern dimension of Europe security. Again, one of

them is linked to the question of enlargement as it is clear that Turkey might be prompted to use its position in NATO to press its allied partners to agree on major improvements in Turkey's present status, namely in its relations with Western European Union. Even if the official Turkish position regarding NATO enlargement might be described as positive but prudent, some people are wondering whether there is any value in Turkey extending its defence obligations within NATO to a given number of central European countries which, for their part, would not be able to contribute in a significant manner to the enhancement of Turkey's security. Furthermore, it is being suggested in those quarters that there is no reason for Turkey to support with enthusiasm the integration of central European countries in the European Union and Western European Union, if Turkey is given no chance to improve its own status in these organisations. In addition, there are still minority problems pending between Turkey and Bulgaria

79 Turkey's unique position is also evident from a number of other outstanding issues which reveal differing interests between the West and Russia. Among these, the exploitation of Caspian oil and natural gas has already involved the oil industries of the United States, the United Kingdom and other western countries to such an extent that in June 1995 some commentators predicted the possibility of a "cold war" over oil and natural gas in the Caucasus<sup>6</sup>. Apart from the United States and Russia, Turkey and Iran are also heavily involved. Under a contract between Azerbaijan and a major western oil syndicate, Caspian petroleum transits via two pipelines, one running through Russian territory and the other through Georgia. But the issue has not yet been settled since it is linked to the question of different interpretations of the status of the Caspian Sea. Moscow (and possibly Iran) defend the position that the Caspian Sea is an inland sea with the consequence that all littoral states would have a say in the exploitation of its natural resources. Conversely, Azerbaijan defends the position that the Caspian Sea is an international sea and that every littoral state can take its own decision on oil exploitation in its part of the sea. The dispute over these questions has so far not been settled.

5. *The Financial Times*, 25 October 1996.

6 Christian Schmidt-Häuer, *Die Zeit*, 16 June 1995

80. Furthermore, three countries – Turkey, Russia and Iran – are in competition as to which has most influence in the central Asian region. The summit organised last year in Bishkek, the capital of Kirghizstan, by the Turkish-speaking republics of Azerbaijan, Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan caused irritation in Moscow even though it was denied that the question of enhancing political cooperation between those countries and Turkey had been discussed at the conference. However, it is not only for economic reasons but also because of the continuing regional and ethnic conflicts in the Caucasian and central Asian regions that any Turkish initiative to enhance its influence in the area is regarded with suspicion.

81. Regarding the settlement of the various ethnic conflicts in the Caucasian region, the Turkish interlocutor with whom your Rapporteur spoke provided a generally positive assessment of the efforts made by the OSCE in all the cases in which the member countries involved were prepared to have recourse to it. In this connection it is worth noting the assessment of a Russian member of the Moscow-based human rights organisation "Memorial" who stated, at a recent conference in Prague, that the refusal of western countries to participate in peacekeeping operations on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States gave the Russian army a monopoly for military intervention<sup>7</sup>.

82. Even though most of the Turkish Government's representatives identified first and foremost the danger of Kurdish terrorism supported by countries such as Syria, Iraq and Iran as a major threat to the security of Turkey, they did not minimise their concern about the security implications for Turkey of Russian policy in general and particularly in the Caucasian region. In this connection, Turkey is above all worried by the West's concessions to Russia regarding its flank obligations under the CFE Treaty.

*V. The state of discussions regarding the central European countries' requests to join the European and transatlantic security structures*

83. The enlargement debate was given new impetus on 16 October 1996, when Lithuania's

President, Algirdas Brazauskas, reaffirmed to NATO ambassadors his country's desire to join the Atlantic Alliance in the first wave of its enlargement. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister of Slovakia, which is now rarely included in references to the Visegrad countries that are supposed to be the first to join NATO, has again said that Slovakia deserves to be in the first wave of new NATO members<sup>8</sup>.

84. Your Rapporteur is only too well aware that consideration of the three Baltic countries poses a particularly difficult problem in this context and he was strengthened in this conviction as a result of the comprehensive talks he had with the Latvian authorities at the beginning of September 1996. However, in line with the WEU Council's decision to grant the status of associate partner to the Baltic states together with six central European countries in May 1994 and to Slovenia in June 1996, he intends to discuss the problems of all the associate partners as a whole without, for all that, neglecting the specificity of each individual case.

85. There is no doubt that the steadfast determination of all the new democratic central European countries from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea to join western European and transatlantic security institutions as soon as possible continues to be a central preoccupation of their governments, parliaments and public opinion. The fact that in some of them, i.e. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, the former communist parties have reappeared as the main political players, does not affect that determination. Consequently, this strong desire also remains topical in the main western capitals as it does in Moscow and a number of other capitals of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

*1. European Union enlargement*

86. As has already been said, the relevant western organisations and governments have so far been unable to agree on a comprehensive approach to respond satisfactorily to the request of the central European applicants. As far as the European Union is concerned, the European Council agreed in Copenhagen in June 1993 "that the associated countries in central and eastern

<sup>7</sup> *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 6 February 1996

<sup>8</sup> *Atlantic News*, No 2857, 18 October 1996.

Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union".

87. Since then "Europe Agreements" have been concluded by the European Union with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the three Baltic states and Slovenia. But the European Union is not only faced with a problem of enlargement towards central Europe but also towards the south. It should be remembered that Cyprus and Malta have applied for membership and that Turkey in particular has been on the waiting list for a very long time. Apart from internal differences within the European Union as to whether to give priority to central Europe or to the south, it is obvious that the Union will have to impose stringent conditions as to proof of commitment to a market economy and to democracy before any new members can be admitted. Among other things this will involve radical reforms of agricultural and regional aid spending. In the Union itself, important institutional reforms – in particular in the decision-making process – will be necessary, and a long transitional period will probably be required before the first central European country joins the European Union as a full member. Nobody expects this to come about before 2000 at the earliest.

88. However, there are further serious problems regarding the criteria according to which the European Union should proceed with enlargement. Some countries, following the lead of Germany's Chancellor Kohl, are arguing in favour of beginning enlargement with a limited number of countries, and the Chancellor has even named Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, suggesting that they should join the Union first.

89. This proposal demonstrates the fundamental importance of deciding whether to (a) tackle the enlargement process on a case-by-case basis, studying each application on its own merits (b) choose the method of considering groups of interested countries or (c) admit all applicants according to a general clause.

90. It seems that the last option is favoured by France. In fact, at the end of February the Elysée laid down general guidelines for France to follow during the negotiations at the intergovernmental conference.<sup>9</sup> The Elysée paper stresses that:

9. *Le Figaro*, 20 February 1996.

"The main purpose of the intergovernmental conference is to prepare the European Union for its future enlargement and to adapt the existing institutions to accommodate that objective. The treaties should therefore include a general clause enabling those states that have the necessary will and capability, to strengthen cooperation with one another. To achieve that end, it ought to be possible for some states to be able to submit to the Council cooperation projects which, once approved by that body, would be considered to have been endorsed by the European Union. If these proposals were adopted as a package, the result would be a stronger European Union able to cope with its future enlargement without however weakening its cohesion"

91. The importance of choosing an appropriate strategy for the enlargement process to be followed by the European Union cannot be considered in isolation from the security dimension, i.e. its relation with the expansion of NATO and Western European Union. There are growing arguments for giving priority to the enlargement of the European Union since this would not give rise to any objections from Russia and would at the same time considerably enhance the stability and security of the central European countries admitted.

92. This idea has found expression in a joint request made by the German and Danish Foreign Ministers, according to which the Baltic states – Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – should join the European Union as soon as possible<sup>10</sup>.

93. A similar request was made at a recent conference held by the Nordic Council in Copenhagen and attended by the heads of government of Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland. In an article published in *The European*<sup>11</sup>, Mr Petersen, the Danish Foreign Minister, underlined that enlargement of the European Union eastward was at the top of the European agenda and that the most important task of the intergovernmental conference was to pave the way for that expansion.

94. In a letter dated 11 March 1996 to Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, our

10. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 March 1996.

11. *The European*, 15-21 February 1996.

Norwegian colleague, Ingvald Godal, underlined the importance of incorporating central European countries, including the Baltic Republics, in western structures. Among other things, he proposed that work should start on a comprehensive strategy to stabilise this region that would include aspects such as a plan for admitting the Baltic Republics into western structures, for instance by bringing them into the European Union first.

95. In a further letter dated 30 April 1996, Mr Godal informed the Presidential Committee of his participation in the first joint meeting of the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic Council for the purposes of a seminar on security problems of the Baltic Sea region. He summarised the conclusions of this seminar as follows:

"1. The Nordic/Baltic region is today Europe's untidy corner as far as security is concerned, with an extremely confused mosaic of membership in the relevant European structures (EU, WEU and NATO) and a lack of solidarity in times of trouble, which is in sharp contradiction to the otherwise well-developed cooperation between these eight countries. The aim should be to rectify this by gradually making all of them full members of the relevant European structures.

2 The strategy to reach this goal could be as follows

- Denmark becomes a full member of WEU – this region would then have at least one full player on the security scene in Europe;
- the Baltic states should become full members of the EU, with the required transitional arrangements, as soon as possible; this would greatly enhance stability in an area that at present is most exposed to aggression if developments in Russia take an undesirable direction;
- Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states should thereafter join the relevant security structures (WEU and NATO); there is a special challenge for Sweden to take responsibility for this, being the largest country in the region in such a central geographic position."

96 Mr Godal also conveyed a report on his participation in the 9th session of the Baltic Assembly in Riga on 5-6 October 1996, the text of which is reproduced in an appendix to this report. Your Rapporteur is very grateful for Mr Godal's contributions and intends to come back to a number of his considerations in the chapter dealing with possible concepts for extending stability and security eastwards.

97. The main problems posed by the enlargement of the Union are not the consequences of admitting certain countries earlier than others on the basis of the principle that all countries with which Europe Agreements have been concluded have a right to become members of the Union. One of the main difficulties is the timetable as a whole. The complexity of the adaptations that are required both in the European Union and in the candidate countries before enlargement can take place would suggest that enlargement of the European Union is unlikely prior to that of NATO or Western European Union.

98. In this context it is worth mentioning that both the European Union and NATO have laid down a good number of conditions that all interested central European countries have to fulfil *before* negotiations on their admission can start

99. Another major difficulty is the kind of link to be established between European Union and NATO enlargement. There seems to be widespread agreement about the idea that all European Union members should also become members of NATO. Many people think that integration in NATO could be achieved prior to European Union membership<sup>12</sup>. But in July 1995 when the German Chancellor paid a visit to Poland, his Polish interlocutors feared that he would establish a formal link between Poland's admission to NATO and to the European Union. In fact, the Chancellor underlined that Poland's accession to NATO and to the European Union were interconnected but that this did not mean that both should take place at the same time.

12. See for instance the Declaration of 11 September 1995 published in Berlin by the German Group of the European Peoples Party (EPP) of the European Parliament

100. So far, the European Union has never formally linked membership of the Union with membership of NATO. The four "neutral" or non-aligned European countries – Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria – that are full members of the European Union are proof of that. The fundamental question is whether it is right to recommend a strategy giving priority to the enlargement of the European Union. This needs to be studied seriously even though it would oblige the European Union radically to reconsider the hitherto envisaged timetable for its enlargement.

101. But in an article published on 12 January 1996 in the *International Herald Tribune*, David Fischer and William C Potter<sup>13</sup> argued that "the best guarantee of the independence and territorial integrity of the fledging new democracies in the former eastern bloc is economic integration with the West. With this in mind, western Europe should speedily integrate them into the European Union, as has been done with Austria, Sweden and Finland, each of which appears to feel secure as part of a European community that has increasingly common foreign and defence policies, and none of which has any intention of joining NATO."

102. However, what might be convenient for a country such as Sweden, and in particular for Finland, might not be applicable to the Baltic states. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing to what Andris Ozolins from the Latvian Institute of International Affairs writes in *Challot Paper 20* published by the WEU Institute for Security Studies:

"Between 1989 and 1991, when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were waging their battle for restored independence, the idea of Baltic neutrality was widespread and popular. Soon after independence was regained, however, the idea of neutrality was abandoned in all three nations as it was considered inappropriate to Baltic security requirements. Formal neutrality would have involved a commitment that the Baltic states would never join alliances or allow foreign

forces on their territory; and was not seen as a satisfactory basis for security. In addition, there was growing uncertainty, and not just in the Baltic region, about what exactly neutrality meant in an age when East-West confrontation had diminished so sharply. But the deciding factor in rejecting neutrality was the historical memory of the events which had led to the demise of Baltic independence in 1940 – a time when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were all pursuing policies of neutrality.

In the place of neutrality, all three Baltic states have preferred a strategy of counter-alliance, seeking integration into an alliance or community of larger states in order to strengthen their position in relations with Russia<sup>14</sup>."

## 2. NATO enlargement

103. With respect to NATO's concept of enlargement, the relevant study, published in September 1995, defines some important principles defining the kind of link NATO intends to establish with the enlargement of the European Union and Western European Union. One of the shortcomings of this study, however, is that the question of which countries might be envisaged for NATO enlargement remains open since it states clearly that "each invitation will be decided on its own merits, case by case, ... taking into account political and security-related developments in the whole of Europe." According to the study, "it will be important not to foreclose the possibility of eventual Alliance membership for any European state in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty".

104. That kind of approach could even include the Russian Federation. On the other hand, the study emphasises that "the enlargement of NATO is a parallel process with and will complement that of the European Union. Both NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests as well as a broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the defence dimension".

13. Mr Fischer is a scholar at the Centre for Non-proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. Mr Potter is Director of that Centre and of the Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Institute.

14. Limits and Opportunities at the Eastern Edge, *Challot Paper 20*, page 65.

105. Furthermore, the study emphasises that "the Alliance has no *a priori* requirement for the stationing of Alliance troops on the territory of new members". But it says that "for new members, the peacetime stationing of other Allies' forces on their territory should neither be a condition of membership nor foreclosed as an option".

106. Regarding nuclear forces, the study underlines that "the coverage provided by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, including its nuclear component, will apply to new members. There is no *a priori* requirement for the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members". But the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons on these territories is not precluded.

107 Regarding the establishment of obligations to be met by potential new member countries and what they should have to do in order to prepare for their membership, the NATO study lists so many conditions to be fulfilled that it would seem difficult for any country to meet all of them in a relatively short time. It is interesting to note that in January 1996, NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr Gebhardt von Moltke, stressed in particular the need for applicants to contribute to the financing of the Atlantic Alliance and added that NATO would also confront Russia with all the relevant requests if that country expressed the wish to become a full member of the Alliance (!)<sup>15</sup>. In this context, it might be admissible to suggest that the numerous conditions set out in the NATO study are to be seen partly as a means of preventing certain countries from becoming NATO members.

108. In any event, at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 5 December 1995, it was decided that in 1996 the enlargement process would consist of three elements.

- "with those Partners who so wish, we would pursue, on an individual basis, intensive bilateral and multilateral consultations, building on the foundation of the enlargement study and the presentations made during the first phase. Any interested Partner would be able to pursue an intensified, individual dialogue with the Alliance,

- through further enhancement of the Partnership for Peace, the Alliance will adopt a programme of practical work that will strengthen ties between the Alliance and all of our Partners. For some Partners these activities will facilitate their ability to assume the responsibilities of membership, while for others they will serve to strengthen their long-term partnership in the Alliance;
- the Alliance will consider what internal adaptations and other measures are necessary to ensure that enlargement preserves the effectiveness of the Alliance. In particular, we must examine the resource and staffing implications of enlargement.

These three elements will constitute the next phase of the enlargement process which NATO began in January 1994. Intensified dialogue will work in two directions. Interested Partners will learn more about the specific and practical details of Alliance membership, they can review their efforts in terms of the various precepts and principles included in the enlargement study. NATO, in turn, will learn more about what individual Partners could or could not contribute to the Alliance and could begin to identify areas for additional work. Participation in this next phase would not imply that interested Partners would automatically be invited to begin accession talks with NATO.

We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to develop and implement each element of this next phase starting early in 1996, taking into account the conclusions of the study and an assessment of the briefing process. This phase will continue through 1996, we will assess progress at our December 1996 Ministerial and consider the way forward."

At the end of January 1996, at a meeting of the 27 countries that signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme of enhanced cooperation, NATO officials unveiled plans for individual discussions with potential new members<sup>16</sup>. This could be seen as

<sup>15</sup> *Interfax*, 25 January 1996.

<sup>16</sup> *Wire Service Rtw* (Reuters World Report).

the beginning of the process of identifying possible new members but there is no prospect of the process of NATO enlargement being a speedy one

### 3. *Western European Union enlargement*

109 With regard to the position of Western European Union in the enlargement process, one has the strong impression that since the creation of associate partnership status for the Visegrad countries - Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states - through the Kirchberg Declaration, the WEU Council considers it has more or less accomplished its efforts to enhance WEU's relations with the central European countries. The Assembly of course warmly welcomed the Council's decision in June 1996 to grant Slovenia the status of associate partner as well. But no major action to improve the status of associate partnership has been taken and neither the first part of the 41st Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly, nor the Madrid Declaration make any further mention of the question of WEU's enlargement to the East.

110. However, in the Birmingham Declaration of 7 May 1996<sup>17</sup>,

"Ministers underlined the importance they attach to the contribution of the associate partners to WEU activities. They welcomed the report to the Permanent Council on measures taken to involve the associate partners more in work on operational development, in particular on African peacekeeping, exercise policy and humanitarian task force operations. They welcomed in particular the agreement to extend information sharing, and briefings on WEU crisis-management procedures, WEU's role in peacekeeping as well as the arrangements for briefing associate partners on WEU space and armaments questions. They welcomed the active participation of the associate partners in discussion of security and politico-military issues within WEU. Ministers endorsed the Permanent Council's decision to keep under review the possibilities for further enhancing the associate partners' involvement in the ongoing work on the development of the operational role of WEU."

<sup>17</sup> See Document 1516, 13 May 1996.

111 But what is lacking above all else is any concept as to how to define WEU's role in the framework of the enlargement process under way both in the European Union and in NATO. The British Presidency clearly indicated that it would focus first and foremost on enhancing WEU's operational capabilities. However, at a first briefing of the Presidential Committee by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to WEU on 19 December 1995 in Brussels, the representative of the British Presidency underlined that WEU was "uniquely qualified to deepen cooperation with observers, associate partners, Russia and Ukraine" but "without overloading the new WEU with excessive membership".

112 Furthermore, the British Presidency also stressed that "there is no question of any country securing Article V guarantees by the back door". It is important to ask for clarification of the meaning of this phrase in further contacts with the Council and its Chairmanship-in-Office. In answering questions put by members of the Presidential Committee, the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to WEU announced that "we will explore the scope to formalise arrangements to involve observers and associates more fully in WEU activities". Furthermore, he confirmed that "we were mandated by the Madrid Ministerial Council to develop the content of relations with Russia and Ukraine. The WEU Institute and the Assembly have an important role to play here".

113 While this would seem to confirm that WEU's enlargement to the east is at present not on the Council's priority list, it is worth noting a speech given on 9 February 1996 at the IFRI by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Erik Derycke. On that occasion, referring to Belgium's forthcoming presidency of WEU in the second half of 1996, he said:

"It is indeed my wish that accession to the European Union, WEU and NATO proceed on an equal basis. There is certainly no question of increasing the differences that already exist. That is why I would welcome the accession by Denmark to WEU and by Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland to WEU and NATO. But it goes without saying that we fully respect the sovereign right of choice of every country as regards its own foreign and security policy."

On the basis of this rationale, the states that formerly belonged to the Warsaw Pact cannot become members of WEU until they have joined the European Union and NATO "

114. When Mr Dehaene, Prime Minister of Belgium, addressed the Assembly on 4 June 1996, he said among other things that.

"... we must in all this remember that Europe is not a homogenous security area: a number of member states are in NATO, others are neutral or non-aligned, while the central and eastern European countries are looking for a new strategic umbrella to protect their security interests. A gradual homogenisation of the European security area would, in my view, make our cooperation more effective. There is no ideological logic behind that statement but sheer pragmatism."

115. Your Rapporteur believes that a careful study should be done to ascertain whether such thinking is justified and in conformity with the role and function WEU should and could assume in a pan-European security architecture. In this connection it should again be repeated that the modified Brussels Treaty obliges WEU member countries to undertake an *active* policy with a view to strengthening peace and security and to *promoting* the unity and integration of Europe. The possibility afforded by Article XI of the Treaty to invite any other country to accede to it on agreed conditions has to be studied on its own merits even if it is obvious that this has to be done on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of the general security conditions in Europe as a whole. The question of WEU's role and contribution in the enlargement process will therefore be an important item in the following section of the report dealing with the various scenarios and concepts

#### *VI. Possible concepts for extending stability and security eastwards*

116. Your Rapporteur believes that the discussion should not exclude any kind of concept and that one should not shy away from discussing proposals which might be considered "unthinkable" by certain members

117. It is obvious that the question of enlargement currently dominates all conceptual considerations of a new European security architecture and most of the other outstanding problems to be discussed are closely linked to this problem. Among the various questions still to be settled, the most important is the kind of conceptual linkage that should be established between the enlargement of the European Union and of NATO and the consequences for a WEU policy in the matter. Your Rapporteur agrees with Karsten Voigt, President of the North Atlantic Assembly, when he says that while accepting a conceptual linkage between the enlargement of the two organisations, there should be no parallelism in time. According to his assessment, "making NATO enlargement hostage to the resolution of agricultural problems in the European Union would signal that NATO membership is not for tomorrow, nor even for the day after"<sup>18</sup>

118. But the difficulties begin when it comes to tackling the questions of "who and when". In both cases, different answers will probably be found for the European Union and for NATO. With respect to the European Union, the question of "who" was settled in principle by the European Council in June 1993. The European Union could therefore begin the enlargement process by admitting the relevant countries individually or in groups, and a country benefiting from a Europe Agreement but not included in the first wave of enlargement would have no reason to fear being left outside definitively. But the European Union has a major problem as regards "when". Should there be a strategy of giving priority to European Union enlargement or that of NATO? According to the German Foreign Minister, it would be in the interest of central European countries for accession to the European Union to take precedence over accession to NATO.

119. In fact, enlargement of the Union is less problematic in the security field but depends on so many different factors and conditions in economic, financial, structural and organisational terms that it is very unlikely to be achieved prior to enlargement of the security institutions such as NATO or WEU. It does not therefore seem realistic to propose a strategy to give the

<sup>18</sup> Karsten Voigt in *NATO review*, No 15, March 1996.

European Union priority as regards the enlargement question.

120. Such a conclusion might have unfavourable consequences, particularly for the Baltic states. Their early admission to the European Union would in fact considerably enhance their stability and security and even Russia would have no objections. While it would be much easier to proceed more quickly with NATO enlargement from a technical and organisational point of view, the question of "who" creates enormous problems.

121. Early admission of the Baltic states to NATO might give rise to a political crisis with Russia, not because Russia would really feel threatened by such a step, but because it is not ready to accept that countries which were part of the Soviet Union until 1991 should join NATO. For NATO enlargement, the question of "who and when" therefore poses fundamental problems, but the time has now come to find acceptable solutions.

122. As long as NATO remains ambiguous on the question of "who", any approach to admit new members in a series of waves may be regarded by other countries as a signal that there will be no second wave of admission to follow the first. A study should therefore be done as to whether an overall arrangement could be found accommodating NATO enlargement for *all* interested central European countries at the same time, even if this might at first sight seem a very provocative approach.

123. Above all, NATO should do away with ambiguities as to "who" can be admitted. Your Rapporteur is convinced that the ten WEU associate partner countries should be considered as potential candidates for joining NATO.

124. But such a comprehensive approach would need some sort of overall agreement between NATO and Russia on their relationship in the framework of a new cooperative security order in Europe. Russia has often argued that when the Soviet Union agreed in the Two + Four Treaty that a reunited Germany would be free to join NATO, the western allies in turn promised not to enlarge NATO further to the east. Even if no such promise by the West is to be found in the treaty, it is worth reiterating that under Article 5, paragraph 3 of the Treaty on the Final Settlement

with respect to Germany, the following was agreed:

"Following the completion of the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces from the territory of the present German Democratic Republic and of Berlin, units of German armed forces assigned to military alliance structures in the same way as those in the rest of German territory may also be stationed in that part of Germany, but without nuclear weapon carriers. This does not apply to conventional weapon systems which may have other capabilities in addition to conventional ones but which in that part of Germany are equipped for a conventional role and designated only for such. Foreign armed forces and nuclear weapons or their carriers will not be stationed in that part of Germany or deployed there."

125. It is true that the situation of divided Germany cannot be compared with the situations of all the central European countries which were victims of the second world war and which should be wholly free to choose their external security arrangements. Nevertheless, it should be possible to agree that no nuclear weapons and no foreign troops belonging to NATO should be deployed in peacetime on the territories of any central European country which is to join the Atlantic Alliance. In that sense the Ukrainian proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in central Europe would seem to be reasonable. That would not prevent such countries from joining the integrated military structures of the Alliance. In order to offer more concessions, there are even proposals to limit the admission of new member countries to the political part of the Alliance<sup>19</sup>. However, there are fundamental doubts as to whether such proposals would satisfy the relevant candidates for membership.

126. At a conference of German and Russian security experts held in the Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik in Bonn in March 1996, the Russian experts insisted on

- limiting NATO enlargement to a few central European countries;

<sup>19</sup> Gerd Schmuckle, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 February 1996.

- the exclusion of the Baltic states, south-eastern Europe and Ukraine from the NATO enlargement process;
- a reinforcement of the OSCE by creating a permanent executive committee on security in which Russia, the United States and the European Union would be represented;
- a special agreement between NATO and Russia on their political relations;
- a thorough revision of the CFE Treaty including Finland, the Baltic states and Sweden, and the inclusion of the security organisation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the security partnership between NATO and Russia.

127. Furthermore, in the framework of the OSCE, the Russians have again proposed the creation of a security charter in which

"each country would provide a document setting out its perception of the risks to which it feels exposed and the means it intends to use to counter them. The central European countries should state either that they do not feel threatened by Russia – in which case there would be no point in their joining NATO – or else that they do feel threatened by that country, in which case it would be clear that any extension of NATO would be directed against Moscow. To respond to the security requirements of the former countries in the socialist bloc, the Russians propose the creation of a neutral zone in the centre of Europe and "overlapping guarantees" provided both by NATO and the Tashkent pact"<sup>20</sup>.

128 In a comprehensive study on a "Strategic Partnership with Russia" Lothar Rühl, a former undersecretary of state in the German defence ministry, developed the following possible scenario<sup>21</sup>.

"In any event the OSCE needs to have full operational capabilities if a true "community

of states" in the security sense is to develop from the former CSCE within the meaning of the 1994 CSCE Budapest document. To that end, Russia's proposal (which was supported by Germany and rejected by the United States) to set up a permanent executive committee as a planning and steering body could be given a new lease of life and further developed. The problem of the selection of members could be solved through "alternating regional round tables" for any action that became necessary to deal with crises alongside three other OSCE members (the "rotating presidential troika" or alternates in the case of individual states having dual status), Russia, the United States and the European Union could be permanent members. It would also be possible for the European Union to be permanently represented through its presidency, with the addition of the United Kingdom, France and Germany

NATO would limit its expansion to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. There would be an end to the open-ended evolutionary process and the self-selection of candidates and to the accompanying, virtually automatic, corollary of continued NATO expansion resulting in a series of changes pushing the borders of the area covered by the Alliance eastward.

For the three Baltic states, agreement would be reached on a special security zone including Finland and Sweden as a regional structure of the OSCE. The subsequent accession of those three countries, and of Finland and Sweden as European Union members, to WEU and beyond that to NATO would remain open but would in principle be admissible. While the NATO states would in due course seek to reach an understanding with Russia on this subject, they would neither accept nor concede that Russia had a veto. NATO and the European Union would respect Russia's sovereign right to organise a security and defence community together with other CIS members in the same way as they are entitled to expect Russia to recognise their own common security and defence organisation as contributing to stability in Europe. The basis for this is the freedom of choice to form communities within the meaning of the

20. *Le Monde*, 15 February 1996.

21. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 16 March 1996.

CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which was confirmed first in November 1990 by the then USSR in the "Charter of Paris for a new Europe" and again in December 1994 in Budapest. The CIS would then be accepted as a legitimate instrument for integration around Russia provided its rules and structures were in conformity with international law and the Helsinki principles."

129 In the framework of this scenario, the author leaves open the need for the conclusion of a security pact between NATO and Russia. But he affirms that

"despite all the disadvantages it would entail for the eastern European countries, the best policy both in terms of western means and of not overstressing the United States, would probably be NATO expansion limited to central European countries with an offer to Moscow to hold general security talks following the presidential elections in the United States in November 1996."

130. These very carefully thought out considerations seem to be balanced and logical. However, they call for a number of comments. First, they give Russia such a degree of co-determination and right of say in the framework of a powerful executive organ to be created within the OSCE while encouraging a reinforced defence organisation within the CIS under Russian domination, that it is difficult to understand why, in such a scenario, NATO enlargement should be limited to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. It might even be said that this concept is more geared to meet American concerns than those of the Russians.

131 It is not easy to predict whether the Americans will now agree to the creation of a permanent executive committee with strong powers in the OSCE, which they refused some years ago. On the other hand, it seems that the limitation of NATO enlargement to the Visegrad countries is being proposed in view of the uncertainty of the position of the American Congress, which has to ratify the admission of new NATO members by a two-thirds majority.

132 Creating a special security zone including Finland, Sweden and the Baltic states in a regional OSCE structure while postponing their possible

accession to WEU and NATO, depending on a subsequent understanding being reached with Russia, would seem to be very problematical. Bearing in mind the strong political and military ties Russia maintains with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), it does not seem acceptable to leave out countries such as Romania and Bulgaria.

133 Furthermore, reciprocal recognition of western security organisations (such as NATO and WEU) and security organisations in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States as contributions to European stability might put countries such as Ukraine in a difficult position. It has so far refused to join the security structures of the CIS and has no plan to join the Atlantic Alliance. It is perhaps for that reason that some analysts say countries such as Romania and Bulgaria might become a political bridge to Russia by forming a security group with others not seeking NATO membership, such as Ukraine.

134 Finally, the shortcoming of all the abovementioned scenarios is that they fail to examine what kind of contribution Western European Union could make in a new pan-European security structure. One should remember in this context that the Brussels Treaty of 1948 preceded NATO and that the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 preceded the Treaty of Rome creating the European Community.

135. Western European Union paved the way for the integration of Germany as a full member of NATO. The protocols on the limitation of the armed forces of member countries on the mainland of Europe as well as the creation of an Agency for the Control of Armaments made a considerable contribution to the security of Europe long before the main East-West discussions on disarmament and the control of armaments began.

136 With 28 European countries in the WEU "family", albeit still with differing categories of status, WEU has as it were anticipated the future pattern of the security dimension of the European Union, which nonetheless remains to be completed by the future accession of Malta, Cyprus and possibly (at a later stage) successor countries of former Yugoslavia. WEU also anticipated the central European dimension of the European Union when it decided to grant the countries participating in the former WEU Consultation Forum the status of associate partnership, well before all these

countries had concluded Europe Agreements with the European Union.

137. It is now necessary for WEU to consider more thoroughly the criteria for a conceptual link between WEU's enlargement eastwards and the enlargement of the European Union and NATO. In this context WEU should see its role (as in the past) as a pioneer paving the way for increased involvement of the associate partners in western security structures, giving substance to relations with Russia and Ukraine and contributing to the project for a common and comprehensive security model for Europe

138. The essential question now is whether the goal of a broad congruence of membership in NATO, the European Union and WEU should be followed as a strict rule or replaced by a more flexible approach without invalidating the ideal underlying that principle.

139. A strict application of the concept of congruence in the membership of NATO, the European Union and WEU is not in line with political realities even now, since the United States and Canada are leading members in the Atlantic Alliance but will not accede to the European Union or Western European Union

140. A flexible approach to the question of congruence in membership could therefore be useful and WEU constitutes the ideal institution for gradually ensuring congruence between the European memberships of both organisations. That means that WEU should help to pave the way for both NATO and European Union enlargement. Such an approach will make it necessary to reconsider whether WEU's enlargement concept as laid down in its December 1991 Declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty should be revised

141. A first objective to be pursued by WEU might be to grant the ten associate partner countries the status of associate members. This would be a further step in preparation for their full membership of WEU to which they expect to accede as candidates for membership of the European Union. While such a step could be taken in a relatively short time, it would simultaneously require acceptance of the Assembly's repeated demands that European members of NATO such as Turkey, Norway and Iceland, be granted full membership of WEU.

142. Such a measure would be a first step towards helping to achieve the aim of more congruence between NATO, WEU and the European Union by giving all European NATO countries the possibility of participating in the structures of the European common foreign and security policy without being full members of the European Union.

143. Admission of the ten WEU associate partner countries as associate members would also require a number of arrangements with NATO, in particular with respect to the CJTF concept and to security agreements. Thus it should also be considered as a measure to prepare for their subsequent accession to NATO.

144. The most delicate problem that would arise for WEU, however, would be what to do if NATO decided to grant full membership only to a limited group of central European countries. If this were not a question of principle but only a matter of proceeding with NATO enlargement in a series of waves, your Rapporteur considers it acceptable and feasible that the admission of central European countries to WEU, at least as associate members, could precede entry to NATO.

145. Things would become much more difficult if NATO, for whatever reason, decided it was not able to admit to the Alliance all the countries which are at present associate partners of WEU. It is true that the security guarantees laid down in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty have genuine value only on the basis of NATO's military capabilities and structures. This results from a decision the European allies took back in 1950. It is one that is still valid and which nobody wants to change. However, in the same way as NATO cannot accept a Russian veto on NATO enlargement, the link between the security safeguards contained in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty cannot lead to the acceptance of an American veto which may limit Europe's freedom of decision regarding the enlargement of European organisations. Broad congruence between NATO and WEU enlargement should remain the fundamental objective. But the complexity of the enlargement problem serves to demonstrate that the possibility of seeking alternative solutions on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty should not be excluded from the outset. It is therefore very important that the

WEU Council should devote much more effort to producing its own concept in this area than it has done so far.

146. In doing this, it is absolutely necessary for member governments of WEU to abandon their prevalent view that the Organisation has no more than a complementary role to play in the elaboration of a pan-European security architecture

147. Meeting in Madrid on 14 November 1995, the 27 WEU countries, as they then were, produced a first document on a common concept for European security. On the basis of that preliminary general assessment, the WEU countries, now 28 in number, should draw up proposals for specific WEU contributions designed to settle the security problems of central and eastern Europe. These should deal with the specific problems that cover an area extending from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and should include relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. In his introductory address to the WEU ministerial meeting in Birmingham on 7 May 1996, the German Foreign minister made some proposals regarding the role of WEU in its relations with Russia and Ukraine

148. Among other things he proposed that

"in involving Russia in the European security architecture, WEU should strive, through specific cooperation projects, to consolidate Russia's generally open position regarding the rapprochement of our central and eastern European partners to the EU and WEU".

This is an approach which should be explored in depth in the new WEU study proposed by your Rapporteur, with particular regard to enhancing WEU's ties with its central European partners

149. The Minister also said that

"WEU's primary task in its relations with Ukraine is to convince this important partner that it is mistaken in its impression that it is being excluded from the process of European integration and left in a "grey area" as far as security matters are concerned".

In the view of your Rapporteur, the problem is much more complex, and Europe is faced with a difficult decision as to how it should respond to

Ukraine's pressing request to be integrated in European structures. At a first step, the Assembly could help to improve relations with Ukraine by establishing a regular parliamentary dialogue with its parliament, and inviting a parliamentary delegation with special guest status to attend its plenary sessions.

## VII. Conclusions

150. The eastern dimension of European security has so many aspects that it is impossible to deal with all of them exhaustively in this report. Your Rapporteur has concentrated on highlighting the principal problems and after a general assessment, he has arrived at the main conclusions described below

151. The East-West security debate has now reached a standstill for several reasons.

- NATO decisions are not expected before next year but differences between the Alliance and Russia dominate all the other aspects connected with the definition of a common pan-European security model and threaten to block any progress on them,
- internal developments in the Russian Federation,
- deadlock in the intergovernmental conference on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty;
- marginalisation of WEU's role and its potential for contributing to the stabilisation of security in central and eastern Europe.

152. In all the talks he had with his interlocutors in the various countries he visited, your Rapporteur was keenly aware of the very positive interest there was in enhancing relations with WEU. At the very least, there was much enthusiasm for better information about the role of WEU about which, in certain countries, very little is known. No single country had a negative attitude towards WEU

153. As the only European organisation with organic links both with NATO and the European

Union, WEU should therefore take advantage of its unique position to give the process of enhancing stability and security in central and eastern Europe fresh impetus and to actively

pioneer reconciliation, as it successfully did in the case of former enemies in western Europe when it was created in 1954

## APPENDIX

*Letter from Mr Godal, Norway, associate member,  
to Sir Dudley Smith, President of the WEU Assembly*

*Report from the 9th session of the Baltic Assembly, Riga, 5-6 October 1996*

Dear Sir Dudley,

It was again my privilege to represent you at a Baltic Assembly session

The following is a short presentation of what I consider to be the main conclusions that can be drawn from this session

1 The prime priority for the Baltic republics is to obtain security for the future through membership of the EU and NATO/WEU. There is an openly expressed fear that they again may be left in some kind of Russian "sphere of influence" during the ongoing negotiations between Russia and the West. Remembering their historical experience, I find this understandable. This fear cannot and should not be met by verbal assurances only, but with a systematic and concrete programme for their integration into the western structures. It seems to me that WEU is well placed to take initiatives in this respect (see my report on the spring session of the Baltic Assembly)

2. The main theme of the session was "Mutual integration of the Baltic states in the context of the European Union". At a conference in Copenhagen recently, the US Defence Secretary, Mr Perry, made it clear that the Baltic states will not be included in the first group that will be admitted to NATO. Consequently they are now focusing on early EU membership. They realise that to a very large extent this depends on themselves and their own ability to prepare themselves for such membership. I find this attitude, which was stressed by many of the speakers, quite encouraging. It seems that they are now really getting down to their homework. Main points stressed during the session were

- a common labour market for the Baltic states,
- common border and customs policy. It was strongly emphasised that especially Latvia and Lithuania must improve the control of their eastern borders;
- all border problems must be settled soon (between themselves and with Russia);
- the economy must be strengthened ("strong economy = security"); a Latvian minister proudly declared that his country is now presenting its first budget without a deficit;
- increased defence spending;
- improve relations with Russia ("Russia will remain a superpower").

The Balts definitely want to be in the first group that is granted EU membership. They hope to start negotiations as soon as possible (early in 1998 was mentioned) and they hope to join in 2001.

3. The Baltic states are also keen to develop their relations with WEU. I presume that the leaders of the Baltic Assembly will be invited to our sessions in Paris in December and June. I informed them about current events in WEU and encouraged them to be active within WEU and NATO (PfP) so as to prepare themselves for further integration.

Sincerely yours,  
Ingvald GODAL



