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**European capabilities in the field of strategic mobility**

**REPORT**

submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee  
by Mr López Henares, Rapporteur

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

<sup>2</sup> *Members of the Committee:* Mr Marshall (Chairman); Mr Atkinson (Alternate: *Brand*), Mr Maass (Vice-Chairmen); Mrs Aguiar, MM Arnau Navarro, Cherribi, *Cunliffe, Diana, Dolazza* (Alternate: *Speroni*), Etherington (Alternate: *Wray*), MM Jung, Kolb, Le Guen, *López Henares, Luís, Martelli* (Alternate: *Turini*), MM *Neuwirth, Nothomb, Olivo* (Alternate: *Lauricella*), Mr Polydoros (Alternate: *Mrs Katseli*), MM Ramírez Pery, *Staes, Theis, Thönnès, Valk, Valleix, Wodarg, Mrs Zissi.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Draft Recommendation*

*on European capabilities in the field of strategic mobility*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that strategic mobility presupposes the capability for coherent deployment of troops and logistic support and for bringing them back;
- (ii) Recalling that WEU, when the moment arrives, must be prepared to undertake the tasks laid down in the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992;
- (iii) Noting that strategic mobility capability is obviously a primary requirement for carrying out those tasks;
- (iv) Considering that to have such capability both the necessary transport means and logistic support and a command structure – in other words an operation command and control system capable of preparing, coordinating and controlling such operations – are essential;
- (v) Underlining that the first, essential condition for a strategic mobility capability is a system of command and control over operations for preparing plans, issuing orders, transmitting them, launching operations, controlling and achieving them;
- (vi) Pointing out that advance planning is therefore necessary, supported by a suitable information system so that a “library” can thus be created of possible intervention sites, based on overall, ongoing, continuously updated assessments of what is happening in those areas where Europe might intervene at some point;
- (vii) Noting that once the appropriate information is available, action plans then have to be drawn up which must logically be based on coordination and cooperation between allies, since operations will be carried out using the joint military means of several countries;
- (viii) Highlighting the fact that it is clear that countries’ military capability for forces projection by land, sea and air must be sufficient in all respects for carrying out WEU missions;
- (ix) Welcoming the fact that the German Presidency has decided to conduct an audit of transport assets available for European operations;
- (x) Considering that the deficiencies in military transport make it necessary to have recourse to civilian transport means;
- (xi) Noting that this situation is leading individual countries to draw up internal agreements on the use of national civilian transport assets;
- (xii) Recognising in this connection the agreements reached between the Council and Ukraine, and the negotiations with Russia, regarding the use of those countries’ air transport assets by WEU nations;
- (xiii) Considering nevertheless that Ukraine or Russia would invariably hold the key to such cooperative ventures getting off the ground;
- (xiv) Persuaded that the programme for large-capacity air transport involving several European nations wishing to acquire strategic lift is of paramount interest as it falls entirely within the framework of a common industrial defence policy;
- (xv) Stressing in consequence that strategic mobility goes hand in hand with equipment standardisation and interoperability;
- (xvi) Welcoming the excellent work done by the relevant working groups on WEU’s strategic mobility and joint logistic support concepts;
- (xvii) Noting that the document entitled “European Security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries” adopted in Madrid in November 1995 drew attention to the existence of a gap in terms of

strategic and in-theatre transport capabilities and countries concluded that there was a need to have transport capabilities available permitting the rapid projection of forces and their deployment to the theatre of operation as required;

*(xviii)* Noting finally that the WEU Mobility Working Group has been tasked with studying the possible acquisition of strategic transport assets and ways of improving cooperation in the field of in-theatre mobility,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Consider the creation within WEU of the permanent structures necessary for acquiring a real strategic mobility capability – specifically a system of operational command and control (CIS) and logistics structures;
2. Urge those WEU countries that have not already done so to conclude internal agreements that enable them to draw on national civilian means of overland, sea or air transport, as necessary, for Petersberg operations;
3. Undertake a study at European level on the possible use of reserves, should the need arise, when making use of such civilian assets;
4. Speed up as much as possible and inform the Assembly immediately of the results of the Mobility Working Group's study on possible acquisition of strategic transport assets and on ways of improving cooperation in the field of in-theatre mobility;
5. Support and give more active encouragement to Airbus Military's A400M European military transport programme, the successor to the earlier FLA (future large aircraft) programme;
6. Take good account of the fact that any decision to be taken by the nations and WEU regarding the European military transport aircraft will be exceptionally far-reaching from a military, political and industrial point of view.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr López Henares, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. WEU, as we know, at present has no forces or permanent command structures. However, when faced with a crisis, the Council may, at the request of one or more member countries or of the European Union, decide to establish such forces as are necessary for the conduct of a given operation. To that end, any WEU country, irrespective of its status, may make whatever contribution it regards as appropriate for carrying out a WEU mission. WEU may furthermore have recourse to joint multinational forces made available to it in the event of crisis.

2. Part II of the Council of Ministers' Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, on strengthening WEU's operational role, states that:

“2. WEU member states declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU.

3. Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

4. Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.

(...)

6. Military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU member states, including forces with NATO missions – in this case after consultation with NATO – and will

be organised on a multinational and multi-service basis.

7. All WEU member states will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made available for use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations.

8. WEU member states intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks.”

3. In this connection, a workshop on crisis management was held on 10 September 1998 at NATO headquarters. The aims were threefold: to develop and validate NATO-WEU consultation procedures in the event of a WEU-led operation using NATO military assets and capabilities, to familiarise the North Atlantic and WEU Councils with the procedures developed for such consultations and to serve as a building-block for a joint NATO-WEU crisis-management exercise in the year 2000.

4. In 1998 also, 24 countries belonging to the Organisation were involved in the WEU crisis exercise, Crisex 98, to which representatives from NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the United Nations were invited as observers. The aim of the exercise was to practise the first phases of WEU crisis-management mechanisms and procedures. Pre- and post-exercise briefings were given to Russia, Ukraine and non-WEU Mediterranean countries.

5. The Organisation, as will become clear in a later chapter, has produced a series of studies on strategic mobility from a strictly military perspective. Your Rapporteur, feels there is a need to examine precisely what strategic mobility consists of and whether WEU has both the necessary studies and resources at its disposal to deploy it and if not, most importantly, whether it

has the necessary political will to acquire such capability and to use it effectively when the time comes.

## *II. Strategic mobility*

6. Strategic mobility is a wider and more complicated concept than the mere projection of forces. According to the strategic mobility concept drawn up by WEU, to which we shall refer at length in due course, strategic mobility is the capability to move forces and their associated logistic support in a timely and effective manner over continental and intercontinental distances. To acquire that capability it is essential to have appropriate intelligence, the necessary transport means and logistic support and a command structure, in other words an operation command and control system capable of preparing, coordinating and controlling such operations.

7. The first, essential condition for a strategic mobility capability is a system of command and control over operations for preparing plans, issuing orders, transmitting them, launching operations, controlling and achieving them. Hence advance planning is necessary, supported by a suitable information system. A "library" could thus be created of possible intervention sites, based on overall, ongoing, continuously updated assessments of what is happening in those areas where Europe might intervene at some point. Such potential flashpoints are easily identifiable.

8. Once the appropriate information is available, action plans then have to be drawn up which must logically be based on coordination and cooperation between allies, since operations must necessarily be carried out using the joint military means of several countries.

9. The factors to be taken into account are many and the solutions not always obvious. One important aspect is forces projection, since the means of projection will vary depending on the magnitude of the conflict, conditions in the theatre into which the forces are to be projected and the distances involved. If light equipment is to be used, airlift will be the preferred means of projection, whereas if heavy equipment is required, overland or maritime means will be used.

10. However, although forces projection is an important consideration, there are other, equally

crucial factors involved, one of them being logistics. There can be no strategic mobility without logistics, in other words without the guarantee that all the projected forces' battlefield supply needs – from munitions to hospitals – can be met. Strategic mobility therefore presupposes a capability for coherent deployment of troops and logistic support and, when the time comes, for bringing them back.

11. Another basic consideration is whether WEU should have its own essential, and hence permanent, structures for strategic mobility, for example a command and control system for operations, since a permanent form of organisation implies a habit of working together and exercising jointly on a regular basis.

12. It is suggested that our own Organisation, WEU, be able to draw on NATO structures. This is a perfectly valid option, but if it is the one chosen, strategic mobility can never be a wholly European asset. In point of fact, WEU's Military Committee would logically be no more than the first stage in a process leading to the creation of structures similar to those of the Atlantic Alliance. WEU logistical structures must clearly therefore be permanent.

## *III. The WEU Council's work in the area of strategic mobility*

13. The WEU Council decided on 7 April 1993 to carry out a study on European strategic mobility requirements, as a follow-up to a preliminary examination of the subject undertaken by the Defence Representatives Group (DRG) a short time before.

14. The aims of the WEU study, which was based on a Franco-German study in the same field, were to evaluate WEU requirements in terms of strategic mobility and develop a concept of strategic mobility for the Organisation, which would be compatible with and complementary to that of NATO.

15. This final section of the study, "Strategic Mobility Concept for the WEU", was developed in cooperation with NATO's advisory group on the management of movements, transport and mobility.

16. On 1 January 1994, in accordance with the decision taken on 24 May 1993 by Eurogroup

ministers to transfer Eurolog to WEU, the WEU Logistics Group (WELG) was formally created. Its tasks involved:

- "producing a booklet containing a concise checklist of key logistic considerations for any nation about to take part in United Nations peacekeeping operations;
- the development of a containerised support concept, and a review of suitable operational logistics management information systems for use in a WEU context (maritime operations);
- the development of the logistics requirement and a framework for WEU ground forces logistics systems in 2000 and beyond (ground-based operations);
- the development of a mobility handbook for potential WEU operations, and work to update the mutual emergency supply and support system (air-based operations)."

17. In October 1995, WELG examined the framework document on WEU ground logistics forces systems drafted by the Planning Cell. The same month the Council approved the mandate of the WEU Strategic Mobility Working Group (WSMWG) chaired by the Planning Cell and composed of national experts on movements and transport. The WSMWG was tasked with defining a WEU strategic mobility concept.

18. The logistics issue was also addressed at the WEU ministerial meeting in Madrid on 14 November 1995 where the document "European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries"<sup>1</sup> was adopted. Here the WEU states noted existing deficiencies in terms of strategic and in-theatre transport capabilities and concluded that there was a need to have transport capabilities available permitting the rapid projection of forces and their deployment to the theatre of operation as required.

19. The document underlined the fact that in this field, Europeans must currently call upon other countries or the international market for heavy airlift. To solve the problem, WEU states

proposed an "examination of the requirements for, and means of generating, strategic lift for the various types of operations envisaged and that thought should be given to the question of military transport aircraft".

20. In April 1996, the Chiefs of Defence Staffs (CHODs) endorsed a WEU strategic mobility concept designed to facilitate Petersberg missions. On 31 October of that year, they gave their formal approval to this concept which was then adopted by the Permanent Council on 30 April 1997.

21. As a result, the WEU Mobility Working Group (WMWG) was tasked with follow-on studies on the possible acquisition of military strategic transport assets and on ways of improving cooperation in the field of in-theatre mobility. In 1997, the Planning Cell prepared a draft document on a joint logistics support doctrine for WEU and drafted a report which analysed possibilities of cooperation with Russia and Ukraine in the field of long-haul air transport.

22. On 30 June 1997, in Brussels, WEU signed a cooperation agreement with Ukraine, on the provision of long-haul air transport assets in support of Petersberg missions, with a view to strengthening WEU's operational potential and the projection capabilities of forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU).

23. According to the WEU press release issued on that occasion, Ukraine was prepared to facilitate the provision of long-haul air transport assets to the WEU nations, giving it priority over other requests, in support of Petersberg missions, including training and exercises, organised under WEU authority. Such cooperation would concern Ilyushin 76 MD aircraft, although the list might be extended by mutual agreement to other types of aircraft, such as the Antonov.

24. Based on this document, WEU countries will be able to finalise bilateral agreements with Ukraine. WEU has also started negotiations with Russia on the provision of similar assets.

25. The second part of the forty-fourth annual report of the Council to the Assembly states that some WEU countries are already engaged in bilateral negotiations with Ukraine over arrangements for obtaining strategic lift assets.

<sup>1</sup> Assembly Document 1493, 20 November 1995.



26. A project on long-haul strategic lift, similar to that with Ukraine, is also underway with the Russian Federation. Again, the forty-fourth annual report states that WEU has agreed proposals from Russia relating to the terminology to be used ("Large capacity air transport" instead of "long-haul air transport"), the deletion of the state of readiness (initially set up for 72 hours) and finally the insertion of "insurance" in the financial terms of the draft agreement.

27. Finally, on 18 November 1997, the WEU Council approved "A joint logistic support concept for the Western European Union". This document, together with the document entitled "Strategic Mobility Concept for the WEU" would appear to be of particular interest in terms of a better understanding of the present report and we shall therefore consider them briefly below.

*"A Strategic Mobility Concept for the WEU"*

28. This document addresses:

- the factors affecting movement and transportation support (M&T), in particular the very limited availability of strategic transportation resources;
- the definition of M&T principles and policies;
- the structures, responsibilities, tasks and procedures, which define the WEU strategic mobility concept.

29. Strategic mobility is defined as "the capability to move forces and their associated logistic support in a timely and effective manner over continental and intercontinental distances". The terms movement and transportation can be defined as follows:

- "Movement is the activity involved in the change in location of equipment, personnel or stocks as part of a military operation. Movement requires the supporting capabilities of mobility, transportation, infrastructure, movement control and support functions".
- "Transportation is the means of conveyance to move forces, equipment, personnel and stocks and includes the requisite materials-handling equipment."

30. The study then establishes a classification of the factors affecting WEU strategic mobility. General factors include the fact that WEU operations may occur anywhere in the world, that not necessarily all member nations will provide forces for a particular operation, that there is a relatively low degree of equipment standardisation and that, by definition, all WEU operations will be "combined".

31. Secondly, there are factors arising from WEU's way of operating; these include the *ad hoc* nature of WEU operations, the fact that there are no command structures permanently under the authority of WEU and the process leading to the creation of WEU forces.

32. Thirdly, there are the factors influencing movement and transportation. These are as follows: limited availability of military transportation assets for strategic movement in WEU nations; the fact that civil movement and transportation resources may be necessary to meet strategic movement requirements; the ability of nations to acquire civilian transportation assets in support of WEU operations; compliance with existing military and civil regulations of host nations concerning transportation, chartering, use of ports, transportation of dangerous goods and possible competition for the use of civil M&T resources.

33. A section of the paper is devoted to WEU strategic mobility principles. The following main principles apply to movement and transportation support of WEU forces. National and WEU authorities, i.e. the Council, the Operation Commander and the Force Commander, share a collective responsibility for M&T support to WEU operations.

34. Specific responsibilities include, firstly, nations' responsibility: the sending nation is responsible for obtaining transportation resources to deploy, sustain and redeploy its forces and also for planning and controlling the movement of national forces and the national component of the multinational forces. This principle must be tempered by the need for cooperation, coordination and economy, and the fact that the host nation has the ultimate authority to approve movement and transportation on sovereign territory.

35. WEU responsibility is as follows: WEU authorities are responsible for initiating, prioritising

ing, coordinating and deconflicting the deployment, resupply and redeployment of the WEU force. Lastly, lead nation responsibility consists in the lead nations appointed by the WEU Council or by constituent nations being responsible for the deployment of the multinational headquarters group.

36. Other principles governing WEU strategic mobility are cooperation and coordination among national and WEU movement and transportation authorities, both military and civilian, economy, efficiency, flexibility, operational primacy, simplicity and transparency.

37. The principle of subsidiarity will apply only in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be efficiently achieved by the nations and can therefore be better effected by the WEU authorities. In that case, the WEU authorities may take action on behalf of nations, subject to their prior concurrence. The final principle is that of transport compatibility which holds that when possible, units with a mobility role should have equipment designed to be compatible with available transport resources.

38. In regard to movement and transportation policies, WEU and national representatives are responsible for the development of policies, for the movement and transportation of forces. M&T planning to support military operations should be carried out and coordinated on a combined service and joint military/civil basis encompassing all modes of transport. Separate planning for maritime, land and air components of force packages should be avoided.

39. Nations are responsible for providing sufficient movement and transportation resources for the deployment, resupply and redeployment of their forces. M&T planning and execution should be supported by standardised and harmonised procedures.

40. The WEU Operation Commander will develop the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and, through the WEU Movement Coordination Centre (WMCC) the WEU Force Commander will be kept informed by the OHQ (WMCC) on the progress of the deployment of forces.

41. Finally, generic and contingency movement and transportation planning will place emphasis on capability planning. Operational M&T

planning will be developed from contingency plans.

42. As far as movement and transportation structure is concerned, there is a permanent structure, the WEU Mobility Working Group (WMWG), chaired by the Planning Cell and composed of M&T experts from all WEU nations. There are also structures to be activated for a given WEU operation as follows (see Appendix I):

- WEU Movement Coordination Group (WMCG): this will be established at the Planning Cell (WEU/PC) to assist the PC under the direction of the Chief of the Logistics/Finance and Movements Section. Its main task will be to coordinate preparations for the force deployment options until this function is taken over by the WMCC.
- WEU Movement Coordination Centre (WMCC): the WMCC will be established at the OHQ (Operation Headquarters) to perform the tasks of coordination, prioritisation and deconfliction of movements in accordance with operational requirements. The Centre will be chaired by a suitably experienced M&T officer and composed of national M&T experts and have Planning Cell representation.
- National Movement Coordination Centre (NMCC): host nations should establish a NMCC to approve, coordinate and control air, sea and inland surface movements within their territory, in support of the operation. The FHQ and the nations involved should provide representation within the NMCC to ensure that all movements are executed in accordance with national requirements and the Commanders' operational requirements.
- National Support Element (NSE): a NSE is a national organisation positioned in theatre when required by a nation. The NSE will support, *inter alia*, reception, onward movement, transportation for sustainment and redeployment of national forces.

43. M&T planning begins with a consultation phase. As the force data becomes known there will be a second phase, the planning phase. A third and final phase, the executive phase, commences once the Operation Commander is entrusted with the responsibility of conducting the operation. The WMCC will then be activated at the OHQ to provide centralised coordination.

44. Tasks and responsibilities are shared between those involved as follows:

- sending nations take the necessary measures for planning and controlling the deployment, resupply and redeployment of their forces and national components of multinational forces to meet the requirements of the Operation Commander, coordinated in the WMCC. They are responsible for providing M&T resources for the deployment of their own forces and operate and control national military and civil M&T resources made available for shared or cooperative use. They also agree to broad modalities of cooperation, by selecting nations to take the lead in performing tasks identified by the WMCG or WMCC;
- non-sending nations may offer M&T resources for shared or cooperative use and operate and control national military and civil M&T resources made available for shared or cooperative use;
- host nations establish, when required, a NMCC to approve, coordinate and control movements of the components of the WEU force on their own territories, taking into account the WEU commander's operational requirements. They operate and control their own national civil and military movement and transportation resources provided at the request of the sending nations and arrange and coordinate border crossing procedures with neighbouring nations;
- lead nations take the lead in planning and controlling deployment, resupply and redeployment of a multinational HQ group (including the Force HQ), performing host nations' tasks and responsibilities when required and per-

forming specific movement and transportation tasks as identified by the WMCC;

- the WEU Planning Cell in general monitors and takes initiatives for the development of policies and procedures in the field of strategic mobility. It also develops M&T annexes of generic plans, consulting nations if necessary. In the event of crises, following Council guidance, it produces the first draft M&T annex for the contingency plan, consults with nations, takes the initiative to form and chair the WMCG and drafts the final annex of the contingency plan;
- WEU Mobility Working Group (WMWG) develops policies, procedures and organisations for the movement and transportation of forces in support of WEU operations;
- the WEU Movement Coordination Group (WMCG) analyses the national replies to gauge the likely M&T requirements against contingency options, develops M&T tasks and responsibilities for the Component Commanders and/or interfaces with other organisations and initiates and coordinates preparation for Contingency Force deployment until this function is taken over by the WMCC;
- the WEU Operation Commander exercises coordinating authority through the WEU Movement Coordination Centre (WMCC), develops all the operational requirements for planning and execution of the deployment, resupply and redeployment;
- WEU Movement Coordination Centre (WMCC) serves as the primary M&T point of contact for nations and the Operation Commander and draws up the M&T annex of the operation plan, which will be submitted to the Council for approval. It develops M&T tasks and responsibilities for the Component Commanders and performs the tasks of coordination, prioritisation and deconfliction of movements, in accordance

with operational requirements. It prioritises and coordinates the integrated use of movements and transportation, identifies and coordinates lead nation functions within the field of movements and transportation and draws up the redeployment plan;

- the WEU Force Commander implements policies, tasks, responsibilities and procedures for movements associated with the employment of the forces; develops M&T plans as applicable to WEU force employment tasks; advises OHQ of required changes concerning force deployment, resupply and redeployment and provides representation in the NMCC(s).

45. Lastly, in terms of ADP (Automated Data Processing) support, communications and reporting, the document notes that WEU mobility planners must be able to develop proposed options, create detailed plans, test the feasibility of these plans and execute them. Secure and interoperable communications and ADP facilities must be provided to enable appropriate planning, control and coordination to be carried out. The document further points out that the WEU Movement Coordination Group and nations and the WEU Movement Coordination Centre must utilise a common ADP support system. Standardised reporting procedures must apply.

*“A joint logistic support concept for the Western European Union”*

46. The introduction to the above paper recapitulates the kinds of missions for which armed forces units of the WEU member states might be used under the aegis of WEU (Petersberg missions) and makes reference to a list of FAWEU (forces answerable to WEU) compiled and updated by the Planning Cell, which will be used for generic and contingency planning purposes. The Planning Cell, it explains, is also responsible for developing logistical plans to identify early and address specific logistic requirements to be taken into account in the WEU force-generation process thus ensuring an adequate logistical posture.

47. Because of the *ad hoc* nature of WEU operations, different force packages are required. These will no longer necessarily be coalitions of

national forces that only operate together in the course of an operation plan. WEU operations will on the contrary require the integration of such forces at a much lower level than hitherto experienced.

48. Operations have to be based on flexible and responsive mobile forces in order to respond to local crises and regional conflicts. Fundamental features of the WEU strategy must be flexibility, mobility, self-sustainment of operational units and sustainability over long distances. Hence its logistics support must be tailored to permit prolonged operations over long distances. Therefore, the introduction concludes, it is necessary to develop “appropriate logistic principles, policies and concepts to meet the specific requirements of integrated multinational WEU force packages”.

49. The document then moves on to address:

- (a) factors affecting logistic support;
- (b) logistic principles and policies;
- (c) the structure, planning process, tasks and responsibilities which define the WEU logistic concept.

50. Factors affecting WEU logistic support fall into two categories: general and those arising from WEU’s method of operating. Regarding the first category, all WEU operations will, by definition, be combined but not necessarily all WEU nations will provide forces for a particular operation. WEU operations may occur anywhere in the world. Operations may last for protracted periods. The degree of standardisation of equipment and procedures is relatively low.

51. Moreover, the availability of some military and civil resources in WEU nations may be limited and there may be competition for local resources. Logistic support also depends on the capability and willingness of host nation(s) to support the WEU force and the availability of local resources.

52. Lastly, there is a need to comply with national and EU legislation and international law/regulations as well as existing host nation(s) military and civil regulations, covering for example, technical support, use of infrastructure and dangerous goods. There is a need also to consider the impact of restrictions arising from in-theatre security conditions.

53. Worthy of note among the factors arising from the WEU method of operating are that WEU operations are likely to be *ad hoc* in nature; there are no command structures permanently under the authority of WEU and there may be a protracted lead time in forces generation, because FAWEU are not permanently assigned.

54. The primary logistics principle is that nations and the WEU authorities have a collective responsibility for logistic support of WEU operations. Specific responsibilities are assigned as follows:

- national responsibility: the responsibility for the provision of logistic resources, and for planning the support of national forces, lies ultimately with the nation;
- WEU responsibility: the WEU Planning Cell and WEU commanders are responsible for planning and coordinating the logistic support to the WEU force;
- lead nation and/or specialist nation responsibility: the provision of specific logistic functions may be assumed by one or more nations, if appropriate.

55. The second logistics principle is connected with authority. The WEU Operation Commander must be given sufficient authority over logistic resources, in a timely manner, in order to enable him to employ and sustain his forces in the most efficient manner. It has to be clearly defined as early as possible during the planning process.

56. Other essential logistics principles include: cooperation between military and civilian authorities in WEU nations and coordination of logistic support between national and WEU authorities; also, that logistic support must be as cost-effective as possible with optimal use of military and civilian resources. There must be flexibility in the planning and execution of logistic support to allow for timely response to changes in the operational situation and readiness and availability of logistics units.

57. Standardisation of materiel, services and procedures has a direct impact on sustainability and combat effectiveness and the document therefore stresses that "this aim should be pursued with vigour". Subsidiarity applies only in so

far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be efficiently achieved by the nations and can therefore be better effected by the WEU authorities. Transparency, in other words information exchange of relevant logistics data, between national and WEU authorities is essential for the efficient support of WEU logistics tasks.

58. According to the document, logistics policies likewise fall into a number categories:

- *General policy*: generic and contingency logistic planning will put emphasis on capability planning. Operational logistic planning will be developed from contingency plans and these will be carried out and coordinated on a joint civil/military basis, where appropriate.
- *Logistic resources policy*: nations retain control over their own resources, until these are released to the WEU commander. Nations must take appropriate measures to ensure that they have sufficient logistic resources to support their forces. They will enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements for resource sharing.

The logistic resources suitable and eligible for multinational provision are identified in the logistic planning process. Coordination of the strategic deployment of WEU forces, as well as the coordination of movement and transportation of resupply for both common and specific resources, are a WEU Operation Commander's responsibility.

- *Host nation support policy*: full advantage should be taken of logistic resources available under host nation support arrangements/agreements. If such arrangements/agreements do not already exist, the Operation Commander is responsible for establishing requirements and concluding host nation support arrangements/agreements on behalf of sending nations subject to their prior concurrence.
- *Logistic sustainability policy*: nations are responsible for meeting the sustainability requirements. The provision of logistic assets must cover the antici-

pated intensity and duration of the operation. The question of rotating units and their associated logistics must also be raised. Operating in unusual and adverse conditions can cause increased wear and tear, and may require the provision of additional resources. A sustainability statement, agreed at the earliest stage by contributing nations, will enhance uniformity among the national contingents. Such a statement should cover the following:

- (i) expected duration of the whole deployment or operation;
- (ii) minimum level of sustainability;
- (iii) any special operational, climatological or topographical factors that may restrict or significantly influence logistic planning;
- (iv) predicted casualty and material usage rates.

- *Redistribution policy*: this is an exceptional crisis-management tool, not to be used as a routine procedure. Redistribution may in no case jeopardise the survivability of the providing unit. It will last only until the deficiency situation is resolved.
- *Medical support policy*: routine care will be a national responsibility. Medical support functions, that might be suitable for lead nation responsibility, role specialisation of a nation or multinational integrated medical support must be identified in the planning process. These usually encompass major surgical interventions, emergency surgery and surgery to prevent potentially disabling complications.
- *Movement policy*: definitions of policies, tasks and responsibilities involved under this heading have already been defined in the WEU Strategic Mobility Concept examined earlier.

59. In relation to command and control, the document notes that since there is no permanent WEU command structure, command and control arrangements will be decided by the WEU Council once the operation is determined. Two

main levels of command can be defined as described below:

60. *Operational level*: here an Operation Commander will be appointed by the WEU Council. His headquarters will be joint and combined as far as required and located outside the theatre of operations. The Operation Commander will be responsible for the overall planning and conduct of the operation.

61. *In theatre*: a Force Commander, designated by the WEU Council, will exercise command in the theatre of operations. His headquarters will be joint and combined as far as required. Additionally, nations will retain full command over their forces and the level of authority (e.g. operational command/control) given to WEU commanders will be decided by the Council for each specific operation.

62. Once the Council has agreed to the operation plan, it will determine the procedures for transfer of authority (TOA). Based on these, individual nations will consider TOA and place their units under operational command/control of the Operation Commander. Nations which agree to committing logistic units to perform multinational logistic support will normally place these units under the operational command/control of the WEU Operation Commander.

63. In terms of logistic structure the document makes a distinction between permanent structures, structures normally activated for any WEU operation, and other (optional) structures that might be activated for a given WEU operation (see Appendix II).

64. Permanent structures include the Western European Logistics Group (WELG), composed of logistic experts from WEU nations and mandated to foster closer cooperation and to promote greater efficiency and harmonisation in logistics. In the event of a possible operation, and pending the nomination of the Operation Commander, the Planning Cell's Logistics Section develops the annexes for logistic support, movement and transportation, medical support, civil/military co-operation (CIMIC) and finance of the contingency plan.

65. The structures normally activated for a WEU operation are as follows:

- WEU Logistics Coordination Group (WLCG). The WLCG will be established at the WEU/PC to assist the PC with logistic planning and to coordinate preparations for the Contingency Force deployment options until this function is taken over by the WLCC;
- Operation Commander Logistics Staff Cell. Once the Operation Commander is appointed, a logistics staff cell will be activated under his authority;
- WEU Logistics Coordination Centre (WLCC). The WLCC, which replaces the WLCG, will be established at the OHQ;
- Force Commander Logistics Staff Cell. Once the Force Commander is appointed, a multinational logistics staff cell will be activated under his authority;
- Force Logistic Coordination Centre (FLCC). An FLCC, composed of representatives from nations and other organisations will be activated only when a MJLC is not established;
- National Support Element (NSE). A NSE is a national organisation positioned in theatre when required by a nation. The NSE will support the reception, storage, onward movement, transportation for sustainment and re-deployment of national forces.

66. Optional structures that might be activated for a given WEU operation are the Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) which, if required, will coordinate in-theatre logistics and the Multinational Integrated Logistics Support Units (MILUs). MILUs may be formed as necessary and placed under operational control (OPCON) of the WEU Force Commander.

67. The logistic support planning process can be divided into four sequential and functional phases: crisis build-up, leading to the development of a common position, including possible action; definition of action; formal decision to take action and politico-military control of the operation.

68. During the "crisis build-up", the logistic planning will commence with a "consultation

phase" which will involve planning conferences between the WEU Planning Cell and nations. During the "definition of action", the WEU Logistics Coordination Group (WLCG) will be activated by the WEU Planning Cell. As the force data becomes available from the replies on the Declaration of Intent Request (DIR) message, the logistic "Planning Phase" will start. The WLCG and the Planning Cell ensure that the needs expressed in the Contingency Plan are aligned with the intentions of each nation.

69. After the "decision to take action", the logistic "executive phase" will commence once the Operation Commander is appointed. The WLCC (see Appendix II) will produce the Logistics Annex of the Operation Plan, based on the replies of the Force Creation Request Message (FCRM). Once the Council has agreed to the Operation Plan it will determine the procedures for TOA and the Force Assembly Message (FAM) is sent. This message will identify the force composition. Individual nations will consider placing their units under Operational Command/Control of the Operation Commander. During the "politico-military control" phase, the coordination of national and multinational logistic support will be initiated by the FHQ or MJLC, if required.

70. The section dealing with tasks and responsibilities explains how sending nations take the necessary measures for planning and controlling the logistic support of their forces, and national components of multinational forces. They are responsible for providing logistic resources for the support of their own forces; they identify available national logistic resources for cooperative use to meet identified shortfalls in other sending nations' logistics plans; operate and control national military and civil logistic resources for the operation and agree to cooperative arrangements by identifying nations to take the lead in performing specific tasks.

71. Nations not committing forces to the operation (non-sending nations) may offer support, assets and/or funding for the operation. Host nations provide host nation support (HNS) on a bilateral or multilateral basis.

72. Lead nations take the responsibility *inter alia* for providing a defined spectrum of logistic support for all or part of the multinational force; take the lead in performing host nation tasks and

responsibilities, when authorised by the host nation, and take the lead in performing specific tasks as identified by WLCC. Role specialist nations take responsibility for procuring and providing a particular class of supply or service.

73. The WEU Planning Cell's tasks and responsibilities are generally to monitor and take initiatives for the development of policies and procedures in the field of logistic support and develop logistic annexes of generic plans. In times of crisis the PC updates logistic parts of generic plans, takes the initiative to form and chair the WLCG and drafts, with the assistance of national representatives, the logistic parts of the final contingency plan.

74. The Western European Logistics Group (WELG) contributes to the formulation of procedures that will ensure the operational logistic support of any WEU force and improves interoperability and standardisation in the field of logistic support. The WEU Logistic Coordination Group, for its part, analyses the national replies to the Declaration of Intent Request message to assess the likely logistic requirements against contingency options and assists in drafting the logistic inputs to the final contingency plan.

75. The WEU Operation Commander is responsible for both the planning and coordination of the deployment, support and recovery of the WEU force. At TOA the Operational Commander is responsible for the coordination of non-organic logistics resources, including medical. He develops all the operational requirements for planning and execution of sustainment and resupply.

76. The WEU Logistics Coordination Centre (WLCC) serves as the primary logistics point of contact for nations and the Operation Commander and assists the Operation Commander in drafting the logistic input to the operation plan, which will be submitted to the Council for approval. The WLCC also coordinates, prioritises and deconflicts national and multinational sustainment and resupply issues, in accordance with operational requirements.

77. The WEU Force Commander develops logistics plans as applicable to WEU force employment tasks; coordinates the activities of the NSEs (national support elements), whenever multinational issues arise; coordinates all aspects

of multinational logistic sustainment in the theatre of operations; implements policies, tasks, responsibilities and procedures for movements associated with the employment of the forces and controls multinational integrated logistic support.

78. The Force Logistics Coordination Centre serves as an in-theatre point of contact for coordination and deconfliction of logistics in accordance with operational requirements. The Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC) is typically responsible for assisting the Force Commander in coordinating logistic support within the task force, establishing host nation support requirements, where appropriate, coordinating and arranging the provision of common supplies and services and coordinating and administratively supporting national, NGO and host nation liaison staffs within the MJLC.

79. The Multinational Integrated Logistic Support Unit (MILU) acquires the agreed supplies and/or services and provides supplies and services to the WEU force.

80. As regards communications, the document notes that communication links must be dedicated to the logistic C2 structure, including automated logistics and administration information system. As regards financial affairs, the report explains that WEU has developed preliminary conclusions and transitional arrangements for the financing of WEU operations.

81. With reference to legal affairs, a status of forces agreement will be negotiated between WEU, the sending and host nation(s). Deployment of forces prior to a formal status of forces agreement (SFA) will be made on a case by case basis. Forces will remain subject to the jurisdiction of their national military procedures. Lastly, a WEU policy on environmental affairs will be developed in due course.

#### *IV. The Assembly's work in the area of strategic mobility*

82. The general philosophy behind the Technological and Aerospace Committee's reports down the years can be summed up in a single sentence: pooling shared resources. This logically includes using joint structures and also presupposes a lengthy process of cooperation and alignment of procedures and standardisation of equipment between nations.



83. The present section refers to reports in which the Assembly studied various aspects that are essential for acquiring a genuine European strategic mobility capability.

*"A command and control system for WEU"*

84. From a military view-point, in order to bring together military resources belonging to different nations, the first requirement is a command structure, in other words an operation command and control system capable of preparing, coordinating and controlling such operations.

85. Mr Cunliffe's report to the Assembly on "A command and control system for WEU"<sup>2</sup> argues that in order to conduct operations under its own aegis, WEU requires a communication and information system (CIS) for command and control, based on its member countries' assets. The report also stresses that WEU should not only be able to rely on having the use of such a system but that it should also be under WEU control.

86. In his report Mr Cunliffe points out that CIS systems carry out tasks on three levels, namely at:

- strategic level (the politico-military interface) at which CIS have an input into evaluating the world situation, crisis monitoring and the planning of possible military operations;
- operational level (coordination of combined joint military operations). Here CIS should offer the means of monitoring and integration of military operations and issuing orders.
- tactical level (coordination of military operations within a theatre). At this level CIS should provide the means of command and control over operational support units on the ground.

87. In view of the above, the Rapporteur stressed that WEU should seek to reinforce the roles that no individual nation can take on by itself. In this context, WEU should operate at the strategic and operational levels while tactical tasks would be carried out by nations, possibly under the responsibility of a framework nation.

<sup>2</sup> Assembly Document 1621, 5 November 1998.

88. The document moreover explains in a straightforward and graphic way the functions, means and possible development of a WEU CIS in the command and control of operations at the various stages of situation evaluation, planning and command and control of operations. Without its own CIS, the Rapporteur concludes, the Organisation would be incapable of undertaking such missions as may be required.

89. As far as intelligence is concerned, in addition to the Assembly documents which have looked at the setting up of a European space-based observation system, the WEU Satellite Centre or a European intelligence policy, Mr Cunliffe's report recommends that in terms of situation evaluation requirements the Intelligence Section of the Planning Cell should draw up an intelligence plan at European level to identify areas of potential crisis, so that national resources and the tasks of the Satellite Centre can be used to better effect.

90. Finally, Mr Cunliffe also makes the point that WEU's aim should not be to create an intelligence superstructure to take the place of national services but to increase their effectiveness, by pooling shared intelligence.

*"Military airlift – prospects for Europe"*

91. The report on this subject submitted by Mr Alexander<sup>3</sup> looked in some depth at how, basically by considerably reducing the time factor in any journey, aviation has become an indispensable tool in managing crises in the modern world. For both combat (including helicopters) or transport aircraft, reaction time is virtually immediate as compared with other land and sea transport means. To give but one example – during the Yom Kippur war in 1973, the United States launched a major operation to provide logistical support to Israel. 26% of the equipment was dispatched by air and arrived in good time, while the remaining 74% dispatched by sea arrived after the end of the hostilities<sup>4</sup>.

92. However airlift also has limitations, especially in terms of the loads it can carry, but it has to be recognised all the same that the use of air-

<sup>3</sup> Assembly Document 1484, 6 November 1995.

<sup>4</sup> Airlift Conference in London, 31 August-1 September 1995: some thoughts on the development of military air transport 1918-1995.

lift has made a decisive impact on crisis management.

93. Military airlift today has many dimensions corresponding to the tasks to be carried out and the means used. These mainly consist of military and humanitarian support missions.

94. Whether for transporting personnel or equipment, airlift has the advantage of speed and time-saving and also the possibility of reaching areas that are inaccessible by land or sea. From the major airlift operations of the second world war to the Gulf war, the use of airlift has proved essential. Several recent examples: the Falklands war (1982), the crisis in the Gulf and the Gulf war (1990-91), the more recent crisis in Iraq (1998) and now the conflict in Kosovo serve to illustrate the importance of airlift and forces projection in recent years.

95. Moreover, from the humanitarian angle, from the time of the Berlin airlift in 1948, transport aircraft have always played an important role in bringing aid to populations in distress, covering large distances to out of the way areas in a short space of time. In the 1980s this role increased and European countries acquired major expertise in operations of this type by undertaking them on several continents, sometimes under very difficult conditions.

96. The Rwandan crisis led to a major mobilisation of military airlift capability. Belgium and France committed aircraft for both military and humanitarian purposes. British, Spanish and other aircraft afforded assistance to populations in distress. Such operations also served to bring to light European countries' shortage of airlift capacity, leading some countries to charter Antonov and Ilyushin aircraft, mainly from Ukraine.

97. The Bosnian conflict, because of its military and above all its humanitarian dimensions, gave rise to the longest airlift operation in history since the Berlin airlift in 1948-49. Over three years, aircraft belonging to more than 20 countries transported more than 100 000 tonnes of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo, often under extremely difficult conditions, with some aircraft being hit by fire from the various factions on the ground.

98. In order to carry out this humanitarian operation successfully, the Air Transport Operations Cell was created in 1992 under UNHCR

(United Nations High Commission for Refugees) management, in order to ensure that aid reached the population of Sarajevo, under siege from Bosnian Serb forces. The Cell is based in Geneva.

99. Experience acquired in many regions of the world, under varying conditions, combining rigorous planning and improvisation, shows the high level of expertise achieved by European countries in the conduct of military airlift operations, and undoubtedly contributes to ensuring their state of readiness to intervene quickly in crisis situations, despite the limited means available to their airforces, as compared with the possibilities of countries such as the United States or Russia.

100. The report by Mr Alexander draws the distinction made in terms of military aviation assets between strategic and tactical lift. The first refers to aircraft with an intercontinental range over 3 000 nautical miles (5 600 km) while the second refers to tactical or in-theatre capability.

101. Strategic lift is still virtually the monopoly of the United States, Russia and one or two other countries of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Europe will have to wait for the advent of what was once known as the FLA (Future Large Aircraft) in order to have such capabilities. However, when it comes to tactical lift it has a great deal of know-how, both through cooperative ventures and national programmes.

102. In his report, Mr Alexander also reviews current military airlift programmes and discusses the challenges they represent and their implications for Europe. The FLA is of particular significance. It is not a matter, for Europe, of a purely military option. There are also important political, industrial, economic and social considerations involved.

103. For the countries participating in the FLA programme – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom – the interest lies not only in replacing the airlift fleet but also in enabling the European aeronautics industry to maintain its world ranking, in the same way as was achieved with the civilian Airbus programme. This is also an important step towards providing European armies with increased projection capability, which is lacking at

present, and ensuring their independence from the United States and other sources.

104. Launched in 1985, in the framework of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), now the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), the former FLA programme has been affected by the vicissitudes of the debate on European defence. It has now been re-christened the A400M. In late January of this year an Airbus spokesman announced that the FLA was dead but that the programme itself was alive and well under the guise of the A400M programme.

105. Airbus Military, Airbus's recently formed subsidiary, will, according to a report by *Jane's Defense Weekly*, take over production of the new military airlifter which is to have its production line in Spain<sup>5</sup>. It should become clear within the year what orders will be forthcoming from governments and the product can then be well and truly launched.

106. According to estimates, the maiden flight should take place four years after the programme is definitely under way. Delivery will be towards late 2005 or early 2006 and the cost will be in the region of US\$ 75 million.

107. Seven European governments have shown an interest in 288 aircraft. Four of them, Belgium, France, Spain and the UK are evaluating other options such as the Boeing C-17 and the Lockheed Martin C-130J. Moreover, Russia and Ukraine have also offered a "westernised" version of their jointly developed Antonov An-70 to France, Germany, Italy and Spain, following continued interest on Germany's part.

108. There is no doubt that the decision countries will take on this matter is of major importance in military, political and industrial terms. Up until now, the programme has fallen within the scope of a common defence industrial policy, making it a flagship programme in which any delay would have serious consequences for the development of a European armaments policy. From an industrial angle, any decision not to continue with the programme would prevent European industry acquiring technological edge and becoming competitive in a difficult economic environment, marked by ever-falling defence budgets.

<sup>5</sup> JDW, vol 31, 3 February 1999, No. 5.

*"European cooperation on the procurement of defence equipment"*

109. Armaments cooperation is an abiding pre-occupation in the work of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, a fact amply demonstrated by the colloquy held in Munich in October 1997 and Mr Lenzer's subsequent report on "European cooperation on the procurement of defence equipment"<sup>6</sup>.

110. The report makes the point that security and defence in Europe must be founded on autonomous military assets which are interoperable with those of our transatlantic allies. Such assets in turn depend on having a European defence industry which is competitive on the international market.

111. In the post-cold war period when defence budgets declined or showed little significant growth, markets shrank, competition became keener and the costs of new weapons systems rose exponentially due to technological development.

112. Europe faced these challenges with an industry that was fragmented and suffered from overcapacity. These shortcomings were mainly due to the fact that every country persisted in maintaining as much independent national capacity as possible while its own domestic market was clearly not sufficiently developed to absorb all the investment being poured into R&D and industrialisation – a situation that was the reverse of that in the United States. All this confirms the view that a European defence industry that is competitive on world markets has to have a European market as its bedrock. The European defence industry must engage in a process of restructuring at both national and European levels. That process, the culmination of which is the setting-up of transnational industries, has already today reached an advanced stage and a number of countries, such as France, Italy and Spain, have embarked on the preliminary phase of total or partial privatisation of certain defence concerns in the state sector.

113. Harmonising requirements at European level is particularly important. The only way to overcome the difficulties encountered in harmonising requirements is for the harmonisation

<sup>6</sup> Assembly Document 1587, 4 November 1997.

process to start as of the research stage. This is what makes the Euclid programme (European cooperation for the long term in defence) and the WEAG Euclid Cell so crucial. The benefits of those extremely useful initiatives are indeed already being felt.

114. The creation of the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO) and of the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) are initiatives to be welcomed. Similarly the creation in May 1997 of the WEU Military Committee is of crucial importance as it will provide the proper frame for defining the joint European military requirements that need to be met – in particular, the joint procurement and use of equipment.

115. Lastly, your Rapporteur considers the reports reviewed above give an idea of the Assembly's work in connection with WEU's acquiring a real strategic mobility capability and furthermore show that that capability is not simply a question of assets, personnel and equipment but also, indeed mainly, of political will, as discussed in the following chapter.

### *V. Conclusions*

116. Under the current German Presidency, WEU decided to carry out an audit of assets available to it for use in European operations. This audit will almost certainly highlight the fact that strategic mobility is an Achilles heel of European defence. In point of fact, not even the United States is self-sufficient in this area although European and United States shortcomings bear no comparison – those of Europe being infinitely the greater.

117. Of the three transport options that exist: air, land and sea, overland means are in principle of least interest since they cannot compare with air for speed or with water-borne means in terms of capacity. Some armed forces complain that specific rail-links, regarded as strategic from a military viewpoint, have been closed to traffic because they are not economically viable. Lack of maintenance of the track and installations have rapidly rendered them unusable.

118. The operations in which Europe has taken part in recent years have made almost exclusive use of air and sea lift. One such operation, the

Gulf War, highlighted the fact that even the United States lacked this form of strategic mobility capability to transport troops and equipment. At that juncture, the United States mobilised 450 000 troops. The most Europe could mobilise at present would be 30 000.

119. If mobility is considered on a continental scale, the deficiencies are obvious as several recent examples go to show. During the conflict in former Yugoslavia many countries used civilian transport (by sea) to carry troops and equipment. Furthermore Europe has no airlift capability for transporting tanks. Viewed on an intercontinental scale, for instance the African Great Lakes crisis, the situation is even worse.

120. Agreements have been reached with Ukraine on strategic lift and a draft agreement is being negotiated with Russia, as referred to earlier in this report. But one must not forget that in such cases, it would be those countries that would invariably hold the key to such cooperative ventures getting off the ground.

121. The lack of transport means also leads to somewhat anomalous situations which in practice occur in almost every country. Each branch of the armed services – army, navy or air force – when faced with a budget that is never enough to cover its requirements, establishes its own priorities, leading, for example, to a situation in which the navy procures the ships it needs to transport its own troops and equipment. The army then also has to procure its own ships to transport its troops and equipment. In short, each service takes account only of its own needs without there being a single underlying philosophy capable of matching needs and resources across the three services.

122. Studies show that, where time permits, transport by sea quickly becomes the most cost-effective way of transporting troops and equipment to the theatre of operations. For example, most of the troops deployed in Bosnia and Albania were taken there by sea and this was also the case in the Gulf war. One difficulty is finding commercial cargo vessels suitable for transporting military equipment – the number of roll on/roll off ferries and freighters in circulation being fairly limited. Thus all WEU member states need to monitor the construction of such vessels in their own yards and make sure they are suitable for transporting heavy vehicles, espe-

cially tanks. Governments should even be encouraged to fund adaptations of original designs for this type of shipping so as to give it that capacity.

123. As sufficient military strategic mobility capability does not exist at present, nor will in the future, it will be necessary to have recourse to the civilian sectors. Each country will have to reach internal agreements on the use of civil means with airlines, shipping companies and the railways. The fact that not all countries have an internal agreement on the use of such means is another problem. Before NATO's recent enlargement, five of its sixteen members had no such agreement.

124. The use of civilian transport and personnel poses problems. For example, staff refuse to serve in war zones. The way round this could be to use reserves. The United States does in fact use reserves in its airlift command.

125. When it comes to forces projection, the question arises as to whether there might be a point in establishing a joint fleet. Once again the A400M programme, the successor to the erstwhile FLA, comes to mind. This programme is of paramount interest as it falls within the framework of a common defence industrial policy and, as such, should be supported and carried forward more actively by WEU. Without such longer-term policies there will be no credible European defence enabling us to assert and protect our

interests in the world.


126. Furthermore, strategic mobility goes hand in hand with equipment standardisation and interoperability. This, contrary to what some might wish, does not mean procurement in one particular country. As an example of the difficulties involved, one can point to the fact that it does not even exist between the US Navy and the US Airforce. Common equipment, education and training and logistics are key factors for strategic mobility.

127. With regard to setting up the organisational structures within WEU necessary for achieving a real strategic mobility capability, your Rapporteur feels that WEU must create permanent structures within the Organisation: specifically a system of operational command and control (CIS) and logistics structures. One view expressed during the preparation of the present report is worthy of careful consideration, namely that overlap and duplication are not the same thing; setting up a secondary system is not the same as duplication – it is simply a security guarantee.

128. Lastly, WEU's problems when it comes to establishing a programme for strategic mobility are no more than the sum total of those of each and every one of its component nations. No solution can be achieved without a prior shake-up of finances, industry and defence, which can only take place if there is a strong political will to build a security and defence Europe.


APPENDIX I

*WEU movement and transportation structure*



- 1: Comprises National M&T experts, PC Rep, OHQ M&T Staff, HN/LN Rep
- 2: Comprises Host Nation organisation, NSE Reps, FHQ Rep
- 3: Comprises Host Nation organisation, NSE Reps, FHQ Rep if required

APPENDIX II  
*Logistic structure*




- Command Relation
- - - - Coordination Relation
- ① ↔ One option: a MJLC can be established





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