

REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES TO THE
SCHUMAN PLAN PROPOSAL
1950-1951

The European Community
Information Service
235 Southern Building
Washington 5, D. C.

INTRODUCTION

The Pre-Schuman Plan Era

The history of the Schuman Plan in the United States does not predate its announcement by the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, on May 9, 1950 in the same sense as in the European member states. The United States had encouraged, but had not participated in postwar conferences and organizations dealing with economic and political problems within a European framework. These included such meetings as those of the European Movement, the Economic Conference at Westminster, and the Council of Europe, where some of the issues later met by the European Coal and Steel Community had been examined.

American reaction to the Schuman Plan for the pooling of West European coal and steel resources should be seen in the light of a new internationalism which arose in the United States out of the experience of World War II. This new consciousness was linked with a growing awareness of the threat posed by Soviet expansion.

In this context, serious doubts were expressed in U.S. official circles concerning the ability of European nations, their economic and social fabric weakened by war, to meet and survive the threat unaided. Thus, concern for Europe's security came to dominate considerations of U.S. foreign policy and, in 1947, the Marshall Plan was proposed as a solution.

The Aid Program

The emphasis of American aid was at first economic but

gradually shifted largely to military assistance after the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950. However, the aid program was guided throughout by the principle that only the unity of European states could ensure the lasting effects of American aid and provide the strength needed to devise future economic measures under European rather than American auspices. The approach to the distribution of Marshall Plan aid through the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was one indication of American belief in the need for closer European economic co-operation.

The Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA), in administering the foreign aid program, was concerned not only with international co-ordination of the European effort at postwar reconstruction, but also with problems recognized in the conception of the Schuman Plan such as the dangers of overproduction and the threat of a new cartelization of European heavy industry. In this sense, certain European ideas which culminated in the Schuman Plan were current in the United States prior to the statement of May 9, 1950.

However, spokesmen for the U.S. Administration did not as a matter of political or economic policy in Western Europe officially advocate more than co-operation between European nations. This official policy did not, of course, prevent some U.S. State Department and ECA representatives in Europe from expressing general views favoring some form of real economic integration among the recipients of Marshall

Plan aid.

U.S. Policy in Germany

Furthermore, the United States, as an occupying power in Germany and major protagonist in the cold war, was forced to deal with other issues in the background of the French proposal. The "cold war" gradually made the original occupation policy in Germany less and less tenable. Consequently, the United States pressed for political and economic changes in the former enemy country to give it greater autonomy and thus win its political support and economic potential for the cause of the West.

The United States had abandoned earlier schemes of separating the Ruhr from Germany as a disarmament measure and opposed French demands for the internationalization of the Ruhr's mines and mills. Instead, it agreed with Britain and a reluctant France in 1948 to place the resources of the area until the end of the occupation of Germany under the control of an International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR). Under IAR activity, Ruhr resources would be developed as a sine qua non of Europe's peacetime economic recovery. The IAR, they agreed, would co-ordinate its plans with those of the OEEC. The latter had already reached the conclusion that Germany must remain a European center of heavy industry and that the development of European economic co-operation which would henceforth include Germany.

The United States and Britain demonstrated that their

primary concern was with European economic recovery rather than with security that might derive from a restrictive and punitive policy toward Germany. Through their insistence, the Anglo-Saxon powers persuaded France to accept a policy which fell short of her hopes for a permanently weak Germany. Thus, the United States contributed to the origins of the ECSC to the extent that she prompted France to seek a new policy which would absorb the potential of the Ruhr and encompass economic co-operation with Germany, a solution which she eventually found in the Schuman Plan.

It is vital to note, however, that the United States in no way interpreted the ECSC as a successor to the IAR or as an instrument for the control of Germany. On the contrary, the Plan was seen as a French move to accept Germany as a partner and to permit the economic development of Germany which the United States had long supported.¹

A discussion of reaction to the Schuman Plan in the United States must bear in mind the difference between the impact of the Plan on American opinion or vice-versa, and its impact in the prospective member countries. The problems which the Plan sought to encompass deeply concerned the United States. But an effective solution to these problems

¹For a description of this issue and comparison between IAR and ECSC see: Gerald W. Thoms, "The Western European Powers and International Control of the Ruhr" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1953.) (microfilm)

required Europeans, according to U.S. policy, to deal with the situation themselves.

Similarly, the public at large regarded the Schuman proposal as an European affair to be encouraged from afar but not participated in. It involved no new regulations for U.S. industry, no transfer of U.S. sovereignty to supra-national authority, and no change of policy toward a former enemy nation. Consequently, interest in the Plan was detached and remote as compared with that generated in the six European countries concerned. Further, because the United States did not participate directly or officially in the drafting of the ECSC Treaty, little or no opportunity was given to representatives of U.S. special interests who might have sought to alter the Plan. Nevertheless, general interest was widespread among Americans in public life, in organizations, and in business and industry. Scores of opinions were generated in response to the proposal and, undoubtedly, some of them reached the negotiators at Paris.

It serves little purpose to present American attitudes toward the Schuman Plan chronologically. The highlights of the 1950-52 period--proposal, signature, and ratification--implied no steps to be taken by the United States, and do not, therefore, provide a breakdown into different spheres of activity. Rather, the interest taken in the negotiations leading to the establishment of the ECSC fluctuated in relation to other problems facing the United States in these years: on the foreign scene, primarily the outbreak and conduct of the Korean war; in the domestic field, the 1952

election campaign. On the whole, however, there was a genuine hope that the European vitality demonstrated by the Schuman proposal would generate the beginning of real European unity. The reception which it was accorded in the United States, both public and private, was therefore, generally favorable, even enthusiastic.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

The Executive Branch

The announcement of the Schuman proposal on May 9, 1950 reportedly caught American officials entirely by surprise, but full support, both then and throughout the course of negotiations that led to the beginning of operations by the High Authority on August 10, 1952, was soon forthcoming.

President Harry S. Truman issued a statement on May 19, 1950, welcoming the Plan and praising its aims. He restated his support in June and November of that year, lent further support to it in a communique issued after talks held with Rene Pleven in January 1951, ^{in the communique, he asked} and, ~~in asking~~ ^{ing to} for the continuation of aid to Europe in 1952, ~~pointed out the~~ ^{and to the promise} economic progress already made in Europe, ~~partly by the~~ Schuman Plan which would soon enter into effect.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who appears to have been informed of the Plan on May 8, 1950, praised it after its announcement, pending further study for a final judgement, at the conference of Western foreign ministers taking place in London in May, 1950. He again supported it in a speech to Congress after his return, seeing in it a move which

would strengthen Europe. He restated his support in the face of rejection of the Plan by the British Labor Party, and hoped for its satisfactory embodiment in a draft treaty shortly before this draft was initialed in March, 1951. He subsequently welcomed its initialing, and gave praise to Robert Schuman as the originator of the Plan. During the 1951 Senate hearings on foreign aid, the Secretary supported the Plan as a great step forward, and joined with the British and French foreign ministers in recognizing it as a step to European unity and strength after a meeting in September, 1951, as well as at a later meeting in Paris. He hailed French as well as German ratification as great steps forward, again stressed before the Senate the progress made in Europe through the Plan during the 1952 hearings on the foreign aid program, and welcomed the ECSC after its entry in force in August, 1952 with a pledge of American support.

The Schuman proposal found other support from the State Department through an article by Acting Secretary James E. Webb and through two publications: An Analysis of the Schuman Plan, and Understanding the Schuman Plan, all of which considered it a bold move.

ECA

Officials of the ECA were also strong in their support. Averell Harriman, Special Ambassador for the Marshall Plan and later Mutual Security Director, testified during House of Representatives Committee hearings on foreign aid in June, 1950

that the Schuman proposal aided the aim of European integration pursued under the European Recovery Program (ERP) and should be given American support, even if Britain did not join. He also stressed its importance in promoting Franco-German co-operation. He repeated his support for the Plan before the Senate shortly afterwards. In connection with the third anniversary of the ECA in 1951, he praised the leadership in European integration taken by M. Schuman. During the foreign aid hearings of 1952, he again lauded the Plan for the expanded production which he expected to result from it, and for the break-down of trade barriers which it would promote.

ECA Administrator Paul Hoffman gave his immediate support to the Plan after its announcement. Together with his aides he applauded its features of expanding production and eliminating trade barriers as well as terminating the policy of economic restrictions imposed on Germany. He recommended U.S. support of the Plan before Senate hearings on foreign aid and found encouraging the prospects of European economic integration deriving from it.

Other ECA officials also commented in favor of the Plan expressing belief that its implementation, rather than German rearmament, should be the main aim of U.S. policy in Europe, though further steps toward European integration were simultaneously demanded by the ECA. ECA Administrator William C. Foster found the Plan encouraging, and discounted fears that it might become a cartel. The acting special representative of the ECA in Paris, Paul R. Porter, called for American aid

to the ECSC in November, 1951, stressing the need for European integration.

Congress

Members of both houses of the U.S. Congress expressed support of the Schuman proposal, among them influential men of varied political beliefs and party affiliation such as Senators J. William Fulbright, Democrat, Arkansas; Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Republican, Massachusetts; William H. Jenner, Republican, Indiana; Pat McCarran, Republican, Nevada; John C. Stennis, Democrat, Mississippi; John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; Estes Kefauver, Democrat, Tennessee; and Tom Connally, Democrat, Texas, Representatives Christian A. Herter, Republican, Massachusetts; John W. McCormack, Republican, Massachusetts; and Francis Case, Republican, South Dakota. They hailed the Plan primarily for its contribution to European strength through integration and to Franco-German conciliation, finding it generally in line with the aims of U.S. policy in and U.S. aid to Europe. The Congressmen called for American support of the Plan while it was in process of being negotiated, but recommended also vigilance to ascertain that it would encourage free competition, at low^{er} cost^s, and prohibit cartels and protective measures. They found the Plan a step toward breaking down national economic barriers, a move which had been recommended in general terms by the Joint Committee on Foreign Economic Co-operation early in 1950, and they believed European economic integration to be essential for insuring lasting effects of ERP aid to Europe. They saw in the Schuman

proposal a slight possibility for diminishing European need for American assistance, as well as a means to terminate the dismantling of German industry. They supported, however, the continued decartelization of the German coal and steel industries, and in this connection criticized the efforts of American lawyers who represented German industrial interests in search of elimination of the decartelization features of the Plan. Criticism of the British attitude toward the Plan was at times so heated that the suspension of aid to Britain was considered by some as a measure of censure, but this view lacked sufficient support. Congress regretted the delays in ratification of the ECSC Treaty, and believed this should be taken into consideration in formulating further aid programs for Europe.

Two opponents of the Schuman Plan in Congress, Representative George G. Sadowski, Democrat, Michigan and Senator James E. Murray, Democrat, Montana, concentrated their criticism on the danger of German economic expansion and exploitation of the Plan for German interests, citing material prepared by the Society for the Prevention of World War III.

General

Comments by American officials and ex-officials in general were entirely favorable, as reported frequently in the press. They endorsed U.S. support for the Plan's implementation, and raised the issue of possible U.S. aid to the ECSC while it was still in the early stages of negotiation, though making this

contingent on the community's promotion of free competition and expanded production. There was less criticism than regret about the British opposition to entry into the Plan among American officialdom, but support for conclusion of the ECsC treaty even without Britain was prevalent, and even the belief that greater progress could be achieved in the absence of Socialist Britain was voiced occasionally.

Prominent Americans who expressed their individual support of the Plan included Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, former Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, General George C. Marshall, General Lucius Clay, Senator Paul Douglas, Democrat of Illinois, Ambassador Chester Bowles, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Allen W. Dulles and General Alfred Gruenther.

Throughout the course of the negotiations, the United States voiced its approval of steps taken: the beginning of negotiations; the initialing of the draft treaty; the signing of the treaty; its ratification by the member countries and, lastly, its entry into force. During the Western foreign ministers' conference in Washington in September 1951, the United States welcomed the Schuman Plan and other signs of progress toward European unity; this opinion was echoed in statements of Congressmen and officials in and out of Washington. Hopes for British co-operation, if not participation, rose with the return to power of the Conservative Party. The view that the Plan might not have come about without American

support and influence on its development was expressed upon occasion. The Democratic Party platform formulated in June 1952 not only stated support for the Plan's early implementation, but also expressed pride in the part that had been played in its development by the United States and promised further assistance.

AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION

Government Attitudes and Activity

It should be recalled that all comment on part of U.S. Government leaders, of the Department of State and heads of specialized agencies, of political parties, and Congress and, lastly, of prominent figures in American public life, was made as bystanders on a policy adopted by foreign nations, inasmuch as neither officials nor legislators were called upon to pass on a new foreign policy or to accept a new treaty. The interest taken in the Plan, however, was indicated not only by frequent official statements but also by the fact that the text of the Schuman proposal and many articles referring to it were read into the Congressional Record together with the statements of the Congressmen.

Behind the scenes, however, considerable American activity concerning the drafting of the ECSC Treaty was carried on both in the Department of State in Washington, and at the scene of negotiations in Europe.

By 1950, the State Department, it is understood, had come to the realization that further progress toward

European integration would be unlikely if it depended upon the participation of Britain. The Department wished to encourage the closer association of the European states, and though hesitant to press for integration of the continental states in the absence of Britain, it proved ready to support the European initiative, taken by W. Schuman. Features presented by the Plan that were novel to American thinking included the Plan's supranationalism, the concept of limited integration in two major economic sectors, and its inclusion of Germany as an equal. The work conducted by Raymond Vernon of the State Department dealt mainly with the anti-trust provisions to be built into the treaty and waivers the ECSC would require from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the OEEC to permit the establishment of the Community. The Department concentrated on anti-cartel aspects because it wished to dispel the popular view that the ECSC might become a cartel and because it recognized many of the real problems in dealing with cartel agreements. The State Department had become apprehensive of the European cartel tradition since the war and knew, from American experience in Germany, the complexities of the issue. In addition, the Department was interested in the avoidance of dirigiste tendencies in the High Authority, with the adoption of a democratic assembly for the ECSC, and with the eventual emergence of European federalism out of the institutional experience of the Community.

No official United States observer was sent to the negotiations on the Schuman Plan but the Department of State in June 1950 sent its good wishes for success of the negotiations and stated that it would be kept informed on the course of negotiations by its embassy in Paris. William Diebold wrote in Foreign Affairs that though there would be no official American intervention in the negotiations, Americans would advise on drafting the treaty. The advice was sought by Jean Monnet, primarily on technical matters related to the establishment of a large federal market. Drawing on American experience with such a market, United States representatives encouraged the formation of a community which would be neither restrictive nor preferential. They aimed at the creation of a real common market which, by enhancing competition and efficiency, would lead to increased multilateral trade not only within the Community, but also between the Community and the rest of the world, thus increasing the volume of world-wide free trade. In support of breaking down trade restrictions, U.S. advice dealt with treaty provisions that would regulate cartels and other conspiracies in restraint of trade.

On the organizational side, American contribution was indirect. The idea of establishing a court for the ECSC came from European negotiators. It is true that the United States Supreme Court, with its practice of judicial review presented itself as a model but the Court's powers were

were altered to meet European needs and practice. With regard to the regulatory powers of the ECSC, again there were models for their conduct in the United States, for instance the Interstate Commerce Commission's role and scope were closely studied.

The primary channel for co-operation between the United States and the prospective members of the ECSC was the United States Embassy in Paris. David K.E. Bruce, U.S. Ambassador to France in 1950-52, later Under Secretary of State, was said to have been one of the first Americans to realize the importance of the Schuman proposal and to encourage France to pursue the policy it envisaged. The support he lent to the Plan as a step to European unity was considered to have been essential for the successful conclusion of the negotiations. In the course of foreign aid hearings in 1952, Bruce lauded the Plan's anti-cartel aspects, its encouragement to free enterprise, competition, and expanding production, and the surrender of sovereignty contemplated by its members. Assisting the Ambassador in following the course of the negotiations was William Tomlinson, representative of the U.S. Treasury Department in Paris who, served as liaison officer between Bruce and Europeans conducting the negotiations. Tomlinson was joined by H.H.L. Flixmons, assistant to the head of ICA in France, General Henry Parkman.

In Germany, still under Allied occupation, U.S. High

Commissioner John J. McCloy gave his early endorsement of the Plan, especially in view of its contribution to minimizing French fear of Germany. He supported German equality within the Plan and took an active part in winning support for it among its German critics. American officials under McCloy acted as go-betweens in the talks on the Plan as they affected the decartelization and deconcentration of German industry. In this sphere, McCloy had the assistance of the legal counsel of the U.S. High Commission, Robert Bowie, and of his assistant, Sidney Willner who were regarded as authorities on the decartelization law promulgated by the Allies in Germany. The policy they followed was to conclude the reorganization of German industry before implementation of the Treaty, and to seek the conditions for the elimination of the International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR) which they thought would be incompatible with the ECSC. Through its membership in the IAR, the United States pressed for the anti-cartel measures of the treaty, not wishing to reverse the occupation policy but striving to give Germany a voice in its future course.

The efforts to obtain German acceptance of this policy at first met with little success. The U.S. High Commission was particularly concerned over the delay in German approval of the Plan caused by the activities of Robert Patterson, a former U.S. Secretary for War who, acting as a private lawyer, pressed the interests of German stock-holders

opposed to decartelization. By March 1951, however, McCloy was able to reach agreement with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on decartelization and the dissolution of the central German Coal Sales Agency, thus clearing the way to progress with the Plan. McCloy achieved further success toward obtaining German support for the Plan through talks to German industrialists. Time Magazine reported that American pressure kept the talks going in face of criticism by Ruhr industrialists and made possible final agreement on the ECSC Treaty. As Germany began consideration of the signed treaty document, McCloy spoke to refute German charges to the effect that unemployment and economic restrictions would result from the Plan, stressing the economic benefits to Germany which would follow its implementation. Shortly before ratification in Germany, McCloy joined with the British and French High Commissioners in pressing for speedy action.

On a different level, American support came from a lawyer and a soldier. George W. Ball, a Washington lawyer who had been invited by Jean Monnet to be a consultant to the French Government on the development of the treaty, wrote in The Reporter and spoke on the University of Chicago Round Table, a radio program, in support of the Schuman proposal. He hailed both the economic aspects and the political goals of the Plan. He defended the Plan, on the economic level, against charges of Socialism and cartelization, and particularly praised the political aspects, France-

German conciliation, integration, and supranationalism.

The soldier, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, called for a final decision on the Plan as a move to European unity in an address before the North Atlantic Treaty Council at the close of 1951. In his annual report to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1952, he stressed the European strength which would follow from unity and, before leaving Europe to seek the presidential nomination in 1952, stated that he would continue to support all measures for European integration, including the Schuman Plan.

Labor and Business

Outside the United States Government, the reception accorded the Schuman Plan, though primarily also favorable, was less enthusiastic particularly in the quarters of labor and business.

The American Federation of Labor (AF of L) endorsed the Plan at its 1950 convention, but elsewhere qualified this support making it contingent on the development of German democracy and of France-German co-operation, and on the prohibition of cartels. The Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) voiced its interest in the rational economic organization envisaged by the Plan, but a resolution passed at its 1950 convention also expressed concern about the cartel issue. The program of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union similarly endorsed the Plan, provided it did not lead to cartelization.

In business quarters, misgivings about the possibility of creating a super-cartel under the Schuman proposal were even greater. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), for example, called for measures which would prevent such a development, and made various suggestions on safeguarding economic freedoms which, if carried out, would permit European economic integration in a form which would win the support of the NAM. It particularly emphasized the need for "free competition". The International Chamber of Commerce requested a number of changes in the Plan which would be more in the interest of business and which would protect free enterprise. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle published two articles highly critical of monopolistic features seen in the Plan, and of U.S. support for its development. One was by Melchior Palyi, the other by Theodor M. Vogelstein, an American citizen and former German banker.

Of the two industries most concerned, the American coal industry initially was generally favorable to the Schuman proposal, while the steel industry produced the greatest critic of the Plan, Clarence B. Randall, president of the Inland Steel Corporation. Though he endorsed the ideal of European integration, Mr. Randall attacked the Plan in the strongest terms as a sacrifice of industrial interests to political goals, as an embodiment of the features of a cartel, as a limitation of free competition by means which would be impermissible in the United States, and as an

avenue to Socialism. He charged that it represented undesirable regulation by public authority and was an organization which would be unable to overcome the lack of competitive spirit in European industry which he considered to be the crux of the difficulty of European economic progress.

There were, however, also supporters of the Plan among business interests. Included in a list of 118 subscribers to a favorable message sent by the American Committee on United Europe, a private organization in New York, were a number of business leaders. Exporters and international traders were quoted as saying they expected an increase in U.S. trade through a greater volume of world trade which would follow the creation of the ECSC.

The Cartel Issue

The cartel issue deserves special consideration because it, particularly, agitated the American public. Fears lest the Schuman Plan give rise to a new international cartel arose also in circles not connected with business. A strong attack by Henry Hazlitt on the statist, bureaucratic, regulatory, cartelized features of the Plan appeared in Newweek magazine; The Saturday Evening Post, popular conservative weekly magazine, saw in it a revival of European cartels and a French device to protect herself against competition; Charles J. Walsh, professor of economics at Fordham University, a Catholic institution, predicted dire

results from the Plan which would establish a cartel; a letter to the editor of The New York Times in May 1951 foresaw unemployment, failure to achieve European unity, and strengthening of conservative, capitalist, clerical forces in a supercartel dominated by Germany.

Robert S. Marcus of the World Jewish Congress expressed fears lest the Schuman Plan develop not only into a cartel, but aid the resurgence of German industrial power and rearmament; Jean Pajus wrote in the New Republic, a liberal bi-weekly journal of opinion, that the international cartel to be created under the Plan would mainly benefit Germany, where industrial power in the Ruhr was again held by the Nazi magnates; The Society for the Prevention of World War III warned primarily against the dangerous rebirth of German heavy industry.

Less concerned about the Plan's danger as a cartel, yet not wholly enthusiastic, were other writers: Walter Dulzbach, believed that it would lead neither to free competition nor to a cartel -- nor to European integration. William H. Chartener, an expert on cartels, was more concerned about the possibility that planning in the ECSC might protect inefficiency than about the fears that the Community would develop into a cartel.

There was, however, no dearth of critics of those who feared cartelization in the ECSC. The Commonweal, a liberal Catholic magazine, lashed out against the interests

represented by the Wall Street Journal, which had called the Plan a cartel, and stressed the economic expansion which would result from the Plan and the political benefits it would bring. Business Week magazine warmly supported the Schuman proposal adding that American sympathy, aid, and prodding to ensure free competition would be necessary to forestall a development toward cartelization. Newsweek magazine likewise discounted the danger, and pointed to the free enterprise features embodied in the Plan and supported by its originators.

Major General William J. Donovan, who had headed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, addressed himself specifically to Clarence Randall, contending that the ECSC would be a blow to monopoly and would contribute to peace and European strength. He found that the Plan would not, as asserted by Randall, lead to the establishment of cartels or to socialism, but to a free enterprise system which could not exist without it. He went further, saying that the Plan provided the only practical approach to the utilization of German industry. Theodore W. Schultz, professor of economics at the University of Chicago, expressed skepticism concerning the Plan's ability to break down all economic restrictions, but he, too, believed it would aid that end.

Informed Opinion

Writers in the learned journals generally supported the Plan and concentrated on what it would do for European economic and political integration and for economic progress. Paul

Alpert, a writer on European economic history, thought the Schuman Plan met the need for European economic integration; William Diebold, Jr. of the Council on Foreign Relations added to this some speculation as to the effects, both economic and political, of limited integration; Howard G. Cary of the Foreign Policy Association issued a study of difficulties which had to be met in its implementation. John A. McKesson, a member of the U.S. Department of State writing in a private capacity, praised the Plan for its promotion of higher standards of living and of Franco-German co-operation, and found that it would tie Germany to the West rather than permit the formation of a third force in Europe. William H. Chartener quoted Clarence Streit, proponent of World Federal and Atlantic Union, as critical of the Plan because it would prevent the wider union to which he aspired, while Streit's colleague, Ruth Lawson, writing on this issue, found it to be more likely to lead to integration than a looser organization such as the Council of Europe. The editors of the American Journal of International Law dealt not only with the new departure in French foreign policy which sought co-operation with Germany instead of alliances against her. Hans J. Morgenthau, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, speaking on the University of Chicago Round Table, emphasized the political rather than the economic aspects of the Plan and the new French policy of co-operation with Germany. In another address he expanded on the new French policy of offsetting German power through co-operation in a pool, and praised the functional

approach to European unity. The Plan was described by Vera M. Dean of the Foreign Policy Association as a form of French insurance against the possibility that German revival might again become dangerous to France.

Considering the Schuman Plan in relation to United States policy, William N. Parker saw the Plan as a gain for American policy in Europe since it made possible French acceptance of German rearmament without a security guarantee, though he doubted that the economic effects of the ECSC would be as great as its political appeal. T.H. White, journalist and author of Fire in the Ashes, found it a solution to the Ruhr problem, though he had stressed the need to prevent its development into a cartel. Percy Wimer wrote in the New Republic that the Schuman proposal had led to American understanding of the fact that European political policy was as important as American economic policy in promoting European integration.

Among influential private American organizations, the Schuman Plan on the whole found warm support. The Notarian, and the New York Bar Association, for example, came out in its favor. On the other hand, James Finucane, Associate Secretary of the National Council for Prevention of War, pointed out the Plan's shortcomings in relation to the American goal of a reunited Germany.

Magazines and Press

Reaching a much wider section of the American public, it is the attitude of these organs which did most to formulate American opinion on the Schuman Plan. The American newsmagazines all supported the Schuman proposal, primarily for its promotion

of European political and economic integration, Franco-German conciliation, economic progress, possible expansion to fields other than coal and steel, and the preservation of European peace. Business Week added to these the hope that the Plan would make less U.S. aid necessary, and it, like Newsweek, discounted the dangers of cartelization under the Plan. Time did not see a danger of a neutral third force growing out of the Plan; U.S. News and World Report did not foresee any adverse effect on American trade. While Business Week called for U.S. support, Time went as far as suggesting that United States pressure be exerted to ensure success in the negotiations.

Other weeklies held similar views: The Christian Century, a liberal Protestant publication, also believed American pressure to be necessary; The Catholic liberal journal, The Commonweal, emphasized the benefits of economic integration, which might spread to other fields, in preventing ruinous competition and eliminating national rivalries in the movement toward political union. Life saw political stability and Franco-German co-operation in the process of integration; Fortune was evidently divided in its opinion: while its editorials praised the Plan for establishing a European community, William S. Schlam of the Fortune editorial board wrote that the Plan would create a cartel, constituting European integration at too high a price, and criticized U.S. policy for being willing to pay this price instead of seeking a form of integration which would safeguard free competition. Both The Nation, a left-wing journal, and the New Republic were editorially skeptical; the former called the Plan merely an experiment,

the latter feared it might become a cartel, though in the absence of this development believed it would be to the good.

The daily press was even more whole-hearted in its support. Large independent papers such as the Christian Science Monitor, the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal, the New York Herald Tribune, the New York Times, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the Washington Post supported it for a variety of reasons. The announcement of the Schuman proposal was widely hailed as a step to integration for economic progress, to French-German co-operation and European unity, strength and freedom. It was seen also as a move toward settlement of the German problem by tying Germany to the west. Its political significance was given more weight than its economic aspects. It was generally believed that the Plan would not develop into a cartel, but during the course of the negotiations the hope that the powers of the High Authority be curbed, and democratic control ensured, was frequently expressed. There was at first uneasiness about the British position, but discouragement over rejection of the Plan gave way to strong criticism of the British Labor Party, the belief that negotiations should continue regardless, and the hope that Britain would eventually be willing to join the ECSC. American support for the Plan was generally recommended in the interest of arriving at agreement on the Plan, promoting free competition and speeding European ability for defense. Fear was expressed lest American broaching of

the subject of German rearmament disrupt the negotiations on the Schuman Plan.

The beginning of negotiations on the Plan in June 1950 was overshadowed in the American press by the outbreak of war in Korea, but its initialing in March 1951 called forth wide and favorable comment. Its signing the following month was also hailed as a great step, though it was given considerably less space in the press, perhaps because of the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur at approximately the same time. French and German ratification in December 1951 and January 1952 was praised, as was the Plan's entry into force, though at the latter date the United States press was primarily dedicated to the 1952 election campaign. Praise for the encouragement of the Plan was given particularly to Schuman, Adenauer, Monnet and, among Americans, John J. McCloy and David Bruce.

CONCLUSION

The Schuman Plan, far from being an American concept as it has sometimes been alleged, was one in whose inception the United States played no direct part. It was, however, well received in the United States and encouraged in every possible way.

The Plan's reception centered as much on its supranational approach, which held out the hope of political integration, as on its economic aspects, which would complement U.S. aid for European recovery.

To the President, the Secretary of State, members of the executive and legislative branches of the Government, and public figures, the Schuman Plan promised a move to European unity which they considered essential for the resurgence of European economic strength as a basis for political stability, a factor which weighed heavily in the context of the cold war. Though others pointed out that this very unity might help Western Europe establish itself as a third force on the international scene, decreased European dependence on the United States was expected and Government circles were confident that the new Community would strengthen Europe as a partner of the West, notably the United States. Officials deplored Britain's refusal to join the ECSC and applauded the courage shown by France in embarking on a new relationship with Germany, one which the United States had hoped for for some time. The occasional warnings concerning the possibly dangerous role of Germany in the ECSC came from without the Government; U.S. officials emphasized instead the step taken toward German rehabilitation and improved Franco-German relations.

Official statements appeared to reflect greater interest in the political effects of the Schuman Plan. In contrast to the concern of business and labor in its economic provisions. These two groups warned against the dangers of cartelization and restriction of free enterprise under the Plan, and their warnings were echoed by many writers. The Government sought to reassure them that fears on this account were unfounded

because its representatives assisted in writing anti-cartel provisions into the ECSC Treaty. In the United States, business and labor pressed for the same guarantees of a free economy to be incorporated into the ECSC; their interests were identical and not opposed as was the case in some of the ECSC member countries. It cannot be said authoritatively that business or labor influenced the treaty provisions in any real sense. Both groups recognized that the Community would provide conditions for more effective results from U.S. aid, that it would be accompanied by political benefits, and above all, the American business community, too, would gain from European production and trade increased through economic rationalization. Enhanced European ability to compete, they believed, would serve to enlarge world-wide multilateral trade to their own benefit as well as that of the ECSC. On the whole, therefore, business and labor were more willing to support the Schuman Plan, provided it safeguarded essential economic freedoms, than to criticize it.

The large number of articles on the Schuman proposal published in political and economic journals testified to the significance attached to it among experts. Though they dealt extensively with the economic progress expected in the Community, the political results which would be brought about by this ostensibly economic move were more generally emphasized. Despite warnings about the difficulties in implementing the project, the experts expressed very little criticism.

It is in the weekly news magazines and in the daily press that the impact of the Plan on American opinion can best be seen, as well as the degree of interest taken in it during the period 1950-1952. Although the isolated voices of critics appeared in the weeklies, the daily press was unstinting in the support for the Plan's features of economic and political importance which it recommended to the American public and its government. Comment on the Schuman Plan in the American press varied in relation to other matters of concern to Americans, on the whole it was extensive, detailed, informative and indicative of the favorable impression which the French proposal had made on American opinion.

Because the United States shared the goals of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, the goal of Europe coupled with economic progress, a community in which the problem of Franco-German relations, the keystone to a new order in Europe, might find a solution, the Schuman Plan was warmly welcomed in the United States.