

European integration and defence: the ultimate challenge?

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Preface

Since St-Malo, three revolutions in European military affairs have been under way: the first concerns Britain, the second the process of European political integration and the third the actual management of security in the post-Cold War world. That is the main thrust of this *Chaillot Paper*, whose author, Jolyon Howorth – professor at the University of Bath and senior visiting fellow at the institute in spring this year – is without doubt one of the foremost historians and specialists in matters of European security.

While there is no longer any doubt over the radical evolution in the position of the United Kingdom regarding the Union's legitimacy in the field of defence, the two other issues on the other hand required serious analysis. And it needed nothing less than the competence, originality and creativity of Jolyon Howorth to examine, in this essay, two of the most fundamental debates that the Union, as an international actor, will have to clarify collectively in the coming months and years.

First, is European defence the ultimate launch pad for greater political integration among the Union's member countries? Will the St-Malo process necessarily lead to a certain sharing of sovereignty in foreign policy and defence – which are above all traditionally a national preserve? Or, conversely, will defence be the ultimate safeguard against political integration to the extent that its intergovernmental regime will allow member states to maintain or even reinforce their national control over the functioning and orientation of the Union? Recent European debates on a federal Europe, the avant-garde, the hard core, the pioneer group, or whatever other formula may in future be adopted in connection with the effective operation of a Europe with thirty members, have so far very largely ignored the impact of defence on the Union's function and purpose. One of the great merits of this *Chaillot Paper* is that it has looked again at the debate on Europe's political objective in the light of the both recent and spectacular advances that have been made in the field of defence. The author is in little doubt that, despite all the hesitation and contortions among member states that can be foreseen, the inclusion of defence in the European

Union's general competencies will also, in the medium term, give extra impetus to the process of integration.

Second, does a specifically European way of managing security issues exist? In the face of a given crisis, will the Europeans do the same thing as other international organisations or individual states, using only European means, or does there exist in the practice, culture and functioning of the Union an irreducible added value that will profoundly modify the actual concept and the practice of crisis management? Jolyon Howorth is of the opinion that this second revolution is also under way. Of course, many questions still have to be resolved in order to arrive at the optimal implementation of the ESDP: this *Chaillot Paper* draws up a searching list of such questions. None the less, since the Union will in the end have a complete gamut of means for crisis management at its disposal, ranging from the economic to the purely military, and since the coherence of its various ways of acting will truly be the added value of the Union as an international actor, the Europeans are in the process of inventing a new model of crisis management that is more appropriate to the complexities of the twenty-first century than military interventionism alone. It is now up to the Union to show that political legitimacy goes hand in hand with operational effectiveness, that prevention is fuelled by dissuasion, and that the coherence of strategies can accommodate the diversity of the actors and means involved. Developments after Nice will also have to demonstrate this.

Nicole Gnesotto

Paris, November 2000

Introduction

The story of European integration began with defence. The Treaties of Dunkirk (1947), and especially of Brussels (1948), were primarily geared to forging a security community which would banish any further prospect of war. But the demands of sovereignty and the sheer complexity of European security problems, including early German rearmament and the need for a transatlantic alliance, ruined the first attempt at defence integration, the European Defence Community, in the early 1950s. Thereafter, for almost fifty years, defence was a taboo subject within a purely European context. But now, in 2001, the European Union (EU) is planning to inaugurate a new and permanent set of security and defence institutions, and gradually to forge a substantial 'Headline Goal' of military forces. These two processes were designated, at the EU Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 (see Annexe A), as the twin pillars of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). The EU is also preparing to embark on a structured dialogue with NATO (and, via NATO, with the United States) over key matters related to the future of European security. The nature of ongoing relations between, on the one hand, the EU, and, on the other hand, NATO and the United States, is the subject of intense speculation and widely divergent analyses. Some feel that present developments will lead to the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance and increasing variance between the two sides of the Atlantic; while others remain confident that the current rebalancing process will lead to an even stronger and more vigorous transatlantic partnership.¹

Europe today is at a historical watershed. It is therefore appropriate and timely to review the progress made towards and the prospects for the creation of a genuinely European security and defence policy and capacity since the breakthrough Franco-British summit in St-Malo in December 1998 (See Annexe B). The main decisions taken at St-Malo were the following: the European Council was to be given responsibility for framing a common security and defence policy under the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); the EU was to be given the capacity for

¹ For a recent concise assessment of the stakes, see Philip H. Gordon, 'Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 4, July/August 2000, pp. 12-17; for a detailed analysis of US attitudes towards CESDP, see Stanley R. Sloan, 'The United States and European defence', *Chaillot Papers* 39 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, April 2000).

autonomous action, whilst at the same time enhancing the robustness of the Atlantic Alliance; new decision-making institutions were to be agreed, as well as plans to develop significant military means – to be placed at the disposal of the EU. The issues which emerged from St-Malo (and in particular the controversial issue of European security *autonomy*) are at the heart of the new European defence challenge. In the past, Europe has on several occasions developed proposals for a security and defence entity. None has ever borne fruit. One of the main conclusions of this study is that, this time, there will be a positive outcome. But the precise details and the possible ramifications of a successful CESDP remain unclear. The principle aim of the study is therefore to assess and evaluate the main factors involved in developing a viable project.

Prior to St-Malo, the United Kingdom exercised an effective veto on any structured linkage between, on the one hand, the EEC/EC/EU as an institutional organisation and, on the other hand, European defence issues. This repeatedly condemned to impotence or irrelevance any initiatives – usually French ones – which aspired to establish such a linkage.² The biggest single stumbling block to both a CFSP and a CESDP was the inability of Britain and France to agree on fundamentals, a problem that dates back to the negotiation of the Treaties of Dunkirk and Brussels. One fundamental difference centred on the respective attitudes in Paris and London to the impact of ‘CESDP’ on Washington. While Paris considered (and has continued to assert ever since) that the emergence of a CESDP with teeth would consolidate and enhance a more *balanced* – and therefore *stronger* – Atlantic Alliance, London feared that the opposite would be the case: that if Europe demonstrated a serious capacity to manage its own security affairs, Washington would retreat into isolationism and NATO would eventually collapse.³ That view – first formulated in Whitehall in the

² Examples of the UK’s (or the UK’s Atlanticist European partners’) blockage of EU defence or security policy initiatives: 1947 (Western Union); 1950-54 (EDC); 1962 (Fouchet Plan); 1997 (merger of EU and WEU).

³ John W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), Chapter V, ‘The Making of the Treaty of Dunkirk’. General de Gaulle always insisted that the strongest alliances were those between partners of relatively equal standing, and that what NATO needed above all was *balance* between the two sides of the ocean: Daniel Colard and Gérard Daille, ‘Le général de Gaulle et les Alliances’, in [Institut Charles de Gaulle, ed.], *De Gaulle en son Siècle, Tome 4: La sécurité et l’indépendance de la France* (Paris: Plon, 1992). See also, on this, Nicole

early months of 1947 – was still very close to being the orthodox view in the summer of 1997.⁴ What St-Malo (apparently) did was to consign it to history. Because of the UK ‘veto’, issues related to European defence were traditionally considered to be the sole responsibility of NATO. Full stop. The Western European Union (WEU) had, as early as 1949, retroceded to NATO full responsibility for collective defence. Prior to the late 1980s, concepts of collective *security* were the preserve of a minority among the international relations cognoscenti.⁵

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, various proposals for the European allies to play a greater part in NATO’s activities by creating a discrete ‘European Pillar’, were floated periodically. On the US side, these tended to emerge out of disputes over finances and *burden-sharing*; on the European side, the projects (usually but not exclusively French-driven) concentrated on generating greater *balance* in influence and leadership.⁶ All of them failed to materialise, largely because of the peculiar constraints of the Cold War. However, after the advent to power in the former Soviet Union of a reforming leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev (1985), the transformation of the East-West security nexus allowed both analysts and actors to envisage the creation, from within NATO, of some more meaningful type of European pillar. There have been many scenarios for the emergence of that

Gnesotto, *La Puissance et l'Europe* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1998) (English translation appearing shortly with Berghahn Books).

⁴ Jolyon Howorth, ‘The Marshall Plan, Britain and European security: defence integration or coat-tail diplomacy?’, in Martin Schain (ed.), *The Marshall Plan Fifty Years On* (London: Macmillan, 2000); author’s interviews in UK MOD and FCO, June 1997.

⁵ For an excellent discussion of the genesis and history of the concept of collective security, see David Yost’s introduction to his *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 1-26.

⁶ On burden-sharing, see Gavin Kennedy, *Burden Sharing in NATO* (London: Duckworth, 1979); Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, *The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present and Into the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), ‘Burden-sharing in NATO’, *Les Notes de l’IFRI* 11 (Paris: IFRI, 1999), nos. 11-13. On French attempts to promote European security, see Frédéric Bozo, *Deux Stratégies pour l’Europe : de Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l’Alliance Atlantique, 1958-1969* (Paris: Plon, 1996); Jolyon Howorth, ‘France and European Security (1944-1995): re-reading the Gaullist “consensus”’, in Brian Jenkins and Tony Chafer (eds.), *France from the Cold War to the New World Order* (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 17-40.

elusive European Pillar: from the reactivation of WEU in the 1980s, via the Platform on European Security of The Hague (October 1987),⁷ to the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels (January 1994) and on to NATO's Berlin ministerial meeting (June 1996), which gave the green light both to a new project – *European Security and Defence Identity* (ESDI)⁸ – and to the military instrument underpinning it – *Combined Joint Task Forces* (CJTF). Yet, in large part because of the impossibility of discussing defence and even security issues *within the EU*, none of those scenarios offered any realistic prospect of recasting the underlying balance of influence and responsibilities inside the Alliance. Despite the fact that, in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, many believed that NATO's days were actually numbered,⁹ US hegemony remained essentially unchallenged and indeed largely unquestioned. France was alone in suggesting that the Europeans might take greater responsibility for the security of their continent, but most of its EU partners found such a prospect too challenging to old, more comfortable habits. European ambitions in the field of security and defence capacity, as revealed in the texts of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, remained both woolly and 'exceedingly modest'.¹⁰

However, the St-Malo process, leading via the June 1999 Cologne EU Council (see Annexe C) to the December 1999 Helsinki Council, did imply such a rebalancing. In the words of a senior British defence official,¹¹ the removal of the UK veto on defence and security discussions within the EU 'let the genie out of the bottle' and automatically opened up more ambitious vistas than those implicit in a 'mere' pillar of the Alliance. The logic of St-

⁷ See, on these events, [WEU], *The Reactivation of WEU: Statements and Communiqués 1984-1987*, (London: WEU, 1988).

⁸ The concept (and acronym) ESDI first appeared in the Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Oslo on 4 June 1992 (see Willem van Eekelen, *Debating European Security* (The Hague/Brussels: SDU/CEPS, 1998), pp. 359-360), but the 'birthdate' is usually attributed to the NAC meeting in Brussels in January 1994.

⁹ Indeed, such questions were still being asked as late as the mid-1990s: see Ronald D. Asmus et al., 'Can NATO Survive?', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol.19, no. 2, 1996, pp. 79-101. For the literature on 'NATO's inevitable demise', see note 24 below.

¹⁰ François Heisbourg, 'European defence: making it work' *Chaillot Papers* 42 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, September 2000), Chapter One: 'Where we are today', p. 5.

¹¹ Richard Hatfield, 'The Consequences of Saint-Malo', Public Lecture at IFRI, Paris, 28 April 2000.

Malo instantly carried within it the seeds of EU-US tensions. 'Autonomy' is not an easy word to interpret. By early 2000, the EU was widely perceived to be moving ahead faster than NATO towards the creation of a viable European security entity. This role inversion led some to believe that the NATO military restructuring plan – ESDI – and the EU's new politico-military ambitions as set out in CESDP were not only quite different processes and projects but also potentially incompatible. In the fall of 1999 and the spring of 2000, many voices were raised claiming that CESDP would lead to the marginalisation of ESDI and even to the collapse of NATO.¹² It was only with some difficulty in the late spring of 2000 that the EU established interim structures for the engagement of a dialogue with NATO and with the United States, a process which was formalised at the EU Council meeting in Santa Maria da Feira on 19-20 June 2000 (see Annexe D). That dialogue is just beginning as this *Chaillot Paper* appears. It is too soon to say quite what the outcome will be.

What is ESDI and what is CESDP, and what is the relationship between them? What is the explanation for and what is the precise nature of the crucial Franco-British defence 'convergence' which took place around St-Malo? How does that process, which is clearly both central to, and the principal motor of, the new European defence challenge, relate to the security ambitions and intentions of other key European Union countries – large, small and neutral? Can the ever more complex institutional nexus of the CESDP prove to be efficient and functional? What are the prospects for the emergence, in the realm of defence and security, of a core group of leading military powers acting, under some form of *coopération renforcée* (enhanced cooperation), in the name of the EU as a whole? How does all this affect those European nations which are either non-EU NATO members or non-NATO EU accession candidates? Who is going to pay for the emerging CESDP? In short, what are the realistic prospects for a gradual harmonisation of views among the EU 15 on the concrete implementation of a credible security and defence policy? And how far does the EU wish to take this process? Will it remain confined to the so-called Petersberg tasks?

¹² Craig Whitney, 'Americans alarmed over European Union's Defense Plan', *New York Times*, 11 October 1999; Gerald Frost, 'Europe will shoot itself in the foot', *Daily Telegraph*, 1 December 1999; 'Thatcher launches attack on Euro-army', *The Times*, 8 December 1999; William Drozdiak, 'US Tepid on European Defence Plan', *Washington Post*, 7 March 2000; Iain Duncan Smith, 'The Nation's new Nuclear Peril', *Daily Telegraph*, 11 April 2000.

Or will it sooner or later aspire to ensure the collective defence tasks which have hitherto been the universally recognised prerogative of NATO? Above all, what is the evolving nature of the complex and increasingly tense relationship between the nascent EU project and both NATO and the United States? Those are the main questions which this study sets out to address.

Although the study looks at CESDP as a whole, and although it makes reference to the views and aspirations of most of the EU's fifteen member states, its main focus is on the evolving positions of the three countries which have been crucial to the entire process: France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The changing role of Germany has also been examined, although to a lesser extent. This is not to undervalue the various roles which will be played in CESDP by all European nations. It is simply a reflection of the fact that Paris, London and Washington have been the primary centres for the elaboration of the new balance which is being introduced into the Atlantic Alliance.

Overall plan

This study will be structured in three main parts, corresponding to the 'whence', the 'where' and the 'whither' of the CESDP project:

- *Where is CESDP coming from?* Without going into distant history, it is nevertheless important to understand how and why the frustrations of the period 1989-97 gave way to the breakthroughs of 1998-2000. This section will highlight the different starting points and approaches between the main national actors involved: France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The emphasis will be on appreciating the difference between an EU-focused approach (France) and an Alliance-focused approach (UK), as well as on understanding the complex historical processes which have produced the current convergence between them.
- *Where is the CESDP project today?* This chapter will involve an analysis of the main problems which preoccupied decision-makers between 1999 and the end of 2000. What were the different national aims and objectives with regard to the new EU security institutions, and with regard to the reality and finality of the new military forces underpinning the Headline Goal. How cohesive and compatible are these different strategic visions? What are the prospects for the smooth functioning of the EU's new

security and defence institutions launched at the Cologne and Helsinki Councils in 1999? What might be the evolving relationship between national capitals and these new multilateral, intergovernmental institutions? What are the realistic prospects for the EU mobilising sufficient European military capacity to carry out operations effectively and (therefore) to begin to carry weight politically and diplomatically? Within what timeframe? What is to be the balance within the EU's emerging CESDP between the military and the civil aspects of crisis management? What are the implications for equipment procurement? And, above all, what is the current status of the relationship between the EU and NATO/the United States? To what extent does the accelerating pace of CESDP both reflect and stimulate divergent tendencies between the EU and the United States? Has ESDI been subsumed under the broader umbrella of CESDP, or are these two projects developing along distinct and even potentially competing tracks?

- *Where is the CESDP going to?* This chapter will focus on the future implications of the new European security challenge. What are the longer-term ambitions of the main European countries in the field of defence and security, and how compatible are they with each other? How will this impact on defence budgets and military planning? How will CESDP arrive at an agreeable division of labour with NATO and the United States? How will the evolution of this most political of the EU's instruments affect the internal and external evolution of the Union itself? What is to be the geographical or geostrategic reach of any future European military capacity? What are the values and norms which will be marshalled to underpin and justify EU military missions, and in whose name would any such missions be undertaken? How will the CESDP balance and reconcile the EU's various commitments to the ethics of international relations and to arms control regimes; to military efficiency and to democratic accountability? In short, in what ways will the emerging CESDP reflect a specifically *European* approach to security and defence which can be seen as distinct from the approach both of the United States and of NATO?

The integration of security and defence – Europe's initial starting point – remains the final, and the greatest, challenge facing the Union.

Chapter One

WHERE IS CESDP COMING FROM?

I.1 Hegemony and the European pillar

The notion that ‘Europe’ – meaning, to all intents and purposes, the countries comprising the various postwar integration projects (EEC/EC/EU) – should legitimately aspire to construct its own security narrative in a state of relative autonomy from the United States is by no means a post-St-Malo phenomenon. As early as the last years of the Second World War, planners in both London and Algiers/Paris devised schemes for the creation, in a postwar world, of a security community involving the main countries of Western Europe.¹³ These schemes for what became known as the ‘Western Union’ underpinned the defensive treaties of 1947 (Dunkirk) and 1948 (Brussels), both of which were predicated on the assumption that European security could and should essentially be underwritten by the European powers themselves. However, even before the ink was dry on the Brussels Treaty – which, as much as any other single document, can be seen as the first real step towards the European Community – the European *security* context had been radically transformed by the onset of the Cold War and the emergence of Russia (as opposed to Germany) as the main threat to peace. This shift had two main consequences. First, it rapidly became apparent that the European ‘powers’ were in no position at all to guarantee their own security. France was already becoming bogged down in an unwinnable colonial war in Indochina. Britain was economically exhausted and massively overstretched, with unsustainable imperial pretensions. Germany was in ruins, Italy was little better and Spain was elsewhere. The Europeans may have had plans for pooling their steel and coal, but they were incapable of defending themselves. Second, it was equally obvious that European security could only effectively be underwritten by the United States, which was urgently enjoined by France and Britain to enter into an ‘entangling alliance’, binding the destinies of the two continents in an Atlantic security community. Even so, it was not the intention of those who framed the

¹³ Young, op. cit. in note 3, pp. 5-14; Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Cold War and the Division of Germany, 1945-1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Documents on *European Recovery and Defence, March 1947 to April 1949* (London: RIIA, 1949); R. G. Hawtrey, *Western European Union: implications for the UK* (London: RIIA, 1949).

Washington Treaty in 1949 that the United States should emerge as the undisputed hegemon within the Alliance, *the one* which was considerably *more equal* than all the others. Indeed, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, at its outset, seemed predicated on the development of two roughly equal military pillars, whose combined articulation was perceived as creating a clear positive-sum relationship.¹⁴ The equal pillars concept simply never happened.

It was the emergency created by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 which transformed NATO from the original relatively balanced blueprint into a hegemonic alliance dominated by the United States.¹⁵ And yet, even here, it is worth emphasising that when, in September 1950, President Truman took advantage of the Korean crisis to deploy four US divisions to Europe, this was subsequently only endorsed by Congress on the basis of a resolution which insisted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 'should certify that the European allies were making a realistic effort on behalf of European defence'.¹⁶ In other words, there has been a permanent tendency within the Euro-Atlantic partnership for the United States to threaten Europe with the dissolution of the Alliance if the Europeans were not perceived to be pulling their weight. This view might appear to confirm French analyses of the Euro-Atlantic relationship, rather than British ones, although viewed from Washington there is a significant difference between burden sharing under a hegemon and autonomy within a two-pillar structure. This feature of the Europe-US relationship was to have very significant consequences in the mid-1990s. American leadership from 1950 onwards was to become both the necessary force which gave the Alliance credibility and direction and the irritant which was to inform both French withdrawal from the integrated military structures (1966) and most of the periodic bouts of 'transatlantic blues' which have punctuated the Alliance's history.¹⁷

¹⁴ Indeed, the initial disputes all centred on what was perceived as US *reluctance* to become properly involved in European security. See, on this, Don Cook, *Forging the Alliance, 1945-1950* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1989), Chapters 9-11. The reality was that the Europeans practically begged the US to assume a leadership role.

¹⁵ Michael Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 16-33.

¹⁶ Stanley R. Sloan 'Burden-sharing in NATO: The US and Transatlantic Burden-sharing', *Les Notes de l'IFRI* 12 (Paris: IFRI, 1999), p. 12.

¹⁷ On 'transatlantic blues', Adam Bronstone, *European Union-United States Security Relations: transatlantic tensions and the theory of international relations* (London:

Attempts to imagine burden-sharing schemes which would create something approximating a two-pillar structure always foundered on the twin reefs of European divisions and American ambivalence. European divisions took the form of contradictory reactions to a succession of French initiatives essentially designed to give Europe at least a measure of autonomy (European Defence Community, Fouchet Plan, Franco-German Treaty, European Political Cooperation).¹⁸ While some countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and to a lesser extent Italy and even Germany) might pay lip service to France's European ambitions, support never actually went much beyond lip service. On the other hand, strong opposition was forthcoming from Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. European nations were also divided – but in different ways – in their responses to the political dilemma posed by integration: how to pool the very essence of sovereignty – responsibility for national defence?¹⁹ The Europeans were unable to decide which was the lesser evil: defence integration or US hegemony. American ambivalence towards 'Europe as power' has remained consistent throughout the entire history of NATO. The United States recognises the need for the Alliance, but (particularly Congress) resents the cost and occasionally even the commitment. Washington demands American leadership of the Alliance, but constantly calls for greater European burden-sharing²⁰ and occasionally ponders renewed isolationism.²¹ In short, to quote a recent commentator, the United States has never clearly decided 'whether its security is better assured by dominating Europe or by withdrawing from it'.²²

Macmillan, 1997); on France and NATO, Maurice Vaïsse et al., *La France et l'OTAN 1949-1996* (Brussels: Complexe, 1996).

¹⁸ Jolyon Howorth, 'National Defence and European Security Integration: an Illusion Inside a Chimera?', in Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon (eds.), *The European Union and National Defence Policy* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 10-22.

¹⁹ See, on this, Nicole Gnesotto, *La Puissance et l'Europe* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1998), pp. 11-12.

²⁰ On the initial debates: Kennedy, op. cit. in note 6 on the more recent debates: Gnesotto, op. cit. in note 6.

²¹ For the recent argument in favour of isolationism, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press and Harvey M. Sapolsky, 'Come Home, America. The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation', *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 4, Spring 1997, pp. 5-48.

²² William Pfaff, 'For Sovereignty, Europe Must Have Its Own Defense', *International Herald Tribune*, 30 May 2000.

So long as Europe was threatened by Cold War nuclear holocaust, US hegemony reigned supreme, marred only by the occasional petulant whining of European nations, resentful of Washington's superpower status but unable and unwilling to challenge it.²³ The end of the Cold War might logically have been expected to transform that situation. With no massive, identifiable, single, overwhelming threat to European security, the need for a complicated alliance with an ambivalent American ally logically became less compelling. Many were those, who, in the period 1989-92, foresaw the imminent demise of NATO as a functioning alliance.²⁴ But it failed signally to happen. Indeed, contrary to general expectation, NATO rose to ever greater prominence. There were several key reasons for NATO's Phoenix-like revival throughout the 1990s. The first was the simple military fact that NATO was the only serious defence/security force available, at a time when the need for combat forces (far from disappearing, as some had assumed) was in fact growing constantly. The second was the political reality that any hypothetical *alternative* security narratives (a Russian penchant for a return to balance of power politics; a German-Czech hankering for prioritisation of the CSCE/OSCE; and above all hypothetical French plans for a resurgent WEU²⁵) all proved to be non-starters. The third reason, which underpinned the two previous ones, was the harsh reality of war – in the Gulf, in the Balkans and in other trouble-spots requiring the robust ministrations of an efficient fighting force. Although NATO was not optimally configured for non-Article 5 military intervention, and although many NATO member states, foremost among which was the United Kingdom, were initially opposed to its adoption of such missions, the fact remained that only NATO could assume this responsibility: hence the *de facto* shift from collective defence to collective security.²⁶ A fourth reason came from an unexpected

²³ Anton W. Deporte, *Europe between the Superpowers. The enduring balance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

²⁴ Perhaps the best critical overview of the realist and neo-realist literature predicting the demise of NATO is to be found in Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, 'Neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and the future of NATO', *Security Studies*, 1993, 3, pp. 3-43; see, for the opposite viewpoint, Charles L. Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 1, Summer 1993, pp. 5-50.

²⁵ Robert B. McCalla, 'NATO's persistence after the Cold War', *International Organization*, 50, 3, Summer 1996, pp. 445-75; Stuart Croft, 'Four alternative Security Narratives for Europe 1989-1995', Paper delivered to the conference of the European Community Studies Association, Seattle, May 1997.

²⁶ David Yost, *NATO Transformed, The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998). See also Jean-Marie

source: France. As the reality of military intervention struck home to a nation weaned on nuclear deterrence and the virtues of *la non-bataille*, the French gradually came to three conclusions: first, that there was now a serious risk of US withdrawal – a prospect which had been virtually unthinkable during the Cold War; second, that European security would be seriously compromised if US withdrawal actually took place; and third that, in the context of ever increasing military intervention, the efficiency of the French military machine required interoperability with NATO.²⁷ Hence, France's 1995 rapprochement with NATO.²⁸ A fifth reason for NATO's revival came from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which had been held hostage by the Soviet Union for fifty years. They saw their immediate salvation as deriving not from membership of the European Union (a prospect which eventually opened up – but only as a long-term goal – in 1993), but from membership of NATO, a prospect which, as late as early 1994, would have appeared fanciful to most serious analysts, but which in fact – for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland at least – proved to be a far more rapid process than EU accession. The drive for NATO enlargement, which gathered speed in the mid-1990s, was a major element in the NATO success story.²⁹

I.2 CFSP: an 'alternative' European security narrative?

But what of the failure of the 'alternative European narrative'? Thousands of pages of published work have been devoted to analysing the fortunes of the EU's adoption, at Maastricht in December 1991, and subsequent development of the project for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP).³⁰ There are those who have suggested that, in the period 1989 to

Guéhenno, 'L'OTAN après la guerre froide. Une nouvelle jeunesse?' *Critique Internationale*, vol. 7, avril 2000, pp. 101-22.

²⁷ See, on this, Anand Menon, *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence: the Politics of Ambivalence* (London: Macmillan, 2000), esp. Chapter 2, 'France, NATO and the Alliance, 1981-1997'.

²⁸ Robert P. Grant, 'France's New Relationship with NATO', *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 58-80; Gilles Andréani, 'La France et l'OTAN après la Guerre Froide', *Politique Etrangère*, 1998, no. 1, pp. 77-92.

²⁹ Among the many excellent articles on NATO enlargement, see James M. Goldgeier, 'NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 21:1, Winter 1998, pp. 85-102.

³⁰ See Bibliography on CFSP, below, pp. 98-9.

1994, France possessed a sort of blueprint for an autonomous EU force based on the WEU.³¹ If any such blueprint existed, it would certainly have been a French one. France has consistently argued that there is an alternative to a hegemonic NATO, and has regularly proposed ‘alternative’ scenarios. But, during the immediate post-Wall period, the reality is more complex.

Given the centrality to the entire CESDP story of French aspirations for autonomy, and of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ resistance to such notions, it is worth analysing closely the security debates of the early 1990s. For there is a sense in which the successful developments of 1998-2000 were already being actively pursued by certain countries in the earlier period. But they failed signally to materialise. It is important to understand why the ‘CESDP project’ failed in the earlier period but succeeded only a few years later. There is no doubt that there were, within the French defence establishment in the late 1980s and early 1990s, individuals – both political and military – who advocated genuine *autonomy* for Europe in the field of security and even defence.³² But such aspirations never came close to reflecting official government policy, or even thinking. Under François Mitterrand, throughout the 1980s, France had adopted a dual approach involving both greater proactivism in the promotion of European defence cooperation and greater openness in intensifying links with NATO.³³ Once the Cold War ended, a brief historical window opened (1989-93) during which the ‘West’ as a whole engaged in an open-ended debate about new strategic directions. That debate threw up the entire range of options, from the total demise of NATO to its assumption of the role of universal policeman, from the creation of an alternative European armed force to the total demilitarisation and wholesale civilianisation of Europe.³⁴ In that debate, there is no doubt that France was

³¹ Samy Cohen, *Mitterrand et la Sortie de la Guerre Froide* (Paris: PUF, 1998), pp. 1-5; Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 172-178; Menon, op. cit. in note 27, Chapter 5, ‘A European Alternative’.

³² Even so, it is difficult to find chapter and verse on this. A statement by Jean-Pierre Chevènement in October 1987, shortly before he became defence minister, is the exception which proves the rule: ‘It is time that Europe thought about ensuring by itself its own defence . . . Today, the aim must be to replace the American defence of Europe with an autonomous European defence’. Quoted in Menon, op. cit. in note 27, p. 122.

³³ Philip H. Gordon, op. cit. in note 31; Frédéric Bozo, *La France et l’OTAN: de la Guerre Froide au Nouvel Ordre Européen* (Paris: Masson, 1991).

³⁴ See, on this, Holly Wyatt-Walter, *The European Community and the Security Dilemma 1989-1992* (London: Macmillan, 1997).

the main advocate of a more autonomous European defence system. It is difficult to pin down with any precision the detailed policy preferences of the French government as a whole, in part because there were different tendencies within it (especially after *cohabitation* in 1993) and in part because François Mitterrand himself was always an equivocal thinker, never being content to plump for a single strategic approach if he could have two other (perhaps even contradictory) ones in reserve. Moreover, one must constantly bear in mind the shortfall between an abstract or theoretical foreign and security policy discourse and the realities of power and influence on the ground. However, to the extent to which it is today possible to lay down any clear analytical signposts for French declaratory policy in this period, they would probably be the following.³⁵

- An assumption that the new historical environment would almost certainly lead to a new equilibrium in transatlantic relations, that elusive re-balancing of the Euro-American relationship which had been the very cornerstone of French policy throughout the Cold War.
- A conviction that the Atlantic Alliance (and indeed NATO) would continue in business, but in a significantly restructured form, with a new division of labour between, on the one hand, its collective defence (Article 5) responsibilities and, on the other, both its political functions and any putative emerging collective security role that might be assumed. The latter functions would progressively become the responsibility of the EC/EU.
- An aspiration towards an ever greater security (and possibly, in the longer term, defence) role for the European Union, probably via WEU, but with no hard and fast notion as to how far this could go or what institutional/political shape it might assume.
- A belief that the absorption, into some Western political structure or another, of the Central and East European countries recently emerged from the Soviet stranglehold would be a task assumed primarily by the CSCE/OSCE or by the EC/EU rather than by NATO or by the United States.
- An immediate recognition, not shared by many other countries, that the end of the Cold War did not imply the end of threats to European security,

³⁵ Philip H. Gordon, op. cit. in note 31, Chapter 7; Anand Menon, op. cit. in note 27, pp. 39-49; Sean Gregory, *French Defence Policy into the Twenty-First Century* (London: Macmillan, 2000), Chapter 2.

and an understanding that notions of a 'peace dividend' largely reflected wishful thinking. The defence budget needed to be maintained.

Symbolically, these multiple (yet by no means necessarily incompatible) policy guidelines were comprehensively demonstrated on a single day: 19 April 1990. In the early morning, François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl published a joint letter to the Irish Presidency of the EC, calling on member states to engage in an intergovernmental conference on political union which would progressively develop a common foreign and security policy. This letter not only consecrated the official healing of a Franco-German relationship which had been badly bruised by post-Wall German moves towards rapid unification; it also represented the first official declaration of a European intention to develop a relatively autonomous foreign and security policy. Later that morning, Mitterrand flew by *Concorde* to Key Largo in Florida where he engaged in wide-ranging discussions with President Bush about the future of the Atlantic Alliance. The Key Largo meeting contains in miniature the entire gamut of Franco-American contradictions which continue to some extent to this day. From the US perspective, the primary strategic objective was the definition of a new role for NATO that would involve both structured dialogue with the former members of the Warsaw Pact and the definition of what would later be called 'Petersberg' (collective security) tasks in the European theatre. From the French viewpoint, although NATO remained the key alliance in Article 5 terms, the new strategic objectives were the stabilisation of Central and Eastern Europe, and the emergence of what would shortly be labelled a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) for the assumption of crisis management or collective security tasks, both of which France saw as essentially *European* responsibilities. The texts of the Key Largo meetings make it clear that, although Bush and Mitterrand believed (or at least pretended to believe) they had been more or less on the same wavelength, they had in fact been talking past each other in a systematic way.³⁶ Although Bush did indeed refer to the need to establish political dialogue between the EC and the United States, and although he envisaged a strengthened role for CSCE in a reconciled Europe, his overwhelming concern was for the future of NATO. Similarly, although Mitterrand paid fulsome tribute to the

³⁶ *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, April 1990, pp. 76-81; Jacques Attali, *Verbatim* (Paris: Fayard, 1995), vol. III, pp. 467-72.

Atlantic Alliance,³⁷ and even specified that the united Germany must be a full member of NATO, his primary focus was on the new deal for Central and Eastern Europe (both via CSCE and via his recent project for a European *Confédération*³⁸) and on strengthening the political role of the EC. The United States wanted to transform NATO from a military to a much more political alliance, embracing collective security tasks and immediately restructuring NATO's military forces to reflect that new reality. France wanted to maintain the Alliance as a strictly collective defence structure and to ensure that the politics of European transformation should essentially be the responsibility of the EC – in close cooperation with Russia. As for military restructuring in NATO, the French view was that this should await the outcome of political dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic, which would lay down the precepts for a new strategic balance. Mitterrand returned from Key Largo convinced that Bush had agreed to his proposal for an end-of-year 'Grand Summit' of the Alliance, at which this broader politico-strategic agenda would be given a full airing. Alas, the French President had failed to appreciate a significant paradox: that, whereas during the Cold War, France's role had actually been crucial to NATO, in the post-Wall world, it was far less indispensable and could no longer command the same attention in the White House and the Pentagon.³⁹

From the French perspective, the two approaches outlined at Key Largo seemed utterly incompatible, and US plans for NATO made no sense. As Gilles Andréani put it: 'Why make NATO the framework for cooperation with an 'East' which had ceased to be a bloc, to the detriment of CSCE, for whom this was the natural function? Was this not just going to encourage the countries of Central Europe to demand NATO expansion – which at the time nobody wanted – and to encourage the Russians in the opposite illusion – that NATO was destined to lose its cohesion and its features as a military alliance, something else which nobody, including the French, wanted to happen'.⁴⁰ French irritation at the American project for the revitalisation of

³⁷ NB he did specify 'in the areas defined by the treaty' ('dans les domaines définis par le traité') – i.e. Article 5.

³⁸ François Mitterrand and Vaclav Havel, *Prague 1991: Assises de la Confédération Européenne* (Paris: Editions de l'Aube, 1991).

³⁹ Gilles Andréani, 'La France et l'OTAN après la guerre froide', *Politique Etrangère*, 1998/1, p. 81.

⁴⁰ 'Pourquoi faire de l'OTAN un cadre de coopération politique avec un 'Est' qui avait cessé d'être un bloc, au détriment de la CSCE dont c'était la fonction naturelle?

NATO was intensified in the weeks after Key Largo, when several things became clear. First, the 'grand summit' of NATO, for which both presidents had called, instead of being properly and carefully prepared by intensive discussions aimed at agreeing on long-term diplomatic and political objectives, was hastily convened in London for early July on the basis of short-term military reforms aimed primarily at reassuring the Russians. Second, the military reforms in question (especially the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force) involved *both* a reinforcement of NATO's integrated command structure, which Paris at this time was even more prone to challenge, *and* a sort of pre-emptive takeover bid on non-Article 5 crisis management in Europe, a role which Paris had clearly earmarked for the EC.

And yet, as the Gulf crisis and war were to make abundantly clear within a year of Key Largo, France (and Europe) were in no position to press for a greater role either in regional crisis management or in Continental collective security. History will record two main features of French policy in the Gulf crisis: first, an immediate alignment on American politico-strategic objectives (at the expense of Paris's long-term elaboration of a distinctive 'Arab policy'); and second, an attempt at 'alternative diplomacy' which ultimately proved irrelevant.⁴¹ Moreover, France's experience of participating in a multinational force commanded by a US general under NATO procedures for interoperability was both humiliating and revealing – particularly for the military. Any illusions which might have remained about France's (and Europe's) capacity to underwrite the collective security of the Continent were shattered in the Saudi Arabian desert. When the French defence establishment gathered in April 1991 at the *Ecole de Guerre* for a collective reappraisal of the lessons of the Gulf, some believed that President Mitterrand, in his closing oration, would announce France's full return to the Alliance's integrated military structure. There were widespread

N'allait-on pas encourager ainsi les pays d'Europe centrale à demander l'élargissement de l'OTAN – dont à l'époque personne ne voulait – et encourager les Russes dans l'illusion inverse, que l'OTAN allait perdre sa cohésion et son caractère d'alliance militaire, ce dont les alliés, y compris la France, ne voulaient pas davantage?' Gilles Andréani, op. cit. in note 39, p. 79.

⁴¹ Jolyon Howorth, 'French Policy in the Conflict', in Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane (eds.), *International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict 1990-1991* (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 175-200; for the case in favour of 'alternative diplomacy', see Edgard Pisani, *Persiste et Signe* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1992), pp. 391-413.

nods of approval when the President made an emotional acknowledgement of France's historical debt to 'the great American ally', and then several audible gasps of disbelief when he nevertheless announced that there would be no return to the integrated military structure. Such a break with what had become over the years a Gaullist shibboleth, was to prove a step too far for a president who had already been following parallel security tracks (NATO and Europe) for almost a decade. It would take France a further five years to digest the strategic lessons of the Gulf War.

This was to be the unsatisfactory pattern of the next few years, marked by occasional – somewhat desultory – statements of intent with regard to a European force, accompanied by equally occasional assertions of loyalty to and belief in the Alliance – all against a backdrop of growing chaos in the Balkans, which the Europeans alone proved quite incapable of stabilising. Meanwhile, alongside these national initiatives, and in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union began to put in place the embryonic structures required for the development of a CFSP. But clear visions as to what that might be were few and far between. Jacques Delors's keynote speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in April 1991⁴² played on the apparent dichotomy of an EU/WEU capacity as being *either* a 'bridge between Europe and the USA' *or* (alternatively) the 'defence arm of the EU' (which clearly had the preference of the President of the European Commission). The implication of the speech was that Europe must choose one or other of these options. Yet to choose the former was to perpetuate the subordination of Europe; to choose the latter was to precipitate decoupling. Neither, on its own, was a sensible option. Combined, they would have made much sense. Widely discussed at the time, Delors's speech gave rise to more confusion than lucidity. The launch of the Franco-German army corps in 1991 was similarly riddled with barely concealed ambiguities. Eurocorps, which most analysts believed to be politically significant but militarily inadequate, was promoted as the embryo of a European army, yet designated in December 1992 as coming under NATO command in the event of Article 5 missions. France's insistence that WEU should send a separate naval task force to the Adriatic to patrol alongside the NATO task force was strong on political symbolism but weak on operational good sense, even though in the longer term it did provide WEU with genuine operational experience. France's 1994 Defence White Paper (*Livre Blanc*)

⁴² Jacques Delors, 'European Integration and Security', *Survival*, vol. 33, no. 2, 1991.

went further than ever before in linking national defence into a European framework, even though the fail-safe references to the Alliance are also abundant. The creation of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR in 1995 was a logical concomitant of the Mediterranean thrust of the parallel 'Barcelona process'.⁴³ Nuclear and air force cooperation with the United Kingdom rounded off a series of bilateral initiatives which, cumulatively, placed France at the centre of a European web of defensive initiatives which was none the less more theoretical than real. To be sure, some of these initiatives were driven by a growing awareness that the EC/EU needed cost-saving synergies wherever it could find them, and the results were not insignificant. Ultimately, all these symbols could be made to add up to a 'policy' which analysts could detect as being informed with aspirations towards genuine security autonomy. In reality, nothing was probably further from the mind of Europe's leaders (including those of France) during this chaotic period where no agency and certainly no individual was really in control of the historical forces few had imagined were still present in Europe. At the Franco-German summit in October 1991, which consecrated the launch of *Eurocorps*, an unrealistic proposal by President Mitterrand in favour of using this new European armed force to intervene in the Balkans was probably only made in the knowledge that it would be vetoed by the United Kingdom (to the obvious relief of Germany). Never was there any serious consideration given to a credible, purely European, intervention force for the Balkans. The French Army, after all, was still configured for territorial defence and massively based on conscription – which explained why, out of a total armed force of almost 300,000, France had only been able to muster 15,000 troops to serve in the Gulf.

Therefore, in answer to the question: why did the alternative European security narrative fail to materialise, one might ask another question: 'What alternative European security narrative?' It must be appreciated that these years (1989-93) were quite exceptional. All sorts of theories and ideas were abroad, most of them interesting, many of them totally unrealistic. Statesmen and political leaders had great difficulty keeping up with the pace of events, let alone attempting to devise for them some sense of direction. Nobody had a blueprint for anything. It is true that France, in these years, was eager to develop European structures which would bind Germany

⁴³ Martin Ortega (ed.), 'The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean security dialogue', *Occasional Papers* 14 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, March 2000).

politically to the EU. While the project for economic and monetary union (EMU) ultimately proved highly successful in this regard, Franco-German defence proposals hardly amounted to a blueprint for a new model European army. To speak, therefore, of 'French attempts to create purely European security structures to rival NATO'⁴⁴ is to speak in essentially figurative or hypothetical terms. No such attempts can actually be chronicled. Nor should it be assumed in this period that NATO or the United States was totally hostile to some new form of genuine military burden-sharing. While the US executive branch tended to devote more attention to the strategic coherence of NATO defence policy, Congressional concerns were always more geared to cost-cutting and budgetary rigour.⁴⁵ A succession of Washington statements alternated between two basic messages: first, any attempt to subvert, displace or replace NATO would be deplored and resisted by the United States; second, any attempts to put in place genuinely European structures from inside the Atlantic framework would be warmly welcomed.⁴⁶

The project for a European Pillar was increasingly influenced, particularly within domestic US politics, by a renewed and intensified debate over burden-sharing. The resurgence of transatlantic tensions over defence spending was sparked by the Bosnian War. The Europeans proved totally unprepared to handle that tragic situation (contrary to their own predictions and to US expectations in the early stages). It was that abject state of unpreparedness which so appalled Tony Blair when, in 1998, he was first briefed on Europe's potential capacity to engage militarily in a hypothetical war in Kosovo. Moreover, the Clinton administration, by committing substantial US troops to IFOR, ensured that the years 1995-97 were marked in Congress by veritable guerrilla warfare over burden-sharing, a battle which was seriously aggravated by the subsequent 1998 debate over the cost of NATO enlargement. Together, these two elements (European military inadequacy and US budgetary concerns) raised in acute form the question of how much longer the American public would be prepared to underwrite an alliance in which the European side was increasingly widely believed to be

⁴⁴ Menon, op. cit. in note 27, p. 127.

⁴⁵ See, on this, Stanley R. Sloan, *The US and Transatlantic Burdensharing*, vol. 2 of Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), op. cit. in note 6, pp. 7-10.

⁴⁶ Mike Winnerstig, 'Rethinking Alliance Dynamics: The US, NATO and the Idea of an Independent European Defence 1989-1996', Paper presented to the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, March 1997, pp. 20-9.

free-riding.⁴⁷ These were to be the two main issues which, historically, led to St-Malo and to the entire CESDP project. Indeed, the battles over Bosnia policy between the UK government of John Major and the Clinton administration were so intense that even Major became convinced that some type of 'European solution' had to be found.⁴⁸ But none of this was clear at the time. While the media focused on the horrors of Bosnia, the politicians squabbled over who was to be responsible for putting an end to those horrors – and above all on who would foot the bill. The early 1990s were therefore a time when nothing much was clear to anybody, even to the most visionary of statesmen. The entire geostrategic focus of the Euro-Atlantic area was blurred. History was moving too fast for anybody to keep abreast. Scholarly analyses which appear to detect sharp lines of division between clear-sighted groups of actors pursuing well-defined goals are simply misleading. It was not until the mid-1990s that guideposts became apparent and it was possible to detect the emergence of relatively lucid and comprehensible policy preferences among the leading actors. The starting point for this was the advent of a new Administration in Washington and a fresh approach to Euro-American relations inspired by a President whose priorities were to do with the economy and with trade rather than with security and defence.

I.3 From ESDI to CESDP

ESDI was unofficially 'launched' at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels in January 1994. Whatever its precise parentage (Paris, London and Washington all played some role as midwife), it was initially conceived largely as a technical-military arrangement which would allow the Europeans to assume a greater share of the burden for security missions through access to those NATO assets and capabilities which European member states did not possess.⁴⁹ But it also had a transformative political

⁴⁷ On all this, see Sloan, op. cit. in note 16, pp. 21-41.

⁴⁸ Jane Sharp, *Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion: British Policy in Former Yugoslavia* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997).

⁴⁹ *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government*, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 10-11 January 1994, NATO Press Communiqué M-1(94)3. Para. 4: 'We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity [which] will strengthen the European Pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link'; para.6: 'We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the

dimension in that it posited a willingness on the part of NATO as an institution and on the part of the United States, as the foremost NATO member state, to countenance a greater security role for the EU. Ultimately, the *political* message of ESDI (that a clearer, bigger European role was both acceptable and desirable) acquired more importance than the technical-military arrangements designed essentially to provide access to NATO/US assets. NATO's 'green light' to ESDI unleashed a political process which eventually led to the St-Malo summit and on to Cologne, Helsinki and the CESDP.

Several factors were important in this process. First, by the mid-1990s, both the United Kingdom and France, in part as a result of their joint experiences on the ground in Bosnia, were arriving at similar conclusions concerning the future security relations between the United States and Europe. Both were conscious of the marked and growing reluctance of Washington to continue writing blank cheques in favour of European security. Both were increasingly fearful of the consequences of Congressional swings towards either isolationism or a new burden-sharing debate. In France, for a variety of practical reasons, a politico-military consensus emerged in favour of moving closer to NATO. Among those reasons were the requirements of interoperability, command and control procedures and the perceived need to shore up the US commitment to Europe. In Britain the Government, largely at the urging of the MOD, took on the role of honest broker between Paris and Washington with a view to smoothing the path for French 're-entry'. Although France had been gradually shifting its position on NATO ever since the arrival in power of François Mitterrand in 1981, the shifts had hitherto been largely symbolic. After the end of the Cold War, however, the requirements of practical cooperation with the Alliance all militated in favour of more serious rapprochement. France continued to deny that the objective was eventual return to the integrated military structure, although in December 1995 even that prospect was held out as the possible *quid pro quo* for genuine and radical restructuring of the Alliance. It was in this context that the British role as honest broker between Paris and Washington was

Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy'.

both crucial and not entirely disinterested.⁵⁰ The result was NATO's June 1996 Berlin ministerial meeting, which in many ways turned out to be the high-point of ESDI. Berlin was predicated on a two-way deal involving a US commitment to support a meaningful European military capacity (through CJTFs and other means) and a French commitment to move towards full integration of a restructured Alliance.⁵¹ In theory, the political potential of the Berlin meeting was very considerable.

Things began to go wrong immediately. First, there was the protracted stand-off between Jacques Chirac and Bill Clinton over the AFSOUTH command.⁵² Second, there was the growing British reluctance, within the context of the Intergovernmental Conference leading to the Amsterdam Treaty, to countenance any significant merger of WEU and the EU.⁵³ By this time in the tragic life of the John Major government, such a prospect, however logical and even appealing to an evolving British security awareness, had become a victim of the internal politics of the Conservative Party.⁵⁴ Third, there was the growing swell of opinion in the United States (as well as in Central and Eastern Europe) in favour of NATO enlargement – a procedure which, far from giving greater responsibility for European security to the EU, in effect extended American hegemony across the entire

⁵⁰ On France, see Grant, Andréani, op. cit. in note 28. On Britain, see Jolyon Howorth, 'Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 5, no. 3, Summer 2000, pp. 1-20.

⁵¹ *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996, NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)63. It was significant that, while the Anglo-Saxon press saw Berlin as a tightening of alliance ties ('A New Kind of Alliance', *The Economist*, 1 June 1996, pp. 19-21, 'NATO Attempts a Second Creation', *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 3 June 1996); the French press put the emphasis on European 'emancipation' ('OTAN, les Européens tentent de s'émanciper de la tutelle américaine', *Libération*, 4 June 1996, 'Les Etats-Unis renoncent à leur hégémonie', *La Croix*, 4 June 1996, 'Alliance Atlantique: une place pour l'Europe', *Le Figaro*, 4 June 1996).

⁵² On the AFSOUTH stand-off, see Gilles Delafon and Thomas Sancton, *Dear Jacques Cher Bill...* (Paris: Plon, 1998), pp. 194-218; Guillaume Parmentier, 'France and NATO, 1995-1997: Hopes Unfilled', Paper presented to conference on 'The Transformation of NATO and the Question of European Unity', University of Washington, 5 May 2000.

⁵³ 'EU-WEU: Text of the Document of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg on the Gradual Integration of the WEU into the European Union', *Atlantic News*, no. 2906, 3 April 1997.

⁵⁴ Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair* (London: Macmillan, 1998), Chapter 11, 'John Major at the Heart of Darkness'.

continent.⁵⁵ When, only one year after the NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin, at the Amsterdam Council meeting in June 1997, the incoming UK prime minister Tony Blair vetoed the proposal for a phased merger of the EU and WEU, it appeared to many observers that ESDI's star was already on the wane.⁵⁶ History, and large doses of political voluntarism, however, were silently waiting in the wings. History took the form of new developments in the Balkans, where first Albania and then Kosovo succeeded Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia in generating a crisis between Milosevic's Serbia and the West. The divergent interpretations of that crisis, and particularly of the ways to deal with it, which marked the responses of, on the one hand, the United States, and, on the other hand, the principal countries of the European Union, led political leaders in Europe to look afresh at the entire structure of EU-US relations. Nowhere was this process more far-reaching than in London, where Tony Blair, anxious to carve out some European role for the United Kingdom, looked on with growing frustration as his friend Bill Clinton, guided and advised by Richard Holbrooke, stumbled from one unsatisfactory approach to Belgrade to another, while Europe attempted vainly to rattle sabres that hardly existed. The Atlantic Alliance, it was concluded in London, was in serious trouble.

Eventually, this historical process and this political will fused, and Tony Blair crossed the European defence Rubicon. In July 1998, the United Kingdom's *Strategic Defence Review* (which in other respects had been conducted with scant attention to European considerations) spoke for the first time of the 'vital role' of the EU's common foreign and security policy. In October, at an informal EU summit in Pörtschach, Austria, the UK prime minister indicated that he would have no objections to the development of an EU defence policy if certain conditions were met.⁵⁷ On 4 December 1998, the St-Malo summit advocated an 'autonomous' political and military

⁵⁵ William Wallace, *Opening the Door: the Eastern enlargement of the EU and NATO* (London: CER, 1994), 50 pp.

⁵⁶ Alexander Moens, 'NATO's Dilemma and the Elusive European Defence Identity', in *Security Dialogue*, vol. 29, no. 4, December 1998; Helene Sjursen 'Missed Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy? The Idea of a European Security and Defence Policy', in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998). Nicole Gnesotto, in *La Puissance et l'Europe* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1998), which appeared just before the St-Malo initiative, also deplored the 'énième déception' which emerged in the aftermath of Berlin (pp. 42-57).

⁵⁷ It should be militarily credible, politically intergovernmental and NATO compatible.

capacity for the EU. The political process unleashed by Pörtschach and by St-Malo proved to be even more revolutionary than that which had been temporarily unleashed by ESDI. The fact that the United Kingdom was, from the winter of 1998 onwards, prepared to endorse the project of a European defence capacity overseen politically by the European Union, was indeed a 'revolution in military affairs'.⁵⁸ The European Pillar project now became something much more significant than a techno-military facility permitting the Europeans to borrow vital NATO assets in order to carry out missions authorised by the North Atlantic Council. Implicit in the St-Malo process is the gradual emergence of an autonomous EU capacity – both institutional (decision-making) and military (force structures) – which was always likely to grow into something which the Alliance in general and the United States in particular would look upon with feelings ranging from suspicion to alarm.⁵⁹ And that is precisely what happened. At the European Council in Cologne (June 1999), the EU bestowed upon itself the institutional framework necessary to take political decisions concerning security and defence matters, and at the Helsinki Council (December 1999), it established the target of the Headline Goal (see Annexes A and C).

In these circumstances, more and more commentators were becoming confused. Clearly, CESDP was something rather different from ESDI – an abbreviation which most journalists continued to use, well into the year 2000, to designate everything and anything connected with the 'European Pillar'. But it was not clear, for most of that year, what the difference was. ESDI had begun as a NATO project, but CESDP was very clearly an EU project. Obviously there was a great deal of interconnection between them. NATO sources tended rather defensively to argue that CESDP should not 'replace' or 'supersede' ESDI.⁶⁰ At the same time, nobody wished ESDI and CESDP to develop and evolve entirely separately from one another – nor indeed could they, since CESDP remained dependent on a close military

⁵⁸ On the Blair 'breakthrough', see Richard Whitman, 'Amsterdam's Unfinished Business? The Blair Government's Initiative and the Future of the Western European Union', *Occasional Papers* 7 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, January 1999); Jolyon Howorth, op. cit. in note 50.

⁵⁹ Sloan, op. cit. in note 1; Nicole Gnesotto and Karl Kaiser, 'European-American Interaction', Chapter III of op. cit. in note 10, pp. 33-44.

⁶⁰ Alexander Vershbow, address to WEU Transatlantic Forum, in Julian Lindley-French (ed.), 'Paris Transatlantic Forum: European Defence – European and American Perspectives', *Occasional Papers* 17 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, July 2000), pp. 22-4.

working relationship with NATO (of which ESDI was theoretically the key component). Obviously, CESDP had become the larger-scale project of the two. Its fullest scope involves nothing less than the formulation and implementation of a common security and defence policy for the EU and its hinterland. ESDI will remain for some years (and possibly on a permanent basis) an important component of that implementation. But it does not equate, either in comprehensiveness, ambition or scale, to CESDP. At the same time, to say that ESDI had been absorbed by CESDP would be to run ahead of reality. In the second half of 2000, as the structures of negotiation between the EU and NATO cranked awkwardly into gear, ESDI and CESDP remained rather like Siamese twins, struggling to retain their identity, yet bound inextricably the one to the other, and at the same time equally uncomfortable with the relationship.

Put at its most neutral, the relationship between ESDI and CESDP as at October 2000 was as follows. Although ESDI had existed for longer, it appeared to have recently been overtaken by CESDP in terms of accomplishments and genuine progress. NATO's June 1996 Berlin ministerial meeting had implied optimistically that all that remained to be done for ESDI to become operational was to implement the nuts and bolts of the CJTF arrangements.⁶¹ The Strategic Concept adopted by the April 1999 Washington summit implied that this had already been achieved: 'NATO has successfully adapted . . . Internal reform has included a new command structure, including the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the creation of arrangements to permit the rapid deployment of forces for the full range of the Alliance's missions, and the building of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance'.⁶² These arrangements were henceforth informally referred to in the jargon as 'Berlin Plus'. And yet, when pressed, NATO officials remained hard-put to offer specific examples of concrete progress on most of the trickiest issues connected with transfer of assets, parallel chains of command, planning procedures and the like. The February 2000 *Crisex* exercises jointly

⁶¹ 'Here in Berlin, we have taken a major step forward in shaping the new NATO . . . Today, we have taken decisions to carry further the ongoing adaptation of Alliance structures, so that the Alliance can more effectively carry out the full range of its missions, based on a strong transatlantic partnership.' Paragraph 2 of *Final Communiqué* cited in note 51 above.

⁶² [NATO], *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999), p. 6, para. 13.

mounted by NATO and WEU, which were designed precisely to test progress on ESDI, appeared to have thrown up a number of outstanding problems, making it clear that there was a great deal more work to be done before things could be said to be operating smoothly.⁶³ The May 2000 Florence ministerial meeting of the NAC hardly made any reference to ESDI, but devoted virtually all of its space to discussing the problems of initiating constructive dialogue between the EU and NATO, and repeated, regularly, the oblique ‘warnings’ that the role of the non-EU NATO allies was crucial to the successful outcome of those negotiations.⁶⁴ This was tantamount to recognising, in effect, that the ESDI project had gone on hold while CESDP had become the focus of everybody’s scrutiny and attention – and an object of continuing concern in Washington.

It is equally in the interests of both the EU and NATO to ensure that ESDI and CESDP develop in harmony with one another. Clearly, neither can function without the other. Everything will depend on the precise working relationship which is eventually established. But that will also depend on NATO (or more precisely, US) officials accepting that CESDP is something much broader and more far-reaching than ESDI, however important ESDI might have been as a historical vector facilitating the emergence of CESDP.

There were therefore three distinct momentums which produced the St-Malo/Helsinki process. The first was an American decision to tip the balance of US policy in favour of greater autonomy for the EU, primarily as a way of satisfying Congressional demands for burden-sharing, but also in the hope that this would relieve the pressure on an overstretched imperium with increasingly complex global security responsibilities.⁶⁵ This process involved no blueprint for the precise – or even approximate – balance which needed to be struck between US involvement and leadership, on the one hand, and European solidarity and autonomy on the other hand. To that

⁶³ There is considerable divergence in interpretation of the outcome of the *Crisex 2000* exercises. French sources stress the failures and inadequacies which were revealed; NATO sources insist that the exercise ‘worked pretty well’. Clearly, as an exercise, it was designed to test procedures. The real proof will be in seeing whether NATO succeeds in learning the lessons of *Crisex* and adapting its structures and procedures in accordance with those lessons.

⁶⁴ NATO Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Florence, 24 May 2000, *Final Communiqué*, Press Release M-NAC-1(2000)52, paras 27-34.

⁶⁵ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: economic change and military conflict 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1988).

extent, it remained somewhat ambivalent and left itself open to the contradictory verdicts of commentators, who did not fail to voice the general schizophrenia prevalent in the United States where European security was concerned. US policy on European defence is indeed on a knife-edge. Too much European capacity might call into question the bases of the Alliance; too little might lead to strategic decoupling.⁶⁶ The second momentum was the long-standing French pressure for the creation of a genuine European Pillar. This project has always been badly understood, particularly in the United States. In part, this derives from its Gaullist origins, where style often appeared to be as important as substance.⁶⁷ Moreover, France, for whatever reason, has never made it sufficiently clear where the 'Gaullist' project would draw the line of balance between the responsibilities of the two sides of the Atlantic, or indeed how it perceives the on-going relationship between a relatively autonomous EU and its 'hyperpowerful' US ally.⁶⁸ But the harsh reality of military intervention in Bosnia was sufficient catalyst for France to draw ever closer to NATO (for reasons of interoperability and military efficiency) and to posit a new and viable working relationship between Europe and the United States, albeit one which concentrates essentially on the construction of CESDP. The third – and arguably most crucial – momentum was the British decision to end a fifty-year-old veto on European defence integration. This decision was stimulated by the American debate over burden-sharing and facilitated by French rapprochement with the Alliance. It did not represent a British 'conversion' to the European cause – to the extent to which, for the United Kingdom, the starting point was a pragmatic attempt to preserve the Atlantic Alliance. If that meant constructing a European instrument (CESDP), then so be it.⁶⁹ The British will be obliged, progressively, to be engaged with the European processes so unleashed, but the unsatisfactory aspect of the British

⁶⁶ Gnesotto and Kaiser, op. cit. in note 10, pp. 36-7.

⁶⁷ Stanley Hoffmann, 'De Gaulle's Foreign Policy: The Stage and the Play; the Power and the Glory', in Stanley Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal: France since the 1930's* (New York: Viking, 1974), Chapter 10.

⁶⁸ Hubert Védrine, who coined the term *hyperpuissance*, fails, in his conversations with Dominique Moïsi, reported in *Les Cartes de la France à l'Heure de la Mondialisation* (Paris: Fayard, 2000), pp. 74-6, to provide a satisfactory response to these questions and seems content to suggest that there really is no problem.

⁶⁹ The UK Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon's speech to the Brookings Institution in January 2000 makes this quite explicit: 'Helsinki is all about enhancing military capability. It is not about political niceties . . . If hanging a 'European' tag on it is what it takes to make it happen, then so be it.'

momentum in 2000 was that too few analysts and policy-makers in London seemed actively to be asking where those processes were leading, or how far down that road the British might be prepared to go. A triple ambivalence, therefore, conveyed willy-nilly by powerful historical forces, led the EU into an unprecedented situation with regard to CESDP. The following chapter looks at the contemporary problems raised by the European defence challenge as France assumed the Presidency of the EU on 1 July 2000.

Chapter Two

WHERE IS THE CESDP PROJECT TODAY?

In the months between St-Malo and the Cologne EU Council meeting of June 1999, the German presidency was instrumental in bringing together the different strands of the embryonic CESDP in a coherent political-military project whose implementation is currently in train.⁷⁰ The defence and security project was predicated on the resolve of the European Council to give the Union the wherewithal to 'play its full role on the international stage'⁷¹ in the context of what was announced as an increasingly proactive Common Foreign and Security Policy. It was explicitly presented as a major new step in the direction of European integration. This implied that the EU should acquire significant political and military capacity, both to take decisions and to implement them. Neither capacity had hitherto been possible, decision-taking for want of any institutional framework, implementation for lack of serious military muscle. Cologne therefore agreed, echoing the words of St-Malo, that 'the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.' The Cologne meeting made full reference to the April 1999 Washington summit of the NAC, at which ESDI had received the formal blessing of the Alliance, in particular the assertion that 'a more effective role for the European Union . . . will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Alliance'. It was this rhetorical assertion of the positive-sum relationship between the EU and NATO which was subsequently to give rise to a certain measure of controversy as sceptics on both side of the Atlantic questioned not only the feasibility but also the wisdom of the EU's project. However, by now the 'genie was out of the bottle' and the project had begun to take on a life of its own.

⁷⁰ The best analytical overview of this crucial work is Mathias Jopp, *European Defence Policy: the Debate on the Institutional Aspects* (Bonn: Institut für Europäische Politik, July 1999).

⁷¹ The next few quotations are all from the Cologne EU Council meeting; see Annexe C for full text.

II.1 The institutional framework

The institutional framework for CESDP, set out at Cologne and launched at Helsinki, involved a number of key institutional innovations. These new institutions were put in place in the six months between October 1999 and March 2000. They include:

- The designation of former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana as the first *High Representative for CFSP* (HR-CFSP), a position which had originally been decided on at the EU Amsterdam Council in June 1997. The *High Representative* also combines the functions of Secretary-General of the European Council and, as of October 1999, Secretary-General of WEU.⁷² This accumulation of responsibilities underscores the political will of the EU to create, within the intergovernmental framework of the European Council, a single centre for politico-military planning, analysis and policy advice. However, the HR-CFSP's staff is minuscule. In addition to the normal support of a *cabinet*, the HR can rely on around twenty advisers drawn from all fifteen member states, who constitute the newly established *Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit* (PPEWU) – usually referred to simply as the Policy Unit. Moreover, the relationship between the post of HR and that of the European Commissioner for External Relations, remains unspecified and sensitive,⁷³ and the office's budget is extremely limited. By late-2000, the HR-CFSP was still searching for ways to acquire the credibility and gravitas which was originally intended to accrue to the function.

⁷² In the context of the intergovernmental conference leading up to the Nice EU Council meeting, there was even a proposal to make the HR-CFSP a Commissioner in his/her own right and Vice President of the Commission. See 'Barnier calls for stronger Commission', *European Voice*, 6-12 July 2000, p. 4. This was also proposed in the Franco-German document referred to below in note 168. Many analysts are in favour of turning the HR-CFSP post into a kind of State Department of the EU.

⁷³ In late June 2000, the incumbent External Relations commissioner, Chris Patten, in an internal European Commission draft paper, voiced concern that the creation of the HR-CFSP had complicated rather than simplified the exercise of foreign policy. He complained of an 'unresolved tension' between intergovernmentalism and Community action in foreign policy. This led to a cooling of relations between Patten and Solana. At its full session on 5 July 2000, the European Commission gave its backing to Patten's demand that the Commission should play a bigger role in foreign policy. See Peter Norman, 'Brussels backs Patten's foreign policy stance', *Financial Times*, 6 July 2000.

- The creation of a *Political and Security Committee* (PSC) comprising senior officials (ambassadorial level) of each EU member state, meeting twice a week in Brussels. The PSC's function is to monitor the development of crisis situations, organise – in liaison with the HR's Policy Unit – evaluation and forward planning, offer policy advice to the European Council and, in the event of actual EU military deployment to a crisis theatre, convene as the political control centre for the day-to-day direction of military operations. Pending definitive arrangements for the composition and remit of the PSC, an interim committee (iPSC) was established on 1 March 2000. It is anticipated that the definitive PSC will be chaired by the HR-CFSP, but the interim committee was chaired by the representative of the country holding the EU presidency.
- The creation of a *European Military Committee* (EMC), the highest EU military body, formally composed of the Chiefs of the Defence Staff of the fifteen member states meeting at least biannually, but normally represented by their military delegates who, in most cases, are double-hatted with each nation's NATO representative. In the interim period, this body was known as the interim Military Body (iMB). The iMB/EMC's function is to give military advice and to make recommendations, through the (i)PSC, to the European Council, as well as to provide military direction to the *European Military Staff* (see below). The Chair of the EMC is a four-star officer, normally a former Chief of Defence Staff, selected from outside the EMC by the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the member states. He participates as appropriate in the PSC and in NATO's Military Committee, and has a close working relationship with the HR-CFSP. He also attends meetings of the European Council when decisions with defence implications need to be taken.
- The creation of a *European Military Staff* (EMS) to provide military expertise and capacity to support the EU's CFSP, including during the conduct of EU-led military operations. The EMS works under the political direction of the European Council (through the (i)PSC) and under the military direction of the EMC. Although the EMS will not act as an operational HQ, it will perform the operational functions of early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning, provide a dedicated source of military expertise to the EU across the entire range of defence and security situations, act as an interface between the EU's political and military authorities and offer effective military support during the strategic planning phase of 'Petersberg' crisis-management situations. Its

working procedures are expected to be based on and compatible with those of NATO.

These arrangements clearly needed time to bed down and also to bring out the full implications for the existing institutional structures of the CFSP/CESDP. In particular, two significant anomalies and duplications required rapid attention:

- *Planning Cells and Situation Centres.* In October 1999, the Policy Unit (PPEWU) called for by the Amsterdam Treaty was finally established in the European Council headquarters in Brussels. It drafts position papers and 'think-pieces' for Javier Solana. It comprises 15 diplomats drawn from the EU member states, 3 officials from the Council Secretariat, 1 from the Commission and 1 military officer with WEU/NATO expertise. It immediately had to cope with some disgruntlement from the staff in the Council Secretariat (also headed by Solana) who had been working on CFSP/CESDP since the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. An informal *modus vivendi* was established whereby the Secretariat concentrates on the more juridical aspects and the Policy Unit tackles policy planning and early warning. Finally, the European Military Staff is also expected, when it is at full complement, to function as an early warning and situation centre. This is bound to duplicate some of the work being done by the PU. From some quarters, calls have already been made for the EU to establish a 'Military Academy' which, were this to happen, would clearly overlap with many of the existing functions of these various bodies. Moreover, an early decision is needed on the future role of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, after which it will be necessary to rationalise the various functions of the existing cells and units. Europe needs cool-headed and high quality security expertise. This needs to be organised properly.
- *Political and Policy Committees.* Prior to January 2000, the political dimension of external and security policy was dealt with via the fortnightly meetings of the Political Committee (PoCo), which, at the level of MFA Political Directors, with the assistance of COREPER (the EU council of permanent representatives), prepared the monthly meetings of foreign ministers in the General Affairs Council (GAC). With the launch of the iPSC, meeting twice a week, it became urgent to revisit the function of the PoCo, and possibly even to envisage a division of labour within the GAC between a 'general CFSP' agenda and a 'hard CESDP'

agenda. Such a division of labour, however, could not resolve the important question of ultimate responsibility for coordination of CFSP. A brewing ‘turf battle’ emerged on this issue between the iPSC and COREPER, which was particularly unhappy about iPSC’s role in the non-military aspects of crisis management. Moreover, there was initially very little real contact between the iPSC and the HR-CFSP, but in the second half of 2000, this intensified as the likelihood grew that the PSC would be chaired by the HR. Finally, given that the vast majority of the actual work carried out (and of the actual money spent) by the Commission on external relations is devoted to civilian crisis management (and, since 1999, specifically to the Balkans Stability Pact), the role of the Commission, and particularly of the External Relations commissioner, Chris Patten, needed urgent clarification.⁷⁴ The Commission has a seat on the iPSC, but this is unlikely to prove adequate to the major requirements of coordination. Again, a substantial re-think of responsibilities and division of labour is necessary.

It has long been argued in international relations and foreign policy circles that Europe’s feeble institutional base (unanimity rule in the Council, weak role of the Commission, rotating Presidency) accounts in large part for the Union’s dwarf-like status on the world scene. Recent events, designed to help improve matters, have not necessarily – yet – had that positive effect. Ever since the 1986 Single European Act conferred upon the Council Secretariat a CFSP remit and staff, the intergovernmental process of foreign and security policy formulation has taken on a new dimension. While the initiative remained overwhelmingly with the national capitals, more and more of the coordination work was being carried out in Brussels, both via COREPER and via the Council Secretariat. Now that a new raft of CESDP committees has been established, this process of Brussels-based intergovernmentalism is likely to intensify. In the formulation of policy, it is bound to lead, sooner or later, to a new balance within the intergovernmental framework, between national capitals and their Brussels-based permanent representatives. It was not by accident that

⁷⁴ Prior to the 2 September meeting in Evian of the GAC, Chris Patten circulated a paper to Commission colleagues deploring the shortfall between the EU’s CFSP rhetorical ambitions and the grossly inadequate resources. He caricatured the role of the Commission as ‘that of a maid who is asked to prepare increasingly large and grand dinners in a poky kitchen with poor ingredients’; cited in *The Economist*, 2 September 2000, p. 35.

intergovernmentalism decided to give precedence to the ministerial General Affairs Council, in which the specific concerns and the political initiative of national capitals remains paramount. But now, as four separate clusters of permanent representatives (COREPER, iPSC, Policy Unit, EMS) get to know one another and 'consociationalise', it is hard to imagine that they will not assume an increasing tendency to develop a collective ethos of their own and to generate transeuropean perspectives on CFSP and CESDP.⁷⁵ While this need not automatically lead to tensions with the national capitals, it is almost certain to lead to a relativisation of the roles of foreign ministries. France in particular is very sensitive to this, and Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine misses no opportunity to insist that what is being forged is a *common* foreign and defence policy and not a *single* one.⁷⁶

At the same time, much of the implementation of the CFSP, especially since the Kosovo crisis, has been assumed by the Commission. We are already witnessing a new and rather different version of the old battle between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. With the profusion of Brussels-based organs of intergovernmentalism, is it time to coin the expression 'supranational intergovernmentalism'? Assuming, as seems likely, that from January 2001 the HR-CFSP takes over the presidency of the PSC, the position of COREPER would appear to be in question. Since everybody is in agreement that there can be no compartmentalisation between foreign policy on the one hand and security and defence policy on the other hand, what can COREPER add which is not already in place via PSC? The answer, presumably, is the 'external relations' activities which are carried out under Pillars one and three. But to give COREPER ultimate authority over Pillar two issues because of its function in Pillars one and three (especially when a completely new institution has just been created specifically to take charge of Pillar two issues) is hardly logical. The internal battle *within* intergovernmentalism must be resolved. One solution might be to dissolve COREPER and the Political Committee as they currently exist and to reconstitute them, along with the PSC, as an upgraded

⁷⁵ Much will depend on the rate at which such officials are rotated. See, on this battle between national capitals and Brussels-based organisms, Gilles Andréani, 'Why Institutions Matter', *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 42, Summer 2000, pp. 81-95.

⁷⁶ Hubert Védrine and Dominique Moïsi, *Les Cartes de la France à l'Heure de la Mondialisation*, op. cit. in note 68, pp. 105-9; see also interview with Védrine in *Les Echos*, 5 July 2000, p. 8: 'Il n'est pas question d'une harmonisation politique par le bas'.

FPSC (Foreign Policy and Security Committee) chaired by the HR-CFSP, who would then become a figure of genuine importance and power. Other – more technical – aspects of foreign policy could then be delegated to a rather different type of General Affairs Council, whose role would be more technical/administrative than policy-making. These meetings, instead of being prepared by COREPER, could be prepared by ‘sherpas’ from the Council Secretariat and attended by officials from the Commission. As for the HR-CFSP, instead of taking a new and special post as Commissioner, as some have argued⁷⁷ (this would definitively blur the boundary lines between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism), he should be recognised as a key interlocutor of the Commission President, with whom he should hold regular, timetabled weekly meetings. These meetings should also be attended by the Chair of the Presidency and the Commissioner for External Relations. Their agenda would include all on-going or current issues of foreign and security policy. This would also help allay the growing stand-off between the Commission, which increasingly does all the CFSP *work* and the Council, which takes all the *decisions*. There is very little chance, short of a wholesale review of the EU institutions (which is not on the agenda), of CFSP or CESDP being moved into Pillar one or reverting to supranationalism. A sensible working arrangement between the different agencies is therefore now urgent.

II.2 Military capacity: the Helsinki ‘Headline Goal’

In addition to launching the new institutions of CESDP, the Helsinki European Council meeting of 10-11 December 1999 also agreed a military ‘Headline Goal’ involving the creation of a European armed force capable of significant peacekeeping, humanitarian or crisis-management operations. The shortfall in European military capacity is widely perceived, in Europe and in the United States, as *the* major priority to be addressed by the Europeans. As one authoritative commentator has put it: ‘Unless and until this capabilities gap with the United States can be closed, the European defense initiative will remain a largely paper exercise’.⁷⁸ The main items proposed at Helsinki were:

⁷⁷ In early October 2000, Romano Prodi, in a speech to the European Parliament, went so far as to propose that the HR-CFSP post should be transferred to the Commission; Peter Norman, ‘Prodi reopens old wounds’, *Financial Times*, 4 October 2000.

⁷⁸ Gordon, op. cit. in note 1, p. 16.

- the creation, by December 2003, of a corps-level force (up to 15 brigades or 50,000 to 60,000 combat troops) capable of rapid deployment within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year;
- this force to be capable of undertaking the full range of Petersberg tasks and to be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and, as appropriate, air and naval elements;
- this should logically require an overall pool of deployable forces on a rotating basis which will approach 200,000 professional, highly trained troops;
- the resulting capabilities are intended to enable the conduct of effective EU-led military operations, whether or not the EU has recourse to NATO assets, as well as providing a full contribution to NATO-led operations.⁷⁹

What will this actually amount to in terms of force capacities? By the summer of 2000, no fewer than four separate organisms were (or had recently been) assessing European requirements for various force structure scenarios.

- The *WEU Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations* was established in November 1998 and reported in November 1999.⁸⁰ Although this report pre-dated the Helsinki decisions on the Headline Goal, its recommendations in many ways anticipated some of the central issues involved in the elaboration of the Headline Goal.
- The *NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative* (DCI), which was launched at the April 1999 Washington summit, sought to identify existing overall NATO capacity, to detect needs and gaps (mainly on the European side) and to arrange for these to be met and filled. It examined 58 separate areas of military capacity with a focus on US-European and intra-European interoperability. This work was also tied in to the 'NATO Force Goals 2000' project. The teams working in NATO on DCI sought to

⁷⁹ For an in-depth analysis of the detailed implications of the Headline Goal, see Chapter VI, on 'Output Criteria', based on a contribution by Rob de Wijk and Maartje Rutten, in Heisbourg, op. cit. in note 10, pp. 80-9.

⁸⁰ WEU Council of Ministers, *Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations. Recommendations for Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management Operations*, Luxembourg, 23 November 1999.

coordinate this work with the intra-EU work on the Helsinki Headline Goal.

- The iMB's *Headline Goal Task Force* (HGTF) pursued the methodology set out in the joint Franco-British paper of February 2000 entitled 'Elaboration of the Headline Goal: Food for Thought'. This involved a six-stage process, moving from the overall strategic context, via planning assumptions and scenarios to identification of the full range of Headline Goal requirements.
- The EU-NATO *Ad hoc working group* on collective capabilities (which began work on 28 July 2000) was intended to coordinate the work of the DCI with that of the iMB-HGTF. However, it remained unclear at time of writing what value-added this group could offer beyond that implicit in the existing organisations, other than to provide a focus for the necessary discussions between NATO and the EU on a range of issues.

There were no attempts to combine these four separate iterations into one coherent committee on force planning, a fact which simply underlined the somewhat chaotic situation which has arisen from the piecemeal, incremental 'committee creep' which characterised the extension of the EU's security interests and remit. Clearly, the elaboration of the Helsinki Headline Goal had to be carried out through sensible cooperation (*en bonne intelligence*) with NATO. Each national target needed to be carefully coordinated with NATO to ensure that absurd, but easily imagined, anomalies did not arise.⁸¹ What will be necessary will be to ensure that the two Military Committees (NATO's and the EU's) devise adequate coordinating mechanisms, either through cross-representation of an agreed proportion of committee members, or through regular bilateral meetings of the respective committee chairs or through some other linking mechanism. The wheel does not need inventing more than once. Nevertheless, in terms of the actual delivery of the Helsinki Headline Goal, experts believed, in the late summer of 2000, that the final numbers might look something like the following:

- *Army*: between 200,000 and 230,000 combat forces (one third each for combat, combat support and logistics) providing the equivalent of 15

⁸¹ For instance, it would be quite ridiculous (but by no means an impossibility if proper coordination does not take place) for the EU to assign to, say, Spain the task of deploying 20 heavy-lift aircraft, while NATO assigned the same task to Italy.

brigades on operations, another 15 training to go, and a further 15 recently relieved;

- *Air Force*: 300 to 350 combat aircraft comprising 8 or 9 *air wings*, complemented by 180 support aircraft;
- *Navy*: three to four *task groups* comprising about 20 frigates each (or, for countries with carriers, a carrier group based on one platform and about 15 supporting frigates). One of the problems for the navy is that the maritime equivalent of 'the most demanding Petersberg tasks' remains to be defined.⁸²

In truth, this is not a difficult target to meet. David Yost has pointed out that the raw numbers are remarkably similar to those that President Chirac announced, in February 1996, as the targets for a deployable and sustainable force *for France alone*.⁸³ François Heisbourg has estimated that, by 2002, when the French reforms of 1996 will have been fully implemented and the UK Strategic Defence Review will be well into implementation, the United Kingdom and France alone should be able to field almost 100,000 fully professional troops.⁸⁴ Now that it has been officially announced that Germany aims to have two entire divisions available for combat service and will be in a position to field up to 20,000 of the 50,000 to 60,000 troops the EU aims to have available under the HG,⁸⁵ it becomes clear that 'the EU member states are almost certain to declare victory in meeting the goal'.⁸⁶ The next stages in the decision-making process leading to the delivery of the Headline Goal were laid out by French Defence Minister Alain Richard as France assumed the Presidency. On 1 July 2000, a seminar took place in Paris involving the political directors, the chiefs of the defence staffs, the national armaments directors and other leading decision-makers from all fifteen EU countries. On 22 September, France hosted a meeting of the fifteen defence ministers to examine the potential catalogue of forces

⁸² Rob de Wijk and Maartje Rutten, op. cit. in note 10, Chapter VI, pp. 80-3. These figures were refined and confirmed at the meeting of EU defence ministers on 22 September 2000 in Ecouen, France.

⁸³ David S. Yost, 'The US-European Capabilities Gap and the European Union's Defense Dimension', paper delivered to the conference on *The Transformation of NATO and the Question of European Unity* (Seattle: University of Washington, May 2000), p. 24.

⁸⁴ François Heisbourg, 'Emerging European Power Projection Capabilities', paper for the Joint RAND/GCSP workshop on 'NATO's New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies: The Middle East', Geneva, 15-16 July 1999, pp. 6-7.

⁸⁵ *Atlantic News*, no. 3213, 21 June 2000, p. 3.

⁸⁶ Yost, op. cit. in note 83, p. 22.

required for the planned Rapid Intervention Force. On 13 November, in Marseille, there will be a ministerial meeting of the WEU Council. On 20/21 November the 'Force Generation Conference' will involve member states announcing their respective contributions to the Headline Goal. And on 7/8 December, the EU Council in Nice will draw all these conclusions together and decide on measures of implementation.

The difficulties are likely to begin when the EU subsequently faces the question: what next? How, and especially how far, would the EU wish to attempt to close the capabilities gap, which is still widening, between Europe and the United States? That is an issue we shall return to in Chapter Three.

II.3 The problem of resources

There remains the major – and thorny – question of resources. Opinions are polarised on this issue, some analysts insisting that, unless the EU generates substantial sums of new money (i.e. not simply recycled from somewhere else in the defence budget), there is no prospect of the EU ever playing a defence role commensurate with its economic strength and political ambitions.⁸⁷ Others, however, point to the fact that the EU member states already spend 60% of the US total (\$165 bn as against \$285 bn), yet aspire to play only a regional security role, whereas the United States has global responsibilities. In this more optimistic view, synergies, rationalisation, restructuring and economies of scale should be sufficient to give the EU the

⁸⁷ US Defense Secretary, William S. Cohen, made a strong – but very diplomatic – plea for increased defence budgets in Europe (and especially in Germany) when he addressed the Bundeswehr Commanders Conference in Hamburg on 1 December 1999. When he addressed the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich in February 2000, the tone had become far less diplomatic: 'Where are the resources to match the rhetoric?', he demanded (quoted in Sloan, *op. cit.* in note 1, p. 43). Peter Rodman, Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Centre, dispensed with diplomatic niceties: 'the Europeans are so clearly unwilling to increase their defence expenditures . . . that their real capacity for independent military action may not exist for decades to come . . . Thus, one could say that the saving grace of the new European enterprise will be its ineffectuality'; Peter W. Rodman, 'European Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policies: Implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance', Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 10 November 1999, p. 2.

forces it will require without having to increase defence budgets.⁸⁸ This issue has been addressed in more detail – and more competently – in other recent *Chaillot Papers*,⁸⁹ and the present author is unqualified to offer a more nuanced judgement on what is an extremely complex and technical matter. However, the facts speak for themselves (see table of defence spending in NATO opposite). It seems unlikely, to say the least, that the EU will be able to achieve what it has set out to achieve while defence budgets are actually continuing to *decrease* – not only in absolute terms but also in real terms.

The resources issue is therefore likely to become the critical variable which will test the seriousness of purpose of the EU Fifteen where military capacity is concerned.

The net effect of the EU's recent energy in creating new institutional structures, working parties, ad hoc groups and force targets has been to generate the impression that great strides forward have been taken since St-Malo – particularly since Cologne and Helsinki. But critics of certain aspects of CESDP – mainly in the United States – voice concern that, irrespective of the functionality and effectiveness of the new institutions, the main emphasis in this new energy is on *institution-building*, which is conflated or equated by these critics with 'European integration', the latter acquiring, in this context, pejorative undertones. Meanwhile the real task of organising serious European *military capacity* is, in this view, simply marking time.⁹⁰ The Europeans' response to this argument is to insist that institutions do matter, since it is from within them that an all-important – and currently absent – *European security culture* will arise. And that security culture, generated by the daily contact of security actors and deciders from the fifteen member states working together in the same

⁸⁸ François Heisbourg, 'In the post-Cold War context, 60 per cent should be more than enough to deal with contingencies inside and along the periphery of Europe. After all, that figure represents one fifth of the world's military expenditure!', 'European Defence Takes a Leap Forward', *NATO Review*, Spring/Summer 2000, p. 9.

⁸⁹ Sloan, op. cit. in note 1; Heisbourg, op. cit. in note 10.

⁹⁰ Alexander Vershbow, address to the WEU-ISS *Transatlantic Forum*, Paris, 18 May 2000 cited in note 60; Philip Gordon, in the article cited in note 1, also argues that the 'Europeans need to give far greater priority to . . . their military capabilities than to creating new institutional structures', *ibid.*, p. 15.

Defence spending in NATO

Defence budgets and procurement spending in West European NATO members and the United States, 1995-99

Constant 1997 \$USm	Defence budget				
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
W Europe					
Belgium	3,534	3,186	2,806	2,723	2,588
Denmark	3,250	3,099	2,726	2,652	2,395
France	42,240	37,861	32,711	30,703	28,353
Germany	34,625	32,745	26,641	26,002	23,790
Greece	3,473	3,598	3,648	3,867	3,675
Italy	16,619	20,680	18,237	17,495	15,609
Luxembourg	128	124	109	105	98
Netherlands	8,775	8,249	6,992	6,869	6,797
Norway	3,901	3,820	3,597	3,099	3,070
Portugal	1,869	1,755	1,698	1,554	1,564
Spain	7,243	7,014	5,942	5,888	5,464
UK	35,725	34,196	35,736	36,111	33,254
Subtotal	161,382	156,327	140,843	137,068	126,657
US	274,624	271,739	257,975	253,423	252,379
Total	436,006	428,066	398,818	390,491	379,036

Constant 1997 \$USm	Equipment procurement				
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
W Europe					
Belgium	293	217	192	203	183
Denmark	406	384	339	351	322
France	7,952	7,588	6,465	5,620	5,242
Germany	3,969	3,705	2,956	3,455	3,715
Greece	1,022	1,146	1,146	1,287	1,273
Italy	1,642	2,026	2,100	2,394	1,905
Luxembourg	3	7	6	5	5
Netherlands	1,338	1,578	1,324	1,581	1,380
Norway	826	839	906	773	691
Portugal	140	263	352	365	400
Spain	998	1,243	1,012	781	744
UK	7,334	8,189	8,466	9,354	8,263
Subtotal	25,923	27,185	25,264	26,169	24,123
US	46,251	43,332	42,930	43,887	47,052
Total	72,174	70,517	68,194	70,056	71,175

location, is a vital ingredient not only in the decision-making process itself, but also in ensuring that practical implementation will happen as foreseen.⁹¹ At one level, this is all part of a difficult but inevitable debate about the finality or ultimate purpose of the CESDP project, to which we shall return. For those many commentators and actors, in Europe and elsewhere, who believe that a credible CESDP does require the institutional capacity to make decisions, the post-St-Malo developments are an encouraging testimony to what is possible among fifteen sovereign states if the stakes are regarded as high enough and if the political will to succeed is present. But behind the surface activity and energy, a number of significant questions remain unanswered. While there is indeed a 'real dynamic "at 15"',⁹² there are also quite different points of view on the major issues under discussion, particularly where the relationship between the EU and NATO/the United States is concerned. It is time to address some of those issues and to assess how the fifteen member states line up on one side or another of the various arguments.

II.4 Differing national perspectives and the chances of an ESDP 'at Fifteen'

How do these contentious issues play out among the fifteen member states? Are there common camps and positions polarised around one or several clearly definable dichotomies? Or do different coalitions form, for complex political and cultural reasons, around distinct issues? There are two main dividers here, which can occasionally produce surprising alliances. First, the old and very basic divide between France and the United Kingdom, as the leading and (until very recently) contradictory exponents of the two polarised views: Atlanticist and Europeanist. Second, there is the divide between the Alliance countries (including France) and the former neutrals, now often called 'post-neutrals'⁹³ or 'non-allied states'.⁹⁴

⁹¹ On this, see Gilles Andréani, 'Why Institutions Matter', *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 81-95.

⁹² Nicole Gnesotto, 'CFSP and defence: how does it work?', WEU-ISS *Newsletter* 30, July 2000, p. 1.

⁹³ Gustav Gustenau, 'Towards a common European policy on security and defence: an Austrian view of challenges for the 'post-neutrals'', *Occasional Papers* 9 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU), October 1999.

To deal very briefly with this latter division first, it was clear, by mid-2000, that the old NATO-based polarities were no longer as strong as they used to be. Austria, which wished to play an increasing role in European peacekeeping operations, was seriously considering applying for NATO membership – in large part because, through the country's experience of Partnership for Peace (PfP), Vienna had come to realise that the coherence of CESDP with NATO required participant countries to play an active role in both.⁹⁵ In 2000, Ireland, for not dissimilar reasons, breaking with an uninterrupted history of national 'neutrality', embarked on participation in PfP. Although such considerations were not unknown in Finland and Sweden, the rather different geostrategic situation of the former and the deeply rooted security culture of the latter probably precluded any thought of NATO membership in the foreseeable future. However, the initial strong reservations of both countries against CESDP (originally formulated in large part out of fear that the EU would attempt to take on board collective defence missions under the WEU Article V procedures) were progressively relaxed throughout 2000. In the second half of 1999, the Finnish presidency to all intents and purposes transcended Finland's specificity and made the country objectively a party to the December 1999 decisions taken in its capital, Helsinki.⁹⁶ Sweden was, by all accounts, far less opposed to the CESDP process than it had been in the early part of 1999,⁹⁷ although its concerns about US hegemony in NATO often made of it a strange

⁹⁴ See Tomas Ries and Alvaro Vasconcelos, 'Strategic Ambitions and the Political Context', in Heisbourg, op. cit. in note 10, p. 13. Heisbourg has recently categorised these groups as forming a spectrum going from 'extroverts' (Britain, France and, increasingly, Italy) to 'neutrals', but he argues that the difference between the two ends of the spectrum is narrowing and that 'the centre of gravity is moving towards greater, not lesser acceptance of the use of military force', Heisbourg, 'Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity', *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 5-15.

⁹⁵ Gustenau, op. cit. in note 93, pp. 16-17; author's interviews at NATO HQ, 30 June 2000.

⁹⁶ Professor Esko Antola, of Turku University, Finland, commented, during the Symposium of Jean Monnet Chairs on the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels (6 July 2000), on the irony involved in the fact that the first time Europe became serious about adopting a 'muscular' military force, that force should be badged with the name of Helsinki, the capital of a country which has always striven to offer alternative approaches to peacekeeping and has fought shy of any association with militarism.

⁹⁷ Intervention by Gunilla Herolf (Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm) at the Colloquium, 'La Présidence Française de l'Union Européenne', Paris, 23 June 2000.

bedfellow for France in some of the more animated debates within the iPSC and other bodies over issues such as EU-US relations and the role of NATO experts. Yet, Stockholm's cooperation over the PfP 'Small Ships' programme demonstrates that the Swedes too, in practical terms, are not averse to moving closer to NATO. As one authoritative study has recently concluded, 'Finland and Sweden are above all being influenced themselves by the process of integration, which now includes the integration of security and defence policies . . . non-alignment is currently being stretched, if not diluted, in several aspects. The non-aligned might at some point have to accept military operations without an explicit UN mandate, combat tasks that go well into the realm of peace enforcement, a merger of WEU and the EU, and a stronger role for the High Representative in the Union's foreign policy. Furthermore, they are involved in the development of increasingly compatible armed forces.'⁹⁸

In this context, the peculiar situation of Denmark needs to be factored in. Denmark took an opt-out from the CFSP/CESDP provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and has continued to assert that opt-out through the EU Council meetings at Helsinki and Feira. Briefly put, Denmark's position is that it is not in favour of Europe even attempting to create an autonomous defence capacity, which it believes should remain the sole prerogative of NATO. Copenhagen believes that the EU should concentrate on civil approaches to peacekeeping and conflict resolution and is very opposed (as high as 66 per cent in some polls) to Europe creating its own armed force.⁹⁹ In short, the 'non-allied' or 'post-neutral' contribution to the implementation of CESDP is likely to be less focused on any residual Atlanticist/Europeanist dichotomy than on the overall balance within the EU's foreign and security policy between military and non-military instruments. This is a position which also finds widespread resonance in Germany and among left-leaning and Green movements in most countries. The Feira EU Council meeting finally gave the go-ahead to development of

⁹⁸ Hanna Ojanen, 'Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the post-Amsterdam development of the CFSP', *Occasional Papers* 11 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, January 2000), p. 25.

⁹⁹ Intervention by Professor Eric Beukel, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Symposium of Jean Monnet Chairs on the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference, Brussels, 6-7 July 2000.

the civilian aspects of crisis management as well as to policing.¹⁰⁰ One of the greatest distinctions between US/NATO approaches to collective security and the approaches likely to be adopted by the EU's CESDP will be the role of civilian and other non-military instruments in humanitarian action, rescue operations, refugee and displaced persons assistance, peace operations, peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, monitoring and a whole range of other tasks. These are precisely the sorts of activities which many of the EU's smaller and/or formerly neutral states are ideally configured to carry out.¹⁰¹ They are also the main focus of external relations commissioner Chris Patten, who is determined to give the fullest possible role to these instruments and, in so doing, to insist on the proper involvement of the Commission in the forging of the CESDP.¹⁰² The former 'neutrals', in their distinctive ways, have therefore created a new collective thrust to the overall EU debate on the specificity of security policy, a civilian thrust which will find support in sympathetic quarters across the 15 member states.

Despite their joint sponsorship of the St-Malo process, Britain and France continued to promote and to epitomise the two contrasting positions on Atlanticism/Europeanism which had traditionally informed their security relationship, even though by 1999-2000 France had moved much closer to NATO and the United Kingdom had moved closer to Europe, thus narrowing the gap without eliminating it. And most other countries situated themselves somewhere along the spectrum between these two poles. Britain's closest 'Atlanticist' partners were Holland (which only very reluctantly, and under great pressure from London, began to accept some of the European logic of the Blair initiative), Portugal and Denmark, although the latter, as we have seen, was motivated more by fears of European defence integration than by any particular fondness for NATO. Italy could also normally be relied on to support the Atlanticist position, but discreetly and without overt enthusiasm. Put schematically, Britain and the other Atlanticists accepted the necessity of constructing a CESDP as the price to

¹⁰⁰ EU Council Meeting at Santa Maria da Feira, *Presidency Conclusions*. Appendix 3: 'Study on Concrete Targets on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management'; Appendix 4: 'Concrete Targets for Police'.

¹⁰¹ See, on this, Hans Gärtnner, 'European Security: a small state perspective', in Simon Duke (ed.), *Between Vision and Reality: CFSP's Progress on the Path to Maturity* (Maastricht: EIPA, 2000), pp. 91-115.

¹⁰² Chris Patten, 'A European Foreign Policy: Ambition and Reality', public lecture to IFRI, 15 June 2000, and RIIA, 16 June 2000.

be paid for ensuring the survival of the Atlantic Alliance. The lesson which these countries appeared to have drawn from the events of the first half of the twentieth century was that the United States must be permanently locked into the structures of European security. Had the United Kingdom been convinced that NATO's future in the post-Cold War world was secure, the St-Malo process might never have happened. In general, considerations geared to ensuring the best interests of NATO (which were assumed to be congruent with the best interests of European security as a whole) took precedence in Atlanticist thinking over considerations about European defence integration *per se*. However, some believe that the United Kingdom under Tony Blair's leadership began, at the turn of the century, to participate more enthusiastically in the strictly European dimensions of defence and security than some of the 'smaller' Atlanticist countries, which had always been reluctant to trade in American leadership for French, German or British leadership.

France adopted the opposite viewpoint, believing, as it has for fifty years, that the main lesson of the two World Wars, as well as that of the Cold War was that Europe should *not* remain dependent upon the American ally for its security, and that it should organise its own autonomous security structures. This should nevertheless be achieved in close coordination with NATO and Washington, which, in the French view, were bound to remain indispensable allies, although they should not be allowed to call all the shots. To a certain extent, both these positions were, in 2000, somewhat atavistic in that: (a) collective defence (Article 5) was hardly high on anybody's agenda; (b) collective security (Petersberg) was very high on the EU agenda; (c) the United States had been encouraging the Europeans to develop their own capacity; and (d) WEU was universally recognised as an inappropriate body through which to attempt to do this. Nevertheless, both Britain and France still tended to judge most issues according to their relevance to either an Atlanticist or a Europeanist standpoint. Thus, during the sensitive discussions on EU-NATO institutional dialogue, the participation in CESDP of the non-EU NATO allies, the identity of realistic crisis scenarios, the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements, recourse to NATO experts and planning procedures, which occupied security planners and policy-makers throughout 2000, the two co-sponsors of the St-Malo declaration often found themselves in disagreement over many of the most significant issues of

implementation.¹⁰³ In these discussions, France's insistence that the EU member states must be prepared to put in their own autonomous efforts – both intellectual and concrete – in order to forge an authentically *European* CESDP (rather than automatically relying on NATO experts and assets) found a polite and receptive ear among its fourteen partners, with some nations such as Sweden, and occasionally Belgium, offering guarded support. But, in the end, when it was necessary to take a decision in order to move business forward, the fact that the United Kingdom stuck to its Atlanticist principles usually resulted in thirteen other states aligning themselves with London and effectively isolating Paris. At that point, because France had wanted for so long and so passionately to construct the CESDP, the French delegate would agree a 'compromise' which was usually remarkably close to the position adopted by the British. It should be added, however, that the French were usually content with the compromise position that was always very close to the position they had hoped to achieve in the first place.

France was also content to adopt this approach because its concentration was on the long-term strategic goal rather than on the short-term pragmatic objective. In the second half of 2000, most EU member states avoided thinking about the long term and concentrated on the specific targets (institutional and military) set by Cologne and Helsinki. While France was happy to co-sponsor these targets, which relate only to the short term (the Headline Goal is due to be implemented in 2003) France's own aspirations for long-term improved capacity were considerably more ambitious. President Chirac's July 1999 'Action Plan' called for a whole panoply of improvements, including a fully-fledged European chain of command, full multinationalisation of existing French and British PJHQs, *autonomous* intelligence, power projection and C4I capabilities, and the establishment of a technological and industrial armaments base.¹⁰⁴ It is instructive to compare the two documents published by the French and the British MODs drawing the 'Lessons of Kosovo'.¹⁰⁵ While the British document concentrates

¹⁰³ Jolyon Howorth, 'Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative', *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 33-55.

¹⁰⁴ Présidence de la République, *Plan d'Action sur la Défense Européenne*, July 1999. See also the remarks by Defence Minister Alain Richard at Georgetown University, 23 February 2000.

¹⁰⁵ French Ministry of Defence, *Premiers Enseignements des Opérations au Kosovo*, seminar of 21 June 1999 (also available on video); *Lessons from Kosovo: Analyses and*

essentially on building up troop levels, the French document stresses, systematically, that in every area where Europe lags behind the United States, a special effort needs to be made to close that gap. The British view of these more ambitious proposals was that, if they were ever actually needed, they should be negotiated into availability through structured dialogue with the United States. London's preferred scenario would be one in which the EU acted as an 'intelligent consumer of NATO's military services'.¹⁰⁶ This was a concept which many French security actors found astonishing for its implication that NATO is a 'neutral' organisation. Just as astonishing, as seen from Paris, was the fact that the British did not seem to be sensitive to French arguments that NATO *cannot* be considered as a neutral organisation.¹⁰⁷ There was little doubt that the French presidency of the EU would be the occasion for France to raise the question of 'strategic assets' (essentially C4I, intelligence, strategic lift, planning) as a necessary long-term objective to be brought into the planning process at an early stage.¹⁰⁸

On this issue, France might reasonably expect the political support of a number of other EU member states, even if none of them was prepared at this stage to get to grips with the budgetary or concrete implications behind such a strategic ambition. Germany is a key player in the delivery of CESDP. It fields a professional army of 116,000 soldiers, NATO's largest European land force, occupies a linchpin geostrategic position across the Continent, has a defence budget which, at \$24 billion, is the seventh largest in the world, and is in every way crucial to the outcome of the project. Three major defence reviews have recently been conducted, with somewhat

References, November 1999. *Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis*, Cm 4724 (London: HMSO, June 2000). Significantly, the French text is much closer to the eventual US equivalent (DoD, *Report to Congress. Kosovo/Operation Allied Force. After Action Report*, 31 January 2000) in terms of the detail of high-technology weaponry and procurement lessons.

¹⁰⁶ UK MOD. Policy Document: 'European Defence and the European Defence and Security Identity'.

¹⁰⁷ Interviews in French MOD and Quai d'Orsay, February to April 2000.

¹⁰⁸ General Jean Michel, Head of the *Division Euro-Atlantique* in the French General Staff, made this a cardinal point of his presentation on the Headline Goal to the Franco-British seminar at IFRI, 28 June 2000.

contrasting but nevertheless broadly compatible recommendations.¹⁰⁹ Germany has made no secret of its belief that Europe needs eventually to deploy the entire raft of strategic assets currently only available to the United States, even though the German defence budget is, in 2000, still falling.¹¹⁰ In particular, all three recent defence reviews call for increased German capabilities in strategic lift, intelligence and C4. German spokespersons and commentators have had no inhibitions about talking openly of the need for a 'European army', a concept most heads of government hoped, for political reasons, to keep out of the public debate. The basic tension in Germany's internal debate is between those (Weizsäcker) who believe its force structures should be overwhelmingly professionalised and reconfigured to prioritise Petersberg missions and those (Scharping) who believe in maintaining significant conscript forces and a collective defence capacity. Germany's position on CESDP has been indissociable from its general policy on European integration. CESDP is viewed positively in Berlin because of the belief that it will help to create a more integrated, if not a federal Europe.¹¹¹ All the recommendations for restructuring the German armed forces stress 'jointery' and are geared towards the inevitability of an integrated European force. The lessons of Kosovo may, for the moment, have made German politicians nervous about further use of the Luftwaffe in combat roles (particularly in the absence of an explicit UN mandate), and may have swung the internal political debate back in favour of conflict prevention and civilian crisis management, but Germany, while remaining a good ally of the United States, will continue to press for ever greater integration of European defence capacity. However, the key issue remains resources, and a recent analysis concluded that 'unless the defence budget increases by about 10% or DM4-5 bn per year, the announced reforms will not be achieved'.¹¹² It must be concluded that,

¹⁰⁹ The 'Weizsäcker Report', the Kirchbach Report and Defence Minister Scharping's own report are analysed in Klaus Becher, 'Reforming German Defence', *Survival*, vol. 42/3, Autumn 2000, pp. 164-8.

¹¹⁰ Unpublished German paper for the EU Political Committee on 28 October 1999; at the Franco-German summit in Mainz, final agreement was reached between the two countries on the long-delayed launch of Europe's radar-satellite scheme. Hanns Maull argues that Germany will give strong political support for further advances in European security and defence integration, even though its budgetary contribution may fall well short of expectations: Hanns W. Maull, 'Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?', *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 56-80.

¹¹¹ Hanns W. Maull, *ibid.*, p. 73.

¹¹² Klaus Becher, *op. cit.* in note 109, p. 167.

however important the new Franco-British partnership might be, unless Berlin is included, 'nothing of significance can be achieved'.¹¹³

Spain, which became a member of Eurocorps in 1994, was also not averse to offering strong political support for an increasingly credible European military capacity, and was rapidly moving towards full professionalisation of its armed forces, whilst simultaneously planning a shift in budgetary priorities towards equipment rather than personnel. These were not obviously complementary ambitions within the same budgetary envelope, especially given that the Spanish defence budget (at 1.3 per cent of GDP) remained one of the lowest in the EU.¹¹⁴ Here again, as in Germany, the shortfall between the discourse and the purse-strings was considerable. Italy, on the other hand, had always been mistrustful of French initiatives on the defence front, and had consistently refused to join Eurocorps. While the Foreign Ministry tended to be very Euro-focused, the Defence Ministry, overwhelmingly staffed by military personnel, looked fixedly in the direction of NATO. Italy, which is geographically close to Europe's two main crisis areas – the Balkans and the Mediterranean – has emerged as a major contributor to peacekeeping operations and is second only to France in its contribution on the ground throughout the Balkan area. The Blair initiative, which initially shook the Rome defence establishment, gradually came to be perceived as a means whereby Italy might finally reconcile its Atlanticist security instincts and its European political aspirations. Above all, CESDP was being used in Italy as a means to reform the Army, restructure and possibly even increase the defence budget, and in general promote change which would otherwise have been politically very difficult.¹¹⁵ Greece, too, was shifting (especially since Kosovo) from a formerly NATO-centred position to one which was more open to weighing the advantages of European integration. Similar developments were taking place in the Netherlands, which has traditionally assumed the most coherent

¹¹³ Philip H. Gordon, 'Franco-German Security Cooperation in a Changing Context', Paper delivered to the conference 'Franco-German Relations and European Integration: a Transatlantic Dialogue', American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington DC, 16 September 1999, p. 78.

¹¹⁴ Eduardo Serra Rexach, Spanish Minister of Defence, 'A Security Agenda for Europe and North America: a Spanish View', paper delivered to RUSI Conference, London, 8 March 1999, p. 4.

¹¹⁵ Antonio Missiroli, 'Italy', in R. Whitman and I. Manners (eds.), *The Foreign Policies of the EU Member States* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

and uncompromising of Atlanticist stances. In particular, the agreement with France on bilateral naval cooperation marked a break with The Hague's traditional mistrust of all initiatives coming from Paris.¹¹⁶ In short, there were, throughout the debates on CESDP, no clearly definable 'camps'. Each country adopted a position on each separate problem which combined realist or rational choice national interests, historical-institutional specificities and the cultural values and norms appropriate to its historical and social traditions. It is really impossible and in any case inappropriate to try to put these countries into 'camps' – other than in the most simplistic terms of Europeanism/ Atlanticism as defined by the Franco-British couple.

However important the specific contributions of the various other EU member states (and particularly Germany) might be, the fate of CESDP at the turn of the millennium lay largely in the hands of the British and the French. As we have seen, despite St-Malo, these two countries still continue to define the extremities of the spectrum of approaches. It is probably the case that the United Kingdom believes France's long-term aspiration towards strategic autonomy to be unattainable. At any rate, the prospect is so far in the future that nobody in Whitehall was yet losing sleep over it. For London, the main point was that Paris was prepared to cooperate on immediate pragmatic developments which the United Kingdom believed to be of crucial concern to Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. British thinking is primarily tactical and probably does not go much beyond the medium-term agenda. France usually has a longer-term strategy, which, in this case, involves nudging the United Kingdom into a European security process from which it may well find it almost impossible, subsequently, to disengage. Since St-Malo, both sides have acted as though they were bound by a type of marriage contract according to which the United Kingdom agreed not to raise the issue of France's reintegration into NATO's military structures and France agreed not to force the United Kingdom into choosing between Europe and the United States. Time alone will tell whether these positions, and the different implications they might hold for EU-US relations, will prove to be compatible. For the moment, both sides have agreed to concentrate on short-term objectives. Any potential disparity over

¹¹⁶ Alfred van Staden, 'The Netherlands', in Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon (eds.), *The European Union and National Defence Policy* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 87-104.

the longer term can temporarily be set aside in the interests of immediate agreement on basics.

Short-term differences of emphasis were essentially presentational. France was far more prepared than the United Kingdom to talk positively rather than negatively about the imperatives of CESDP and was not at all reticent about invoking 'necessary duplication' of military assets.¹¹⁷ In the aftermath of St-Malo, French officials were uninhibited in seeing CESDP as part of a process which should lead, one day, to meaningful European autonomy in the fullest sense of the word.¹¹⁸ Yet all French officials stress that the object of the exercise is not the diminishing of US influence but the *re-balancing* of the Alliance in order to increase its overall strength.¹¹⁹ The United Kingdom's approach was, at first, rather different. The discourse accompanying St-Malo stressed denial of what Madeleine Albright had called the (unacceptable) '3 Ds': decoupling, duplication and discrimination.¹²⁰ This emphasis shifted after Kosovo. From the second half of 1999, Whitehall statements projected a more constructive tone, and former UK Secretary of State for Defence George Robertson, in November 1999, suggested replacing Albright's '3 Ds' with his own, more positive, '3 Is': *Indivisibility* of the Alliance, *Improved* European Capabilities, *Inclusiveness* of all partners.¹²¹ UK officials rarely spoke of 'rebalancing' the Alliance, but they did insist that CESDP would lead to a 'strengthening' of NATO.¹²² At the Franco-British summit in London on 25 November 1999, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac went out of their way to insist that

¹¹⁷ Interviews in French MOD and Quai d'Orsay, 1999-2000.

¹¹⁸ Interviews with Quai and MOD officials, April and May 1999.

¹¹⁹ Typical of this view, which recurs like a leitmotiv in all French speeches, is Defence Minister Alain Richard's comment at the Franco-German summit on 30 November 1999: 'The emergence of a true European defence pillar will help make the alliance better able to adapt to the requirements of new missions – *and make it stronger because it is more balanced* (emphasis added)', quoted in Craig R. Whitney, 'French Say Arms Plan Finally Makes Europe a Player', *New York Times*, 12 December 1999.

¹²⁰ Madeleine K. Albright, 'The right balance will secure NATO's future', *Financial Times*, 7 December 1998. 'Discrimination' refers to a 'second-class' status within the new EU institutional structures for the non-EU NATO members.

¹²¹ Lord Robertson, 'NATO in the new Millennium', *NATO Review*, no. 4, 1999, p. 6.

¹²² Chris Patten: 'Increased cooperation could only strengthen the European component of the alliance, not weaken it', quoted in Craig R. Whitney, 'Americans Alarmed Over European Union's Defense Plan', *New York Times*, 11 October 1999; George Robertson, 'More Europe does not mean less United States, it means a stronger NATO', Reuters wire, 25 November 1999.

they were saying the same thing.¹²³ The summit declaration stressed that the new plans would 'contribute directly and substantially to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance, by making a stronger and more balanced partnership'.¹²⁴ Quite what the United Kingdom wishes to see the EU force become in the longer term is not something that anybody in Whitehall talks about openly.

But this, ultimately, is set to be the critical issue for the CESDP. If autonomy is to have any meaning at all, it must, presumably, mean the capacity for the EU to envisage a *political choice* between conducting a mission without recourse to NATO/US assets, and conducting it in association with the United States and NATO. For France, that *choice* is primarily political: irrespective of military capacity, does the EU wish to address this crisis alone or in alliance with the United States? This is a perfectly valid question. At present, however, the question – and the ambition – is merely rhetorical: if a crisis comes, the only question that matters will be what military forces are available to cope with it – and they are unlikely, for at least the next ten years, to be purely European. However, France is not alone in assuming that at some stage in the future (ten years? fifteen years? twenty years?) the EU will have developed sufficient advanced military capacity to be able to cope with, say, a Kosovo crisis without having recourse to either NATO or US assets.¹²⁵ At that point, the choice could well become political in the strict sense: the EU, knowing it could tackle a crisis with its own military assets, might nevertheless choose, for political reasons, to involve the United States (assuming it was willing). But the EU would only be in a position to make that political decision if it had assets which permitted it. Would the United Kingdom be prepared to support such ambitions? For the moment, London is studiously avoiding such questions. But the time is approaching when the United Kingdom will

¹²³ Blair: 'This . . . is not an attempt in any shape or form to supplant or compete with NATO . . . It is about strengthening Europe's military effectiveness and capabilities in a way which will both reinforce and complement the NATO Alliance'. Chirac: 'Les dispositions que nous avons prises n'ont absolument aucune conséquence négative, naturellement, sur l'OTAN. Je vais plus loin, elles renforcent l'OTAN en réalité . . . J'ajoute que la France n'a jamais eu l'intention de saper ou d'affaiblir l'OTAN'; press conferences post-summit.

¹²⁴ *Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments*, paragraph 3.

¹²⁵ A 'Strategy for Action' report issued by the Bertelsmann Foundation, envisages similar developments; The Venusberg Group, *Enhancing the European Union as an International Actor* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2000), 80 pp.

be obliged to take a stance on this issue, because at that time it could well be faced with the choice it has constantly striven to avoid having to confront: the choice *between* Europe and the United States. That dichotomy has informed most of the thorny problems which have confronted policy-makers involved in the delivery of the CESDP.

II.5 Stumbling blocks on the road to Feira . . . and Nice?

Most difficulties which arose during the six-month Portuguese presidency (January-June 2000), and indeed during the French presidency (July to December 2000), were related to the fundamental issue of the new structural relationship between the EU and NATO/the United States.

1. The organisation of structured dialogue between NATO and the EU over future relations between these two main bodies now jointly assuming responsibility for European security proved difficult to establish. In the second half of 1999, US officials began to press very hard for the opening of formal discussions between NATO and the EU, to deliver on the proposal formulated in the April 1999 Washington summit Communiqué, that 'NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU'.¹²⁶ Politically, the United Kingdom (along with a clear majority of NATO members) considered such discussions – which would normally be conducted on the NATO side by the Alliance's Policy Coordination Group¹²⁷ – to be entirely reasonable and indeed vital. However, from late 1999 until April 2000, these countries encountered the refusal of France to countenance any such discussions prior to the consolidation of the CESDP's institutional base. The fear in Paris, shared to some extent by other capitals, was that the monolithic strength of NATO would steamroller the infant CESDP into adopting structures, procedures and policies which would be unduly influenced by Washington and would therefore be likely simply to replicate NATO practice. For totally

¹²⁶ Washington Communiqué, para. 9b.

¹²⁷ This group, composed of the deputy permanent representatives and their military counterparts, meets whenever there is a specific need.

opposite reasons, Turkey also opposed the opening of such discussions.¹²⁸ In the first quarter of 2000, there were regular signs that the more Atlanticist members of the EU were running out of patience as the French veto on official contacts between NATO and the embryonic CESDP showed no signs of being relaxed.¹²⁹ It was a Franco-British compromise which generated a breakthrough on this issue at the meeting of the EU's Political Committee on 19 April 2000, when an agenda for the engagement of the overarching EU-NATO dialogue was agreed by the EU member states.¹³⁰ Regular but provisional discussions of cooperation began in July 2000. The EU proposed the creation of four ad hoc working groups on: (1) military capacity; (2) questions of security – of buildings, information and documents; (3) the transfer of NATO assets to the EU ('Berlin plus'); (4) permanent arrangements for consultation between the two organisations. Given the urgent need for the first three groups, and given the existence of the fourth group (which, unlike the others, did not hold a first meeting until late September 2000), clearly little of substance had actually been agreed. The substantial issues remained to be discussed.¹³¹

2. In many ways, the most difficult issue was the place within the new institutional structures of CESDP to be assumed by the non-EU NATO European nations (Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Turkey – hereinafter referred to as 'the Six'); but also by the nine candidates for accession to the EU which are not members of NATO (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). The issue of 'discrimination' against the non-EU NATO allies had ostensibly been a major reason for the UK's 1997 veto on EU-WEU merger. The April 1999 Washington Communiqué stated that: 'We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on

¹²⁸ Turkey's objections were to what it perceived as inadequate arrangements within the EU for involving the non-EU NATO members. See Ian Black, 'Veto threat to EU force: Turks' warning hits plans', *The Guardian*, 21 June 2000.

¹²⁹ NATO sources indicated that even informal dinners in Brussels between the two sides were outlawed. The only formal contacts regarded as acceptable were the fortnightly breakfast meetings between George Robertson and Javier Solana.

¹³⁰ *Atlantic News*, no. 3201, 5 May 2000, p. 2; Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000, *Presidency Conclusions*, Appendix 2.

¹³¹ For example, the establishment of an EU-NATO Consultation Council, which would meet regularly to agree criteria for complementarity and for the exercise of autonomy. Venusberg Group, *Enhancing the European Union*, op. cit. in note 125, p. 35.

existing consultation arrangements within the WEU.’ As with the Washington statement on NATO-EU relations (above), the question of the NATO-WEU *acquis* became a problem in engaging a NATO-EU dialogue. Obviously, it made sense to adopt as much of the NATO-WEU *acquis* as possible, but equally obviously the EU was a very different body from the WEU and could not simply accept the existing *acquis* as the last word on structured dialogue between the two bodies. The United Kingdom, supported by Holland, Portugal and other Atlanticist EU members, insisted from the outset that the Six should attend meetings of the new EU Military Committee on a permanent basis, albeit as observers, while the Political and Security Committee would hold regular, perhaps monthly, meetings with the Six for purposes of political transparency. This clearly reflected the Atlanticists’ view that the *military* dimension of the EU’s CESDP should always prioritise the NATO reference. It also recognised the potentially dramatic switch in status which threatened the Six who had, for several years, enjoyed active participation in WEU decision-making, while the four EU neutrals had played no role at all in that body. Now, those roles were to be reversed as the neutrals became full participatory members of all the CESDP committees, whereas the Six risked being kept waiting outside the door. Moreover, in this view, the Six needed to be fully involved from the outset in military planning, even for an EU-led operation since, should that operation begin to falter, and should NATO be obliged to take over, possibly under the terms of Article 5, the Six would automatically be implicated.¹³² In reality, these same arguments also applied, possibly with even more acuity, to the United States and Canada. While the entire EU-NATO ‘dialogue’ tended to be a negotiation between the EU and the United States, Canada began to feel more and more isolated and increasingly made the case (based on its record of significant participation in European security operations) to be admitted to the discussions along with the European non-EU NATO members.¹³³ While not disputing the validity of these arguments, France, with occasional support from one or two other countries, insisted on the principle that since CESDP is *an EU project*, priority in considering

¹³² For the most complete and strongest statement of support for the fullest possible involvement of the Six, see WEU Assembly Document 1690, ‘The WEU Associate Members and the New European Security Architecture’, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Messrs Martinez Casan and Adam Czyk, Rapporteurs, 9 May 2000, 12 pp.

¹³³ Address by David Wright, Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO, to the Transatlantic Forum, in Julian Lindley-French (ed.), *op. cit.* in note 60, pp. 25-6.

third-country participation should be given to political discussions with candidate countries for accession to the Union. These, of course, include four of the Six, as well as nine other countries.¹³⁴ But they excluded Norway and Iceland. From the 'Europeanist' perspective, there was no justification in giving countries not even wishing to join the EU priority over countries which had long been candidates for membership. The lines of battle were drawn between advocates of discussions on a '15-plus-15' basis (France did not go so far as to propose '15-plus-13') as against advocates of discussions at '15-plus-6'.

Eventually, at the meeting of the Political Committee on 19 April, another compromise was reached, which was subsequently endorsed at the Feira Council. According to this compromise, there was to be 'a single inclusive structure in which all the 15 countries concerned . . . can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU'.¹³⁵ Within that structure, it was agreed that there would be regular meetings in 15-plus-15 format and at least two meetings per presidency in 15-plus-6 format, one of which was likely to be at ministerial level. In addition, arrangements needed to be worked out for the Six to be involved in the capabilities pledging conference for delivery of the Headline Goal. However, these arrangements remained a rather tense compromise. The United States and NATO remained unconvinced that the proportionality and articulation of the 15-plus-15 format as against the 15-plus-6 format was the correct one. Moreover, Turkey insisted that the Feira arrangements were totally unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the Six. One of the Feira decisions to which Turkey particularly objected was the distinction made between EU operations requiring NATO assets and EU-only operations. In the former case, the Six would participate automatically in preliminary discussions 'if they so wish', whereas in the latter case they would simply 'be invited' to be involved – if the Council saw fit to issue such an invitation.¹³⁶ Ankara regarded these arrangements as highly discriminatory and threatened to veto the entire 'Berlin-plus' procedures unless they were changed. This type of reaction helped fuel fears in Washington that the CESDP could result in a weakening rather than a strengthening of NATO. NATO as an organisation refrained from making any official comment on the Feira proposals.

¹³⁴ the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey; plus Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

¹³⁵ *Presidency Conclusions*, Santa Maria da Feira, Appendix 1, Article 5.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, Article 19.

3. A third difference of interpretation arose around the definition and prioritisation of, and the overall strategic approach towards, the various types of military missions to be assumed. These were agreed to be basically of three types: (a) NATO alone; (b) the EU using NATO assets; (c) the EU alone. Given the different starting points of the two basic approaches, the Atlanticists tended to assume that priority should be given to planning for the first two types of mission, while the Europeanists made a point of insisting that serious thought should urgently be given to the third option. There seems little doubt that, in 'Atlanticist' thinking, future military scenarios in which NATO is not involved remain somewhat hypothetical. As UK Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon remarked in Washington in January 2000: 'For meaningful large-scale military operations, NATO remains and will remain, the only game in town. It will be the sole organisation for collective defence in Europe. It will be the organisation that we expect to turn to for significant crisis management operations.'¹³⁷ When British officials were asked to give hypothetical examples of operations which *the EU alone* might undertake, either using NATO assets or using purely EU assets, the response was something of a blank stare. The troubles in Sierra Leone in spring 2000 allowed thinking to stray to potential missions on the African continent – but this is hardly the most propitious starting point for considerations of what is, after all, supposed to be *European* security. French statements on this issue, on the other hand, regularly reflected the view of Defence Minister Alain Richard in his speech to Georgetown University in February 2000. According to Richard, the EU-only option 'is a workable option that requires serious efforts on the part of the Europeans. It is an indispensable one if we want all our nations to have a real choice when they decide in the future.' This difference of approach reflects an underlying difference between the two sides over the legitimacy and credibility of the EU as an autonomous security actor. France's starting point is that the EU *is* an autonomous body that has an inalienable right to generate its own CESDP, and will engage in equal dialogue with NATO in order to ensure compatibility and maximum synergy between the two organisations. These must therefore remain tightly enmeshed, thereby creating 'win-win' dynamics for both.¹³⁸ The Atlanticists' starting point is

¹³⁷ Address by Secretary of State for Defence, Geoffrey Hoon, to the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 26 January 2000.

¹³⁸ Speech by Richard at Georgetown (23 February 2000): 'This project serves to reinforce and revitalize the Atlantic Alliance. Improvement of our national capacities will be of significant benefit to the Alliance as well as to the Union . . . Taking up greater

far less Euro-centred. While not denying the legitimacy of the EU's quest for autonomy, they tend to view autonomy in far more pragmatic terms. There *may* – one day – be occasions when an autonomous military capacity is needed; therefore it should be planned for. But always, in this view, the NATO reference is primary and concern for the health of the Atlantic Alliance is central to the overall strategic approach. These two approaches may well prove entirely compatible. But they are quite different.

4. A fourth problem area was the function and organisation of strategic military planning. This had not, by Feira, emerged into the open as a major item of contention. But insiders were aware that two very different approaches were being canvassed. The Atlanticist approach stressed the logic and convenience of using the very considerable planning capabilities of NATO as the basic resource for EU planning. Not only did this resource exist (and it would be extremely complicated and expensive to replicate) but it would have to be involved anyway to ensure compatibility and coherence between NATO and EU planning. The United Kingdom had been instrumental in persuading its EU partners to write into the Helsinki text a sentence implying that the normal planning procedures for the CESDP would be those of NATO: 'Member states would use existing planning procedures, including, as appropriate, those available in NATO and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of the PfP.' France, which is not involved in NATO planning procedures, argued for maximum involvement of the EU's own (but much more limited) joint planning capabilities, in particular the French and the British Combined Joint Headquarters facilities. Once again, the argument concerns the need for the EU to put in the intellectual effort to think through European security requirements without automatically deferring to NATO.

5. A fifth problem area was the longer-term perspective on autonomous European capacity in areas which Washington and NATO perceive as 'unnecessary duplication' of existing Alliance capacity: satellite intelligence, command and control systems, strategic lift, etc. This is an issue that will be returned to in Chapter Three.

responsibilities as Europeans will enable us to act as collective partners in an Alliance of democratic countries. This I believe is the greatest guarantee that the US itself will remain engaged in common projects with its European allies in the future.'

6. The role, in various working groups and committees, of NATO experts from SHAPE, DSACEUR, etc. The Atlanticist members of the EU insisted that such experts should form an integral part of the work of force planning, largely on the grounds of overall military coherence. France resisted this approach, insisting that the EU cannot dispense with the necessary intellectual effort required to think through its own security requirements, and arguing that it is not enough for the EU simply to take over the WEU-NATO *acquis*.

7. The question of treaty change. Several member states insisted that the new institutional arrangements (and particularly the planned remit of the PSC) required a treaty change. Countries like Italy and Belgium argued this case, for reasons connected with democracy and legitimacy, while others such as Holland tended to see it as a means of slowing down the process of European autonomy. France and the United Kingdom remained united in hoping to avoid what would almost certainly be a long and contentious debate over treaty change. Feira dodged this issue, noting that it would have to be looked at again at Nice and afterwards.

8. The absence of any European strategic concept to guide decision makers as to whether or not, when, and how to intervene militarily, or how and when to apply non military instruments to looming crisis situations. This tends to pit 'pragmatists' against 'ideologues' and the military against politicians. Increasing numbers of experts have been arguing, in late 2000, that the EU cannot continue to develop the CESDP without making a serious effort to develop a strategic concept similar in nature and scope to that adopted periodically by the Atlantic Alliance.¹³⁹

Although these problem areas might appear to be diverse and relatively discreet, they were all directly or indirectly linked to the same fundamental difference of perspective which informed the entire debate around CESDP: the nature of the future relationship between the EU and NATO/the United States. What the broad span of opinion among the EU 15 on issues of transatlantic relations is should be clear from the foregoing. It is now time, therefore, to turn to the question of how different constituencies in the United States view the European conundrum.

¹³⁹ See papers from conference at Clingendael on 5-6 October 2000, 'Towards a European Strategic Concept', www.clingendael.nl.

II.6 US perceptions of CESDP

Stanley Sloan's recent *Chaillot Paper* has offered a broad panorama of US opinion on this delicate question and I do not intend to replicate its analyses here.¹⁴⁰ Many actors and analysts in the United States have misgivings about switching from a relationship of hegemony to a relationship of rough equality in which the United States faces an EU of comparable weight in all areas except military power (an area which may also be nudging in the direction of greater equality). One might have expected a certain tendency to lecture the Europeans and to warn them not to push their ambitions too far for fear of damaging what has been, for fifty years, a cosy and relatively unproblematic Alliance. Such attitudes are in fact few and far between. There are very few Americans who actively *oppose* CESDP. Those who do are in a small minority and constitute a strange alliance of out-and-out hegemonists, isolationists or people who see Europe and NATO simply as a distraction.¹⁴¹ The vast majority, who are broadly supportive, fall into several broad categories. The first Sloan has called the 'Yes, but' school: support for CESDP on condition that it situates itself within a strict Atlanticist logic. A second, more sceptical, variant on this, represents the 'Oh yeah?' school: Europeans have illusions about their capacity to deliver CESDP, and will in reality have to be content with a role as second fiddle to the United States. The third might be called the 'Yes, please' school: enthusiastic support for CESDP in the belief that it will lead to a stronger and healthier Atlantic Alliance. A fourth attitude suggests a relative *lack of interest in Europe* from both right ('US national interests first')¹⁴² and left ('domestic interests first'), but both these approaches concentrate on the opportunity costs of US involvement in Europe rather than on the principles of shared leadership or transatlantic bargains. Whatever the school, the political approach is essentially driven by security considerations and is set in an international relations context. It is also normally predicated on the

¹⁴⁰ Sloan, op. cit. in note 1.

¹⁴¹ Individuals such as Representatives Douglas Beureuter and Dana Rohrabacher, John Bolton of the American Enterprise Institute and Peter Rodman of the Nixon Center fall into this category. See Sloan, pp. 27-9 and 33-5; Peter W. Rodman, 'The World's Resentment: Anti-Americanism as a Global Phenomenon', *The National Interest*, no. 60, Summer 2000, pp. 33-41, summarises the fears of many in this category.

¹⁴² George W. Bush's foreign policy adviser Condoleezza Rice devoted only a short paragraph to Europe in her recent all-embracing policy article, 'Promoting the National Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 1, January/February 2000.

perpetuation of US hegemony, or at least leadership, across the Euro-Atlantic area and on an assumption that various projects for European political union (deepening) either will not happen or will be contained within a broader Euro-Atlantic project.

At the level of official discourse, the Clinton administration has formally supported CESDP. The support has varied considerably in both tone and conviction. Witness three speeches by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. In October 1999, at London's Royal Institute of International Affairs, he made the remark which is now regularly quoted as an indication of Washington's concern about the drift of European defence policy: 'We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO, but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO.' In his 15 December 1999 address to the North Atlantic Council, Talbott strove to counter the negative connotations of his earlier remarks by making an unambiguous statement of support: 'There should be no confusion about America's position on the need for a stronger Europe. We are not against it, we are not ambivalent, we are not anxious; we are for it. We want to see a Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance or, if NATO is not engaged, on its own – period, end of debate.' But alas that was not the end of the debate,¹⁴³ since Talbott returned to the theme barely six weeks later when addressing the DGAP in Bonn. This time, the concerns had become explicit: 'We're in favour of ESDI. But while our support for the concept is sincere, it is not unqualified . . . to work, it must reconcile the goal of European identity and integration on the one hand with the imperative of transatlantic solidarity on the other; it must reinforce, not duplicate or dilute the role of the Alliance as a whole; and it certainly must not attenuate the bonds between our defense and your own.' Similarly, in a statement published on 20 June 2000, President Clinton, in welcoming the decisions taken at the EU Council in Feira, reiterated the US belief that CESDP would strengthen both Europe and the Alliance, but added that it was essential to make further progress both on the

¹⁴³ Only two days later, US ambassador to NATO, Alexander Vershbow, speaking in Berlin, quoted these words by Talbott and went on to say: 'But of course it's not the end of the debate and there are some issues which still have to be worked on in the coming weeks and months'. He identified those issues as: (1) the role of the non-EU NATO allies and (2) structured relations between the EU and NATO.

integration of the non-EU NATO allies and on the broader discussions between the EU and NATO.¹⁴⁴

This approach, which Sloan has dubbed ‘Yes, but’, comes from those quarters which are close to European affairs and care deeply about the on-going vitality of the Euro-Atlantic area. It is exemplified by one of the United States’s foremost specialists on Europe, Philip Gordon, in the summer 2000 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. It consists in saying to the Europeans: ‘We want you to go ahead with CESDP because it should be in all our interests, but, because we have only limited confidence in your ability to achieve your own objectives, we need to lay down some firm guidelines and conditions which must be adhered to if you are not to fail in your endeavours and simply make matters worse.’ The conditions outlined by Gordon included the two which Talbott, Vershbow and Clinton had highlighted earlier (the need for involvement of non-EU allies and for serious EU-NATO discussions). But he added four others: the need to concentrate above all on serious military capacity; to adopt a ‘NATO-first’ policy in considering military intervention; to concentrate on ‘Berlin-plus’ rather than duplication; and to facilitate transatlantic industrial cooperation. From the perspective of Washington, this is a sincere plea for the Europeans to engage in CESDP in a way which will enhance rather than weaken the Alliance. From a European perspective, however, it could be interpreted as implying that Europeanisation is acceptable to Washington only so long as it is done in a way which puts American interests to the forefront. It is implied in this discourse – but not demonstrated – that US interests are coterminous with European interests.

This ‘Yes, but’ approach probably helps to fuel the current sensitivity of transatlantic relations. For a start, three of the conditions (participation of ‘the Six’, engagement of EU-NATO dialogue, and concentration on military capacity) are ones which the Europeans had already accepted. Furthermore, the latter three conditions (NATO-first; Berlin-plus; transatlantic industrial cooperation) are ones which depend at least as much on the US side as they do on the European side. To insist explicitly on NATO’s ‘right of first refusal’ is seriously to question the legitimacy of European autonomy. Yet CESDP has become a reality precisely because of widespread feelings on both sides of the Atlantic that the US guarantee *cannot work* in the same

¹⁴⁴ *Atlantic News*, no. 3214, 23 June 2000, p. 2.

way as in the past. If the United States is serious about supporting EU autonomy, then it must also be serious about having confidence in the Europeans to make the right choice – assuming a choice genuinely exists – when deciding on intervention. Similar arguments might be deployed with respect to ‘Berlin-plus’. Of course the Europeans would prefer to be able to rely on US assets if required. But the reason the Euro-Atlantic security debate reached new heights of sensitivity in 2000 is precisely that there remained an element of doubt about the availability of those assets. NATO doctrine has never gone beyond the rather vague concept of ‘presumption of availability’. US military spokespersons have repeatedly expressed their unhappiness about transferring to the EU assets which constitute the jewels in their military crown. The Europeans cannot be expected to rely crucially on assets about whose *automatic* availability there is the remotest doubt. Besides, as many other analysts have argued, ‘constructive duplication’ can be of benefit to both sides of the Alliance.¹⁴⁵ Finally, strictures in favour of transatlantic industrial cooperation, even if formulated, as appears to be the case in the Gordon article, primarily for American eyes and ears, are somewhat hard to take for European industrialists and politicians who know only too well how much of an impenetrable ‘Fortress’ the US arms market is.

A variant on the ‘Yes, but’ approach is the more sceptical ‘Oh yeah?’ approach recently exemplified by former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.¹⁴⁶ Brzezinski believes that the EU lacks the passion and patriotism necessary to generate a common defence policy, that it will never be able to deliver on the military front and that NATO will therefore assume permanent responsibility for regional security. Brzezinski also states explicitly that if the EU did succeed in deepening through the successful pursuit of a CESDP, this would ‘inevitably generat[e] severe two-way transatlantic tensions’. Therefore, by inference, it is better if the CESDP project fails – or at any rate fails to move beyond a minimalist objective. Both the ‘Yes, but’ and the ‘Oh yeah’ approaches, in very different ways, help breed resentment in Europe. Such resentment was demonstrated by the French defence minister’s reaction to the announcement in Washington on

¹⁴⁵ Kori Schake, ‘Constructive Duplication and European Procurement Plans’, paper presented to conference ‘The Transformation of NATO and the Question of European Unity’, University of Washington, May 2000.

¹⁴⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘Living with a New Europe’, *The National Interest*, no. 60, Summer 2000, pp. 17-32.

30 June 2000 that the United States enthusiastically supported *Australian* intervention in East Timor. Perhaps, commented Alain Richard acerbically, the United States could grant the Europeans 'the same level of trust as to the Australians'.¹⁴⁷ The time has come for the United States to demonstrate unreserved confidence in the historical value, the legitimacy and indeed the inevitability of CESDP.

Such an attitude, which might be called the 'Yes, please' approach, can be found in an outspoken contribution by Charles Kupchan in the Summer 2000 issue of *Survival*. Kupchan begins with the recognition that, on both sides of the Atlantic, and particularly in the United States, a radical reappraisal of the terms of the Atlantic Alliance is in full swing: 'the transatlantic security compact must become more balanced if it is to remain intact'.¹⁴⁸ He rehearses four types of concern frequently voiced in the United States and recognises the thinking behind them but demonstrates why each is inappropriate or misguided. Worries about *decision-making* and *alliance cohesion* run the whole gamut from: 'if it ain't broke don't fix it', to concerns about decoupling, to fears that one day Europe could become a rival and competitor for the United States. Worries about *implementation* focus on issues of duplication and discrimination, both of which are believed to weaken the Alliance. Worries about the *political implications* stem from the supposed linkage between European progress on CESDP and US isolationism and/or from the conflict between the United States and Europe over the need for a UN mandate. And worries about *feasibility* derive from past failures and current budgetary realities in Europe. Kupchan dismisses all these fears wholesale by arguing that history has already moved on and that the critical mistake in the United States is 'in failing to recognise that the traditional Atlantic bargain is already unravelling, that the status quo is unsustainable, and that the Atlantic link can be preserved only if Europe and America strike a new and more equitable bargain'. On *decision-making*, Kupchan makes a vigorous case in favour of EU caucusing and unicity of voice, arguing that the linkages and interdependencies between the two sides of the Atlantic are far more significant than the North Atlantic Council itself, and reminding his readers that Europe has more to lose than the United States from breaking the pact.

¹⁴⁷ Quoted in *Atlantic News*, no. 3216, 1 July 2000, p. 2.

¹⁴⁸ Charles A. Kupchan, 'In Defence of European Defence: An American Perspective', *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, p. 16.

On *implementation*, he argues that some duplication would be a positive development in strengthening the Alliance, and that the Europeans themselves are unlikely to ignore the assets that can be brought to the table by those allies who are willing to help. On *political implications*, he dismisses the logic of isolationism and notes the crescendo of voices in the United States calling on the Europeans to do more as the condition of the Alliance's survival. On *feasibility*, he demonstrates a willingness to take the Europeans at their own word and he argues that success in achieving the Headline Goal does not depend on generating more money but on spending existing money more wisely. He ends by enjoining both Europeans and Americans to support the endeavour of institutional and military reform arising from Helsinki, and by encouraging European leaders to build public support for the project. And apparently turning his pleas to a new American administration, he calls for an end to the Clinton policy of 'Yes, but', for a proactive policy of support for EU empowerment and for new thinking on a more mature and balanced strategic partnership between the EU and the United States.

Whatever the partisan dimension of some of the specific arguments deployed by Kupchan (this approach seems increasingly identifiable with the George W. Bush team¹⁴⁹) it is hard for Europeans to baulk at a proposal which is tantamount to arguing for a genuinely more balanced Alliance. This has been a French (Gaullist) vision for some fifty years. To this extent, the 'Yes, please' approach could prove helpful. What is required by all parties to the current developments (both intra-EU and EU-US) is less defensiveness and more confidence about CESDP. Since virtually everybody agrees that some measure of European defence integration is historically inevitable as well as politically desirable and that, if properly carried out, it will be to the mutual benefit of the EU and NATO/the United States, then it is important to move forward with confidence and not to spend too much time agonising over motivations, implications and apparent principles, many of which can appear to 'the other camp' as ideologically informed. In the run-up to Feira, the Atlanticists' emphasis on the urgency of entering into structured negotiations with NATO and the United States, and particularly their insistence on the need to organise meetings between

¹⁴⁹ It is supported by key Bush strategist Robert Zoellick, 'A Republican Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 1, January/February 2000, p. 74, but it is not absent from significant individuals close to the Democrats, such as Robert Hunter and Ivo Daalder; see Sloan, op. cit. in note 1, pp. 36-7.

the iPSC and the NAC, the priority which they accorded to the '15-plus-6' format and their upbeat support for NATO planning procedures were all interpreted in Paris as overtly 'ideological'.¹⁵⁰ They were attributed to the almost Pavlovian alacrity with which the European Atlanticists respond to pressures from Washington. Similarly, the French propensity to resist as vigorously as possible the formal involvement, in CESDP implementation, of NATO personnel, procedures or instruments came across to France's main EU partners as an ideological aberration stemming from another age. This resulted in stand-offs between the two sides on the details of the EU proposals and decisions but not on the substance. This is the crucial point. The Europeanists were not opposed to the principle of NATO involvement and the Atlanticists were not opposed to the principle of European autonomy. The fact that the French prioritised discussions in a '15-plus-15' format did not mean that they did not recognise the legitimacy and the significance of the '15-plus-6' format. The fact that the British were concerned to hasten the process of EU-NATO institutional contacts did not mean that they had serious doubts about the need for EU autonomy. Clashes were about sequencing, about tone and priorities, but very rarely about substantial policy issues.

If it is possible for the Atlanticists to transcend the feeling that they must constantly be looking over their shoulder for Uncle Sam's approval; and if it is possible for the Europeanists to banish the worry that their long-cherished project is somehow in danger of being jeopardised, compromised or side-tracked by the unavoidable presence of the United States and NATO, then many of the current difficulties can be avoided. The fact that the French presidency took place during the American 'interregnum' did not make such adjustments any easier, since there was no consistent line coming out of Washington – except that, all in all and one way or another, the CESDP project had the cautious blessing of the transatlantic ally. But by the beginning of 2001, the political context for the next five years should be fairly clear and most of the groundwork completed for the implementation of Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Nice. It is really not difficult for the Europeans to agree on the short-term and even medium-term steps forward on CESDP. The problems will begin to emerge once discussion begins on the longer-term implications: what is the strategic objective; how far do different countries wish to take this project; what sorts of weapons systems

¹⁵⁰ Author's interviews in Quai d'Orsay, May and June 2000.

should the EU be procuring for 2015 and 2030; what are the more global implications for relations between the two sides of the Atlantic? Indeed, decisions on the restructuring of the Alliance over the next few years will need to be predicated on an accurate guess as to what sort of world we are likely to be living in thirty years from now. And there are radically different views on that.¹⁵¹ These are the issues addressed in Chapter Three.

¹⁵¹ 'Europe and America: weathering the storm', *The Economist*, 9 September 2000, pp. 29-35. The *Economist* is open-minded as to whether the world will be a more or less dangerous place in 2030, but either way it argues that NATO will still be the most appropriate security response.

Chapter Three

WHERE IS THE CESDP LEADING US?

There are four main sets of issues which will determine the future itinerary of the project launched over the past year under the abbreviation CESDP. The first has to do with the eventual military scale and ambition of the project. How big is it likely to become, and what is the significance of size? The second set of issues has to do with the geographical scope of the new project. Is its deployment to be strictly limited to the EU's 'near abroad', or could the European rapid reaction force be deployed well beyond the EU's borders, and into Africa, the Middle East, or even Asia? The third has to do with the relationship between CESDP and the other main political and institutional developments within the EU. Will CESDP remain strictly intergovernmental, or could it, perhaps paradoxically, enhance recent proposals for a federal (Fischer), vanguard (Delors) or pioneering (Chirac) European collection of states? Finally, the fourth set of issues has to do with the norms and values which will underpin the project? What will be the characteristics of 'security governance' in the EU? Will it succeed in harmonising the different cultural approaches to security which have characterised the various European nation-states, and in particular will it successfully articulate the interface between the military and the civilian aspects of the Petersberg tasks? In short, how will it define its distinctive European-ness?

III.1 What sort of military power will the EU become?

One of the characteristics of the Helsinki Headline Goal which facilitated its adoption by all fifteen of the EU member states was the studied ambiguity surrounding it as to its ultimate size and purpose. The numbers chosen for the 2003 deadline were relatively uncontroversial: sufficiently high that each member state would have to take the exercise seriously and examine carefully its own potential commitment; sufficiently low to ensure that there was little danger of the targets not being reached. However, the 2003 deadline was only an initial – and fairly crude – attempt at number-crunching. Beyond that, it is already becoming urgent, in the second half of 2000, for EU member states to begin to address the question of their

collective equipment requirements for the medium- to long-term.¹⁵² Procurement programmes have a lead-time of between fifteen and twenty years. The Force Generation Conference in November 2000 was tasked with identifying not only immediate but also longer-term shortfalls. How would these be identified? Within what strategic planning concept? Clearly, there is a world of difference between, on the one hand, France, which has already signalled its hopes of persuading its EU partners to plan for as much as possible of the panoply of high-technology weaponry which is available to the United States and, on the other, a country like Denmark which has severe reservations about the EU having its own armed force at all. One can nevertheless make certain working assumptions based on current trends. The first is that this EU force is intended to intervene and is designed to be used. All fifteen EU member states (with the possible exception of Denmark) are agreed on that. This being the case, the European force is bound to experience the same type of inflationary creep as all other self-sustaining organisms. It will generate its own inherent expansionary logic. The military are not noted for making do with less than the maximum obtainable in terms of infrastructure, forces and equipment. There will therefore be a corporatist drive towards growth, which the politicians will, for their part, seek to contain. But beyond that inbuilt logic, there will be crucial questions about the *type* of armaments and equipment that will be considered desirable or essential. These will to some extent depend on the extent to which the new force proves to be required for intervention purposes.

Will Europe, for instance, follow the United States down the road towards a 'revolution in military affairs'? Or will the EU take a conscious decision to limit its military-industrial programming to the types of conventional weapons systems currently within its grasp? As François Heisbourg has recently remarked 'what is most striking is not the scope of explicit disagreement [among EU member states], but, rather, the lack of open consideration of the extent of European interests and ambitions'.¹⁵³ Already, as the Kosovo campaign of 1999 showed, the outer limits of the Petersberg tasks ('peace establishment'), to which all parties to the Amsterdam Treaty, with the exception of Denmark, officially signed up, take procurement

¹⁵² This requirement was one highlight of Javier Solana's speech to the 1 July 2000 'seminar' of defence decision-takers summoned by the incoming French presidency. See *Atlantic News*, no. 3217, 5 July 2000, p. 1.

¹⁵³ Heisbourg, *op. cit.* in note 94, p. 7.

programmes a long way in the direction of capabilities for all-out war. Even if the EU were to agree that one of its objectives would be the capacity – say in ten to fifteen years’ time – to conduct a Kosovo-style campaign predominantly on its own, perhaps even with access to certain NATO assets, the future procurement shopping list would be very considerable, with highlights on strategic lift, C4 and satellite-based intelligence, as well as appropriate strengths in the field of precision-guided munitions, air supremacy and offensive electronic warfare. For the moment, very little of this figures in the actual military planning of any EU member states other than the United Kingdom and France. Were the EU to engage in a serious discussion on this perspective, three key debates would inevitably occur. First, how much ‘duplication’ would or would not be desirable and/or permissible with regard to weapons systems already available through NATO/the United States? It is quite possible that, by the time this debate takes place, the duplication issue will have become less contentious. American analysts promoting the interests of ‘constructive duplication’ may well have generated a different attitude in Washington. It is also likely that, within a few years, there will be more ambitious longer-term programmes within and between the two great European armaments manufacturers (EADS and BAE Systems). Finally, governmental concern that Europe should make every effort to keep abreast of technological developments is unlikely to diminish. A necessary measure of duplication could well no longer be regarded as suspicious, and could even be seen, on both sides of the Atlantic, as inevitable and healthy.

The second debate will address the issue of Europe’s *capacity* to keep abreast. Several recent studies have demonstrated the size of the ‘capabilities-gap’ to be filled.¹⁵⁴ All have concluded that it is not technological expertise which is lacking in Europe so much as political will and budgetary commitment. After some hesitation, political will showed renewed signs of robustness in July 2000, when the six big defence equipment manufacturing states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) signed a long-awaited Letter of Intent on defence

¹⁵⁴ Robert P. Grant, ‘The RMA – Europe can keep in step’, *Occasional Papers* 15 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, June 2000); Robbin F. Laird and Holger H. Mey, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives’, *McNair Paper* 60 (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, 1999); David S. Yost, ‘The US-European Capabilities Gap and the European Union’s Defense Dimension’, paper quoted in note 83.

harmonisation designed to facilitate industrial restructuring and improve European procurement capabilities.¹⁵⁵ Recent UK decisions in favour of major *European* procurement projects (the *Meteor* air-to-air missile and the A-400M military transport aircraft) suggest that Europeanisation may yet become the default policy option for London. The United Kingdom officially denies that any policy shift should be read into these two major decisions, and insists that London will continue to cooperate on procurement with both sides of the Atlantic.¹⁵⁶ However, it is likely that in practice the political and economic logic of CESDP, combined with the imperatives of European procurement and the industrial structures now in place, will result in the United Kingdom increasingly siding with Europe on armaments policy. And concerns in Europe about US domination of the information highway have been such that, in the last two years, both governments and industry have been combining their strategy to ensure that the United States does not increase its near monopoly of information technology. In 1998-99, both Alcatel and GEC acquired various US telecommunications firms, and within Europe the sector was marked by Thomson's acquisition of Racal. Moreover, the EU competition commissioner, Mario Monti, began to subject to unprecedented scrutiny any US bids for European telecommunications companies. Although it would be an exaggeration to suggest that the EU is beginning to plan in any systematic way for a significant capacity in the field of C4I, there are numerous separate developments which, combined, might facilitate the generation of such a capacity as the requirements of autonomy become more pressing.

The third major debate concerns budgetary commitment. It is here that the EU's seriousness of purpose will be put to the severest test. If it fails this test, much of the rest will be revealed as largely abstract. CESDP will have been shown up as 'much ado about nothing' and the EU will have failed at the very first hurdle in its quest to emerge as a serious international political actor. The stakes are extremely high. It is for this reason that, having pledged so much political capital on the emergence of a CESDP, the main EU countries are going to have to take up the challenge of finding the necessary resources, either through rationalisation, or through use of

¹⁵⁵ Douglas Barrie and Colin Clark, 'Six European Leaders Settle on Export Process', *Defense News*, 17 July 2000

¹⁵⁶ Ian Lee's intervention at Franco-British seminar, IFRI, 29 June 2000.

synergies, conversion and restructuring, or through fiscal creativity. And while it is likely that the existing military powers in Europe, particularly France and Britain, will agree to take on the lion's share of the financial and procurement burdens, it will be necessary for all EU member states to take much more seriously their commitment to force and equipment planning. The first test of this commitment will be the Force Generation Conference in November 2000.

If these suppositions turn out to be correct, then the EU will, in a few years' time, be on the verge of bestowing upon itself a sizeable military capacity, which will automatically lead to the next big strategic debate: what is all this for? By then (possibly around 2010), the discussion is unlikely still to be focused on definitions of Petersberg tasks. Most EU member states, having gone that far, will have accepted that Petersberg implies ambitious programming and that the EU, if its CESDP is to be at all credible, simply has to deliver. The debate on ultimate objectives is more likely to be focused once again on the autonomy issue. For, by 2010, the European force in prospect will be approaching something which would, theoretically, allow the Union largely to dispense with US – or even NATO – supporting assets. Would the Atlanticist members of the EU see this as a desirable development, or would they still be attempting to apply the brakes in the name of 'Atlantic solidarity'? It is possible that, by then, this debate too will have shifted focus. Autonomy, as it finally comes into its own, will most likely prove to be no more threatening to the Alliance than was the development of French and British nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s. The greater degree of acceptance of CESDP in the United States (assuming that these European developments have not exacerbated a 'Fortress USA' mentality), the gradual realisation of France's long-term strategic ambitions, the increasing participation in this military-industrial 'Great Leap Forward' on the part of the United Kingdom and Germany, all these elements will have created such an intricate network of interdependencies that the debate on autonomy – necessary though it will be – will be a short one. Europe as a strategic actor will by then have reached 'cruising speed', and will be within reach of autonomy. The United States will have come to terms with the new strategic realities and will be busy implementing a new global restructuring of its military commitments. The Alliance, far from feeling threatened, will have emerged reinforced. Europe will go ahead and deliver. The precise ultimate size of Europe's armed force will depend very largely on the way in which the EU sets the relative priorities it attaches to conflict prevention

and resolution, as opposed to military intervention. But the force will be large enough to cope with firefighting of the Kosovo type, and it will be equipped to fight while causing minimal collateral damage. It will remain an integral part of NATO, but will increasingly be identified as a genuinely autonomous European component. It will also be configured for optimal participation in Alliance-led operations alongside US forces outside the European theatre.

There are two alternative scenarios. The first, which remains possible, is that the EU will fail (either at the first or at another early hurdle) to reach agreement on capacity or resources and will have resigned itself to eternal junior partnership in an American global crusade. This is unlikely, simply because the Union is increasingly frustrated in that role and the United States is equally unhappy with the current division of labour. The second alternative is that the growth of real autonomy will lead to significant and growing rivalry between the United States and the EU, which will gradually prise the Alliance apart. This scenario also is unlikely for the simple reason that, however noisy might be the EU-US spats over genetically modified foodstuffs or cultural production, these are as nothing compared with the deep-rooted values which the two cultures share and which make them much closer to one another than either is to any other culture anywhere on the planet.

III.2 Geographical scope and scenarios

At this point, the second set of issues (which will have been discussed in parallel with procurement) will become important: what is to be the geographical range of this new EU force? To date, the EU has set its sights firmly against any temptation to limit its sphere of activity. First, both France and the United Kingdom have traditionally perceived themselves as global players. Second, only a handful of EU member states were uninvolved in imperial expansion over past centuries. Third, the EU is a global economic power. The result is that the Union can reasonably claim to have interests more or less worldwide. Moreover, to the extent to which its concept of intervention has always been predicated on the core values it claims to epitomise, it is difficult for the Union to draw up geographical boundaries beyond which it might consider that it had no responsibility for

the defence of human rights.¹⁵⁷ However, in practice, it is unlikely that any significant *EU* military intervention would take place in many far-flung places. The realistic geographical limit is unlikely to extend much beyond the EU's 'near abroad': the Caucasus and Transcaucasus, the Middle East, Africa. But, to the extent to which there might be a notional dividing line beyond which intervention is improbable, this line is likely to shift with geopolitical and geostrategic developments in Europe's hinterland.¹⁵⁸ And much will depend on the geography of political developments, including EU and NATO enlargement, relations with Russia, the future of Turkey, the Ukraine, the Arab-Israeli conflict, developments in the Persian Gulf area and in both North and sub-Saharan Africa. Above all, it will be necessary for the EU to decide, once and for all, where its external borders lie, for only then will it be in a position to develop a clearly articulated CFSP – which is a necessary concomitant of a functional CESDP.

In this context, it will be crucial for the EU, through its CESDP, to extend its formal, structured dialogue with neighbours to the East and to the South and even to engage in more intensive partnerships. Whether or not the three Baltic states eventually join NATO, it is probable that, within a decade, they will, along with Poland, be full members of the European Union. This, among other things, will have the effect of situating Kaliningrad inside the borders of the Union. A mature, institutionalised relationship with the Russian Federation must be a priority for any medium-term to long-term CESDP. This must clearly be conducted in close cooperation with NATO's Permanent Joint Council deliberations, but it should also be quite distinct from that process. European policy towards Russia will not be identical to that followed by the United States. As all or most of the former Soviet satellites become members of the EU, it will become urgent for the Union to negotiate some form of durable security pact or partnership with Moscow (and also with Kyiv), possibly introducing a European version of Partnership for Peace, or, at the very least, an integrated programme of

¹⁵⁷ On this, see Alyson J. K. Bailes, 'European Defence: Another Set of Questions', *The RUSI Journal*, February 2000: 'For the EU even to formulate a theoretical limit to its military engagement could do damage to its credibility in these contexts and would smack of a reversion to discredited "spheres of influence" politics.'

¹⁵⁸ Alain Richard has asserted that: 'There will be a development in time of the notion of the European security environment', quoted in *Atlantic News*, no. 3216, 1 July 2000, p. 2. At the meeting of EU defence ministers in Ecouen on 22 September 2000, Richard specified for the first time that the EU force would have a range of 4,000 km.

confidence and security-building measures. There can be no question of allowing EU enlargement to reintroduce collective security threats into the Continental strategic equation. The signs are that Moscow is finally beginning to look upon the EU: (a) as an integrated whole, as opposed to a number of isolated states, and (b) as a viable and potentially interesting partner at all levels.¹⁵⁹ Collective security from the Atlantic to the Pacific (including in the Caucasus and beyond) is a project in which both parties have an equal interest. It is not impossible that the late President Mitterrand's premature and ill-fated project for a transeuropean *Confédération* might find fresh momentum in these circumstances. The factors which stifled the original project at birth (relative might of the Soviet Union, exclusion from the EU of the Central and East European states, absence of the United States) are no longer the significant factors they were ten years ago. A joint EU-Russian-Ukrainian approach to policy planning in key areas such as energy, the environment, transport and communications, migration, trade and regional development would be a powerful factor in the promotion of collective security. Policy towards Russia should be an urgent priority for an on-going CESDP. This would also help stabilise South-Eastern Europe – a project which is increasingly shaping up to become one of *internal* EU policy.

Relations with Turkey will remain difficult. Despite the Helsinki decision to designate Turkey as an official candidate for EU membership, accession itself remains a distant prospect. Turkey's opposition to the Feira EU Council decisions on the participation in CESDP of non-EU NATO members (see above, p. 59) were soon toned down, both as a result of US pressure on Ankara, and through the practice of the '15-plus-6' discussions.¹⁶⁰ Turkey's contribution to the EU's force planning will be both significant and welcome. But the EU's reluctance to give Turkey a blank cheque for automatic involvement in all aspects of the CESDP signals a

¹⁵⁹ Vladimir Baranovsky, 'Russia, a part of Europe or apart from Europe?', *International Affairs*, vol. 76/3 (2000); 'UK-Russian Security Policy Support Seminar', University of Birmingham, Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy, June 2000, Seminar Report.

¹⁶⁰ On Turkey, see Münevver Cebeci, 'A delicate process of participation – The question of participation of WEU Associate Members in decision-making for EU-led Petersberg operations, with special reference to Turkey', *Occasional Papers* 10 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, November 1999). For the case in favour of Turkish membership, see David Barchard, *Turkey and the European Union* (London: Centre for European Reform, 1998).

broader ambivalence about the longer-term implications of Turkish membership. While there are those forecasters who believe that in twenty years the EU can expect to embrace as full members both Russia and Turkey,¹⁶¹ this is unlikely. An EU with borders at the Black Sea is an entirely different strategic actor from an EU with borders throughout Asia Minor and/or across to the Pacific. Indeed, it is likely to be this consideration, rather than strictures on human rights, which will delay for some considerable time the accession of Turkey to full EU membership. The EU *as such* has to stop somewhere – otherwise it would appear to be objectively embarked on the universalising Kantian project of a ‘pacific federation’, seeking to ‘put an end to all wars forever’ and gradually incorporating ‘an ever-growing state of nations, such as would at last embrace all the nations of the earth’.¹⁶² The logical place for it to stop is with the incorporation of all those states which are currently candidates – to which one might expect, eventually, to add Norway and Switzerland. With Turkey, the EU should negotiate a formal and institutionalised Partnership, based not only on intensive military and security cooperation, but also on joint projects related to all the areas under discussion in a hypothetical resuscitated *Confédération*.

Similarly with the African continent. Existing links with the countries to the south of the Mediterranean should be consolidated through the Barcelona process and a growing collective security partnership should become a major element of that process. Investment and development funds for the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean should be carefully articulated with those for other priority target areas (Balkans, Ukraine, Russia, Africa, etc.) in order to ensure that no area either is or feels neglected or abandoned. Stability from the Baltic to the Bosphorus and across to the Atlantic should be perceived by the EU as part of a seamless web of partnerships and projects linking the Union to all its immediate neighbours. Security is indeed indivisible. As far as sub-Saharan Africa is concerned, the EU should steadfastly steer clear of any temptation to turn its Rapid Reaction Force into the Continental *gendarme*. While there will almost

¹⁶¹ Jacques Attali’s report for Hubert Védrine, entitled ‘Une Union Plurielle’, cited by Baudouin Bollaert in *Le Figaro*, 6 July 2000.; Zbigniew Brzezinski, op. cit. in note 146.

¹⁶² Immanuel Kant, ‘Eternal Peace: a Philosophical Essay’ (1795), from Kant, *Eternal Peace and Other International Essays*, trans. W. Hastie (Boston, MA: World Peace Foundation, 1914), pp. 84–6, cited in Yost, op. cit. in note 83, p. 10.

certainly be flash-points where a judicious EU intervention will be appropriate, the main security policy priority in this area should be the encouragement, and if necessary the training, of a pan-African intervention force which will progressively assume most of the responsibility for collective security in the region. This was a serious possibility in the mid-1990s before St-Malo raised the prospect of a more muscular collective EU. It is neither appropriate nor sensible for an EU armed force configured to underpin the collective security of *the European continent*, to find itself regularly dispatched to former colonial outposts in order to defend an inevitably shifting and highly relative pattern of 'order'.

This raises the question of the 'scenarios' for EU military action on which force planning and procurement must necessarily be based. To those who ask: 'what is this European army all about and where is it going to be used?' (and taxpayers are bound to ask this question once governments hint at increases in defence budgets), an answer must be forthcoming. The standard answer to date has revolved around the sorts of mission scenarios discussed in the 1990s by WEU, with distinctions between 'NATO-only', 'Berlin-plus' and 'EU-only', even though specific examples, particularly of the latter two types, were hardly ever forthcoming. As the EU force grows in size and credibility, those distinctions, based hitherto largely on scale and dimension, will become less relevant. The types of political criteria privileged by France will become more prominent. It will be appropriate, for instance, when deciding whether a given operation should be conducted by the EU alone or in conjunction with the US ally, to take into consideration the past history of relations between the country or region in which intervention is being considered and the various potential intervening nations. CESDP should not be an instrument for perpetuating colonial or neo-colonial hegemony. Factors such as the availability of language or other human skills will also be important, as will the ability to create civil-military synergies. In many such areas, the EU may well prove to be a more appropriate actor than the United States or even NATO.¹⁶³ But it would be a mistake for the EU to be too explicit in conjuring up possible scenarios for military action. Just as strategic finesse in the nuclear age consisted in refusing to state in advance the circumstances in which deterrence would be deemed to have failed, so the requirements of the post-Cold War period demand a studied ambiguity in scenario-defining. The very fact of the

¹⁶³ Bailes, op. cit. in note 157, p. 39.

existence of a sizeable and efficient EU military force will have two effects. First, as a credible stick, it will have a beneficial impact on the effectiveness of the EU carrot, which will take the parallel form of conflict prevention and conflict resolution diplomacy as well as policies of aid, investment and development funding. Second, as an efficient military force, its effectiveness will be enhanced by the avoidance of any temptation to state in advance where and in what circumstances it might be deployed. Again, those circumstances, just like the line dividing intervention probability from non-probability, will shift over time according to geostrategic developments. The EU force, whose geographical scope and purpose will remain uncircumscribed, will be a concrete reality, available for multiple purposes, alone or acting with allies, at the behest of various actors: UN, OSCE, NATO, and above all the EU itself.

III.3 CESDP and the institutional evolution of the EU

This leads to the third set of issues affecting the development of the CESDP: its relationship with other institutional developments in the EU. The Union has, in the last fifteen years, transformed itself from an embryonic common market into a thriving and successful single commercial and industrial space, with – for most members – a single currency. The *political* impact of the EMU project has been at least as significant as its economic and financial impact. It has led, and will continue to lead, to a convergence among the leading EU member states on some of the most fundamental aspects of policy – those which once defined the realm of ‘sovereignty’, such as economic policy, monetary policy and fiscal policy. The impetus given by the single currency to the development of a political Europe has been considerable. The prospect of CESDP is a complementary driver taking the EU in the same direction. This has inevitably led some leaders of the Union to think more energetically about its eventual institutional form. Most recent blueprints imagine that the corollary of enlargement (an EU of up to thirty states) must be some form of core component or federal inner circle which will both maintain the essence of the original project (‘ever closer union’) and ensure that integration forges ahead at a pace faster than that of the slowest members. Whatever the specific details of the proposals, the visions of Joschka Fischer (‘a Federation based on a constituent treaty’ – Humboldt University 12 May 2000); Jacques Delors (‘a Federation of nation-states based on an avant-garde’ – *Libération*, 17 June 2000); Jacques

Chirac ('a pioneer group forging ahead with a European Constitution'—Bundestag, Berlin, 27 June 2000) all call for the creation of an efficient fast track to political unity on the part of those states wishing to belong. Where does CESDP fit into this picture?

Ever since Europe began seriously to discuss political cooperation in the 1970s, the writing has been on the wall for 'sovereignists'. This is not to say that institutions as jealous of their prerogatives as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or the Quai d'Orsay, are about to throw in the towel and embrace a *single* (as opposed to a common) CFSP or CESDP. Even those as committed to further integration as the current British and French foreign ministers are vehement in their defence of the perennity of national foreign policy.¹⁶⁴ But the St-Malo initiative, and the transfer to the EU of considerable powers in the field of security and defence (the original *raison d'être* of the sovereign state) cannot but further galvanise a process which, through the Single European Act and the single currency, has gathered considerable momentum over the last ten years. But will the implementation of CESDP facilitate or impede the creation of the embryonic federal system¹⁶⁵ which so many blueprints advocate? There is an immediate paradox in that the creation of the 'Second Pillar' at Maastricht (which consigned CFSP and CESDP to the realm of intergovernmentalism) would appear, on the contrary, to militate against the emergence of federal structures. Ever since the 1950s, when Jean Monnet, buoyed by the success of the Coal and Steel Community, decided to try to apply the same supranational method to the European Defence Community, it has been clear to most analysts that, while one can decide on steel quotas by committee, one cannot send young men to die in a foreign field by qualified majority voting. To date, the implementation of CESDP has been rigorously intergovernmental. Even the forging of the Headline Goal has scrupulously respected the sovereignty of each nation-state. It is up to each country to decide what it can contribute. This will be announced at the November 2000

¹⁶⁴ Op. cit. in note 68, pp. 105-6; Robin Cook, 'Britain's Future in Europe', Speech to the Britain in Europe Campaign, 23 November 1999.

¹⁶⁵ The use of the word 'federal' is probably misleading. 'Confederal', however, is no more helpful. The debate on Europe's institutional future is in need of a new vocabulary. Helen Wallace has proposed the neutral formula of 'EU-isation' (ECSA-Canada, Quebec, August 2000). I continue to use the word federal in the following discussion, largely out of convenience, to designate processes and structures which constitute ever closer political unification and coherence.

Force Generation Conference, and it will then be up to each country to go away and use its own national procedures to deliver that contribution. Although the media have constantly (most often not without disingenuousness) referred to the creation of a 'European Army', most governments have been at pains to persuade their electorates that this is decidedly *not* what is being created. And indeed, the NATO model is there to suggest that a consensual approach, based on unanimity among up to nineteen sovereign states, can indeed deliver a highly efficient fighting machine.

But the NATO model is based on *leadership*. It is based on the vanguard role of one sovereign state which is, in reality, much more equal than the others. There is no such situation in the EU. In order to create a fully integrated European Rapid Reaction Force, enjoying a significant measure of autonomy *vis-à-vis* the United States, the EU states have already consented to the market-driven internationalisation of their once sacrosanct defence industrial bases as the necessary price of staying in the game. Joint European procurement is now becoming the norm, and will be further stimulated by the requirements of interoperability. Already, there is agreement that the European troops will have to undergo joint training. One of the more surprising conclusions drawn by the French government from the operations in Kosovo was that their officer corps was deficient in competent English language speakers.¹⁶⁶ Interoperability is best conducted in a single language. Many of the elements of 'internationalisation' are already in place. And it is scarcely credible that when the members of the EMC sit down to discuss force planning for 2010, they will elect to repeat the methodology which was, in effect, the only one available in putting together the numbers for 2003: nations being left to decide what, when, how and where.

It is much more likely that the requirements of long-term force planning will introduce into CESDP substantial elements of centralised proactivism. Country x will be assigned the task of developing such and such a capacity and this capacity will be developed in cooperation with other national capacities through the medium of a transeuropean procurement base

¹⁶⁶ '... a high-level command of the other official language of NATO [is] essential for both the crews and officers called on to fill the staff positions', French Ministry of Defence, *Lessons from Kosovo*, November 1999, p. 18.

orchestrated by a EU-ised and transformed OCCAR. All this is bound to have a knock-on effect at the level of decision-making. While national capitals will naturally wish to keep as much control over events as possible, the presence in Brussels of several strata of permanent representatives with responsibility for CESDP (see above, pp. 34-5) is almost bound to produce increasing gravitation of the decision-shaping, and eventually decision-taking, process towards the 'centre'. We are already seeing signs of what might be called 'supranational intergovernmentalism'. A recent study, jointly produced for the French and German foreign ministries by their respective forward planning cells, points to the urgent necessity of formulating a strong and proactive foreign policy, and therefore proposes in the medium to long-term the merging of Pillars One and Two, and recommends that the HR-CFSP should cease to be a purely intergovernmental post by becoming, *in addition to* Secretary-General of the Council, Vice-President of the Commission. Moreover, it is suggested that The HR-CFSP's Policy Unit should operate in close cooperation with the relevant CFSP and CESDP planning teams in the Commission to form the embryo of a European Foreign Ministry. This confidential document¹⁶⁷ does not reflect the official thinking of either foreign ministry, particularly the French, but it is a revealing indicator of prevailing thinking among long-term foreign policy planners. It is also very significant that the study – which is essentially focused on foreign policy – was commissioned as a Franco-German exercise rather than as a Franco-British exercise, despite the centrality to the defence and security project of the Paris-London axis. The Franco-German 'motor' of the EU is by no means moribund, even in the field which has recently been dominated by Franco-British initiatives.

Would such a radical 'federalisation' of security and foreign policy prove to be the dramatic final straw which would force the British into rethinking much of their strategy on CESDP? The answer is almost certainly no, for three reasons. First, by the time any of these developments actually comes to pass, the United Kingdom will be so heavily involved in the CESDP project¹⁶⁸ that pulling out would hardly be an option – the more so in that,

¹⁶⁷ Its existence was revealed to the press in early July 2000. See Baudouin Bollaert, 'Quelle Politique Etrangère à Trente?', *Le Figaro*, 6 July 2000; Daniel Vernet, 'Français et Allemands envisagent en commun l'avenir de l'Europe', *Le Monde*, 6 July 2000.

¹⁶⁸ Assuming, of course that there is not a dramatic reversal of political fortunes in the United Kingdom. The current Conservative opposition, were it to form a government in

by then and by the same token, the United States will most likely have made contingency plans to concentrate its main military resources elsewhere in the world other than Europe. The CESDP, as it is implemented, will become more, not less crucial to the foundations of European security. Second, as the single biggest contributor and as arguably the most influential country in the CESDP field, Britain will have found itself in a position to exert critical influence (and probably a measure of leadership) over the outcome of the EU discussions on implementation. This was certainly the case throughout 1999 and continues to be in 2000. Third, Britain will by that time have reached the point where the ultimate decision on Europe can no longer be put off. The referendum on the Euro, which seems unavoidable, will in fact be a referendum on Europe. Assuming a Blair government is still in power, it will have had to muster its entire arsenal of propaganda and decision-shapers, as well as mobilising cross-party pro-European support and enlisting the help of all those among the élites – business, academia, writers, sports and media personalities – who ‘believe’ in Europe. Turning tail on the one project in which Britain will probably have taken a commanding lead and can continue credibly to do so is not going to be the course adopted by a prime minister trying to win a referendum on Europe.

So the question remains: will CESDP – at present a purely intergovernmental enterprise – paradoxically fuel ‘federalist tendencies’ within the EU? The answer depends to some extent on the interaction between structure and process. To the extent to which the EU, *for other reasons* (historical inertia, the impact of EMU, the institutional consequences of enlargement, the determination of the Berlin government) begins to assume some of the trappings of a federal system, then the existence of a CESDP project and process is very unlikely to act as a countervailing trend. Indeed, as we have seen, despite what is almost certain to be the desire of national capitals to retain as much national control as possible, the structural imperatives of the CESDP project can be perceived to be pointing in the same centralist (if not federalist) direction. In other words, CESDP will not impede federalisation if that is the direction the EU is heading in. On the other hand, it will not actively promote it – beyond a certain point which will be largely determined by the requirements of

the foreseeable future, would be almost obliged politically to call into question most aspects of the CESDP project, against which it is currently waging a form of guerrilla warfare.

military planning – if the Union appears to be actively resisting the sirens of federalism. However, to the extent to which CESDP is an overt recognition of the ambitions of the EU to intensify the process of political union, then the seeds of greater political centralisation have already been sown. Many analysts have argued that the EU cannot have a unified foreign policy without a unified executive. It may well prove that CESDP will nudge the Union in that direction.

A noisy distraction in this area was created by President Chirac's 27 June 2000 Bundestag speech in favour of encouraging 'enhanced cooperation' in a number of difficult policy areas where consensus is unlikely. Among these, he specifically mentioned defence and security. But the Chirac speech (which was above all an exercise in revitalising a moribund Franco-German couple) was aimed primarily at breaking the log-jam on QMV in the intergovernmental conference. What the President was saying, in essence, was that if member states could not agree on QMV, then they could always fall back on enhanced cooperation. This, in itself, is neither good news nor bad news. It all depends on whether one is or is not in favour of QMV as a means of taking integration forward. But the reference to CESDP as an appropriate area for enhanced cooperation was a distraction for two reasons. First, because this is the one area where there is not and never has been any question of taking decisions by QMV. Second, it is an area where the exercise of some type of enhanced cooperation has been the rule rather than the exception throughout the entire period since the fall of the Berlin Wall. All EU military operations in the Balkans or elsewhere have been examples of coalitions of the willing.

This raises another question, however. Can the EU allow itself to indulge in a division of labour within its ranks, whereby certain nations take on the lion's share of responsibility for defence and security and the others offer little more than political and financial support? However superficially attractive this 'mercenary scenario',¹⁶⁹ might be either to those doing the fighting or to those doing the financing, it is incompatible with the spirit of community which is supposed to inform the European Union project. It should therefore be vigorously excluded and, as in the Headline Goal project, every country must be expected to participate actively in the common endeavour. After all, Pennsylvania, which contains a high

¹⁶⁹ Alain Joxe, *L'Amérique mercenaire* (Paris: Stock, 1992).

percentage of Quakers and other religious non-conformists and pacifists, does not benefit from an opt-out from US military commitments. However, a more likely division of labour will be that those (mainly Nordic) members of the EU with strong peacemaking traditions will participate in strictly military operations with only symbolic forces, while concentrating their efforts and resources on civilian aspects of crisis management. Indeed, the distinctiveness of the CESDP will be the fine balance which will be achieved between the 'hard' and 'soft' ends of the spectrum of security implementation. That in itself will constitute a unique, consensual European approach to the future of foreign and security policy.

III.4 Norms, values and political legitimacy

This brings us to the final set of issues which will influence the direction of the CESDP project over the coming decades. Whatever the inner strengths and common purposes of the Atlantic Alliance, the political and social norms and values which underpin the European Union are distinct and quite different from those which have forged the United States. The historical itinerary of the two continents contrasts greatly, the nature of their interaction with different societies and peoples assumes different characteristics, and their approach to security and war is formed by vastly different geostrategic realities and experiences. Some might challenge the credentials of the Europeans as purveyors of values. It is true that, in the first half of the twentieth century especially, Europe hardly set an example which other parts of the globe should be invited to follow. But a case can be made that, in the second half, the Europeans have learned and have applied the lessons of their own murderous folly and have created, for the first time in history, and of their own free will, a consensual community which is much greater and more dynamic than the sum of its parts. One should not overstate this, for it is also true that one of the great strengths of the EU is its diversity and that, within the current fifteen member states, one can encounter an enormous range of political, social, moral and ethical norms. Identities are also multiple and elusive. Any attempt to define too closely 'European values' almost inevitably runs the risk of offending certain countries or constituencies.

Collectively, however, the EU does represent a system of political, economic and social rules and values which has a strong appeal, especially

to states which are not yet members. That system does not engage in overt proselytism. The European Union is not embarking on a CESDP with a view to challenging the United States as a universal role model. That is a project which France is often tempted by: indeed only France and the United States among the nations of the world have purported to put their socio-political model forward as one which has claims to universal emulation. The EU's project is more limited: it is to project stability wherever instability threatens, particularly in areas (the EU's 'near abroad') where the spillover effect could have direct or indirect repercussions on internal EU stability or security. In so doing, the Union nevertheless wishes to act according to certain precepts which it perceives as underpinning its own communitarian ethos: that pluralism and tolerance are the surest underpinnings of a healthy polity; that war and violence are not appropriate or productive methods of settling differences between peoples; that there are many different forms of intervention and that the EU's preferred method prioritises the humanitarian over the military, the pre-emptive over the reactive; that where military intervention seems unavoidable, it should be conducted according to international rules, and in the name of a genuine international community with some clear legal mandate as a legitimising framework; that while it seeks to exercise influence in areas where instability reigns – notably by positing its own communitarian values as an ideal of interstate action worthy of consideration – it does not seek to dominate, control or impose on others. Alyson Bailes has offered a helpful check-list of values which should always inform any EU intervention in the affairs of other nations: minimal and proportionate use of armed force; adequate legal base; moral authority; respect for the Geneva Convention; coherence with EU commitments in the area of arms control; democratic accountability; transparency.¹⁷⁰ It is worth pondering for a moment some of these elements, for they introduce a new concept in international relations: that of *security governance*.

Whereas, according to the traditional schools of international relations (Realism and Neo-realism), defence and even security are matters best dealt with by states and governments, acting according to the time-honoured

¹⁷⁰ Bailes, op. cit. in note 157. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in his Chicago speech of 22 April 1999, set down five less moral or legalistic and more utilitarian tests for intervention: (1) are we sure of our case? (2) have we exhausted all diplomatic options? (3) are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? (4) are we prepared for the long term? (5) do we have national interests involved?

precepts of national interest, the end of the Cold War has allowed analysts to perceive the construction of a new approach to international security – based on precepts of governance – which differentiates itself from the traditional approach in a number of important ways. The literature¹⁷¹ suggests that the institutions and practice of *governance* can be distinguished from those of *government* in six different areas: (1) functional scope; (2) geographical scope; (3) interests; (4) norms; (5) decision-making; (6) policy implementation.

According to this approach, it can be argued that security policy decision-making has, in recent years, been marked by a shift from governmental to governance modes. First, in terms of functional scope, security policy has been constantly broadened away from the narrow ‘zero-sum game’ attitudes of traditional defence policy. The inclusion, in the broader definition of security policy, of non-military factors such as social, economic, environmental and cultural considerations (my neighbour’s security is the best guarantee of my own) have ensured that a much wider range of actors are involved in the delivery of security than was hitherto the case. Second, in terms of geographical scope, the traditional focus on the state, or, at most on the macro-regional dimension, has been replaced by a multi-level approach to security involving inputs at every geographical level from the sub-state to the global. These inputs also depend, increasingly, on non-governmental organisations and on non-military actors, including – now – a major actor such as the European Union itself. Third, the end of the Cold War has removed the notion of irreconcilable ideological interests which informed traditional approaches to international relations. In their place, we now see the notion of common threats to security, which require the cooperation of all states in a given region. At the same time, we have witnessed a significant diversification of the activities of the main multilateral organisations within the North Atlantic area. The enlargement of NATO has involved many bilateral agreements under Partnership for Peace, which focuses on the distinctiveness of each signatory state and relativises the dominance of common interests. Similarly, EU enlargement, which also has a very important security dimension, combines an approach

¹⁷¹ Perhaps the most comprehensive overview of the question is to be found in Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising (eds.), *The Transformation of Governance in the European Union* (London: Routledge, 1999). For a critical overview of the debate, see Simon Hix, ‘The study of the European Union II: the “new governance” agenda and its rival’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 5/1, March 1998, pp. 38-65.

based on common interests with one which recognises distinctiveness. And now, the EU's CESDP posits yet another approach to international security which combines a respect for diversity with a vision of commonality. Fourth, the time-honoured norm of state sovereignty has been breached by new concepts of *ingérence* (interference), positing the right of intervention based on superior human values. This move towards the dilution of sovereignty has been a cardinal feature of the EU's political practice (though as yet only to a limited extent in the field of security), involving ever greater use of qualified majority voting. Fifth, the diversification of functions and levels involved in the definition and delivery of security policy has led to a proliferation of actors in the political, social, economic, environmental and basic humanitarian fields, all of whom have some part to play in decision-making. Finally, at the level of implementation, governments welcome the support of these non-state actors, since the functional expansion of the notion of security means that the problem is simply too big even for large states to handle.¹⁷² The role, for instance, of a group such as *Médecins sans Frontières* has been crucial to the delivery of security in the Balkans.

In these circumstances, issues of transparency, legitimacy and even democratic accountability are likely to be central to the success of EU defence and security policy, even though they have traditionally been absent from classic state-based policy in these areas. To date, all too little attention has been paid to the reality of transparency and legitimacy, even though lip-service is regularly paid to them in the texts of the European Council. It will be necessary formally to involve some degree of parliamentary oversight if the EU is not to be perceived as preaching one thing and practising another. But beyond that purely formalistic aspect of democratic accountability, the broader implications of legitimacy will need to be borne in mind, since the CESDP is a project which touches European society at every level, and will be conducted in the name of the norms and values which confer upon the EU project itself the legitimacy which alone allows it to continue its journey to an unknown destination. Legitimacy is at the heart of governance.

¹⁷² This concept of security governance is central to a major research project being undertaken by the UK's Economic and Social Research Council under the 'One Europe or Several?' project. The specific research team working on 'security governance' includes Stuart Croft, Terry Terriff and Elke Krahmann (Birmingham University), Jolyon Howorth (Bath University) and Mark Webber (Loughborough University).

The significant added value of the CESDP in terms of security governance is, of course, the addition of the military capacity. The EU's ability to persuade through example or through investment, development aid or other forms of 'sweeteners' has had very clear limits. The carrot, without the stick, is often an inadequate if not an inappropriate instrument. But as Kofi Annan famously remarked about UN influence over Iraq, diplomacy backed up by force is considerably more effective than diplomacy alone. When the EU possesses both the carrot and the stick, the combination of the two instruments will greatly increase the effectiveness of each one, but particularly of the carrot. This brings us back once again to the unique combination of military and non-military instruments which the EU will bring to bear on the implementation of the CESDP. In this, the EU will genuinely be in a position to offer an alternative approach to security – particularly in its 'near abroad' – than that traditionally offered by the United States. This will indeed represent a revolution in European affairs.

Conclusions: CESDP in a new global order

As will be clear from the foregoing, CESDP has some way to go before it fulfils the expectations of its creators. There will be many problems en route and the journey will be long and complicated. Nevertheless, three factors in particular suggest that, however daunting the current and future problems, the chances are that, unlike in the past, this time some viable form of CESDP will emerge. First, the degree of political will which has been generated in Europe behind this project, ever since the St-Malo summit in December 1998, is considerable. It has acquired an inner dynamic, rather in the manner of the single currency or the EMU project, which will prove increasingly difficult (and indeed dramatic) to reverse – the more so as Europe's credibility as an international actor becomes associated with the project itself. In a very real sense, the EU has everything to gain from making a success of CESDP and everything to lose from failure. Indeed, failure would have profound ramifications across the entire range of political projects currently being undertaken by the Union – including enlargement and EMU. The premium on success is of historic proportions. Second, historical forces are all pushing in the same direction. The Cold War is over and US commitment to Europe cannot remain the same as it was from 1947 to 1989. The American taxpayer cannot be expected to continue to defray the lion's share of a responsibility – and of a bill – which the EU is quite capable of assuming. To a large extent, the survival of the Alliance itself is now dependent on the generation of a significant European military capacity. At the same time, the creation of that capacity is intimately tied up with the EU's ability to maintain a defence industrial base and stay abreast of technological developments in the field of sophisticated weaponry. Third, and crucially, all the signs suggest that the United Kingdom has thrown itself fully into the project. Whether or not the United Kingdom will eventually become a fully-fledged member of the EU's other main integrated projects (the Euro, Schengen), it seems beyond question that, barring a political upset, London is now seriously committed to the cause of CESDP. The road ahead may be ill-lit and untrodden, but there is little doubt that it is leading to a new balance in the respective responsibilities of the EU and the United States for the security of the Old Continent.

However, other problems still to be resolved are many and significant. Institutions need oiling and adjusting, defence and security cultures need time to adapt to one another, a strategic project needs to be developed, an efficient executive structure to emerge and above all a credible military capacity has to be delivered. Among the most intractable of these on-going problems is that of generating political support for the increased defence budgets which, sooner or later, will almost certainly be a necessary concomitant of increased European military capacity. Such support will need to be galvanised in different ways, via distinct discourses in different member states, and the extent to which that proves possible will depend crucially on the balance which is eventually struck between the military and the civil-political dimensions of the EU's policy instruments. The attitude towards such a new European capacity which will eventually be adopted by a new Administration in Washington is also a large unknown. In the longer term, it will be necessary for the EU and the United States to negotiate a new transatlantic relationship, which will inevitably be set in a shifting global context. US thinking is increasingly focusing on a new global arrangement between the two sides of the Atlantic, according to which the nascent EU political-military capacity, *in addition to* playing a much greater role in policing the European 'near abroad', will prove able and willing to back US security policy across the globe (China-Taiwan, Korea, the Gulf, Middle East Arc of Crisis).¹⁷³ The United States no longer sees its vital interests as being threatened primarily, if at all, from the European theatre. What the United States is interested in knowing is what the EU can bring to the global security table to reciprocate the US contribution to European security over the past century. The answer which appears to have been forthcoming, from Cologne to Helsinki and on to Nice, is: 'Petersberg'. For the United States, this may not be enough to hold the Alliance together. The Helsinki Headline Goal is widely seen in Washington as too limited in scope. This poses the question of defining the optimal scope of a CESDP. France is quite prepared to envision the EU as a major global actor, one which will necessarily remain allied to the United States – but not one which will automatically or blindly follow US policy wherever it strays. The

¹⁷³ Stephen Larrabee and David Gompert, *America and Europe: a partnership for a new era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); John C. Hulsman, 'A Grand Bargain with Europe: Preserving NATO for the 21st Century', *The Heritage Foundation Background*, no. 1360, 17 April 2000; interventions by Ivo Daalder, Stephen Larrabee and William Harris at WEU-ISS annual conference, Paris, 24-25 February 2000.

United Kingdom, on the other hand, despite its global interests, seems to see a more limited regional role for CESDP, with possible extension into Africa, but not much else. Current UK thinking on the European defence remit does not go much beyond Petersberg-type collective security missions. To some extent, this reflects traditional British misgivings about Europe and defence – misgivings which have recently been modified but not abandoned. But it also connects with the United Kingdom's tendency to feel that support for US global policy is something the United Kingdom offers Washington more or less in isolation from the EU allies.¹⁷⁴ That has certainly been the case where US policy in the Gulf or in South-East Asia has been concerned.

A crucial test of these contrasting approaches will come over the implications and consequences of current US plans to deploy a limited National Missile Defence (NMD) system, which would theoretically protect US territory from the unwelcome ballistic missile attentions of so-called 'rogue states'.¹⁷⁵ Although all EU countries, including the United Kingdom, have pressured Washington not to deploy such a system, arguing that it would be in breach of the ABM Treaty, and that it would merely encourage Russia and China to engage in a new arms race, the evidence suggests that Washington is likely to ignore these pleas and go ahead with the system. That, then, poses two sets of dilemmas for the Europeans. Assuming that, at some stage in the future, the United States enjoyed some degree of (albeit limited) protection from hostile states and that the EU did not, the potential for divisions within the Alliance would be considerable. Is it conceivable, for instance, that the EU would join a new US coalition against Iraq if European countries were vulnerable to a strike from Iraqi missiles armed with atomic, biological or chemical weapons? One American 'solution' to this dilemma is the suggestion that the Europeans build their own NMD system. Paradoxically, given the United Kingdom's current involvement in US early warning systems, this is a proposal to which France would not be totally averse (even though Paris has been much more outspoken in its criticism of the US plans for NMD than has London). However, it is

¹⁷⁴ In the MOD's *Strategic Defence Review* (paras. 51-4), there is no role for a European contribution beyond the NATO area, but considerable scope for UK intervention, primarily in the Gulf, the Caribbean and South-East Asia.

¹⁷⁵ In June 2000, the US officially dropped the concept of 'rogue states' and replaced it with that of 'states of concern'. The best introduction to the fiercely complex NMD debate is Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Goldgeier and James M. Lindsay, 'Deploying NMD: not whether but how', *Survival*, vol. 42/1, Spring 2000, pp. 6-28.

unlikely that the United Kingdom would feel comfortable, either politically or financially, with the implications of such a plan. The potential of the NMD conundrum to drive a wedge not only between the United States and the EU but also between different EU member states, is considerable.

This US quest for a new global security deal between NATO and the EU is bound to pose a major dilemma for many EU member states. There is no consensus among the Fifteen as to the overall balance sheet of US global policy. Moreover, as the EU completes its enlargement process and becomes a stable international actor, it will need to design a different mix of political and military instruments from that traditionally favoured by the United States. Maintaining stability in the EU hinterland is bound to mean something rather different from 'merely' the projection of military power. The biggest EU failure so far has been the failure of deterrence, the failure to replace military instruments by political instruments. One major lesson from the 'wars of succession' in former Yugoslavia is that political blandishments, economic and commercial sweeteners and security diplomacy simply do not work (particularly with ruthless adversaries such as Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic) unless accompanied by military muscle. However, if the muscle is present, it ought progressively to be possible to achieve political and diplomatic objectives without actually having recourse to it. In that context, European approaches are bound to be different from US ones. The United Kingdom, which has tended in the past to side with the more muscular US approach to peacekeeping, will increasingly find itself under pressure to espouse the EU's more subtle approach to security diplomacy. This is already happening – 'defence diplomacy' became a favourite theme of New Labour – but the process is likely to accelerate. And the nascent division of labour between the EU and NATO will accelerate it even further. To this extent, the United Kingdom's current self-perceived position as the pivot between the two sides of the Atlantic will become harder and harder to sustain. That is not to say that the EU and NATO will inevitably drift apart or adopt incompatible policies, but it does mean that each individual national player will sooner or later have to make clear choices about belonging. It is in this sense that the United Kingdom and some of its Atlanticist allies within the EU may well find themselves one day having to make that fateful choice – not so much of loyalties, because they can be multiple, but of priorities for specific action and involvement, because that demands time and resources, which are finite. That will be the moment when the paradigm shift entered into at St-Malo

and completed at Helsinki will pose the most serious dilemma for the United Kingdom and its EU allies.

For the remainder of the EU member states, beginning with France, the CESDP project is yet another 'journey to an unknown destination'. With fewer reservations about the impact of the project on Washington thinking (Paris is confident that the United States can and will adapt to the implications of CESDP), most European countries will have little difficulty in marrying the advantages of relative European autonomy with the inevitability of a shift in the balance of EU-US relations. Different regions of Europe will undoubtedly have slightly different strategic priorities: it would be unreasonable to expect Lisbon, Madrid and Rome to attach the same importance to developments in the Baltic states as will be the case in Berlin, Helsinki and Stockholm. Concern for the coherence of a viable Mediterranean policy will be less urgent in Copenhagen and Luxembourg than in Athens and Paris. But already there are abundant signs that all fifteen members of the current EU are beginning to view CFSP and CESDP as aspects of a seamless web of policy transactions which will sooner or later affect each country equally significantly. Collective security in one part of Europe inevitably has implications for all the other parts. This growing awareness of the unicity of European foreign and security policy is bound to have an impact on the institutional development of the Union itself. While capitals will continue to formulate options appropriate to their specific situation, overall policy will increasingly be finessed at the centre. As the EU emerges as a true international actor, this cannot but lead towards some form of governance which combines consensus with efficiency, diversity with unity. For that, after all, is the essential distinctiveness – and the true moral force – of the European Union. The implementation of a coherent security and defence policy is indeed the ultimate challenge for the process of European integration.

Abbreviations

AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe
C4	Command, Control, Communications and Computers
CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force(s)
COREPER	Permanent Representatives Committee
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EADS	European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company
EMC	European Military Committee
EMS	European Military Staff
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
EU	European Union
EUROFOR	European (Rapid Deployment) Force
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Force
FPSC	Foreign Policy and Security Committee
GAC	General Affairs Council
HG	Headline Goal
HGTF	Headline Goal Task Force
HR	High Representative
IFOR	Implementation Force
iMB	interim Military Body
iPSC	interim PSC
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OCCAR	Joint Armaments Cooperation Structure (French abbreviation)
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters
PoCo	Political Committee
PPEWU	Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union

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ANNEXE A

PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 10 AND 11 DECEMBER 1999

II. COMMON EUROPEAN POLICY ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE

25. The European Council adopts the two Presidency progress reports (see Annex IV) on developing the Union's military and non-military crisis management capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defence.

26. The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

27. The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.

28. Building on the guidelines established at the Cologne European Council and on the basis of the Presidency's reports, the European Council has agreed in particular the following:

- cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;
- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework;
- modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;
- appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management;
- a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States.

29. The European Council asks the incoming Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to carry work forward in the General Affairs Council on all aspects of the reports as a matter of priority, including conflict prevention and a committee for civilian crisis management. The incoming Presidency is invited to draw up a first progress report to the Lisbon European Council and an overall report to be presented to the Feira European Council containing appropriate recommendations and proposals, as well as an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary. The General Affairs Council is invited to begin implementing these decisions by establishing as of March 2000

the agreed interim bodies and arrangements within the Council, in accordance with the current Treaty provisions.

ANNEXE B

**JOINT DECLARATION ISSUED AT THE BRITISH-FRENCH SUMMIT,
ST-MALO, FRANCE, 3-4 DECEMBER 1998**

The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom are agreed that:

1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union.

2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.

In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.

Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union (European Council, General Affairs Council, and meetings of Defence Ministers).

The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European states.

The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected.

3. In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).

4. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.

5. We are determined to unite in our efforts to enable the European Union to give concrete expression to these objectives.

ANNEXE C**PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS
COLOGNE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 3 AND 4 JUNE 1999****EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE COMMON
EUROPEAN POLICY ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE**

1. We, the members of the European Council, are resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence. The work undertaken on the initiative of the German Presidency and the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam permit us today to take a decisive step forward.

In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives and the progressive framing of a common defence policy, we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the 'Petersberg tasks'. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.

2. We are convinced that to fully assume its tasks in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management the European Union must have at its disposal the appropriate capabilities and instruments. We therefore commit ourselves to further develop more effective European military capabilities from the basis of existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities and to strengthen our own capabilities for that purpose. This requires the maintenance of a sustained defence effort, the implementation of the necessary adaptations and notably the reinforcement of our capabilities in the field of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control. This also requires efforts to adapt, exercise and bring together national and multinational European forces.

We also recognise the need to undertake sustained efforts to strengthen the industrial and technological defence base, which we want to be competitive and dynamic. We are determined to foster the restructuring of the European defence industries amongst those States involved. With industry we will therefore work towards closer and more efficient defence industry collaboration. We will seek further progress in the harmonisation of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms, as Member States consider appropriate.

3. We welcome the results of the NATO Washington summit as regards NATO support for the process launched by the EU and its confirmation that a more effective role for the European Union in conflict prevention and crisis management will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Alliance. In implementing this process launched by the EU, we shall ensure

the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between the European Union and NATO.

We want to develop an effective EU-led crisis management in which NATO members, as well as neutral and non-allied members, of the EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU operations.

We will put in place arrangements that allow non-EU European allies and partners to take part to the fullest possible extent in this endeavour.

4. We therefore approve and adopt the report prepared by the German Presidency, which reflects the consensus among the Member States.

5. We are now determined to launch a new step in the construction of the European Union. To this end we task the General Affairs Council to prepare the conditions and the measures necessary to achieve these objectives, including the definition of the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks. In this regard, our aim is to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000. In that event, the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose. The different status of Member States with regard to collective defence guarantees will not be affected. The Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defence of its Member States.

We therefore invite the Finnish Presidency to take the work forward within the General Affairs Council on the basis of this declaration and the report of the Presidency to the European Council meeting in Cologne. We look forward to a progress report by the Finnish Presidency to the Helsinki European Council meeting.

ANNEXE D**PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS
SANTA MARIA DA FEIRA EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 19 AND 20 JUNE 2000****ANNEX I PRESIDENCY REPORT ON STRENGTHENING
THE COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY****I. INTRODUCTION**

1. In Cologne, the European Council expressed its resolve that the EU should play its full role on the international stage and that to that end the EU should be provided with all the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence. Since Cologne, the European Union has been engaged in a process aiming at building the necessary means and capabilities which will allow it to take decisions on, and to carry out, the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union ("Petersberg tasks"). These developments are an integral part of the enhancement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and are based on the principles set out in Helsinki. The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. Having approved the two Finnish Presidency progress reports on military and non-military aspects of crisis management, including the common European headline goal and the collective capabilities goals, the European Council in Helsinki asked the Portuguese Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to carry work forward in the General Affairs Council on all aspects, as a matter of priority. The Portuguese Presidency was invited to draw up a first progress report to the Lisbon European Council and an overall report to be presented to the Feira European Council containing appropriate recommendations and proposals, as well as an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary.

3. A first progress report, reflecting the work carried forward by the Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, within the General Affairs Council was presented to the Lisbon European Council. The European Council of Lisbon welcomed the progress already achieved and in particular the fact that the interim bodies had been established and had started to function effectively and that the Council had identified a process for elaborating the headline goal and identifying national contributions so as to meet the military capability target.

4. The European Council in Lisbon looked forward to the further work that the Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, would pursue in the Council and to the Presidency's overall report to the Feira European Council, including proposals on the involvement of third countries in EU military crisis management and the further development of the EU's relationship with NATO.

5. The Lisbon European Council furthermore appreciated what had been achieved in the non-military crisis management track and invited the Council to establish by, or at, Feira a Committee for Civilian Crisis Management.

6. Since then, work has been carried forward on all aspects of military and non-military crisis management and substantive progress has been made, in particular with the identification of appropriate arrangements for the participation of third countries to EU military crisis management, as well as of principles and modalities for developing EU-NATO relations. The headline goal has been further elaborated; a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management has been set up; a coordinating mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services, has been established at the Council Secretariat; the study to define concrete targets in the area of civilian aspects of crisis management has been concluded; concrete targets for civilian police have been identified.

7. The Presidency submits herewith its overall report to the Feira European Council covering, in Chapter II, the military aspects and, in Chapter III, the non-military aspects of crisis management. Work has also been carried out on conflict prevention. The usefulness of finding ways of improving the coherence and effectiveness of the EU action in the field of conflict prevention has been recognised.

8. In the course of the work during the Presidency on the strengthening of military and non-military crisis management and conflict prevention, the importance has been underlined of ensuring an extensive relationship in crisis management by the Union between the military and civilian fields, as well as cooperation between the EU rapidly-evolving crisis management capacity and the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe.

9. In presenting this report, the Presidency has taken note of the fact that Denmark has recalled Protocol No 5 to the Amsterdam Treaty on the position of Denmark.

II. MILITARY ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

A. Elaboration of the Headline and the collective capabilities goals

1. Concerning the development of the Headline and the collective capabilities goals, the General Affairs Council, reinforced with Ministers of Defence, concluded at its meeting of 20 March that the "Food for thought" paper on the "Elaboration of the Headline Goal", including the timetable set out therein leading to a Capabilities Commitment Conference to be convened by the end of 2000, constitutes a basis for future work to be conducted by the competent bodies.

2. The General Affairs Council, at its session of 13 June, with the participation of Ministers of Defence, approved the work carried out by the Interim Military Body and forwarded through the IPSC, up to the "First Seminar of National Experts in Defence Planning" held in Brussels on 22-24 May 2000. The Council, inviting the competent bodies to continue on that basis, adopted the following guidelines for further work:

– The development of the Headline and collective capabilities goals, which have been agreed at the European Council in Helsinki, should be conducted by the 15, in accordance with the decision-making autonomy of the EU as well as the requirements regarding military efficiency.

- The Interim Military Body, with the political guidance of the IPSC, will propose the elements which will encompass the Headline Goal.
- In order to do this, the Interim Military Body will identify the capabilities necessary for the EU to respond to the full range of the Petersberg Tasks.
- In elaborating the Headline and collective capabilities goals by drawing on Member States contributions, the IMB, including representatives from capitals, will also call meetings with DSACEUR and NATO experts in order to draw on NATO's military expertise on the requirements of the Headline and collective capabilities goals.
- In this connection, transparency and dialogue between the EU and NATO will in addition be provided by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the capabilities goal provided for in Appendix 2.
- The Headline Goal requirements agreed by the IMB at CHODs level will, after endorsement by the Council, be the basis for the Member States in considering their initial offers of national contributions to the Headline Goal. These contributions will be examined by the Interim Military Body. This process must be concluded before the convening of the Capability Commitment Conference.
- It will be important to ensure coherence, for those Member States concerned, with NATO's defence planning process and the Planning and Review Process.
- In accordance with the determination expressed at Helsinki and Lisbon, once the needs and resources available have been identified, Member States will announce, at the Capability Commitment Conference, their commitments with a view to enabling the EU to fulfil the Headline Goal and the collective capabilities goals. It will be also important to create a review mechanism for measuring progress towards the achievement of those goals.
- The European Union will encourage third countries to contribute through supplementary commitments. In order to enable those countries to contribute to improving European military capabilities, appropriate arrangements will be made by the incoming presidency regarding the Capabilities Commitment Conference. These arrangements will take into account the capabilities of the six non-EU European NATO members. The offers of capabilities already made by Turkey, Poland, the Czech Republic and Norway are welcomed.

B. Recommendations on the institutional development of the new permanent political and military bodies related to the CESDP within the EU

The interim political and military bodies were established on 1 March 2000. In the light of the experience gained since their establishment, work has been carried out on the institutional development of the new permanent political and military bodies, in accordance with the Helsinki conclusions. Further work is under way, in order to ensure as soon as possible the start of the permanent phase and of the EU operational capacity for crisis management.

C. Proposals on appropriate arrangements to be concluded by the Council on modalities of consultation and/or participation that will allow the third States concerned to contribute to EU military crisis management.

Work has been carried forward on the modalities of consultation and/or participation concerning the non-EU European NATO members and other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU.

In this context, the aim has been to identify, in accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, arrangements for dialogue, consultation and cooperation on issues related to crisis management ensuring the decision-making autonomy of the EU. These arrangements will provide for the interim period meetings with the abovementioned countries, which will take place within a single inclusive structure and will supplement the meetings held as part of the reinforced political dialogue on CFSP matters. Within this structure there will be exchanges with the non-EU NATO European members when the subject matter requires it. For the permanent phase, arrangements will take into account the different needs arising in the routine phase and in the operational phase. The outcome of the Council deliberations is contained in Appendix 1 to this report.

Exchanges took place on 11 May 2000 between the EU Member States' Political Directors and their counterparts of the non-EU NATO European members and other candidate countries as well as between the EU Member States' Political Directors and their counterparts of the non-EU NATO European members.

Russia, Ukraine, other European States engaged in political dialogue with the Union and other interested States, may be invited to take part in EU-led operations. In this context, the EU welcomes the interest shown by Canada.

The French Presidency is invited, together with the Secretary General/High Representative, to carry forward further work within the General Affairs Council in order to make initial proposals to the Nice European Council on appropriate arrangements for consultation and/or participation to allow these other prospective partners to contribute to EU-led military crisis management.

D. Proposals on principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and recommendations on developing modalities for EU/NATO relations, to permit cooperation on the appropriate military response to a crisis

The Council has identified the principles on the basis of which consultation and cooperation with NATO should be developed. As to modalities, the Council has recommended that the EU should propose to NATO the creation of four "ad hoc working groups" between the EU and NATO on the issues which have been identified in that context: security issues, capabilities goals, modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets and capabilities and the definition of permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation.

The outcome of the Council deliberations is contained in Appendix 2 to this report.

E. Indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary

The existing provisions of the TEU define the questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy governed by Title V of the Treaty. On this basis, the Council has decided to establish the interim Political and Security Committee and the Interim Military Body, and to reinforce the Council Secretariat with military experts seconded from Member States. Article 17 TEU expressly includes the Petersberg tasks in the CFSP. The Presidency took note of the opinion of the Council Legal Service the conclusion of which reads as follows:

"The Council's Legal Service is of the opinion that the conclusions of the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils regarding European security and defence policy can be implemented without it being legally necessary to amend the Treaty on European Union.

However, such amendments would be necessary if the intention is to transfer the Council's decision-making powers to a body made up of officials, or to amend the Treaty's provisions regarding the WEU. Furthermore, it is for Member States to determine whether amendments to the Treaty would be politically desirable or operationally appropriate."

The Presidency suggests that the issue of Treaty revision should continue to be examined between the Feira and Nice European Councils.

III. CIVILIAN ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

1. The Presidency has, together with the Secretary General/High Representative, responded as a matter of priority to the Helsinki European Council's invitation to carry work forward on all aspects of civilian crisis management, as defined in Annex 2 to Annex IV to the Helsinki conclusions.

2. The aim of this work has been to enhance and better coordinate the Union's and the Members States' non-military crisis management response tools, with special emphasis on a rapid reaction capability. This will also improve the EU's contribution to crisis management operations led by international and regional organisations.

3. As a concrete result of this intensive work, the following measures have been taken:

(a) A Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management has been set up by a Council decision adopted on 22 May 2000. The Committee held its first meeting on 16 June 2000.

(b) A coordinating mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services, has been set up at the Council Secretariat. Further developing the inventory of Member States and Union resources relevant for non-military crisis management, it has, as a first priority, established a database on civilian police capabilities in order to maintain and share information, to propose capabilities initiatives and to facilitate the definition of concrete targets for EU Member States collective non-military response. The coordinating mechanism has further developed its close cooperation with the interim Situation Centre/Crisis Cell established by the Secretary General/High Representative.

(c) A study (Appendix 3), drawing on experience from recent and current crises, on the expertise of the Member States and on the results of the seminar on civilian crisis management in Lisbon on 3-4 April 2000, has been carried out to define concrete targets in the area of civilian aspects of crisis management. This study identifies priorities on which the EU will focus its coordinated efforts in a first phase, without excluding the use of all the other tools available to the Union and to Member States.

(d) Concrete targets for civilian police capabilities have been identified and are set out in Appendix 4. In particular, Member States should, cooperating voluntarily, as a final objective by 2003 be able to provide up to 5000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations and in response to the specific needs at the different stages of these operations. Within the target for overall EU capabilities, Member States undertake to be able to identify and deploy, within 30 days, up to 1 000 police officers. Furthermore, work will be pursued to develop EU guidelines and references for international policing.

4. In addition to these measures, the Council has received and is examining the Commission's proposal for a Council Regulation creating a Rapid Reaction Facility to support EU activities as outlined in the Helsinki Report.

IV. FOLLOW-UP

1. The French Presidency is invited, together with the Secretary General/High Representative, to carry work forward within the General Affairs Council on strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The French Presidency is invited to report to the European Council in Nice, in particular on:

(a) the elaboration of the headline goal and the collective capabilities goal agreed at Helsinki, including results reached at the Capabilities Commitment Conference to be convened before Nice;

(b) the establishment of the permanent political and military structures to be put in place as soon as possible after the Nice European Council;

(c) the inclusion in the EU of the appropriate functions of the WEU in the field of the Petersberg tasks;

(d) the implementation of the Feira decisions on :

– the arrangements that will allow consultations with and participation of third countries in EU-led military crisis management;

– the development of the arrangements ensuring consultation and cooperation with NATO in military crisis management on the basis of the work undertaken in the relevant EU-NATO “ad hoc working groups”;

(e) the development and the implementation of EU capabilities in civilian aspects of crisis management, including the definition of concrete targets.

2. The issue of Treaty revision should continue to be examined between the Feira and Nice European Councils.

3. The Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission are invited to submit to the Nice European Council, as a basis for further work, concrete recommendations on how to improve the coherence and the effectiveness of the European Union action in the field of conflict prevention, fully taking into account and building upon existing instruments, capabilities and policy guidelines.