

DR GUNTER BURGHARDT, DIRECTOR GENERAL, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR
EXTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, BRUSSELS.

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THE NEW EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

It may seem rather an ambitious undertaking to talk about the New Europe when there is so little clarity about its content or contours. Yet it is surely a huge step forward that we can now discuss and plan for the future of our continent, no longer divided and frozen in the grip of the Cold War. The full implications of the geopolitical earthquake which shook the continent in 1989-90 have still to be digested. Recent events are forcing us all to re-examine many traditional ideas and concepts. For example, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia into more than twenty states, many of which contain regions or ethnic groups which want to secede and create new states in their turn, has raised fundamental questions about nationalism, statehood, sovereignty, self-determination and the inviolability of frontiers.

Inside the European Union (EU) there is also evidence of renationalisation of many policy areas and there is certainly no consensus on many basic political issues such as the goal of a federal Europe. What should be the balance between "widening and deepening"? Is the old Community model still viable? Or are we moving inexorably towards variable geometry or Europe a la carte? The Maastricht debate not only exposed the fundamental differences in attitudes towards European integration amongst our governments but also amongst our populations. It is clear that a huge gap has opened up between the governed and those in government. The German term "Politikverdrossenheit" could describe the situation in several European countries. Many people seem incapable of coping with the speed of change affecting their lives. But in today's world there is no time to sit back and relax. Gorbachev spoke the truth in East Berlin five years ago when he said that "Wer zu spat kommt - den bestraft die Geschichte" - roughly translated - "History punishes those who are too late in changing".

How then to regain popular support and increase the momentum of European integration? The next IGC in 1996 is not far away but there is little evidence of new thinking which will be necessary if the European Union is to meet the challenges of the New Europe.

In seeking solutions to these problems, political scientists have an important role to play in analysing trends, assessing the possible and even thinking the unthinkable. I hope that this Congress will provide the stimulus for much needed reflection on these key issues.

I do not propose today to offer any prescription for the New Europe but rather to focus on the key role of the European Union (EU) in the future architecture of our continent. The European Union is already a significant global actor but more a civilian than a military power. With a population of over 350 million (and approaching 400 million after enlargement) and accounting for more than 900 billion ecus of world trade (22% at present and 25% after enlargement), the EU plays the key role in world trade negotiations. It is the main source of development assistance and humanitarian aid to the third world. It is the prime organiser of the economic rescue of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (over 70% of Western aid) - and it is drawing its northern, eastern and southern neighbours into a complex web of agreements as a magnet attracts bits of metal. This economic weight has yet to be translated into political power but the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union is designed to aid the EU punch its true political weight in the world.

It is important to recall that the concept of the Founding Fathers was to create a political and security community. This aim of building a genuine a security community, as defined by Karl Deutsch, has been largely achieved. Indeed I would suggest that the Union is arguably the most successful confidence building measure in modern European history. The challenge is to extend this zone of prosperity and stability to our immediate neighbourhood.

THE NEW STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The end of the Cold War has dramatically changed the strategic context of the European Union and its member states. The Soviet threat has disappeared. Former adversaries now cooperate in a variety of fora and new relationships are developing between both halves of Europe. Outside Europe we witness the United States concentrating increasingly on domestic affairs whilst in Asia, Japan and China continue to increase their influence on world politics. The end of the Cold War, however, by no means implies the end of security concerns for Europe. On the contrary there is the need for new reflection on how to deal with a security environment which is in many ways more complex than that of the Cold War.

There are some commentators who foresee two new powerful actors developing in Europe. The first will be centred on the European Union and extend from the Baltic States to the Balkans. The second will be centred on Russia and include most of newly independent states (NIS). Recent election results in Ukraine and Belarus would appear to offer some validity for this thesis. If this scenario was to prove accurate then it would be all the more important to ensure a cooperative relationship between the two actors and avoid the erection of new barriers between the different parts of Europe.

Certainly the future relationship between Russia and Ukraine is of crucial importance for Europe. As far as Russia is concerned there are some encouraging signs of greater political and even economic stability. The same cannot be said of Ukraine which remains in deep economic crisis. In recognition of Ukraine's vital strategic role in Europe, the European Union is now engaged in a major effort to support political, economic and environmental reform in Ukraine.

Whilst on geopolitical issues let me stress that that it will be equally important for the EU to maintain a close partnership with Turkey which will continue to play a key role in a troubled neighbourhood. In this city most people are focussed on trouble spots in the east. But I need hardly remind this audience of the enormous problems facing Europe in the Maghreb, the Middle East and the Balkans.

EU INTERESTS AND PRIORITIES

Given the variety and gravity of the security problems identified above it is vital that the Union develops not only the political will to act but also adequate resources. The establishment of the CFSP will not in itself change anything but it does provide a political framework in which to further define our common interests and then to promote them through "joint action". A number of areas have already been identified for joint action including Bosnia, the Middle East, South Africa and measures to stem nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately the balance so far has been disappointing as there has been a lack of real substance to CFSP.

Now clearly some member states will have a greater influence than others in the search for a security identity and the defining of common interests. But what these states must recognise is that no state can "go it alone" in the modern world : not Britain, not France, not Germany. European security is indivisible and the actions of one state will impact on the others. It is highly regrettable that in recent months there has been an increasing tendency for member states to undertake individual actions without considering the wider common interests of the Union. The Greek embargo of FYROM and the Italian blockage of opening negotiations with Slovenia on a Europe Agreement are just two such examples. Certainly the Union should demonstrate solidarity with individual members, but member states should not take the Union hostage for the pursuit of individual interests.

A priority task for the European Union, therefore, will be to define its foreign and security policy interests. In the Treaty on European Union, the objectives of CFSP were set out in very general terms - safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union. The really difficult questions, however, remain to be answered. These include :

- what are our essential common interests ?

- what priority should they be accorded ?
- are we prepared to support these interests by military force if necessary ?

Some people argue that attempting such an exercise in the EU would simply expose differences which are best glossed over. But in a world of limited resources, and for the CFSP there are tight budgetary limits, the EU will always be confronted with difficult choices. And if the EU makes no attempt to establish its interests and priorities, there is a danger that the media will set the agenda.

Let me therefore set out my own initial list of EU interests and priorities.

1. Consolidation of the EU following enlargement (in particular ensuring that enlargement strengthens and does not weaken CFSP)
2. The progressive integration of the central and eastern European countries into the Union
3. Developing a genuine European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), compatible with NATO, and capable of effective independent action. This would be the basis for a new and strengthened transatlantic partnership
4. Promoting a stable immediate neighbourhood (including Russia, Ukraine, Balkans, Middle East and Mediterranean) to reduce potential threats to the EU
5. Maintaining close political and economic ties with the US and Japan (and increasingly other Asian countries) to promote international cooperation in monetary, trade and security policy
6. Safeguarding the security of energy supplies and raw materials

A further category of interests might include the promotion of democracy and human rights ; the promotion of a safer environment (including efforts to control high population growth) ; promoting a stable and benign China, Indian sub-continent and South Africa

There is clearly scope for disagreement with the above list but what cannot be denied is the importance of the EU having an extensive discussion of its interests and priorities. Again I would hope that many of you present today would wish to participate in this debate.

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The acceleration of history has led to an acceleration of problems and some would say an inflation of institutions. Too often commentators write about European institutions in terms of

competition ("inter-blocking rather than inter-locking") but given the enormity of the problems facing Europe, I believe that we can only afford to talk about cooperation and partnership. In the past two years there has been considerable progress in defining the tasks of NATO and the WEU, the CSCE and the Council of Europe. All are in the process of adjusting to the dramatically changed political and security environment in Europe.

NATO remains at the centre of transatlantic security and has launched the PFP initiative aimed essentially at the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. But NATO is having to adapt to a changed environment in which the number of US forces in Europe is being reduced from 300,000 in 1990 to 100,000 in 1996. In this context the Europeans quite simply will have to do more for their own defence as was recognised at the January NATO summit with its ringing endorsement of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and reaffirmed by President Clinton in this city just last month. The events of the past two years have made the development of a European pillar essential to the very survival of the Atlantic Alliance. It is increasingly clear that it will be impossible for the United States to maintain its commitment to Europe indefinitely unless tasks are redistributed in a way that demonstrates to the US Congress and American public opinion that burdens are being fairly shared.

The challenge for NATO will be to develop in a manner compatible with an emerging European security identity : and for WEU to develop into a genuine European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance which will be able when necessary to act without US participation. The Yugoslav conflict is a clear indication of the limits of US involvement in Europe.

The declarations adopted in the margins of the Maastricht summit set out a three-stage process for WEU's development. The first stage makes WEU "an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Alliance". A second stage will be "the eventual framing of a common (European) defence policy" which might, in a third stage, "lead to a common defence". Some progress has been made towards giving the WEU teeth but too many politicians are still concentrating on the peace dividend rather than assessing the costs of meeting the new challenges. I fully understand the political difficulties of providing funding for defence when there are so many other competing demands for resources but the adoption of a common defence policy would permit tremendous savings to be made, particularly in procurement. There are also arguments made about the institutional problems of incorporating the WEU into the European Union, a proposal which the Commission President Delors made during the 1991 IGC. I think this problem may be exaggerated because it would be perfectly feasible to have a joint EU/WEU Ministerial Council and then the implementation of military action could be undertaken by the WEU itself. Furthermore it is surely time for the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the EU to meet on a regular basis.

Let me say a word about the CSCE. I believe that it is vitally important to strengthen the CSCE as a regional security organisation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As a basic

principle regional conflicts should be resolved by actors within that region. This was one of the guiding principles in Agenda for Peace and a strong motive behind the Stability Pact which the EU launched in May this year. There are a number of proposals to strengthen the CSCE on the table for discussion and I am confident that we shall secure agreement on a number of them at the Budapest Review Conference later this year. We have made some progress with the establishment of a Secretary General and a High Commissioner for Minorities. The efforts to create a Code of Conduct are also a move in the right direction. But the resources devoted to CSCE are tiny compared to the magnitude of its tasks. I would like to see a more streamlined structure, a larger and unified budget, increased staff and a permanent reserve of experts capable of participating in CSCE missions. The Russians have recently called for a smaller steering group of the larger CSCE member states to provide more impetus to the organisation. This certainly merits consideration because there are severe limits in operating an inter-governmental system with over 50 countries involved.

A UNION WIDENED AND DEEPENED

Let me turn now to the central role of the European Union in the future architecture of Europe. There can be no denying the setbacks which the European Union has had to face since signing the Maastricht Treaty. The ratification debates in various countries have demonstrated the need for more democracy, transparency and subsidiarity within the Union. At the same time no one can question the need for a strong integrated Union if it is to play its proper role as the anchor of stability and security in our changing continent.

But to adopt a generous attitude towards countries outside the Union, which is certainly in our own long-term interests, we need to do everything to strengthen our own economic base. This is why the Commission attaches so much importance to the successful management of the Internal Market, the next stage of economic and monetary union and measures to promote economic growth and reduce unemployment in the Union.

In the discussion about the future direction of the EC there is broad agreement that the Union should speak and act with one voice as regards external policy. The European Community has always had a foreign and security policy dimension. The 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) defined its creation in the preamble as a contribution to the safeguarding of world peace.

In the early years of the Community this mission was achieved principally through the elimination of "age old rivalries" within Western Europe rather than through specific actions on the world stage outside. To the extent that the early European Community had external policies, they were in the first instance a necessary consequence of the EC's internal progress towards integration whilst taking into account the foreign policy patterns of individual member states, particularly towards their former colonies.

Perhaps the clearest example of how internal success implied external responsibility was provided by the 1992 Single Market programme, launched in 1985 and which, to an extent which surprised everyone, immediately started to precipitate far-reaching reactions in the international community. At first there were fears, mainly in the US and Japan, of the EC becoming a "Fortress Europe" but as business began to understand the liberalising effects of the Single Market these fears diminished and were replaced by a scramble to secure optimal placement within the EC to take advantage of the planned changes.

External developments however were still more important in pushing the Community forward as an international actor. The rapid and radical internationalisation of the global economy, the problems surrounding the collapse of communism, the Gulf War and crisis in the former Yugoslavia brutally exposed the limitations of any one European state to influence events. Against this background, the Treaty on European Union, despite its many shortcomings, can be seen as another important milestone in the history of European integration. It set a timetable for the introduction of a single currency, established the CFSP, extended Community competences in several areas and gave increased powers to the European Parliament.

The Community's EFTA neighbours were also forced to come to terms with the economic giant on their doorstep and the debate on future relations with the Community involved fundamental questioning not only of their external economic policies, but also of their concept of national sovereignty. The EFTA countries are not only the EU's immediate neighbours but also their most important trading partners - more important even than the US and Japan combined. The creation of the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1993 between the Community of Twelve and six out of seven EFTA countries has led to the largest free trade area in the world, more comprehensive in scope than NAFTA. Given that the EEA meant acceptance of some 60% of the *acquis communautaire*, the agreement greatly facilitated the conclusion of accession negotiations with four EEA countries (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway) for membership of the Union. An enlarged EU with the rich, politically stable, socially and economically progressive EFTA countries will further enhance the Union's standing in the world.

The European Union has a special responsibility not only because of its importance as a model but also because it possesses many of the necessary instruments to deal with the most pressing problems in the East and in the South. This was certainly recognised by the four applicant countries who will bring increased resources to operate CFSP - much of which is based on financial and economic diplomacy - and who have a good record on development assistance and considerable experience of peacekeeping.

The question of enlargement to the east and south is altogether more difficult. At present we have applications on the table from Poland and Hungary and other applications from central and eastern European countries can confidently be predicted. We also have applications from

Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, not to forget Switzerland which is awaiting the outcome of the present enlargement before deciding how to proceed. I note that the public and political climate in Iceland is also turning in favour of membership !

The question of Europe's boundaries is often raised and as far as prospective membership of the Union is concerned there can be no definite answer. The European Council has already accepted the principle of membership for the countries of central and eastern Europe which have signed Europe Agreements. At present there are six but this could increase to ten with similar agreements about to be negotiated with Slovenia and the three Baltic republics.

Obvious criteria for membership include :

- the capacity of the country concerned to assume the obligations of membership (acquis communautaire)
- the stability of institutions in the candidate country guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities
- the existence of a functioning market economy

At this stage no one can predict how soon it will be possible to envisage membership for the countries to the east and south. But the EU is committed to speeding the process and is developing a pre-accession strategy which involves closer cooperation in all three pillars of the Treaty. There are obvious difficulties to overcome in sensitive areas such as agriculture and structural funds but the Commission is already working on possible solutions to these problems.

Of course no one has an interest in joining a weakened Union. The challenge for us all is how to organise an enlarged Union on the basis of democracy, transparency and efficiency ? Gridlock with 12 members is bad enough . with 16 or 20 members there is a danger of seizing up completely. In the run up to 1996 it is important that there is an informed public debate on the question of institutional reform.

The issues to be resolved touch all the institutions. For example the number of votes in the Council of Ministers. The extension of majority voting. The size, role and powers of the European Commission and Parliament. There is already a powerful lobby supporting a change in the manner in which the President of the Commission is chosen. But should all member states continue to appoint a Commissioner - even in an enlarged Union of twenty plus members or should there be some limit set ? Another key issue is the Community method or the inter-governmental approach. The lesson so far is that practically no progress has been made in pillar three of the TEU ; and only very limited progress in pillar two.

A revised treaty should, I believe, allow a majority of member states to proceed down the path of integration at a faster pace if they so desire. Indeed this is already provided for in the Treaty section covering EMU. It might also be worth considering inserting a provision for member states to leave the Union.

GERMANY'S KEY ROLE

Before concluding, let me say a word about Germany's role in the new Europe. There are some who argue that Germany is heading towards a dominant leadership role in Europe. This I very much doubt because the assertion fails to comprehend the nature of the integration process which is based on tolerance and semi-permanent negotiations based on shared common interests. Europe is not a symphony orchestra obeying an imperious conductor, rather it is a chamber-music ensemble where each member has to blend into the harmony of the whole. Unification may strengthen Germany in the long-term but in the short and medium term it has raised a multitude of problems which make a leadership role for Germany, even if its leaders wished to play such a role which I doubt, out of the question.

At some stage Germany may be confronted with a difficult choice : between playing the third fiddle in a trio with France and the UK ; or leading the small and medium-sized states of the EU further down the path of integration. Whilst there may be some tempted by the first option, only the second would be in line with the Basic Law, ie subsuming its national role in the context of European integration.

Acting together means sharing together and in the security field there is clearly more scope for equitable burdensharing. In this context and in this city let me say that a united Germany cannot hide from its international responsibilities. Last month's decision of the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe enabling German troops to operate "out of area" is thus very much to be welcomed. I look forward to the day when a Eurocorps brigade, comprised of German, French and other nationalities all serving under one banner (and perhaps wearing green helmets), is ready to serve in peacekeeping missions anywhere in the world.

CONCLUSION

I have outlined the many challenges facing Europe as a result of the momentous changes over the past four years. The new strategic environment requires a new approach to security issues. Partnership and cooperation between all European institutions is vital to safeguard our common interests. A European security identity is an essential pre-requisite for the future of transatlantic relations.

In this new strategic environment the European Union has a special role to play, as a model of integration, as a pole of attraction for other European states, as the chief provider of aid to the east and south ; in short as the anchor of stability for the entire continent. Tolerance,

solidarity, integration and fair sharing of the responsibilities and burdens - these must be the guiding principles for the new Europe, widened and deepened.

In the 1970s and 80s West Germany used to be described as "an economic giant but a political dwarf". The same description could have been applied to the Community in the 1980s. But just as the unification of Germany has given the Germans a stronger political voice, so too will the political weight of the European Union increase in parallel with further moves towards integration. A common foreign and security policy is gradually beginning to take shape but it will take many years to develop. The ability of the Union to pursue an active as opposed to reactive role in defending these interests will be decisive in determining whether or not the European Union will be capable of playing a genuine world role.

The European Union is thus well placed to play an increasingly important role in international affairs but it remains to be seen whether the member states of the Union will be able to generate the necessary political will to ensure that the Union can live up to the challenges of the future.

Thank you for your attention.