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IMMIGRATION - THE SITUATION IN THE EC MEMBER STATES IN 1992
ATTITUDES TOWARDS CONTROLS, LABOUR MARKET REQUIREMENTS
AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION

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Note to readers

This overview is the fruit of the regular contributions made by 12 independent correspondents, who together make up the RIMET (Information Network on Migrations from Non-Member States).

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The information contained in this report does not necessarily reflect either the position or views of the Commission of the European Communities.

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The social and political climate surrounding the events, debates and decisions relating to immigration and integration in 1992 was one of both hope and fear.

Hope came first of all from Germany. After a long period of procrastination and excuse-seeking on the part of certain authorities and sections of the population, a momentum got underway to try to stem the rising tide of right-wing extremism and racist violence which is contaminating virtually all of Europe. This mobilisation against xenophobia¹ was symbolised by the human-chain candlelight protests, particularly in Berlin, where one such protest attracted more than 100 000 people under the banner "*human dignity is inviolable*".²

The hope seemed all the more justified in that the gravity of the German situation helped to alert the other Member States, all of which have since exercised greater caution in playing the immigration card for political ends, being more aware now of the potential pitfalls. This was the case in Spain, which has also seen a revival of xenophobia. Following a series of violent acts, the murder in Madrid of a woman of Dominican origin unleashed a wave of emotion and was debated in Parliament³.

¹ Many Lander have also organised information campaigns to explain the contribution which foreign workers make to the country's economic expansion.

² Extract from Article 1 of Germany's Basic law.

³ The Minister of the Interior took the view that this crime did not reflect wide-spread racism in Spanish society but was the action of a minority. For their part, the PSOE (governing party) and the Partido Popular (main opposition party) believe that any problems which occur are due not to the actual numbers of immigrants but to their rate of entry and their excessive concentrations in some regions. In the previous month the Congress of Deputies had unanimously approved a declaration condemning all forms of racism and xenophobia.

In Italy the same worries led to the organisation of a March in Milan, at the end of January, by trade-union organisations and more than 150 associations of differing political and religious persuasions. The aim was to draw the attention of the government and the general public not only to the situation in Italy but also to the threat arising elsewhere in Europe⁴.

In the Netherlands a national petition against xenophobia was launched in March 1992, instigated by a coalition of associations, trade unions and religious organisations. At the same time, at a demonstration organised in Amsterdam the Prime Minister warned that people should not be tempted to blame the ethnic minorities for the country's problems.

Nevertheless, the fear remains that this awakening will not be enough to stem the upsurge of racism and xenophobia engendered by an economic crisis which, to those at the bottom of the heap, seems to have no end in sight. It is a crisis which is driving a growing number of adult workers to despair and depriving their children of any concept of collective life or social cohesion. With the remorseless rise in unemployment, the former can only watch helplessly as the fruits of their years of gainful employment collapse around them and their children, whom they can no longer support, slip beyond their control. The ramifications are serious: with more jobs disappearing than being created, the world of work offers these adolescents no more chance to build a future than did the world of school to overcome the difficulties of their backgrounds. It is not in the least surprising, therefore, that these young people should be in the front line of the new violence afflicting our towns and suburbs today. Or, worse, in the front line of the racist violence which all too often results in deaths.

⁴ The slogan for this march was: "Action against all forms of racism. For a Europe of rights, solidarity and peaceful coexistence. For Italian hospitality and solidarity".

With the economy in crisis, society in disarray and civic and moral values collapsing, people have begun to turn their sights on the same old target: the foreigner, the immigrant, the refugee. "*Fear of the future*", the title given by Beate Winckler to one of her articles, accurately reflects the climate of the past year. A fear shared both by the populations of Europe and the foreigners who have settled in Europe⁵.

In the face of these events - some worrying, others more reassuring - a growing consensus has emerged on the response required: firstly, the need to control flows strictly, secondly, the need to keep the door open for certain groups, and thirdly the need to give more heed to the integration of foreigners or minorities, in view of the fact that current economic and social difficulties are increasing the risks of schisms or conflicts between groups. These three objectives are almost unanimously seen as the three essential planks of any immigration policy.

Already regarded as urgent in 1991, the need for stricter immigration control was voiced even more firmly in 1992. Regarded as a *sine qua non* for the other two objectives mentioned, this point has found broad agreement among governments at Community level and also between the ruling and opposition parties at national level. This is particularly evident in Denmark⁶ and even more so in Spain, where the most recent communication on immigration from the national directorate of the Partido Popular (December 1992) refers explicitly to a "*wide-ranging national agreement in respect of migration policy*"⁷.

This consensus underlines the importance which Member States attach to illegal immigration and asylum seekers. Their concerns stem from the vision they have conceived - some justifiably, others exaggeratedly - of a dual threat posed by the steadily worsening position of the southern countries and the political upheavals in the East.

⁵ Analysing the situation in Germany, B. Winckler considers it to be all the more worrying in that exploitation of the situation for political ends has tended to fan the flames of xenophobia and to induce in some quarters a hatred of foreigners. She stresses the problems faced by Germany's leaders in their attempts to establish a clear course of policy capable of countering the outburst of violence.

⁶ The vote on measures to restrict immigration was opposed on only two fronts in Denmark: the Socialistik Folkepartiet found them too harsh and the Freinskridspartiet (popular right) found them too lax.

⁷ There is complete agreement between the principal parties and the government on the new immigration policy, as well as on the reform of the Law concerning foreigners and the Law governing asylum and refuge.

As far as the situation of the southern countries is concerned, it is quite true that the deterioration witnessed in recent years seems to exceed even the most pessimistic forecasts. Whatever models they have chosen to adopt since the end of colonialisation, the vast majority of these countries seem unable to break out of the infernal cycle of population explosion, food dependence and massive debt: a negative spiral which leaves populations with no option other than exodus or immigration.

The most visible signs of this are the increases in the number of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers in the northern countries. These, at least, are what feed the fears and fantasies of the developed societies and give credence - in the collective consciousness - to the idea of being invaded.

Matters have been aggravated by the political upheavals in the East. The main brunt has been borne by Germany, which has seen an exponential growth in the number of asylum seekers, from 193 000 in 1990 to 438 000 in 1992⁸. Public opinion in Germany could obviously not remain indifferent to this. But without wishing to underplay the part which migratory pressures and the consequences of the collapse of the "Eastern Bloc" have played in creating Germany's present difficulties⁹, it is probable, as indicated by B. Winckler, that the resurgent violence has been fuelled by the disastrous economic and social situation of the new Länder. This socio-economic explanation for the climate of violence against foreigners applies even more to the other Member States, which have not had to contend with the massive inflows of populations which Germany is experiencing today.

Moreover, however significant the statistics and however undeniable the underlying realities, they must not be allowed to disguise the fact that it is the southern countries

⁸ Meanwhile, as these numbers have been increasing the rates of recognition of refugee status has been declining, from 16.2% in 1986 to 6.9% in 1991, and down further to 4.3% in 1992. An estimated 1.1 million persons (recognised political refugees or persons refused refugee status but not expelled) have arrived in Germany over the last few years.

⁹ In addition to the steep increase in the numbers of asylum seekers Germany has also seen the "repatriation" of many of its own immigrants (Aussiedler), another consequence of the upheavals which have taken place in Eastern Europe. While this return of members of German minorities scattered throughout central and eastern Europe is not a new phenomenon, it has taken on an entirely new dimension since the end of the 1980s. Of German stock, these "repatriates" enjoy immediate entitlement to German nationality (Article 116 of the Basic Law) and considerable resources have been allocated to aid their re-integration. But their numbers have grown so steeply that since 1990 they have also been required to go through application formalities prior to the access procedures.

themselves which suffer most as a result of this acceleration in international mobility. We need more than ever to be aware of this truth, because it contains the seed, if we do not take care, for even worse social and political explosions than we have witnessed so far.

Accordingly, Europe and the developed world in general cannot afford simply to sit back and impose selective, indefinite restrictions on the freedom of movement and establishment of persons. Not only for altruistic reasons, but also out of self-interest, they should instead be committed to encouraging development in the countries concerned, so as to revive that other fundamental right of man: the *"right to remain"*.

For the moment, there is an irrefutable need to conduct a reasoned analysis of the migrations towards Europe and to put their impact into perspective with the tragedies being enacted in other regions of the world. As far as illegal immigration is concerned, the most dramatic turns of events this year seem to have occurred in Spain and, to an even greater extent, Greece. The Greek authorities are particularly concerned about the numbers of illegal arrivals of Albanians since these are occurring against a steadily worsening economic background and a soaring crime rate blamed on certain groups, serving to harden public resentment of foreigners. Anger raged when it was reported that armed gangs coming from Albania were carrying out raids on Greek frontier villages. In view of the gravity of the situation, the government decided to send in the army to keep the peace. A further factor is that large numbers of people have been arriving via Turkey, giving rise to tension in relations between the two countries: the Greek authorities criticise Turkey for allowing the traffickers to operate from Turkish soil with impunity. The same type of traffic can be found in other Member States (Spain and Germany), albeit in different forms. While these types of incident may provide fuel for latent racism, instances of discrimination or violence are still isolated in Greece.

In the general context of fear provoked by illegal immigration, the particular case of the United Kingdom needs mentioning. According to the Home Secretary, the number of illegal immigrants entering the United Kingdom is "negligible" and the slight increase in expulsions is due more to increased efficiency on the part of the authorities than to any increase in the flows of illegal immigrants. Of 23 293 expulsions ordered in 1991, almost 80% (18 182) were of persons apprehended on entry into United Kingdom

territory. These figures help to explain the United Kingdom's reluctance to abolish controls at its *frontiers* and replace them by controls within the country.

As regards asylum seekers, and leaving aside Germany which we have already discussed, the countries most affected were Belgium, Denmark and - a new development - two of the more southerly Member States, Spain and Italy. In contrast, the problem receded in France, where the authorities seem to have found an effective and acceptable solution, at least as far as public opinion is concerned. A similar situation obtained in the Netherlands, where flows seem to have been better controlled than in the past.

As expected, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia had an immediate knock-on effect throughout virtually all of the Community, including Ireland, which had previously managed to avoid the problem of asylum seekers. Nevertheless, the political consensus mentioned earlier remained intact. After an initial reaction of sympathy and openness "on humanitarian grounds", the restrictive and selective admission policies mentioned earlier soon regained the upper hand. The concern was to avoid creating any breach in the admissions control system which might lead to new inflows of populations. Accordingly, the common policy adopted was to make it clear to refugees from the former Yugoslavia that they were being admitted on "humanitarian" grounds and on a purely "temporary" basis.

Having said that, apart from the difficulties in deciding who deserves to be admitted and who does not, the case of the former Yugoslavia sharply underlines the contradictory nature of "*a lasting temporary arrangement*." Not one of the host countries has managed to control the "duration" of this "temporary arrangement" (with good reason), and all are finding it extremely difficult to establish a simple and consistent rule concerning the status and rights of the persons concerned.

The problem had already arisen in 1991, with the "tolerated aliens" in the Netherlands and the "rejected asylum seekers" in France. It led this year in Denmark to the adoption of a new Law granting *temporary right of asylum to victims of civil war*, and in the Netherlands to a scheme for the issuing of *conditional residence permits*. This obviously has major implications for the future. The risk is that with each day that passes more and more people will be eligible to claim refugee status as defined by the Geneva convention,

yet no new status corresponding more accurately to the reality of their situation will have been created.

Generally speaking, the systems devised by each of the Member States to overcome the problem show clear similarities. France's policy of examining applications more rigorously and being more selective in granting asylum seems gradually to be winning general approval. On the other hand, this dual restriction also means that certain nationalities no longer stand any chance at all of being accepted.

Despite being overwhelmingly in favour of a stricter immigration policy (greater control of flows, and restrictions in respect of permanent residence)¹⁰, certain Member States (Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and Italy) nevertheless wish to keep open the option of a labour policy. Through various arrangements (quotas, temporary contracts, etc.), they are doing all they can to keep the door open for fresh inflows of workers to meet the requirements of the market. This dual approach, contradictory in appearance only, was noted in the previous report and is now confirmed. The need for a limited recourse to foreign labour helps to explain why the Spanish and German authorities, for example, are at pains to combat the xenophobic tendencies of their citizens by stressing the benefits which foreign workers bring to the economy¹¹.

Finally, there is the question of integration. All governments are becoming aware of the urgent need for ambitious policies in this field. But while the diagnosis may be the same in all countries, the attention given to the problem and the resources allocated for tackling it are not always commensurate with the needs identified.

The southern Member States, which have only more recently had to contend with the realities of immigration, have appeared keener to tighten up their control arrangements than to launch an ambitious integration policy. Portugal is a case in point. The go-ahead

¹⁰ In Spain, the United Left differs in that it wishes to reform the Law concerning foreigners so as to limit the government's prerogatives, while at the same time considering it impossible to set an immigrant quota to channel migratory flows. It has (along with some nationalist parties) unsuccessfully put forward proposals to reform the Law concerning foreigners.

¹¹ In Germany, where the demographic forecasts of the Federal Statistical Office point ineluctably to an ageing population, a study by the Institute for Economic Research (RWI) emphasises the positive contribution made by foreigners.

given by the Portuguese Parliament to the government for a major reform of the legislation concerning foreigners has highlighted the absence of a global vision of the problem, particularly as regards the integration of foreigners.

The more northerly Member States, with longer experience of the immigration problem, generally seem to be more convinced of the importance of long-term action in this field. Although their integration models may differ, there is a convergent trend towards a policy linking specific programmes more closely with ordinary law programmes.

The policy also places strong emphasis on the revitalisation of social relations in urban environments and on local initiatives bringing together decision-makers, prevention services and beneficiaries. This reflects a greater awareness of the difficulties specific to certain suburbs in the major conurbations. The urban policy developed in France, and the adjustments made to it in 1992, typify this approach. But there is no doubt that the country which did most to further integration policy in 1992 was Denmark. The resolution on *"better integration of the rights of foreigners"* adopted by the Danish Parliament marks a sea-change in Denmark's traditional approach to immigration questions and reflects a new desire for a more rounded and more coordinated approach.

Whatever the approach chosen, the need to foster greater integration is more pressing than ever, since there can be no doubt that the violence mentioned earlier is not simply a question of the hostility of certain citizens towards new immigrants but is also linked (directly or indirectly) to the question of integration, in other words to the treatment of long-standing foreign populations in each of the Member States and, even more, to the future that lies in store for their children.

Once again the situation observed in Denmark serves as an example. Attacks and acts of aggression against immigrants and refugees¹² have been more frequent this year, and tensions between sections of the population have become more evident. There has been more attention focused on the growth of street gangs and criminal activities involving adolescents and on acts of direct violence perpetrated at certain public events, although

¹²

The dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, the inflow of refugees from the former Yugoslavia and the prospect of the removal of frontier controls between EC countries have reopened the debate as to the number of foreigners which Denmark can receive.

it has not been possible to carry out any real assessment of the nature and extent of such phenomena.

There is a similar situation in Belgium, where there appears to have been greater conflict between the police and immigrant communities. There have been numerous instances where "strong arm" police tactics have caused violent reactions, sometimes degenerating into riots. This situation has been exploited by the extreme right, which has used the opportunity to diversify its activities.

In other Community countries the situation has indisputably grown calmer, but vigilance is called for since the slightest incident could upset the fragile peace. France and the Netherlands fall into this category. In the Netherlands, although there appears to be growing opposition to the continued arrival of asylum seekers, there is no indication of outright intolerance towards foreigners. Two surveys provide ample evidence of this dual attitude found in Dutch society.

The first shows that 85% of Dutch people want stricter control of asylum seekers, with 10% considering that the Netherlands should not accept any more and 30% wanting to see a reduction in the number of those already in the country. Moreover, a third of those interviewed want asylum seekers to be accommodated in closely guarded centres pending examination of their case. And a majority want to see those who lose their case deported to their own country immediately, if necessary by force.

The second survey takes a broader look at public opinion in the Netherlands regarding the presence of foreigners. While it somewhat tempers the severity of the preceding survey¹³, it more importantly reveals new differences of opinion as to integration and the resultant constraints. While 14% of those interviewed believe that immigrants should adapt to all the rules and standards of the host society, the majority (roughly 50%) feel that they are required to do so only in respect of certain aspects, the main one being learning the Dutch language (three-quarters of those interviewed believe that immigrants should be obliged to learn the language, with the others stating that it is up to the

¹³

Three quarters of those interviewed in this second survey consider the country to be too heavily populated. However, young people and, more broadly, those living alongside ethnic minorities display greater tolerance towards the new arrivals.

immigrants themselves to learn it if they want to). Finally, a third of those interviewed consider the Islamic culture to be a menace, while the majority (59%) do not.

The situation in the Netherlands is comparable to that observed in France. For both the general public and politicians the question of immigration has, at least during this period, ceased to form the central plank of ideological debate¹⁴. But this lowering of tension in no way indicates that the fundamental problems are settled, nor that there has been any softening of opinion vis-à-vis foreigners or, more broadly, peoples of foreign origin. This is confirmed by an opinion poll carried out on behalf of the Commission on Human Rights.

Compared with the findings amongst Dutch people, this survey indicates that the French take a generally more negative view and, in particular, are more selective in terms of groups targeted. To begin with, more French people than before (60% of those interviewed, up 6% in a year) seem to be convinced that the presence of foreigners is in no way beneficial and is in fact a burden on the economy. According to this survey, "immigrants" are the group with whom French people feel least solidarity, just ahead of drug addicts.

The negative nature of this assessment is reinforced by the fact that this rejection of "immigrants" is not a rejection of foreigners in general, but of specific groups. Around 60% of those interviewed believe that there are neither too many Asians nor too many Europeans from Mediterranean countries. Two groups are targeted more particularly: "Arabs" and "Blacks". They induce an "invasion" mentality¹⁵, their numbers being viewed in purely subjective terms regardless of the true figures. 70% of those interviewed believe that there are *"too many Arabs"* in France and just under 50% believe that there are *"too many Blacks"*.

¹⁴ Evidence of this is to be found both in the Council of State's judgment on the "Islamic veil" case and in the steps taken to deal with those whose claims for asylum have been rejected. In the first case, while the judgment has aroused different opinions, it has not sparked any outbursts similar to those of Autumn 1989, and as for the problem of rejected claims for asylum, this is now being treated as a "technical" dossier under the normal administrative routine.

¹⁵ The question of refugees is closely linked to that of immigration. 40% of those interviewed state that *"France has too many immigrants and must stop accepting refugees altogether"*. Only 28% are in favour of an open-door policy, with a similar proportion in favour of a selective policy.

These results need to be studied closely since they are more than just a barometer of public opinion on the question of frontier controls. They raise the whole question of integration and suggest that the French tend to perceive different groups on the basis of their racial origin, independently of their actual nationality. Some who have now become French nationals are still regarded as "foreigners" in the eyes of French society.

The potential for social disharmony in the event of such distinctions becoming widely adopted is sufficiently serious to require close consideration of matters concerning integration, nationality and citizenship. In other words, the issue goes beyond that of immigration pure and simple.

At any rate, in the years ahead this will be one of the major challenges for German society. Obviously, the whole issue raises a lot of questions. Assuming a stabilisation of foreign immigration, is it enough for Germany to cling to its existing legislation on foreigners rather than establishing a new stable legal framework for immigration? If it is, how can social harmony be guaranteed when there is a perpetual disparity between German nationals and foreigners born or long settled in the same State?

In Germany, perhaps more than in any other country, the integration issue ineluctably gives rise to reflection on the question of citizenship and civil rights, and on whether the nationality rules need to be revised. Here, as elsewhere, the question of immigration (and more specifically of integration) touches on a fundamental problem: the problem of the identity of the Nation, its foundations and its future.

The situation of Luxembourg gives rise, although very differently, to the same questions and merits equal attention¹⁶. The question of citizenship of the Union (along with the effects of the Yugoslav conflict) has been the most notable aspect of the year. The large number of Community nationals in Luxembourg explains why this aspect is deemed of paramount importance there, on a similar level to the reform of Article 16 of the Basic Law in Germany. As with Germany, it gives rise to reflection on the foundations of the State and the rules governing the exercise of democracy. It is thus understandable that

¹⁶

Although xenophobia and acts of racist violence exist in Luxembourg too, matters have not assumed the proportions encountered elsewhere.

the authorities should wish to preserve social harmony by safeguarding and strengthening a **"Luxembourg model"** of conciliation between nationals and foreigners.

This concept is worth considering beyond the specific case of Luxembourg. Could we conceive of a **"European conciliation model"** vis-à-vis nationals of third countries living in Europe? Could an initiative of this type help to overcome the different approaches to nationality rules, conditions for exercising civil rights and the rights of minorities? Member States should perhaps give serious thought to the possibility of devising a joint initiative of this kind, since each is experiencing difficulties in devising its own social cohesion model and there is a growing risk that the problems being experienced in certain States will spread by contagion to all the others.

MIGRATION TRENDS

Migrants have continued to arrive in all the Member States, whether legally (workers with a temporary or seasonal contract, families entitled to join a relative already in the country, students admitted to universities, etc.), legally "*ad referendum*" (asylum seekers) or illegally. As regards the latter category, the turn of events has sometimes been dramatic, especially in Spain and Greece, with the result that the countries concerned have had to review the control measures recently introduced and even to create new ones. The situation has been exacerbated by events in the former Yugoslavia, forcing Member States to admit persons whose status is still somewhat nebulous and who cannot be properly categorised in terms of the "*temporary*" nature of their stay.

Illegal immigration and trafficking

Although illegal immigration has continued everywhere, Spain and Greece have undoubtedly seen the most dramatic developments, in the unusual form of organised trafficking on a professional scale.

*The year of the "pateras"*¹⁷. The Spanish people will undoubtedly associate this name forever with the large-scale and brutal development of immigrant trafficking in 1992, which resulted in the deaths of 80 people in the waters of the Straits of Gibraltar.

The highly lucrative nature of this traffic in human misery only adds to the horror of the tragedy. Each immigrant wishing to make the journey is required to pay between 50 000 and 150 000 pesetas depending on the type of vessel, weather conditions, the number of passengers and even the person's sex¹⁸. Having done their job, the "sea-based" traffickers hand their cargo over to their "land-based" counterparts: taxi drivers charging the disembarked persons an average of 30 000 pesetas to drive them into the country across

¹⁷ From the name of the light craft 5 metres long and 1.5 metres wide, powered by 50-hp engines and generally operated by five Moroccan fishermen. Immigrant trafficking has changed their use. They are now used to ferry potential immigrants across the 14 nautical miles separating the coasts of Morocco and Spain, 15 to 30 people at a time.

¹⁸ Even in this respect, women are discriminated against, since they are asked for an average of 200 000 pesetas per journey, on top of the inflated price they would already have paid for their false visa on the black market (250 000 pesetas).

regional frontiers, or lorry drivers who hide them in their trailers for the journey from Spain to another European country for an average of 100 000 pesetas. These figures give some idea of the extent¹⁹ of a criminal activity²⁰ which now has a foothold on both sides of the Straits, the full repercussions of which are not yet measurable on Spanish society. The response to this illegal trafficking in immigrants was slow to come, the Moroccan police having left it until October before deciding to cooperate meaningfully with their Spanish counterparts. Relations between them have since improved considerably and, even though it has not been enough to stop completely the entry of illegal immigrants, the flows have clearly slowed down²¹. However, everything points to the existence of other networks in Spain for the trafficking of labour, some of which extend to the Dominican Republic, Peru and China. These practices have something in common with the trade in women revealed in Germany and Belgium and the increasing incidence of Germans purchasing bogus marriages with foreigners anxious to stay in Germany.

In Greece, the three main places of entry for illegal immigration are: the Greece-Turkey land frontier, the islands of the Aegean Sea facing the Turkish coast and the Albania-Greece frontier. Others also arrive from the north, mainly from the former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria²². The Ministry of the Interior estimates that there is a total of 400 000 illegal immigrants in Greece, half of whom are Albanians²³. No less important in the eyes of the authorities has been the increase in immigrant trafficking from Turkey (by sea) to the Aegean islands. This is believed to occur on a daily basis, and the coast

¹⁹ Many articles in the press have identified the Moroccan bosses behind the activities and have reported on the arrest of independent traffickers. At Algeciras (first coastal port accessible to the illegal Moroccans, in the province of Cadiz), 1 208 detentions were recorded in the first eight months of 1992, as against 841 in 1991 and 263 in 1990.

²⁰ Illegal trafficking in immigrants is covered by Article 499 of the Penal Code, with "traffickers" being fined anything between 100 000 and 2 million pesetas or receiving prison sentences of one to six months.

²¹ See the chapter on policies implemented.

²² The Bulgarian government has asked the Greek authorities to open two frontier posts to facilitate the free movement of frontier peoples, but the response has been negative.

²³ The Greek embassy in Tirana has issued only 80 000 visas. Deportation is pointless, since most return immediately to Greece. According to the Minister of the Interior, 330 000 Albanians illegally entering Greece were deported between January and September 1992. In the north of the country, almost 5 000 were stopped and deported in ten days.

guards on the island of Samos and on the other islands are dissatisfied at the lack of manpower and resources available to carry out the necessary surveillance²⁴.

This traffic reached a peak in September and October, leading to a renewal of tension between Greece and Turkey when the Greek authorities tried to turn back every illegal immigrant arriving from Turkey. Immediately, the Turkish government decided to prevent all Iraqis from entering its territory and to turn them back to the island of Kos. Two tragic events heightened the tension between the two countries. The first was the death by drowning of 30 Iraqis, abandoned by boatmen during a storm off the island of Kos, from a vessel in a poor state of repair. The second, less tragic, concerned 77 Iraqis, including 20 children, who were on the Greek vessel *Kostakis* for 15 days²⁵. In an attempt to find an overall solution to the problems, two delegations from Greece and Turkey were appointed and met on 21 October. As an interim measure, the Greek government agreed to admit the Iraqis "temporarily"²⁶.

The intractable problem of refugees

Of all the Community countries, Germany has the greatest problem with asylum seekers, in terms of both the numbers involved (438 200, or almost twice as many as in 1991) and the effects of their arrival on civil and political life. The phenomenon is, however, also causing increasing concern in Belgium, Denmark, and in the new countries of immigration in southern Europe.

²⁴ In 1992, 3 254 illegal immigrants were stopped on these islands, as against 924 in 1991, with the increase attributable mainly to the growing number of Iraqis and Albanians (table 2).

²⁵ A similar incident occurred in July, although it should be noted that Iraqis are not the only people moving via Turkey: Pakistanis, Indians and Afghans have also been stopped.

²⁶ Wider discussions are planned, but the Greek authorities accuse the Turks of not being very cooperative. There is thus no documentary evidence that the illegal immigrants embark in Turkish ports. The incident involving the 77 Iraqis aroused the compassion of the inhabitants of Kos and humanitarian organisations such as "Docteurs sans frontières (= Doctors without frontiers)". The national resistance organisation on the island of Syros offered to take in the refugees, if necessary, until a solution was found. The people of Kos have also expressed hostility towards the Turkish tourist vessels arriving on the island. Greek owners of tourist vessels plying the route between Kos and Alikarnassos suspended their trips to Turkey for a time. The majority of inhabitants on Kos and representatives of the Church, in concert with the coalition of left-wing parties, have proposed that the government grant temporary asylum to the Iraqis until the matter is properly settled.

In Belgium the authorities regard this as a major problem. 17 754 new requests were registered in 1992, a rise of almost 20% over the previous year. In spite of the efforts made to accommodate them (extending the capacity of existing centres, providing extra staff and granting subsidies to charitable organisations) the authorities are struggling to cope. In particular, they do not know where to place groups of people who are facing increasing problems in finding housing and who are reported to be singled out for victimisation in this respect²⁷.

The same concern is felt in Denmark. Generally speaking, the number of requests for asylum began to climb in the last quarter of 1991, a trend which continued throughout 1992 and which the policy-makers view as a sustained development. On 1 October, 8 000 asylum seekers had been registered, with 4 709 coming from the former Yugoslavia; the number of requests by Iraqis, Somalis, Sri Lankans and people from the former Soviet Union has also increased steadily. According to the Ministry of Social Affairs, the refugees are tending more and more to settle around the large towns and cities, where they feel they have more job opportunities, in spite of the attempts by the Danish Refugee Council to distribute them evenly. This is the case in Aarhus (second largest city in Denmark) and in the suburbs of Copenhagen²⁸.

The problem of housing asylum seekers is experienced more keenly in Germany, on account of the violence being perpetrated there. In the areas concerned, public acceptance is as necessary as finding available accommodation and providing funds. Following the terrorist attacks on hostels in the new Länder, the authorities, in some cases aided by the courts, have tried to put a brake on the flight of asylum seekers from the new Länder to the western Länder.

The countries of southern Europe have not been spared. While Portugal appeared to remain relatively untouched by these developments, the figures for Italy (1991) show a

²⁷ They appear to face similar problems in terms of economic integration, especially in the agricultural sector, in breach of rules granting them legal access to the labour market.

²⁸ Aarhus has an average of 212 refugees per 10 000 inhabitants, followed by Sønderborg (207 refugees per 10 000 inhabitants), Odense (193 refugees per 10 000 inhabitants), Nykøbing Falster (183 refugees per 10 000 inhabitants), Vejle (172 per 10 000) and Aabenraa (152 per 10 000). The national average is 82 refugees per 10 000 residents, constituting a sharp increase over previous years. A fifth of districts fall within the average (against a third in 1990).

clear jump: 8 044 refugees and 15 239 asylum seekers, coming mainly from Albania, Romania and Somalia. But it was Spain that recorded the biggest rise in 1992 (44%), with the origin of asylum seekers changing²⁹. There is no doubt that the parties concerned have established a clear link between asylum requests and regularisation, and that the latter attracted some of the asylum seekers in 1991 (those known as "economic refugees"); their numbers thus naturally fell in that year, before rising again the following year. This temporary redirection of entry strategies was particularly beneficial for Poles, Peruvians, Dominicans and Senegalese.

In the United Kingdom 24 610 requests for asylum were lodged in 1992³⁰. Applicants came mainly from the former Yugoslavia (5 635, rising steadily each quarter), Sri Lanka (2 085) and Turkey (1 865)³¹, followed by Pakistan (1 700), Ghana (1 600), Somalia (1 575) and India (1 450). Most applications are refused and the applicants are then considered to be in the country unlawfully and expelled.

In France the question has receded from the forefront of public and political concern³². The measures adopted in previous years have undeniably borne fruit³³, and may well have provided an impetus for the reforms implemented or planned in most of the Member States. The same is true of the Netherlands where, according to the Minister for Justice, the number of requests fell by 19% in 1992 after having risen in each of the previous ten years. As in other countries, the origins of the requesters also changed, reflecting the changing face of national and international conflicts. Two other countries

²⁹ 5 680 requests were registered in the first six months of 1992 (including families), as against 4 450 for the same period in 1991. The most dramatic increases involved Ecuadorians, Dominicans, and refugees from Bangladesh and the former Yugoslavia. In absolute terms, Peruvians led the field in 1992 (as also in 1991), followed by Poles.

³⁰ To give an idea of the scale, this figure corresponds to approximately two-thirds of the total number admitted each year on work permits and to less than half of the number admitted for permanent residence, to join their families or for other reasons.

³¹ Excluding Yugoslavia, the number of asylum requests from central and eastern Europe in 1992 was negligible, totalling a mere 755, of which 180 were from Bulgaria, 305 from Romania and 270 from the former USSR.

³² Assessed at 13 486 in 1990, then at 15 467 in 1991, the number of refugees is expected to fall by around 30% in 1992, with the number of asylum seekers alone dropping as low as 40% (according to the provisional figures available, these two groups accounted respectively for 10 800 and 29 000 persons in 1992).

³³ See 1992 report.

appear (for different reasons) to be less worried about the asylum phenomenon: Ireland, which is, objectively, largely unaffected, and Greece, where concern is focused wholly on the Albanian problem.

The effects of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia

In terms of the movement of peoples, the repercussions of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia have extended to practically all the Member States, including Ireland, for which the question of refugees had, as already noted, hitherto been of little concern. Of the 200 Bosnians accepted by the Irish government at the start of the year, 178 are already settled. They are expected to be followed by their families and those of other refugees already present in the country. In Denmark, out of a total of 8 000 asylum seekers admitted on 1 October, 4 709 came from the former Yugoslavia. They are the largest group of asylum seekers in the Netherlands, and in Italy they accounted for an increase of some 40% in the number of asylum seekers in the region of Frioul-Venezia Giulia alone. In Spain, two specific temporary (1-year) refuge programmes, one private and the other public, have been introduced. The first, targeting 1 500 Bosnians, is coordinated by several NGOs, with the support of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Interior and Social Affairs. For the second (public) scheme, a quota of 1 000 persons (former prisoners and their families) has been set by the government. Additionally, 430 Yugoslavs requested asylum and 120 Bosnians (Jews of Spanish origin) obtained a single work and residence permit. In all, 4 500 citizens of the former Yugoslavia were thus reported to have arrived in Spain in 1992 and been looked after by various public and private institutions³⁴.

In France, the total volume is difficult to ascertain. Only three groups are correctly accounted for: those requesting asylum (2000), those taken in by the government (300 civilian prisoners and their families taken in for the winter) and those arriving as part of the operation to provide shelter for 1 000 children. On the other hand, it is not known how many arrive by their own means, more often than not joining up with a family

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It is estimated that 1 350 people are being allowed to stay longer for humanitarian reasons.

already in the country³⁵. Finally, in Luxembourg, more than 8 000 arrivals were recorded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in one year (91-92); some 60% of these are believed to be from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A selective, transitory approach

In addressing the matter, most of the Member States are at pains to emphasise the exceptional nature of the measures taken. All have been anxious not to cause any disruption to the system of control and to prevent a flood of arrivals. Thus, after an initial phase of "humanitarian understanding", tighter restrictions have been imposed, although they vary from country to country. In Denmark, for instance, a visa requirement was introduced in autumn 1992 for persons from certain republics of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia). This decision had an immediate impact, but also caused problems for people from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia who were in possession of passports from those republics. The Danish Parliament is considering amending the rules on visas, but remains steadfast in its intention of reducing the number of asylum seekers from those regions: few have a chance of being granted refugee status. Although the number of arrivals has increased, relatively few people have been given authorisation to stay on a long-term basis, and the majority are still awaiting the outcome of their applications. Recently, 14 Macedonian asylum seekers had their cases rejected, and there are likely to be others.

In the Netherlands also, the authorities are anxious to ensure that all the persons arriving do not seek asylum. The Minister of Justice considers that most of them do not satisfy the conditions laid down by the Convention on refugees. They are considered to have fled the violence of the war and are not covered by asylum procedures. Consequently, since 1 August 1992 the temporary rules for receiving displaced persons (Tijdelijke regeling opvang ontheemden) have been applied to them, in order to control more effectively a situation where entry and stay are deemed to be limited to the duration of the civil war. Requests for asylum which had already been submitted were therefore put on hold. The persons concerned do not receive a genuine residence permit, but receive

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According to the 1990 census, more than 60 000 Yugoslavs are lawfully resident in France, with a further 30 000 having been naturalised. The estimated figure has been swelled by more than 50 000 visas issued to nationals of the former Yugoslavia by French consulates.

a "document for displaced persons"³⁶. By the end of September 1992, 3 600 former Yugoslavs had been granted this status³⁷.

This concept of provisional entry on humanitarian grounds underpins the measures taken by the French authorities to assist those who have not initiated a standard procedure for seeking asylum. They are issued with a provisional residence permit (six months renewable) entitling them to welfare cover. They may be granted a work permit for the same duration as the residence permit, although the procedures vary from case to case. Those coming from a war-torn region are treated more favourably: the employment situation cannot be invoked against them, whereas common law provisions apply to others. To provide them with accommodation, a reception centre was set up in Albertville, reserved for single women with or without children. Subsequently, with the arrival of Bosnian prisoners taken in by the government, holiday villages were opened, where the refugees may also receive social and medical assistance.

These "refugees" have also been the focus of much attention in Luxembourg. Since March 1992, the government has debated their situation on six occasions. In line with other countries, it was decided to grant them legal status on humanitarian grounds for a limited six-month period³⁸. This temporary residence entitlement is accompanied (as in France) by a work permit, material aid (money and food coupons), free medical assistance and clothing provided by the Red Cross; social support is provided by non-governmental organisations (Caritas, Pax Christi). The State has also helped the new arrivals to find housing and to arrange their children's schooling. By July, 30 million francs had already been released for this purpose³⁹.

³⁶ The Ministry of Justice estimates that 6 000 "displaced persons" will be living in the Netherlands at the end of 1992. They are accommodated in barrack buildings or with host families.

³⁷ This approach by the Dutch Ministry of Justice is hotly disputed. Some experts feel that these people are covered by the Convention on refugees and that their requests for asylum cannot be rejected. Moreover, this rule is claimed to be discriminatory, since it applies only to refugees from the former Yugoslavia. The government is to review the situation after 1 November.

³⁸ On 4 September 1992 it was decided to extend by six months the residence period initially granted.

³⁹ Despite earnest entreaties from local authorities, the question of housing is still far from settled and may become a major source of concern. As regards children's schooling, rather than isolating them in special classes, it was decided to facilitate their integration into the Luxembourg system.

Like Denmark, Luxembourg wishes to avoid an unduly liberal approach, which would encourage a flood of arrivals. On 3 July 1992, the government decided that humanitarian status was to be reserved strictly for nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with others being turned back. Additionally, the entry visa requirement was reintroduced, frontier controls (especially on certain railway routes from Belgium or Germany) were reinforced, and labour agreements concerning other nationals of the former Yugoslavia were suspended. To ensure strict application of these decisions and to provide an effective screening process, the immigration service and passport office have temporarily been given extra resources, with special offices being set up for staff from various departments responsible for examining refugees' applications.

A lasting temporary arrangement: "Right of abode on humanitarian grounds"

The example of the former Yugoslavia has drawn attention to the more general problem of displaced persons (increasing in number) who, in the eyes of the host countries, do not satisfy either the criteria for asylum or the provisions of common law laid down for foreigners' entry and residence.

In the first half of 1992, 9 000 "tolerated aliens" were living in the Netherlands. In May, improvements were made to the relevant legislation (Regulation for tolerated aliens - *Gedoogdenregeling*)⁴⁰. They may henceforth maintain their application for asylum without losing the benefit of their status, and they have a right of appeal. It should be noted that conflicting interpretations on the part of the Council of State and the Ministry of Justice have undermined this regulation and indirectly strengthened the criticisms levelled by the refugees' association⁴¹.

⁴⁰ The Regulation for tolerated aliens (*Gedoogdenregeling*) was introduced at the start of 1992. It covers asylum seekers whose application has been rejected but who cannot be expelled for humanitarian reasons. See previous report.

⁴¹ Last September, the jurisdiction division of the Council of State acknowledged that six asylum seekers whose applications were rejected and who were seeking a residence permit for humanitarian reasons were within their rights. The status of tolerated alien, which had been granted to them by the Ministry of Justice, gave them fewer guarantees against deportation. The Council of State considered that the Ministry of Justice had to explain why they were admitted as tolerated aliens and not given a residence permit. The Secretary of State for Justice confirmed the Ministry's intention of maintaining this regulation, even if it meant that refusals to grant residence permits for humanitarian reasons had to be more fully explained.

Such cases have led, in Denmark, to the granting, as an exceptional measure, of "*residence permits for humanitarian reasons*" to those whose "*particular conditions or circumstances must be taken into consideration*"⁴².

The growing significance of this question led to the tabling (in November 1992) of new legislation for granting temporary right of asylum to victims of civil war. The aim is to allow entry into Denmark for a limited period (six months with possibility of renewal) for "*semi-refugees*" who stand no chance of being given the guarantees of integration offered to "genuine" candidates. They would receive a limited education, or could follow a vocational training course in their own language to facilitate their reintegration on return, but would not be entitled to look for work or apply to join their family.

The uncertainty surrounding the situation of these "*semi-refugees*", who are let into the country without any real guarantee as to their future, is already causing problems in Denmark in connection with the "*law on temporary asylum*". Whilst it has received the backing of the Danish Refugee Council⁴³, others have pointed out that it might inadvertently help to consolidate the position of the persons concerned in that it provided them with a form of asylum, thereby providing access to social structures. Conversely, there is the fear that those taken under the programme's wing may find themselves isolated from Danish society and therefore caught up in an impasse if the conflict were to spread. Their children would thus be growing up in less secure circumstances than other children in Danish society.

⁴² This category covers: older people, people with serious health problems, families with young children etc., arriving from a war-torn or similarly ravaged country. During the first few months of 1992, 24 persons received a permit of this type, whereas 253 persons had their applications rejected. The Danish Ministry of Justice does not believe that these situations indicate any change in official practice regarding right of asylum.

⁴³ Organisation responsible for the first 18 months of integration programmes for refugees, which coordinates programmes for persons residing temporarily in the country.

THE LABOUR MARKET

Traditionally more vulnerable than nationals to labour market movements, foreign workers, and more generally all those with an immigrant background, have been particularly affected by the current restructuring of production systems and the new flexibility requirements. In this context, whilst they remain no less vulnerable to unemployment, their inter-sectoral mobility has increased and their presence in the self-employed sector has grown.

Changes in the employment sectors and qualifications

These changes are clearly reflected in the results of the 1990 population census in France, which show that while the total number of foreigners settled in France has remained more or less the same, the number with jobs has declined very considerably (from 1 511 240 in 1975 to 1 304 144 in 1990, i.e. a drop of about 14%, compared with a rise of more than 8% in the total number of French nationals in work). These results show that the economic crisis and the restructuring of the industrial sector have hit foreigners much harder than nationals.

But the economic crisis and the modernisation process have not only accelerated the disappearance of jobs in traditional industry; they have also shifted the balance of power between sectors, with the services sector in the ascendancy. These changes have in turn brought about a significant renewal of the workforce, greater mobility and greater flexibility. The pattern of employment for foreigners reflects this perfectly: in 1975, 66% of foreign employees worked in industry and the construction sector, and only 29% in the services sector. Yet 15 years later (1990) these proportions were well on the way to being reversed (47% and 50% respectively).

These changes in the type of work performed by foreign labour in France have been paralleled by equally significant changes in the qualifications structure, with a big drop in the proportion of manual workers (- 15% in 15 years) and a corresponding rise in the proportion of non-manual workers, mirroring the shift towards the tertiary sector. Even so, the qualifications structure of foreign employees continues to lag far behind that of

their French counterparts. At the end of the 1980s eight foreign employees out of ten were manual workers, compared with less than half of French employees. In addition, the proportion of women in the foreign working population continues to grow, having reached more than 30% today compared with only 18% in 1975. This has been a considerable change and represents one of the main trends in the changing situation of foreigners on the job market.

More entrepreneurs and traders

As job prospects in industry have declined, many more foreigners have established themselves in self-employed work. In 1990, France had 133 394 self-employed foreign workers⁴⁴. The increase in the number of self-employed foreigners was remarkable enough between 1975 and 1982 (+ 26.5%), but was even more remarkable over the last inter-census period (+ 62.5%), all the more so as it contrasts with a 3% decline in the number of French self-employed workers.

As a general rule, these self-employed foreigners tend to go either into the commercial or services sectors, where they rely on contacts within the community, or into the building trades sector (dominated by Southern Europeans), which is less reliant on community contacts.

The self-employed foreigners are mainly Southern Europeans (Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese) or Maghrebis, with status and type of activity quite closely linked to national origin. The vast majority of bosses are Southern European migrants, particularly Italians and Spaniards, while the majority of building craftsmen are Spaniards and, predominantly, Portuguese. Meanwhile, Maghrebis are more attracted to trade.

If we add to the above figures the figures for persons with acquired French nationality, we obtain a more accurate picture of self-employment among the working populations originating from the post-war immigrations. Together, they make up more than 10% of the total number of craftsmen and slightly more than 9% of the total number of traders

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Including farmers, who represented only 13% of the total compared with 45% among their French counterparts.

recorded in France in the 1990 census⁴⁵. This extension of the field of observation also highlights the essentially urban nature of the phenomenon. In 1982, 15.7% of craftsmen, traders and owners of firms in Paris and its suburbs were foreigners or persons of foreign origin, compared with 21.6% in 1990⁴⁶.

This phenomenon, which is already quite marked in Germany and the United Kingdom, also applies in Denmark, particularly to Pakistanis. According to an unofficial report, almost 70% of kiosks in Copenhagen are run by immigrants, who are also taking over numerous grocery shops and setting up small import-export businesses in quite large numbers⁴⁷.

In Spain, the effects of the regularisation process (an extra 64 000 legal workers) have given a new dynamic to the labour market. The foreign workforce in lawful employment almost doubled between 1990 and 1991 (from 85 372 to 167 845); at the same time, it has become a younger workforce and its composition in terms of nationality has changed significantly. Whilst the numbers of all groups have risen appreciably in absolute terms, it is the African and Latin-American workers⁴⁸ who have, relatively speaking, benefited the most from opportunities on the Spanish labour market. Estimates for 1992 point to a consolidation of this trend, with the proportion of Africans and Latin Americans continuing to rise, and that of Europeans, North Americans and Asians to fall. Analysis of data relating to the regularisation process indicates that "paperless" workers are employed largely in the services sector, agriculture and construction, usually in a temporary capacity, with the result that they are forced to take more than one job. These results are wholly in line with data concerning the regularisation process in France about 10 years ago.

⁴⁵ In 1990, as in 1982, persons with acquired French nationality also outnumbered foreigners in the liberal professions, in most cases being the children of foreign employees who have acquired French nationality at school age at their parents' urging.

⁴⁶ According to E. Ma Mung (1992), more than 20% of the businesses put up for sale in Paris and the surrounding departments (Hts-de-Seine, Seine-St-Denis and Val de Marne) in the first half of 1989 were bought by Asians and Maghrebis: an absolutely remarkable figure.

⁴⁷ Other openings exist for immigrants on the labour market: multi-cultural teaching posts, positions in the health and social services sectors, manufacture of indigenous products, and translation and consultancy work for Danish companies.

⁴⁸ Principally Moroccans, Argentines, Peruvians, Algerians, Senegalese and Gambians.

Unemployment rate still above that for nationals

The French census confirms the greater vulnerability of foreigners on the labour market, with unemployment around the 20% mark, i.e. double the national average. The disparity is even more marked in respect of certain nationalities (Algerians, Moroccans, Africans from the southern Sahara and Turks) for whom unemployment rates range from 25 to 30%.

In Denmark also, immigrants and refugees are significantly more vulnerable to unemployment than nationals, regardless of the level of education, skills, age and sex. The former, constituting around 3.3% of the total population, represent only 2.4% of the active labour force, but account for 6% of the total unemployed⁴⁹. In 1991, it was found that 18 408 foreigners were out of work in Denmark, i.e. 27% of the total, as against 10.6% of Danes. However, this average conceals marked differences between the figures for nationals from Nordic countries or the EC (respectively 15% and 17%) and those for other groups of foreigners (35. %), the most disadvantaged being Pakistanis (38.7%) and Turks (47%). The situation is even worse for women from these nationalities, of whom respectively 56% and 49% were looking for work⁵⁰. The most recent data published by the Social Commission (1992) confirm these findings. They indicate that the principal reason for this unemployment is not so much lack of education as the particular difficulties encountered by these populations on the labour market. Moreover, the situation appears to be getting worse for some groups. A survey conducted in Greater Copenhagen shows that, between 1986 and 1991, unemployment amongst these groups increased by 60%⁵¹. This deterioration is generally attributed to a lack of skills, which is all the more detrimental since the jobs usually reserved for foreigners are disappearing from the labour market and employers are becoming more reluctant to take them on.

⁴⁹ Amongst this unemployed group, there are more men than women and more refugees than immigrants (Social commission 1992).

⁵⁰ It is difficult to build up an accurate picture of the situation of the most recent refugees, most of whom are engaged in training or education activities.

⁵¹ They represent 5% of the region's labour force yet form 14% of the total unemployed.

In these circumstances, it would appear to be more of a hindrance than a help to provide foreigners with exactly the same form of assistance as that given to Danes⁵². A survey carried out in Karlebo underlines this paradox. Having regard to the labour market as a whole, the authors deplore the fact that the authorities devise policies which are unsuitable for certain groups of workers, including older, "worn-out" and less-skilled foreigners. The report suggests that better use should be made of the funds earmarked for their retirement. A "*barriers committee*" has been set up under the aegis of the Ministry of Labour to study obstacles encountered by refugees and immigrants on the labour market⁵³. It is to report to Parliament before the end of 1992. The key problem lies in the nature of the compromise to be worked out in terms of acknowledging that they be given priority over other groups.

The situation is much the same in the Netherlands where, generally speaking, unemployment amongst minorities remains very high, in the region of 28% for Surinamese, West Indians and Arubans, and approaching 40% for Turks and Moroccans⁵⁴. According to the Central Statistical Office, there are two main obstacles to any significant, lasting improvement of their position on the labour market: their younger age structure than that of the Netherlands population and the continuing process of immigration, both of which contribute to a steady increase in the number of those available for work. From 1987 to 1990, the number of Turks and Moroccans available for work rose from 74 000 to 90 000, and that of other groups from 21 000 to 27 000. The Ministry of Social Affairs (SOZAW), estimates that the number of job seekers is likely to increase from 20 000 to 30 000 per year as a result of immigration, with half of that number arriving in the country simply to join their family. Compared with 1987, there has nevertheless been an improvement in the employment of ethnic minorities, with some (Surinamese and West Indians) faring better than others (Turks and Moroccans)⁵⁵.

⁵² Refugees are relatively privileged in that they benefit from specific financial provisions in certain areas (education or vocational training).

⁵³ Unemployment amongst foreigners has been the subject of statistical surveys, but the characteristics of their unemployment and the specific difficulties which immigrants and refugees encounter in looking for work have still to be analysed.

⁵⁴ According to a survey conducted in 1990, 18% of Moluccans were also unemployed.

⁵⁵ The unemployment rate amongst the former fell by only 1% over the period in question as against 8% for the latter. The fall has been even more marked in the case of Moluccans, 40% of whom were unemployed in 1983.

In its 1991 report, the Central Employment Board (CBA) noted that there had clearly been a rise in the number of jobs found for unemployed members of ethnic minorities. The year's target of 12 000 was exceeded by 8%, with a 25% increase in the proportion of immigrants finding jobs over a yearly period. The figures for the first nine months of 1992 indicate that the efforts of the regional employment offices are starting to bear fruit: 12 000 members of ethnic minorities found employment, constituting 90% of the year's objectives.

In Germany, 248 316 foreigners were recorded as being out of work in April 1992, a rise of 20.5% over the previous year (42 313 in absolute figures)⁵⁶.

Illegal employment ever present...

Regardless of trends in the legal employment of nationals and foreigners on the labour market, illegal employment remains and specific forms of employment are developing. This applies to all Member States and appears to confirm that for certain types of workforce the requirements of the market are not being met and that there is consequently still a significant imbalance between labour supply and demand.

According to the Federal Government's report on temporary labour and illegal employment in Germany, the number of known cases of illegal employment has almost doubled over the last two years, to 24 353⁵⁷. In Berlin and Brandenburg, the construction industry's trade union is calling for systematic legal action and heavy penalties in respect of those employed illegally on work sites.

In France over the past three years (1989-91) the control agencies have reported more than 14 600 cases to the courts, involving a total of 33 480 offences against the Labour Code and French legislation on foreigners. A clear majority of these offences involve "clandestine work" in its true sense (failure to declare the existence of a business or of employees) rather than "the employment of foreigners in an irregular situation". The data

⁵⁶ The Federal Labour Office published an analysis of the labour market for 1991.

⁵⁷ The figures include not only third country nationals but also Community citizens (4 943 French, 1 488 British and Irish, 1 306 Italians and 1 150 Greeks).

relating to the prosecution reports may not reveal the nationalities of the offenders, but this information can be obtained by analysing the sentences recorded in the police records and comparing these with the offences studied.

During 1988 and 1989 more than 6 131 persons were sentenced by the courts for a total of 7 244 offences. A breakdown by nationality shows that the vast majority were French (69%) or, more generally, nationals of EC Member States (75%). Third country nationals accounted for 21.5%, a hefty figure when one considers that they make up only 6.6% of the corresponding active population. Third country nationals received stiffer penalties than French nationals for all categories of offence.

In the Netherlands, the labour relations inspectorate (DIA) detected 557 cases of illegal employment in 1991, mainly in the primary sector, the hotel and restaurant trades, steelworking and the clothing industry. The trade unions consider that the situation is extremely worrying in the latter sector. There are believed to be 1 000 workshops operating to varying standards of illegality, providing a turnover of between 40 and 600 million guilders a year. Unless the authorities act quickly, the number of illegal workers could rise from 8 000 to 12 500 in 1993, matching the total of legal workers.

In Spain, the labour inspectorate conducted 10 381 actions in connection with foreigners in 1991, and drew up 1 986 prosecution reports in respect of 3 750 workers. Around 1.5 billion pesetas were recovered in penalties as a result of these actions (around 376 000 pesetas per worker and 540 000 pesetas for each prosecution report drawn up against an employer)⁵⁸.

In Luxembourg, the practice of subcontracting usually accompanied by the use of temporary labour (both lawful and unlawful), has become increasingly widespread in viticulture⁵⁹ and, more especially, in the construction and public works sector. In this

⁵⁸ It should be noted that the infringement rate (number of infringements detected in relation to the total number of checks carried out) fell in 1991 compared with 1990 (19% against 36%) although the number of companies inspected was higher (10 381 in 1991 against 6 532 in 1990). The most likely explanation is that the lower figure is an indirect effect of the regularisation process carried out in 1991.

⁵⁹ Wine growers have received from the Ministry of Labour authorisation to simplify the recruitment of workers from eastern countries, mainly Poland, which in fact constitutes the legalisation of formerly illegal recruitment practices.

sector, where foreign workers are already largely in the majority and where fixed-duration contracts are authorised, companies are also permitted to recruit on a group basis the workers needed for the job in hand. This is the method used mainly for recruiting workers from non-EC countries through intermediary agencies, with networks apparently extending as far as Colombia. According to one trade-union official, there is *"no work site which does not employ a large proportion of Polish, Czech or Hungarian workers"*. Obviously, the obligation to pay a minimum wage is never respected, nor is attention paid to minimum housing requirements; the workers sometimes live in cellars. The police have carried out numerous arrests in connection with the unauthorised employment of workers, more often than not in the public works and construction sectors.

In Italy, the CGIL (General Workers' Confederation) is calling for a moral crusade on the labour market to combat tax evasion and the abuse of fringe benefits. It considers, however, that work done by foreigners employed illegally has to be recognised. In this connection, it is seeking on-the-spot regularisation of the situation of workers who are to be kept on by their employers. It is also demanding that the workers concerned be exempted from the obligation to return home in order to apply for a work permit, thus sparing them unreasonable and unjustified travel costs.

Unlike their Italian counterparts, the Greek trade unions fear that the (excessive) employment of foreign workers at wage levels substantially lower than those of nationals, will create a downward wage spiral overall. This already appears to be the case in construction where, moreover, activity has fallen by 35%. The chairman of the workers' union for the sector considers that, in this context, the recruitment of foreigners is contributing to unemployment amongst Greeks⁶⁰. There is clearly less of a problem with workers lawfully resident in the country and in possession of a work permit. They are fewer in number and tend to have steady jobs. In September 1991, there were 17 000 non-EC workers in Greece (1 000 fewer than in 1990) and 14 000 EC nationals.

⁶⁰

According to this trade unionist, most of the (illegal) immigrant workers are found in the construction and public works sector. Out of an "estimated" total of 400 000, around 80 000 work in construction, agriculture and tourism. Foreigners earn between 2 000 and 2 500 drachmas a day, compared with 6 000 to 9 000 drachmas for Greek nationals. Other official data on wages indicate that Poles, regarded as good construction workers, are paid from 100 000 to 175 000 drachmas a month. Filipino domestic staff receive 100 000 drachmas (ECU 400) a month, Sri Lankans 40 000, and Ethiopians 70 000 to 80 000. Albanians work for 2 000 to 3 000 drachmas a day. The minimum legal wage in Greece is 3 500 drachmas a day.

New instruments of labour policy: worker quotas, training courses for foreigners, company contracts and temporary employment

Throughout 1992, officials of the Directorate-General for Migration in Spain strove to convince the general public⁶¹ of the importance of regularisation, emphasising that the 105 000 foreign workers who had benefited from it, far from competing with the national labour force⁶², were in fact making good the "employment deficit" on the Spanish market. The final report on the regularisation process, indicating the job vacancies not filled by nationals, will serve as a basis for drawing up the official annual quota of (temporary and permanent) immigrant workers. Although this quota has not yet been set, workers from Latin America and Maghreb are expected to be given preferential treatment. It is likely that the continuing shortage of labour lay behind the government's decision (in July 1992) to adopt an extremely flexible approach to the renewal of work permits for those whose situation was regularised in 1991⁶³.

In Germany, the growth of unemployment amongst foreigners already in the country is not acting as a deterrent to the arrival of more workers from eastern Europe in possession of temporary contracts. This phenomenon is undoubtedly one of the major problems on the German labour market. Unofficial data put the figure at 68 000, whilst the central association for the German construction industry believes the figure to be in excess of 130 000⁶⁴.

Many voices (companies, associations and trade unions) have spoken out against the infringement of competition rules occasioned by this form of labour force management⁶⁵.

⁶¹ According to a survey carried out in May 1991 by the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) involving a sample of 17 687 persons, 62% of those interviewed believe that "foreigners are taking jobs which could be done by Spaniards, especially young people". However, they recognise also (54%) that "foreigners generally do the work that Spaniards do not want to do", even though a third of them consider that "the foreign labour force has a negative impact on the growth of the Spanish economy".

⁶² This message from the Ministry of Labour has its origin in an as yet unpublished study concerning jobs taken by nationals, carried out on the basis of data from the national employment institute (INEM).

⁶³ See chapter on integration policy.

⁶⁴ The rumour is starting to spread that they are taking the jobs of German construction workers.

⁶⁵ The advantage of this type of company contract is that it exempts the German contractor from having to pay the collectively agreed contributions to the construction industry's social insurance fund. These contributions, representing 41% of taxable income, serve to finance leave, wage compensation, vocational

The SPD and IGbau (the industry's trade union) are the main opponents of this type of contract which, in their eyes, increases the risk of a downward review of wages. The SPD is calling for a ceiling of 100 000 to be imposed on the number of foreigners thus employed in Germany⁶⁶. The Federal Government is considering introducing a payment of DM 1 000 to 2 000 for each contracted worker whose employment is approved, and prohibiting the employment of Polish workers. Seasonal work is not taken into account.

The same need to adjust to the requirements of the economy has led, in Italy, to the preparation of a decree on temporary work permits authorising the entry of new workers for seasonal jobs. The CGIL has criticised the policies of the last few years, which have focused too closely on the unrealistic objective of closing frontiers. This government policy has, in its view, helped to create a distorted picture of the labour market and, objectively, exacerbated the situation as regards the employment of illegal immigrants. Although the trade unions were not opposed to these temporary work permits, their agreement was linked to the provision of guarantees including the assurance of a residence permit valid for three months (renewable up to six months) irrespective of the duration of the employment season in agriculture or tourism, the agreement of the governments in the countries of emigration and the trade unions to the establishment of the work contracts, and the guarantee of a "return bonus" ensuring at least the "re-employment" of the "temporary immigrants" in their country of origin.

In Belgium, an advisory council for foreign workers has been set up to replace the advisory council on immigration, with the task of advising the government on labour requirements, but with no power to decide on quotas.

Luxembourg still has the largest proportion of foreigners on the labour market⁶⁷, yet this high proportion appears to fall short of meeting all the country's requirements. Thus, whilst expressing its determination not to grant new work permits to third country

training and supplementary pensions. On the question of the limits to be applied (or not) to the transnational management of manpower, a ruling is awaited from the British courts on the application of the principle formulated by the European Court of Justice in the Rush case (a German company employing an Indian national who has no residence permit in Germany wishes to employ him in England and claims he is fully entitled to work there, citing Article 54 of the Treaty).

⁶⁶ The company contract quotas set by the Federal Government are illegally exceeded.

⁶⁷ They constitute more than 50% of workers, with only one in five new jobs being taken by a national.

nationals, the government continues to tolerate their recruitment in varying forms of legality: authorisation of a fixed-duration contract, failure to comply with collective agreements on working conditions and wages, bogus subcontracting and other illegal forms of employment. Moreover, the Luxembourg government has given the go-ahead for various temporary training and apprenticeship contracts for nationals from countries of central and eastern Europe, e.g. medical and paramedical training for Romanians, or banking and hotel experience for Poles, and discussions are now taking place on projects for Hungarians in areas where labour shortages have arisen.

In the Netherlands, finally, the central employment board (CBA) and the social economic council (SER) have encouraged the government to revise the law on the employment of foreign workers (WABW) with a view to improving the control of flows, taking into account the needs of companies and the existing labour force. It is proposed that temporary work permits should be refused if the labour supply is sufficient or if the employer has not done enough to recruit people and that, in any case, they should be granted only for a maximum of one year.

FLOW CONTROL POLICIES

Over the past year immigration control policies have principally centred around the re-introduction of visas, modifications to institutional systems, the stepping up of frontier controls, and stricter regulation of family immigration. In some countries the changes have merely involved partially reforming or augmenting recent legislation, while in others (Spain and the Netherlands) they have been more radical. Another innovation has been the conclusion of frontier cooperation agreements (Spain, Germany), which have added a new dimension to the fight against illegal immigration.

Modifications to institutional systems, laws and regulations

In the past year the countries which have overhauled their immigration policies most radically are the Netherlands and Portugal. For the Dutch authorities, controlling migratory flows is re-confirmed as a main priority, but it now forms part of a more comprehensive approach combining prevention and more efficient management of arrivals of new migrants. The government believes that this new "*integrated policy*" for regulating migratory flows should help to foster the integration of ethnic minorities.

The programme contains all the classic measures applied in this type of case: stepped-up frontier checks; closer surveillance of foreigners; measures to combat illegal immigration, residence and employment; and increased use of the expulsion option. Additionally, the inviolability of official papers has been reinforced and the method for registering residence status reformed. Also, the number of immigration control officers has been increased in the four largest cities. The immigration control officers will be helped by the new System for the Administration of Foreigners (VAS)⁶⁸, set up to improve exchanges of information between the administrations involved in the fight against illegal immigration⁶⁹. With the aim of reducing the length of time needed for the examination of cases, a bill proposing radical reforms to the 1965 Foreigners Act was

⁶⁸ Scheme operated jointly by the Ministry of Justice and the Foreigners Registration Department.

⁶⁹ Since November 1991 any person requesting a SOFI number (a tax and social security number) in order to gain entitlement to public services must present his or her residence permit.

submitted to Parliament at the end of August. Under this new law, persons refused asylum and threatened with expulsion would be entitled to appeal to the Foreigners Division of the Court in The Hague. To put an end to the *"problem of immigrants without papers who cannot be expelled"*, transport operators would be required to check that their passengers met the conditions for entry to the territory of the Netherlands and to make a copy of their identity papers.⁷⁰ Moreover, the acts of aiding and abetting entry and residence, and recruiting and employing illegal workers, would become offences against public order. Also, the new law would give legal force to the regulations on "tolerated aliens", who, once their cases had been studied, could be issued with a "conditional residence permit" valid for one year and renewable for a maximum of two further years⁷¹. After three years this conditional permit would be exchanged for a normal permit⁷². Finally, new provisions to stamp out marriages of convenience are currently being drafted.

The preventive side of the programme will mainly involve experimental projects, devised following studies of the motives expressed by immigrants and asylum seekers and aimed at reducing the pressures which drive people from their countries of origin. Romania, Iran, Morocco and Ethiopia will be the first countries tackled. The Minister for Development Aid will endeavour to set up new cooperation arrangements with them, based on existing or still-to-be-defined bilateral relationships. Financial loans will be made available to these countries, while attempts will be made to establish conditions favourable to the return of refugees.

In Portugal, Parliament passed a legislative authorisation in June 1992 establishing the government's prerogatives for the drafting of a series of legislative decrees. The aims are twofold: to align national legislation with the international conventions signed by Portugal and to settle "irregular" situations arising from a lack of clarity in the current legislation. The government has therefore received the green light to regularise these situations, transpose the Community directives into national law, establish new entry and

⁷⁰ This obligation does not apply to "genuine refugees" without papers who are fleeing a country because their lives are in danger, provided their story is credible.

⁷¹ In the third year of residence the "tolerated alien" would be granted access to the labour market.

⁷² On condition that the obstacles preventing return to the country of origin still apply. If they were removed, the conditional permit would become invalid.

residence criteria, re-define the expulsion system⁷³, create a new crime of abetting illegal immigration and refusing to carry out an expulsion order, and increase the levels of fines for illegal residence, employment without a work permit and transporting of a person whose entry has not been authorised.

The legislative decree on "exceptional regularisation" was published in October 1992. Prospective beneficiaries must meet two requirements: they must have arrived in Portugal at least six months prior to the decree's entry into force and must have at least a minimum means of support. Nationals of Portuguese-speaking countries who arrived prior to 1 June 1986 and have lived continuously in Portugal ever since need not furnish evidence of their means of support. The following are not entitled to regularisation under the decree: foreigners who have been sentenced to a year or more in prison, those who have committed an offence for which they may be expelled, and those who have in fact been expelled or banned from entering Portuguese territory. The operation has a limited duration (four months), and is managed by a technical committee responsible for examining applications. When an application is approved the applicant, his spouse and children living with him receive a residence permit for one year, renewable thereafter.

None of the other measures provided for by the Parliamentary authorisation has yet seen the light of day. Many observers blame this delay on the absence of any official institution for coordinating government activity in the field of immigration and on the poorly defined role of the immigrant support associations. In an attempt to remedy this situation the Portuguese Communist party has tabled a bill for the creation of an Immigration Institute - a national body to coordinate policy in this field and liaise between immigrants and the authorities. The Socialists have also drafted a bill, this one aimed at giving greater rights to immigrant support associations to facilitate their integration into Portuguese society.

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Foreigners residing legitimately in Portugal will be dealt with by the courts under a rapid expulsion procedure incorporating safeguards of the defendants' fundamental rights. Foreigners not residing legitimately in Portugal will be dealt with by an administrative expulsion procedure, again with safeguards concerning their fundamental rights. In this latter case, the powers of the judicial authorities will need to be specified. In this context, it is worth mentioning two judgments of Portugal's Supreme Court as to whether or not expulsion should be an automatic additional penalty. It was accepted as automatic by the Court in a case relating to a drugs offence (judgment of 5 June 1991), but was rejected for any foreigner having resided in Portugal for between five and 20 years unless serious grounds were stated in the accusation.

In Spain, an Inter-Ministerial Committee on the status of foreigners⁷⁴ has been set up to coordinate the activities of the various Ministries, harmonise sectoral policies and centralise all the information available. Its role is to define the broad lines of Spanish immigration policy, prepare legislation, study trends in migratory flows, centralise sociological data and statistics, and determine the criteria for the intervention of the departments responsible for foreigners. It has approved the renewal of the permits of persons whose situation has been regularised and is currently preparing the reform of the Law on Asylum and Refuge.

At the same time, the Spanish Immigration Institute has been converted into the Directorate-General for Migration, within which a Subdirector-General for Immigration deals with the problem of employment of foreigners, determines the economy's needs and decides on the forms of recruitment. Finally, three "Foreigners Offices" (Oficinas Unicas de Extranjeros - OUE) have been set up in Gerona, Alicante and Almeria (with others planned for the main provinces of immigration), and in Madrid an "Office for Asylum Seekers and Refugees" (Oficina de Asilo y Refugio - OAR) has been set up to deal with requests for asylum⁷⁵. The government has also stepped up surveillance along Spain's southern coastline and created a special police corps equipped with modern observation equipment, helicopters and speedboats. This increased surveillance complements the re-introduction of visas for Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians (in May 1991) and Peruvians (July 1991) and now enjoys the cooperation of the Moroccan police⁷⁶.

In Greece, in an endeavour to stem the steeply rising tide of illegal immigration, the government decided in February 1992 to strengthen controls along its borders with Albania, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Seven mobile patrols were to be assigned to this task⁷⁷.

⁷⁴ The Committee has four sub-committees covering the fields of international cooperation, employment, social integration and social security for foreigners. It brings together the Under-Secretaries of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, the Interior (who chairs the Committee), Labour and Social Security, and Social Affairs.

⁷⁵ The Ministries of the Interior and Social Affairs are involved.

⁷⁶ This should enable illegal immigration to be combated more effectively. A reduction in the flow of illegal immigrants was observed during the last months of 1992.

⁷⁷ The Greek army has had a village protection plan for a year now, but the effectiveness of the patrols is hampered by the length of the frontier and the difficulty of access to the sensitive zones.

Following a meeting last May in Tirana between the Greek and Albanian Prime Ministers, the Greek authorities decided to grant temporary work permits to Albanians, to accept seasonal workers, to add a third frontier post to the two existing ones and to open consulates in Albania⁷⁸. Amendments may be made to the 1991 law, which the Minister for the Interior claims was adopted in a "panic situation" in response to the "Albanian crisis" and has serious shortcomings.

There was a meeting between delegations from Greece and Turkey to try to defuse the growing tensions arising from the increased smuggling of persons across their common frontier⁷⁹. Pending a definitive solution, the Greek government agreed to accept "temporarily" the Iraqis whose case was mentioned earlier. Wider consultations are planned, but the Greek authorities have doubts as to the goodwill of the Turks. Faced with these problems, the government has expressed the wish that the problem of illegal immigration should be dealt with in the context of an "integrated Community policy". Finally, an amendment is currently being studied on the expulsion of foreigners entering Greece illegally by sea without any documents indicating their country of origin⁸⁰.

Similar preoccupations have led to the same approach being adopted in Luxembourg. The Chamber of Deputies has received a draft amendment to the Law on entry and residence conditions for foreigners, and more specifically to the Article on the temporary detention by the government of persons representing a threat to public order⁸¹. The other modification expected concerns the alignment of Luxembourg's national law with that

⁷⁸ The Associated Press and Reuters have reported complaints by Albanians concerning abuse by Greek border guards, but the Greek government has firmly rejected this accusation.

⁷⁹ During 1991, 40 immigrant smuggling networks were smashed by the police, 84 smugglers of immigrants arrested and 39 lorries, taxis and private cars seized.

⁸⁰ This amendment is being prepared jointly by the Ministers for Internal Security, the Merchant Marine, National Defence and Finance. It also provides for stricter penalties for those who smuggle in immigrants.

⁸¹ This draft amendment follows on from a judgment of the Council of State, which had annulled a Ministerial authorisation for a government detention order on the grounds that the government had not deliberated before taking its decision, as required by the law. The Minister for Justice has reported that 19 foreigners were the subject of this type of administrative internment in 1991, but that the government did not have a more suitable place of accommodation for them, while explaining that *"the fact of detaining a foreigner in the state prison is not incompatible with Luxembourg's international undertakings, since these are persons who are in an illegal situation on Luxembourg's territory."* According to the terms of the bill presented, the decision regarding detention by the government should therefore be taken by the Minister for Justice, the foreigner having the right to lodge an appeal with the Council of State's Litigation Committee in the month following notification of the decision.

section of the Schengen Agreements which provides for penalties against carriers of foreigners not in possession of the required documentation⁸².

In Germany, the 1990 Foreigners Act has been criticised in numerous quarters⁸³, and the growth in the number of asylum applications (438 000, i.e. almost double the 1991 figure) has revived the debate on the need for a proper immigration policy. The dominant feeling is that the Federal government does not have a clear vision of what its immigration policy should be. The government itself acknowledged that it did not have a complete awareness of the directives and decrees adopted by the competent authorities in the regions (Länder).

At Länder level, however, the general approaches are broadly similar, whatever the political parties in power⁸⁴. All feel that the State should contribute more towards the costs of accommodating and caring for asylum seekers; but their main concern is that the State and its Community partners should adopt a common approach concerning the right of asylum. The Prime Minister of Lower Saxony, for example, has campaigned for a European solution to the problem of immigration. However, not everyone is agreed on this "European" approach: some see it as a detour which will simply delay the decisions which need to be taken and would prefer to see national initiatives taken instead. The Länder most in favour of national action are those bordering Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics. The Federal Minister for the Interior has announced a stepping up of the fight against illegal immigration and organised trafficking of immigrants⁸⁵.

⁸² In Germany the Federal Court has ruled that the provision banning airlines from carrying passengers without a residence permit is unconstitutional.

⁸³ Cf. R.M. Hoffmann, *Das neue Ausländergesetz aus anwaltlicher Sicht* (the new Foreigners Act as seen by jurists), *Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik* (ZAR) 1992, pp 240 et seq; Bericht des Ausländerbeauftragten an den Senat der freien und Hansestadt Hamburg; H. Apel, *Gedanken* (Reflections on an immigration policy). For its part, the DGST (National Confederation of Unified German Trade Unions) chose as the main theme for its 1992 class "Germany, country of immigration".

⁸⁴ Foremost among the shared preoccupations are the problems of dual nationality and racism. Thus, the 69th session of the Conference of Ministers for Employment and Social Affairs adopted by a huge majority a draft resolution on the right of asylum.

⁸⁵ The same concern to combat human trafficking networks has led Bavaria to submit to the Bundesrat (Upper House of the Federal Parliament) a bill amending the penalties and fixed-scale administrative fines provided for in the Law on Foreigners. An amendment to the Penal Code has also been presented, creating the new legal concept of "human trafficking" in order to offer women and girls better protection against sexual exploitation.

The changes in other Member States have been less radical. In Belgium no new measures were taken concerning illegal immigration, but since July 1992 competence in this field has been transferred from the Minister for Justice to the Minister for the Interior⁸⁶, the new rules on the keeping of population registers (Royal Decree of July 92) have come into force, and the possibility of introducing stiffer penalties for employers is being examined.

In Italy the main event of the year was the abolition of the Ministry of Immigration by the new government formed by Giuliano Amato (after the April elections), a decision strongly criticised by the PDS (Social Democratic Party). The former Minister had presented to the Council of Ministers a decree amending the Martelli Law, with the aim of speeding up the expulsion procedure for foreigners found guilty of serious offences⁸⁷.

Tighter restrictions on refugee status

The trend towards much stricter controls over the right of asylum, already emphasised in the previous report, has been firmly maintained. Very few applicants were granted political refugee status in the past year and the regions where immigration is a more recent phenomenon are starting to clamp down just as severely as the countries with a long history of immigration.

In France, there was a 30% drop in awards of refugee status between 1991 and 1992. In Spain, the rate of acceptance of applications has fallen to 4%, compared with around

⁸⁶ The latter's "chef de cabinet" (principal private secretary) has explained that the reason for this switch is "to remove this area of responsibility from the State security services, since foreigners must no longer be viewed with suspicion as in the past". Budget allocated in 1990 for removal from the territory: 16 million; and for voluntary repatriation: 10 million.

⁸⁷ Although 23 806 expulsions had been ordered only 4 000 had been carried out. Renewed twice without ever having been the subject of a bill, this decree has been criticised by both the Republican Party and the "Rifondazione comunista". The former states in its official organ, the "Voce Repubblicana", that "the change in immigration policy announced so suddenly by the government is a sham: it is the price which it is making citizens pay for not dumping the Martelli Law altogether, even though the facts show it has failed. The government has had to admit that there are still hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants in Italy". The Rifondazione comunista considers the decree to be unconstitutional.

10% in the previous two years⁸⁸. And according to the data produced by the Swedish Immigration Office (1991), Italy, together with Switzerland, is the country which refuses most applications. The Italian Council for Refugees and the religious organisations are extremely concerned about this and have demanded that information points be set up as a matter of urgency at frontier posts and in airports in order to help and advise asylum seekers on the procedures to follow⁸⁹.

In addition to these restrictions on numbers there is also now greater selectivity, severely reducing the chances of applicants of certain nationalities. In Spain this applies to Poles, Dominicans, Romanians and Peruvians: the rate of acceptance for these nationalities is virtually nil, even though they presented the most applications between 1988 and 1992. Priority is instead given to refugees from Afghanistan, Somalia, Iran and Iraq. In Denmark, the groups most frequently granted refugee status are applicants subject to quotas from Vietnam, Somalia and Iran. Lebanese nationals and stateless Palestinians benefit from special legislation passed in February 1992⁹⁰ and are more favourably treated than nationals from eastern Europe, in particular Romanians and Russians, who fare worst of all.

Stricter asylum legislation

The concern to prevent what all Member States consider to be abuses of the right of asylum by "economic refugees" has often led to new amendments to the existing rules, at the risk, as one of the experts points out, of a denial of certain fundamental freedoms.

⁸⁸ Over the last three and a half years (1989 to mid-1992) the total number of applicants for refugee status (including family members) was 26 542, of whom 1 310 (5% of the total) were accepted.

Year	Number of applicants	Successful	%
1989	4 077	264	6.5
1990	8 647	490	5.7
1991	8 138	313	3.9
1992*	5 680	243	4.3

(* six months)

⁸⁹ This measure, moreover, is in keeping with the Martelli Law and the Ministry of the Interior's Circular No 10 /1991, which have never as yet been applied.

⁹⁰ This legislation, passed by a majority in Parliament, provides for the granting of Danish residence permits to stateless Palestinians who have been waiting more than a year for their request for political asylum to be dealt with. 315 Palestinians received residence permits under this arrangement. This marked the end of a period during which a large group of Palestinians had taken sanctuary in a Copenhagen church after their applications had been rejected. This trend was continued over the summer with a series of protests to the Ministry of Justice concerning the treatment of Iranian asylum seekers whose applications had been rejected.

It is in Germany that reform of the right of asylum has undoubtedly stirred up the most controversy. This explains why, despite five different amendment proposals, Article 16(2)(2) of the Basic Law has still not been amended. Pending this, a law regulating asylum procedures was adopted in June 92, giving the Länder more responsibility for the initial reception structures (transit camps) and transferring to the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees the powers of the regional authorities responsible for foreigners. As is the case elsewhere, this law sets out to reduce the time taken to examine dossiers, fixing the period at two weeks⁹¹. It also requires that applicants' fingerprints be taken, in order to prevent social security fraud through the submission of multiple applications.

Other changes have occurred in individual Länder. Rheinland-Palatinate has set up a study group attached to the Ingelheim criminal investigation department to deal with asylum-related frauds. In early September the regional parliament of Schleswig-Holstein adopted a resolution restricting immigration and the right to asylum. Baden-Wurtemberg has published a law on the accommodation of asylum seekers, and Bavaria has published an Order on their reception. These regulations lay down the arrangements for the organisation of assistance for asylum seekers and the distribution of the costs involved.

Amendments to the existing rules have also been adopted in Denmark. As in Germany, applicants are now obliged to give their fingerprints, but the main change is that Danish representatives abroad have been given greater powers and responsibilities. Ambassadors are now empowered to reject applications without needing to consult the central administration in Denmark. Under the new arrangement, responsibility for the expulsion of rejected applicants is transferred from the Ministries of Justice and the Interior to the Refugees Bureau, which decides in particular whether expulsion can be ordered to a country where the persons concerned risk persecution. According to the authorities, this new division of responsibilities is designed to make expulsions of those leaving

⁹¹

The experts believe that this law will do nothing to speed up the processing of applications unless more staff are allocated to the task (cf B. Huber, "Das neue Asylverfahrensrecht" - the new law on asylum procedures - 1992, pp 749 et seq). Since the law came into force the number of unprocessed cases has risen from 300 000 to 400 000.

involuntarily more efficient⁹². Other measures have also been adopted with a view to speeding up procedures. To avoid lengthy delays in the examination of dossiers as a result of an increase in the number of complaints, a new committee has been set up to examine applications individually⁹³.

Spain has taken similar action. In accordance with the recommendations of the Law on Foreigners, as approved by the Congress of Deputies (Lower House) in April 1991, the government has substantially amended the 1984 Law on Asylum and Refugees, with the twin aims of re-defining the concept of asylum and speeding up the decision-making process. Firstly, the parallel existence in the 1984 Law of both a right to asylum and a right to refuge (source of confusion for some, source of abuse for others) has been abolished. There is now only one form of asylum, and those granted it enjoy full entitlement to the rights recognised by the Geneva Convention, i.e. the right to live and work on Spanish territory. At the same time, the "right to asylum on humanitarian grounds" (which was granted to foreigners who were not suffering persecution) has been abolished; those concerned are now dealt with under the normal legal procedures. To speed up the treatment of cases a period for the preliminary examination of applications has been introduced, during which those which appear to be unfounded can be rejected. Entry into Spain depends on the result of this preliminary examination, and rejection means that no further consideration will be given to the application. In this case, the foreigner is obliged to leave Spain, which was not a provision of the 1984 Law⁹⁴.

The government's aims in adopting this new law are threefold: to adapt to the new international instruments and agreements, to clamp down on the numbers of rejected applicants who stay on in Spain illegally, and to prevent abuse of the system set up to protect and help victims of persecution⁹⁵. These measures supplement the procedure set

⁹² The police coordinate the carrying out of the expulsion order and supervise the expulsion of those who refuse to leave the country voluntarily. During the months of July and August the police intervened in the expulsion of 200 rejected applicants.

⁹³ At the same time as the committee was set up, however, the composition of the Refugees Bureau was modified. Since these are all recent measures it is too soon to be able to assess their impact.

⁹⁴ The 1984 Law actually conferred on rejected applicants advantages which were denied foreign workers applying through the normal legal process.

⁹⁵ The new law accords with the legal writings of the Constitutional Court and abolishes the Ministry of the Interior's powers under the 1984 Law to suspend foreigners' associations.

up by the Asylum and Refuge Office, created in 1991 and inaugurated in February 1992⁹⁶. The Office's role is to examine applications and check whether or not they are well-founded before forwarding them to the Interministerial Committee for Asylum and Refugees⁹⁷.

In Belgium, the Minister for the Interior has laid before Parliament a bill designed to discourage applications for asylum. The bill includes the following new features: a reversal of the burden of proof (the applicant would need to prove the risk of persecution); entitlement of the authorities to serve an expulsion order on grounds of a threat to public order at any stage of the procedure; longer detention periods for foreigners or asylum seekers in an irregular situation; and a reduction of the time limit for appeals to the *Conseil d'Etat* (supreme administrative court) from 60 to 20 days in respect of all decisions taken pursuant to the 1980 Law on foreigners.

All these provisions reflect a keen desire to tighten up still further on entries into Belgium. In a similar vein, there have been more and more cases of the authorities refusing to register persons applying for refugee status, often for no apparent reason. The same trend has been observed in numerous public welfare centres.

In Luxembourg, the ratification of the Schengen Agreements sparked off a major debate on the question of refugees. Two motions have been published, one from MPs of the ruling coalition parties and the other from the refugee community. The committee for foreign and community affairs, meanwhile, invited the government to introduce legislation in this field, suggesting that applicants should have access to better legal assistance and the right to appeal to the Council of State. In September 1992, in response to these suggestions, the government set up a consultative committee charged with advising the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the examination of individual applications, established a new list of safe countries and pressed ahead with a study on ways of speeding up the examination of dossiers. However, the government has no plans for any

⁹⁶ Significant progress seems to have been made, since 7 357 applications were examined in 1992 compared with 3 808 in 1991 (an increase of 93%).

⁹⁷ Only having reached this stage does the applicant become legally entitled to the various forms of social security available. The presence on this committee of senior representatives from the Ministry of the Interior and the Police and of social workers from the INSERSO (National Institute for Social Services) enables actions to be harmonised, procedures to be speeded up and social security fraud to be prevented.

new legislative initiatives prior to ratification of the Dublin Convention, which is regarded as one of Parliament's priorities for the year.

Faced with similar preoccupations, the Netherlands has modified its reception and admission arrangements for asylum seekers. A new system has been set up, and applications can now only be lodged with a small number of municipalities. Since April, asylum seekers arriving at Schipol airport with no chance (according to the Ministry of Justice) of being accepted, have been housed in a "closed" reception centre. This "frontier hostel" (Grenshospitium) also houses persons who have previously been accommodated in other centres but who have infringed the rules fixed for their stay. It can also be used for foreigners in an irregular situation, pending their expulsion⁹⁸.

The increased selectivity in the examination of applications, and the concomitant rejection of virtually all of them, has at the same time obliged the authorities to apply stricter controls in the reception centres with the aim of ensuring that rejected applicants do not abscond from these centres and take up illegal residence in the Netherlands. The 11 reception centres have therefore been surrounded with fences, guards have been placed on the sole exit, and occupants must register with an electronic identity card. Additionally, those whose chances of being accepted are judged low are required to present themselves to the warden twice a day, failing which the police are authorised to seek and arrest them. When the Schengen Agreements were ratified by the Netherlands Parliament in July, MPs expressed regret that asylum seekers' chances of acceptance were becoming increasingly slim.

While there were no substantial modifications to the United Kingdom's immigration laws during the year⁹⁹, an important bill was laid before Parliament at the end of October 1992 concerning the appeal procedures under the asylum and immigration laws. Officially, the bill is designed to establish a right of appeal (prior to expulsion) for persons requesting asylum on arrival in the United Kingdom. In reality, it has a more

⁹⁸ These decisions have provoked a wave of protests from refugee organisations as well as from other associations and private individuals. However, examination procedures have been speeded up by grouping applications and types of reception into different categories.

⁹⁹ At most, there were amendments relating to the issuing of visas and the duration of validity of work permits or in-service training authorisations.

restrictive side in that it introduces a new category of rejection for asylum requests said to be "*manifestly unfounded*" and removes the right of appeal in certain cases¹⁰⁰.

The averred aim is to simplify procedures and alleviate the burden on the appeal system, so that it can concentrate on the more important cases¹⁰¹. However, it is to be feared that this removal of the right to appeal against administrative decisions may encourage "bad" practices and at the same time increase the number of applications to the High Court for cases to be reviewed. Even now, most of the judicial review cases before this court concern immigration problems.

Immigration of family members made more difficult

Denmark's reforms with regard to family re-unification have been the most radical, in the sense that they mark a break with the fundamental rights upheld in this field since the 1970s and recognised by the Law of 1983. Family re-unifications are no longer authorised unless the applicant is able to take full responsibility for the upkeep of his family with no additional aid from the State¹⁰². Applicants originating from third countries must also be able to provide evidence of at least five years' residence and their spouses must be at least 18 years of age¹⁰³. Finally, the minimum length of time during which the couple must live together before the spouse can be granted a permanent residence permit following marriage has been increased from two to three years¹⁰⁴. Also under the new rules, parents aged over 60 years will only be granted a residence permit if they have no other child living in the country of origin capable of looking after

¹⁰⁰ For example, short-stay visa requests (visitors, future students or short-term students, i.e. six months or less) and all decisions where it would appear that the judge would have no other option than to reject the appeal.

¹⁰¹ The legislative process was under way, and the finalised bill was not expected to become law before April or May 1993.

¹⁰² This change means that immigrants receiving social security benefits or unemployment benefit have virtually no prospect of being joined by their families.

¹⁰³ A young immigrant who entered Denmark at the age of 17 will not be able to apply for his wife to join him until he is aged 22, whatever the date of their marriage.

¹⁰⁴ There are some exceptions to this rule, however, particularly in the case of battered wives.

them¹⁰⁵. These new measures seem to have had a swift impact, putting a brake on the steady increase in family re-unification authorisations, particularly for applicants originating from third countries. Only 7870 such authorisations were issued in 1992, compared with 8 517 in 1991 (and 6996 in 1988). During the second half of 92 there was a 45% drop in the number of authorisations issued to non-refugee foreigners (excluding nationals from the EEC or Nordic countries), and the number of refusals doubled compared with the same period in the previous year¹⁰⁶.

In the Netherlands, there was pressure from numerous quarters to clamp down on family re-unifications¹⁰⁷. The government came to a compromise, deciding that the current rules would be observed more strictly and that financial assistance would no longer be considered an adequate means of support for a spouse to be allowed into the country, except in certain cases to be defined in a note from the Prime Minister. Additionally, the conditions governing the admission of only parents have been modified: authorisation is now no longer granted unless at least two of the children (instead of one) residing in the Netherlands can support the parent independently and the parent has a place to stay in their neighbourhood¹⁰⁸. Luxembourg too has revised the minimum conditions which must be met in terms of income and accommodation for family re-unification to be allowed. But the biggest innovation is the requirement that the applicant must possess a second work permit providing evidence of residence and of unbroken employment for at least one year.

¹⁰⁵ These rules apply only to immigrants from the Third World. They do not apply to nationals of the EEC and Nordic countries, and there are exceptions for refugees.

¹⁰⁶ During the first half of 1992 4 345 family re-unification authorisations were issued. From July to December (November) only 586 authorisations were issued (and 173 refusals), compared with 1 005 authorisations and 47 refusals for the same period in 1991.

¹⁰⁷ Even within the government, the Christian-Democrats proposed that immigrants should have to be resident in the Netherlands for at least one year before becoming entitled to apply to bring in their children or parents. A recent study has shown that it is inefficient to try to reduce immigration solely by imposing restrictions on the re-unification or creation of families, firstly because of the standards laid down by international agreements and secondly because most of those who apply for their partners to be allowed to join them are in fact Dutch nationals.

¹⁰⁸ The other existing conditions remain unchanged, i.e. the parent must take out health insurance, admission is granted on the basis of "manifest humanitarian grounds", all the parent's children must in practice reside in the Netherlands, and the parent must not be a threat to national security.

In Belgium the *Conseil d'Etat* has endorsed the administration's decision that a visa is required for family re-unification, even in those cases where all the preconditions are met. Persons without this visa are obliged to return to their country of origin to apply to the Belgian Consulate for it. Moreover, the imposition of a "durable cohabitation" requirement, with no precise duration specified, causes additional insecurity for the foreigners concerned.

In Spain, the government has made re-definition of the criteria governing family re-unification one of its priorities for the first half of 1993. Immigrant applicants will need to be able to provide evidence of at least one year's residence, stable employment and adequate financial resources. Additionally, the admission process will involve a dual approach, on the one hand to the local authorities for official attestation of the applicant's economic stability and legitimate residence status, and on the other hand to the relevant Consulate in the country of origin for official attestation of the family relationships between the individuals concerned.

Discouraging marriages of convenience

Considered as an abusive way of circumventing the residence laws, "marriages of convenience" have recently been under close scrutiny in the Member States. The Netherlands and Denmark have taken new measures to clamp down on them, and the issue has provoked considerable controversy in France, where the introduction of new legislation seems certain.

In January 1992 a bill was presented to the Netherlands Parliament requiring marriage officials to check the foreign spouse's residence permit and requiring the latter to furnish a police certificate proving that he (or she) possesses a residence permit or has at least applied for one¹⁰⁹. In Denmark, a bill had been proposed whereby marriage to a foreigner could be authorised only if the partner had fulfilled his or her legal obligations (possession of a legal residence permit or valid visa) or was exempt from any obligations of this type. The bill was withdrawn, but these requirements have been incorporated into the marriage legislation itself.

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Where fraud is established, the State prosecutor may demand the annulment of the marriage. Under the new law, taking part in a marriage of convenience would become an offence.

In the United Kingdom the "primary purpose rule" (the main instrument for ensuring the genuineness of marriages between nationals and foreigners) continues to attract attention because of the difficulties which it creates¹¹⁰. A prime example is the case of a couple who were married in 1987 and who have been refused permission for the foreign spouse to enter the United Kingdom. They have just learned this year that their appeal has been dismissed. Many observers find the grounds put forward by the judge (Lord Justice Glidewell) more than a little specious. *"I know that it puts some intending immigrants in a very real difficulty, but it is not enough for someone like Mr Masood to convince the Entry Clearance Officer that he likes his wife, it may be he even loves her... and that he intends to make a permanence of his marriage. This could be a perfectly genuine long lasting marriage. But that is not enough"*.

This ruling confirms the fears of those who believe that the "primary purpose rule" is an affront to the freedom of a British citizen, forcing him to choose between leaving his country of birth or not living with his spouse. What makes the situation even more inadmissible in their eyes is that this text, which heavily penalises genuine marriages, appears to be of little use against those who enter marriages of convenience (who would be excluded anyway by the requirement to show the genuineness and permanence of their union).

In order to avoid being taken to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg on this point, the government sent a guidance note to staff instructing that in principle any application from a spouse for entry clearance or for leave to remain should be allowed if it was proven that the marriage was genuine and subsisting and either the couple have been married for at least five years or one or more of the couple's children have the right of abode in the United Kingdom¹¹¹. In another case, this time concerning an Indian citizen who had been living in Germany with his British wife and who was refused entry to the United Kingdom, the European Court of Justice argued that EC nationals and members of their family (whatever their nationality) returning home after exercising their

¹¹⁰ See Rimet report 92, page 20.

¹¹¹ Since then, numerous British or foreign wives living in Great Britain without their husbands (because the husbands have been refused entry) have returned to their countries of origin to try to conceive a child and thus meet this second condition. Unfortunately, they do not always manage to conceive and as a result are placed under considerable stress, a source of great suffering which makes these women feel that they are to blame for being ostranged from their husbands.

right to freedom of movement in another Member State, should at least have the same rights as any other national of a Community country and the members of that person's family¹¹². The paradox in this matter is that Community legislation can prove to be more generous than national legislation.

Cooperation agreements

Spain signed a cooperation agreement with Morocco in February 1992, providing for the return to Morocco of foreigners who have entered Spain illegally via Morocco. In return, Moroccans residing legally in the European Community are accorded the right to free movement within Spain for up to three months. Additionally, the Spanish and Moroccan authorities will organise the movement of workers between the two countries as needs require, and will safeguard their social rights. Moroccan workers thus receive preferential treatment when Spain is drawing up temporary quotas for agricultural work.

Germany has concluded similar agreements with Poland and Romania. The agreement between Germany and Poland provides for the development of cooperation between the two countries' police forces, to which end the German authorities have released a budgetary appropriation of DM 6 million for the Polish police. And in the agreement between Germany and Romania (September 1992), Romania undertakes to accept Romanian nationals residing illegally in Germany and returned to Romania, including those who have no valid identity papers¹¹³. However, reservations have been expressed concerning the advisability of this type of measure. It is certainly legitimate to question, as the German report does, the basis of a means of control which consists of *"rejecting the burden which movements of (political or economic) refugees place on neighbouring countries"* without splitting the financial costs.

¹¹² Numerous couples prevented from living together, the foreign spouse having been unable to satisfy the "primary purpose rule", decided to settle elsewhere in the EEC, after which they are entitled to return to the United Kingdom under this application of the Community law.

¹¹³ The agreement applies chiefly to Romanian asylum seekers and is designed to facilitate their expulsion.

Combating illegal work

The measures concerning admission and residence of foreigners are complemented by measures concerning "illegal work", although, as mentioned in the last report, the issue of illegal work goes far beyond the single issue of employing foreigners without a work permit.

Over the past year the Netherlands has taken the most substantial measures to combat illegal work, with procedures having been tightened up and penalties increased since 1 July 1992. The levels of fines have been raised and employers are liable to a one-month prison term, in addition to which judges are now empowered to close down the firm temporarily. Moreover, the employer is obliged to pay the full amount of any taxes and social security contributions "saved" by employing immigrants illegally, and the State prosecutors have been instructed to adopt a stricter approach. Additionally, the government has decided to extend the applicability of the notorious "chain responsibility law" (restricted to the building sector since 1982) to the clothing industry, in order to clamp down on sweatshops employing illegal labour. The underlying principle of this law is that in cases of clandestine employment the main contractor is held liable for payment of all income tax and social security contributions not paid by subcontractors.

France has not enacted any new legislation in the field of illegal work since the important law passed by Parliament in December 1991. As well as publishing important implementing instruments relating to this law¹¹⁴, France also published two new decrees in June 1992 designed to further the Law's objectives: the first relates to the declaration prior to recruitment, the second to the rights of the social security agencies to use (on an experimental basis) the national identification register of physical persons. These two instruments should help to tighten up control of illegal work.

In Germany, the powers of the Federal Labour Office were increased by a Law of 18 December 1992, authorising the Office to carry out on-the-spot checks in firms employing foreign workers in order to ensure that the work being performed by these

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Decrees of 11 June 1992, one on illegal work and the other on the documents to be given to employees upon recruitment. These decrees are supplemented by the Interministerial Circular of 5 November 1992 explaining the new provisions of the Law of 31 December 1991.

workers corresponds to that stipulated in their work permits and that they are receiving the same treatment as their German colleagues. The government is also considering amending the Law on manpower loans and amending the arrangements for the payment of social security benefits to foreigners or even reducing the amounts of some of these benefits. This latter proposal (which could also affect EEC nationals to some degree) has aroused loud protests.

In Luxembourg, the National Immigration Council¹¹⁵ has adopted an opinion on illegal workers, expressing concern at the large number of such workers but at the same time emphasising that most of them are in fact only "semi-illegal", being registered with the social security but not possessing work permits. The Council has recommended that their applications for regularisation be examined favourably. At the same time, it has urged the government to step up the fight against illegal immigration and to grant work permits only after having checked that the minimum accommodation standards are complied with.

As yet, no legislative amendments have been enacted in the field of illegal work, and the Law on the admission and residence of foreigners continues to apply. However, a bill has been put before Parliament on temporary work and temporary loans of manpower in order to eliminate the legal loopholes in Luxembourg concerning the illegal contracting of labour, as mentioned in the chapter "The labour market". Attention has also been drawn to the higher accident risks faced by foreign workers, particularly in the construction sector where almost 95% of employees are foreigners. These risks are all the greater in that the resources devoted to labour inspection appear to be derisory. The government intends proposing to Parliament a new instrument aligning national law with the Community standards. In Belgium too the Social Affairs Inspectorate is considered to have an important role to play, although follow-up administrative penalties are still applied as imperfectly as ever.

Individuals' rights sometimes forgotten

With the tightening up of policies on entry, right of abode and asylum, some experts have expressed fears that individuals' basic rights and the principles enshrined in law risk

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A national consultative body comprising representatives of the Ministries and Administrations, the trade unions and the foreign communities.

being flouted more and more often. Such fears have been confirmed in the Netherlands in a survey of the cases of approximately 100 Ethiopian and Eritrean asylum seekers, which revealed that two thirds of the rulings violated the principles of Netherlands law and contained unfounded arguments for refusal of the application.

The same applies in Germany. The Federal Constitutional Court has dealt with numerous cases of asylum applications, and its rulings show that the assessments made by the courts and the authorities often go against the basic principles of the Constitution. In most cases they fail to abide by the requirements of the Constitution in rejecting applications which are judged on the evidence to be unfounded, or in rejecting offers to provide evidence¹¹⁶. The Constitutional Court has rejected certain parts of North-Rhine Westphalia's law governing the reception of foreign refugees, condemning the practice whereby municipalities allot refugees to accommodation according to their ethnic origin¹¹⁷. There is also disagreement on the interpretation of Article 7a(3) of the Law on the Right of Asylum concerning the position of applicants' children and whether they must be minors in order to enjoy entitlement to family asylum¹¹⁸.

An equivalent question has been asked in Denmark, where there have been more and more cases of children having waited years for their case to be examined and then being rejected outright on their 18th birthday. Certain opposition parties have demanded better safeguards of the rights of unaccompanied minors entering Denmark as refugees, and in particular, recognition of the possibility of their obtaining the right to asylum¹¹⁹. After

¹¹⁶ On the other hand, the Court has ruled that Vietnamese nationals who had been living in East Germany and who came to West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall should not be regarded as victims of political persecution. The fact that an unauthorised stay in another country constitutes an offence under Vietnamese law is no obstacle to their expulsion (Judgment of 1.6.1992).

¹¹⁷ In a more general context, Hamburg's foreigners' representative has emphasised in his first activity report that the aims of providing legal safeguards for foreigners and refugees, as pursued by the government in its new Law on Foreigners, are far from being achieved.

¹¹⁸ The Federal Administrative Court has ruled the criterion to be not the date of admission of the parent or parents but the date on which the child's application is lodged (Judgment of 21.1.1992). The authorities in Lower Saxony and Hamburg, on the other hand, go by the date on which the parents are admitted as asylum seekers (Lower Saxony Higher Administrative Court, Judgment of 25.3.1992; Hamburg Higher Administrative Court, Judgment of 17.12.1991).

¹¹⁹ A bill designed to guarantee asylum for applicants aged between 15 and 18 has been drafted by the Central Democrats, but examination of the bill by Parliament seems to have been deferred. The problem revolves around the failure to clarify the links to be established between application for asylum, provisional status and family re-unification. The bill will be re-drafted in a new form.

most of the political parties in Denmark unanimously agreed on the need to tighten up the legislation on foreigners, many people are now protesting about excessively severe restrictions on the fundamental rights of foreigners. Many consider that the latest measures adopted create a legal vacuum in the policy of equal treatment of Danes, EC nationals, refugees and third-world immigrants. Immigrant organisations and Danish humanitarian organisations have demonstrated against these restrictions, which they believe go against the fundamental principles of the rights of man, of ethics and of freedom.

In December 1991 in Italy, the Constitutional Court, deliberating on the question of the expulsion of a foreign citizen, reaffirmed his inviolable right to legal protection, under Article 3 paragraph 5 of the Martelli Law (No 39/90), in accordance with Article 24 of the Constitution. The question had been raised before the Aosta Court, charged with ruling on an authorisation for the expulsion of a foreign national against whom criminal proceedings had been instituted. The Constitutional Court declared as unconstitutional the judge's decision to authorise expulsion, since this was a matter for the administrative authorities. (...) The Court also ruled that the Constitution, in defining the inviolability of the right to be defended, offers its safeguards not only to Italian citizens but indiscriminately to all those against whom legal proceedings are brought¹²⁰.

The problem of special checks on certain population groups has also arisen in Portugal, specifically with reference to a regulation of the Republican National Guard on nomads. The State Prosecutor has ruled this regulation to be unconstitutional since it is aimed specifically at gypsies, adding that the inspection of their caravans contravenes the principle of inviolability of domicile as established in Article 34 of the Portuguese Constitution. The Constitutional Court confirmed this interpretation (Judgment of 28 June).

Finally, the United Kingdom's principal immigration agency, the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, has published a report entitled "Between a rock and a hard place:

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This argument has been adopted by the government, which has ruled that even if ordered to be expelled the foreigner is entitled to 15 days to organise his defence before being escorted to the frontier. Additionally, he may request from the Minister of the Interior special authorisation to return to Italy under Article 151 of the single text of the 1931 laws on public safety, which has not been repealed by the Martelli Law. "Rifondazione Comunista", for its part, considers that the decree allowing foreigners to be expelled without the right of appeal to the Regional Administrative Court is unconstitutional.

migrant workers in Gibraltar", in which it comments on the situation of third-country nationals in Gibraltar. The Governor of Gibraltar is accused in the report of inflicting "degrading and inhuman treatment" on thousands of Moroccans and Indians residing in Gibraltar. The situation appears to be particularly difficult for Moroccans, who, according to the report, find themselves trapped "between a rock and a hard place" and under constant threat of expulsion¹²¹. Under the current immigration rules they are denied the security of permanent right of residence¹²², nor can they be joined by their families. Children born in the colony and pregnant women have been expelled¹²³. Since these immigration rules confer arbitrary powers on the Executive, in the person of the Governor, it is rare for the workers concerned to win their cases. The Moroccans are in fact caught in a conflict of interests between Spain and the United Kingdom. They are the main victims of the economic upheaval caused by the withdrawal of the British Army and the severe restrictions imposed at the borders by the Spanish government in Madrid in order to step up pressure on Gibraltar.

¹²¹ The 3 000 Moroccan workers in Gibraltar (out of a total population of 30 000) represent approximately 20% of the workforce and are mainly employed in unskilled jobs in the public sector.

¹²² Their right of residence is directly linked to employment, and they are only employed on one-year contracts.

¹²³ The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants is considering bringing complaints before the European Commission of Human Rights. In particular, the organisation's legal experts believe that the expulsion of children contravenes the European Convention safeguarding the right to family life.

INTEGRATION POLICIES

1992 undeniably saw a growing conviction in all Member States that the marginalisation of immigrant populations carries grave risks of social upheaval, particularly in these days of political and economic insecurity and of increasing doubt and uncertainty concerning the futures of both individuals and communities. As a result, the need to improve "integration policies" appeared more pressing than ever. However, the perceived scope of this term still differs significantly from one Member State to another. Similarly, in all Member States the debate remains open as to the philosophy which should shape policies, choices and decisions in this area. In this context, four examples stand out from the others: Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg.

Denmark: Integration, a new priority

For the first time in Denmark's recent history Parliament has adopted, alongside the new legislation on foreigners, a resolution on "better integration of the rights of foreigners in Denmark"¹²⁴. This event marks a sea-change in the Danish approach to immigration questions and represents the first step along the way towards a coordinated policy. The resolution provides for a more consistent and more varied palette of adult education opportunities, more help for immigrants on the labour market, and deeper research into education for non-Danish-speaking children and workers. It also advocates a more even geographical distribution of the immigrant communities, increased cultural and information activities, and the creation of a body to ensure equal treatment between all groups. A (modest) budget has been allocated to finance information and awareness-raising activities¹²⁵.

Despite the good intentions, however, Denmark is still finding it difficult to decide on the appropriate integration philosophy to underpin these social policies. The dominant

¹²⁴ Presented to Parliament by the Social-Democrats in April 1989, this proposal took a long time to be accepted.

¹²⁵ At the same time, the first comprehensive study on municipal integration work has been carried out, covering all the themes which dominate the debate on the integration of immigrants into Danish society: equality of opportunities, access to employment, education and accommodation.

idea is that of a policy of assimilation aimed at treating immigrants, refugees and Danes more equally and thus offering little opportunity for immigrants to preserve their own languages and cultures. In this sense, the notion of a pluricultural society seems to be rejected completely.

In practice, however, things are less simple. For example, while decisions to spread immigrant children geographically throughout all schools and all residential areas and to give priority to the teaching of Danish and the inculcation of Danish traditions and standards clearly tie in with the policy of assimilation, the decision to work towards cohesive integration can only be based on recognition of the specific characteristics of each of the populations concerned, which clearly presupposes some recognition of ethnic and cultural plurality. The same applies to the need felt by the municipalities (who have an important role to play in integration policy) to tailor their efforts to immigrants' specific needs (adaptation of schooling, adult education, etc.).

The same ambivalence is seen with regard to immigrant and refugee associations and what should be expected of them. Everyone agrees that their influence remains very limited and that they are not very closely involved with the Danish authorities in seeking solutions to the most pressing problems¹²⁶. This finding has been confirmed in two recent studies by the Danish Association of International Cooperation, which partly attribute this lack of involvement to differences in each side's traditions as regards cooperation, leading to differences in each side's expectations and to difficulties in agreeing on the "rules of the game"¹²⁷.

Should we regard this situation as beneficial and prefer to see the difficulties encountered by the immigrant communities dealt with exclusively by voluntary Danish organisations on an individual basis? Some of these already provide assistance and care for asylum seekers and refugees and organise cultural activities for immigrants (films, plays, etc.). But the general impression is that they do not properly understand the real needs of these

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As for local immigrant organisations, these still function mainly as meeting points, sometimes as centres for leisure and cultural activities. They have little contact with the local authorities and no involvement with the municipalities on local initiatives for immigrants.

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Other "barriers" are linked to a lack of "competence", particularly in social and public relations matters.

groups and that the latter, for their part, rarely get involved in the cultural and leisure activities of the local communities.

In contrast with this type of approach, therefore, should we instead recognise that there is a collective dimension to some of the difficulties encountered and some of the needs expressed, and thus a need for the immigrant groups themselves to take responsibility for dealing with their problems? If so, this would mean encouraging them to be more effective organisations and thus promoting a community dynamic. The Immigrant Board¹²⁸ seems to have been following such a policy in recent years, seeking greater powers to intervene with the government and individual Ministries. For the moment, the question as to which policy is preferable remains unresolved. It is against this background that the Danish Association of International Cooperation has launched a study to investigate ways of developing contacts and cooperation between the immigrant organisations, voluntary organisations, local authorities and government departments.

This emphasis on integration is not something which is exclusive to Denmark. It is found in other Member States, chiefly the northern ones, even if the resources committed to the policy are not always adequate. The same concern is also felt in the countries of more recent immigration, albeit less strongly. In this context it is worth mentioning, if only for its symbolic value, Italy's establishment of a "Council for the Integration of Immigrants"¹²⁹. This new institution, similar to the High Council for Integration set up in France, has the role of helping the government to define its policy towards immigrant groups. Its first task will be to advise the government on the integration model which Italy needs to adopt. It will also be responsible for ensuring the accuracy and credibility of the statistics produced and will supply all the information necessary for the drafting of coordinated legislation.

¹²⁸ Advisory body to the government comprising representatives of different immigrant organisations.

¹²⁹ Composed of university professors (sociologists, demographers, jurists and political scientists), who will collaborate with international organisations (such as the Council of Europe) and with similar structures in other countries.

Netherlands: No more special treatment?

Discussions on which integration model to adopt have been even more explicit in the Netherlands, where the year's main development concerned the consensus on the recognition of the special characteristics of ethnic groups and the rights of minorities. Hitherto, it had been virtually taboo to voice overt criticism of ethnic minorities, their culture and their behaviour. Doubts raised publicly at the end of last year by the leading figure in the liberal party in Parliament on progress made by Muslims in integrating into Dutch society effectively raised that taboo. Despite the widespread media reaction and condemnation of the MP's statements, the question of the "integration" of ethnic minorities had effectively emerged into the public domain and a major discussion had started on the way society was moving. This has revealed a split in Dutch society as regards attitudes to minorities, with some politicians and a section of the public at large now apparently less tolerant towards the cultural peculiarities and problems of ethnic minorities and expressing greater insistence on their "duty to integrate", in the sense of adhering more closely to the dominant norms and cultural values of Dutch society.

Since the end of 1991, the Minister of the Interior has been officially advocating that the question be debated nationally and in Parliament. In a letter to Parliament she defined two priorities: a more intensive effort to combat all forms of discrimination, and more resources for improving the prospects of young members of minority groups. On the first point she received a wide measure of support from Parliament, the federations of trade and industry and the major public institutions (unions, churches, etc), who gave their approval to an "*agreement on equal treatment*", e.g. in the form of anti-discrimination codes. As to the second point, the government indicated that it saw the school environment as the key element, with the essential backing of parents and other interested parties¹³⁰.

Three meetings of experts were held on the prospects for young foreigners in terms of safety, work and training, leading to a list of 30 or so recommendations, some of them already implemented by minority groups' support organisations and the Advisory Council

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It sets out three essential points underlying the action of the Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture: pre-school activities, extra-curricular programmes and parental support.

on Government Policy¹³¹. Ideas include "*integration contracts*" (for recent arrivals and young people) laying down a set of mutual obligations on the teaching of the Dutch language, employment (acceptance of the need for training in exchange for help in finding a job), housing and security (committing an offence implies termination of contract and the imposition of sanctions).

The minority groups' support associations presented their own alternative plan in February, known as the "*Delta plan*", the dominant idea of which was to encourage a positive approach to minorities by maximising their potential. The aim was to reverse the image traditionally presented in the media of minorities as a problem. It was proposed that a national agreement be concluded between government, the social partners and the minority groups' organisations. Under this agreement, the government would be responsible for creating the right conditions to enable the organisations to concentrate their efforts on mobilising their members¹³². These proposals were not approved by the government and the debate was abandoned in September 1992.

As a corollary to the discussion on the recognition of special circumstances, there was renewed discussion on positive discrimination with the publication of the first evaluation (at the beginning of 1992) of the "*agreement on ethnic minorities*"¹³³ by the Employment Council and of the special programme for Moluccans. The somewhat disappointing results of the evaluation exercise (with only very slight progress registered¹³⁴) renewed the debate on whether or not to legislate in this field. The government has consistently

¹³¹ One example is the introduction of a law on the promotion of job opportunities; others concern the improvement of pre-school activities, the development of parental participation and the simplification of secondary vocational education.

¹³² The Delta plan proposed: substantial investment in a preventive policy geared particularly at looking after new immigrants, measures to strengthen pre-school programmes to teach Dutch, the creation of a special support structure for children arriving in mid-school career, and the adaptation of lessons for foreign pupils. The plan also provided for wider publicity for job vacancies, more rigorous prevention of collective redundancies and improved conditions for access to housing: "*Making all housing areas accessible to ethnic minorities*".

¹³³ Signed by the employers' and trade union organisations, this agreement (1990) provided for the creation of 60 000 jobs in industry and commerce over a 4-5 year period.

¹³⁴ It is hoped that the first really significant results will appear in 1992, with the appointment in the meantime of more than 50 "minorities' advisers". Appointed by the regional employment offices, their job is to facilitate the entry of members of minority groups into companies and to help companies to set up a programme. At the end of last year, there was a broadly conceived information campaign ("fellow countryman/fellow worker"), which showed that only 17% of small businesses and 51% of big firms knew anything about the agreement.

refused to adopt the legislative option, preferring to use a contractual approach. However, after consultations with the Regional Employment Office firms employing more than 10 people are now obliged to declare the number of employees from minority groups, and to give details of their vacancies and the conditions attaching to them. Firms with more than 35 employees are required to tell their board of administration what policy they are pursuing vis-à-vis ethnic minorities. The idea was that the Minister for Welfare and Employment would present a new bill to Parliament on this subject¹³⁵.

On the other side of the coin, the "1 000 jobs for Moluccans" programme has been a major success. According to the conclusions presented to the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior, 1 200 Moluccans found work between 1985 and 1990, 280 of them in administration¹³⁶. The result was a substantial reduction in unemployment among Moluccans, from 40% in 1983 to 18% in 1990. This has led the Prime Minister to advocate a similar approach for other minority groups.

Another important issue, closely linked to the problem of "positive discrimination", is that of identifying the groups concerned, a matter which was highlighted in the previous report. Discussion continued on the beneficial and negative effects of collecting data according to a person's ethnic origin. The "registration chamber"¹³⁷ feels that this would have a negative "categorisation" effect by reference to origin or skin colour. The government, on the other hand, thinks it essential to have information so that it can evaluate its policy on minorities¹³⁸. It is thus favourable to the establishment of objective

¹³⁵ The associations representing ethnic minorities felt that the government was not going far enough in this respect, calling for sanctions to be taken against employers who failed to furnish the requisite information. Their demand was taken up by the opposition, which tabled a different bill. If this proposal were to be adopted, it would oblige employers to make an annual declaration of the number of employees from ethnic minority groups and to give details of the policy they intended to pursue the next year with a view to providing more jobs for such groups. These reports would be addressed to the RBA and to the chambers of trade and industry. Non-observance of the public report requirement would be regarded as a violation of the law.

¹³⁶ The special feature of this plan was to provide individual assistance to the jobless - first of all in terms of schooling and training and subsequently in the search for a job. An assurance was given from the outset that there would be a job at the end of the line.

¹³⁷ Responsible for monitoring application of the law on the registration of individuals and for ensuring that the privacy of individuals is respected.

¹³⁸ The problem of monitoring government policies has also cropped up in Denmark, causing the Directorate of Aliens (responsible for the statistical system dealing with persons applying for asylum and family reunification authorisations) to increase its resources. The objective is a twofold one. The system must, on the one hand, make it easier to keep track of asylum applicants from the time of entry up to the date

identification criteria over and above that of nationality¹³⁹. Similarly, steps have been taken to improve and standardise the statistics produced by ministries affected by the questions of employment, education and housing for minorities¹⁴⁰.

A similar debate has been going on in Great Britain concerning positive discrimination policies. Among the measures proposed, the idea of ethnic monitoring of the workforce has aroused divided opinions. While the CBI (Confederation of British Industry) rejects compulsory monitoring of this type, the IPM (Institute of Personnel Management) and the TUC (Trade Union Congress) are more in favour. The IPM considers the information as essential in order better to assess the progress and effectiveness of equal opportunities policies and practices. The Home Secretary agrees, since according to him compulsory monitoring would have the advantage of collecting information about ethnic minority employment which was previously only available via the Labour Force Survey, with the distortions attendant upon such a small sample. *"I most certainly approve of ethnic monitoring as a means of taking action on discrimination and, indeed, as part of any positive employment policy which a good employer should follow"*¹⁴¹. In this context it should be pointed out that the 1991 Census was the first to collect information on ethnic origin¹⁴²; previously, only information on the place of birth was collected¹⁴³. The

of final decision, and must, on the other, monitor the conditions for family reunification and the different aspects of the integration process. The reasons underlying an authorisation (e.g. asylum, family reunification, employment) will likewise be registered centrally with a view to having information on foreign citizens from the moment they arrive in Denmark, particularly those who have applied for, or intend to apply for, Danish citizenship. The Directorate of Aliens forwards this information to the Danish Statistical Record.

¹³⁹ In order to establish a uniform model, the ethnic identification systems will feature the following information: country of birth, mother's country of birth, father's country of birth; these will be recorded by the local registry offices. These objective criteria should make it possible to census the first and second generations. There has been a suggestion for introducing a subjective self-classification criterion ("To which ethnic group do you feel you belong?") to determine the ethnic status of the third and fourth generations, such as the Moluccans. This criterion was not adopted by the government, for reasons which appear to be motivated by a reluctance to interfere in people's private lives.

¹⁴⁰ By January 1994, all the ministries concerned will have to adapt their sources of information and any sources for which they are directly responsible. Organisations for the defence of minority interests have been consulted. Generally speaking, they feel they can go along with an ethnic census on the grounds that it is essential to any viable policy in favour of minority groups.

¹⁴¹ Statement to the House of Commons on 9 June 1992.

¹⁴² This did not apply to the whole of the United Kingdom, but only to Great Britain; the question concerning ethnic origin was not asked in Northern Ireland. Apart from the Census, the only other source of information on ethnic origin was the Labour Force Survey, which uses a small sample.

initial results were made public at the end of 1992, and show that ethnic minorities at present account for 5.5% of the population of Great Britain, or approximately 3 million out of a total population of 54.9 million¹⁴⁴. In absolute terms, those from the Indian subcontinent make up the largest group, accounting for almost half of the ethnic minority population and 2.7% of the total population (Indians 1.5%, Pakistanis 0.9% and Bangladeshis 0.3%). Afro-Caribbeans come next, accounting for a quarter of the ethnic minority population and 1.6% of the total population. Within these averages, however, are marked regional differences: for example, ethnic minorities form 25.7% of the population of Inner London and only 2.1% of the population in Scotland.

Germany: Who are the "foreigners"?

Things have not been standing still in Germany either in this respect, with new questions being asked about the place and status of "foreigners" in a new German society. At any event, the successful integration of foreigners is now regarded by all - except for a few extremists - as an essential factor in social harmony¹⁴⁵.

Long neglected, it may well have been the root cause of the recent increase in xenophobia. The great paradox is that both the public at large and the business world seem to be more aware of the urgency of the situation than do the politicians, who seem intent on cultivating ambiguity¹⁴⁶. The basic issue underlying the whole question of immigration and the debate on amending the constitution is the question of the identity

¹⁴³ The question on ethnic grouping in the 1991 Census offered the following possible responses: White, Black-Caribbean, Black-African, other Black (specify), Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Other (specify). For the last option, 28 response codes were used. Some statistics will not present a full detailed breakdown but simply show (1) White, (2) Black, (3) South-East Asian (India, Pakistan/Bangladesh), (4) Chinese or other. A full report will be presented in the special volume "Ethnic Group and Country of Birth", to be published in 1993.

¹⁴⁴ This exceeds the estimate, based on the Labour Force Survey, of 2.85 million in 1991.

¹⁴⁵ The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs will, over the next few years, be intensifying its integration work in respect of foreign workers and their families in Berlin and in the five new Länder.

¹⁴⁶ Against the background of the resurgence in racism this past year, the captains of industry have taken the initiative in a press campaign denouncing intolerance of foreigners. In some sectors, discussions are in progress with a view to concluding a "non-discrimination agreement" providing for severe penalties for wrong-doers. One interesting point is that the law on industrial relations already has facilities for penalising anything which disrupts the social harmony of the workplace, which is taken to include discriminatory treatment of people by virtue of race, religion, nationality or origin.

of the German nation and the attendant philosophical issues, and there have been a great number of official reports or publications dealing with the subject¹⁴⁷.

It is interesting, too, to speculate on the idea that the immigration control issue might have been overshadowed by the consequences of unification as the most dramatic experience of "otherness" for West Germans. It was, indeed, the way Germans discovered that it is quite possible for a fellow German to be more "foreign" than a non-German. All of a sudden, the ways that the latter have of organising society and general norms of behaviour seem less foreign than they did before. Hence the great confusion between what is a "foreigner" and what is a "national". It is significant here that the German report, in referring to young immigrants, uses the term "*nationals of foreign nationality*".

This explains why, in Germany - more than elsewhere - the theme of integration is closely linked to the right of nationality and to whether or not it needs amending. At any rate, the ideas of simplifying the naturalisation procedures and increasing the number of authorisations for dual nationality now seem much more possible. Major decisions might well be taken on these matters in the course of 1993. A number of proposals have already been made, and the Minister of the Interior has just (February 1993) tabled a bill making provision for such amendment¹⁴⁸. It is worth mentioning at this juncture the resolution adopted by the "delegates for foreigners' affairs" (at the end of 1992) calling on the federal authorities and the Länder to recognise dual nationality: "*German nationality must be available to the children of non-German parents at birth, where at least one of the parents is born in Germany or has lived in Germany for a long time on a regular basis (...). [This is] a priority objective*".

Other signs of changes taking place in Germany today are the proposal from the Federal Constitutional Reform Commission (May 1992) on minorities and the decision of the

¹⁴⁷ These include the report produced by the Hamburg "delegate for foreigners's affairs" in November 1992, which features a sound analysis of the local situation and puts forward a number of national-scale proposals, as does the report on "Two and a half years of the Bureau for multicultural affairs". Another work worthy of mention is the book jointly written by D. Cohn-Bendit, "Heimat Babylon", which is regarded as the most important work of the year on immigration policy and related issues.

¹⁴⁸ The bill features provisions affecting the question of asylum and the status of foreigners. It is currently being debated between the federal authorities and the Länder, but there is no certainty at the moment that it will actually go through the full legislative procedure.

Federal Court on the right of Muslims to practice their religion. In its report, the abovementioned Federal Commission proposed incorporating into the Basic Law (i.e. the constitution) an article stipulating that the State shall protect the identity of ethnic, cultural and linguistic minorities¹⁴⁹. For its part, the Federal Court, in a judgment handed down in February 1992, nonsuited a legal action brought by neighbours against an authorisation to build a meeting centre for the Islamic Association in a residential area with commercial undertakings and a Roman Catholic church. The building did not violate any of the requirements of the building law. The fact that the faithful sometimes come to pray before six o'clock in the morning and that their presence adds to the traffic nuisance had to be accepted by the residents, given the size of the group in question.

The citizenship issue in Luxembourg

However much the question of European citizenship may, in the run-up to the ratification of the Maastricht agreements, have given rise to impassioned debate in the Member States, nowhere has the issue been so crucial as in Luxembourg¹⁵⁰. This is very largely because foreigners now account for 30% of the entire population, with 28% of them from Community Member States. It has to be said, though, that the subject has not given rise to any really clamorous public debate, with discussion being largely confined (deliberately?) to the political sphere, perhaps widened a little to take in the trade unions. Being keen to achieve as wide a consensus as possible, it would seem that the government has sought to avoid any real debate on the presence of foreigners in Luxembourg. This is one of the reasons why it has refused to organise a referendum, either on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty or on the more restricted issue of votes for foreigners in local elections.

This taboo on matters relating to immigration has also been the subject of a broad consensus between all political groupings. In reality, though, the insistence on side-

¹⁴⁹ On the other hand, the Commission was not in favour of amending Article 118 of the Basic Law (applying to nationality).

¹⁵⁰ In France the debate reached its peak in autumn 1992, at the time of the referendum to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. The two Houses (National Assembly and Senate) voted an amendment to the French Constitution in June 1992, granting citizens of the European Union the right to vote. Portugal is also considering amending its Constitution to allow ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which would make recognition of the political rights of Community citizens acceptable.

stepping the issue will merely defer discussion until a later date. The fact is that the questions it raises on such fundamental points as national integrity, the source of national sovereignty, the form a community of citizens should take and democracy itself cannot be put off for long. Discussion on such points merits the greatest possible attention, opening up new perspectives, the repercussions of which will be sure to extend far beyond the territorial limits of the Grand Duchy. One highly significant development here is the unprecedented upsurge in the use of the Luxemburgish language, which some people see as a stronger factor for social cohesion than the nationality issue. The idea is gaining ground that *"it is no longer just a sense of national belonging which is an integrating factor, but also - and perhaps increasingly - a feeling of linguistic belonging."*

The way ideas are changing on these points is cast even more into relief in Luxembourg by the fact that trilingualism (officially instated since 1984) has often been portrayed as one of the main pillars of national identity. What we are seeing here is basically the same problem as in Germany, albeit with a radically different background. It all goes to show how much the realities of immigration weigh on the processes of national identification in the host countries, in each case forcing a country's inherent contradictions to the foreground (cf. the notion of triangular relations between West Germans, East Germans and foreigners).

As the Luxembourg report points out, *"such factors as the espousal of European citizenship and the quest for ways of overcoming the labour shortage now imminent in certain sectors mean that the nationality criterion is tending to be relativised by the criterion of being able to communicate in Luxemburgish so as to play a full part in society. Knowledge of the language is undoubtedly becoming (...) a key element in the acceptance of foreigners by the locals"*. Again, what we are seeking here is the question of whether acquiring a particular nationality is or is not the best proof of becoming integrated into the host society.

Despite a very different context, the situation observed in the United Kingdom also illuminates the debate concerning the impact that the granting of political rights to new "non-national citizens" can have on existing democratic balances. The 1992 General Election provided an opportunity to measure the civic and political commitment of the

ethnic minorities and find out whether the ethnic vote carried any weight. Of the 23 candidates from ethnic minorities, six were elected (1% of the composition of the House of Commons)¹⁵¹, although they benefitted more from a "party" vote than from an "ethnic" vote.

Integration as a daily experience: the results of regularisation in Spain

Integration is not just a matter for social debate, it is also a set of concrete measures affecting schooling, the learning of the host country's language, integration in the labour market, vocational training, social rights and housing. In this respect, national initiatives have been very uneven.

The measures adopted in Spain are a good example of the way it is possible to combine market and integration policy imperatives. Although the Spanish government has not yet drawn up a detailed plan on the kind of integration policy it intends to pursue, it has given certain indications of the major choices it has already made¹⁵². First and foremost here is the statement made by the Minister of the Interior to Parliament laying down the broad lines of government action: a controlled opening to immigration, stabilisation of the foreign element on the labour market, and special measures for legal immigrants¹⁵³. In this respect, two political messages have gone out to Spanish society, the first defending the idea that Spain is capable of receiving new foreign workers, and the second indicating the government's desire to avoid foreigners concentrating in particular residential areas and thus creating ghettos.

This two-pronged approach (i.e. meeting the needs of the labour market and encouraging the integration of foreigners) very largely explains why the most important thrust in

¹⁵¹ All Commonwealth citizens with "ordinary resident" status are entitled to register on the electoral lists and vote in all local, national and European elections. The six categories of British nationality are involved, including citizens of all the Commonwealth countries and those with no permanent right of abode. Irish nationals classified as ordinarily resident are also entitled to vote. At local level, there are an estimated 200 elected representatives from ethnic backgrounds (ethnic minorities make up approximately 5.5% of the total population).

¹⁵² Responsibility for the policy of social integration for immigrants now lies with the Directorate General for social action at the Ministry of Social Affairs.

¹⁵³ In this case, the choice seems to have been in favour of a "positive action" type of integration policy designed to compensate for the greater vulnerability of foreigners.

terms of social policy in 1992 was the renewal of regularised workers' permits¹⁵⁴. The price for the renewal of a permit (1 000 pesetas per worker and 15 000 pesetas per employer) and the flexibility of the conditions imposed on workers in terms of proving their established status in the world of work confirm this political will¹⁵⁵. The other objective was to encourage the occupational mobility of regularised workers by allowing them to take up work throughout Spain rather than just in the province for which their initial permit had been issued¹⁵⁶. As a result, three types of permit have been proposed, replacing the initial special documents.

The first of these (type C), valid for five years, was granted to two categories of foreigner: (a) those providing evidence of irregular work for 20 months over the past four years, (b) those who could supply proof of regular employment for one year and who fulfilled one of the following criteria: spouse or child of a lawful worker with a type C permit; regularised and originating from Latin America, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea or Andorra; from Ceuta, Melilla or Gibraltar; regularised and descended from immigrants who have obtained Spanish nationality. All the others were issued a one-year permit (type B) on condition that they could show evidence of discontinuous employment and of actively looking for stable and regular employment. The third permit (type D), again for one year, was reserved for self-employed workers.

A similar type of initiative has been taken in Italy (April 1992). The Minister for Immigration called on all foreigners from non-Community countries whose residence permits were due to expire on 30 June to renew them so as not to lose any of their acquired advantages. An information campaign was organised and proved more effective

¹⁵⁴ Details of this operation were made public on 9 July 1992.

¹⁵⁵ The non-governmental organisations, the immigrant support associations, the trade unions and other institutions working with foreigners have been prevailed upon to circulate the regulations and provide information to the persons concerned and to help resolve problems or doubts throughout the operation. Another concern was to avoid the kind of thing that happened with the first collective regularisation exercise in 1985-86, where it was found (three years later) that only 39% of those regularised were still in a lawful situation.

¹⁵⁶ Again with a view to fostering integration, the Ministry of Labour has doubled the aid available for vocational training programmes and for the teaching of Spanish. In addition, the Interministerial Commission on the status of foreigners has proposed that the effective application of social, economic and cultural rights for foreigners (recognised under Spanish law) be encouraged, and that there be consultations with non-governmental organisations, trade unions, business interests and immigrant support associations. The Commission is also endeavouring to gain acceptance for preferential treatment for immigrants of Latin American origin.

than the earlier one¹⁵⁷. The appeal went out to all non-Community nationals, even those in marginal and irregular situations. Those concerned were authorised to remain in Italy for a further four years, or two years in the case of "self-declaration". By the end of April, the results had proved quite encouraging in that of 230 000 residence permits issued, 60% had been renewed.

Young people: Preventing unemployment and delinquency

In Belgium, as we said before, but also in France, the Netherlands, Denmark and elsewhere, the continuing marginalisation of young people from the immigrant scene, and the development of petty delinquency and of more serious criminal activity are a constant cause for concern. The situation is all the more alarming for the fact that the parents' social problems are increasing and their authority is declining, even over the very young. The common characteristic among these adolescents and pre-adolescents is that they increasingly feel abandoned at the margins of society and see themselves as the victims of social ostracism. A growing number have abandoned all hope of breaking out via "normal" channels, and as a result more and more children of barely 12 years or so are getting into trouble with the police and appearing in court.

In France, the situation has recently been the subject of a report, which was vehemently contested by the former Secretary of State for Urban Affairs. The author confirmed the extreme youth of young delinquents (or those well on the way to being so) and stressed the ravages wrought by drug trafficking. This is indeed something that warrants special attention. The danger with the drugs factor is not just that it effectively sets up an alternative economy, but that it constitutes a new form of socialisation from a very early age. These two relatively new phenomena are particularly worrying, even if the real extent of the problem is still difficult to gauge.

In the Netherlands, the problem lies especially with young people from Morocco and the West Indies. Neither their parents nor society know how to deal with them. They are increasingly getting into trouble with the police and becoming involved in criminal

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A guide for non-Community citizens resident in Italy has been published in five languages, featuring information on the rights and duties of foreign citizens (e.g. entry authorisation, residence permit, declaration, education, work, health, family, Italian citizenship, the risks of undeclared work, etc.).

activities. The figures are alarming. To give one example, from 1991, half of all police suspects involving crimes committed by young people in Utrecht concerned young Moroccans, way beyond the percentage share of Moroccans in their age category. Most people are now taking the line that they need special treatment, i.e. a much harder line. Suggestions have been made that they should be made to serve in the army or sent to boarding school.

The situation is no less alarming in Denmark. Although criminal behaviour among young Danes seems to be on the decline, the number of young foreigners getting into trouble is on the increase. Of course, care is needed in interpreting any statistics, but the fact is that young foreigners are turning up more and more frequently in police records. This is a worrying development, and the social authorities are on a permanent state of alert. For the time being, there is nothing to indicate that they are more involved in serious crimes such as robbery with violence or drug trafficking. They tend to be implicated more in cases of theft, burglary, violence, destruction of property and public disorder. But here too, the authorities are coming across very young delinquents, and it is by no means rare to find children of less than ten years of age getting into trouble with the police.

In the United Kingdom too, the penal statistics show a disproportionate number of prisoners to be from ethnic minorities: for example, ethnic minorities make up 17% of the male prison population aged over 21, compared with only 6% of the corresponding age class in the general population¹⁵⁸. West Indians and Guyanese predominate among this ethnic prison population, with Indians and Pakistanis being under-represented. This disproportionate presence of Caribbeans, Guyanese and Africans in the prison statistics is confirmed by another study¹⁵⁹. One explanation offered is that they are more often imprisoned for offences for which Whites are not imprisoned, added to which they normally receive longer sentences than Whites.

¹⁵⁸ According to the 1987 Home Office British Crime Survey ethnic minorities are also more likely to be victims of crime than the white population. 26% of Afro-Caribbeans and 20% of Asians are victims of car theft. 1% of Whites are victims of theft or burglary, compared with 3% of all Afro-Caribbeans and Indians.

¹⁵⁹ Many are in prison for drug trafficking offences. They account for 29% of all over-21s in prison for this category of offence.

It is worth taking a look at this problem in terms of the situation for young foreigners on the labour market. In Denmark, for example, young people of foreign origin are still more likely to be without a job than young Danes, with the proportion increasing from year to year. All the experts agree on one point, which is that young people of foreign origin are much more likely to be tomorrow's "educated unemployed". Faced with this situation, the authorities are trying a variety of solutions, although nothing has been found to date with any real prospect of overcoming the problem. Special projects were launched in various districts in 1992, combining family work, teaching and counselling with leisure activities and social and community-type street work. The fact is that leisure facilities for these adolescents are still inadequate (especially for girls), social work structures are very basic and other institutions to which they turn (libraries, clubs, cafes in sports centres, etc) are not specially geared to these types of people. Relations are often conflictual and violent.

In Amsterdam, a programme has been devised especially for young Moroccans of between 14 and 19 who are in trouble with the police or who have left school early. The idea is that a special team, including social workers, will take them in hand and try to get them reintegrated into the school system. The team will have special intervention facilities in schools and under the Guaranteed Youth Employment Scheme. Young people refusing to accept aid can be prosecuted. Parallel to this, there will be a preventive programme aimed at young people aged from 10 to 17, and attempts will be made to set up a support scheme in the Moroccan community.

In France, the government has continued with its policy of earlier years, namely of integrating special treatment for these young people into the general framework of urban policy. Thus, most of the regulatory work in 1992 was devoted to this sector of the population, concentrating on the social exclusion phenomenon and on the most vulnerable groups, regardless of origin (i.e. unlike the situation in the Netherlands, which has measures geared specifically to young Moroccans).

This course adopted by the French authorities is a clear indication of how aware they are of developments in certain parts of the urban fringe, and of their concern to head off a trend which threatens to accentuate the destabilising social divisions appearing in various forms within French society. Taken together, the measures all have the same aim: quite

simply, they attempt to respond to specific situations and maximise the potential in each. The basic concern is to pinpoint, utilise, disseminate and upgrade the fund of knowhow and to reinforce the educational dimension of the various measures by re-establishing the family dimension. Finally, rather than adding to the range of institutions, the tendency is to make use of existing arrangements, fostering or improving partnership arrangements between the public and semi-public sectors and the private sector.

In Great Britain, where the policy on the treatment of minorities is closer to the Dutch model than the French model, there was a noticeable improvement in the employment of ethnic minorities in government departments between 1990 and 1991. A report on equal opportunities showed that minority representation in government departments climbed from 4.5% to 4.7% in this period, whereas minority groups accounted for only 4.1% of the economically active population as a whole. At Executive Officer (junior management) level - the grade targeted for priority attention in the action programme - representation went up from 3.1% in 1990 to 3.4% a year later. There are now more than 3 500 ethnic minority staff at EO level and another 1 800 in more senior posts. The Minister for the Civil Service expressed satisfaction with these results. *"I am encouraged by the progress departments and agencies have made to ensure that their policies and practices provide equal opportunities for employment and advancement ... Selecting, developing and retaining the best available people from all sections of the community is not only fair and just, it makes for an effective workforce"*. More generally, between 1990 and 1991 minorities made up almost 7.7% of all new recruits to the Labour Market.

These relatively optimistic figures, however, unfortunately tell only one side of the story. The latest Labour Force Survey figures confirm that the rate of unemployment remains higher among ethnic minorities (13%) than among Whites (7%).

The highest rate of unemployment is among Pakistanis/Bangladeshis (21%) and the lowest among Indians (10%). The situation is more or less identical for women. These figures give cause for concern, since they owe less to poor qualifications than to discriminatory practices¹⁶⁰.

This is even more true in the case of the younger generation. A recent study¹⁶¹ showed that, on average, young people from ethnic minorities stayed longer in non-compulsory secondary education than their young white counterparts: 37% of the latter stayed on full-time at school after the age of 16, compared with 51% of young Afro-Caribbeans and 67% of young Asians. And by the third year of the study more than 50% of the Asians and 20% of the Afro-Caribbeans were still in full-time education, compared with only 16% of the Whites. This is partly because youngsters from ethnic minority families are encouraged more by their parents to continue with their studies, but it is probably also connected with the difficulties which they have in finding work¹⁶². Whatever their academic results, it seems that Afro-Caribbeans and Asians will always be at greater risk than Whites of ending up unemployed, or at least of being unable to find a full-time job. The biggest problem lies in overcoming employers' prejudices during recruitment interviews¹⁶³.

Another study on the situation of young Blacks on the labour market in Liverpool (New Community, January 1992) confirms this¹⁶⁴. The study shows that young Blacks are almost three times more likely to find themselves unemployed than their young White

¹⁶⁰ A series of court decisions taken in the United Kingdom in 1992 reflected a firm commitment on the part of the authorities to respect both the letter and the spirit of the law in combating all forms of discrimination at work. A consistent feature of these decisions is the reminder to employers of their obligation to provide staff with information on the Race Relations Act and to draw the appropriate lessons from this Act so as to improve matters at their place of work.

¹⁶¹ The Youth Cohort Study, a three-year follow-up of a representative national sample of 28 000 young persons (including Asians and Afro-Caribbeans) who were due to leave school in 1985/86.

¹⁶² Among the minority groups, the Afro-Caribbeans do least well academically. 25% of the Asians had passed four or more O-levels by the age of 16, compared with only 10% of Afro-Caribbeans. And proportionally more Asians than any other group (including Whites) had passed two or more A-levels by the age of 18. In contrast, Afro-Caribbeans top the table for the attainment of vocational diplomas at the age of 18.

¹⁶³ The Council of Sikh Gurdwaras reported in August 1992 that some young Asians were even being driven to adopting more English-sounding surnames in order to get over the first hurdles in job recruitment.

¹⁶⁴ This report is based on data collected in 1989.

counterparts with equivalent schooling. Two and a half years after finishing their fifth year (final year of compulsory schooling in the United Kingdom), 45% of the total sample studied had found a full-time job and 19% were unemployed; for the young Blacks in the sample, these proportions were respectively 21% and 52%. The report also emphasises their fear of applying for jobs, based less on previous experiences of discrimination than on fear of being confronted with discrimination. This adds to their marginalisation and, paradoxically, deprives them of the opportunities offered by the equal opportunities programmes designed to facilitate their entry into the labour market.

Prevention needs to start earlier

Whatever hopes we might have of the various measures taken to limit the problems discussed above, for most people they will be too late - or almost too late - the thinking being that it is at primary-school or even pre-school level in families that vigilance is most needed and will certainly have to be increased.

This would seem to be the approach adopted in the Netherlands. It is, at any rate, the thinking behind the "Opstap" project, which is a pre-school programme designed for application in the home environment for very young children and their mothers, whether Dutch or foreign¹⁶⁵. An initial assessment of the programme was somewhat disappointing. The effects on children and their mothers are not very marked: children's intelligence and behaviour improved, but the same cannot be said for their mastery of Dutch, apart from Moroccan children. Nonetheless, there was at least an improvement in links between mothers and school. This relative lack of success has not discouraged the Ministry of Education, which has decided to persevere with the programme, albeit making certain changes. More importance will be attached in future to the learning of the Dutch language, and tuition will now be given at school rather than at home. The "Opstap" programme has now been joined by another project known as "Overstap", which is designed for children at grade 3 of primary school. The idea here is, in conjunction with the children's parents, to put into practice what the children have learnt at school. This programme was due to commence in 1993 in 230 schools in "priority education zones". Mention should also be made of the "Opstapje" programme, which is

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The idea is that, with the help of experienced mothers, the mothers learn to teach their own children using games, drawings and books.

geared to children of between two and four years and their mothers. The overall cost of preparing and running these pre-school and extramural programmes will be around Hfl 15 million per year.

There have been other educational initiatives, more particularly the introduction of a basic curriculum common to all pupils in the first three years of secondary school, the aim being to ensure that they do not specialise too soon, as is the case at present. Additionally, thanks to decentralisation the local authorities and schools have more leeway in deciding the most appropriate teaching structure for ethnic minorities.

In the context of the national debate on ethnic minorities, the local and regional organisations have been invited by the government to foster twinning arrangements between firms and secondary schools with a high percentage of pupils from ethnic minorities. The idea is that there should be agreements in which the firm would undertake to help in funding school activities, to organise visits to the firm for schoolchildren and to reserve traineeships for them. The general aim here is to create earlier and closer links between school and the world of work, so that employers too become aware of the full potential of young people from ethnic minority backgrounds.¹⁶⁶ Generally speaking, as far as the government is concerned 1993 should be a pivotal year for education policy for minorities.

The point of this vast programme is to help schools once more play their part in ensuring equal opportunities for all - a far from luxurious ambition, since we all know that any failure of the school system penalises these ethnic minority youngsters the most, adding to the disadvantages and discriminations they already suffer in everyday life.

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The government has also released Hfl 100 million for the next three years to facilitate adult education and reduce the waiting lists caused by a growing demand. The local authorities will be responsible for organising intensive courses for workers, another area where demand is growing fast.

POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP (Thousands) on 1 January 1991

EUROSTAT 11-Jun-93

		B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
Table 1	CITIZENS OF												
	TOTAL	9987.0	5146.5	79753.2	10120.0	38993.8	56652.0	3524.0	57746.2	384.6	15010.4	9858.5	56705.0
	EUROPE	9741.2	5084.9	78690.1	9985.3	38816.6	54716.8	3506.6	57232.4	377.0	14720.7	9782.1	55207.0
	EUR12	9833.9	5013.6	75674.0	9945.1	38782.7	54367.2	3504.8	57114.4	371.8	14486.5	9779.5	55058.0
	BELGIUM	9082.4	0.3	20.9	1.5	13.0	56.1	0.6	4.7	10.3	23.6	1.0	9.0
	DENMARK	2.6	4985.8	15.6	1.4	13.3	3.5	1.0	2.0	1.5	1.6	0.4	11.0
	GERMANY	28.1	8.4	74235.0	13.0	49.7	52.7	3.3	42.1	8.9	44.3	4.8	42.0
	GREECE	20.9	0.5	320.2	9890.9	0.8	6.1	0.2	21.0	0.8	4.9	0.1	16.0
	SPAIN	52.2	0.9	135.5	1.0	38509.9	216.0	0.5	14.4	2.5	17.2	7.5	29.0
	FRANCE	94.3	2.0	85.1	7.3	32.5	53055.4	1.6	24.4	13.2	8.9	3.2	38.0
	IRELAND	2.4	1.0	10.3	0.6	2.9	3.5	3436.3	2.3	0.5	3.4	0.2	510.0
	ITALY	241.2	2.0	552.4	7.0	18.2	252.8	1.5	56965.0	19.1	16.9	1.2	86.0
	LUXEMBOURG	4.7	0.0	5.3	0.0	0.2	3.0	0.1	0.2	268.3	0.3	0.0	..
	NETHERLANDS	65.3	2.0	111.7	3.3	18.6	17.9	1.4	7.0	3.4	14318.0	1.8	20.0
	PORTUGAL	16.5	0.3	85.5	0.4	37.6	649.7	0.1	4.5	39.3	8.3	9750.7	20.0
	UNITED KINGDOM	23.3	10.2	96.5	18.6	86.1	50.4	58.2	26.8	3.2	39.0	8.5	54276.0
	EFTA	(7.5)	24.9	243.9	7.5	30.0	(33.9)	(0.4)	35.3	2.0	(9.1)	2.0	(40.0)
	AUSTRIA	1.1	0.6	183.2	1.7	2.9	3.3	0.3	8.8	0.4	2.9	0.3	7.0
	FINLAND	0.6	1.8	10.5	1.0	4.3	1.6	..	1.8	0.2	0.8	0.2	3.0
	ICELAND	..	3.0	1.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	..	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.0	..
	LIECHTENSTEIN	..	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	..
NORWAY	0.8	10.2	5.8	0.8	3.7	1.9	0.1	1.0	0.2	1.4	0.3	8.0	
SWEDEN	2.7	8.2	12.1	2.1	9.8	4.8	..	3.6	0.5	1.8	0.6	14.0	
SWITZERLAND	2.4	1.1	31.2	1.8	9.2	22.1	..	20.0	0.5	1.9	0.6	8.0	
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE	(6.8)	6.6	407.7	26.3	3.0	63.0	(0.1)	41.1	0.7	7.9	0.5	(55.0)	
of which:													
BULGARIA	..	0.1	14.7	3.6	0.3	1.0	..	2.9	..	0.4	0.1	..	
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	0.4	0.3	34.4	1.2	0.3	2.4	..	3.1	..	0.5	0.0	1.0	
HUNGARY	0.8	0.3	36.7	1.0	0.3	2.7	..	4.1	..	1.0	0.1	4.0	
POLAND	4.9	4.7	242.0	13.3	1.1	47.1	0.1	17.0	..	4.1	0.1	34.0	
ROMANIA	..	0.8	60.3	3.2	0.3	5.1	..	7.5	..	1.3	0.0	..	
USSR	0.7	0.4	19.6	4.1	0.7	4.7	..	6.5	..	0.6	0.2	15.0	
OTHER EUROPE	(90.8)	39.8	2364.5	6.4	0.8	(252.7)		41.6	2.4	(217.0)	0.1	(54.0)	
of which:													
TURKEY	84.9	29.7	1694.6	3.4	..	197.7		4.7	0.2	203.5	0.0	29.0	
YUGOSLAVIA	5.9	10.0	662.7	2.0	0.6	52.5		29.8	2.2	13.5	0.1	6.0	

POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP (Thousands) on 1 January 1991

EUROSTAT 11-JUN-93

CITIZENS OF	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
AFRICA	182.3	7.1	198.0	19.1	39.9	1633.1		238.6	1.7	186.2	45.3	(148.0)
of which:												
ALGERIA	10.7	0.3	7.4	0.2	1.1	614.2		4.0	..	0.7	0.0	2.0
CAMEROON	..	0.0	1.6	0.1	..	18.0		0.8
CAPE VERDE	..	-	0.4	0.0	1.7	..		5.0	1.1	2.6	28.8	..
CONGO	..	0.0	0.3	-	..	12.8		0.4
EGYPT	..	0.4	9.8	9.4	0.6	6.3		19.8	..	4.5	0.0	4.0
ETHIOPIA	..	0.5	18.0	2.8	0.0	..		11.9	..	3.9	0.0	..
GHANA	..	0.3	18.8	0.1	0.2	2.8		11.4	..	5.2	0.0	20.0
IVORY COAST	0.4	0.1	0.6	0.0	..	16.7		2.1
MALI	..	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.1	37.7		0.3
MAURITANIA	..	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	6.6		0.9
MAURITIUS	0.7	0.0	0.7	0.1	..	13.0		5.4	16.0
MOROCCO	141.7	3.0	69.6	0.3	28.2	572.7		78.0	..	156.9	0.1	3.0
NIGERIA	..	0.1	9.8	1.0	0.2	0.9		6.9	..	1.1	0.0	22.0
SENEGAL	..	0.0	1.7	0.0	2.0	43.7		25.1	0.1	..
SOMALIA	..	0.6	5.8	0.1	0.0	1.1		9.5	..	3.8
TUNISIA	6.4	0.3	26.1	0.4	0.4	206.3		41.2	..	2.6	0.0	..
ZAIRE	12.0	0.0	3.9	0.4	0.1	22.7		2.1	..	1.0	0.1	..
AMERICA	19.3	7.9	144.6	28.8	98.4	72.8	(7.6)	128.4	1.8	42.2	26.4	(221.0)
of which:												
ARGENTINA	..	0.2	4.2	0.4	22.4	3.1	..	12.8	..	0.5	0.3	..
BRAZIL	1.1	0.4	10.5	0.6	2.9	6.3	..	14.3	..	1.6	11.4	..
CANADA	1.6	1.0	8.5	1.8	1.8	6.8	..	4.8	0.1	2.4	2.1	29.0
CHILE	1.3	0.6	6.4	0.4	6.8	7.5	..	4.2	..	1.6	0.1	..
COLOMBIA	0.6	0.3	3.8	0.4	6.0	3.8	..	5.5	..	1.6	0.1	..
HAITI	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.0	..	12.3	..	0.3
JAMAICA	..	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	40.0
MEXICO	..	0.1	3.2	0.3	4.3	1.9	..	3.6	..	0.3	0.1	..
PERU	..	0.1	4.0	0.1	5.4	2.3	..	5.3	..	0.5	0.1	..
SURINAM	..	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	..	19.3	0.0	..
USA	11.7	4.5	92.7	22.2	18.3	24.2	7.6	58.1	1.2	11.4	6.9	98.0
VENEZUELA	..	0.0	1.5	0.2	10.8	1.0	..	5.0	..	0.3	5.1	..

POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP (Thousands) on 1 January 1991

EUROSTAT 11-Jun-93

CITIZENS OF	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
ASIA	22.2	38.2	513.4	36.1	36.4	227.0		140.3	1.6	53.0	4.2	(453.0)
of which:												
AFGHANISTAN	..	0.3	30.6	0.0		0.2	..	0.8
BANGLADESH	..	0.1	3.6	0.1	0.1	..		4.9	..	0.6	0.0	42.0
CAMBODIA	..	0.0	1.4	0.0	..	47.4		0.3	..	0.5
CHINA	2.4	0.8	18.4	0.4	5.7	14.1		18.7	..	6.5	1.2	8.0
INDIA	2.7	0.9	29.0	1.6	6.4	4.6		11.3	..	3.2	0.6	135.0
INDONESIA	0.7	0.1	8.4	0.1	0.2	1.3		0.8	..	8.5	0.0	..
IRAN	1.7	9.0	92.2	3.8	2.7	15.2		14.6	..	5.4	0.5	25.0
IRAQ	..	2.8	5.8	3.4	0.4	2.2		2.1	..	1.1	0.1	..
ISRAEL	1.9	0.6	8.9	0.8	0.6	2.9		4.3	..	1.7	0.1	2.0
JAPAN	3.1	0.7	22.1	1.7	3.6	10.9		5.6	..	4.4	0.4	29.0
JORDAN	0.2	0.7	11.9	2.2	0.9	..		5.7	..	0.3	0.0	..
LAOS	..	0.0	2.0	0.0	..	31.8		0.2
LEBANON	1.8	3.2	47.1	5.9	1.7	21.0		5.8	..	1.2	0.2	..
MALAYSIA	..	0.1	2.4	0.1	0.1	..		0.4	..	1.0	0.0	16.0
PAKISTAN	1.8	6.2	24.4	2.4	1.1	9.8		6.5	..	3.9	0.7	84.0
PALESTINE	..	0.0	41.2	0.0		0.1
PHILIPPINES	..	1.3	22.0	7.5	9.1	1.9		34.3	..	1.7	0.1	17.0
SOUTH KOREA	..	0.4	19.1	0.5	..	4.3		2.2	..	0.6
SRI LANKA	..	5.1	36.4	1.2	0.1	10.3		12.8	..	2.6	0.0	26.0
SYRIA	..	0.3	14.5	2.8	1.4	6.1		2.8	..	1.1
THAILAND	..	1.4	15.7	0.5	..	1.6		1.9	..	1.1
VIETNAM	0.3	3.7	45.8	0.3	0.1	33.7		2.4	..	5.1	0.0	7.0
AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA	0.5	0.8	7.1	2.1	1.1	2.3		5.5	0.1	2.4	0.4	(53.0)
of which:												
AUSTRALIA	0.4	0.6	5.7	1.7	0.9	1.7		4.9	..	1.9	0.3	34.0
NEW ZEALAND	..	0.2	0.8	0.4	0.2	..		0.5	..	0.5	0.0	19.0
STATELESS AND UNKNOWN	0.9	7.6	24.3	3.4	1.2			1.1	2.4	6.0	0.2	623.0

NOTES:

- .. No further breakdown is available
- "Zero"
- () Eurostat estimate
- = UK: Figures below 1000

Belgium: For 20600 refugees breakdown by citizenship is not available.

Germany: China includes Taiwan.

The population of the 6 new Länder is 16 million, of which 175700 with no German citizenship.

Further breakdown is not available.

Greece: Total includes 45300 Greeks with foreign citizenship.

France: 1990 Census results, Metropolitan France only.

Ireland: For 17900 non-Europeans breakdown by citizenship is not available.

Italy: UK includes 300 people from Gibraltar.

Netherlands: For 200 non-EC Europeans and 400 non-Europeans breakdown by citizenship is not available.

United Kingdom: Labour Force Survey 1991 provisional data.

China includes Taiwan.

POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP – Females – (Thousands) on 1 January 1991

EUROSTAT 11–Jun–93

CITIZENS OF	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
TOTAL	5106.3	2610.1	32874.8	5073.4		29086.9	1765.0	30008.1	196.1	7590.9	5100.9	29005.0
EUROPE	4994.4	2583.2	32516.7	5012.8		28253.5	1755.9	29821.1	192.2	7462.9	5069.4	28226.0
EUR12	4942.7	2546.2	31169.9	4992.3		28086.6	1755.7	29758.1	189.7	7354.4	5068.1	28145.0
BELGIUM	4688.8	0.2	10.7	0.8		28.1	0.3	2.7	5.4	12.0	0.5	5.0
DENMARK	1.4	2534.9	9.4	0.9		2.1	0.5	1.4	0.8	0.9	0.2	9.0
GERMANY	13.1	3.8	30544.0	6.7		27.0	1.6	25.1	4.9	21.1	2.2	26.0
GREECE	9.6	0.1	143.4	4963.3		3.0	0.1	6.8	0.4	1.7	0.0	8.0
SPAIN	24.7	0.4	60.4	0.5		103.7	0.4	9.1	1.2	7.4	3.7	18.0
FRANCE	47.5	1.0	45.0	3.7		27472.6	0.8	15.1	7.2	4.4	1.6	23.0
IRELAND	1.3	0.4	4.9	0.4		2.2	1721.5	1.2	0.3	1.6	0.1	273.0
ITALY	107.8	0.5	216.7	2.9		108.0	0.6	29673.7	9.2	5.5	0.5	41.0
LUXEMBOURG	2.0	0.0	2.3	0.0		1.5	–	0.2	138.7	0.1	0.0	–
NETHERLANDS	27.7	0.9	52.5	2.1		9.0	0.7	4.2	1.7	7279.9	0.8	13.0
PORTUGAL	7.8	0.1	39.6	0.2		304.2	–	2.9	18.3	3.7	5054.4	13.0
UNITED KINGDOM	10.8	3.9	41.1	10.8		25.1	29.2	15.9	1.5	16.0	4.0	27716.0
EFTA	(3.6)	14.0	(243.9)	4.9		16.9	(0.2)	22.3	1.1	4.8	0.9	(29.0)
AUSTRIA	0.5	0.2	80.2	1.0		1.9	0.2	5.8	0.2	1.4	0.1	5.0
FINLAND	0.3	1.1	7.9	0.8		1.1	..	1.5	0.1	0.6	0.1	3.0
ICELAND	..	1.5	..	0.0		0.1	..	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	..
LIECHTENSTEIN	..	0.0	..	0.0		–	..	0.0	..	–	–	..
NORWAY	0.4	5.9	..	0.5		1.2	–	0.6	0.1	0.8	0.1	4.0
SWEDEN	1.3	4.7	6.9	1.4		3.0	..	2.5	0.2	1.0	0.3	11.0
SWITZERLAND	1.1	0.5	17.5	1.0		9.7	..	11.7	0.3	1.0	0.3	6.0
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE	(3.6)	4.0		12.9		36.9		23.6	0.4	4.6	0.3	(25.0)
of which:												
BULGARIA	..	0.1		2.0		0.5		1.6	..	0.2	0.1	–
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	0.2	0.2		0.6		1.2		1.9	..	0.3	0.0	1.0
HUNGARY	0.3	0.1		0.5		1.1		2.5	..	0.6	0.0	2.0
POLAND	2.7	3.0		5.5		28.9		9.5	..	2.6	0.1	16.0
ROMANIA	..	0.4		1.9		2.6		4.3	..	0.6	0.0	–
USSR	0.3	0.2		2.5		2.6		3.7	..	0.4	0.1	5.0
OTHER EUROPE	(43.7)	19.0	(1052.6)	(2.7)		113.1		17.1	1.1	(99.1)	0.0	(27.0)
of which:												
TURKEY	40.9	14.1	753.7	1.4		87.5		1.5	0.1	92.8	0.0	14.0
YUGOSLAVIA	2.7	4.9	298.9	0.8		24.5		12.3	1.0	6.2	0.0	2.0

POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP --Females-- (Thousands) on 1 January 1991

EUROSTAT 11--Jun--93

CITIZENS OF	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
AFRICA	83.0	2.8	66.5	5.5		689.8		48.8	0.8	79.0	18.2	(61.0)
of which:												
ALGERIA	4.6	0.1	1.7	0.1		253.9		0.7	..	0.2	0.0	-
CAMEROON	..	0.0	..	0.0		8.3		0.3
CAPE VERDE	..	-	..	0.0		..		4.4	0.6	1.4	10.8	..
CONGO	..	-		5.5		0.1
EGYPT	..	0.2	2.3	1.9		2.0		2.8	..	0.5	0.0	1.0
ETHIOPIA	..	0.2	..	1.5		..		7.1	..	1.4	0.0	..
GHANA	..	0.1	5.8	0.0		1.1		3.6	..	1.8	-	10.0
IVORY COAST	0.1	0.0	..	0.0		7.6		0.4
MALI	..	0.0	..	0.0		14.0		0.1
MAURITIUS	0.5	0.0	..	0.1		6.8		2.6	8.0
MAURITANIA	..	0.0	..	0.0		2.4		0.5
MOROCCO	66.1	1.3	27.2	0.1		250.7		7.3	..	69.8	0.0	1.0
NIGERIA	..	0.0	1.4	0.2		0.3		2.5	..	0.2	-	10.0
SENEGAL	..	0.0	..	0.0		17.0		0.8	0.0	..
SOMALIA	..	0.2	..	0.0		0.3		5.5	..	1.2
TUNISIA	2.2	0.1	9.8	0.1		84.8		4.5	..	0.9	0.0	-
ZAIRE	5.6	0.0	..	0.2		9.8		0.7	..	0.3	0.0	..
AMERICA	10.1	3.9	70.6	14.8		38.6	(4.2)	78.3	1.0	22.2	11.4	(118.0)
of which:												
ARGENTINA	..	0.1	2.3	0.2		1.6	..	6.4	..	0.3	0.1	..
BRAZIL	0.6	0.3	6.8	0.5		3.7	..	9.5	..	0.9	5.0	..
CANADA	0.8	0.5	4.3	1.1		3.4	..	2.3	0.1	1.1	0.9	15.0
CHILE	0.6	0.3	3.2	0.2		3.6	..	2.3	..	0.7	0.0	..
COLOMBIA	0.3	0.2	..	0.3		2.1	..	3.8	..	1.0	0.0	..
HAITI	0.1	0.0	..	0.0		6.5	..	0.2
JAMAICA	..	0.0	..	0.0		0.1	-	19.0
MEXICO	..	0.1	..	0.2		1.1	..	2.1	..	0.2	0.0	..
PERU	..	0.1	..	0.1		1.3	..	3.3	..	0.3	0.0	..
SURINAM	..	-	0.0	..	10.4	0.0	..
USA	6.1	2.2	40.9	10.1		13.0	4.2	35.7	0.6	5.6	3.1	51.0
VENEZUELA	..	0.0	..	0.1		0.6	..	2.3	..	0.2	2.0	..

POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP –Females– (Thousands) on 1 January 1991

EUROSTAT 11–Jun–93

CITIZENS OF	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
ASIA	9.8	16.8	191.5	16.7		103.8		56.5	0.9	23.4	1.7	(232.0)
of which:												
AFGHANISTAN	..	0.1	..	0.0		..		0.1	..	0.3
BANGLADESH	..	0.0	..	0.0		..		0.2	..	0.1	-	23.0
CAMBODIA	..	0.0	..	0.0		22.6		0.1	..	0.2
CHINA	1.1	0.4	..	0.1		6.6		6.9	..	3.2	0.4	4.0
INDIA	1.0	0.4	7.2	0.3		2.0		4.7	..	1.1	0.3	78.0
INDONESIA	0.3	0.1	3.2	0.1		0.6		0.4	..	4.3	0.0	..
IRAN	0.7	2.9	33.8	1.5		7.0		4.4	..	2.1	0.2	9.0
IRAQ	..	0.9	..	1.1		0.9		0.3	..	0.4	0.0	..
ISRAEL	0.8	0.2	3.5	0.2		1.3		1.1	..	0.6	0.0	1.0
JAPAN	1.5	0.4	11.1	0.8		5.9		2.8	..	2.1	0.2	17.0
JORDAN	0.1	0.3	3.3	0.4		..		0.3	..	0.1	0.0	..
LAOS	..	0.0	..	-		15.0		0.1
LEBANON	0.6	1.5	18.2	2.4		8.6		1.3	..	0.4	0.1	..
MALAYSIA	..	0.1	..	0.0		..		0.2	..	0.5	0.0	8.0
PAKISTAN	0.5	3.2	6.2	0.3		3.6		0.3	..	1.4	0.3	42.0
PALESTINE	..	0.0	..	0.0		..		0.0
PHILIPPINES	..	0.9	..	6.8		1.4		23.9	..	1.3	0.1	12.0
SOUTH KOREA	..	0.2	10.0	0.2		2.4		1.2	..	0.3
SRI LANKA	..	2.0	..	0.9		3.7		4.1	..	0.7	0.0	10.0
SYRIA	..	0.2	5.2	0.6		2.4		0.5	..	0.5
THAILAND	..	1.1	..	0.4		0.9		1.5	..	0.8
VIETNAM	0.2	1.6	..	0.1		15.3		1.0	..	2.2	0.0	3.0
AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA	0.3	0.4	3.5	1.3		1.1		3.0	0.0	1.2	0.2	(27.0)
of which:												
AUSTRALIA	0.2	0.3	2.9	1.0		0.9		2.6	..	0.9	0.2	19.0
NEW ZEALAND	..	0.1	..	0.2		..		0.3	..	0.3	0.0	9.0
STATELESS AND UNKNOWN	0.3	3.0	26.0	1.2				0.4	1.2	2.2	0.1	340.0

NOTES:

- .. No further breakdown is available
- "Zero"
- () Eurostat estimate
- = UK: Figures below 1000

Belgium: For 8500 refugees breakdown by citizenship is not available.

Germany: Data refers to the territorial situation prior to 3 October 1990.

Greece: Total includes 21100 Greek women with foreign citizenship.

France: 1990 Census results, Metropolitan France.

Ireland: For 4600 women breakdown by citizenship is not available.

United Kingdom: 1991 Labour Force Survey 1991 provisional data.

China includes Taiwan.

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
CITIZENS OF												
TOTAL	4880.7	2536.4	30850.9	4984.0		27565.1	1759.0	28072.5	188.6	7419.5	4757.6	27700.0
EUROPE	4746.7	2501.7	30321.5	4909.9		26463.3	1749.4	27745.7	184.8	7257.8	4712.7	26980.0
EUR12	4691.2	2467.4	28652.2	4890.1		26280.7	1749.1	27690.7	182.2	7132.0	4711.3	26913.0
BELGIUM	4393.6	0.2	10.2	0.7		28.0	0.3	1.9	4.8	11.8	0.5	4.0
DENMARK	1.2	2450.9	6.2	0.6		1.4	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.2	2.0
GERMANY	15.0	4.6	27839.1	6.3		25.7	1.7	17.0	4.0	23.2	2.7	15.0
GREECE	11.3	0.4	176.8	4865.0		3.1	0.1	14.2	0.4	3.2	0.0	8.0
SPAIN	27.5	0.5	75.1	0.5		112.3	0.1	5.3	1.3	9.8	3.8	12.0
FRANCE	46.8	1.1	40.1	3.6		25582.7	0.8	9.3	6.0	4.5	1.6	15.0
IRELAND	1.1	0.6	5.5	0.2		1.4	1714.8	1.1	0.3	1.8	0.1	237.0
ITALY	133.4	1.4	335.7	4.1		144.7	0.9	27625.8	9.8	11.5	0.7	46.0
LUXEMBOURG	2.7	0.0	3.0	0.0		1.6	0.1	0.1	130.6	0.2	0.0	-
NETHERLANDS	37.5	1.2	59.2	1.2		8.9	0.7	2.8	1.6	7038.1	1.0	7.0
PORTUGAL	8.7	0.2	45.9	0.2		345.5	0.1	1.6	21.0	4.6	4696.2	7.0
UNITED KINGDOM	12.5	6.4	55.4	7.8		25.3	29.0	11.0	1.7	23.0	4.5	26560.0
EFTA	(4.0)	10.9	(124.4)	2.7		17.0	(0.2)	13.0	0.9	4.2	1.1	(11.0)
AUSTRIA	0.6	0.3	103.0	0.7		1.4	0.1	3.0	0.2	1.5	0.1	1.0
FINLAND	0.3	0.7	2.6	0.2		0.5	..	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	=
ICELAND	..	1.5	..	0.0		0.1	..	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	..
LIECHTENSTEIN	..	-	..	0.0		-	..	0.0	..	-	-	..
NORWAY	0.4	4.4	..	0.2		0.7	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.7	0.2	4.0
SWEDEN	1.4	3.5	5.2	0.7		1.8	..	1.0	0.2	0.8	0.3	3.0
SWITZERLAND	1.3	0.5	13.7	0.8		12.4	..	8.3	0.2	0.9	0.3	2.0
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE	(3.2)	2.6		13.4		26.2	(0.1)	17.6	0.3	3.4	0.3	(30.0)
of which:												
BULGARIA	..	0.1		1.6		0.5	..	1.3	..	0.2	0.1	-
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	0.2	0.1		0.6		1.2	..	1.2	..	0.2	0.0	-
HUNGARY	0.4	0.2		0.5		1.6	..	1.7	..	0.5	0.0	2.0
POLAND	2.2	1.7		7.8		18.2	0.1	7.4	..	1.4	0.1	18.0
ROMANIA	..	0.4		1.3		2.5	..	3.1	..	0.8	0.0	-
USSR	0.3	0.2		1.6		2.1	..	2.8	..	0.3	0.1	10.0
OTHER EUROPE	(48.3)	20.7	(1304.8)	3.7		139.5		24.5	1.4	118.0	0.1	(27.0)
of which:												
TURKEY	44.0	15.6	940.9	2.0		110.2		3.2	0.1	110.8	0.0	15.0
YUGOSLAVIA	3.2	5.2	363.8	1.2		27.9		17.5	1.3	7.3	0.1	3.0

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
AFRICA	99.3	4.3	131.5	13.6		943.3		189.8	0.9	107.2	27.1	(87.0)
of which:												
ALGERIA	6.1	0.2	5.7	0.1		360.3		3.3	..	0.5	0.0	2.0
CAMEROON	..	0.0	..	0.1		9.7		0.5
CAPE VERDE	0.0		..		0.6	0.5	1.2	18.0	..
CONGO	..	0.0		7.3		0.3
EGYPT	..	0.2	7.5	7.5		4.3		17.0	..	4.1	0.0	2.0
ETHIOPIA	..	0.3	..	1.3		..		4.9	..	2.4	0.0	..
GHANA	..	0.2	13.0	0.1		1.7		7.8	..	3.4	0.0	9.0
IVORY COAST	0.2	0.1	..	0.0		9.1		1.7
MAU	..	0.0	..	0.0		23.7		0.2
MAURITIUS	0.2	0.0	..	0.0		6.2		2.7	8.0
MAURITANIA	..	0.0	..	0.0		4.3		0.4
MOROCCO	75.5	1.7	42.3	0.2		321.9		70.7	..	87.1	0.0	2.0
NIGERIA	..	0.1	8.4	0.8		0.6		4.4	..	0.9	0.0	12.0
SENEGAL	..	0.0	..	0.0		26.7		24.3	0.0	..
SOMALIA	..	0.4	..	0.1		0.7		4.0	..	2.6
TUNISIA	4.2	0.3	16.3	0.3		121.6		36.7	..	1.7	0.0	=
ZAIRE	6.5	0.0	..	0.2		13.0		1.4	..	0.7	0.0	..
AMERICA	9.3	4.0	74.0	13.9		34.2	(3.4)	50.0	0.9	20.0	14.9	(103.0)
of which:												
ARGENTINA	..	0.1	1.9	0.2		1.5	..	6.5	..	0.3	0.2	..
BRAZIL	0.5	0.1	3.7	0.1		2.6	..	4.8	..	0.6	6.4	..
CANADA	0.8	0.5	4.2	0.7		3.4	..	2.5	0.1	1.3	1.2	13.0
CHILE	0.7	0.3	3.2	0.2		3.9	..	1.9	..	0.9	0.0	..
COLOMBIA	0.3	0.2	..	0.1		1.7	..	1.7	..	0.6	0.0	..
HAITI	0.1	0.0	..	0.0		5.8	..	0.1
JAMAICA	..	0.0	..	0.0		0.0	0.0	21.0
MEXICO	..	0.1	..	0.1		0.8	..	1.5	..	0.1	0.0	..
PERU	..	0.1	..	0.0		1.1	..	1.9	..	0.2	0.0	..
SURINAM	..	0.0	0.0	..	9.0	0.0	..
USA	5.6	2.4	51.8	12.2		11.3	3.4	22.4	0.6	5.8	3.8	47.0
VENEZUELA	..	0.0	..	0.0		0.5	..	2.7	..	0.1	3.2	..

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
ASIA	12.4	21.4	280.8	19.5		123.2		83.8	0.8	29.5	2.5	(220.0)
of which:												
AFGHANISTAN	..	0.2	..	0.0		..		0.1	..	0.5
BANGLADESH	..	0.0	..	0.1		..		4.7	..	0.5	0.0	19.0
CAMBODIA	..	0.0	..	0.0		24.8		0.2	..	0.2
CHINA	1.3	0.4	..	0.2		7.4		11.7	..	3.3	0.8	4.0
INDIA	1.7	0.5	21.8	1.3		2.5		6.5	..	2.0	0.3	57.0
INDONESIA	0.3	0.1	5.2	0.0		0.7		0.4	..	4.2	-	..
IRAN	1.0	6.1	58.3	2.3		8.2		10.3	..	3.3	0.3	16.0
IRAQ	..	1.9	..	2.3		1.3		1.7	..	0.7	0.1	..
ISRAEL	1.1	0.4	5.4	0.6		1.8		3.2	..	1.1	0.0	1.0
JAPAN	1.6	0.3	11.0	0.9		5.0		2.8	..	2.3	0.2	13.0
JORDAN	0.2	0.4	8.8	1.8		..		5.4	..	0.2	0.0	..
LAOS	..	0.0	..	0.0		16.8		0.1
LEBANON	1.2	1.7	28.9	3.5		12.3		4.5	..	0.8	0.1	..
MALAYSIA	..	0.0	..	0.0		..		0.2	..	0.6	0.0	8.0
PAKISTAN	1.3	3.0	18.2	2.1		8.2		6.2	..	2.5	0.4	42.0
PALESTINE	..	0.0	..	0.0		..		0.1
PHILIPPINES	..	0.3	..	0.7		0.5		10.4	..	0.4	0.0	5.0
SOUTH KOREA	..	0.2	9.1	0.2		1.9		1.0	..	0.3
SRI LANKA	..	3.1	..	0.3		6.6		8.7	..	1.9	0.0	16.0
SYRIA	..	0.1	9.3	2.2		3.7		2.3	..	0.6
THAILAND	..	0.2	..	0.1		0.8		0.4	..	0.3
VIETNAM	0.2	2.1	..	0.2		18.5		1.4	..	3.0	0.0	4.0
AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA	0.3	0.4	3.6	0.6		1.1		2.5	0.0	1.2	0.2	(26.0)
of which:												
AUSTRALIA	0.2	0.3	2.8	0.7		0.9		2.2	..	0.9	0.2	15.0
NEW ZEALAND	..	0.1	..	0.1		..		0.2	..	0.2	0.0	10.0
STATELESS AND UNKNOWN	0.5	4.6	39.5	2.2		-		0.7	1.2	3.8	0.1	283.0

NOTES:

- .. No further breakdown is available
- "Zero"
- () Eurostat estimate
- = UK: Figures below 1000

Belgium: For 12100 refugees breakdown by citizenship is not available.

Germany: Data refers to the territorial situation prior to 3 October 1990.

Greece: Total includes 24100 Greek men with foreign citizenship.

France: 1990 Census results, Metropolitan France.

Ireland: For 9600 non–European men breakdown by citizenship is not available.

United Kingdom: Labour Force Survey 1991 provisional data.

China includes Taiwan.

IMMIGRATION BY COUNTRY OF PREVIOUS RESIDENCE 1991

EUROSTAT 11-Jun-93

Table 4

COUNTRY OF PREVIOUS RESIDENCE	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
TOTAL	67460	43567	1182927	24346	24320	102109			10913	121136		267000
EUR12	27713	10486	150543		8732					33914		71000
BELGIUM		460	4521		689					5402		4000
DENMARK	305		3534		106					469		1000
GERMANY	3343	2425			2671					11003		29000
GREECE	649	248	29332		24					966		5000
SPAIN	1448	948	8523							1953		4000
FRANCE	7473	1260	17701		2472					2835		15000
IRELAND	314	185	5837		30					851		..
ITALY	2557	547	38372		324					1521		6000
LUXEMBOURG	1017	118	1111		28					182		1000
NETHERLANDS	6120	497	9949		488							6000
PORTUGAL	1726	126	11489		404					1033		1000
UNITED KINGDOM	2761	3672	20174		1496					7699		
EFTA	1694	7337	32858		2881					2529		11000
AUSTRIA	102	127	16898		60					442		2000
FINLAND	234	273	2271		60					243		1000
ICELAND	..	713	431		5					63		1000
LIECHTENSTEIN	..	1	51		9					8		-
NORWAY	249	2520	1702		71					326		3000
SWEDEN	606	3014	3478		147					442		2000
SWITZERLAND	503	689	8027		2529					1005		2000
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE	(472)	1737	297362		..					4192		(2000)
of which:												
BULGARIA	..	112	17240		..					354		1000
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	90	101	24438		..					294		-
HUNGARY	11	119	25676		..					255		=
POLAND	48	773	145663		..					1452		1000
ROMANIA	..	172	84165		..					1155		=
Ex-USSR	323	460	195272		..					682		1000
OTHER EUROPE	(3097)	4227	309783		..					14960		(9000)
of which:												
TURKEY	2324	1986	82818		..					12519		2000
YUGOSLAVIA	773	831	222824		..					2315		1000

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IMMIGRATION BY COUNTRY OF PREVIOUS RESIDENCE 1991

EUROSTAT 11-Jun-93

COUNTRY OF PREVIOUS RESIDENCE	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
AFRICA	12633	2851	52761		3095					20283		(33000)
of which:												
MOROCCO	2874	342	6094		2168					8993		=
NIGERIA	..	88	8749		..					924		4000
SOUTH AFRICA	..	63	3314		47					943		8000
AMERICA	5437	8164	52174		7664					27585		(36000)
of which:												
CANADA	553	504	3901		142					1329		6000
USA	3197	3627	31614		737					5353		25000
ASIA	4984	7244	83539		776					15350		(65000)
of which:												
CHINA	424	366	5560		..					1267		2000
INDIA	634	290	8079		..					875		5000
IRAN	215	781	8143		47					1531		=
JAPAN	653	255	6209		44					1365		10000
PAKISTAN	374	692	5219		..					990		12000
VIETNAM	67	537	8732		..					228		=
AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA	246	1081	3779		336					2323		(41000)
of which:												
AUSTRALIA	201	880	3063		333					1492		30000
NEW ZEALAND	..	183	556		..					763		11000
UNKNOWN	7984	440	4804			(-)

NOTES:

- .. No further breakdown in available
- "Zero"
- () Eurostat estimate
- = United Kingdom: Figures below 1000

Belgium: For 3181 immigrants from non-European countries further breakdown by country of previous residence is not available.
Total includes 19 refugees.

Denmark: For 7 immigrants from non-EC European countries further breakdown by country of previous residence is not available.
America includes 10 immigrants from the West Indies.
Asia includes 17 immigrants from Middle East.

France: Data do not include French nationals.

EMIGRATION BY CITIZENSHIP 1991

EUROSTAT 11 - Jun-93

CITIZENS OF	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
TOTAL	33752	32629	582240		9149				6740	57447		239000
EUR12	25738	24990	181343						5519	45300		169000
BELGIUM	13217	57	1463						652	899		1000
DENMARK	191	22167	1853						142	182		2000
GERMANY	1691	583	84764						462	2527		6000
GREECE	284	57	15532						39	256		3000
SPAIN	676	103	5983						107	696		2000
FRANCE	2542	358	9761						986	775		10000
IRELAND	158	143	4846						25	262		2000
ITALY	2056	299	36609						424	552		3000
LUXEMBOURG	111	1	354						873	14		..
NETHERLANDS	2746	253	4800						243	36075		3000
PORTUGAL	360	31	4188						1321	223		1000
UNITED KINGDOM	1706	938	11190						245	2839		137000
EFTA	732	2304	19893						192	762		(2000)
AUSTRIA	46	35	12757						20	104		..
FINLAND	145	203	1689						65	111		..
ICELAND	..	645	225						9	11		..
LIECHTENSTEIN	..	-	8					
NORWAY	146	779	971						29	224		1000
SWEDEN	273	562	1872						45	183		"
SWITZERLAND	122	80	2371						24	129		"
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE	(307)	599	191899						117	982		(1000)
of which:												
BULGARIA	..	11	3630						17	66		..
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	34	57	13250						23	72		"
HUNGARY	38	31	14880						8	95		..
POLAND	163	346	117193						46	428		1000
ROMANIA	..	14	30784						8	288		..
Ex-USSR	72	140	12162						15	33		..
OTHER EUROPE	(325)	453	91323						91	2131		(3000)
of which:												
TURKEY	248	272	36638						7	1836		1000
YUGOSLAVIA	77	177	53937						84	281		..

Table 5

EMIGRATION BY CITIZENSHIP 1991

EUROSTAT 11 - Jun-93

CITIZENS OF	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
AFRICA	1556	513	22076						98	2214		(4000)
of which:												
NIGERIA	..	13	3558						..	109		1000
MOROCCO	342	71	2000						14	1149		=
GHANA	..	31	2980						4	131		=
AMERICA	3243	2038	22996						480	3065		(23000)
of which:												
USA	2528	1593	14348						326	1565		17000
CANADA	231	196	1519						21	264		3000
BRAZIL	148	79	1874						27	116		2000
ASIA	1537	1344	48995						194	2551		(24000)
of which:												
JAPAN	670	153	4832						45	896		5000
VIETNAM	14	37	9949						1	27		..
IRAN	23	276	5455						52	101		=
AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA	94	313	1777						10	406		(14000)
of which:												
AUSTRALIA	85	248	1037						7	316		9000
NEW ZEALAND	..	61	197						3	86		5000
STATELESS AND UNKNOWN	3	75	1914						39	36		(1000)

NOTES:

- .. No further breakdown is available
- "Zero"
- () Eurostat estimation
- = United Kingdom: Figures below 1000

Belgium: Total includes 59 refugees.

Switzerland: China includes 401 people from Tibet.

EMIGRATION BY COUNTRY OF NEXT RESIDENCE 1991

EUROSTAT 11-Jun-93

Table 6

COUNTRY OF NEXT RESIDENCE	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
TOTAL	33752	32629	582240		9149				6740	57417		239000
EUR12	21003	10731	124314		1769					26302		71000
BELGIUM		506	4401		37					7369		3000
DENMARK	222		2465		-					345		1000
GERMANY	2704	2793			42					6977		17000
GREECE	360	202	16258		-					1919		3000
SPAIN	1362	797	9485							2521		13000
FRANCE	6605	1324	16944		1613					474		20000
IRELAND	156	167	5084		-					1167		..
ITALY	2208	608	39207		4					356		7000
LUXEMBOURG	1176	220	1071		-					254		-
NETHERLANDS	4010	510	10278		1							6000
PORTUGAL	412	132	4901		40					532		1000
UNITED KINGDOM	1788	3472	14220		32					4388		
EFTA	1318	6671	31295		6581					2580		6000
AUSTRIA	113	146	17137		3					370		1000
FINLAND	147	238	1820		..					126		-
ICELAND	..	834	285		..					18		1000
LIECHTENSTEIN	..	2	64		..					4		-
NORWAY	156	2466	1269		227					376		2000
SWEDEN	278	2200	2432		2					332		=
SWITZERLAND	624	785	8288		6349					1354		2000
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE	(134)	738	181047		18					1110		(2000)
of which:												
BULGARIA	..	11	3555		..					58		-
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	43	98	13475		..					144		1000
HUNGARY	-	66	15278		..					155		-
POLAND	-	393	118029		2					439		1000
ROMANIA	..	17	30710		..					223		-
Ex-USSR	91	153	12987		16					91		=
OTHER EUROPE	(328)	1289	91239		..					2224		(7000)
of which:												
TURKEY	245	281	36763		..					1841		1000
YUGOSLAVIA	83	150	53571		..					282		-

EMIGRATION BY COUNTRY OF NEXT RESIDENCE 1991

EUROSTAT 11-Jun-93

COUNTRY OF NEXT RESIDENCE	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
AFRICA	2716	1342	25332		169					4084		(16000)
of which:												
MOROCCO	392	69	2072		76					1191		=
NIGERIA	..	58	3714		..					242		2000
SOUTH AFRICA	..	68	1928		..					489		6000
AMERICA	4512	6977	44936		572					13853		52000
of which:												
CANADA	456	455	5251		5					1121		14000
USA	3232	3858	29057		20					4621		32000
ASIA	1954	2284	49614		39					5576		45000
of which:												
CHINA	89	105	3073		1					142		1000
INDIA	87	89	4608		..					202		3000
IRAN	24	198	4769		..					68		=
JAPAN	672	261	5051		1					902		8000
PAKISTAN	46	283	1776		5					279		3000
VIETNAM	14	24	9741		..					12		-
AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA	233	1005	3258		1					1688		39000
of which:												
AUSTRALIA	179	846	2648		1					1015		32000
NEW ZEALAND	..	149	469		..					635		7000
STATELESS AND UNKNOWN	499	1588	18209			-

NOTES:

- .. No further breakdown is available
- "Zero"
- () Eurostat estimate
- = United Kingdom: Figures below 1000

Belgium: For 1055 emigrants to non EC European countries further breakdown by country of next residence is not available

Denmark: For 4 emigrants to Europe further breakdown by country of next residence is not available

America includes 3 emigrants to the West Indies

Spain: Africa includes 6 emigrants to Senegambia

United Kingdom: America includes 108 emigrants to Montserrat

FOREIGN EMPLOYEES BY NACE DIVISION (Thousands) 1987-1992

11-Jun-93 EUROSTAT

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	
NACE 0													
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing													
1987	0.9	1.0	12.1	0.8	:	32.2	0.8	:	0.5	2.0	:	:	1987
1988	1.0	1.0	12.1	0.9	:	40.4	0.6	:	0.6	2.0	:	:	1988
1989	1.0	0.9	13.4	0.7	1.5	41.6	0.5	:	0.6	3.0	:	:	1989
1990	:	0.9	15.1	1.2	3.1	:	0.7	:	0.7	5.0	:	:	1990
1991	:	0.9	16.9	2.0	3.3	:	0.5	:	0.8	5.0	:	:	1991
1992	:	0.9	19.7	:	20.2	:	:	:	0.8	:	:	:	1992
NACE 1													
Energy and Water													
1987	5.7	0.2	30.3	0.5	:	12.4	0.2	:	0.1	3.0	:	12.1	1987
1988	2.6	0.2	30.4	0.3	:	11.3	0.2	:	0.1	3.0	:	11.8	1988
1989	2.1	0.2	29.6	0.3	1.1	9.7	0.3	:	0.1	2.0	:	:	1989
1990	:	0.3	28.4	0.3	1.2	:	0.1	:	0.1	3.0	:	:	1990
1991	:	0.2	27.8	0.5	1.3	:	0.1	:	0.1	3.0	:	:	1991
1992	:	0.2	27.0	:	1.6	:	:	:	0.0	:	:	:	1992
NACE 2													
Mineral extraction, Chemicals													
1987	20.2	1.6	118.8	0.7	:	43.7	0.5	:	7.4	14.0	:	21.7	1987
1988	20.1	1.4	115.3	0.6	:	43.9	0.7	:	7.3	12.0	:	21.5	1988
1989	20.6	1.4	120.4	0.5	1.6	43.4	0.7	:	7.6	12.0	:	20.6	1989
1990	:	1.3	122.4	0.5	2.0	:	1.2	:	7.8	12.0	:	23.1	1990
1991	:	1.3	124.3	0.6	2.5	:	1.2	:	7.8	15.0	:	20.4	1991
1992	:	1.2	126.4	:	3.6	:	:	:	8.3	:	:	:	1992
NACE 3													
Metal manufacturing industries													
1987	24.8	6.0	477.0	1.3	:	144.6	2.1	:	3.9	30.0	:	89.2	1987
1988	24.7	5.9	469.8	1.2	:	142.3	2.1	:	4.3	28.0	:	90.5	1988
1989	26.3	5.8	486.2	1.1	2.5	138.7	2.4	:	4.6	32.0	:	71.6	1989
1990	:	5.6	507.7	1.4	3.6	:	2.2	:	5.0	31.0	:	71.5	1990
1991	:	5.4	518.8	0.6	5.0	:	3.1	:	5.3	33.0	:	66.6	1991
1992	:	4.9	514.9	:	6.3	:	:	:	5.4	:	:	:	1992
NACE 4													
Other manufacturing industries													
1987	19.7	5.9	238.7	3.3	:	146.2	2.2	:	5.1	28.0	:	97.6	1987
1988	20.1	6.2	239.2	2.8	:	137.6	2.3	:	5.4	26.0	:	103.4	1988
1989	21.9	6.0	244.3	2.6	2.8	155.1	2.5	:	5.6	30.0	:	70.3	1989
1990	:	5.9	255.6	2.9	3.5	:	2.0	:	5.9	30.0	:	60.9	1990
1991	:	5.8	274.4	1.6	4.3	:	2.9	:	6.1	33.0	:	51.6	1991
1992	:	5.4	291.3	:	8.9	:	:	:	6.2	:	:	:	1992
NACE 5													
Building and civil engineering													
1987	17.1	1.6	132.8	1.9	:	233.6	0.8	:	9.6	9.0	:	47.9	1987
1988	18.7	1.6	132.1	1.7	:	234.8	1.1	:	11.8	10.0	:	52.2	1988
1989	21.9	1.5	140.3	1.6	2.9	243.0	0.7	:	13.0	10.0	:	42.5	1989
1990	:	1.4	147.2	1.9	4.3	:	1.0	:	14.1	9.0	:	36.5	1990
1991	:	1.3	151.1	0.8	6.2	:	1.4	:	15.1	7.0	:	32.2	1991
1992	:	1.2	173.0	:	19.5	:	:	:	16.7	:	:	:	1992

Table 7

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FOREIGN EMPLOYEES BY NACE DIVISION (Thousands) 1987-1992

11-Jun-93 EUROSTAT

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	
NACE 6													
Distributive trades													
1987	36.1	7.8	204.9	6.5	:	175.5	3.8	:	11.8	25.0	:	182.5	1987
1988	37.1	8.1	219.2	6.4	:	180.1	4.5	:	14.5	26.0	:	194.9	1988
1989	40.3	7.9	232.6	6.2	12.9	186.4	3.5	:	16.0	30.0	:	158.6	1989
1990	:	7.7	251.7	6.6	16.1	:	4.0	:	17.7	36.0	:	155.7	1990
1991	:	7.8	281.1	8.1	18.9	:	3.7	:	19.1	38.0	:	141.2	1991
1992	:	7.7	320.1	:	36.6	:	:	:	20.0	:	:	:	1992
NACE 7													
Transport and communication etc.													
1987	7.3	3.0	60.3	2.1	:	34.7	0.7	:	1.9	11.0	:	56.5	1987
1988	7.5	3.2	62.4	2.1	:	37.4	0.7	:	2.5	12.0	:	49.9	1988
1989	7.3	3.1	65.6	2.3	5.0	41.4	0.8	:	2.9	12.0	:	43.6	1989
1990	:	3.1	71.7	2.3	4.9	:	0.7	:	3.5	11.0	:	50.6	1990
1991	:	3.2	80.3	5.7	5.3	:	1.0	:	3.9	10.0	:	39.6	1991
1992	:	3.2	89.1	:	5.8	:	:	:	4.4	:	:	:	1992
NACE 8													
Financing, insurance etc.													
1987	14.6	2.8	49.5	1.3	:	91.3	1.3	:	8.8	12.0	:	87.3	1987
1988	16.3	2.9	53.5	1.1	:	102.7	1.7	:	8.5	13.0	:	91.7	1988
1989	20.7	2.9	60.0	1.0	4.6	94.3	1.8	:	9.9	13.0	:	70.5	1989
1990	:	2.9	69.2	1.0	6.1	:	1.7	:	11.9	14.0	:	77.6	1990
1991	:	3.0	78.7	1.3	7.5	:	2.2	:	14.0	16.0	:	72.0	1991
1992	:	3.0	86.0	:	15.6	:	:	:	15.1	:	:	:	1992
NACE 9													
Other services													
1987	27.3	15.3	232.4	6.5	:	225.4	7.1	:	10.9	41.0	:	304.9	1987
1988	28.4	16.5	242.1	6.9	:	223.7	7.3	:	9.1	43.0	:	294.0	1988
1989	31.3	16.9	253.5	5.3	13.8	239.8	6.7	:	9.2	49.0	:	260.8	1989
1990	:	17.6	271.1	5.1	17.7	:	7.7	:	11.1	50.0	:	258.5	1990
1991	:	18.4	290.9	8.3	21.0	:	7.5	:	11.5	52.0	:	266.1	1991
1992	:	18.6	319.1	:	48.5	:	:	:	15.4	:	:	:	1992
UNKNOWN													
1987	2.5	0.4	0.0	0.0	:	6.1	0.3	:	0.7	0.0	:	11.4	1987
1988	3.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	:	6.0	0.0	:	0.1	0.0	:	4.3	1988
1989	3.3	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	9.9	0.0	:	0.3	0.0	:	4.6	1989
1990	:	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.4	:	0.0	:	0.7	0.0	:	2.5	1990
1991	:	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.6	:	0.0	:	2.7	0.0	:	:	1991
1992	:	0.1	0.1	:	1.8	:	:	:	3.0	:	:	:	1992

Source: Reg.311/76 and Labour Force Survey
 . The Labour Force Survey does not provide more detailed information for figures below 10000.

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TOTAL WORKING POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP AND AGE GROUP (Thousands) – 1991 EUROSTAT 11–jun–1993

	less than 40	15–24	25–39	40+	40–54	55–64	65+	Total
BELGIUM								
Nationals	2246	441	1805	1429	1174	240	15	3675
Other EC	135	26	109	70	61	9	1	206
Non EC	62	16	46	23	21	2	0	85
Total	2443	483	1960	1523	1256	251	16	3965
DENMARK								
Nationals	1570	551	991	1271	906	284	80	2841
Other EC	10	2	8	6	5	1	0	17
Non EC	35	11	24	15	12	2	0	50
Total	1616	565	1023	1292	924	287	81	2908
GERMANY								
Nationals	15622	4950	10673	13075	9783	2995	297	28697
Other EC	480	145	335	390	307	81	0	870
Non EC	988	324	665	750	644	100	5	1738
Total	17090	5418	11673	14215	10734	3176	305	31305
SPAIN								
Nationals	8855	2949	5905	6158	4187	1833	138	15013
Other EC	17	5	12	12	8	4	0	29
Non EC	23	5	17	9	7	2	0	32
Total	8894	2959	5935	6179	4201	1839	139	15073
FRANCE								
Nationals	13503	3043	10460	10164	7857	2149	158	23667
Other EC	350	79	271	329	253	71	5	678
Non EC	510	100	410	431	353	74	5	942
Total	14363	3222	11141	10924	8463	2293	168	25287
IRELAND								
Nationals	795	290	504	500	349	117	34	1295
Other EC	19	7	12	12	9	2	0	31
Non EC	5	1	3	2	2	1	0	7
Total	819	298	520	514	360	120	34	1334
NETHERLANDS								
Nationals	4204	1316	2888	2454	1994	403	57	6658
Other EC	58	13	45	38	32	6	0	96
Non EC	124	37	88	49	43	6	1	173
Total	4386	1366	3020	2542	2069	416	57	6928
UNITED KINGDOM								
Nationals	15620	5613	10006	11902	8509	2936	457	27521
Other EC	196	48	148	255	184	63	8	451
Non EC	321	70	251	199	155	40	4	521
Unknown	143	52	92	87	68	17	2	230
Total	16281	5784	10497	12443	8916	3055	472	28724

Denmark, Germany and France: 1990 data

France: Conscripts are counted in the total working population but are not considered as persons in employment

United Kingdom: 1989–1991 3–year average

PERSONS IN EMPLOYMENT BY CITIZENSHIP AND AGE GROUP (Thousands) – 1991 EUROSTAT 11–jun–1993

	less than 40	15–24	25–39	40+	40–54	55–64	65+	Total
BELGIUM								
Nationals	2103	394	1709	1383	1133	236	15	3486
Other EC	115	20	95	64	55	8	1	179
Non EC	45	10	34	20	18	2	0	65
Total	2263	425	1838	1468	1207	246	16	3730
DENMARK								
Nationals	1430	499	903	1193	854	260	79	2623
Other EC	9	2	7	6	5	1	0	14
Non EC	25	8	17	12	10	2	0	37
Total	1464	509	927	1210	868	262	79	2674
GERMANY								
Nationals	14694	4687	10008	12331	9308	2729	293	27025
Other EC	447	135	312	356	286	68	0	803
Non EC	843	279	564	664	577	82	5	1507
Total	15984	5100	10884	13350	10171	2879	301	29334
SPAIN								
Nationals	6943	2032	4910	5617	3803	1678	136	12559
Other EC	14	3	11	11	7	4	0	25
Non EC	18	3	15	8	6	2	0	26
Total	6974	2039	4936	5635	3816	1684	136	12609
FRANCE								
Nationals	11597	2212	9384	9370	7290	1927	153	20966
Other EC	309	65	243	296	232	60	4	605
Non EC	358	62	297	341	283	54	4	699
Total	12264	2339	9924	10006	7805	2041	161	22270
IRELAND								
Nationals	656	221	434	438	303	102	33	1094
Other EC	15	5	10	10	8	2	0	24
Non EC	4	1	3	2	2	1	0	6
Total	675	227	447	450	313	105	33	1125
NETHERLANDS								
Nationals	3889	1180	2710	2329	1887	386	57	6219
Other EC	50	11	39	35	30	5	0	85
Non EC	83	22	61	34	30	4	1	117
Total	4022	1213	2810	2398	1947	395	58	6421
UNITED KINGDOM								
Nationals	14194	4936	9259	11121	8067	2718	436	25416
Other EC	179	44	136	229	167	55	8	409
Non EC	280	58	222	179	140	35	4	459
Unknown	128	46	82	83	65	16	2	211
Total	14781	5084	9699	11612	8439	2824	450	26495

Denmark, Germany and France: 1990 data

France: Conscripts are counted in the total working population but are not considered as persons in employment

United Kingdom: 1989–1991 3–year average

UNEMPLOYED BY CITIZENSHIP AND AGE GROUP (Thousands) – 1991 EUROSTAT 11–jun–1993

	less than 40	15–24	25–39	40+	40–54	55–64	65+	Total
BELGIUM								
Nationals	143	47	95	46	41	5	0	189
Other EC	20	5	15	6	6	0	0	26
Non EC	17	6	11	3	3	0	0	20
Total	180	58	122	55	50	5	0	235
DENMARK								
Nationals	140	52	88	78	52	24	1	218
Other EC	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	2
Non EC	10	3	7	3	3	1	0	13
Total	152	56	97	82	56	25	1	234
GERMANY								
Nationals	928	263	665	744	475	266	0	1672
Other EC	33	10	23	34	21	13	0	67
Non EC	146	45	101	86	67	19	0	232
Total	1107	318	789	865	563	298	0	1971
SPAIN								
Nationals	1912	917	995	542	384	155	2	2454
Other EC	3	2	1	1	1	0	0	4
Non EC	5	2	3	1	1	0	0	6
Total	1920	921	1000	544	386	156	2	2464
FRANCE								
Nationals	1675	608	1067	794	567	222	6	2469
Other EC	41	13	28	33	21	11	0	73
Non EC	152	38	113	91	70	20	1	242
Total	1867	660	1207	918	658	253	7	2785
IRELAND								
Nationals	139	69	70	62	46	15	1	201
Other EC	5	2	2	2	2	0	0	6
Non EC	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	144	71	73	64	47	15	1	208
NETHERLANDS								
Nationals	315	136	178	125	108	17	0	439
Other EC	8	3	6	3	2	1	0	12
Non EC	41	15	26	15	13	2	0	56
Total	364	154	210	143	123	20	0	507
UNITED KINGDOM								
Nationals	1425	678	748	680	442	218	21	2106
Other EC	17	5	12	26	17	7	1	43
Non EC	42	12	29	20	15	5	0	62
Unknown	16	6	10	4	3	1	0	19
Total	1500	701	799	730	477	231	22	2230

Denmark, Germany and France: 1990 data
 United Kingdom: 1989–1991 3–year average

FOREIGN EMPLOYEES BY NATIONALITY 1991 (REG 311/76) - TOTAL												
(Thousands)												
	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
NATIONALITY												
EUR 12	:	12.7	496.8	17.6	36.1	:	18.5	:	81.4	92.0	8.3	332.8
Belgium		0.1	6.5	0.5	1.2	:	0.1	:	15.1	24.0	0.4	.
Denmark	:		2.7	0.6	0.7	:	0.3	:	0.4	1.0	0.1	.
Germany	:	4.0		4.1	6.9	:	0.9	:	9.1	18.0	1.3	16.6
Greece	:	0.2	103.1		0.1	:	0.1	:	0.1	2.0	0.0	.
Spain	:	0.4	61.1	0.1		:	0.1	:	1.0	8.0	2.5	18.2
France	:	0.9	42.3	2.1	5.0		0.5	:	21.9	4.0	1.1	20.2
Ireland	:	0.5	2.0	0.2	0.8	:		:	0.2	2.0	0.0	203.3
Italy	:	0.8	168.8	1.6	2.8	:	0.3		8.3	9.0	0.4	40.4
Luxembourg	:	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	:	0.0	:		0.0	0.0	.
Netherlands	:	1.0	24.7	1.2	2.0	:	0.4	:	1.1		0.6	10.6
Portugal	:	0.1	45.0	0.0	8.3	:	0.0	:	23.4	4.0		.
United Kingdom	:	4.6	39.7	7.2	8.4	:	15.8	:	0.9	19.0	2.0	
NON-EC												
COUNTRIES	:	34.3	1327.5	11.9	39.4	:	5.0	:	5.1	122.0	31.5	371.1
Other Europe	:	23.0	1139.0	3.7	2.1	:	0.1	:	2.4	56.0	0.8	:
Yugoslavia	:	3.6	318.5	0.1	0.2	:	0.0	:	1.2	6.0	0.0	.
Turkey	:	6.8	624.1	0.6	0.1	:	0.0	:	0.0	45.0	0.0	.
African countries	:	:	48.6	:	9.5	:	:	:	:	:	22.8	:
Algeria	:	0.1	2.4	0.0	0.2	:	0.0	:	0.0	0.0	0.0	.
Morocco	:	0.6	19.1	0.0	6.6	:	0.0	:	0.1	30.0	0.0	.
Tunisia	:	0.1	8.8	0.0	0.1	:	0.0	:	0.0	1.0	0.0	.
Other countries	:	:	139.8	:	27.8	:	:	:	:	:	7.9	:
USA	:	:	:	:	3.1	:	:	:	0.4	:	1.3	:
Canada	:	:	:	:	0.2	:	:	:	:	:	0.4	:
India	:	:	:	:	1.0	:	:	:	:	:	0.2	:
Japan	:	:	:	:	0.9	:	:	:	:	:	0.1	:
Stateless	:	0.4	18.2	0.0	0.1	:	:	:	:	1.0	0.1	:
TOTAL	:	47.4	1842.4	29.5	75.5	:	23.6	:	86.5	214.0	39.9	704.0

Notes: The sum of individual countries might not be equal to the subtotal due to rounding errors

: not available

. The Labour Force Survey does not always provide more detailed information for figures below 10000

FOREIGN EMPLOYEES BY NATIONALITY 1992 (REG 311/76) - TOTAL
(Thousands)

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
NATIONALITY												
EUR 12		12.8	475.9		36.1				86.8			
Belgium		0.1	6.5		1.2				15.9			
Denmark			2.7		0.7				0.4			
Germany		4.0			6.9				9.7			
Greece		0.2	103.1		0.1				0.1			
Spain		0.4	61.1						1.0			
France		0.9	42.3		5.0				24.7			
Ireland		0.5	2.0		0.8				0.2			
Italy		0.8	168.8		2.8				8.2			
Luxembourg		0.0	0.9		0.0							
Netherlands		1.0	24.7		2.0				1.1			
Portugal		0.1	45.0		8.3				24.5			
United Kingdom		4.6	39.7		8.4				1.0			
NON-EC												
COUNTRIES		34.3	1327.5		39.4				4.6			
Other Europe		23.0	1139.0		2.1				2.6			
Yugoslavia		3.6	318.5		0.2				1.4			
Turkey		6.8	624.1		0.1				0.0			
African countries		:	48.6		9.5				:			
Algeria		0.1	2.4		0.2				0.0			
Morocco		0.6	19.1		6.6				0.1			
Tunisia		0.1	8.8		0.1				0.0			
Other countries		:	139.8		27.8				:			
USA		:	:		3.1				0.4			
Canada		:	:		0.2				0.1			
India		:	:		1.0				0.0			
Japan		:	:		0.9				0.2			
Stateless		0.4	18.2		0.1				0.8			
TOTAL		47.4	1842.4		75.5				92.3			

Notes: The sum of individual countries might not be equal to the subtotal due to rounding errors
: not available
. The Labour Force Survey does not always provide more detailed information for figures below 10000

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
CITIZENS OF												
TOTAL	67460	43567	1182927	24346	24320	102109			10913	120237		267000
EUR12	38166	25110	390190	13972	17047	9320			8592	55952		148000
BELGIUM	13330	71	2126	85	169	916			869	1632		=
DENMARK	378	21445	3060	137	88	258			169	351		1000
GERMANY	2695	934	262436	665	749	1407			618	5891		7000
GREECE	714	104	28419	10993	8	192			91	702		1000
SPAIN	754	156	4860	15	13767	372			116	587		2000
FRANCE	5799	433	12886	342	452	..			1145	1411		9000
IRELAND	396	149	5768	35	19	384			47	918		2000
ITALY	2601	247	35768	191	248	1526			480	1024		4000
LUXEMBOURG	184	4	494	2	3	22			938	18		=
NETHERLANDS	6207	337	6567	220	192	511			267	35949		4000
PORTUGAL	1894	39	11007	10	338	1090			3471	791		=
UNITED KINGDOM	3214	1191	16799	1277	1014	2642			381	6678		117000
EFTA	1433	2882	23796	878	368	1589			247	1209		6000
AUSTRIA	78	52	13480	193	41	120			23	246		=
FINLAND	276	268	2170	233	53	183			36	214		1000
ICELAND	..	571	384	..	1	..			18	48		=
LIECHTENSTEIN	..	1	11	..	-		1000
NORWAY	241	996	1470	73	51	125			49	205		3000
SWEDEN	637	902	2898	264	87	341			82	302		=
SWITZERLAND	201	92	3383	115	135	820			39	194		1000
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE	(1113)	1635	293018	3409	..	5167			307	4156		(2000)
of which:												
BULGARIA	..	96	17085	882	..	384			55	349		1000
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	96	89	22378	67	..	137			32	240		..
HUNGARY	108	105	24734	98	..	128			31	245		=
POLAND	524	744	128422	421	..	2420			64	1495		1000
ROMANIA	..	170	61487	565	..	1247			84	1163		=
Ex-USSR	385	431	38912	1376	..	851			41	664		=
OTHER EUROPE	(3882)	2723	307888	571	..	(10727)			499	14976		(3000)
of which:												
TURKEY	2900	1907	82536	106	..	9327			27	12663		1000
YUGOSLAVIA	982	808	221263	137	..	1088			446	2276		1000

IMMIGRATION BY CITIZENSHIP 1991

EUROSTAT 11-Jun-93

CITIZENS OF	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
AFRICA	9673	1838	48212	1520	2670	46765			190	18444		(14000)
of which:					2208							
MOROCCO	3443	323	6077	24	1917	17774			25	9260		=
ALGERIA	503	53	1790	9	180	11775			14	167		=
NIGERIA	..	33	8586	7			2	811		2000
AMERICA	4786	2389	32552	1650	3229	7353			501	12516		(25000)
of which:					3163							
USA	2884	1460	19183	249	170	2712			216	2607		18000
CANADA	405	224	2081	51	25	643			19	547		4000
SURINAM	..	1	8	6688		..
BRAZIL	318	129	3511	35	147	576			67	559		=
ASIA	5369	5450	82065	1931	659	20730			432	12027		(47000)
of which:					189							
JAPAN	742	188	5917	68	41	1318			158	1312		7000
INDIA	796	221	7995	146	..	639			25	826		5000
VIETNAM	71	635	10316	5	..	3150			7	713		=
PAKISTAN	456	450	4845	99	..	342			5	826		7000
IRAN	259	955	8361	18	44	458			37	1636		=
CHINA	560	328	4793	1233			52	1392		2000
AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA	164	368	2336	88	19	245			24	810		(22000)
of which:												
AUSTRALIA	123	281	1498	69	16	177			..	617		12000
NEW ZEALAND	..	85	326	19	..	51			6	184		9000
STATELESS AND UNKNOWN	12	1172	2833	327	..	189			121	147		(0)

NOTES:

- .. No further breakdown is available
- "Zero"
- () Eurostat estimation
- = United Kingdom: Figures below 1000

Belgium: Total includes 244 refugees

Denmark: Asia includes 21 immigrants from Middle East without further breakdown by citizenship

France: French citizens are not included

For 13 non-EC Europeans further breakdown by citizenship is not available

Asia includes 57 Arabs. Further breakdown by citizenship is not available

Greece: Asia includes 21 Kurds and 5 Assyrians.

Switzerland: China includes 426 people from Tibet

REFUGEES 1991

EUROSTAT 11-Jun-93

CITIZENS OF	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
TOTAL	206	3501				15467		8108		2695		505
EUROPE	25	123				3578		5278		288		112
EUR12								3				
GERMANY								-				
GREECE								-				
SPAIN								3				
FRANCE								-				
ITALY								-				
NETHERLANDS								-				
PORTUGAL								-				
UNITED KINGDOM								-				
EFTA												
AUSTRIA												
SWEDEN												
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE	10	22				976		3265		66		9
of which:												
BULGARIA	-	1				151		256		-		-
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	1	-				5		144		-		-
HUNGARY	-	-				2		120		-		-
POLAND	-	3				7		1104		-		2
ROMANIA	9	18				609		1566		-		7
USSR	-	40				202		75		66		10
OTHER EUROPE	15	61				2602		2010		222		93
of which:												
TURKEY	9	17				2243		2		222		90
YUGOSLAVIA	3	41				91		67		-		3

Table 11

REFUGEES 1991

EUROSTAT 11-Jun-93

CITIZENS OF	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
AFRICA	65	595				2268		2005		332		180
of which:												
SOMALIA	20	552				27		1166		217		48
ETHIOPIA	5	14				74		634		115		67
ZAIRE	23	1				744		19				12
AMERICA	22	1				528		50		100		22
ASIA	94	1994				9066		744		827		182
of which:												
SRI LANKA	-	100				4050		56				17
VIETNAM	48	617				2757		279				3
IRAN	10	469				199		149		341		57
IRAQ	4	472				190		62		251		45
CAMBODIA	12	11				887		53				
LAOS	9	-				621		25				
AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA												
of which:												
AUSTRALIA												
NEW ZEALAND												
STATELESS	-	788				24		31		-		9
UNKNOWN	-	-				3		-		1148		9

NOTES:

- .. No further breakdown is available
- "Zero"
- () Eurostat estimation

France: Chine includes 3 from Tibet

Italy: Somalia includes 1 refugee from Erithrea

United Kingdom: Provisional data

Switzerland: China includes 1178 from Tibet

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
12 CITIZENS OF												
Table TOTAL	15354	4609	256112		8142	47380		15648		21615	233	44842
EUROPE	6129	1336	166662		2522	14958		14575		7956	64	3700
EUR12	12	3						1				
of which:												
BELGIUM								1				
GERMANY	3	2						-				
GREECE	1	-						-				
SPAIN	1	-						-				
FRANCE	6	-						-				
NETHERLANDS	-	-						-				
UNITED KINGDOM	1	1						-				
EFTA	2	1						1				
of which:												
AUSTRIA								1				
FINLAND	-	-						-				
NORWAY	2	1						-				
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE	3482	566	(45894)		(2462)	3912		1987		4084	62	(1196)
of which:												
BULGARIA	403	40	..		577	569		418		440	1	374
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	13	6	1546		..	27		2		250	-	6
HUNGARY	42	7	396		..	11		2		171	4	..
POLAND	472	91	3448		972	406		9		548	4	19
ROMANIA	2386	108	40504		813	2486		1491		1662	45	556
Ex-USSR	166	314	..		100	413		65		1013	8	243
OTHER EUROPE	(2467)	766	(98731)		(60)	11046		12586		(3872)	2	(2429)
of which:												
TURKEY	1083	51	23877		..	9915		1		914	-	2111
YUGOSLAVIA	1168	705	74854		60	875		48		2733	2	318

CITIZENS OF	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
AFRICA	5982	591	36094		(2291)	16494		822		(4891)	148	27498
of which:												
ZAIRE	2020	12	..		163	4402		18		297	60	7010
NIGERIA	773	35	8358		331	221		6		740	4	333
GHANA	1459	19	4541		106	677		6		465	39	2405
ANGOLA	363	1	..		497	1718		7		159	6	5782
ETHIOPIA	70	42	3096		..	42		345		816	3	1687
SOMALIA	78	280	33		406		1710	-	1995
MALI	19	1	3223		-		..	1	..
TOGO	203	2	68		1		98	1	1308
UGANDA	8	71	3		-		..	-	1448
SUDAN	13	3	16		6		97	-	1151
CONGO	16	1	855		1		..	1	372
LIBERIA	224	25	..		358	199		12		335	24	..
GUINEA	86	7	..		67	1011		1		..	-	..
MAURITANIA	11	2	1116		-		..	-	..
SENEGAL	54	2	..		339	701		-		..	1	..
AMERICA	148	9	293		(2087)	1091		8		(197)	1	180
of which:												
PERU	21	6	..		1618	176		5		..	-	..
ASIA	3257	2111	50612		(379)	14730		242		(7827)	20	13033
of which:												
SRI LANKA	30	280	5623		..	3400		104		1821	3	3763
IRAN	173	418	8643		70	305		22		1726	-	530
PAKISTAN	906	68	4364		..	1892		17		218	4	3243
INDIA	1269	35	5523		..	1128		2		318	4	2075
AFGHANISTAN	36	75	7357		..	104		1		297	-	..
LEBANON	129	110	4887		..	75		37		213	-	756
CHINA	47	51	2442		3		1311	3	525
IRAQ	61	967	..		309	169		29		684	1	914
VIETNAM	112	-	2301		17		503	-	..
BANGLADESH	286	10	691		2		66	3	296
LAOS	21	-	1174		-		..	-	..
AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA												
of which:												
AUSTRALIA												
N.ZEALAND												
STATELESS AND UNKNOWN	4	562	2451			107		1		224		435

NOTES:

.. No further breakdown is available

- "Zero"

() Eurostat estimate

Denmark: USSR figures exclude Baltic states

Spain: Includes refugees

France: Chine includes 3 from Tibet

Netherlands: Only those countries of nationality are separately listed that numbered at least fifty

United Kingdom: Provisional data