

THE TWO FACES OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

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[PAPER ABSTRACT]

The paper examines how international cooperation practices influence the policy-making processes in Central and Eastern Europe; the focus is on the consequences for the democratization projects of these states in general and in particular – for their elites' autonomy.

The analysis is based on a qualitative comparative study of the impact a security and an economic/governmental international organization, NATO and the EU, have had on two Central and East European countries – Poland and Romania – which were diametrically opposite with respect to their elites' autonomy before the cooperation process began. The study traces the chronological development of the EU's and NATO's involvement in Central and Eastern Europe, focusing on the content of cooperation and how it impacts elite accountability and control. Furthermore, since international regimes could influence the way domestic forces exercise control over their elites, the paper also examines whether the institutionalization of the cooperation processes limits or encourages the elites' autonomy by redistributing elites' and domestic groups' access to procedural and cognitive political resources. The procedural instruments examined include policy-making initiative and institutions, while the cognitive resources studied are ideas and information to monitor and evaluate government performance.

The paper concludes that the involvement of the EU and NATO in Central and Eastern Europe has served to enhance the quality of these democracies unevenly: the reforms promoted by the two international institutions not only provided Central and Eastern European executives with a better capacity to articulate national interests but also limited the state elites' prerogatives; yet, through the institutionalization of the cooperation process, the executives were also empowered within the realm of those newly limited prerogatives. Whether they were originally developed as in Poland, or weak as in Romania, democratic forums were largely marginalized in the domestic policy-making process as control over the procedural and cognitive resources was redistributed in favor of the executive. In sum, the institutionalization of the EU and NATO involvement has served to widen the gap between state elites and citizenry by enhancing elite autonomy at the expense of representative institutions such as parliaments. This process, however, has not necessarily been EU- or NATO- specific but rather inherent to the internationalization of policy-making.

The analysis ends with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the democratization project of Central and Eastern European countries in the long term and for international cooperation in general. Thus the paper argues against the proponents of the belief that the institutionalization of democracy could be supported by the assistance of external forces, if domestic actors are lacking or weak and that integration in "the West" is Central and Eastern Europe's surest way to democratization. The study also cautions against theories of international cooperation that treat states as unitary actors and overlook the domestic distribution of international collective action benefits.

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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

1. CEEC Post-communist Democratization Agenda

With the collapse of state-socialism, most of the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) became committed to the liberalization of their political and economic systems. However, during the period of state-socialism/communism the public sphere had swallowed up the private; civil and political society had been either destroyed or prevented from developing; and the state had become intertwined with, and quite dependent upon, the regime.¹ Therefore, part of the democratization reform agenda grew to be the “de-etatization” of the political systems – a series of state-rebuilding processes aiming at the separation and explicit delineation of the role of the state bureaucracies meant to restore not only the boundaries between politics and economics, but also the boundaries separating public from private, the state from civil society, and the regime from the state. A step in that direction was the revising/ redrafting of constitutions immediately after the collapse of state socialism but necessary was also a change in the nature of state power so that it would support and complement the democratization of the political system. During the period of state-socialism the Communist Party/State elites possessed considerable – if unconstitutional – power, as the vanguard, and thus “trustee” of the interests of their peoples. Hence, the successful democratization of CEE also entails on the one hand, decreasing the autonomy of the elites, and institutionalizing and strengthening the elites’ accountability; and on the other hand, increasing of the capacity of the state to actually penetrate society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.²

2. International Environment

In addition to domestic political and economic restructuring, most of the former state-socialist countries opted for establishing political and economic relations with “the West” as a step to make the transition to liberal democracy and market economy irreversible in the immediate term and to acquire a new ‘home’ in the international system in the long run.³ Consequently, they sought membership in almost all “Western” international organizations (IOs) and most importantly, in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both organizations made an explicit link between membership and the adoption of liberal norms and values. Accordingly, the EU and NATO began playing an important role in the transitions of CEECs by helping them democratize and thus meet the membership criteria. As a part of the socialization processes meant to prepare these countries for membership, the two organizations have been providing blueprints for reform, examples to emulate, and direct expert guidance with the assumption that such aid can be crucial and can offer tangible solutions to the CEECs, most of which “lack the technical expertise to design the democratic institutions they desire.”⁴ Important, then, becomes the question about the effects of this international assistance on the democratization process in CEE.

¹ Valerie Bunce, “The Collapse of Socialism, the Soviet Bloc and Socialist States: An Institutional Account,” *Columbia International Affairs Online Working Papers* (Columbia University).

² After Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Powers of the State,” *European Journal of Sociology* (1985): 185-213.

³ Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: a Constructivist Explanation,” *Security Studies*, 8.2-3 (1998-1999): 198-234.

⁴ Dessie Zagorcheva in Dan Reiter, “Correspondence with Harvey Waterman and Dessie Zagorcheva,” *International Security*, 26.3 (Winter 2001): 221-235.

3. Theoretical Context

Scholars, observing the changes in the post-socialist world, were concerned about the possible democratic deficiencies of the CEECs, faced with the strong state-socialist legacies, the inexperience of post-communist elites, and the complications of a simultaneous transition from state-socialism to democracy and from planned to market economy.⁵ However, other intellectuals and eastern and western practitioners, triumphant in response to the Third Wave of Democratization, fostered the belief that the institutionalization of democracy could be supported by the assistance of external forces, if domestic actors were lacking or weak.⁶ This body of literature was further expanded by the (practicing and academic) proponents of both NATO and EU enlargement, who advocated that integration in “the West” is the CEECs’ surest way to democratization.⁷ At the same time, scholars studying the EU have been drawing attention to its democratic dilemma (utilitarian or democratic roots of legitimacy).⁸ This has led some to speculate that the EU could be exporting its democratic deficit.⁹ Some studies on the involvement of external actors in the civil society sector have also pointed to the problems of “exporting democracy” in general.¹⁰

4. Research Question

How and to what degree did major IOs like the EU and NATO, so closely involved in the CEEC transition, affect the democratization projects of CEECs? Have Western efforts been helpful, irrelevant or detrimental to the consolidation of CEE democracies in the short and the long terms? Little work has been done in assessing either the planned or the unintended consequences of the

⁵ Philip G. Roeder, “The Revolution of 1989: Postcommunism and the Social Sciences,” *Slavic Review*, 58.4 (Winter 1999): 743-756; Valerie Bunce, “The Transition from State Socialism to Liberal Democracy,” *World Policy* (1990); Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Press, eds., *Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Claus Offe, “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe,” *Social Research*, 58.4 (Winter 1991): 865- 897.

⁶ Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors, and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995); Laurence Whitehead, *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996); Jack Snyder, *From Voting To Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York, NY: Norton and Co., 2000); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Strobe Talbott, “Why NATO Should Grow,” *New York Review of Books*, 42 (August 10, 1995): 27-30. Arguments about the importance of external actors in bolstering civil society have been even more prevalent, for example: Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

⁷ Gale Mattox, “NATO Enlargement: A Step in the Process of Alliance Reform,” and Ronald Bee, “Boarding the NATO Train: Enlargement and National Interests,” in Robert Rachhaus, ed., *Explaining NATO Enlargement* (London, UK: Frank Cass, 2001); Frank Steves, “Poland and the International System: External Influences on Democratic Consolidation,” (Available Online 16 October 2001).

⁸ Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., *The European Union: How Democratic Is It?* (London, UK: Sage, 1996); Brigitte Boyce, “The Democratic Deficit of the European Community,” *Parliamentary Affairs*, 46.4 (1993): 458-477; Shirley Williams, “Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community,” in Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, eds., *The New European Community: Decision-making and Institutional Change* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991); Jeffrey J. Anderson, ed., *Regional Integration and Democracy: Expanding on the European Experience* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

⁹ Margit Besseney Williams, “Exporting the Democratic Deficit: Hungary’s Experience with the EU Integration,” *Problems of Post-Communism*, 48.1 (January/February 2001): 27-38; Heather Grabbe, “Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process,” Paper for the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Turin, 22-27 March 2002.

¹⁰ Sarah L. Henderson, “Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 35.2 (March 2002): 139-167; Janine Wedel, *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989-1998* (New York, NY: St. Martin’s, 1998).

cooperation between IOs and CEECs on limiting the institutional and practical elite autonomy.¹¹ Yet, the desire to deny Communist Party/State elite the ability to set goals with marginal input or control by domestic groups was a focal point for the mobilization of opposition to state-socialism and the impetus for the democratization project in CEE. Furthermore, the study of elite autonomy seems an important inquiry because of its bearing on issues like accountability, legitimacy, popular control and representation, responsiveness of elites. To address this gap in the literature on CEE transitions, this study sets out to answer the question: how did cooperation with the two IOs influence the negotiations between political leadership heading CEE states and domestic groups either through civil society or the electorate? It should be noted, however, that this study concerns itself primarily with the relationship between the executive and the legislature, because since the fall of communism CEE parliaments have proven to be the most prominent venue for societal control over state elites and because the benefits of direct civil society access to the executive have already been questioned elsewhere.

5. Hypotheses

Since IOs, like the EU and NATO, have been guiding CEECs efforts for democratization, and since part of the democratization of CEECs involves restricting the independent power of state elites, previous academic work suggests two hypotheses about the possible impact of the two IOs on elite autonomy:

Hypothesis One, could be put forth by the proponents of external expertise: It could be expected that the intervention of IOs would contain initiatives and incentives that encourage the re-building CEE states, so that the power of the political leadership heading CEE states to set out goals independent of routine negotiations with domestic groups is limited (but so that the state has the organizational capacity to implement whatever goals have been set up). Most importantly, using the conditionality of the application process, social influence or persuasion, the IOs could have favored the de jure and de facto enhancing of domestic control over CEECs' state elites. Furthermore, the IOs could have set an example with the way they involved both the state elites and the institutions, overseeing CEECs' foreign policy, in the cooperation process.

Hypothesis Two, borrows insights from the literature on the problems of "exporting democracy" and the literature about the dilemmas involved in the institutionalization of international regimes: It could be expected that the intervention of IOs would be intended to promote the establishment of institutions that guarantee civic control over state elites. However, given the complexity of the democratization problems, the short political deadlines for meeting the membership criteria with limited resources, and the constitutional "near-monopoly" of the executive in foreign policy, IOs might have been tempted to channel their influence mainly through the top governmental level rather than rely on the mercy of inexperienced CEECs parliament. This empowerment of the executive and marginalization of parliaments would parallel EU practices that have led the integration priorities to take precedence over legitimacy and accountability in the EU structures.

6. Research Design

To test these hypotheses, I evaluate not only the direction and ends of IO involvement but also the biases, mobilized in the political organization of CEEC-IO cooperation. First, I analyze whether the institutionalization of the cooperation between the IOs and CEECs limits or encourages elite autonomy. Domestic societies use both procedural and cognitive instruments to assert their control over executive actions.¹² Furthermore, as Moravcsik points out, international regimes utilize

¹¹ Elite autonomy is defined here as the autonomy of the political leadership heading CEE states (state elites) to set goals independent of routine negotiations with domestic groups.

¹² John Ferejohn, "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control," *Public Choice*, 50 (1986): 5-26.

structures that correspond closely to these domestic instruments.¹³ Therefore, international regimes can influence the way domestic forces exercise control over their state elites.¹⁴ To assess this influence, I examine how the cooperation between IOs and the CEECs has redistributed the access of both elites and domestic groups to procedural and cognitive structures. Second, in addition to studying the cooperation political structures, I also look more closely to the goals of cooperation and how they influence elite autonomy.

Finally, to test the two hypotheses, I use a comparative study of the influence a security and an economic/government IO have had on two CEECs. Thus I can distinguish both between the difference in IO impact within the same country and between the difference in IO impact among different countries. In order to isolate a generalizable conclusion about the effects of international cooperation on elite autonomy, I examine two former socialist countries that were mostly similar before the cooperation process began but for their elite autonomy. To assess the control domestic groups exercise over state elites, I rely on the strength of their civil societies since the final years of state-socialism and the development of their parliaments in the initial years of the post-communist transition. Initially Poland had the most developed civil society and a robust parliament, which allowed for regular rotation of elites through elections. Romania, on the other hand, had the weakest and most fragmented civil society and a parliament that did not prove to be a stringent check on post-socialist government activity.¹⁵ Therefore, Poland and Romania seem suitable case studies for testing the two hypotheses.

Given the difference between the two CEECs, I would expect to validate the two hypotheses in the following way:

Hypothesis One: the IOs promoted reforms that assert institutional and practical decrease of elite autonomy. The IOs also provided for a genuine involvement of both the executive and the legislature in the accession process, as well as equal participation of politicians and bureaucratic officials within the executive. In Poland, the IOs should have stimulated the already existing democratic actors, whereas in Romania, the IOs should have paid particular attention to bolstering the development of democratic actors.

Hypothesis Two: despite promoting the establishment of institutions of social control over state elites, the IOs' practices created incentives for ignoring and circumventing of democratic forums, whether they are developed (operational, well-functioning) as in Poland or not, as in Romania.

7. Theoretical Framework

Decreasing elite autonomy is a function of increasing the exercised societal control. In other words, the relationship between the executives and domestic groups can be seen as an ongoing set of bargains, where the relative bargaining power determines the degree of autonomy of executive with respect to their preferred domestic policies.¹⁶ To assert control over the executive actions, domestic groups must enjoy access to procedural and cognitive resources. Procedural instruments include institutions and initiative. "Initiative" stands for the authority to introduce or block the introduction of issues onto the domestic agenda. "Institutions" are the procedures by which domestic decisions

¹³ Andrew Moravcsik, "Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Association, New York, NY (1-4 September 1994) borrowing from Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

¹⁴ Andrew Moravcsik, "Why the European Community Strengthens the State..."

¹⁵ Patricia Chilton, "Mechanisms of Change: Social Movements, Transnational Coalitions, and the Transformation Process in Eastern Europe," in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In* (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Mitchell Orenstein, *Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

¹⁶ Moravcsik, "Why the European Community...", p. 4.

are legally adopted. Cognitive resources comprise information and ideas to monitor and evaluate government performance. “Information” refers to political and technical knowledge. “Ideas” include the supply of legitimate ideological justifications for specific policies.¹⁷ Then, the relative bargaining power of executives and social groups can be evaluated in terms of their respective controls over the four domestic political resources: *initiative, institutions, information* and *ideas*.

International regimes are said to: create a negotiating forum with rules governing bargaining and linkage; codify the legal liabilities of governments; facilitate the intergovernmental exchange of information; legitimate cooperation ideologically.¹⁸ Those functions correspond closely to domestic practices used by domestic forces to exercise control over their government. Therefore, international regimes could influence the way the domestic groups limit elite autonomy. The process of international cooperation (especially preparation for membership) can redistribute control over domestic initiative and over the domestic procedures, under which policy decisions are ratified and implemented. The exchange of information between governments can modify the domestic distribution of political and technical knowledge by addressing or creating specific information imbalances. Finally, international cooperation can alter the set of ideas employed in ideological debates or reshape their justification.

Given that international cooperation can redistribute control over domestic political resources, the question that this paper tries to answer – did cooperation with IOs help decrease elite autonomy – can be broken down into the following sub-questions:

How has IO involvement influenced the authority of elites and domestic groups to introduce or block the introduction of issues onto the domestic agenda?

How has CEEC-IO cooperation constrained or altered the actions of domestic legislative authorities?

How has the exchange of information between IOs and CEECs modified the domestic distribution of political and technical knowledge?

How has IO assistance changed the set of legitimate policies?

8. Overview of the Study

This study of the impact of cooperation with NATO and the EU on Poland and Romania suggests that while the EU and NATO are democracy-promoting IOs, they have also in certain ways compromised the democratization projects. In both Romania and Poland, the EU pushed forth many reforms necessary to build a stable liberal democracy, including the restructuring of the executive in the direction of the clear delineation of its responsibilities and improved inter-departmental coordination. NATO not only established a balanced type of civil-military relations in both Poland and Romania but also broadened their scope to include other institutions governing the domestic order and civil society organizations in Romania. As a result of the interaction with both IOs, the Romanian and Polish executives were reformed to be limited in their prerogatives but with a better capacity to articulate national interests. However, there were also some costs of the cooperation process itself. In particular, despite promoting the establishment of channels for domestic control over the executive, the IOs practices empowered the executive within its limited entitlement. Whether they are developed as in Poland or not, as in Romania, democratic forums were largely marginalized in the domestic policy process through the redistribution of control over the four domestic political resources in favor of the executive.

Some words of caution concerning methodology and interpretation of the evidence are necessary. The impact of the two IOs should not be overestimated: both the IO and candidate country governments have a vested interest in claiming that the IOs are the principal driver of most reforms. It is also important to distinguish IO influence from other powerful exogenous and endogenous processes like globalization and the simultaneous transition from state-socialism to

¹⁷ This theoretical framework is borrowed from Moravcsik, “Why the European Community...,” p. 6.

¹⁸ Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

democracy and from planned to market economy. A further distinction should also be made – that between intentional and unintentional effects of the IO involvement, especially in a context where the IO norms are oftentimes poorly understood and have been invoked without IO demand in various contexts. Furthermore, some of the consequences are not so much a result of deliberate norms and models but rather a product of the incentives and interests created by cooperation institutionalization. Finally, it is as of yet difficult to speak definitively about the effects of the two IOs on CEECs, given the dynamic nature of the process, which is still developing.

A final cautionary note concerns the subject matter itself: foreign policy offers few opportunities for substantial input by legislatures. Foreign policy issues are under minimal parliamentary scrutiny and oversight is usually limited to the ratification of government-initiated proposals. Legislative involvement lengthens and complicates international cooperation and executive elites tend to exclude additional actors. Yet, the cooperation between the two IOs and CEECs does not constitute just a foreign policy issue but something that affects the transformation of CEE societies. Cooperation with the IOs changed not only the operation of domestic politics but also their nature. Therefore, limited CEE parliament's and its relevant social and economic committees' involvement in the process is an especially disturbing trend because it diminishes the influence CEE societies have on their post-socialist transformation.

The next part of the study examines the impact of the cooperation between NATO and Poland and between NATO and Romania. Both processes were very much initiated and driven by the executive. *Initiative* in the defense and security domains was largely transferred to the executive network of NATO and CEEC officials in both cases. In Romania there was a further erosion of parliament's involvement in defense and security matters because reform in these policy areas was promoted through governmental directives rather than parliamentary legislation. However, some channels for civil society participation in those domains were open in Romania. In both Poland and Romania, NATO supplied CEEC officials with technical and political *information* about its preferred policies, which not only mobilized support for (NATO-suggested) reforms but gave officials involved in the cooperation process the opportunity to alter the domestic distribution of *information* to their advantage. Finally, NATO and CEEC executives successfully limited the legitimate set of *ideas* in defense and security to include only ones compatible with the alliance's but at the expense of limiting debate in defense and security matters in general.

The second subsection of this part evaluates the impact of cooperation between the EU and Poland and between the EU and Romania. Such cooperation resulted in a pronounced shift of policy *initiation* to the EU level with few opportunities for national input. The executive was empowered with the colossal and important obligations of managing the integration process. Parliaments are further restrained by fast-track *procedures* for passing EU-related legislation, which allowed them little input or oversight. The cooperation process limited the *ideas* in circulation in many policy areas by the linkage between the EU and the success of CEEC transition and the CEEC obligation to synchronize their policies with the EU's. The redistribution of *information* as a result of the EU-CEECE cooperation increased domestic competition and favored integration.

The third part of this study summarizes the similarities and differences in EU/NATO impact between Poland and Romania and in EU/NATO impact within the same country. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the possible implications of the unintended empowerment of the executive in terms of the democratization process in CEE.

PART TWO: IO INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

An important outcome of the global spread of democracy is that scholars and practitioners have become increasingly prone to regard democracy as a universal value whose roots can be nurtured in all regions of the world.¹⁹ Accordingly, the discussion in academic and policy-making circles has gradually shifted to whether and to what degree state and non-state actors should and can be actively involved in democracy promotion abroad. Foreign influence has often been seen to provide an international context that can facilitate the development of democratic practices within a given country. The experience with international assistance before the fall of the Berlin Wall, revealed the need to establish appropriate levels of political commitment and bureaucratic competence in recipient countries as a prerequisite for successful economic change. This observation with the theoretical justification of neo-liberalism provided for “the integrated Western perspective on the role of economic aids and loans, involving simultaneous and symbiotic transformation of economic systems through structural adjustments and political change. Thus evidence of good governance went beyond sound financial management to include legitimate, institution-aliased and democratic modes of political decision making.”²⁰ In other words, around the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, democracy promotion had become both an end and a means of international assistance.

It was not until the Cold war’s end that democracy promotion became an explicit goal of EU foreign policy. EU’s initial preoccupation with the changes taking place in EE was soon transformed into action because of the mandate the European Commission received to coordinate aid for the CEE transition to market economies, which was subsequently broadened to include democracy promotion. In 1989 EU politicians began linking economic development with political freedom in declarations on developmental issues and in 1991 transition to democracy became condition for receiving EU assistance. Only in 1992, however, did the European Parliament insist on adding a special democracy line into the general budget for that year, which forced the Commission to create a special democracy component within its assistance program, PHARE. In the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht emphasized that the development and consolidation of democracy is one of the EU’s most important aims but also allowed for separate actions on the part of individual EU members in addition to the system of “joint actions”. The complex web of competencies and diverging interests, as well as the complex EU institutional framework explains the incoherent and inefficient nature of EU foreign policy initiatives, within which democracy promotion remains a low priority issue.²¹

EU’s democracy program was limited to the PHARE program. Democracy promotion has encompassed several specific areas: strengthening parliamentary practice and organization; promoting transparency in public organizations and public management; developing NGOs and other civil society; ensuring the strengthening of an independent and responsible media; civic education and promoting and monitoring of human rights. Each of those components was perceived as contributing to the strengthening of democratic structures and the promotion of cross-cultural cooperation, primarily through involvement in partnerships between local and regional authorities, and NGOs. Even though NATO did not sponsor an explicit democracy promotion program, through its Partnership for Peace program, the alliance has encouraged democratic control over the armed forces and transparency of national defense planning and budgeting – policies essential to democratic consolidation.

¹⁹ Peter Schraeder, “Promoting an International Community of Democracies,” in Peter Schraeder, *Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs Reality* (Boulder London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

²⁰ Mike Mannin, “Democratic Governance in CEE: the Conditions for Change,” in Mike Mannin, ed., *Pushing Back the Boundaries: the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999): 98-132, p. 105.

²¹ Gorm Rye Olsen, “The European Union: An Ad Hoc Policy with a Low Priority,” in Peter Schraeder, *Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs Reality*, (Boulder London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

Moreover, the enormous benefits and demanding requirements of membership created conditions for substantial influence of the two IOs on CEE domestic policy choices. Example at hand is the requirement that countries aspiring membership in NATO/the EU must adopt certain level of democratic standards before being considered for accession. The requirement has provided powerful incentive even for countries, perhaps more interested in the presumed economic or security benefits of membership, to re-fashion their political systems in a more democratic direction. EU and NATO enlargements involve different processes that affect to some extent institutional and policy transformations in CEEC:²²

- Aid and technical assistance: By providing resources for the implementation of IO models, the EU/NATO have not only changed the priorities in the government agenda but have also helped CEE pay for transposing IO standards. Technical assistance, on the other hand, has facilitated building the CEEC institutional capacity to use IO practices.
- Benchmarking and monitoring: progress toward IO accession has become a central issue in CEE political debates, so IOs have influenced policy and institutional development through monitoring applicants' performance and ranking candidates (benchmarking).
- Advice: Both IOs have programs, through which EU/NATO officials are seconded in CEE ministries and other public administration. IOs officials work closely with their CEEC counterparts over overall institutional reforms and policy direction largely through the alteration of beliefs and expectations of domestic actors leading to changes in cognition and preference formation.
- Gate keeping: access to negotiations and further stages in the accession process and aid and benefits have been conditional on progress in requirement fulfillment.
- Models: legislative and institutional templates are provided by the EU through the process of legal transposition of the Union's laws and rules and harmonization with EU regulations.

NATO INVOLVEMENT IN CEE

This study explores how cooperation with two international organizations (EU and NATO) has been affecting the democratization struggle of two Central and Eastern European Countries (Poland and Romania) in the area of limiting elite autonomy. This part of the study looks at the role NATO played in Poland and Romania. A central part to the alliance's involvement has been reform of civilian authority. There are three distinct types of civil-military relations:²³

Balanced: Civilian and military responsibilities are clearly distinguished and the latter are subordinate to the former. The president and the minister of defense are assigned political functions, and the highest-ranking officer – command of the military forces.

Coordinate: The minister of defense is limited to nonmilitary administrative duties and the military chief discharges his military functions directly under the president but the level of his authority with direct access to the president allows him to make political decisions.

Vertical: The minister of defense and the highest-ranking officer have identical responsibilities. The military chief is given control over all the activities of the ministry, specifically military command and planning. Even though he is formally subordinated to the minister, the latter may be reduced to a figurehead.

The coordinate and the vertical types of civilian authority could be inconsistent with civilian control. The alliance has, therefore, promoted the balanced type of civil-military relation in order to maximize civilian control in CEECs.

²² Heather Grabbe, *Enlarging the EU Eastwards* (London, UK: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998).

²³ The typology of civilian authority is borrowed from Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).

A. NATO AND POLAND

A.1. Introduction

This part of the study addresses the specific case of NATO's impact on curbing elite autonomy in national defense and security issues in Poland. Since the beginning of its transition in 1989, Poland officially expressed its aspirations for membership in NATO. While aiding the country's application and later its preparation for integration into the alliance, NATO had the opportunity to influence the reform trajectory of Poland. The alliance was particularly active in Poland's civil-military reform and the reorganization of the armed forces. To assess the effects of cooperation between NATO and Poland on elite autonomy, I briefly introduce the establishment of civil-military relations prior to NATO involvement. I then describe the structures of *initiative*, *institutions*, *ideas*, and *information* in terms of the access that both elites and domestic groups have to the process of international cooperation. An outcome of the cooperation with positive effect on Poland's democratization project was the reform of civil-military relations. The highest-ranking officer was denied direct access to the executive: he could no longer get involved into politics easily and thus undermine civilian control. Furthermore, while transforming the civil authority over the armed forces, Poland also reformed the executive by clearly delimiting the prerogatives of each executive institution in defense, security and foreign affairs matters. On the one hand, this reform effectively increased the executive's capacity to exercise control over the armed forces. On the other hand, such delineation decreased the tension between and increased the cooperation of the executive bodies. However, those benefits came at the expense of the overall empowerment of the executive. I conclude that the NATO-Poland cooperation was institutionally and in practice channeled through the executive. The collaboration was initiated by a small group of NATO and Polish officials. NATO further preferred to rely on and pressure the executive for defense policy *initiation*. The executive came to guide the country into adopting the "right" (reflecting NATO values) legislation. By presenting alliance membership as a strategic cultural choice, the NATO-Polish elite changed the security debate to preclude debate on NATO membership or on the NATO-supported reorganization of the armed forces. As a result, the pre-NATO involvement type of civil-military relations was changed and the policy of Territorial Defense was substituted with emphasis on out-of-area operations. By limiting the set of legitimate *ideas*, NATO and Polish officials created a seeming consensus. This consensus, however, led to the marginalization of the parliament as a democratic forum for debate.

A.2 Polish Armed Forces Reform at the Beginning of the Transition

Under state-socialism the military was under civilian – if undemocratic – control. The armed forces were led by a minister of defense, who was also the highest-ranking military officer but who was controlled by the Communist Party at the domestic level, and the Warsaw Pact Joint Command and the commander of the Soviet Forces in Poland at the international level.²⁴ With the fall of communism in 1989, Poland opted for establishing a democratic political system, which required a corresponding restructuring of the Polish armed forces. Immediate objectives were the re-nationalization and the depolitization of the armed forces. Also pending were the civilianization of the military and the establishment of democratic civilian control. Finally given these sweeping changes in the character and the organization of the armed forces, further restructuring was necessary to accommodate Poland's new security policy and defense doctrine.

By autumn 1990, Poland reasserted full command of its own army, reestablished jurisdiction over its units, and abolished the last remnants of communist control over the Polish military.²⁵ An

²⁴ Ewa Busza, "Transition and Civil-Military Relations in Poland and Russia," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 29.2 (June 1996): 167-184.

²⁵ Mark Kramer, "Restructuring of the Civil-Military Relations in Poland Since 1989," in David R. Mares, *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998): 132-163, p. 143.

early decision (July 1991) on restructuring Polish armed forces was taken upon the recommendation of the inter-ministerial Commission for Reforming the Organization of National Defense, chaired by the then head of the Office of Ministerial Council, Jan Zabinski. Having evolved in the course of three administrations (the Mazowiecki, Bilecki, and Olszewski ones) and being approved by the State Defense Committee, the Zabinski Commission Report gained credibility and consolidated a consensus from political elites on civil-military relations and the role of the armed forces in Poland. It became a blueprint for the military reforms between 1991-1994 by recommending the appointment of a civilian minister of defense, the division of ministry of defense into civilian-military and military components and their restructuring, and the establishment of effective parliamentary oversight.²⁶

By 1991, the recommendations of the Zabinski Commission were implemented. In the years between 1992 and 1995 there was little further change in the civil-military balance. The established concept of civilian authority can be defined as coordinate, because of the division of military and administrative functions immediately below the executive. Moreover, the executive (the president more than the minister of defense) controlled the armed forces through General Staff. Finally, the years between 1992-1995 were years of continuing tension between the presidency and the ministry of defense for control over the armed forces – a struggle, which limited the executive's capacity to exercise control over the armed forces.²⁷ Parliamentary control, too, was relatively weak by basic law and further weakened by the lack of qualified staff to serve on the National Defense and Foreign Affairs commission and the frequently changing composition of Polish parliaments. The military was de facto autonomous.²⁸

In brief, the nature of the Polish military tradition²⁹ and the institutional weakness of the executive at the beginning of the transition obstructed the establishment of a civilian authority over the armed forces of the type deemed necessary by the NATO and Polish officials who initiated the enlargement process. NATO involvement in the second half of the 1990s can be understood only in the context of the alliance helping these Polish elites to recast the role of the military in Polish society so that it would be compatible with NATO's civilian democratic control, collective security, and joint command.

A.3 Impact of NATO Practices on Elite Autonomy in Defense and Security Matters

A.3.1 Impact on Domestic Initiative

NATO-Polish cooperation was conceived by a small group of NATO and Polish officials. In 1990 - 1991, after the de-sovietization and re-nationalization of the armed forces, Poland went through a wide-ranging debate about the nature of domestic governing institutions and possible security arrangements. However, a small but well positioned group of reformers believed that Poland would become part of a more successful civilization by imitating Western authority relations between the military and the state.³⁰ Before NATO had officially decided on enlarging, and before the question of membership in NATO was put forth for national debate in Poland, the pro-NATO Polish reformers, together with NATO officials, cooperated to realize NATO expansion. Even

²⁶ Andrew A. Michta, *The Soldier-Citizen: the Politics of the Polish Army After Communism* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 81.

²⁷ The lack of basic law in Poland until 1997, and the lack of clear delineation of presidential and cabinet functions in the interim "Little Constitution" of 1992 allowed President Lech Walesa to begin amassing security and foreign policy powers in the presidency. The tension between president Walesa and Ministry of Defense over civil-military reform erupted in a scandal, the so-called Parys Affairs and later, in September 1994, brought down the first elected left government since the transition.

²⁸ Barany argues that the president would be physically incapable of running the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense had little control prerogatives over the armed forces. (See Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience," *Comparative Politics*, 30.1 (October 1997): 21-43).

²⁹ Michta, *The Soldier-Citizen*, p. 80.

³⁰ Rachel Epstein, *International Institutions and Domestic Policy: Depoliticization and Denationalization in Postcommunist Poland* (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 2001), p. 162.

though Poland publicly suggested alliance enlargement in 1991, it was high-level NATO officials who had coached the Polish elites. Poland was encouraged to propose the *idea*, so that it would enjoy legitimacy as a voluntary initiative.³¹ In a document from December 21, 1991 Prime Minister, Jan Olszewski, declared officially Poland's desire for membership in NATO.

Despite the initial negative response from NATO, the Polish government made entry into NATO an official policy goal. In creating Poland's aspiration to join the alliance, NATO and Polish officials intentionally made efforts to produce interests at the elite and public levels that might have not otherwise come into being. However, NATO had to further rely on the executive to *initiate* defense policies, so that they would be compatible with the alliance's own.

In many instances Polish officials anticipated the reforms necessary for Polish integration into the alliance. Hanna Suchocka's government paralleled the 1991 Alliance's New Strategic Concept: documents that regulated Polish defense policy did not recognize any state as a threat and expressed Poland's concern about regional instabilities since the collapse of the Soviet Union.³² Also, in 1993, Minister of Defense, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, sought to lay a comprehensive set of regulations that would become the foundations for civilian democratic oversight in a way that is acceptable to Poland's Western partners. In other cases, however, the Polish officials failed to modify certain policies that NATO regarded as problematic. For instance, the alliance did not accept the civil-military relations established at the recommendation of the Zabinski Commission as civilian authority. NATO officials interfered to have Polish officials design and promote the reforms, deemed necessary by the alliance. In either case, defense and security policies were coordinated with NATO rather than with parliament. Since NATO recommendations became preconditions for membership, reform was tailored to reflect NATO objectives even if those differed from Polish tradition or social preferences. The coordination of reform in defense and security matters with NATO left little room for domestic *initiative* or direct domestic control and gave the alliance the opportunity to participate in crafting basic *institutions* of the Polish state.

A.3.2 Impact on Ideas

NATO helped change the nature of Polish national defense debate and "altered the criteria by which Polish politicians could win legitimacy."³³ The alliance taught Polish reformers to express their aspirations for membership in a way acceptable to the West³⁴ and so that in Poland accession to the alliance precluded other security alternatives. NATO coached Polish elites to phrase NATO membership not only as the best possible security guarantee but also as an important cultural choice. The linkage between NATO membership and Poland's national interest was so salient in the domestic political arena that accession to the alliance could not be rejected even by factions critical of NATO membership. Since in Poland there was a tradition of a desire to be accepted by the West, as a part of "Europe" and NATO membership was framed as "a return to Europe," all parties had to prove their democratic credentials and advance on the way towards Europe. However, the thinness of domestic debate also meant that Poland was purchasing a policy package without a clear idea of its contents, to which the country might not have necessarily subscribed had there been a meaningful debate about the meaning and implications of integration. In other words, NATO set the agenda,

³¹ Epstein, *International Institutions and Domestic Policy*, p. 140.

³² The Alliance's New Strategic Concept indicates NATO members believed that security threats were less likely to come from "calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies" than from "the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faces by many of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe," at www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/stratcon.htm.

³³ Epstein, *International Institutions and Domestic Policy*, p. 147.

³⁴ Polish politicians desired membership both because they wanted a return to the West and because they wanted protection against Russian resurgence should it happen. NATO was concerned about its relations with Russia, so the Alliance advised Polish politician to change their rhetoric. This changed the nature of the political debate at home and eventually, even politicians who had never been in direct contact with the NATO officials started emphasizing the need to be part of NATO for securing democratic values, increased transparency, defense cooperation, and political stability for both the Poland and the region. (Epstein, *International Institutions and Domestic Policy*, p. 104)

“focusing the security debate around how and when Poland could join the alliance, and around which domestic reforms Polish politicians would have to implement in order to prove Poland’s Western credentials.”³⁵ The alliance also used its authority as the security provider for the North-Atlantic community to change the normative foundation of the Polish defense and security institutions. NATO and some pro-NATO Polish officials emphasized the alliance’s experience to legitimize NATO’s recommendations as the best, the right alternative. Thus, the *idea* of security as territorial defense was substituted with the objective of achieving regional stability. Furthermore, the nature of the civil authority over the armed forces was changed to reflect balanced civil-military relations.

A.3.2.1 NATO and Civil-Military Relations

After the Cold war there were social groups and corresponding elites who favored a continuation of the prominent role of the armed forces in Polish politics. Their preference was institutionalized with the establishment of coordinate civil authority. President Lech Walesa, too, believed that a strong and effective military was a necessary attribute of a competent state.³⁶ He supported the generals’ de facto autonomy, consolidated under an expanded authority of the president. But as NATO became officially involved in Poland’s military reform, this position became untenable. The established coordinate type of civil-military relations were deemed undesirable by NATO and some Polish reformers. The highest-ranking officer had direct access to the executive and could easily get involved into politics, thus undermining civilian control.

NATO insisted that the only legitimate model is where civilian authority is shared between the president, the parliament and the government; or what has been defined as a balanced type of civil authority. After the alliance raised serious questions about the nature of civil-military relations in Poland around 1993, Minister of Defense, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, responded by introducing new reforms in budgeting and the army’s force structure in line with NATO’s expectations. However, before the implementation of the set of laws, the government fell. To retaliate against President Lech Walesa’s extensive interference in defense ministry appointments, the next Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak fired the Minister of Defense and appointed in his place an old-line communist who reversed Onyszkiewicz’ regulations. Because at this time Poland was trying to burnish its candidacy for the NATO-initiated Partnership for Peace (PfP), this step expedited the collapse of the Pawlak government.³⁷ This example well illustrates how even maintaining the status quo against NATO prescriptions was untenable.

In January 1994 NATO launched Partnership for Peace, which became instrumental for teaching CEE about the necessity and importance of the NATO-advised type of civil-military relations. PfP was a way for NATO to prepare CEECs to be better able to cooperate with the Allies both militarily and politically in future peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. PfP mainly worked for improving the military compatibility and interoperability between CEECs and the Alliance. However, a small portion of the program was devoted to ensuring democratic control of defense forces and encouraging the internalization of the liberal values and norms of the Alliance (articulated as the Perry principles by U.S. Secretary of defense, William Perry, in Munich in 1995).³⁸ Through PfP the Alliance instructed Poland on “the meaning” of those principles and conveyed how important they are to winning Western support necessary for membership.³⁹ The importance of the institutionalization these values and norms was further publicly emphasized by the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement. It not only officially demonstrated NATO readiness to expand

³⁵ Epstein, *International Institutions and Domestic Policy*, p. 147.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

³⁷ Michta, *The Soldier-Citizen*, p. 96.

³⁸ William J. Perry, “The Enduring Dynamic Relationship That Is NATO,” *Defense Viewpoint*, 10 (9): Available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/s19950205-perry.html>

³⁹ Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. 15.

its membership but also emphasized the importance of shared values, democratic practices, and collective defense principles.

In response to NATO's growing dissatisfaction with Polish "weak civilian control," the then Deputy Minister of Defense, Andrzej Karkoszka, initiated the legislation necessary to recast government defense institutions according to NATO prescriptions.⁴⁰ The Law on the Office of Ministry of Defense re-subordinated the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense. Later the role of the officers in defense planning was further weakened by eliminating the financial section within General Staff and moving its functions to the ministry.⁴¹ Finally, the new legislation also delimited the prerogatives of each executive institution in defense, security and foreign affairs matters, thus effectively increasing the executive's capacity to exercise control over the armed forces and decreasing the tension between the Presidency and the Cabinet.

However, the codification of the norms NATO recommended was not a result of the involvement of society in a consensus-building process around those norms. The Polish political elites and public had already consolidated a consensus on civil-military relations reflected in the Zabinski Commission Report, so reform of the civilian authority was anchored through the salience and tactical use of the norms imported by NATO rather than through any constructive debate and assessment of policy options. NATO's claims about the benefits and necessity of balanced type of civilian control, echoed by Karkoszka and other Polish officials, coached by the alliance, legitimated this kind of civilian authority and led to the association of those norms with the advancement of the country's national interest.⁴² Moreover, CEECs thought that consensus is a sign of the maturity and stability of their democracy, and would improve their image abroad, so consensus should be maintained or forged at any price.⁴³ Hence, there was little debate over NATO-promoted reforms, or as Jerzy Szmajdzinski, Vice Chairman of the Sejm's Commission of National Defense, suggested, "parliament would support government decisions by special statements but decisions about support for the alliance should not be subject to long disputes in the chambers of Parliament."⁴⁴ However, the lack of consensus-building process around the adoption of a norm, which differed from Polish tradition, made the implementation of balanced type of civil-military relations difficult.

Given the resistance to the implementation⁴⁵ of the Law on the Office of Ministry of Defense in 1996, NATO released to Poland unofficially the Defense Planning Questionnaire. This was a restricted NATO document used by the alliance as a checklist to assess the country's commitment to democratic values, civilian control and collective security procedures. It was used by the executive as a guideline to set the reform agenda and put pressure on other political and military actors to have the reforms implemented. In 1997 NATO invited Poland to join the alliance. The 1998-report submitted by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "noted the range of institutional changes Poland had undertaken to codify civilian control over the armed forces," and recommended that the US Senate support the accession of Poland.⁴⁶ Poland was granted membership on March 12, 1999.

⁴⁰ Epstein, *International Institutions and Domestic Policy*, p. 155.

⁴¹ Elizabeth Coughlan, "Democratization and the Military in Poland: Establishing Democratic Civilian Control" in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, eds., *The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), p.132.

⁴² Epstein, *International Institutions and Domestic Policy*, p. 155.

⁴³ Williams, "Exporting the Democratic Deficit..."

⁴⁴ Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski and Arthur Rachwald, "Poland: Returning to Europe" in Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald, eds., *Enlarging NATO: the National Debates* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001): 111-129, p. 128.

⁴⁵ Some military and political officials critical of the reforms suggested that they appeared to be chiefly designed to address western criticisms at the expense of national security and that given the Polish armed forces, the restructuring was called into question; that it's civilian command not control, or that this is reminiscent of the Warsaw Pact. (Miroslaw Cielemecki, "The New Model of Command Over the Polish Army Is a Caricature of the US One," *Wprost*, 17 March, 1996).

⁴⁶ US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic*, March 6, 1998.

In sum, the evolution of civil-military relations in Poland well illustrates how NATO-Poland cooperation redefined civilian authority. At the beginning of the Polish transition a small group in the executive framed NATO membership not only as the best possible security guarantee but also as an important cultural choice. Repeated declarations by those authoritative political figures linking NATO membership and Poland's successful return to Europe made the connection so salient in the domestic political arena that those who called into question the NATO-Polish cooperation were seen as acting against Poland's national interest. This discourse, however, precluded any further consequential opposition or debate on defense and security issue. Even though this seeming consensus facilitated the de-legitimization of a coordinate type of civil-military relations and the legitimization of a balanced type, it was at the expense of the marginalization of parliament as a forum for democratic discussion and societal input.

A.3.2.2 NATO and Polish Security Institutions

As late as 1997 NATO came to circumscribe another theme in the Polish national defense debate. NATO recast the role of the military in Polish society so that it would be compatible with NATO's collective security and joint command. In Polish history the military had become the symbol of national survival. The role of the armed forces was perceived to be to defend Polish autonomy, territory and internal stability. This national tradition and vision informed the secondary reorganization of the armed forces in Poland. Preparing for the 1997 parliamentary elections, members of the Solidarity Electoral Action and Polish Peasant Party began promoting Territorial Defense. The policy recommended a halt on the contraction of the armed forces and that 60% of the projected total armed forces be assigned to defending the territory around their bases. Territorial Defense was meant to include all social institutions rather than being the domain of governing officials and the armed forces. The Policy became a heated domestic debate not only about the availability of resources to fulfill Territorial Defense but also about its ideological underpinnings: Would it lead to militarization of the society and resurgence of political neutrality and defense-self-sufficiency? How compatible was it with integration in NATO?

NATO objected to Territorial Defense because it was questioning the credibility of NATO security guarantees and was portraying the Alliance as antagonistic to Russia. NATO officials also questioned the efficacy of Territorial Defense. However, the proponents of Territorial Defense were voted into office in 1997. NATO responded directly and privately. "In closed door meetings, NATO representatives, in delegations to Poland and to the Polish delegations in Brussels, repeatedly stressed that they would prefer that Poland focus on the basic issues of integration and compatibility with the alliance rather than expending effort and resources on territorial defense."⁴⁷ Yet, the alliance could not persuade Polish politicians that NATO's move away from Article 5 (where Territorial Defense would fall) toward out-of-area operations is consistent with Polish interests.

In a 1998 meeting with the Polish Deputy Minister of Defense, Romuald Szeremietiew – the most ardent and powerful civilian-supporter of Territorial Defense – American officials insisted that Szeremietiew should not pursue that plan.⁴⁸ The Minister of Defense was told that Territorial Defense was unnecessary since NATO would not abandon Poland and Russia did not pose a threat. After the meeting, the government all but dropped their territorial defense plans.⁴⁹ In addition in 1998, the Sejm and Senate passed the law concerning the use of the Polish Army abroad in operations following from international agreements and other allied obligations. This step was taken to align Poland's defense strategy with NATO's emphasis on out-of-area operations even though Polish

⁴⁷ Epstein, *International Institutions and Domestic Policy*, p. 101.

⁴⁸ Epstein, *International Institutions and Domestic Policy*, p. 110.

⁴⁹ Szeremietiew explained its abandonment in terms of budgetary constraints. The disagreement was kept secret because it would compromise NATO's image and values and because it was deemed illegitimate. Epstein, *International Institutions and Domestic Policy*, p. 110.

people were not supportive of military activity outside the range of the collective defense of the NATO area⁵⁰.

The fall of Territorial Defense demonstrates how NATO altered the legitimate set of *ideas* about the role of Polish military in social life and national security. The tradition of military prominence was no longer justifiable after 1998. NATO further acted to replace Polish threat perceptions (threat coming from the East) with ones compatible with NATO's own (threat coming from regional instabilities). Most of the times, NATO was successful in securing the support of the Polish executive. The government was held responsible by the electorate for the country's advancement towards Europe, so all Cabinets cooperated with the alliance and were receptive to its reforms recommendations. As the fate of the Pawlak government demonstrates any administration seen to obstruct Poland integration with the West was quickly brought down. However, as the Territorial Defense example illustrates, when persuasion and social influence failed, NATO was prepared to use any means to assure government compliance. NATO's direct and behind the closed doors pressure on the executive to abandon an important part of its electoral campaign was not only problematic in terms of its legitimacy, but also created a precedent for executive eluding popular representation and democratic accountability.

A.3.3 Impact on Information

The NATO-Poland cooperation had a profound effect on the domestic distribution of technical and political knowledge. To mobilize support for their cause, NATO and Polish officials used primarily *information* about the political constraints imposed by the preferences and power of the alliance. The 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement spelled out to the CEE public what reforms the alliance expects from applicant countries to consider them for membership. The 1996 release of the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire had one sole purpose – to mobilize Polish political elites behind the type of civil-military relations preferred by NATO. Finally, NATO with the help of Polish officials publicized Collins/Meyers report, "NATO's Military Enlargement: Problems and Perspectives,"⁵¹ to demonstrate to the Polish public and political elites the persisting "deficiencies" in civilian control over the armed forces, and to raise anxiety over whether Poland was sufficiently qualified to join the alliance.⁵²

Since Polish aspiration to membership in the alliance was very strong, NATO could disarm opposition by appealing to the Polish fear of exclusion. An example at hand is the forcing out of office of the Chief of General Staff Wilecki. Wilecki was resisting the recommended subordination of General Staff to Ministry of Defense and NATO was unable to change his behavior. The alliance applied direct pressure: an US official told the Polish president that US Senate ratification is uncertain as long as Wilecki is in office.⁵³ Still, President Kwasniewski was reluctant to remove Wilecki because of his broad support and powerful constituency. Then NATO and Polish Deputy Minister of Defense, Andrzej Karkoszka, without the president's knowledge and against his will, described to the New York Times the resistance of Wilecki and General Staff generals to the terms of NATO membership. Then, the same article⁵⁴ was publicized in Poland, so that the president then had no choice but to remove Wilecki for impeding progress to NATO accession.

Another example of the power of NATO to instigate reforms, even when influential Polish political are opposed to them includes the passing of a secrecy act, restricting access to information, classified as sensitive. Complaints arose immediately about undue haste and poor drafting including the fact that the act was too broad and could potentially undermine the effectiveness of the right-to information law passed earlier on in 1999. In addition, Poland's ombudsman questioned the

⁵⁰ Piotrowski and Rachwald, "Poland: Returning to Europe."

⁵¹ John M. Collins and Jason D. Meyers, *NATO's Military Enlargement: Problems and Perspectives*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1995).

⁵² Epstein, *International Institutions and Domestic Policy*, p. 151.

⁵³ Epstein, *International Institutions and Domestic Policy*, p. 159.

⁵⁴ Jane Perlez, "Poland's Top Commander Resists Terms for NATO," *New York Times*, January 22, 1997.

constitutionality of rules in the country's new Classified Information Act. Poland's judges also complained about intrusive investigations to determine whether their lifestyles could make them "susceptible to . . . pressure."⁵⁵ The Polish government claimed that their legislation is tailored to suit NATO requirements. However, irrespectively of whether the government is using the process of NATO expansion as a pretext for adopting unnecessarily broad laws or whether NATO's requirements are unduly biased against transparency, the act does allow cabinets to hide from public scrutiny by invoking the secrecy clauses.

In addition, NATO provided Polish officials with technical *information* about the consequences of alternative policies. To call the efficacy of Territorial Defense into question, NATO provided its multiple strategic assessment of the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, according to which threats come from the European periphery in the form of serious economic, social, and political instabilities.⁵⁶ The Territorial Defense debate was also couched in terms of spending priorities and whether Poland could afford the policy in addition to allowing sufficient resources to NATO's arrangements. NATO officials argued that every defense dollar should be spent on NATO-capable forces referring back to their strategic assessment. In other words, NATO provided the reasons for the reversal of the policy, so the national governments could then "begin a process of explaining the reasons for change to their publics."⁵⁷ In the civil-military relations case, the alliance also supplied Polish state elites with a detailed interpretation of "the meaning" (NATO's understanding) of civilian authority. In numerous meetings between NATO and Polish officials and through PfP NATO informed Polish civilians about the necessity and benefits of balanced civil-military relations, so the Poles were could articulate that logic at the domestic level.

In brief, NATO helped change the informational status quo in Poland. The alliance made available to the population and the Polish elite a vast array of *information* about the "deficiencies" of Polish civilian authority or the benefits of the NATO-inspired alternative defense policies. This technical *information* was supplemented with political *information* about the preferences of Poland's Western allies on defense matters. Because of the military prestige of the alliance and the democratic experience of the West, the *information* provided by NATO weighed a lot and helped mobilize support. With few exceptions Polish journalists and commentators were incapable of probing into technical defense issues, and no private organizations were available to scrutinize the details of military policies⁵⁸. So the organization also supplied NATO's report on the progress the Polish government had made in reforming defense and security institutions according to the alliance's recommendations. As a result, the public and political elites were able to use NATO's opinion to judge the performance of the Polish governments. This increased the government's accountability in defense and security matters but it also it was also accountability measured against the goals of the alliance rather than the preference of the electorate itself. Even if those may have coincided in the 1994-1999 period, that shift could potentially be problematic in the long-term.

A.3.4 Impact on Institutions

In discussions of both civil-military relations and Poland's defense strategy, NATO's influence was channeled through the executive. Deputy Minister of Defense Andrzej Karkoszka was the principal mediator between NATO officials and the Polish armed forces. The primary responsibility for ties with NATO was delegated to the civilian-led Department of Foreign Military Affairs.⁵⁹ Not only was the legislature marginalized from the cooperation process but also NATO recommendations for improving civilian democratic control of the armed forces addressed the

⁵⁵ Alasdair Roberts, "NATO, Secrecy, and the Right to Information," *East European Constitutional Review* 11/12.4/1 (Winter 2002/Spring 2003)

⁵⁶ Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and Stephen F. Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, 72.4 (September/October, 1993): 28-37.

⁵⁷ Frank Boland, "Force Planning in the new NATO," *NATO Review* 46.3 (Autumn, 1998), p. 3.

⁵⁸ Kramer, "Restructuring of the Civil-Military Relations," p. 155.

⁵⁹ Kramer, "Restructuring of the Civil-Military Relations," p. 143.

problems within the executive and did not target in any way the weakness of parliamentary oversight. NATO limited its assistance for strengthening domestic control over defense and security issues to workshops organized within PfP and the North Atlantic Assembly and meant to spread knowledge about the functions of parliamentary defense and security committees and procedures for ensuring democratic control of the military. In other words, the *institutional* channels for the participation of domestic groups (either parliament or civil society) were hardly improved.

A.4 Conclusion

The alliance inspired a lot of positive changes in the Polish defense and security institutions. At NATO's recommendation, civil-military relations were changed to eliminate direct access of the highest-ranking officer to domestic politics. Another beneficial outcome of this reform was strengthening the government's capacity to exercise control over the armed forces while limiting the contestation between the different branches of the executive over defense, security and foreign affairs matters. Moreover, NATO training helped improve the awareness of some parliamentarians of the functions of the legislature in ensuring democratic civilian control of the armed forces. NATO further supplied *information* on governmental performance in defense and security, which increased elite accountability in domains of importance to the alliance. Finally, by ruling out Territorial Defense, NATO prevented the possible militarization of Polish society.

However, this brief overview of NATO involvement in restructuring Polish defense and security institutions also demonstrated that domestic political resources were redistributed mostly in favor of the executive. NATO channeled its influence mainly through a compact team of experts within the executive. Moreover, NATO-Polish reform efforts focused on bolstering executive, not parliamentary control. Polish and NATO enlightened elites came to "guide" Polish citizens in choosing a direction for the Polish national defense strategy, which correspondingly limited domestic *initiative*. By presenting alliance membership as a strategic cultural choice, the NATO-Polish executive network not only changed the set of legitimate policies to include only a balanced type of democratic civilian control but also altered the criteria on which Polish politicians could win legitimacy. Polish leaders could no longer opt for challenging NATO prescriptions without penalty. While limiting the array of legitimate *ideas*, NATO structured the Polish domestic debate so the country would almost unequivocally comply with the alliance's propositions. Such incentives (the legitimacy of which could be questioned in cases such as Territorial Defense) could become extremely problematic for the democratization project of the country, as they contribute to the marginalization of parliament as a forum for democratic debate in addition to its already relative functional weakness.

B. NATO AND ROMANIA

B.1 Introduction: Section Outline

While aiding the Romania's application for membership into the alliance, NATO had the opportunity to influence the country's reform trajectory. The alliance was particularly active in the civil-military reform and the reorganization of the armed forces. To assess the effects of cooperation between NATO and Romania on elite autonomy, I briefly introduce the outlook of defense and security institutions prior to NATO involvement. I then describe the structures of *initiative*, *institutions*, *ideas*, and *information* in terms of the access that both elites and domestic groups have to the process of international cooperation. A positive to Romania's democratization project outcome was the further civilianization and transparentization of civil-military relations and the improvement of channels for civil society participation and parliament's oversight abilities. However, policy *initiation* was shifted to the alliance and to some extent to the executive. Reform was promoted primarily through executive acts rather than parliamentary legislation. Since failure to act within the prescriptions of NATO and pro-NATO Romanian reformers was described by those officials as a sign that Romania is not a democratic and truly European state, real debate about the

reform process was precluded. The redistribution of control over domestic political resources in favor of the executive led to the marginalization of parliament.

B.2.1 Communist Legacies and Transition Agenda

Under communism, the alienation between the Romanian military and the Romanian communist regime grew, and professional standards deteriorated with time. It was the army's rival – the Security Police – that received preferential treatment from Bucharest. The armed forces were left poorly provided for. Because of Bucharest's reluctant and limited participation in the Warsaw Pact, professional standards deteriorated further. Moreover, the Communist Party executed extensive and intensive control over the military, so that "politicized" civil-military relations prevailed in Romania. Finally, Ceausescu periodically rotated the top military officials to prevent them from building their own powerbases.⁶⁰ On the other hand, the relative autonomy of the Romanian military from the Warsaw Treaty Organization allowed the army to maintain its public respect both before and after the transition.⁶¹

Due to the particular position Romania held in the former Warsaw Treaty Organization, its national defense was configured to be able to respond to a series of multidirectional threats.⁶² Therefore there was little structural adjustment necessary after the end of the Cold War. However, the Romanian military needed to be modernized. Due to the deterioration of professional standards, the armed forces were big, heavy and inefficient, military infrastructure had decayed and technologies were largely outdated. Finally and most importantly, because of the politicization of civil-military relations under state-socialism, civilian post-socialist leadership was generally too weak to head the modernization of the armed forces or the restructuring of the defense and security institutions. Therefore, the establishment of democratic control over the military and the internal security services and the development of transparency in the defense budget⁶³ became necessary as a prerequisite for the modernization of the Romanian armed forces.

B.2.2 Security and Defense Institutions before NATO involvement

The 1991 Constitution entrusted Parliament with providing the legal framework for the functioning of the defense institutions and holding the executive branch and the military accountable for their actions. The legislature was given the right of interpellation. Four committees overseeing defense issues were created within the parliament. The Constitution also delegated to Parliament the right to ratify partial mobilizations, declarations of war and the suspension of armed hostilities. With the Defense Law of January 1991, the Ministry of National Defense became the central executive organ for defense issues. The minister was made accountable to the government for all the ministry's activities and also, as a member of the government, to parliament. Finally, the president was selected as the Commander-in-Chief of the Romanian army. As such, he chairs the Supreme National Defense Council. Council members include the leaders of the pertinent ministries and governmental agencies. Yet, the Council has no legal-constitutional authority.

The broad decision-making powers of the executive branch are further increased in practice. The delayed passing of additional legislation, necessary to determine the division of responsibilities between the executive power and the legislature, undermined the transparency, accountability, and legal regulation of security and defense matters. On the one hand, very few of the members of the committees in either chamber or any independent institutions had any expertise in those issues.⁶⁴ On the other hand, President Ion Iliescu has tried to obstruct attempts by parliamentary committees to

⁶⁰ Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military," p. 24.

⁶¹ Jeffrey Simon, "Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe," *Strategic Forum*, 172 (June 2000).

⁶² *The Officer* (October, 2000).

⁶³ King Michael of Romania GCVO, "Romania and NATO: The Time for Real Partnership," *RUSI Journal* (April 1997): 6-11.

⁶⁴ Alexandra Gheciu, *Security as Community?: NATO and the Politics of State-Crafting in Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe* (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 2001), p. 277.

establish control over the military and the police. He used the presidential power to vest himself in increasing authority to ensure that the army will protect the regime from its internal opponents.⁶⁵ Iliescu further made an effort to establish his powerbase in the military by interfering in personnel matters.⁶⁶

In brief, prior to NATO involvement in Romania in 1994, the Romanian civil-military relations could be qualified as vertical type. The Minister of Defense is the highest-ranking military official, who oversees the entire defense establishment and controls the administrative personnel. This model is largely inconsistent with stable civilian control over the military because of the direct access of the officer to the executive. Furthermore, due to institutional and practical limitations, parliamentary and societal control over defense and security was extremely weak.

B.3 Impact of NATO-Romania Cooperation Practices

The formal cooperation between NATO and Romania began with Romania's application to the Partnership for Peace Program in January 1994. The purpose of PfP has been to foster a close CEE-NATO working relationship oriented toward transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and interoperability with NATO forces in peace-keeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations.⁶⁷ Over 800 Romanians graduated PfP courses for military officers and civilians from ministries of defense and ministries of foreign affairs of the former socialist block. The courses aimed at achieving normative and military interoperability in addressing various problems of domestic and international stability. In addition, hundreds of Romanians participated in over a hundred seminars and workshops organized within the North Atlantic Assembly under the Rose-Roth initiative. They sought to diffuse knowledge about the functions of parliamentary defense and security committees and procedures for ensuring democratic control of the military.⁶⁸ Together with on-going interactions between permanent NATO members and associate delegations from PfP countries, these activities created a link for Romanian parliamentarians to interact with their counterparts from NATO member-states.⁶⁹ All those measures intended to improve the ability of CEE societies to exercise control over defense and security.

Outside the PfP framework, the cooperation between NATO and Romania was aimed at promoting reforms of the defense and security institutions, so that Romania would satisfy NATO membership criteria, as outlined by the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement and the Perry Principles.⁷⁰ When NATO decision-makers reviewed Romania's candidacy before the 1997 Madrid Summit, it appeared that the country had taken important steps toward the democratization of its defense and security institutions but substantial reforms had yet to be implemented. While actively

⁶⁵ As the head of the Supreme Council the president calls to order and controls the coordination of the cooperation between Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior for "the maintenance and restoration of legal order." President Iliescu has used the military on several domestic occasions between 1990 and 1991. Because the military resisted/resists such interferences and the public supports its neutrality, the army's role in domestic life has declined. (See, Robert D. Kaplan, "The Fulcrum of Europe," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 282.3 (Sep 1998): 28-36)

⁶⁶ Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military," p. 33-34.

⁶⁷ NATO, "Partnership for Peace: Invitation," press communiqué M- I (94) 2, meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO headquarters, Brussels, January 10-11, 1994.

⁶⁸ In 2000, Romania has participated in over 300 NATO/PfP activities, including 15 military exercises, and over 470 bilateral cooperation activities with 18 Allies and 15 Partner countries. Various training institutions have been established with bilateral assistance; Enhanced sub-regional co-operation at a bilateral, trilateral and multilateral level concentrating on priority areas of common interest and concrete projects. Active participation in the dialogue and exchange of experience with the other aspirant countries included in the Membership Action Plan. See, <http://domino.kappa.ro/mae/dosare.nsf>.

⁶⁹ Gheciu, *Security as Community?* p. 290.

⁷⁰ In addition, a privileged framework of cooperation at governmental level has been created for the bilateral relations with some countries in the Alliance, by establishing strategic partnerships with multiple dimensions, namely political, economic and military, such as is the case with the US, France and Italy. (Anca Visan, "Romania's Path to NATO--One Romanian View," *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace*, 3 (2002), p. 28; Anonymous, "Romanian Armed Forces' Bilateral Relations with NATO Members," *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace*, 3 (2002): 43-45)

preparing the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for assuming NATO membership in 1999, the Alliance encountered unexpected difficulties, which called for re-evaluation of the cooperation practices.⁷¹ At the Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO once again mentioned Romania as a country within enlargement plans, and most importantly came up with a resolution to become more deeply involved in CEE restructuring. This commitment led to institutional changes such as the endorsement of an expanded and adapted PFP, a more comprehensive and institutionalized Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and Membership Action Plan (MAP). MAP included the submission of Annual National Plan by each candidate, a comprehensive system for monitoring and feedback to aspirant countries, assessment meetings in the North Atlantic Council, and systematic consultation and workshops between candidates and NATO teams in each of the areas of the Annual National Plan, enhanced defense planning that establishes and reviews agreed planning targets, and a clearinghouse for coordinating security assistance.⁷² Three years into the Membership Action Plan, at the Prague Summit in November 21-22, 2002, Romania was invited to begin Accession Talks with NATO.

B.3.1 Impact on Initiative

NATO and Romanian elites “guided” the Romanian citizens in choosing a direction for their defense and security institutions. After the Romanian revolution of 1989, a neo-communist leadership under President Ion Iliescu’s guiding hand began leading Romania’s post-socialist democratic transition. Iliescu pressed to gain legitimacy for his regime through access to Western institutions and funding.⁷³ As early as July 1990, Romania invited NATO's Secretary General Manfred Wörner to visit Romania and proposed the accreditation of a Romanian Ambassador to NATO. Although officially unresponsive to Romania’s interest in a partner relationship with NATO, the alliance preferred to see Romania aspire to the Western democratic world than to stall or reverse the transition. President Ion Iliescu formulated Euro-Atlantic integration as a main objective of Romania’s foreign policy, despite a striking disagreement over this goal among Romanian political elites.⁷⁴ It was President Iliescu who built some consensus among Romania's political parties around Romania’s full integration with Euro-Atlantic economic and military institutions.⁷⁵

In sum, in the period between 1990 and 1996, the Iliescu circle and NATO officials cooperatively produced Romania’s interest in joining the alliance. It should be mentioned, however, that NATO was less involved in the formulation of Romania’s aspirations to join the alliance, than it was in Poland. Because that interest in integration in the Euro-Atlantic area was established from above despite the disagreement among Romanian political elites, NATO had to further rely on the executive to *initiate* defense policies, so that they would be compatible with the alliance’s own.

After 1996, Romanian policy-makers accepted most of the “recommendations” made by their Western counterparts but tended to present those as the result of their own efforts.⁷⁶ Similarly, when in 1999 Romanian decision makers asked Western advisers to become directly involved in identifying national priorities in the area of defense and security and to formulate strategies for the achievement of those priorities, this invitation was presented as a step that was initiated by Bucharest rather than being “result of subtle modes of international social influence.”⁷⁷ Thus in early

⁷¹ Chris Donnelly, “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: a Framework for Tackling the Problem,” *NATO Review*, 45.1 (January 97) at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/rev97-1.htm>

⁷²The ANP covers political, economic, defense, resource, security and legal aspects of membership. *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, 23-25 April 1999*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999) and at <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030103.htm>

⁷³ Donald Falls, “NATO Enlargement: Is Romania Ready To Join the Alliance?” Air Force National Defense Fellowship, May 2000: p.14.

⁷⁴ Marke R. Shelley and John P. Norris, “NATO Enlargement: The case for Romania,” United States Naval Institute, Proceedings 123.3 (Mar 1997): 68-70.

⁷⁵Shelley and Norris, “NATO Enlargement.”

⁷⁶ Gheciu, *Security as Community?* p. 292.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p. 311.

1999 a NATO associate-general became the de facto main author of the Romanian Annual National Program chapter that deals with security issues. Moreover he was the one who presented the plan to NATO's North Atlantic Council in the spring of 1999 and received feedback on behalf of Romania.⁷⁸ In brief, not only was the Romanian defense reform agenda composed by NATO and Romanian officials together – even if legitimacy dictated its presentation as purely Romanian – but after 1999 NATO acquired the power to participate in crafting basic *institutions* of the Romanian state through Romania's National Programs and security legislation.

In addition to accepting permanent Western advisers in key ministries, in 1999, the Romanian executive created special departments within the various relevant executive agencies dedicated exclusively to NATO and PfP related activities. These departments were also united under an Interdepartmental Commission for NATO Integration.⁷⁹ The operation of the Commission strengthens and increases the Romanian - NATO executive network. Through the Commission, NATO provides the Romanians with new "correct" *ideas* and *information*. NATO's suggestions are picked up and rearticulated by the pro-(NATO)reform officials within the Romanian circles as reforms, legitimized by NATO's experience and authority in defense issues. The creation of the Commission not only provides a forum for building consensus within the executive around reforms advocated by NATO advisers but also allows NATO to monitor executive activities.

In conclusion, cooperation with NATO influenced the authority to introduce or block the introduction of defense and security legislation. By working closely with the executive in composing the defense and security reform agenda, the alliance shifted domestic *initiative* toward the alliance and to some extent the executive. Since NATO recommendations became preconditions for membership, defense and security matters were internalized as Euro-Atlantic integration issues rather than treated as a part of the external policy process, which effectively reduced domestic control over and *initiative* in those issues.

B.3.2 Impact on Ideas

The alliance used its enormous political and cultural power to change the set of *ideas* that Romanians regarded as legitimate. On the one hand, pro-NATO Romanian elites and the alliance itself described the adoption of liberal political and economic institutions as Romania's road to peace and prosperity.⁸⁰ On the other hand, these officials established in Romania the Western discourse that NATO is not just an alliance but also an embodiment of the western community of these liberal values and norms.⁸¹ Pro-NATO Romanian elites insisted that Romania, as a country with "democratic, liberal and humanist values," should seek inclusion in that community ("Europe, and by extension "the Western structures").⁸² This not only sanctioned the notion that membership in NATO is a cultural and identity choice, but also led Romanians to invite NATO officials to play key – if not intrusive – roles in the process of western-style democratization of the defense and security institutions. Through NATO officials and through (pro-NATO) Romanian executives re-articulating the alliance's position, the organization delineated the normative foundation of the Romanian defense and security institutions. Just as in the Polish case, Romanian policy-makers could not question the consensus, created by the reformers and NATO officials without compromising their observing of the Romanian national interest. Hence, little debate about either NATO integration or NATO-initiated reforms occurred.

By banking on Romania's aspirations to the West – and thus indirectly to peace and prosperity – and to NATO's power to punish and reward Romania in those terms (aspirations), the

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 312.

⁷⁹ The Commission does not include parliament representatives but is to consults with the military and other social actors. See, <http://domino.kappa.ro/mae/dosare.nsf>.

⁸⁰ Gheciu, *Security as Community?* p. 281.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Teodor Melescanu, pointed out in Teodor Melescanu, "Security in Central Europe: A Positive-Sum Game," *NATO Review*, 41.5 (October 1993): 12-18.

NATO-Romanian executive network redefined the already established norms and reformulated pre-existing Romanian tradition. The idea of security as protecting Romanian territorial integrity from external threats was substituted with the objective of achieving good neighbor relations and regional stability. Furthermore, the nature of the civil authority over the armed forces was changed to reflect balanced civil-military relations and steps were taken to enhance societal control in defense and security institutions.

B.3.2.1 Security Threats, Sovereignty and Good Neighborhood Treaties

The socialist and nationalist political elites in power before 1996 stated their support for Euro-Atlantic Integration but they also emphasized the need to preserve Romania's sovereignty. Integral part of the election platform of a 1992 election winner⁸³ was built around the possible Hungarian (and to some extent Russian) threat to Romanian integrity and the portrayal of Western institutions as potential sources of danger to Romanian sovereignty.⁸⁴ Not only did the alliance try to persuade the Cabinet that the only way to domestic security and prosperity is the adoption of democratic institutions, but NATO also made clear that such reforms would improve Romania's standing in the international community, facilitate access to funding and improve the country's chances of getting into NATO (sticks and carrots). President Iliescu was compelled to take steps to improve relations with Hungary. They culminated in the conclusion of a Good Neighborhood Treaty with Hungary in 1996.⁸⁵ Again, after similar encouragement from NATO, Romania's second post-communist President Constantinescu signed and ratified a basic Romanian-Ukrainian Treaty in time for the 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid.⁸⁶

The conclusion of Good Neighborhood Treaties especially with Hungary and Ukraine are significant in two respects: they make provisions for guaranteeing minority rights and they demonstrate that Romania has redefined its national security threat perceptions. This redefinition – even if in contrast with the sentiments of the population at large⁸⁷ – was undertaken because NATO did not accept territorial rivalries and neighborhood grudges as legitimate security risks. The alliance insisted on an even more explicit synchronizing of the Romanian threat perception with NATO's threat assessments. In 1999 NATO advisers persuaded Romanian officials to pass a new National Security Strategy, which states that there is no major military threat to the country's security⁸⁸ and assigns the Romanian military “the protection and promotion of Romania's national interests abroad.”⁸⁹ Correspondingly, Rapid Reaction Forces for out-of-area operations were created and Romanian armed forces were reduced.⁹⁰ Moreover, Western officials convinced Romanians that since the National Security Strategy acknowledged that threats were coming from potential internal socio-economic instability, an intergovernmental body – the Interdepartmental Commission for

⁸³ The party that gathered most voices was the Party of Social-Democrats of Romania (PSDR). Since it did not have a majority in Parliament it formed a coalition with Greater Romania Party (PRM), Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR), and Socialist Labor Party (PSM).

⁸⁴ The discrepancy in the platform is probably because of poor understanding of the implications of Euro-Atlantic integration and probably because of the superficial consensus Iliescu created around Euro-Atlantic integration.

⁸⁵ For a detailed discussion on the political-military agreements between Hungary and Romania and the dynamics of their cooperation, Corneliu Bjola, “NATO Enlargement Between Promises and Reality. Cooperation and Stability in Central and Eastern Europe,” at www.seep.ceu.hu/archives/issue33/bjola-appendix.pdf.

⁸⁶ Anonymous, “Romania's painful gamble,” *The Economist*, 342.8006 (March 1, 1997).

⁸⁷ Tony Barber, “Romania in the Grey Zone,” *Foreign Wire*, (September 3, 1996) on the persistent Romanian-Hungarian tensions and Mariana Cernicova-Buca, “Romania: the Quest for Membership,” in Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald, eds., *Enlarging NATO: the National Debates* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001): 199-219 on remaining Romanian-Ukrainian tensions; Radu Bogdan, “Romanian Reflections,” *NATO Review*, 48.2 (Summer-Autumn 2000).

⁸⁸ Statement by State Secretary and Head of Department for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defense Policy in the Ministry of Defense, George Mior, in George Cristian Mior, “Romania's Defense Policy – Developments, Defense Diplomacy and Military Engagement,” in *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace*, 3 (2002): 34-39, p. 35.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Chief of the General Staff, General Mihail Popescu in Mihail Popescu, “The Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace* 3 (2002): 22-27.

NATO Integration – should be formed by representatives from ministries of labor, interior, industry, transportation and finance to cooperate with ministry of defense in the formulation and implementation of future legislation in the area of defense.⁹¹ Thus, Romania was compelled to change its security perceptions according to the tradition of the community of democratic states, to which Romania was aspiring.

Finally, during the Kosovo crisis of 1999, NATO “persuaded” the Romanian government that “true commitment to liberal-democratic norms was inconsistent with failure to act in support of the West.”⁹² NATO pointed out that other democratic nations supported allied action and suggested that, “it was time for Romania and its neighbors to show whether their political reorientation towards Western liberal-democracy was real or merely rhetorical.”⁹³ However, Romanian policy-makers were concerned about the possibility that Yugoslavia might retaliate either directly or on the Romanian minority in Yugoslavia. In addition, Russia was exercising considerable pressure on Bucharest warning that alignment with the West might have adverse consequences on the Romanian-Russian relations. About 78% of the population was opposed to the military operations. But because of the international pressure, at the end, Romania took concrete steps in support of the West: it allowed unlimited use of Romanian airspace, accepted refugees, and sent troops as a member of PfP.

In sum, NATO and Romanian officials limited the set of legitimate *ideas* that formed the base of the Romanian National Security Strategy. They successfully delegitimized the idea of threat to Romanian territorial integrity. Instead, they put to the fore the theme of good neighbor relations and a change from classical territorial defense to the protection and promotion of Romania’s national interests abroad. This was largely done at the executive level where the National Security Strategy was formulated. However, when introducing security issues in parliament, as in the Kosovo crisis case, both the Romanian decision-makers and the alliance framed their justification in a value-based discourse. They explained that failure to cooperate with NATO and act like member-states might lead the West to place Romania in “the camp of non-civilized people.”⁹⁴ Given Romanians’ desire for peace and prosperity, emblemized by Euro-Atlantic integration, such rhetoric effectively delegitimized alternative actions, and again created a superficial consensus like in the Polish case.

B.3.2.2 Civil-Military Relations

NATO also worked closely with Romania on its reforms in the area of civil-military relations – establishment of transparency and accountability of defense institutions, limited and clearly defined mandates of the different agencies that govern defense-related decision-making, civilianization of the ministries of defense and interior, and the empowerment of civil society vis-à-vis the state.

It was only in 1994 and under international pressure that a law on the organization of the Romanian Ministry of National Defense was passed. Trying to burnish Romania’s candidacy for PfP, Iliescu’s Cabinet proposed the appointment of a civilian minister of defense in the hope that cosmetic changes would be sufficient for Western diplomatic support. Even though in 1994 the first civilian minister of defense was appointed, the Ministry of National Defense below him remained almost devoid of civilians. The minister of defense and the highest-ranking military official had practically the same duties with administrative personnel responsible to the highest-ranking military officer. Again the highest-ranking military officer oversaw the entire defense establishment but was formally subordinated to the civilian. This model was seen as problematic in regard to stable civilian control because of the immense authority in the hands of the highest-ranking officer.

⁹¹ Gheciu, *Security as Community?* p. 296.

⁹² Ibid. p. 321-322.

⁹³ Ibid. p. 323.

⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 324.

However, it still was a step in the direction of the democratization of Romanian civil-military relations, because the officer's direct access to the executive was taken away.

The alliance did not accept Romania's vertical civil-military relations as legitimate democratic civilian control. In dialogues with Romanian decision-makers from the new pro-Western government in 1997-1998 and with the appointment of permanent advisers from NATO member-states to the Ministry of Defense in Bucharest, the West pressured Bucharest to balance civil-military relations. The first step was taken with the discontinuation of practices of better benefits for military staff and of the abuse of a heavily politicized system of selection and promotion.⁹⁵ Additionally, in 1999, the government passed two resolutions, which promulgated the reorganization of the Ministry of Defense, advocated by NATO.

Moreover, NATO officials and Romanian reformers also worked together to have Romanians move away from the hierarchical and exclusionary governance in defense matters. At NATO recommendation, a new system was created to enable societal actors to become more deeply involved in policy-making and policy-implementation in the area of defense and security. It requires the ministry of defense to inform and cooperate on a permanent basis with other ministries and departments, the parliament, as well as with societal actors. In addition, the Interdepartmental Commission for Integration into NATO is to also consult with the military and other social actors in order to take advantage of the expertise of societal agencies in the area of defense and security.⁹⁶

In conclusion, NATO changed not only the nature of the civil-military relations but also the state structure by enhancing societal control with improving venues for civil society participation. NATO delegitimized the nature of the repressive Romanian state, by compelling the Romanians to reform the Ministry of Interior and better protect the civil and political rights of Romanians. To change the set of *ideas* that Romanians regarded as legitimate, the alliance used its authority and vast experience in those spheres. NATO drew its own legitimacy from its image of the embodiment of the community of western liberal democracies, whose experience and evolution it represented. The alliance transferred its legitimacy to its partners in the NATO-Romanian executive network. Since Romania is aspiring to be a part of that community, it should, NATO and those Romanians insisted, also adopt these norms and values and implement the changes that the more experienced NATO recommended. Thus, NATO precluded any alternative arrangements or debates about them. Parliament was marginalized because it was excluded from the process of establishing the ideological underpinnings of Romanian defense and security arrangements, a role that was assumed by NATO advisers.

B.3.3 Impact on Domestic Institutions

Both PfP and later MAP involve parliamentarians from CEE in different activities meant to educate the CEE Members of Parliament about the functions of parliaments in ensuring democratic civilian control in defense and security matters. Furthermore, it should be noted that MAP introduced the participation of representatives of parliament in a few of the workshops and required that individual partnership programs be ratified by parliament. However, NATO's influence was channeled mainly through the executive. Since it was through this cooperation that the restructuring of defense and security institutions was performed, national parliaments have been marginalized in those state-building processes. Given the ideational constraints established by the alliance (discussed in the previous section) and the limited opportunities for the parliament's participation in the

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 298.

⁹⁶ Romania, Office of the Prime Minister, *Annual National Plan within MAP*, 1999. The argument is a reiteration of the arguments put forth by NATO. Finally, Romania was compelled to initiate the civilianization of the Ministry of Interior and turned it into a more transparent and more accountable institution, compatible with its Western counterparts. By NATO's suggestion, the Romanians also took steps to place limitations on the duration of the state of emergency that could be imposed by the executive without a mandate from parliament, to establish procedures for the declaration, duration and end of the state of emergency, and to limit the right of the authorities to suspend the rights of individuals even in that special context.

formulation of national security doctrines, it can be concluded that national democratic forums have been marginalized in the cooperation process between NATO and Romania.

Even more importantly, parliaments were denied the opportunity to exercise control over or modify the content of the decisions of the executive network of NATO and Polish officials: after 1996, in Romania, cooperation with NATO constrained the activity of domestic legislative authority, since reform was furthered through executive acts rather than parliamentary legislation (Figure.1). Even if NATO officials did not propose the use governmental resolutions, they tacitly agreed to it.

Figure 1. National Defense: Legislative Framework in Romania

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
of national defense contributing to the military system reform and organization:
1. Law no. 45 / 1994 on the national defense of Romania;
2. Law no. 73 / 1995 on national economy and territory preparation for defense;
3. Law no. 80 / 1995 on military personnel status;
4. Law no. 46 / 1996 on preparing the population for defense;
5. Law no. 106 / 1996 on civil protection;
6. Law no. 132 / 1997 on goods and public services requisitions for public interest;
7. Government Decision no. 618 / 1997 on alternative military service;
8. Government Ordinance no. 7 / 1998 on measures for the civil protection of the personnel during the MoND restructuring process;
9. Government Resolution no. 52 / 1998 on defense planning;
10. Government Resolution no. 121 / 1998 on material responsibility of the military personnel, approved by the Law no. 25 / 1999;
11. Urgency Government Resolution no. 1 / 1999 on the state of siege and emergency;
12. Government Resolution no. 385 / 1999 on MoND organization;
13. Government Resolution no. 41 / 1999 on MoND organization and function.

Source: Romanian Ministry of National Defense

NATO officials were eager to have the Romanians redefine the role of Romanian security institutions and the meaning of democratic civilian authority over the armed forces. However, progress in the reform process achieved through executive acts rather than parliamentary legislation led to the further marginalization of domestic democratic forums. It altered the functioning of domestic *institutions*, setting a precedent that the executive not only initiates but also passes defense and security legislation. The redistribution of control over domestic political resources in favor of the executive not only did not address the weakness of parliamentary oversight in Romania but exacerbated it.

B.3.4 Information Distribution

It was through the skillful use of *information* that NATO and (pro-NATO) Romanian reformers achieved the already described sweeping reforms of the Romanian defense and security institutions. NATO and (pro-NATO) Romanian officials modified the domestic distribution of political and technical knowledge.

Political *information* about the preferences and power of different actors was the most used cognitive instrument. In the period before 1996, President Ilescu used his personal authority and manipulated the remnants of the communist political culture of “following the leader and his orders” to set Euro-Atlantic Integration as a foreign policy priority in Romania. On NATO’s side, the alliance confronted Ilescu with *information* about its preferences and about the carrots and sticks the organization was willing to use to compel Romania to behave in the direction recommended by the alliance. The alliance was successful in getting Ilescu to take steps to improve Romania’s relations with at least Hungary and at least appoint civilian minister of defense.

In the post-1996 period, the most used cognitive means was political *information* about NATO's power and preferences, which was distributed at different levels in Romania. To mobilize Romanian executives around liberal norms, NATO officials interpreted for them the alliance's expectations down to the specific details about what Romania's institutions and behavior should be.⁹⁷ In numerous consultations, through the Intergovernmental Commission on NATO Integration and in the "Report on the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security,"⁹⁸ the alliance provided guidelines for the "necessary" (according to NATO) reforms. This tradition was institutionalized through the MAP's comprehensive system for monitoring and feedback to aspirant countries and assessment meetings in the North Atlantic Council. This *information* was expected to be passed on to other policy-makers and the general public either in the form of internalized agenda or again as NATO's political preference, i.e. as the preference of any liberal democracy and therefore of Romania, as well.

Often times, NATO officials or/and pro-NATO Romanian reformers would inform the public about the West's dissatisfaction with the progress of reforms in Romania to mobilize support for the speedy continuation of reforms. For instance, US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, told Romanians during a visit to Romania in late 1999 that their country had to demonstrate that it is security provider not just consumer.⁹⁹ Similarly, in a White House meeting between the then Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea and Vice President Al Gore, the US reportedly offered explicit though non-public assurances to Bucharest, that Romania will be accepted in the second round of NATO enlargement. However, Gore's assurances also came with a caveat that Romania pursues the road it started.¹⁰⁰ Often times NATO's criticism of the work of the Romanian government increased the government's accountability to some extent but just as in the Polish case, the long-term consequences of the shift in responsiveness might be still unclear. Telling is the adoption of the secrecy law in Romania – a law, which according to the International Helsinki Federation failed to strike a proper balance between secrecy and the public's right to know in allowing for "incredibly broad" restrictions that could "substantially undermine" the new right-to-information statute. A colonel of the Romanian Intelligence Service "came down like a storm on the members of the Senate Juridical Commission" telling them that Brussels informed them that unless the bill is passed within two weeks, they cannot exclude adopting a critical attitude regarding Romania. The senators understood the "huge problems" Romania might face unless they pass the bill as soon as possible and approved the draft bill in the form passed by the Chamber of Deputies.¹⁰¹

Political *information* about NATO's power and preference was used at the implementation stage, as well. In several separate cases long-delayed reforms within different ministries were finally passed because of NATO's intervention, acting on request of (pro-NATO) Romanian reformers¹⁰². Because of the thinness of Romanian public debate on defense and security issues and the resultant superficial consensus about the reform agenda in those areas, the implementation of the reforms suggested by the alliance and promulgated by the (pro-NATO) executives often lacked the necessary wide support. For example, the reduction of the military required the cooperation of the Ministry of Labor. In 1999, the Ministry of Labor was still delaying the creation of retraining and replacement programs, so a couple of pro-reform members of the ministry of defense asked NATO to intervene. A senior member of the Political Affairs of NATO's international staff called one of the bureaucrats at the ministry of labor and "allegedly told him: 'NATO wants to see this done. Do you think you can do it?'" Soon after, the Ministry of Labor began the creation of such programs.¹⁰³

⁹⁷ Gheciu, *Security as Community?* p. 296.

⁹⁸ In 1997-1998, a team of British experts participated in the formulation of *Report on the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security*.

⁹⁹ Falls, "NATO Enlargement," p. 9.

¹⁰⁰ Foley, "Ciorbea Says Gore Gives Assurance on Future NATO Membership," RFE/RL, June 18, 1997.

¹⁰¹ Roberts, "NATO, Secrecy, and the Right to Information."

¹⁰² Alexandra Gheciu, *Security as Community?* p. 318.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, p. 319.

Similar action was used frequently to further reform in the Ministry of Defense, when the bureaucracy stalled the process. Western officials informed those bureaucrats that “NATO required” that particular program.

Finally, to mobilize broader support amongst parliamentarians and military officers, NATO used technical *information* about defense and security institutions in liberal democracies. Through various workshops in PfP, MAP and the Rose-Roth Initiative, the alliance disbursed *information* that aimed to improve understanding among legislators of their various problems and perspectives; to familiarize legislators with key security and defense issues; to promote the development of appropriate civil-military relations, including the democratic control of armed forces; to share expertise and experience in parliamentary practice and procedures. In other words NATO sought to disseminate a particular, Western-defined, set of understandings that were a “desirable” or “better” alternative to the Romanian defense and security institutions.

B.4 Conclusion

Acting under NATO’s guidance, Romanian reformers have enacted new legal and institutional arrangements in the security realm. NATO involvement legitimized particular meanings of liberal-democratic practices and institutions and discredited alternative interpretations. In conformity with NATO’s definition of democratic control and contrary to the view previously held by Romanians, the 1999 reform on Romanian security institutions established a balanced type of civil-military relations, which maximized the prospects for professionalization of the armed forces and civilian control over them. Romania also took steps to broaden the meaning of defense and security institutions to include institutions governing the domestic order like Ministry of Interior.¹⁰⁴ After cooperating with NATO, Romanians accepted the further civilianization and transparentization of all defense institutions and improved venues for civil society and public participation. NATO successfully compelled Romania to implement a national security strategy based on the assessment that Romanian security can only be based on building good neighbor relations and the promotion of Romania’s national interests in the region.

These positive and important changes came at the cost of marginalizing domestic democratic forums. NATO took steps to build parliament’s ability to oversee defense and security matters, but parliament was hardly involved in the reorganization of the defense and security institutions. The formulation of the role of Romanian security institutions and the meaning of democratic civilian authority over the armed forces was coordinated between NATO and pro-NATO executives. The institutionalization of these redefined roles was achieved through executive acts rather than parliamentary legislation. Thus not only was much of the *initiative* passed to the alliance and the executive but also it was the government that passed defense and security regulations. Since failure to cooperate with NATO and act like member-states was presented by NATO and pro-NATO Romanian reformers as a sign that Romania was not a democratic and truly European state, real debate about the reform process was precluded. The redistribution of control over domestic political resources in favor of the executive not only did not address the weakness of parliamentary oversight in Romania but also exacerbated it. The legislature effectively lost its right to contribute to and oversee defense and security matters.

The implications of these practices can be twofold. On the one hand, because reforms were promoted by an executive network, often there were problems of implementation. Especially if reforms depended on a broad array of institutional and societal actors, pro-reform actors had difficulty mustering the level of support required for norm implementation.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, such practices might have established a tradition of greater elite autonomy that might prove difficult to reverse.

¹⁰⁴ Romania, Office of the Prime Minister, *White Paper of the Romanian Government*, 1999.

¹⁰⁵ Gheciu, *Security as Community?* p. 336.

EU INVOLVEMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

1. Introduction

This section of the study addresses the specific case of the EU's impact on curbing elite autonomy in Poland and Romania. The analysis begins with a brief overview of the historical development of the relations between CEEC and the European Community or European Union after 1993. Then the chapter proceeds with a discussion about the impact of the institutionalization of the CEEC-EU cooperation on the distribution of domestic resources in both Romania and Poland. One of the conclusions of this section is that the lack of real debate on European integration in both CEECs reflects a thin consensus on accession but also little or belated awareness of the details of the legislation that parliaments are passing.¹⁰⁶ Domestic debate is additionally constrained by the CEECs' obligation to adopt the White Paper and the *acquis communautaire*, which shift policy *initiation* towards the EU. Parliaments' legislative and oversight power is further limited by the agreement to fast-track procedures for EU regulation. Moreover, the *institutions* created to manage CEEC-EU cooperation were established within the executive, thus empowering it with the colossal and important obligations of managing the integration process. The conclusion raises some possible problems stemming from the marginalization of democratic forums.

2. Historical Context

With the advent of Perestroika in the Soviet block, the European community received the opportunity to engage in direct and formal negotiations with individual CEECs. In 1989 bilateral agreements on trade and economic cooperation were concluded with Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union but trade cooperation and aid assistance became conditional on further CEEC commitments to political transformation¹⁰⁷. The EC's role in providing external encouragement and support for domestic economic reform was additionally strengthened since the Commission was given the responsibility to coordinate aid from several international financial institutions and G24.¹⁰⁸ The EC/EU began administering the PHARE Program (Poland, Hungary: Assistance for Economic Reconstructing) and some limited bilateral aid.¹⁰⁹ Even though Romania had cooperated with the West since the 1970s, concern over the Romanian government's limited progress with political and economic reform led to Romania's initial exclusion from PHARE and one-year delay in the negotiations of a trade agreement.

The deterioration of economic conditions in the years immediately after the beginning of the CEE transition necessitated adjustment of the 1989 agreements. Initial negotiations for what came to be known as the Europe Agreements with Poland (and Hungary and Czechoslovakia) started in December 1990.¹¹⁰ Poland wanted the new agreement to be a transitional agreement towards full membership but only in April 1991 a reluctant Council agreed to a preamble that referred to

¹⁰⁶ Heather Grabbe, "How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion, and Diversity," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8.4 (2001): 1013-1031.

¹⁰⁷ Mike Mannin, "EU-CEEC Relations: an Overview," in Mike Mannin, ed., *Pushing Back the Boundaries: the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999): 3-31, p. 8.

¹⁰⁸ Jackie Gower, "EU Policy to Central and Eastern Europe," in Karen Henderson, ed., *Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union* (Philadelphia, PA: UCL Press, 1999): p. 4.

¹⁰⁹ From 1989 to 1991, PHARE provided primarily technical assistance. In the 1991-1995 period, support for public and private institutional reform was prioritized and from 1998 on the PHARE was designated as the main financial instrument of the Pre-accession Strategy. In 1992 at the insistence of the European Parliament a modest "democracy line" was created to enhance democratic practice, establish human rights, enforce rule of law. By 1994-1996, allocations in the related fields of civil society and democracy, administration, public institutions came to constitute about a third of PHARE's expenditure with national demand-led programs dominating three quarters of the PHARE activities. See, Mike Mannin, "Policies Towards CEEC," in Mike Mannin, ed., *Pushing Back the Boundaries: the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999): 31-70, p. 38-40.

¹¹⁰ European Agreements arranged financial, technical, and economic cooperation meant to create a free trade area, to introduce competition, and to minimize state-subsidies. The country specific clauses discussed the sensitive sectors in each CEEC.

membership as an eventual but certainly not automatic outcome of association.¹¹¹ Romania too requested an upgraded agreement and in 1993 signed one but without the reference to membership.

In the early 1990s, the EC/EU was reluctant to enlarge and prioritized internal integration. CEECs were precluded from a speedy membership if only since the EU became busy deepening not widening and since with further internal EU integration, accession to the EC/EU became more complex.¹¹² Yet, even if no political rights were assigned to correspond to CEECs economic responsibilities, the Europe Agreements created the legal framework for multilateral cooperation that would bring CEE closer to the political, socioeconomic and legal frameworks of the EC/EU. Furthermore, with adding political elements (adhering to democracy and enforcing human rights) to the essentially economic/trading nature of previous agreements, the EU sought to relate political, legal, administrative, and economic change in the partner countries to future EU-CEEC relations.¹¹³

At the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, the European Council publicly conceded the possibility of membership for associated CEECs as soon as they became able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying a set of political and economic conditions: stability of institutions like democracy, rule of law, human and minority rights; functioning market economy; and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union and to take on membership obligations, such as the European Monetary Union and the Common Security and Foreign Policy. The 1994 Essen Council launched a Pre-accession Strategy to bring these countries closer to the European Union, taking into account their needs and with the ultimate aim of providing the associated countries with an appropriate way of preparing for their accession to the Union. The two principle instruments devised as part of this strategy were a 'structured dialogue' between the associated states and the Union and the 'European Agreements,' the preparation of the Associated States for integration into the Union's internal market. The Essen Council also requested that the European Commission prepare a White Paper defining membership obligations in terms of the *acquis communautaire* – the laws and rules adopted on the basis of the EU's founding treaties.

To speed up Poland's integration into the European community, the government announced a "Programme of Measures for Adapting the Polish Economy and Legal System to the Requirements of the Europe Agreement" and published annual progress reports on the adjustments. Poland also submitted its official application for membership on April 8, 1994. In June 1995 with full backing from parliament, Romania also applied for membership. Since it had established new legal and institutional frameworks to implement the Europe Agreement and had made some efforts to continue domestic reforms and to improve relations with its neighbors, Romania was included in the Pre-accession strategy multilateral cooperation. The EU's commitment to enlargement was carefully designed to encourage further reform in Romania by reassuring it that it would not be left out: the 1995 Madrid Council agreed that negotiations would take place simultaneously for all the applicants on the basis of common criteria. The European Commission was to proceed with preparing Agenda 2000 – a detailed review of the candidates' applications, a broader analysis of the impact of enlargement on existing EU budgetary and policy arrangements, and a composite pre-accession and accession strategy.

The Commission's opinion of the candidates' applications was published in 1997. At its recommendation, in December 1997 the European Council adopted the Reinforced Pre-accession Strategy to enable all the applicant states to become members of the European Union and, to this end, to bring them into line as far as possible with the Union's *acquis* before accession. The new Strategy combined the Union's various forms of support into a single framework (Accession Partnerships) and familiarized the applicants with the Union's policies and procedures by offering them the opportunity to take part in Community programmes. The Partnership document listed short-term (1998) and medium-term (2002) priorities for action and financial support from the EU.

¹¹¹ Mannin, "EU-CEEC relations," p. 10.

¹¹² Mannin, "EU-CEEC relations," p. 8-10.

¹¹³ Preston, *Enlargement and Integration in the European Union* (London, UK: Routledge, 1997).

Individual Accession Partnerships were negotiated with all applicants and regular reviews on their progress in meeting membership criteria were prepared annually. Poland, which had been screening both pre-existing legislation and new draft statutes for compatibility with the EU *acquis*, quickly prepared “National Strategy for Integration” summarizing the measures taken up date and formulating the priorities for the adjustment process, together with a schedule of measures to adapt the Polish legal system. The country also worked out a draft “Programme of Preparation for Membership in the EU” to implement the EU priorities.¹¹⁴ Romania too designed a national strategy, meant to prepare the country for membership.

In 1998 the EU started bilateral discussions with all the candidates but opened formal accession negotiations with only five of them, Poland included. Accession talks with Poland were concluded at the Copenhagen European Council on 13 December 2002. The Accession Treaty was signed with Poland on 16 April 2003 at the Athens European Council with a view to full EU membership on 1 May 2004. With the start of bilateral negotiations with the EU, Romania adopted a “National Strategy for the Preparation of Romania's Accession to the EU”, which marked the procedural steps and the actions to be undertaken in the process of closing the gap with the Community's structures rather than rapid entry. The Helsinki European Council summit in December 1999 decided that negotiations for accession with Romania (and Bulgaria) would start in 2000. At the 2002 Copenhagen European Summit, the EU leaders reiterated the Union's intention to welcome Romania as member in 2007 - "depending on further progress in complying with the membership criteria". Romania (along with Bulgaria) was invited to participate in the next Intergovernmental Conference as observer.

3. Going West: Impact on Ideas

The Cold War “victory” of the West affirmed the superiority of the “Western ways.” To the East, the West was the principle political, economic and cultural force: the West came to symbolize mainly consumer prosperity and personal freedoms, but also democracy, security, and human rights, which the suppressed socialist societies had for so long desired. The West and being like the West were promoted by both western and CEE elites as a panacea for all problems. The EU presented itself as a haven of political and economic stability and had little choice but to applaud the transition efforts of Eastern Europe and promise support, it could not always supply.¹¹⁵ The initial, mostly enthusiastic and willing, public commitment on behalf of the EU to assist in CEE transformation in order to “reunite Europe,” loomed the East’s aspiration to “return to Europe”. Thus the Eastern “transition” / ”transformation” – a means by which CEECs pursue their interests, by articulating their identification with whom they belong and to whom they would like to belong and be like – became a surrender of Eastern identity to the Western project. The “return to Europe,” confirmed by membership in the institutional expression of the European community, was therefore not just a strategic but also an identity choice. A transition, which is completed signifies a new kind of identity, but the reverse argument – the reaffirmation of specific identity as a sign of a completed transition – is what drives the East and what makes it so desperately strive for membership. Aspiring to membership in the EU as a national priority altered the nature of domestic political life in CEECs.

3.1 The Polish Civilization - an European Civilization?

In the early 1990s, EU membership was considered only one of the options available to Poland but by the mid-1990s it had become the priority and prerequisite of Polish foreign policy.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Andrew Francis, “Poland: Return to Europe,” in Mike Mannin, ed., *Pushing Back the Boundaries: the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999): 295-319, p. 311.

¹¹⁵ Wadel, *Collision and Collusion*, p. 180-188.

¹¹⁶ Karl Cordell, “Introduction: Aims and Objectives” in Karl Cordell, ed., *Poland and the European Union* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2000): 1-8, p. 4.

The first post-communist government in Poland promoted the idea that the road to Poland's economic recovery and to liberal democracy passed through membership in NATO and the EC/EU¹¹⁷. Opinion polls indicated that the new political class and the general public agreed even if the wish to join the EU was motivated by the deeply rooted idea of Europe without borders rather than by knowledge about the IO and its aims.¹¹⁸ The debate about the EU was framed as an identity choice: "If Poland does not become a member of the EU, it will mean isolation, marginalization and in consequence the collapse of Polish civilization... We cannot at this moment let our fears [of losses] cause the process of building borders to begin anew," former Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka instructed parliament.¹¹⁹

On the one hand, that association between accession to the EU and the success of the transition to a capitalist democracy in the Polish public discourse sanctioned the notion that anyone who slows or challenges Polish membership in the EU is not following the country's national interest. Therefore, even though there had been little constructive debate, the linkage EU membership-successful transition was so salient that the first post-socialist left coalition felt an obligation to reaffirm Poland's commitment to EU integration (if only to enhance its democratic credentials).¹²⁰ European integration even received a Sejm sanction, as it was unanimously supported in 1994 by all parliamentary groups since most parties agreed to the principle of integration. The election of the Polish right back into office in 1997 brought unenthusiastic supporters of EU enlargement, although the politicians, appointed to positions of prominence concerning Polish integration into the EU, showed readiness to emphasize the advantages over the losses of accession, despite the anxieties of some parts of society.¹²¹ Similarly, in its "yes" campaign, meant to encourage Poles to approve the country's accession in the EU in the June 2003 referendum, the government focused on promises "that things will improve rapidly once Poland is inside the EU."¹²² Again, the understanding that the advancement of the country's transformation depends on Polish membership in the EU was reflected in the 77.45% of votes in support of EU accession in the referendum of 7 and 8 June 2003.

On the other hand, the linkage between accession to the EU and Poland's successful transition to a capitalist democracy precluded meaningful debate about Polish cooperation with the EU. Instead of competing for the formulation of public and foreign policy, Polish elites have had to accept what Europe defines as legitimate and necessary, if not only because "the West knows best" but also because EU's recommendations are requirement for accession.

It should be noted that EU's requirements were generally beneficial to the declared aims of the Polish transition. However, the existence of numerous membership requirements has foreclosed debate about alternative (to EU-recommended) policies, thus limiting political accountability and representation. Since there was little constructive debate about the consequences of accession, the majority of Poles remained ignorant of the implications of membership –ignorance, which can preclude them from furthering their interests. For example, the right of foreigners to purchase land in Poland is opposed by three quarters of the Polish population but is a prerequisite for accession.¹²³

¹¹⁷ Cordell, "Introduction," p. 3. The CEE governments were assuming that they were walking through an open door and that their claims that they had never left Europe were sufficient for integration. The EC/EU limited itself to series of statements about integration.

¹¹⁸ Elzbieta Stadtmuller, "Polish Perceptions of the European Union in the 1990s" in Karl Cordell, ed., *Poland and the European Union*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2000): 24-45, p. 29.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹²⁰ The argument is constructed after Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," *International Studies Quarterly*, 40.4 (1996): 451-578; Teresa Los-Nowak, "Contemporary Government Attitudes towards the European Union," in Karl Cordell, ed., *Poland and the European Union*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2000): 8-24, p.18.

¹²¹ Michael Jackie Gower and John Redmond, eds., *Enlarging the European Union: The Way Forward* (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 2000).

¹²² Breffni O'Rourke, "EU: Poland Heads Into Referendum With Chorus Of Encouragement," *RFE/RL*, (Prague, 6 June 2003).

The unawareness of the essence of the accession process is also exemplified by the understanding of Polish elites that even though integration is “inevitable,” Poland should take part in it once Polish politicians have obtained favorable terms.¹²⁴ However, little in the accession process is debatable: funding and the deadlines for implementation of accession obligations and both only to some extent. This implies that some interests of Polish society could be unintentionally ignored, as would probably be the case with the Polish farmers or economic development of the Eastern borderlands.¹²⁵ In fact, some have argued that it was this fear of severe economic hardship for those two groups that significantly reduced voter turnout (to 58.85%) at the June 2003 referendum.¹²⁶ Even though, an array of world leaders, including Pope John Paul II, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Sweden's Prime Minister Goeran Persson and even U.S. President George W. Bush, beseeched Poles to vote “yes,” the majority of Poland’s rural population, comprising more than a third of the country's people, chose to stay home.

3.2 The Cost of Overcoming Iliescu’s Nationalistic Agenda of the Early Transition

At least officially, full integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures has been a key aim of Romanian foreign policy since the overthrow of Ceausescu. After the Romanian revolution of 1989, a neo-communist leadership under President Ion Iliescu headed the country. A return to Europe was prominent in the 10-point program, issued by the National Salvation Front in December 1989. President Iliescu subsequently authoritatively established European integration as a main objective of Romania’s foreign policy and built a general consensus among Romania's political parties around Romania’s full integration with Euro-Atlantic economic and military institutions.¹²⁷ This consensus was superficial and the Iliescu government and Romania’s political elite had little understanding what integration entailed.¹²⁸ Romania’s early post-1989 foreign policy appears to have been concentrated far more on combating perceived threats from neighboring states than promoting cooperation with them.¹²⁹ The Iliescu government made little and slow progress in the cooperation with the EU. The obligations of the Europe agreement, however, stimulated reform in Romania and locked it into a path of westward oriented trade and development.¹³⁰

By 1992-1993, however, Romania was beginning to show increased interest in establishing closer ties with the EC/EU. This reactive desire not to be excluded and to add a degree of respectability to Romania’s tarnished image was accompanied by a more considered and pro-active government policy on Euro-Atlantic integration.¹³¹ The first right and pro-European government reaffirmed Romania’s commitment to accession and was far more active in pursuing it. Around the mid-1990s integration became synonymous with competition between political parties and leaders for recognition and favors from the West.¹³² Accession became a power resource helping domestic actors translate their preference into policies by claiming that the policy is necessary for Romania’s integration in the EU. Moreover, the country’s underdeveloped political parties soon abandoned

¹²³ Stadtmuller, “Polish Perceptions,” p. 41.

¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 35.

¹²⁵ Arista M. Cirtautas, “Poland” special feature on “The Ordeal of EU Enlargement,” in *East European Constitutional Review*, 9 (Fall 2000): 86-90.

¹²⁶ “The Church Interferes in the Polish Referendum for Membership in the EU,” *Sega* (Sofia, 9 June 2003).

¹²⁷ Tom Gallagher, “Building Democracy in Romania: Internal Shortcomings and External Neglect,” in Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, eds., *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹²⁸ “Romanian President Speaks on EU Joining” in *XINHUA*, 01/31/2000.

¹²⁹ David Phinnemore, “Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: a Decade of Frustration?” in Duncan Light and David Phinnemore, eds., *Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001): 245-270, p. 253.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p.255.

¹³¹ Ibid, p. 255-6.

¹³² Annette Freyberg-Inan, “Which Way to Progress? Impact of International Organizations in Romania” in Ronald H. Linden, ed., *Norms and Nannies: the Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002).

policy formulation and confined themselves to implementation of EU composed programs (and some representation of their clientele at the expense of their constituencies).¹³³

A positive outcome of the lack of domestic debate on EU integration is that regardless of their political affiliation, the government programs of both parties have come to oscillate around Brussels' recommendations rather than the nationalistic agenda of the early transition. A negative outcome is that since both major parties declare the same objectives, elites came to challenge each other's competence to achieve the desired goals with statements like that of Foreign Minister, Mircea Geoana, "It's only a small exaggeration to say that this [government] is a last chance for Romania to stay on track to join the European Union and NATO."¹³⁴ Aspiration to join the EU has not only curtailed legitimate reform party platforms but also limited political competition, thus offering electoral accountability but no political accountability.¹³⁵ Even though the EU-endorsed package of policies commits successor (mainly ex-communist) parties to serious reform programs that they would never otherwise have adopted, it left the parties themselves crippled, unpopular, and underdeveloped.

In conclusion, the cooperation with the EU altered the set of legitimate *ideas* in the CEE domestic political process. CEE and EU officials cooperated in order to help CEECs in their transformation and to establish liberal norms and values. The EU consistently promoted a state that regulates, redistributes, privatizes, establishes rule of law, a state that is decentralized and administratively capable.¹³⁶ However, in the process of circumscribing the CEE political spectrum around liberal norms and values, the cooperation process has also limited political competition in general. This constrained domestic policy debate and hence legitimacy, accountability, and representation could be especially problematic in terms of the development of the party systems in CEECs, as parties were confined to compete on the "modus operandi rather than over substantive programmatic alternatives or ideological commitments."¹³⁷

4. The *Acquis Communautaire* – A Blessing or a Burden: Impact on Initiative

Cooperation with the EU has redistributed the access to domestic *initiative* mainly in two ways: 1) through the recommendations of the so-called White Paper – a checklist of reforms necessary to speed the transition from socialist to market economy; and 2) through the accession negotiations process, constituting the legal harmonization of CEEC with EU regulations.

Once the EU built an internal consensus on enlargement and became publicly committed to expansion, it also came forth with an accession strategy, the so-called White Paper. The White Paper's purpose was to assist the associated countries in their institution building. It identified in considerable detail, for each sector of the internal market, the key measures that the associated countries needed to adopt and the legal approximation necessary to bring their existing laws in line with the EU's. The Paper also suggested a logical sequence for the approximation program, while leaving it to each state to draw the timetable. The Paper also prescribed structural reforms, necessary to make the recommended legislation effective and focused the use of PHARE funds to that end.

The CEECs have also purchased a continuously changing institutional package – the EU's massive regulatory framework. In the bilateral negotiations to accession, the EC worked with governments to design accession strategies – Individual Accession Partnerships. They map the path that each country must follow to go from wherever it stands to the EU level and to adopt the full

¹³³ Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, "Romania" special feature on "The Ordeal of EU Enlargement," in *East European Constitutional Review*, 9 (Fall 2000): 77-81.

¹³⁴ Steven Erlanger, "Romania Seeks to Stay On the Track to Europe," *New York Times*, Feb 11, 2001.

¹³⁵ Abby Innes and Anna Grzymala-Busse, "Great Expectations: The EU and Domestic Political Competition in East Central Europe," *East European Politics and Societies*, 17.1 (Winter 2003): 64-73.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.68.

acquis communautaire. Or as colorfully described, “the head of the EU delegation is the most important person in the country next to the prime minister. He is the latter’s best friend, feared ally, and domineering adviser.”¹³⁸ The strict implementation of the White Paper and the Accession Partnerships has been monitored by the European Commission. The Commission builds its opinion, whether cooperation towards membership with each applicant should be continued, based on the progress, made in the implementation of the White Paper and the Accession Partnerships.

The introduction and adoption of the White Paper and the Individual Accession Partnerships has had several important consequences. The Paper and the Partnerships “inevitably shift the focus of policy *initiation* and implementation towards the Commission – effectively internalizing EU-CEE relations rather than treating them as a part of the external policy process.”¹³⁹ Moreover, the move towards a technical approach to implementation depoliticizes a vast array of policies and institutional choices. It reduces input and influence of not only domestic interest groups but also domestic constituencies. The universal prescriptions – same requirements for all CEECs – allow for even less domestic representation since they do not take into consideration country particularities. Finally, this technicalization of the reform process also precludes domestic debates on the issues covered by the Commission. Therefore, cooperation with the EU has passed a significant fraction of domestic policy *initiation* to the supranational level and to the top portion to CEEC governments. If such a shift is inherent to the process of international cooperation, the scope of domestic *initiative* transferred in the EU-CEEC case is unprecedented.

5. Negotiating EU Membership: Impact on Institutions

Cooperation with the EU has changed the functioning of domestic *institutions* primarily in two ways: by changing the practices of the already existing government institutions involved in the process and by necessitating the dissolution of some the establishment of institutions that would service the cooperation but also remain in place after accession. If the modification of pre-existing government institutions is country-specific, the institutions set up to facilitate accession is more universal and depends on the cooperation stage. At the association stage, the Europe Agreements provided for bilateral Association Councils at the ministerial level, Association Committees at ambassadorial level and advisory Parliamentary Committees. The 1994 Essen Council introduced the “Multilateral Structured Dialogue,” which centered cooperation around CEE and EU ministerial meetings and annual meetings at the head of state/government level in the “margins of the European Council.” Finally, at the accession negotiations stage, the institutions provided for within Agenda 2000’s Reinforced Pre-accession Strategy are a Presidency/Commission bilateral discussion format, complemented by an annual European Conference at the head-of-government level to discuss non-economic – Common Security and Foreign Policy and Justice and home affairs – issues. In brief, cooperation has been centered around the executive, thus empowering it with the colossal and important obligations of managing the integration process.

European Agreements:

Within the Association Councils, foreign ministers of the EU member states, government representatives from the associated country and the EU commissioner of the General Directorate on International Affairs met once a year to take binding decisions, where provided for by the Europe Agreements. The Councils usually concerned themselves with broad political objectives and serve mainly to ratify agreements and position papers developed at the lower levels. The Association Councils were also assigned the task of developing the “Political Dialogue,” meant to create “lasting links of solidarity and new forms of cooperation” and to facilitate the integration of the states “into the community of democratic nations.”¹⁴⁰ The Political Dialogue concerned developments in European CPSP. Initially, the Dialogue utilized existing diplomatic channels and convened

¹³⁸ Pippidi, “Romania.”

¹³⁹ Mannin, “Policies Towards CEEC,” p. 45.

¹⁴⁰ <http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/1997-3/pr49-97.htm>.

meetings of the president of a candidate state with the presidency of the EU and the president of the European Commission but after a few years, the EU and CEEC agreed that the latter can associate themselves formally with declarations of the EU.

The majority of the coordination and preparation work for the Association Councils was performed by the Association Committees. They were staffed by senior ministry officials from the EU Member States, the Associates and the Commission. The delegates representing the EU in the Association Committee could only commit it to decisions and actions that had been pre-approved by the General Affairs Council of the EU and any decision tabled at the Association Council was almost impossible to alter. This not only depoliticized the issues but also created an imperative for the CEECs to influence the decisions politically at the lower level and in advance.¹⁴¹ On the one hand, this procedure decreased both the number of issues that CEECs can influence and their chances of success. On the other, it also presented the CEECs with a policy package (“all or nothing”). Packaging decreases the likelihood that the CEECs would reject the agreement but also increases the possibility that they would agree to a policy, which would not pass on its own.

The Joint Parliamentary Committees, established as a forum for exchange of views and close political contacts between CEE parliaments and the European Parliament, met twice a year. The position of the European Parliament representatives was not strictly coordinated. The Joint Parliamentary Committees are to be kept informed by and to make recommendations to the Association Council but they did not have to be consulted before a decision is reached. The Committees were thus the weakest cooperation structure since their recommendations rarely impacted the executive decisions: the statements of these committees were rarely observed by the CEECs’ institutions and even less often considered by the Commission, the Council of Ministers or even the resolutions of the European Parliaments. In other words, it’s the executive that is empowered with resources and attention by the Europe Agreements.¹⁴²

Pre-accession Strategy: Multilateral Structured Dialogue

Both CEECs and the EU soon realized the limited effects of the “Political Dialogue” in speeding up integration and the demands for broader agenda and closer cooperation within an “enlarged Council” grew. The 1994 Essen Council launched the “Pre-accession Strategy.” It consisted of a wide-ranging network of “structured dialogue” in several areas linked to integration: foreign policy, security policy, domestic and legal issues. It involved Joint Ministerial Meetings, in which CEE and EU ministers, responsible for a specific field, met to discuss cooperation and progress in that issue area. The enhanced dialogue was to speed governmental reorganization in CEE to address directly the new demands of the EU-CEEC association. The distinguishing feature of the structured dialogue was its multilateralism. In addition to the Joint Ministerial Meetings, head of CEE states and governments were invited to the second day of the EU Council meetings and foreign ministers and to the second day of the General Affairs Council. CEECs were thus given the opportunity to “participate” in the EU process prior to the commencement of accession negotiations as a reward for their progress in democratic transition.¹⁴³ The dialogue – some complained – was still ineffective since its multilateralism effectively reduced the control of individual CEEC over EU decisions.¹⁴⁴

Reinforced Pre-Accession Strategy: Partnership for Accession

The Reinforced Pre-accession Strategy was launched to aid the EU in its bilateral discussions with each CEEC towards accession. To engage in negotiations, each applicant country, represented by its Chief Negotiator and his supporting team of experts, draws up the country’s position on each of the 31 chapters of the EU *acquis*. The Presidency of the Council of Ministers presents the EU’s negotiating positions, prepared by the Commission and agreed to by the Council.

¹⁴¹ Rupp, “The Pre-Accession Strategy,” p. 92.

¹⁴² All three institutions and their operation are described in Grabbe, *Enlarging the EU Eastwards*.

¹⁴³ Mannin, “Policies Towards CEEC,” p. 37.

¹⁴⁴ Rupp, “The Pre-Accession Strategy,” p. 94.

The Presidency of the Council of Ministers also chairs negotiating sessions held at the level of ministers or deputies, i.e. permanent representatives, for the Member States, and Ambassadors or Chief Negotiators for the applicants. The Commission and most importantly its General Directorate for Enlargement are in close contact with the applicant countries in order to seek solutions to problems arising during the negotiations. The negotiations focus on the terms under which the applicants will adopt, implement and enforce the *acquis*, that is, the granting of possible transitional arrangements, which must be limited in scope and duration. The results of the negotiations are incorporated in an accession treaty, submitted to the Council for approval, to the European Parliament for assent, and to member states and applicant countries for ratification. Once again the executive has been privileged in terms of access and power in the accession negotiations.

The PHARE political and institutional effects

The institutionalization of the PHARE program has been comparatively more decentralized than other cooperation mechanisms. Once Indicative Programmes are drawn up and funds allocated to each CEEC, the Commission only administers the dispatch of funds to the Program coordinator and the Program Management Unit in the partner countries.¹⁴⁵ The National Programs – upon which the whole PHARE program is based – are developed by the ministries and the national coordinators of the PHARE program. After Essen, CEECs were given the opportunity to take a more active role in defining and managing their own programs as long as they were linked to the aims set out in the European Agreements and the Pre-accession Strategy. PHARE allowed the individual countries to retain policy *initiative* at the domestic – even if mostly executive – level and encouraged them to cooperate with local civil society in the preparation of the National Programmes. Even though the PHARE program has been criticized for being dominated by western consultants under contract with the commission and for heavy reliance on CEEC government (rather than civil society) mechanisms in both establishing national priorities and fund management, the PHARE program has yielded important political lessons.¹⁴⁶ It has helped develop cross-border networks of cooperation to master common challenges for the region and has provided some channel for civil society participation, which in turn ensured potential for more domestic representation.¹⁴⁷

In sum, cooperation between the EU and CEECs have given a central role to national executives, which came to be privileged in terms of political attention, access to the integration process, and commitment of resources – human, financial and *informational*. Little debate over and *initiative* in Community Directives is possible and it is the executive that could possibly influence the negotiation terms politically. Moreover, the technocratic bias in the EU approach means very limited parliamentary involvement beyond this formal structure.¹⁴⁸

5.1 The Polish Experience

Following the signing of the 1991 Europe Agreement, the Polish Council of Ministers established the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration and Foreign Assistance to prepare the country for an anticipated early accession. The Polish Council of Ministers sought to isolate Poland's integration process from the frequent changes of government and the disputes of competencies between the prime-minister and the president. The Office and its head, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, were attached to the Prime-Minister's Office in the position of an under-secretary of state. This established the power of the cabinet and the independence of the Office. The Plenipotentiary came to control and dominate the cooperation between Poland and the EU. "All domestic aspects of integration, the White Paper exercise, and the use of PHARE related money for integration-related internal policies went through the hands of the Plenipotentiary."¹⁴⁹ This

¹⁴⁵ <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/>

¹⁴⁶ On the problems and successes of PHARE, Wedel, *Collision and Collusion*, p. 36-38.

¹⁴⁷ On the roots of transnational cooperation through PHARE, see Rupp, "The Pre-Accession Strategy," p. 103-104.

¹⁴⁸ Grabbe, "Europeanization Goes East."

¹⁴⁹ Rupp, "The Pre-Accession Strategy," p. 99.

concentration of power, however, meant risking that the more technical and complex matters would be left out and that there would be no broadly based incorporation of all departments of government into the integration process.¹⁵⁰ In order to undertake the complex legislative objectives specified in the White Paper, Poland had to also set up a EU Integration Unit within each ministry.

In 1996 a Committee for European Integration was established by a law to replace of the Office of the Plenipotentiary. The Committee is chaired by the prime minister and includes the heads of almost every ministry, one parliamentary deputy and one leading academic. The Committee takes decisions on accession issues. It also coordinates and steers accession policy through the activity of the European Units, created within each ministry. The political coordination of the process is achieved within the Committee, which convenes on a weekly basis to discuss the integration agenda of the government and most importantly to dissolve disputes to be settled between ministries. In addition, in 1997 an Inter-ministerial Team for the Preparation of Documentation for Poland's Negotiations Regarding Membership in the EU was established. It comprised of 28 sectoral and 5 horizontal teams. Even though the institution, responsible for cooperation with the EU, remained highly centralized, the change of its structure has helped provide faster solutions to even complex and multifaceted problems. The structure was praised by EU officials as "by far the most effective," since it facilitates contacts at all governmental levels and allows the EU to develop a clear picture of the complexity of some issues.¹⁵¹ Furthermore, through the administration, Poland began incorporating sectoral interests into the policy formulation process, thus effectively developing a national viewpoint on enlargement.¹⁵² Moreover, in order to render itself compatible with the EU *acquis communautaire*, Poland defined and redefined the roles of the cabinet and the prime-minister, underwent numerous ministerial reorganizations, and restructured the senior civil service and the sub-national governance framework.¹⁵³ EU influence was aimed at aiding the strict delineation of executive responsibility, limiting disputes between state institutions, increasing state capacity and overcoming government centralization.

It should also be noted that despite being given a marginal role in the integration process, the Sejm was quite active in trying to establish itself in the EU-Polish cooperation process. In 1992, the Sejm passed a resolution recognizing the fundamental importance of the Europe Agreement to the future of the country and to the transformation of the Polish economy. In order to ensure that the Europe Agreement would be implemented in a satisfactory manner, in 1992, the Sejm established an Extraordinary Commission to oversee the implementation of the treaty.¹⁵⁴ Then in 1994, the Sejm endorsed Poland's accession to the EU with a declaration, unanimously supported by all parliamentary groups. The Sejm also issued a resolution for the production of a National Strategy for Integration to summarize the measures taken to date and to formulate the priorities for the adjustment process.¹⁵⁵ The National Strategy for Integration was considered by the Sejm in 1997 and a set of implementation measures was drawn up setting out the work of individual government institutions. Finally, in March 1998 the Sejm accepted a resolution that would allow for a 'fast track' approach to EU integration. The resolution, however, emphasized that one of the principle conditions of integration within the EU is that it must have the support of society. To that end, Poland held a referendum on the ratification of its accession to the EU in June 2003.

¹⁵⁰ Bernard Steunenberg, ed., *Widening the European Union: the Politics of Institutional Change and Reform* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002).

¹⁵¹ Hungary, for example, has been cited as having the most democratic structure that includes an advisory body with experts from NGOs, members of commerce chambers or private enterprises. Still most policy initiation rests outside the country and the country simply reacts to outside events rather than set the agenda: there are far more regulations in the EU than in any CEECs, so reactive responses to European regulation prevail, which to a large degree undermines the advisory body.

¹⁵² Rupp, "The Pre-Accession Strategy," p. 100.

¹⁵³ Cordell, "Introduction," p. 5-6.

¹⁵⁴ Los-Nowak, "Contemporary Government Altitudes," p. 18.

¹⁵⁵ Müller-Graff and Andrzej Stepniak, eds., *Poland and the European Union: Between Association and Membership* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997).

5.2 Romania's Reforms

The Iliescu administration established the Department for European Integration within the Government as the institution responsible for cooperation with the EU. The department was subsequently (1994) transformed into a Department for European Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similar departments were created in other ministries, whose activity was coordinated by the Inter-ministerial Committee for European Integration. Only in 2001, with the intensification of cooperation with the EU, did the Romanian Government take “the necessary administrative and legislative measures to strengthen the leadership and to prepare efficiently the process of Romania’s accession to the European Union.”¹⁵⁶ Preparation for EU entry spared widespread reforms in the Romanian executive. With increasing its interaction with the EU and in attempt to fully absorb the available EU funds, Romania was placed under great pressure for internal restructuring and greater inter-departmental coordination. The Natase Government has restructured government institutions to strengthen cross-ministerial cooperation and policy presentation. This led the EU Commission to note that the overall functioning of government has improved, which allowed for enhancing the efficiency of the legislature as well.¹⁵⁷

In addition to strengthening the executive, the Ministry of European Integration was established with Government Resolution no.14/04.01.2001. The ministry ensures the coordination of Romania’s preparation for accession to the European Union, as well as the coordination of the accession negotiations. Through its organization, the Ministry of European Integration coordinates “the economic transformations and institutional building in the preparation of accession in accordance with the programming instruments requested by the European Commission.”¹⁵⁸ The ministry gives binding legal opinion on all legal drafts that transpose Community provisions. Finally, the ministry not only coordinates the relations of Romania with EU institutions and with the Member States during the accession process but also manages the activity of the National Delegation. Every ministry and institution of the central public administration with responsibilities in the field of *acquis*, is represented in the National Delegation.

The Romanian parliament has been more apathetic to the accession process than the Polish Sejm. The Romanian parliament did indeed endorse Romania’s integration in to the EU and subsequently prepared the 1995 “National Strategy for Preparing Romania's Accession to the European Union.” However, with its creation, the Ministry of European Integration assumed the elaboration of the National Programme and of other accession preparatory programs. The Romanian parliament also adopted a “fast track” channel for integration related legislation, which additionally marginalized it. Still, the National Delegation provides some forum for inter-institutional negotiations as well as internal consultations with social partners, political parties and parliamentary committees, even if those are confined within Romanian readiness to accept any integration terms.

In general, a shift to the top level of government – the level of the state-secretaries where the inter-ministerial committees are established – is quite pronounced in both Poland and Romania. The shift of responsibility from lower levels to higher is partly because of the intensification of integration, which now requires genuine political cooperation and partly because of the elite-bias in the EU institutions, which prefer to cooperate with their counterparts in CEECs. It has become increasingly important for CEEC governments to control policy-formation at the EU level and policy implementation at the national level.¹⁵⁹ So individual ministries are expanding to deal directly with European issues. It’s the executive that has had the longest and most consistent role in EU

¹⁵⁶ www.mie.ro

¹⁵⁷ Geoffrey Pridham, “EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-Communist States – Formality and Reality,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40.5 (December 2002): 953-973, p. 959.

¹⁵⁸ www.mie.ro

¹⁵⁹ Rupp, “The Pre-Accession Strategy.”

preparations, which gives it considerable power in the comprehensive adaptation process. Moreover, EU's demands for managerial competence and central coordination favor concentration of cooperation in small teams, privileged in terms of resources.¹⁶⁰ The emergence of a core accession team in the executive, which controls the work programs of ministries and departments, is at the expense of the other government branches. At the same time, under pressure to register fast progress, both countries have adopted fast-track procedures for passing EU legislation, which further limits the control parliaments exercise on state elites.

6. Accountable for Brussels-Defined Goals: Impact on Information Distribution

The European Union has effectively redistributed the sources of political and technical knowledge in CEECs. Exchange of political *information* about the preferences and power of different actors within both CEECs and the EU has taken place in the Association Councils, the Political Dialogue Initiatives and the Accession Negotiations Delegations, where broad issues are discussed and the agenda for future cooperation set. These institutions have strengthened and expanded the EU-CEE executive networks and have provided a forum for building consensus around reforms advocated by the EU. In such forums, the CEEC leaders have had the opportunity to pick up the "correct" *ideas* and *information*, conveyed by their EU counterparts, and later rearticulate and implement them domestically.

And if at those forums EU officials convey primarily general reform expectations, the Annual Reports on the progress made toward accession of individual CEECs, spell out in detail EU's more technical preferences. The Annual Reports are a written, publicly available, and obliging testimony of EU's preferences. As such the Reports are used by the EU to mobilize support for specified reforms within CEE government and among the general population through media publicity. Because European integration has become such a priority issue, the reports receive unusual attention by the press in both countries. The Reports comprise an evaluation of the work of CEE governments by a powerful institution and thus are important at two levels: at the international level, a country's accession negotiations are compromised or could be blocked if the Commission's opinion in those reports had been that not enough progress is made; at the domestic level, a negative Commission opinion is politically and electorally costly, since obstructing the country's EU accession is considered to threaten the country's national interest. Finally, while CEE executives use the Reports to justify unpopular reforms by legitimizing themselves with the EU's authority and domestic opposition use the Reports to challenge the ruling elite's ability to return the country to Europe. Therefore, the Annual Reports have become a powerful instrument for redistribution of political *information* in favor of mobilization of support for EU recommended action.

The Annual Reports and the Commission's Opinion of 1997 have been effective in increasing domestic competition and thus eliciting CEE responses. For example, the Commission's comments were used to identify priorities for all the institutions of the Polish administration.¹⁶¹ Romania has also been conscientious of the deficiencies and delays, signaled in the Opinions of the European Commission and used them as a base for the National Programme for EU Accession, the Action Plan and the Macroeconomic Framework of the Medium Term Economic Strategy, as well as the 2002 Government legislative harmonization program. In addition to preparing the Annual Reports, the EU Commission also plays the role of internal and external mediator. It recommends a common position to be agreed on by the Council and that takes into consideration not only what the member states would be ready to agree amongst themselves but also what the applicant country will be ready to accept. The Commission's advice to candidate countries on what is possible in the political and often tendentious circumstances of the Council is usually crucial.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ Grabbe, "Europeanization Goes East."

¹⁶¹ Francis, "Poland: Return to Europe," p. 310.

¹⁶² Mannin, "EU-CEEC relations," p. 21.

Recently, the EU launched its Communication Strategy for Enlargement – the third track in the preparations for enlargement in addition to the pre-accession strategy (the reform process in the candidate countries) and the accession negotiations. The strategy aims to explain to the public in the current and future member states why the Union is about to undertake its largest and most ambitious enlargement so far, and what the consequences of this step are likely to be. The 1997 Polish National Strategy for Integration also saw the need for a concerted information campaign but it was implemented only several months before the June 2003 referendum.¹⁶³

In addition to mobilizing support for reform, the EU provided CEECs with technical *information* about the structure and responsibilities of key institutions in liberal democracies. When requiring the CEECs to comply with the White Paper and the Accession Partnerships, the EU sought to disburse a particular set of understandings, derived from the European experience that were a “desirable” or “better” alternatives to past and current CEEC institutions. Moreover, through PHARE, a new bureau – the Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office – was set up as a database of expertise and other information to assist CEE market adaptation.¹⁶⁴ In addition to the numerous exchange programs for placing CEE officials within the EU institutions, in 1998, the Commission established the so-called Twinning Exercise, which assigns civil servants from EU member states to the CEECs with a task to speed the setting up of institutions for implementation of the *acquis*.¹⁶⁵

In brief, the EU-CEEC cooperation has changed the CEEC domestic access to political and technical *information* so as to favor EU accession. The various EU institutions have used their authority to promote certain institutional definitions – for example, what a state should look like and what the state should do – and therefore encourage a set of reforms. As an established and respected community of liberal democracies, the EU referred to its own tradition and experience to justify the recommended redefinition, specified in the Europe Agreements, White Paper, and Accession Partnerships. Then again through its social prestige and because of the power asymmetry in the EU-CEEC relations, the EU encouraged their implementation. The EU has made explicit its preferences to CEEC elites and its evaluation of the CEE government work to the public thus mobilizing domestic competition and support for accession at both levels.

7. Summary of Findings

The EU has encouraged the development of limited government, rule of law, the autonomy of legal order, improved state capacity, increased domestic competition, and respect for human and minority rights. The importance of those positive outcomes cannot be overestimated but the resultant costs should also be acknowledged. By encouraging consensus on EU accession, the EU has come to limit CEE debates on integration issues. CEE elites tended to present accession as a strategic identity choice, synonymous with the transition to liberal democracy and market economy, a choice that should therefore not be questioned. At the same time, this linkage has allowed for and legitimized both the transfer of policy *initiation* towards the EU and the technicalization of much of public policy. Large portions of the reform process have been coordinated by the EU and top CEEC officials thus removing it from domestic control. Domestic forums have been marginalized by the adoption of fast-track procedures for passing EU legislation, which further limits the control parliaments exercise on elites. Moreover, the EU evaluation of government progress in the reform process became more and more influential. This policy shift to the international level has been

¹⁶³ Francis, “Poland: Return to Europe,” p. 314.

¹⁶⁴ Marc Maresceau, ed., *Enlarging the European Union: Relations between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe* (New York, NY: Longman, 1997).

¹⁶⁵ Dimitris Papadimitriou, “Exporting Europeanization: EU Enlargement, the Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Eastern Europe,” Paper for the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Turin, 22-27 March 2002. Twinning is not designed to provide advice. Instead it is a sweeping operation in a specific field that must yield guaranteed results. Hence, according to the Commission, ‘by the time twinning ends, the applicant country should have developed an efficient, working organization enabling it to fulfill its Community obligations.’ (Commission, 1998: paragraph 1.2).

complemented with a shift to the top level of CEE governments, which received considerable power in the comprehensive adaptation process. The cooperation process led to the expansion of the executives' scope of activity and resources. At the same time, the cooperation process has allowed for very limited parliamentary involvement outside the formal cooperation structures, where parliaments were accorded insignificant functions.

The marginalization of domestic forums could potentially decrease elites' accountability and impair the development of CEE party systems. The policy shift to the international level has diminished popular representation. Those trends not only exacerbate the communist legacy of political elitism but are also likely to persist after CEEC accession to the EU. "EU membership will certainly safeguard formal civil liberties, political rights, and general human rights. But the capacity of ordinary citizens to act in politically meaningful ways in pursuit of their own interests will be further undermined by the conditions of EU membership"¹⁶⁶ or by what some have termed as the EU's democratic deficit. Moreover, as Kuehnhardt points out "EU membership presupposes well-organized interest groups, NGOs, and political parties, in addition to well-trained civil servants, all capable of negotiating and sustaining credible commitments and effective policy positions."¹⁶⁷ However, the decline in living standards has had a negative impact on the capacity of many CEE citizens to promote their interests and some estimate that even Poland's relatively strong activist networks is going to find it difficult to navigate all the relevant levels of representation, given their limited financing and experience.

¹⁶⁶ Cirtautas, "Poland."

¹⁶⁷ Martin A. Smith and Graham Timmins, *Building a Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in Comparative Perspective* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2000), p. 8-10.

PART THREE: CONCLUSION

1. Similarities

The end of the Cold War inspired a reevaluation of the role of governments worldwide as the notion of state and the concepts of democracy and liberalism were reexamined in the light of globalization and the post-Cold War environment.¹⁶⁸ In Eastern Europe the democratic transformations became tightly interwoven with international cooperation, as organizations like the EU and NATO became not only the international environment for CEE democratization processes but also received the opportunity to influence the direction of the CEE transitions.¹⁶⁹ The EU and NATO were particularly attractive to Eastern European states as a welfare-enhancing common market and a security-enhancing political community. Striving for membership in those international organizations provided not only a foreign policy goal but also clues as to the domestic policies necessary to achieve this goal. In this sense, the EU and NATO provided normative targets for EE states well before the organizations had set out any membership requirements or even agreed to enlarge.¹⁷⁰ In sum, EU and NATO's identification with democracy and membership obligations served to further CEE efforts to strengthen political reforms.

Through sanctions, conditional aid, examples to emulate, and later through economic and political standards, transcribed into membership requirements or direct expert advice, the EU and NATO exported to CEECs their vision of liberal democracy. From the beginning of the Eastern European transitions, Western aid became conditional on further democratization and such aid was withheld if a country's democratization prospects looked bad, as happened in Romania in 1990. The EU and NATO and their member-states served as specific models when CEECs made decisions about which democratic institutions to put in place. Moreover, some have estimated that about three quarters of the requirements of EU membership are consistent with reforms that most observers would consider necessary to build a stable liberal democracy and a functioning market economy but also reforms of the judiciary, the civil service and state administration.¹⁷¹ Two of the five principle requirements for NATO membership are functioning democracy and market economy. Both organizations have also attached experts in key CEE ministries to help the candidate countries compose reform programs consistent with the goals of membership in the two IOs. Furthermore, in some countries with less developed party systems like Romania, both organizations worked with pro-reform opposition parties to provide them with a convincing electoral platform based on economic prosperity achieved through acceptance in both organizations.¹⁷² In general, IOs improved political competition and accountability by presenting publicly a fairly accurate assessment of the quality of reform in aspiring states in relation to the candidate's prospects for membership. In conclusion, most academics and practitioners believe that locking the applicants into the Western community in the long term is likely to reinforce democracy in indirect and direct ways, as some have argued happened in Spain, Portugal and Greece.¹⁷³

Most important to this work, both the EU and NATO promoted a neoclassical form of liberal democracy that rests on a clear distinction of public from private activity, both of which are protected by a representative government and a responsive administration with public behavior being supported by the activity of secondary associations capable of encouraging and representing

¹⁶⁸ Mannin, "Democratic Governance in CEE."

¹⁶⁹ Smith and Timmins, *Building a Bigger Europe*, p.8-10.

¹⁷⁰ Milada Anna Vachudova, "The Leverage of the European Union on Reform in Postcommunist Europe," Paper presented at ECPR Joint session Workshops, Turin, 22-27 March, 2002.

¹⁷¹ Vachudova, "The Leverage of the European Union."

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ For CEECs, see Geoffrey Pridham, "EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-Communist States – Formality and Reality," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40.5 (December 2002): 953-973. For Southern Europe, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

private activity within legal limits. These become a barrier to creeping interventionism of the state and more particularly elite control of the state. These characteristics must be assisted by an informed and free flow of public information and political elites who by example reinforce these values in their exercise of open, limited and responsible governance.¹⁷⁴ On the one hand, the EU promoted and encouraged the restructuring of the executive in the direction of the clear delimitation of its responsibilities and greater inter-departmental coordination in both Romania and Poland. On the other hand, NATO not only established a balanced type of civil-military relations in both Poland and Romania to keep the military forces under steady civilian democratic control but in Romania the alliance also broadened the scope of defense and security institutions to include other (non-governmental and quasi-governmental) institutions governing the domestic order and civil society. As a result of the interaction with both IOs, the Romanian and Polish executives were reformed to be able to better articulate “national interests” without disputes about the prerogatives of the different executive institutions.

While recognizing these positive benefits, one should acknowledge that cooperation between CEECs and the two IOs came at some cost. Particularly problematic have been the thinness of public debate in both member states and applicant countries about the importance or the political and economic implications of expansion and a clear bias toward executive autonomy relative to domestic groups. The IOs-CEEC cooperation has redistributed control over domestic *initiative*, *procedures*, *informational* means, and over the domestic set of legitimate *ideas*, and has thus influenced the way domestic forces exercise control over their elites. The result is the indirect marginalization of parliament - and the citizenry at large - and the strengthening of executive prerogatives.

The EU and NATO effectively shaped the domestic debate in their respective issue fields. In Poland, former dissidents in cooperation with officials from the two IOs set the terms of the political debate. Future economic prosperity and the fate of the democracy project were linked to being/acting like the West, and eventually becoming part of the West by securing membership in the two IOs. Membership in those two organizations were presented as a strategic cultural choice and failure to cooperate and comply with the reform recommendations of the IOs was presented as handicapping the transition to liberal democracy and market economy. On the one hand this legitimized the influence of the two IOs in translating the liberal norms into policy prescriptions. Such a linkage allowed the two IOs and their supporters in CEE to limit the set of legitimate policies to include only ones that support the liberal democratic norms exported by the West. On the other hand however, this framing of the CEE political debate coupled with the practice of the two IOs to encourage consensus on integration issues might have precluded any meaningful debate about the integration process. The two IOs and their CEE supporters insisted that the policies they are promoting are not just a political model but simply technical “best practice” that should therefore not be questioned.

In Romania, unreformed communists were shaping the political debate in the first years of the transition. They kept up a rhetoric of working earnestly to join the EU because a certain level of Western acceptance strengthened their domestic credentials as “reformers” while Western loans and trade agreements provided the much needed economic resources for sustaining their rule. Because of the concentration of power in their hands, unchecked by other political forces, they could also mislead the electorate that they are advancing towards Europe. However, setting up integration as Romanian priority allowed the two IOs to affect Romania’s domestic policy choices, making the opportunity costs of illiberal politics at home unusually high. Iliescu’s administration was attacked for forsaking the country’s prospects of a return to Europe by both the IO officials, and opposition politicians and local civil society leaders, coached by the IOs. Soon the political debate started resembling the one in Poland. Both parties tried to fit the increasingly attractive “pro-EU space” on

¹⁷⁴ Mannin, “Democratic Governance in CEE,” p. 103.

the political spectrum and the two IOs circumscribed not only the substance of the Romanian liberal democratic agenda but possibly also the political debate in general.

Coupling the fate of the democracy project with membership in the two IOs, not only precluded domestic debate on important transition issues but also allowed for and legitimized the transfer of policy *initiation* towards the two IOs. Large portions of reform process were coordinated by the IOs and top CEEC officials, thus becoming increasingly independent of domestic control. This policy shift to the international level has been complemented with a shift to the top level of CEEC governments, which received considerable power in the comprehensive adaptation process. The cooperation process has led to the expansion of the executives' scope of activity and resources. Moreover, even if steps were taken to build parliament's oversight capacity, domestic democratic forums were marginalized by the adoption of fast-track procedures for passing EU legislation or Romania's use of executive acts for defense and security issues reform, which further limited the control parliaments exercise on elites. At the same time, the cooperation process has allowed for very limited parliamentary involvement outside the formal cooperation structures, where parliaments were accorded insignificant functions. As a result, executive centered cooperation with the EU and NATO has led to a relative marginalization of democratic forums, whether they were initially developed (operational, well-functioning) as in Poland or not, as in Romania.

While the EU and NATO are democracy-promoting IOs, they are also in certain ways compromising the democratization project. It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the possible explanations of the unintended, and quite paradoxical, empowerment of the executive. Yet, it might be useful to quickly highlight the possible interests and incentives that have produced the tension between the IOs' democracy promotion means and ends. In the West, democracy promotion became considered as one of the most effective means of achieving global stability and thus European security.¹⁷⁵ However, promoting democracy as both a means and an end has its advantages and disadvantages and amongst the costs is the priority assigned to other (usually economic or security) issues if the latter are in conflict with the first. Therefore, the role of democracy promotion for democracy's sake in EU and NATO's involvement in EE should not be overemphasized. At the same time, however, one must remember that the marginalization of the domestic democratic forums is not an intended policy.

The complexity of the democratization problems, the short political deadlines for meeting the membership criteria with limited resources, and the constitutional "near-monopoly" of the executive in foreign policy, compelled IO officials and CEE elites to pursue short-term benefits over long-term development: the two IOs chose to work directly through the top governmental level rather than rely on the mercy of inexperienced parliaments. In turn, the thus structured cooperation has probably created the wrong incentives by isolating the executive instead of encouraging it to cooperate with other social and political institutions. Furthermore, the IOs have a tangible interest in isolating to some extent CEE executives from domestic vested interests, while themselves maintaining channels to directly influence EE transitions. Finally, both IOs have been very sensitive to instability or political discontinuity on the part of governments in candidate countries. Therefore they have emphasized that cross-party consensus over accession is very important because it strengthens a government's position in relation to the two IOs and to domestic opinion. This, however, produced a seeming domestic consensus, which has prevented meaningful debates about integration.

2. Differences

2.1 NATO vs the EU

For the first time in their history both the EU and NATO have created formal accession criteria, which have given them a wide leverage to influence the transformation of Central and

¹⁷⁵ Olsen, "The European Union."

Eastern European Countries and have reduced the ability of applicants to negotiate entrance and membership concessions. As the world's most highly institutionalized and rule-constrained regional integration project, the EU offers the greatest benefits of membership and the most extensive requirements. The EU requirements are more far-reaching, non-negotiable, uniformly applied and closely enforced. Not only did the EU's involvement in CEEC post-communist transitions span to a wider policy domain – from banking and insurance regulations to clean judiciary – but the accession requirements for each of those issue areas were more detailed and strict. The European Commission also developed criteria to evaluate the candidate's record and has insisted on more or less fair and meritocratic accession process.¹⁷⁶

NATO, on the other hand, was primarily involved in CEEC defense and security matters. However, NATO's definition of security threats as coming from potential internal socio-economic instability in Eastern Europe allowed the alliance to insist on and be involved in reforming also the ministries of labor, interior, industry, transportation and finance in Romania (and other MAP countries) in order to improve their ability to cooperate with the ministry of defense. The criteria for membership put forth by NATO were more general and therefore, candidate evaluation was more loose and interpretative. Furthermore, NATO's accession decisions are less meritocratic and more political than the EU's. By the time, NATO invited Poland to the alliance, there were still outstanding problems in civil-military relations and Poland had not even begun providing channels for civil society involvement in defense and security institutions. It could also be argued that by the time Romania was offered membership in the alliance, it still did not qualify as democracy or market economy.

If in the beginning of its cooperation with CEECs, NATO used primarily regular diplomatic channels to influence reform of defense and security institutions, through the years, the accession path became more and more institutionalized. For example, Poland was advised or compelled to reform mainly through bilateral, high-level meetings between NATO and Polish civil and military officials. However, while actively preparing the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for membership, NATO encountered unexpected difficulties, which called for re-evaluation of these cooperation practices.¹⁷⁷ The alliance came up with a resolution to become more deeply involved in CEE restructuring through the Membership Action Plan. MAP included systematic consultation and workshops between aspiring countries and NATO Teams over the political, economic, defense, resource, security and legal aspects of membership. MAP also enhanced the monitoring of candidate progress.

The EU came to exercise the greatest potential leverage on the domestic politics of applicant countries, partly because of the attractiveness of the organization and partly because it presented all aspiring countries with the same detailed non-negotiable requirements list. In contrast, NATO worked with each candidate individually from the beginning. Progress in accession with NATO depended mostly on the fulfillment of country-specific conditions. This allowed the alliance to target the particular weaknesses of each applicant and suggest a country-specific solution. Not having to rely on an exhaustive requirement list added to the attractiveness of the organization, since membership seemed achievable in a shorter time span. The seeming accessibility of the alliance added to its leverage on domestic reform in CEECs. The individuality of reform programs that NATO promoted increased the alliance's legitimacy. NATO accepted that there is not single model of authority relations between civilians and the military, which has allowed for certain amount of national sovereignty. Accordingly, NATO officials had to spend much more time than EU officials teaching CEEC officials about the meaning of democratic civilian control or persuading the Eastern Europeans that, for example, balanced civil-military relations are the best type of civilian authority.

¹⁷⁶ Milada Anna Vachudova, "Political Competition and the Leverage of the European Union on Democratizing States," (forthcoming in *International Organization*).

¹⁷⁷ Donnelly, "Defense Transformation in the New Democracies."

In contrast, the EU worked under the assumption that CEECs' aspiration and the performance of the organization are the necessary legitimization.

2.2 Romania vs Poland

Polish politicians were generally better received by the two IOs. The interaction between Polish and IO officials was much more of a cooperative effort: the former sincerely eager to carry out democratization reforms and the latter more willing to help. Not only was Poland a symbol of the massive protests against communism, but also a powerful and geo-strategically well-positioned country. It behaved with the self-esteem of a country that belongs to the West and that could not be left out. At the same time, it tried to carry out reforms to the liking of the two IOs even before it was required to do so. Most problematic was not that Poland would not adopt democratic policies but rather that Polish elites behind composing those policies had flawed understandings of basic concepts. An example at hand is the widespread understanding that coordinate civil-military relations is an optimal civilian authority type. In order to avoid such faulty understandings, the EU provided detailed reform blueprints.

Both IOs were more disinterested in the fate of Romania. Iliescu's near-authoritarian and belligerent rule and little desire to proceed rapidly towards integration alienated the West. Still, both IOs preferred to see Romania aspiring to the West and worked to change Iliescu's agenda. Upon failing to change his behavior, the two IOs started working to prop up the opposition and ready it to assume power. However, even the pro-Western Romanian politicians were rather reactive and very dependent on the two IOs for advice on the direction and details of reform. Moreover, the process of building democracy in Romania has been extremely sensitive to the external environment and active backing from abroad. Romania showed greater political fragility when its Western prospects dimmed, demonstrating what decisive effects external support could have. However, it also appears that the manner in which assistance was provided mattered, as well. The first set of NATO advisers, for example, with a more authoritarian style of prescribing reforms were largely unsuccessful and only after they were substituted with a team that seemed interested in Romania and spent time working with local actors, did NATO start really impacting the reform process.¹⁷⁸

Both IOs have been keenly aware of Romania's poorly institutionalized parties, lacking ideologies or government programs, the weakness of civil society and the state. They offered the external assistance that began to appear more and more a *sine qua non* to sustaining reform. The two IOs worked much more with Romania (and hardly at all with Poland) to enhance state capacity and create channels for civil society participation. Then again, the weakness of the Romanian parliament seems to have encouraged and facilitated the more dramatic redistribution of access to *initiative* and especially *institutions* with the Romanian government reforming entire sectors (defense and security, for example) with executive acts rather than parliamentary legislation. In contrast, in Poland, the Sejm was much stronger and made numerous attempts to establish itself in the cooperation process within the limited space left to it by the executive. In general in Poland, the democratization project received little attention from either IOs and if Polish parties and parliament were well developed and functioned satisfactorily, Poland could have gained a lot from ensuring venues for civil society participation in Polish governance structures.

Finally, the Romanian case well demonstrates a curious conclusion of this study, namely that cooperation with both IOs has empowered the executive, the political leadership heading CEE states, in general, not just pro-IOs reformers. It is true that both IOs were more likely to work with and assist Romania's pro-Western government but even at the time of Iliescu's rule, a significant redistribution of access to political resources in favor of the executive was already under way. Furthermore, non-reformist governments were more likely to abuse that transfer of power and claim non-existing progress towards Europe or IO backing for their own agenda. The ability of domestic

¹⁷⁸ Gheciu, *Security as Community*, p. 336.

actors and institutions to resist IO pressure or accommodate it without losing their core logic should not be underestimated.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized, however, that IOs' pressures have been distorted by selective exaggeration of certain political issues over others either due to particular international concerns or because of domestic factors. For example, especially in Romania (but the other countries as well) political conditions were subordinate to those of economic reform and state capacity. Targeting Romania's persistent problems with implementing the economic transformation and with a weak state capacity – also a motor of democratic consolidation – were a priority.¹⁷⁹ This study also demonstrates how the interplay between external and internal factors produced different reform dynamics in the two countries studied. Poland was far more successful in utilizing the reform potential of the enlargement process than Romania not just because of its more favorable internal environment but primarily because of its willingness to do so early in the transition and to continue doing so even after. Some of these discrepancies can further be explained by the relatively 'soft' IO conditionality in certain fields (including some aspects of democratization) or the fragmented and diverse manner with which the IOs chose to police reform in Eastern Europe that allowed the reinforcement of the significance of domestic factors mediating the IO impact. The diverse and non-linear nature of IO impact should be highlighted. Integration is of course not uniform at all levels, nor does it occur at the same pace in every political.

3. Some Implications at the Domestic Level: Prospects for the Democratization Project

Both IOs helped CEECs in making accountability effective by encouraging well-defined and legally established institutional boundaries that delimit the proper exercise of authority – a prerequisite for institutional autonomy. Such a network of boundaries and controls that state agencies exercise over other state agencies, i.e., horizontal accountability¹⁸⁰, are an important part of the formal institutionalization of the full package of democracy. However, in some cases, for efficiency's sake and quick reform results, the cooperation process has promoted or ignored the encroachment of one state agency upon the lawful authority of another. For example, reform of defense and security legislation in Romania after 1996 was promoted exclusively through executive acts rather than through parliamentary legislation. Another example of the possible infringement on horizontal accountability is the tendency to weaken parliamentary oversight over the executive. Cooperation with both IOs has entailed the coordination of large portions of reform outside domestic control: legislation initiated at the suggestion of either IO passes through parliament with special priority (fast-track channels for EU-required laws), that is without much modification or discussion. Bypassing the legislature not only did little to improve the already weak parliamentary oversight in the region but also, "deprived the incompletely democratized EE of the most important school of democracy – the necessity to hamper a coherent policy out of a cacophony of domestic interests and opinions."¹⁸¹ Such practices, especially if maintained in the long term could prove problematic for CEE democratic consolidation.

In addition to focusing on fortifying the institutional foundations of the executive, reforms recommended by both IOs have centered on its depolitization. Given the communist legacy of partisan state administration, reforms have emphasized the establishment of clear boundaries between the administrative and political components of the executive. However, under communism governments were mere executives since the preparation and assessment of policy alternatives were discussed within the party. This legacy persists not only because inexperienced officials find it difficult to make an active contribution to preparing political decisions and to managing of conflict

¹⁷⁹ Geoffrey Pridham, "Romania and the European Union Accession: The Domestic Dimension," *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, 1.2 (2001): 21-48.

¹⁸⁰ Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions About Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy*, 7.2 (1996): 34-51 addresses why the term is problematic.

¹⁸¹ Stephen Holmes, "A European Doppelstaat?" *East European Politics and Societies*, 17.1 (Winter 2003): 107-118.

resolution inside government and between the government and other political *institutions* (parliament, parties and civil society), but also because cooperation with both IOs has created an environment, in which political directions are formulated from outside.¹⁸² Executive politicians are tempted and encouraged to seek policy advice and managerial skills from outside the executive bureaucracy and to bypass it in favor of more informal networks or small entourages placed outside the administration (the party or the IOs). Such a practice is likely to contribute negatively to the long-run democratization of CEECs.

The transfer of *initiative* powers to the international and somewhat to the top executive levels could have possible negative consequences on policy legitimacy. Effectiveness can hardly replace representation as an independent basis of legitimacy and informal groups and networks should not substitute parliament as important center of authority.¹⁸³ This lack of popular engagement and diminished popular representation could create a potential for widening the gap between political elites and masses, already a problem in many post-communist democracies.¹⁸⁴ Two important consequences emerge: 1) because reforms were promoted by executive networks, implementation has been often times problematic; 2) state elites had to now satisfy two groups – domestic and more importantly international.¹⁸⁵ Since the essence of effective democracy lies in the clear lines of accountability running from the government to electorate that can use competition among political parties to hold it responsible for policy, the new and increasingly important layer of accountability seems to have altered the principles of representation and accountability – foundations of democracy.¹⁸⁶

The institutional empowerment of the executive through the cooperation process could possibly have implications for the power of CEE states. The successful consolidation of democracy in CEE requires complementary rebuilding to increase the infrastructural capacity of the state, i.e. the capacity of the state to actually penetrate society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm. The EU reform package includes reforms that target improving state's capacity and special attention has been paid to that objective in the PHARE program. However, the democratization process also necessitates diminishing the despotic power of CEE states, that is the range of actions, state elites are empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiations with civil society groups or with the parliaments. Michael Mann argues that "state infrastructural power derives from the social utility in any particular time and place of forms of territorial-centralization which cannot be provided by civil society forces themselves, and furthermore, that the extent of state despotic power derives from the inability of domestic forces to control those forms of territorial centralization, once set up."¹⁸⁷ In line with this argument, the IOs involvement can be perceived as pressure on CEECs to import unmediated shifts in infrastructural power with sometimes little root in society. In fact, this appears to be increased infrastructural empowerment of the state but one that cannot be controlled by the CEECs societies. Thus it has probably become a vehicle for increased despotic power of CEE states, which could serve to undermine the democratization project.

The marginalization of domestic forums could have impaired the development of the party systems in CEECs. Party politics in CEE developed overwhelmingly from within the parliamentary

¹⁸² On the persistence of executive trends, see Klaus H. Goetz, "Executives in Comparative Context," in Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds., *Varieties of Capitalism: the Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001); Special Issue of the *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8.6 (2001) devoted to governance in Central and Eastern Europe.

¹⁸³ C.W. Anderson, "Political Design and the Representation of Interests," *Comparative Political Studies*, 10.1 (1977): 127-151.

¹⁸⁴ Pridham, "EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy," p. 954.

¹⁸⁵ The EU is allowed to judge and request changes in the quality of democracy, rule of law and human rights, and the treatment of minorities.

¹⁸⁶ Finally, silencing domestic debate might have negative long-term consequences.

¹⁸⁷ Mann, "The Autonomous Powers of the State," p.189.

arena and not from grassroots constituencies, which gave politicians the opportunity to frame the new political debate from the top-down.¹⁸⁸ However, the spectrum of the political debate in CEE was constrained by the international and domestic consensus for neo-liberal market reforms as promoted by the EU and NATO and Western blueprints for public policy. The narrowing of the set of legitimate policies left CEE parties little competitive leeway but to dispute each other's competence in achieving the desired result rather than the constitution of the desired result. It's the perception that there is "no alternative" that has constrained both responsive and accountable party competition. CEE political systems offer electoral but little political accountability. As the discussion on *ideas* in both Romania and Poland shows, parties went in and out of office but their policies did not.¹⁸⁹ Even though, both EU and NATO impacted *information* asymmetries by providing *information* on the government's progress in the reform process, which reinvigorated competition, parties were questioning mainly their opponents' identity and credibility to carry out the country's return to Europe. The evolution of party competition in the region has "a form of dependent development, which might in the long run preclude the development of accountable domestic politics and of public ideological debate."¹⁹⁰

In general, IOs' efforts to promote democratic development run against the incentives created by the accession processes, which have disproportionately empowered the executive at the expense of domestic groups and most notably parliament. The incentives and constraints, created by the cooperation process, favor the executive, which in turn reinforces a historical tendency within CEEC towards political hierarchy. Many studies suggest that once initial political and institutional choices have been made, the realities created by these choices make it difficult to change course. Therefore, the policy implications of this study should not be lightly dismissed.

4. Some Implications at the International Level

The conclusions of this study confirm some of the arguments made in the literature that studies the importance of external actors in bolstering CEE civil society. Just as in the civil society promotion cases, institutions that joined the international circuit neglected their own communities and tended to reflect the agenda and moral concerns of the external actors.¹⁹¹ Very much like INGO assistance, foreign aid has helped design and build institutions associated with democratic states but has done little to ensure that these institutions operate in a manner consistent with democratic consolidation.¹⁹² This study also confirms the conclusions of other works on international cooperation/socialization that IOs' greatest influence was in cases in which the advice was consistent and detailed and in which the applicant countries showed strong political will to implement the requested institutional models and policy change.¹⁹³

This study of the impact of international cooperation with the EU and NATO has had on elite autonomy and democratization in CEE is conceptually linked to the Europeanization literature as it examines a certain dimension of Europeanization, namely structures of representation.¹⁹⁴ As

¹⁸⁸ Abby Innes, "Party Competition in Postcommunist Europe: The Great Electoral Lottery," *Comparative Politics*, 35 (October 2002): 85-104.

¹⁸⁹ Innes and Grzymala-Busse, "Great Expectations."

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁹¹ Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*; Brian Smith, *More Than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

¹⁹² Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn, eds., *The Power and Limits of NGOs: a Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002).

¹⁹³ Henderson, "Selling Civil Society."

¹⁹⁴ In L. Mjoset "The Historical Meanings of Europeanization," Arena Working Paper 24, (Oslo: University of Oslo, 1997), Mjoset even argues that NATO, too, is a part of the Europeanization process. The differences between governance structures between CEECs and the EU present an excellent opportunity to test the Europeanization hypothesis outside the cultural, political and economic particularity of advanced Western European democracies and at the same time offers insight in the transformation of these countries. Europeanization here is defined as "the impact of the EU accession process on national patterns of governance" (Grabbe, "How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance?" p. 1014) also more like

was mentioned in the introduction, Poland and Romania approached IO accession with different executive–legislature balance, one that was different from the EU’s. Yet, the marginalization of the legislature in both CEECs was an unintended consequence, which runs against EU’s advocacy of democratic institutions and capable lawmakers, but parallels closely the problems of the EU itself. Such convergence suggests that the EU has reshaped CEE public institutions: western structures have been imported to facilitate policy-making between EU and CEECs. The domestic effects of the policy and institutional transfer through the adoption of all the obligations of EU membership are comparable to the ones observed in both the EU members and other CEECs.

If Europeanization is not necessarily reinforcing democratization, what are the consequences of the political conversion? Most important is the redefinition of the relationship between citizens and state elites toward the democratic process. And as the analysis of cooperation with both IOs has demonstrated, the transfer of policy processes to the international level seems to distort in general the systems of social concentration and interest intermediation by widening the gap between state elites and the masses. Since much of the activity associated with representative government no longer takes place around (Western or Eastern) European legislatures, the trend could be characterized as a movement away from the “parliamentary core.”¹⁹⁵ However, some have argued that given global pressures this shift could very well be democracy-enhancing: it has mediated the larger reductions in the scope of democracy by maintaining a modicum of European control over what happens in Europe.¹⁹⁶ Indeed, the shift in domestic resources toward executives feeds back into international bargaining, often facilitating international cooperation.¹⁹⁷

On a more theoretical level, it must be noted that the strengthening of state elites is not necessarily EU- driven since the same process was observed with NATO’s involvement in CEE. The dynamic is rather inherent to the internationalization of policy-making. International cooperation severely restricts formal participation in decision-making by most domestic actors other than the executive as issues that were once handled by domestic parliaments and publics are bargained in secret diplomatic sessions and handled by domestic constitutional procedures designed for “high politics” issues of traditional foreign policy. In other words, international cooperation often bestows functional benefits unevenly across domestic actors; in particular, it tends to benefit disproportionately those who control access to the international policy arena – most often, though not invariably, national executives.¹⁹⁸ Therefore, theories of international cooperation, which treat states as unitary actors and overlook the domestic distribution of international collective action benefits appear inadequate in capturing this dynamic.

“convergence” than “harmonization” or “integration.” In the CEE case, however, Europeanization is not a two way process because CEE have no way of uploading policies, which confines them to simply downloading ones. This particularity of the East European version of Europeanization, strengthens the research by avoiding the tautological use of cause and effect.

¹⁹⁵ Peter Hall, “Institutions and the Evolution of European Democracy” in Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds., *Varieties of Capitalism: the Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹⁹⁶ Robert Bideleux, “ ‘Europeanization’ and the Limits to Democratization in East-Central Europe,” in Geoffrey Pridham and Attila Agh, eds., *Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001).

¹⁹⁷ After Moravcsik, “Why the European Community Strengthens the State...”

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.