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Paper prepared for the 2001 European Community Studies Association Conference, Madison, Wisconsin
Panel: "CFSP and the Member States"

LESSONS FOR THE CFSP: EXPLAINING MULTINATIONAL SECURITY POLICY CHANGE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

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INTRODUCTION

Political destabilization and ethnic violence in the Balkan region led to the utilization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a means of collective security implementation by the Western powers[1] in the 1990s. Shifting from its Cold War role as a purely defensive alliance,[2] NATO exercised military power beyond its member states' borders, for the first time in its history, during the Bosnian Civil War. This was done only to a limited extent in Bosnia, primarily in order to protect United Nations (UN) peacekeepers and pressure the Yugoslav government into accepting UN Security Council resolutions aimed at ending the war. However, by the time of the Kosovo crisis, NATO had become the *principal* instrument of European collective security policy. The "new" NATO was seen by the West as being the most effective instrument of guaranteeing stability in Europe.

The 1992-1995 Bosnian Civil War is an interesting case wherein the West intervened in a war between three rival domestic factions: the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs.[3] This case epitomized the post-Cold War problems of instability in Europe and the West's difficulty in responding to it. The West's interventions in this conflict and in the Kosovo crisis are instructive, because they reflect an apparent shift in Western security and intervention policy over time. In Bosnia, various policies and implementation approaches were both debated and attempted. Diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, and limited military force were utilized

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[1] For this paper, my use of the term "Western powers" will refer specifically to the United States, Canada, and the Western European members of NATO and the European Union. Traditionally, other nations (such as Japan) are also considered members of the "Western powers." However, their roles and interests in the Balkan conflicts were minimal, and thus, I do not include them in the use of the term.

[2] See the original North Atlantic Treaty (signed in 1949), Article 5, as compared to the revision of the Treaty in 1991.

[3] It should be noted, however, that by the time NATO took action in Bosnia (March 1, 1994), the Bosnian Muslims and Croats were close to signing an alliance (March 18, 1994). This effectively left only two sides in the conflict: the Croat-Muslim Federation and the Bosnian Serbs.

through the United Nations, the European Union, and the Contact Group.[4] By contrast, in Kosovo, the West acted almost exclusively through NATO, without the specific authorization of the UN Security Council.[5] An analysis of the Western (particularly the great powers--United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany) response to the Bosnian and Kosovo crises provides particular insights into major change over time in the formation and implementation of multinational security policy. In turn, such insight may prove useful in understanding the current complexities involved in attempts by the European Union member states to coordinate and even consolidate their national foreign and security policy procedures into an EU-level policy making and policy implementing framework. Furthermore, this approach may also be helpful in both understanding future EU-level responses and recommending suggestions at the institutional level in order to better the effectiveness of those responses at all stages of the policy process.

As a preliminary step, this paper examines the question of major international security policy change within a multinational context. I consider a range of decisions and actions taken within the framework of a Western security *regime* with regards to the ultimate interventions in both the Bosnian Civil War and the Kosovo crisis. By characterizing the Western powers in terms of an *informal* multinational security regime, I distinguish the *policy making* aspects of Western governments from their efforts at *policy implementation* (through various *formal* organizations, such as the United Nations, the Contact Group, the European Union, NATO, etc.). This distinction is necessary for two main reasons. First, from a practical and methodological perspective, a level of analysis needs to be identified and selected. Second (and perhaps more importantly), I would posit that in its current status, the European Union's Common Foreign and

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[4] Created specifically to develop a response to deal with and (if possible) end the Bosnian war. It originally consisted of the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Italy was added later when the Contact Group reformed to deal with the Kosovo crisis.

Security Policy (CFSP) resembles a *regime* much more than it does a simple international organization, alliance, supranational entity, etc. As such, a regime-level analysis of security policy change seems most appropriate. This paper will simply attempt to demonstrate the utility of a new framework of analysis (i.e. methodology) that may be easily applied to future studies of the CFSP process.

I will examine the policy process and causal factors of major policy change within the Euro-Atlantic multinational security regime (which includes the EU as a distinct actor but also includes non-EU actors). Throughout the ongoing crises in the former Yugoslavia (beginning with the initial breakup and continuing through the Bosnian war and then the Kosovo crisis), the national security policies of regime members concerning the crisis changed—sometimes repeatedly. However, a single, collective military/security policy was maintained by the regime—even when important members (the U.S., France, U.K., Germany, and Italy) *may have individually advocated a different policy.* The "puzzle" that I will seek to solve, then, is how and why did the *collective* regime policy change when it did? By identifying a plausible answer to that question, I offer it also as a plausible answer to the question of how and why does EU-level *collective* foreign and security policy change, when individual powerful member states advocate a different policy.

By analyzing the policy process and policy change in the Euro-Atlantic security regime (using the Western military interventions in the former Yugoslavia as case studies), I would like to accomplish four goals in my ongoing research. First, I would like to demonstrate that theories designed for domestic public policy analysis can be applied logically to the study of security regimes. Second, I would like to offer a causal explanation for the policy changes that took

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[5] Although the Security Council had unanimously voted in September 1998 to demand a halt to the Serb attacks against civilians in Kosovo and the withdrawal of Serb security forces, a new resolution authorizing NATO to

place regarding Western military interventions in the former Yugoslavia (from non-intervention at the initial breakup and beginning of the Bosnian Civil War to virtually unrestricted intervention by the time of the Kosovo crisis). Third, I would like to show that this approach is a helpful analytic tool in studying the policy process of the European Union's CFSP. And fourth, I would like to use this model in a *normative* fashion to suggest specific changes that should be made (and are realistically possible) in the CFSP process in order improve the likelihood of its successful implementation. The findings of such an analysis could have a direct impact on the CFSP institutional decisions currently being made by the EU member states and the European Commission.

My research poses three related questions. First, does real policy learning take place within a security regime? Second, is policy change "incremental" or "major"? And third, what are the causal factors involved in this policy change? This research should also have an important impact on international security studies for two reasons. First, most studies in the literature on international security utilize theories of international relations (neorealism, neoliberalism, constructivism, Marxism, etc.). Policy analysis and theories of the policy process are only applied to studies of *national* foreign policy making. The concept that I am developing of using a *domestic policy analysis* approach to study *regime* security policy, is, therefore, somewhat unique. Second, I believe that the regime level of analysis and policy process approach is better suited as a model for studying the EU's CFSP policy process as it unfolds than are other models currently utilized in the international security literature.

Several theories of public policy may be used to analyze the formation and change of public policy over time. However, most (if not all) of the examples and case studies presented in public policy literature focus solely on domestic policy formation and change. In this paper, I

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enforce compliance with these demands faced a near-certain Russian and/or Chinese veto.

hope to demonstrate that theories of public policy analysis may also be used to examine changes over time in multilateral/multinational security policy.

In particular, I believe that the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), first proposed by Paul Sabatier in 1988,[6] is a useful (and yet overlooked) tool, which can be used to analyze policy changes over time within a multilateral/multinational security regime. The ACF is useful in this case, because it looks beyond traditional political science approaches to security policy analysis: namely rational choice-based models focusing on individual and state interests and/or bureaucratic/organizational approaches focusing on rules and standard operating procedures.[7] By focusing on competing advocacy groups within a policy subsystem (in this case, the Euro-Atlantic security subsystem), the ACF also enables the researcher to examine policy change across national boundaries. This also goes beyond traditional "state-as-unitary actor" realist approaches to foreign and security policy analysis.

Using the ACF, one may identify advocacy groups as the primary agents of policy change within a multinational security regime and not unitary state governments. This entails examining the basic beliefs (policy goals and causal and other perceptions) of the various advocacy groups (rather than their expected utility from various outcomes). Using this paper as a preliminary, exploratory step for future (and more thorough) research, I will apply the ACF to Euro-Atlantic policy change concerning military intervention during the crises in the former Yugoslavia. I will attempt to identify the actors and their advocacy coalitions, the beliefs of the coalitions, and generally demonstrate how policy change occurred as a result of the conflict between these groups. However, **I will not attempt to empirically test the ACF's many**

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[6] See Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein," *Policy Sciences*, No. 21, 1988.

[7] See especially Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971).

hypotheses using a case study methodology. **It must be emphasized that (at this point) this paper is merely an *exploratory* project.**

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND THE "MISSING LINK"

In terms of my research topic, neoliberal and constructivist critiques of realism certainly seem to apply.[8] A realist approach to the topic would argue that intervention policy in the former Yugoslavia is first and foremost set individually by states, and that such a policy would reflect their attempts to maintain or increase their power (relative to other states) in the international system. Furthermore, any national intervention policy would be concerned primarily with the distribution of power among the major states in the system.

However, my initial research shows that this type of realist approach is not very convincing. First, the major states involved in the crises placed a great emphasis and operated to a significant degree through international organizations: the United Nations, the European Union, the Contact Group, and NATO. Such extensive use (and even the desire for such use) of international organizations seems to counter the realist argument that states will not cooperate in such a manner unless they specifically have something to gain in terms of power or national interest. Additionally, realism may account for the shared non-intervention policy at the outset of the crisis, but it does not explain why such a policy changed over time. If states individually chose a non-intervention policy because that was what was in their national interest, then the fact that their policy changed can only mean one of two things: 1) either states do not fully and

[8] The basic tenets of realism may be found in Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). In addition, the modern structural or "neorealist" approach is explained in Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979) and Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

rationally perceive what is in their own interest; or 2) national interest is fluid—it can change with regard to the same policy issue. Realism does not really allow for either possibility.

The neoliberal[9] and constructivist[10] approaches to IR offer a better explanatory framework in comparison to realism, but I believe that a combination of the two would be necessary in order to explain my "puzzle." Unfortunately, neither theory alone is entirely sufficient. Neoliberalism offers an explanation as to why a collective policy was adopted by the major states (as opposed to individual policies pursued by each state). Simply put, neoliberalism allows for the existence of a security regime, with a common set of values, norms, rules, and procedures. This would explain the common policy and the emphasis on using international organizations. However, what neoliberalism cannot explain is why the policy changed over time. Although neoliberals argue that realists define state interests wrongly, they still agree on their existence, as well as the rationality involved in identifying them. As with realism, however, the neoliberal approach is insufficient because it does not offer an explanation as to how state interests could either be misperceived by the state itself or could change with regard to the same policy issue.

Since the main problem with using realist or neoliberal approaches to study this puzzle seems to be their notion of rationality, it seems logical that either the notion of state rationality must be "deconstructed" (as constructivists would argue) or that it simply must be scrutinized in more detail. Unfortunately, while constructivists offer some excellent criticisms of realism,

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[9] For an explanation of the tenets of neoliberalism and its critique of realism, see Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), David Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 3, 1992; Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); and John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

[10] Probably the most important constructivist critique of realist IR theory was made by Alexander Wendt. See Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

unlike neorealist and neoliberal theorists, they have thus far offered no set of assumptions of their own which might be testable/falsifiable. Thus, I am pursuing the study of this subject utilizing a different framework altogether: one which can incorporate the critiques of realism made by constructivists as well as the notions of cooperation and regimes found in neoliberalism. In order to do so and to further explore the problem of rationality discussed previously, I turned to a separate body of literature—to fill in the "missing link."

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY AND THE ACF

Change is an inherent phenomenon in public policy. However, despite the large number of research projects and agendas aimed at uncovering the "secrets" of policy change, there is no consensus on a single framework or theory in the field. The notion that policy change is a complex phenomenon and is shaped by a number of variables is not a new discovery.[11] But thus far in the study of the policy process, there has been no agreement over what to study (in terms of policy change), much less on a framework on how to go about studying it. Most of the public policy literature focuses on only one of two aspects. The first of these involves using the policy process model (or "stages heuristic") to analyze how and why a specific policy evolved the way it did. The second of these involves using theories of decision making to analyze how and why a policy changed at a given time.

Several frameworks, models, theories, and/or "heuristic devices" have been used to analyze the formation and change of public policy over time.[12] The concept of the policy cycle is the oldest and (arguably) has been, until recently, the most popular one. The extensive literature on the policy cycle concentrates on the stages through which any policy must go in

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[11] See Charles Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," *Public Administration Review*, No. 19, 1959; and Aaron Wildavsky, *Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979).

order to become an operative policy and the effects of each stage on the nature of the outcomes of subsequent stages.[13] The policy cycle literature generally attempts to understand *why* certain policies operate as they do (i.e. why and how they work or do not work).

The principle virtue of the policy cycle as a focus of analysis is that it stresses the dynamics of making public policies. Policies are seen as arising from a complex, sequential cycle, rather than from the rational analysis of a few specific policy elites. This approach also stresses the political nature of public policy and the various potential points of access within the cycle for those who seek to influence the nature of the policy. However, the policy cycle approach has come under criticism by several researchers in the field of public policy. Perhaps the leading critics of the stages approach are Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier. They state that "while the textbook approach made important contributions during the 1970s and early 1980s, and still retains some value, it has outlived most of its usefulness."[14]

Specifically, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith offer six main criticisms of the policy stages model.[15] First, and most important, the stages model is not really a *causal model.* It lacks identifiable forces to drive the policy process from one stage to another and generate activity within any given stage. Second, because it lacks causal mechanisms, the stages model *does not provide a clear basis for empirical hypothesis testing.* Third, the stages model suffers from *descriptive inaccuracy* in its positing of a sequence of stages starting with agenda setting and passing through policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. Fourth, the stages model suffers from a built-in *legalistic, top-down focus.* It thus tends to neglect other important actors.

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[12] See Paul A. Sabatier (ed.), *Theories of the Policy Process* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 6-12.
[13] Harold D. Laswell, *The Decision Process* (College Park: University of Maryland Press, 1956).
[14] Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier, "Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework," *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1994.
[15] Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier, "The Study of Public Policy Processes" in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (eds.), *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 3-4.

Fifth, the stages model inappropriately *emphasizes the policy cycle as the temporal unit of analysis*. In fact, they argue, policy evolution often involves *multiple, interacting cycles involving multiple levels of government*. Finally, the stages model fails to provide a good vehicle for integrating the roles of policy analysis and *policy-oriented learning throughout the public policy process*.

This initial critique of the stages approach led to two primary research questions that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith sought to answer. How can on understand the incredibly complex process of policy change over periods of one or several decades? And what are the principal causal factors behind this change? In attempting to provide a framework for answering these questions, the ACF was born.

The ACF itself has four basic assumptions.[16] First, that understanding the process of policy change—and the role of policy-oriented learning therein—requires a time perspective of a decade or more. The focus on time spans of a decade or more comes directly from findings concerning the importance of the "enlightenment function" of policy research. Carol Weiss argued that a focus on short-term decision making undermines the influence of policy analysis because such research is used primarily to alter the perceptions and conceptual apparatus of policy makers over time.[17] Sabatier also argues that time frames of a decade or more are also necessary in order to complete at least one policy cycle of formulation, implementation, and reformulation.[18]

The second assumption is that the most useful aggregate unit of analysis for understanding policy change over such a time span in modern industrial societies is not any

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[16] Paul A. Sabatier, "Policy Change over a Decade or More," in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 15, pp. 16-17.
[17] Carol Weiss, "Research for Policy's Sake: The Enlightenment Function of Social Research," *Policy Analysis*, No. 3, 1977.

specific governmental institution but rather through a focus on "policy subsystems." A policy subsystem is the interaction of actors from a variety of public and private organizations, who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue and seek to influence governmental decisions in that policy area). By using the term "policy subsystems," Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that perceptions of such should be broadened from traditional notions of "iron triangles" (administrative agencies, legislative committees, and interest groups) to include actors at various levels of government, as well as journalists, policy analysts, academics, etc.

The third basic assumption is that the policy subsystems must have an intergovernmental aspect; that is, they normally involve actors from all levels of government (at least for domestic policy). Focusing only at the national government level runs the risk of ignoring policy innovations that often occur at the subnational level.

The fourth assumption is that public policies and programs incorporate implicit theories about how to achieve their objectives and thus can be conceptualized in the same manner as belief systems. They involve value priorities, perceptions of important causal relationships, perceptions of world states (including the magnitude of the problem), perceptions of the efficacy of policy instruments, etc.

At any given time, each coalition adopts a strategy envisaging one or more innovations that it feels will further its policy objectives. Conflicting strategies from various coalitions are normally mediated by a third group of actors, which Sabatier terms "policy brokers," whose principal concern is to find a reasonable compromise which will reduce coalition conflict.[19] Sabatier further argues that advocacy coalitions will resist information suggesting that their basic beliefs may be unattainable, and they will use formal policy analysis primarily to support their

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[18] See Daniel Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier, *Implementation and Public Policy* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989).

beliefs or attack those of their opponents. Thus, while policy-oriented learning is an important aspect of policy change and can often alter secondary aspects of a coalition's belief system, changes in the *core* aspects of a policy are usually the results of changes in factors external to the subsystem.[20]

At its inception, Sabatier posited nine falsifiable hypotheses.[21]

Hypothesis One: On major controversies within a policy subsystem (i.e. when core beliefs are in dispute), the lineup of allies and opponents will tend to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so.

Hypothesis Two: Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on issues pertaining to the policy core, although less so on secondary aspects.

Hypothesis Three: An actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects of a belief system before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core.

Hypothesis Four: The core (basic attributes) of a governmental program is unlikely to be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition that instituted the program remains in power.

Hypothesis Five: The core (basic attributes) of a governmental action program is unlikely to be changed in the absence of significant perturbations external to the subsystem, i.e. changes in socio-economic conditions, system-wide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other subsystems.

Hypothesis Six: Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely to occur when there is an intermediate level of informed conflict between the two. This requires: a) each have the technical resources to engage in such debate; and that b) the conflict be between secondary aspects of one belief system and core elements of the other or, alternatively, between important secondary aspects of the two belief systems.

Hypothesis Seven: Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there exists a forum which is: a) prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to participate; and b) dominated by professional norms.

Hypothesis Eight: Problems for which accepted quantitative data and theory exist are more conducive to policy-oriented learning than those in which data and theory are generally qualitative, quite subjective, or altogether lacking.

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[19] Sabatier, *op. cit.* in note 6, p. 133.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 134-137. Such factors may include (but are not limited to) changes in socio-economic conditions and technology, changes in systemic governing coalitions, and policy decisions/impacts from other subsystems.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 141-157.

Hypothesis Nine: Problems involving natural systems are more conducive to policy-oriented learning than those involving purely social systems, because in the former, many of the critical variables are not themselves active strategists, and because controlled experimentation is more feasible.

REVISIONS TO THE ACF

Primarily as a result of a series of qualitative and quantitative case studies published in their 1993 book, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith revised two of the ACF's hypotheses and added several new ones.[22]

Hypothesis Four (Revised): The policy core (basic attributes) of a governmental program in a specific jurisdiction will not be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition that initiated the program remains in power within that jurisdiction—except when the change is imposed by a hierarchically superior jurisdiction.

Hypothesis Five (Revised): Changing the policy core attributes of a government action program requires both: a) significant perturbations external to the subsystem (i.e. changes in socioeconomic conditions, system-wide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other subsystems; and b) skillful exploitation of those opportunities by the (previously) minority coalition within the subsystem.

Hypothesis Eleven: Within a coalition, administrative agencies will usually advocate more centrist positions than their interest group allies.

Hypothesis Twelve: Even when the accumulation of technical information does not change the views of the opposing coalition, it can have important impacts on policy—at least in the short term—by altering the views of policy brokers or other important governmental officials.

In the five years following the 1993 book, there were at least eighteen additional published case studies that critically applied the ACF to investigate the nature of long-term policy change: three involving Sabatier or Jenkins-Smith and fifteen by other scholars, including

[22] Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Assessment, Revisions, and Implications for Scholars and Practitioners," in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 15, pp. 213-222.

thirteen unmotivated by the two original ACF authors.[23] These studies led to a number of additional revisions to the 1993 version of the framework.

These studies, employing more systematic methods of data acquisition and analysis, have both confirmed the existence of advocacy coalitions and suggested a number of amendments to the framework. Survey data used in the case studies demonstrated that scientists are not necessarily "neutral" or "policy indifferent" but instead are often members of the coalitions themselves. Also, quantitative analysis revealed that there might well be more coalitions than is first apparent. Virtually all qualitative applications of the ACF found one to three coalitions, with most finding two.[24]

The case studies also led to several clarifications of the policy core of belief systems.[25] Early versions of the ACF were ambiguous about the defining characteristics of policy core beliefs, especially about whether the critical difference between deep core, policy core, and secondary aspects was scope of belief or degree of abstraction. Subsequent work suggests that scope and topic should be the defining characteristics of policy core beliefs. Scope means that the belief should apply to virtually all aspects of subsystem policy, rather than to only narrower ranges (which are covered by secondary aspects). And topic means that it should pertain to one of the subjects of the policy core.[26]

The 1988 and 1993 versions of the ACF defined a "policy subsystem" very loosely as a group of actors interacting with some regularity in a functional policy area. The boundaries of the subsystem were not clarified, however. In the revisions included in the 1998 article, Sabatier

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[23] Paul A. Sabatier, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe," *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1998, p. 107.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 108.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 110.
[26] Basic causes of the problem, method of financing programs, and desirability of participation by public versus experts versus elected officials.

distinguished between a nascent subsystem (one in the process of forming) and a mature one (that has existed for a decade or more).[27]

The "necessary and sufficient" criteria for the existence of a mature policy subsystem include: 1) the participants regard themselves as a semi-autonomous community who share a domain of expertise; 2) they seek to influence public policy within the domain over a fairly lengthy period of time (seven to ten years); 3) there are specialized sub-units within agencies at all relevant levels of government to deal with the topic; and 4) there are interest groups, or specialized sub-units within interest groups, which regard this as a major policy topic. This, in turn, led to a revision of Hypothesis One:

> *Hypothesis One (Revised)*: On major controversies within a mature policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be stable over a period of a decade or so.[28]

Another critique of the ACF came from Michael Mintrom and Sandra Vergari in 1996. They argued that the ACF neglects the exact conditions under which major policy change occurs.[29] This forced Sabatier to revise Hypothesis Five:

> *Hypothesis Five (Revised)*: Significant perturbations external to the subsystem (i.e. changes in socio-economic conditions, public opinion, system-wide governing coalition, or policy outputs from other subsystems) are a necessary but not sufficient cause of change in the policy core attributes of a governmental program.[30]

ON SECURITY REGIMES

An obvious problem with the argument that theories of public policy analysis can be successfully applied to the area of multinational security is that the former assumes a hierarchical

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[27] Sabatier, *op. cit.* in note 23, p. 111.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.
[29] Michael Mintrom and Sandra Vergari, "Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Entrepreneurs, and Policy Change," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1996.
[30] Sabatier, *op. cit.* in note 18, p. 118.

national/subnational government structure. In contrast, multilateral/multinational policy making implies a non-hierarchical, inter-governmental structure. Simply put, decisions made and policies adopted by a national government *legally supercede* those of subnational governments and bodies that run counter to it. However, in an international context, there is no similar legal superceding authority. Thus, the field of public policy studies is based upon the study of the policy process within a single nation.

However, with the advent and rise of the European integration effort—the European Economic Community, European Community, and now European Union—the world witnessed something of a new phenomenon (at least new since 1648). The Europeans forged a supranational entity, with quasi-legal (and increasingly autonomous) jurisdiction over individual national policy making. This has led to a flood of literature (too numerous to mention here) concerning the study of the policy process in such a political entity. I mention this because the EC/EU policy literature reflects the (successful) ability of researchers to apply public policy approaches to a non-national political context.

What about security? Any casual observer of EU policy making will point out that the Union (despite its stated desire to do so) has thus far been unable to formulate security policy at the supranational level. Thus, once again, in terms of studying the multinational security policy process, the current literature is not very helpful. I argue, however, that a fundamental mistake is being made by most public policy analysts: the assumption that *public* policy only arises from *formal institutions*. Of course, to be codified into laws, executive orders, rulings, directives, etc., policies must pass through some sort of institutional framework. But I argue that it *does not have to be a formalized or legally binding framework*. Such a framework can greatly aid a policy in moving through the stages of the policy process (initiation, estimation, selection,

implementation, evaluation, and termination), but *it is not a necessary component to any of the stages.*[31]

If one accepts the notion that a legally binding framework is unnecessary in order to adopt multinational/multilateral policies, then how are they adopted? I argue that policy adoption and change in this context is achieved because of the existence of international regimes, which function as quasi-legal political entities. Stephen Krasner defined an international regime as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area."[32] As such, a regime is quite different from other international interactions, such as agreements, alliances, treaties, etc. Regime-based behavior is based on long-term rather than short-term calculations of interest. An actor is willing to give up a certain amount of decision making flexibility and short-term gain-seeking in return for the assumption that other actors in the regime will reciprocate, to the benefit of all. In this sense, a regime protects and provides a collective good (in this case, security). Since it is a collective good, it is by definition, a *public* good. And since it is a public good, it is logical to assume that studies of processes of public policy may be instructive.

The more difficult part of this argument, of course, is attempting to "prove" that a regional security regime exists in the Euro-Atlantic region. For this, I turn to Robert Jervis' essay on security regimes.[33] Jervis argues that there are essentially four main criteria necessary to establish a security regime.[34] First, the great powers want to establish it. Second, actors must also believe that others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation. Third, even if all actors would settle for the status quo, security regimes cannot form when one or more

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[31] For a more detailed discussion of the stages approach to the policy process, see Laswell, *op. cit.* in note 13 and Garry D. Brewer and Peter DeLeon, *The Foundations of Policy Analysis* (Monterey, Ca.: Brooks and Cole, 1983).
[32] Stephen Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1.
[33] Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes" in Krasner (ed.), *op. cit.* in note 32.

actors believe that security is best provided for by expansion. And fourth, war and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly.

I believe that all criteria apply. First, remember the definition of a regime itself. The United States, its NATO allies, and the member states of the European Union all share a similar set of principles and norms in terms of international security. All share basic values about human rights, democracy, and capitalism. All share a basic belief in national sovereignty (when the nation in question does not violate its own citizens' human rights). All share a strong desire to avoid the major wars of the past and to maintain regional stability. They disagree to some degree on the appropriate rules for interaction, but all agree on the norms of intergovernmental negotiations and collective action (within the European region). In this regard, it can be seen that it does not matter which institution (NATO, EU, etc.) implements regional security policy, since such policy will have originated from the shared values and norms of the regime.

As for Jervis' criteria, they also seem to apply. The great powers of the US, Germany, UK, and France are all willing participants of the regime. One could argue that Russia poses a problem. However, two responses to this are possible. First, there is some question about whether or not Russia is even a great power. Economically and militarily, it is a basket case. The only factor that places it in the "great power club" is its possession of nuclear weapons. But states such as Israel and Pakistan also possess nuclear weapons, and not too many people would argue that they are great powers. And second, one could make the additional argument that Russia lies outside the regime's geographic area. It is no longer seen as being part of socio-political "Europe," and (more importantly) it has never been viewed as (nor viewed itself as) a part of the "Euro-Atlantic" geographic region.

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[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 176-178.

Jervis' remaining three criteria are much easier to justify. All the members of the regime value mutual security and cooperation; this is especially true for the member states of the European Union, which are integrated economically, socially, and politically. None of the states in the regime are currently in favor of any kind of attempt to expand territorially, and this has been codified in several post-war treaties recognizing current boundaries. And finally, (major) war is certainly seen as extremely costly.

THE EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY SUBSYSTEM

The conflict in the West over security policy in general, and the military interventions in the former Yugoslavia in particular, provides an excellent case study of the determinants of long-term multinational policy change. The case provides an opportunity to evaluate the applicability of the ACF outside the traditional context of domestic politics and policy. The ACF, while not ignoring the role of political power, emphasizes cognitive processes (i.e. policy learning involving secondary beliefs) and major external events as primary causes of policy change.

The Western response to the breakup and conflict in the former Yugoslavia was chosen because it provides an unusual challenge to the ACF. The formulation politics surrounding decisions to use military force seem to follow the typical pattern of subsystem-based policy making prevalent in multinational politics. This section describes the Euro-Atlantic security policy making subsystem through the lens of the ACF model. In particular, I discuss: 1) exogenous variables affecting the subsystem; 2) the advocacy coalitions within the subsystem contesting for policy control; and 3) core and policy core belief structures of the three main advocacy coalitions.

External Factors

Relatively Stable System Parameters

The stable parameters that constrain and structure security policy making in the Euro-Atlantic subsystem include: 1) the complex body of international treaties and agreements between or among the actors, including (but not limited to) the North Atlantic Treaty, the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the Treaty on Western European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations Charter; 2) the many and complex bureaucracies involving all of the national governments, the North Atlantic Council, the Secretary-General NATO, the WEU Ministerial Council, the UN Secretary-General, UN Security Council, many public and private entities (for example, relief agencies), etc.; 3) the basic distribution of economic and military resources across the various actors; and 4) the underlying causes of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the basic beliefs held by the Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs.

External System Events

Changes in social attitudes and perceptions among the populations of the Western powers, changes in ruling governments, various alterations in the battlefield success of the combatants, and war crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs (all factors existing outside the subsystem) influenced Western intervention policy to some degree. The social/public outrage over the perception of Serb aggression also played an important role. As Misha Glenny writes, "Initially, (U.S.) policy was guided purely by an emotional response to Serbian atrocities. However, the more deeply the United States became involved, the more this moral position was

muddied by security implications."[35] And the changes in ruling governments played a key role, particularly in the United States and France. After the transition from Socialist to Gaullist president, France altered its position: "Jacques Chirac, who had been elected in May 1995, also supported a more robust approach in dealing with the Bosnian crisis....at the end of May, Chirac became even more resolute about taking strong action against the Serbian side."[36]

The Internal Structure of the Euro-Atlantic Security Subsystem

Expanding upon a model of different post-Cold War American grand strategies proposed by Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, I have identified three primary advocacy coalition groups, within the Euro-Atlantic security subsystem.[37] Posen and Ross effectively argue that "four grand strategies, relatively discrete and coherent arguments about the U.S. role in the world, now compete in our public discourse. They may be termed neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy."[38]

I argue that a model based upon these American "grand strategies" may also be utilized in order to determine the core beliefs of the three advocacy coalitions within the Euro-Atlantic security subsystem. The neo-isolationist group identified by Posen and Ross in the United States corresponds with a "non-intervention" advocacy group within the Euro-Atlantic regime. Similarly, their selective engagement group corresponds to a "limited intervention" coalition group. And finally, the American cooperative security group corresponds to an "active intervention" group in Euro-Atlantic security policy making. The primacy group is non-existent in this subsystem (and probably would not exist in any security regime).

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[35] Misha Glenny, "Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1995, p. 101.
[36] Lenard J. Cohen, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fragile Peace in a Segmented State," *Current History*, March 1996, p. 104.

Belief Structures

Belief systems are the central organizing principle for advocacy coalitions. All three coalitions have distinctive and very different belief structures. These beliefs can effectively be organized in accordance with the categories established by Sabatier.[39] Specifically, each advocacy coalition has a deep (normative) core, a set of fundamental policy beliefs, and instrumental beliefs. Table One outlines the various beliefs of the three coalitions.

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[37] Barry L. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1996.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

Table One: Coalition Belief Structures in Euro-Atlantic Security Policy

Belief Category	Non-intervention Coalition	Limited Intervention Coalition	Active Intervention Coalition
1. Normative Core Beliefs			
Analytical Anchor	"Defensive" Realism	Balance of Power Realism	Liberalism
Priority of Values	National Interest	Balance of Power	Human Welfare
Primary Goal of Foreign Relations	Maintain National Security	Avoid great power war or upsetting balance of power	Maintain peace and uphold basic human rights
2. Policy Core Beliefs			
Major Challenge Posed by Breakup of & Conflict in Former Yugoslavia	Avoid becoming involved	Maintaining peace among the great powers/Avoiding "spillover" of conflict into neighboring states	Establishing a lasting peace in the region
Preferred Political Order in Balkans	Not Relevant	Balance of Power	Interdependence
Conception of Security Interests	National	Regional	Global
Political Priorities	National	Formal Alliances	Western Norms & Values
3. Instrumental Policy Beliefs			
Perception of Cause of Balkan Wars	Historical Ethnic Animosity	Serb Attempt to Maintain Integrity of Sovereign State	Serbian Aggression
Role of United Nations	Irrelevant & Useless	Policy Authorization	Ineffective
Role of NATO	Defensive Military Alliance	Collective Security Implementor	Collective Security
View on Military Intervention	Abstain	Contain Conflict/ Discriminate Intervention	End Conflict/ Indiscriminate Intervention
Implementation Preference	Humanitarian Aid Only/ If Military Force Is Required, Use Overwhelming Force	UN-authorized Air Strikes, Limited Ground Forces, "Proactive" Peacekeeping	Minimum Level of Military Force Necessary, Not Under UN Command or Authorization

[39] Paul A. Sabatier, *op. cit.* in note 6.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF WESTERN SECURITY POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: 1991-1999

Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia

With increasing tension between the Yugoslav federal government in Belgrade and the individual republics in 1991, the European Community seized the diplomatic initiative and dispatched a mediation mission of three foreign ministers to the region. The "Troika" comprised the recent, present, and coming foreign ministers of the Presidency of the European Community. In June 1991, its members were Gianni de Michelis (Italy), Jacques Poos (Luxembourg), and Jans van den Broek (Netherlands). The Troika's mission was to mediate a cease-fire between the Federal government and the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and it was fully backed by the EC and its member states.[40] This quick reaction by the EC demonstrated its desire to become diplomatically involved in the crisis and established it as a (somewhat) independent actor. This independence would carry over through the Troika, the EC presidency, and later special envoys (first Lord Carrington and then Lord Owen).

The EC, however, quickly found itself in trouble as it simultaneously tried to mediate a cease-fire and a political settlement. Thus, it was all too willing to pass responsibilities for the former to the United Nations (primarily the special envoy of the Secretary-General, Cyrus Vance). And so, the United Nations Secretary-General's office becomes a second key actor in the crisis.[41] After a UN-brokered cease-fire, the UN deployed peacekeepers to Croatia in the spring of 1992.[42]

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[40] James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 50-51.

[41] To be especially distinguished from the UN Security Council or other UN bodies as an actor.

[42] Peacekeepers were largely unnecessary in Slovenia, as fighting there ended rather quickly, and the republic was able to (mostly) separate peacefully from Yugoslavia. There are two primary reasons given in the literature to explain this peaceful separation: 1) a lot of initial bungling by the Yugoslav Army; and (more importantly) 2) the fact that there were very few ethnic Serbs in Slovenia, thereby ensuring that Belgrade had less interest in the republic than in others.

War broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 1992, as negotiations to keep the republic within a rump Yugoslavia collapsed, and its government declared independence. The international community's response to the war was, at first, muted. In the United States, the Bush Administration deferred to its European allies, arguing that the breakup of Yugoslavia was an opportunity for the Europeans to show that they could act as a unified power.[43] Probably the clearest indication of Bush's non-involvement policy came when he announced that "aggression would be reversed by all available *peaceful* means" in May 1992.[44] *Thus, the initial American (i.e. Bush Administration) policy was non-intervention.*

The Europeans, meanwhile, were attempting to figure out their own policy. The EC had already demonstrated that it could play only a diplomatic role in the crisis. The three great powers, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, were apparently split as a result of their different policy beliefs. The British Conservative government of Prime Minister John Major actively opposed any Western military response.[45] Major bluntly stated in May 1993 that, "People are not prepared to put 200,000 troops in Bosnia to force them (the Serbs) back by armed force, but we will maintain a diplomatic pressure";[46] and his Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, declared that "The international community will not impose a solution by force. It follows that the fighting will stop when the parties fighting are persuaded to stop."[47] *Thus, the initial British (under Major) policy toward Yugoslavia was non-intervention.*

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[43] Wayne Bert, *The Reluctant Superpower: United States' Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 138.
[44] Mark Almond, *Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans* (London: Mandarin, 1994), p. 276.
[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 296-302; see also Stuart Kaufman, "The Irresistible Force and the Imperceptible Object: The Yugoslav Breakup and Western Policy," *Security Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1994, p. 314.
[46] S. Victor Papacosma, "NATO and the Balkans" in S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss (eds.), *NATO in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 261.
[47] Ivo H. Daalder, "Anthony Lake and the War in Bosnia," (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1995), p. 5.

France, under President Mitterand, seemed erratic in its policy toward the war, at times seeming to side with Britain and refuse to consider military intervention,[48] while at other times, he seemed to hint at supporting increased military pressure on the Serbs.[49] Generally, most researchers seem to indicate that the former policy was predominant under Mitterand, and that apparent fluctuations were due mainly to changing French public opinion. For example, Stuart Kaufman argues that "France...opposed military action largely because Germany wanted it. The Socialist government also worried about its poll losses."[50] However, the most significant French policy change certainly came about with the change from Mitterand's Socialist government to Jacques Chirac's Gaullist presidency. As Lenard Cohen writes: "...Jacques Chirac, who had been elected in May 1995, also supported a more robust approach in dealing with the Bosnian crisis. When Bosnian Serbs took more than 350 UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) peacekeepers hostage at the end of May, Chirac became even more resolute about taking strong action against the Serbian side."[51] *Thus, French policy was dramatically different under the Socialists (non-intervention) and the Gaullists (limited intervention), showing that, in all likelihood, there was a major difference in core beliefs along party lines.*

Unlike its EC partners, Germany always favored military action, but (due to psychological, sociological, and constitutional limits) only if that action were taken by others.[52] However, in part because of the effect on public opinion of the nearly universally anti-Serb German media, the German government even began to take steps to alter the constitution so as to enable German military participation in future crises.[53] *Thus, the German (under the Christian*

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[48] See Almond, *op. cit.* in note 44, p. 298.
[49] Gow, *op. cit.* in note 40, pp. 162-165.
[50] Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 45, p. 314.
[51] Lenard J. Cohen, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fragile Peace in a Segmented State," *Current History*, March 1996, p. 104.
[52] Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 45, p. 314.
[53] Gow, *op. cit.* in note 40, p. 173.

Democrats) policy toward the conflict appears to have been one of supporting limited military intervention.

Working through the UN, the Europeans deployed thousands of "peacekeepers" to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to thousands of (mostly) Muslim Bosnians, who were suffering under the Bosnian Serb offensive.[54] However, the Europeans were operating under the authority of the UN Security Council. As several authors point out, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was always *opposed* to even sending peacekeepers to the region, calling the conflict a "rich man's war," arguing that the situation could turn into a "UN Vietnam," and that much more could be achieved if the funds for Bosnia were spent elsewhere in the world.[55] Early in the Bosnia crisis, it becomes apparent that both *the EC and the UN Secretary-General's office supported non-intervention.* Further evidence of their non-intervention stance is provided in statements to that effect made by both UN special envoys and both EC special envoys.[56] The EC preferred to pursue strictly diplomatic efforts and deploy peacekeepers in only in impartial, non-combat roles. The Secretary-General did not want to deploy peacekeepers at all. The initial "peacekeepers" were limited to delivering humanitarian assistance.

As the war intensified during the summer of 1992, there were an increasing number of media reports of Serb atrocities—including "ethnic cleansing,"[57] the creation of concentration camps, and large-scale incidents of the rape of Muslim women. As a result, media criticism (especially in the U.S.) of the West's reluctance to become more involved in the conflict

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[54] Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 45, pp. 91-98; also see Elinor C. Sloan, *Bosnia and the New Collective Security* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), pp. 20-21.
[55] See especially James Gow, *op. cit.* in note 40, pp. 94-97 and Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Hercegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 1994), p. 11.
[56] See Almond, *op. cit.* in note 44, pp. 290-291.
[57] *Čišćenje terena*: the self-described Serb practice of creating ethnically homogeneous villages, towns, and cities by killing and forcefully expelling non-Serb populations.

increased throughout the summer.[58] The Western media was to play an independent and very important role in the gradual policy change during the crisis.[59] Not only was its reporting of atrocities devastating to the non-intervention advocacy group, but its generally anti-Serb editorializing also played a key role, becoming especially critical of the UN. UN commander Lieutenant General Michael Rose complained: "It is, of course, understandable that a government struggling for survival should have a propaganda machine. It is not understandable that the international media should become part of that machine. Certainly some correspondents in Sarajevo, particularly from the United States, became famous for aggressively challenging the UNPROFOR line at press conferences."[60]

The Western media seems to have predominantly supported some form of military intervention and was strongly critical of non-intervention policies. The degree of intervention supported is relatively hard to measure, however. From the literature though, it seems as if the media's concern was primarily that some sort of military intervention should take place in order to ease or stop the humanitarian crisis. The details of intervention were unimportant. Thus, the media's focus on humanitarian (and not legal, political, or strategic) concerns to me shows a distinct active intervention set of core beliefs.

Meanwhile, in American politics, joining the media criticism was President Bush's Democratic opponent in the 1992 election: Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton. Clinton called on the United States to stop Serb aggression and halt the ethnic cleansing. He also suggested that the United Nations lift the arms embargo against Bosnia, arguing that the victims of the war

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[58] Almond, *op. cit.* in note 44, p. 321; Bert, *op. cit.* in note 43, pp. 154-158, and Rigby, *op. cit.* in note 55, p. 12, p. 20, p. 27, and p. 36.
[59] See especially James J. Sadkovich, *The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, 1991-1995* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998).
[60] Stephen Badsley, "The Media and UN 'Peacekeeping' Since the Gulf War," *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Spring 1997, p. 17.

should not be left defenseless.[61] *Candidate Bill Clinton supported limited intervention.* Clinton went on to defeat Bush and win the presidency. Immediately after his inauguration, Clinton and his top advisors reviewed U.S. policy toward Bosnia. There was an obvious split in their positions along the advocacy coalition axis of non-intervention versus limited intervention.

Unlike the Bush Cabinet, which was relatively unified behind a policy of non-intervention, there was considerable disagreement on policy within the Clinton cabinet. The two advocacy groups were composed of different bureaucratic agencies. Leading the non-intervention group was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. With the support of the Pentagon and uniformed military, he "stymied any U.S. military action."[62] On the other hand, Vice President Al Gore, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, and UN Ambassador Madeline Albright strongly favored the use of air strikes.[63] Apparently sitting in the middle and remaining undecided or non-committed were both Secretaries of Defense (Les Aspin and his replacement, William Perry) and Secretary of State Warren Christopher.[64] Furthermore, Ivo Daalder states that "Madeline Albright...had been the strongest proponent of military action in Bosnia," and "From the beginning, Lake had sided with the activists in the administration."[65]

Thus, in the Clinton Administration, the JCS and Pentagon are in the non-intervention advocacy group; the Vice President seems to be in the limited intervention advocacy group, although he may be in the active intervention group. And UN Ambassador (and later Secretary of State) Madeline Albright and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake seem to be in the active intervention coalition group. This demonstrates the competing advocacy coalitions within a

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[61] The arms embargo had originally been imposed on Yugoslavia in 1991, but by inference, it had been extended to all states (including Bosnia) that had subsequently become independent.
[62] Almond, *op. cit.* in note 44, p. 298 and Rigby, *op. cit.* in note 55, p. 21 and p. 33.
[63] Almond, *op. cit.* in note 44, p. 33 and Daalder, *op. cit.* in note 47, p. 1.
[64] Daalder, *op. cit.* in note 47, p. 1.
[65] *Ibid.*

single executive branch of a single government, and that such coalitions do not always fall along national lines.

The President had ruled out the deployment of American ground troops, except to enforce a peace agreement. But this still left the Clinton Administration without an "official" policy to deal with the crisis. A decision finally came in May 1993, after months of intense debate between the competing advocacy groups (within the administration, in Congress, and in the media).[66] The administration proposed to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and to attack Serb artillery and other heavy weapons with air strikes. *Thus, President Clinton maintained his pre-election position advocating limited military intervention.* However, this "lift-and-strike" proposal met with vigorous opposition from Europe, particularly from Britain and France, which had the largest number of "peacekeepers" on the ground in Bosnia. They were adamantly opposed to lifting the arms embargo, fearing that this would increase the already significant risk to their troops.[67] The U.S. had finally adopted a policy, but it had no support among its allies.

Having failed to convince the Europeans to endorse the lift-and-strike proposal, U.S. efforts subsequently concentrated on securing allied agreement to use air power for a variety of more limited tasks. These included: the enforcement of a UN-imposed no-fly zone over all of Bosnia, the protection of UN "peacekeepers" from attack, and the defense of six UN-designated "safe areas"[68] from Serb shelling. Again, the Europeans were reluctant to consent to the American plan, fearing that the use of air power would increase the risk to their forces—a risk that the United States did not share. Nevertheless, the allies eventually did concede a role for

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[66] Bert, *op. cit.* in note 43, pp. 85-90.
[67] Edgar O'Ballance, *Civil War in Bosnia, 1992-94* (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), p. 144.
[68] As Bosnia disintegrated in 1992, thousands of Muslim civilians fled from the advancing Serb army and paramilitary forces, which were conducting the "ethnic cleansing." Many refugees fled abroad, but many also fled to the larger towns, where they hoped to find protection. In May 1993, the UN established these places as "safe havens": Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zepa. The UN did not define the safe zones, demilitarize them, or (most importantly) provide for their defense.

NATO air power for these limited purposes, provided, however, that the decision to resort to air strikes reside with the UN rather than NATO.[69] By the end of 1993, *a Western policy of limited military intervention was beginning to take shape—an obvious change from the previous policy. The American perceived need and/or desire to have allied support and not act alone (when it probably could have) also reinforces the notion of a Euro-Atlantic security regime.*

In the meantime, two major events occurred on the diplomatic front. First, in March, an agreement was signed in Washington bringing hostilities between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to an end. The agreement also called for a Muslim-Croat federation within Bosnia. Officially, it meant a cease-fire between the two groups. Unofficially, it meant a Croat-Muslim alliance against the Serbs.

Second, in April, a new international body, the Contact Group, was established to deal with the ongoing Yugoslav problem. Its members were the U.S., UK, France, Germany, and Russia. Together, the great powers pursued a Franco-German plan, proposed in June, to apply an economic "carrot and stick" policy toward Belgrade, in order to convince Serbian President Slobodan Milošević to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into agreeing to end the war. An easing of UN sanctions against Yugoslavia was offered in exchange for a Yugoslav embargo against Pale, the Bosnian Serb capital. Milošević complied in a limited manner, but the Bosnian Serbs refused to negotiate.

The Serb position changed with successful Croatian offensives in the spring and summer of 1995. The Croatian Army completely drove the Serbs out of the Krajina. The success of the offensive, combined with the NATO bombing campaign of Serb positions around UN "safe areas," shifted the balance of power away from the Serbs. As a result, Slobodan Milošević became more amenable to a peace settlement. A split had developed between Milošević and the

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[69] Gow, *op. cit.* in note 40, pp. 134-136 and Sloan, *op. cit.* in note 54, pp. 31-32.

Bosnian Serbs, particularly Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadžić, a potential political rival.[70] In addition, Serbia proper was beginning to suffer greatly from UN economic sanctions imposed in May 1992.

In early fall, 1995, US special envoy Richard Holbrooke began a period of round-the-clock shuttle diplomacy with all the Bosnian factions, Croatia, and Serbia. The negotiations produced a tenuous cease-fire in October. Peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, began on November 1, and a final peace settlement was signed on November 20, calling for a zone of separation to divide Bosnia into two roughly equal parts: the Muslim-Croat Bosnian Federation and the Serb Republic. The zone of separation would be enforced by a NATO implementation force (IFOR).

Kosovo[71]

Beginning in late 1997, Western governments focused regularly on the developing situation in Kosovo. In December, NATO foreign ministers confirmed that its interest in Balkan stability extended beyond Bosnia to the surrounding region and expressed concern at the escalating ethnic tension in Kosovo.[72] This was re-emphasized in a statement by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in March 1998.[73] Instead of waiting for recommendations or specific authorization from the UN or Contact Group, the Alliance almost immediately issued a policy statement regarding the crisis.[74] *Unlike in the Bosnia crisis, the West immediately allowed*

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[70] Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), p. 335.
[71] This section of the paper is much less developed than the previous section for the simple fact that there is much less literature available on the Kosovo crisis than on previous events in the former Yugoslavia. The purpose of this paper is only exploratory. More serious research into and analysis of the Kosovo crisis would provide for an interesting addition to this ongoing work. In addition, however, it is my belief that the primary policy change occurred during the course of the Bosnia crisis (from non-intervention to limited intervention). With the Kosovo crisis, we seem to see the complete end of the non-intervention advocacy group but simultaneously, the rise of a third advocacy group: the active intervention coalition.
[72] Official NATO Website, press releases: http://www.nato.int/docu/press.htm.
[73] *Ibid.*
[74] *Ibid.*

NATO to play a policy making role in the crisis and not merely an implementation role. This suggests that a policy shift had already taken place away from non-intervention. By now, it was obvious that the non- intervention advocacy group had become completely dominated by one or both of the other groups, possibly (or probably) due to the major political changes that took place in all four of the major powers' ruling governments since 1992.

Throughout 1998, diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated solution were pursued by the Contact Group. But the U.S. and West Europeans quickly came to the conclusion that this might not be enough (as Russia was blocking attempts to formulate a limited intervention policy). Therefore, NATO defense ministers decided in June to ask NATO military planners to produce a range of options (both ground and air) for military support for the diplomatic process.[75] NATO also undertook a series of air and ground exercises to demonstrate the alliance's ability to project power rapidly into the region. *Once an intervention policy was stymied in the Contact Group, the West immediately sought an alternative body to both formulate and implement such a policy.*

By mid-September, the crisis intensified, as an estimated 200,000 Kosovo Albanians had been driven from their homes.[76] On September 23, the UN Security Council voted in favor of Resolution 1199, which demanded a cease-fire and the start of real political dialogue.[77] The following day, NATO defense ministers affirmed their resolve and determination to take action if required; NATO also agreed to begin the formal build-up and readying of forces to conduct air strikes.[78] On October 8, a Contact Group meeting in London gave US envoy Richard Holbrooke

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[75] *Ibid.*
[76] Source: Marc Weller, "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo," *International Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 2, 1999, p. 217.
[77] BBC News Website: http://news1.thdo.bbc.co.uk/, April 1, 1999.
[78] NATO Official Website, *op. cit.*, in note 72.

a mandate for his mission to Belgrade to secure agreement for the requirements of SCR 1199.[79] On October 13, Holbrooke reported to NATO that Milošević had agreed to the deployment of an unarmed OSCE verification mission to Kosovo and to the establishment of a NATO aerial verification mission.[80] Following negotiations with senior NATO military representatives, Yugoslav authorities also agreed to reduce the numbers of security forces personnel in Kosovo to pre-crisis levels.

Despite some doubts about whether the Holbrooke agreements would deliver a lasting settlement, the U.S. and West Europeans recognized the opportunity they provided to allow the Kosovar refugees to return home, and therefore, were determined to make them work. The OSCE deployed military and civilian observers to Kosovo. NATO also deployed an Extraction Force in Macedonia, under French command, in case it was necessary to conduct an evacuation. This was NATO's first deployment of combat troops to the area. On January 28, 1999, NATO issued a warning to both Milošević and the Kosovo Albanian leadership.[81] The increased military pressure was paralleled by accelerated diplomatic activity. On January 29, the Yugoslav and Kosovo Albanians leaders were summoned to talks at Rambouillet, France; one side would face NATO air strikes if it did not sign an agreement that the other side did. The next day, NATO issued a statement reaffirming its demands and delegating the authority to commence air strikes to NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana.[82]

At this point in the crisis, there is no doubt that the Euro-Atlantic regime desires to intervene militarily. Now, however, the real debate is over how and to what extent to intervene

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[79] BBC News Website, *op. cit.* in note 77.
[80] *Ibid.*
[81] Official NATO Website, *op. cit.*, in note 72.
[82] *Ibid.*

(i.e. versus the limited and active intervention groups). However, these indications are only limited observations, and more data is needed to fully understand the dynamics of the situation.

The negotiations at Rambouillet in February presented the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians with proposals for an equitable and balanced agreement on interim self-government in Kosovo. The first round of talks ended on February 23, with a significant amount of confusion.[83] The Kosovar Albanians accepted the text as the definite outcome of the negotiations. Serbia, on the other hand, regarded the process as by no means concluded. So, a second round of talks began in Paris on March 15 to discuss implementation. The Western allies made it clear that this would involve a NATO-led military force on the ground. It also became clear that the Yugoslav government would not accept this. The talks were suspended on March 19.

While the talks in France were going on, NATO was preparing for a possible ground force to implement any peace agreement. In February and March, NATO forces began deploying in strength to Greece and Macedonia. The force was named Kosovo Force, or KFOR, and was led by British Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson. *Once again, the preparation of a possible NATO ground force indicates the influence of an active intervention coalition. But if so, was it the challenger to the limited interventionists or had it become dominant? The crisis ended before the answer could be witnessed by NATO actions. Therefore, as I stated earlier, more data is needed.*

On March 19, with the suspension of the peace talks and a massive Serb offensive underway in Kosovo, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek, announced the immediate withdrawal of the OSCE verifiers.[84] US envoy Richard

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[83] Marc Weller, *op. cit.* in note 76, p. 233.
[84] BBC News Website, *op. cit.* in note 77.

Holbrooke flew to Belgrade on March 22, in a last-ditch effort to persuade Milošević to back down. But Milošević remained intransigent.

The failure of Rambouillet and Holbrooke's mission, coupled with the increasing level of brutality of Milošević 's security forces, pushed the West to take action. On March 24, following final consultations among the NATO allies, Javier Solana directed NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) to initiate air operations against Yugoslavia. Ultimately, despite opposition from Russia and China and the beginnings of dissent within the West, the air strikes were successful. On June 3, Milošević agreed to the terms laid out by NATO, demanding the full withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo.

THE ACF AND EURO-ATLANTIC MILITARY INTERVENTION

Advocacy Coalitions

Coalitions

For the crises in the former Yugoslavia, the non-(military) intervention coalition is composed of American Republican congressional conservatives (example: Senator Jesse Helms, Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee), British Conservative and Labor Party centrists/moderates (example: Prime Minister John Major), the Bush Administration, the European Community/European Union Presidency, French Socialists (example: President Mitterand), the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Pentagon, and the United Nations Secretary-General's office. The limited intervention coalition is composed of American congressional centrists/moderates (example: Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, Senator Joe Biden), British rightist Conservatives (example: Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher), French Gaullists (example: French Prime Minister and later President Jacques Chirac), German Christian

Democrats (Example: Chancellor Helmut Kohl), and President Clinton. Finally, the active intervention coalition is composed of Ambassador to the UN and later Secretary of State Madeline Albright, American Democratic congressional liberals, British Labor Party liberals (example: Prime Minister Tony Blair), German Socialists and Greens (example: Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder), National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, and the Western media.

Beliefs

At the heart of the ACF is the assumption that the advocacy coalitions are held together through agreement on policy core beliefs. Policy core beliefs came into conflict during the crises in the former Yugoslavia, as the United States threatened to take military action alone. In competition was the non-interventionists' core beliefs of the national interest and staying out of "peripheral" wars versus (both groups of) the interventionists' core belief in maintaining regional balances of power and upholding human rights. In accordance with the ACF, *all three coalitions protected their policy core beliefs by making adjustments in secondary (policy core) aspects of their belief systems.* This is probably why a sort of "middle ground" of limited intervention evolved as regime policy. It required the least amount of change (in terms of secondary beliefs) on behalf of the non-interventionists and active interventionists. But all three of these coalitions changed their management practices (including implementation efforts) but not their policy objectives.

Stability

During the course of the crises in the former Yugoslavia, the lineup of allies and opponents of military intervention in the policy subsystem remained quite stable. While it often

appeared that certain countries (most notably the U.S., France, and UK) changed coalitions, this perception was due, in fact, to a change in governments, each of which had different core beliefs. The political parties and individuals who made up those governments *did not change their core belief structure throughout the crises, regardless of whether they were members of a ruling government or members of the opposition.* This also reinforces the notion that substantial policy change within a regime occurs due to cross-national advocacy coalitions rather than changes in the policies of individual national governments. However, once again, the Kosovo situation remains relatively unresolved, due to a lack of data.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper offers an initial investigation into the Euro-Atlantic security regime's military intervention policy change during the crises in the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. The analysis of multinational security subsystems is complex, and this paper certainly raises more questions than it answers. However, the example of Western policy toward military intervention in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s highlights the possible *potential* of using the ACF to explain and predict policy change in a non-national domestic policy subsystem.

The record of Western policy toward the former Yugoslavia seems to validate the ACF thesis that "self-interested" policy learning is an important force in promoting long-term (although incremental) change. The case of military intervention in the former Yugoslavia seems to indicate the importance of external events (such as changes in national governments) in facilitating policy learning and change. Without the changes in American, British, and French governments, military intervention may never have taken place, as the core beliefs of the non-intervention coalition were not very likely to change, regardless of the situation "on the ground."

The Kosovo intervention also highlights the limitations of policy learning. The new Western emphasis on active intervention demonstrates that the limited interventionists have adopted specific secondary beliefs of the active intervention advocacy coalition. However, there is no evidence that either the non-interventionists or limited interventionists have backed away from their original core beliefs. In short, *it was exogenous changes in the power of the coalitions that led to policy change and not changes in the core beliefs of any of the advocacy coalitions.* This reinforces the thesis that major long-term policy change is highly unlikely *unless the dominant advocacy coalition is politically replaced by a different advocacy coalition. Policy learning may take place within secondary (policy) beliefs, but core beliefs are highly resistant to change.* The West never intervened in Bosnia or Kosovo because its elites in power changed their minds and decided that it might be a good idea after all. *The West intervened because non-interventionist elites were replaced by those with a completely different set of core beliefs via national political processes exogenous to the Euro-Atlantic security subsystem.*

The former Yugoslavia experience suggests that policy learning over the long-term may be the result of political stalemate. In fact, the political intractability of the issue of military intervention in Bosnia has forced the traditional non-interventionists and active interventionists within the subsystem to compromise their principles in order to better facilitate a more viable policy option. Political intractability, activist national-level political actors, and external events such as regime change are responsible for the gradual ascent of limited intervention beliefs.

Before the ACF's hypotheses can be formally tested within this policy subsystem, however, further research will be necessary to fully identify all primary actors, better identify elite belief structures, track elite communication within and across national boundaries, and determine what role (if any) elites from smaller countries may have played. In addition, as the

West continues to change and expand its responsibilities in the security field, further research would be useful to analyze the policy changes that lead to such activity.

What then are the "lessons" for the CFSP to be gained from my (albeit rudimentary) analysis? I believe that, foremost, the notion of unitary state interest must be abandoned. While states may have a very broad set of global "interests" that any elites in power would pursue (access to natural resources, favorable trade status, etc.), this "bag of utilities" (to borrow a phrase from the rational choice school) is much too generally described to be of any particular use in analyzing behavior *in a specific policy field, sub-system, or decision.* In fact, I do not dispute the rational choice assumption that *individuals* are rational; what I dispute is the notion that a nation-state possesses a common, collective, unchanging set of interests. Individuals are rational; in foreign and security policy, they rationally pursue those interests inherent to their personal belief system/ideology. Nation-state "interests," therefore, change depending on what belief system is dominant in the national government. Similarly, regime-level security policy changes based upon what belief system is the dominant one throughout the regime.

For those who choose to either study the Euro-Atlantic or EU security regimes or to work as a professional within the latter's slowly growing bureaucratic structure, this concept may be particularly useful. I would suggest that academics and professionals seeking to identify causes and/or problems with the CFSP framework should move beyond a "member state versus member state" approach. In other words, the primary activity in formulating a common, regime-level policy may not be found at the intergovernmental level but in reality at the advocacy group level. While I attempted to demonstrate this within the Euro-Atlantic security regime, I believe that it is even more salient within the European Union, as the subnational and supranational ties within the latter are obviously much stronger.

Of course, I could be wrong. As I have tried to emphasize throughout the paper, I consider this work to be entirely exploratory. I do not empirically test my framework and its hypotheses here. I strongly believe that any good social scientist must be ready and willing to acknowledge that all of his or her hard work may prove to be wrong or inconclusive. Hopefully, I will have the opportunity to present such results (after I conduct field research) at some future opportunity. Similarly, I cannot yet offer specific institutional recommendations for the European Union's CFSP, although I hope to do so after the next stage of my research. My hope in writing this preliminary paper was to offer an alternative analytical and methodological approach to a new field of study that (unfortunately) has so far continued to rely on rather old ideas.

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