

[REDACTED]
Altiero SPINELLI

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is with great emotion that I have come here to receive this impressive prize which recalls the work of Robert Schuman and sets my name alongside that of Jean Monnet and others who have laboured greatly for Europe.

I appear before you at a time when serious doubt, even a feeling of resignation and defeat, is weighing heavily upon the entire European venture. This could well turn out to be one of the many political ventures that break down before being fully realized, because the effort of will, the imaginative force and the political insight of those responsible for undertaking them flag. As a Member of the Commission of the European Communities, an institution which is in the forefront of the European venture, I am one of those who bear this responsibility. If the European venture were to fail, the whole past history of men and institutions would be of very little consequence to you and future generations, and even this act of awarding and receiving prizes would seem like something out of a tragi-comedy.

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When reflecting upon and weighing the possibility of such a failure, I find myself thinking about the point of departure of my European political experience when, away back in 1940, I observed from my vantage-point on the island of Ventotene, to which political exiles were banished, the fearful disintegration of Europe in the holocaust of the Second World War. I then discovered and felt, like so many others, who were then completely unknown to me, that the federal unity of the free peoples of Europe could no longer remain a beautiful dream, which God knows what future generation might perhaps put into practice, but should become the main task of our generation, which bore the spiritual and bodily wounds inflicted by the fatal course of events which Grillparzer had tersely prophesied with the words "Von der Humanität durch die Nationalität zur Bestialität".

From then on, my political assignment was to take part in the struggle for European unity.

Anyone who thought that Europe could from a certain point onwards emerge almost of its own accord is now a disappointed man; those who always maintained that it could be formed only by a strong effort of political will are not disarmed by the difficulties. I for one am convinced that the struggle to form Europe is far from over. I am convinced that there are still reserves of tenacity, hope, political insight and deep interests in Europe which are sufficient to halt the retreat before it becomes a rout, and to turn it into a new surge forward.

My coming here today to receive this prize is therefore rather like taking up the gauntlet in reply to the challenge of the future. I should prefer to accept it as such rather than as recognition of my past, and it is in this spirit that I warmly thank the Kuratorium of the FVS Stiftung and all of you here today for the honour which you are paying me.

For some years now the course of events has not been kind to Europe, especially in the last year. The only successes have been the accession of three new members to the Community, and the fact that all the States of Black Africa, without exception, have sought to open general negotiations for association with the Community. Apart from these two positive points, there have been only defeats and setbacks.

The unsatisfactory and divergent way in which the individual States have dealt with inflation has robbed of all effective substance the commitment to coordinate national economic policies and channel them towards economic unity.

The European and world monetary disorder has wrecked the attempt to maintain and strengthen joint floating of the Community currencies.

The oil crisis has had increasingly serious repercussions upon the Community. At first, the Community countries were so frightened that they no longer even dared to utter between themselves the word "solidarity", and decided shamefacedly to cultivate so-called bilateral barter relations with producer countries, without bothering about each other. Once they began to overcome their initial fear, they

sat down to discuss, under the name of a common energy policy, simple exchanges of information. In a fit of bad conscience, they voiced a few principles of European identity, and then decided to take a united stand at the Washington discussions with other consumer countries. This identity disintegrated, however, at the very moment when it should have asserted itself.

The United States have for some time been urging on us a general review of US - European relations. But we replied in the most absurd of ways. We indicated the various places in which we are ready to discuss each problem: the Atlantic Council, the OECD, the Working Party on Energy (at least eight of us), the International Monetary Fund, the Committee of Twenty, the GATT, ... , but we have so far refused even to try and form a global vision of European policy vis-à-vis our main world partner. We always prefer to appear vassals, sometimes docile, and at other times rebellious, but still vassals.

We have set up a confused and contradictory system of bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and if the inconsistencies and inadequacies of these negotiations have not yet been revealed, this is only because the Security Conference and the MLBR talks have so far been marking time. Here too, we are in fact incapable of taking an overall view of the conditions, possibilities and limits of military détente, of economic cooperation and of human relations.

What should be said about the inability to formulate a Mediterranean policy? What should be said about the inability to review the agricultural policy in order to make it less costly and, at the same time, socially fairer? What should be said of the inability to fulfil the pledge to create a European policy of regional solidarity, even though it has been solemnly reiterated on several occasions? What should be said of the refusal to accord the European Parliament a true say in the control of the Community budget?

What should be said of the so-called "political cooperation", which drags its meetings of Ministers and political directors from one capital to another, and the main activity of which seems to be the evasion of burning problems while nevertheless proposing increasingly frequent meetings?

What should be said, finally, about the meetings of Heads of State or Government, pompously known as Summit Meetings, - perhaps so that each may be given the motto "Über allen Gipfeln ... spirest du kaum einen Hauch" - meetings whose frequency seems to be bent on increasing in proportion to their fruitlessness?

The malaise which had already been smouldering in the Community for some time became a veritable creeping paralysis in the course of 1973 and in the first few months of 1974. The year which should have witnessed the majestic launching of the enlarged Community has been Europe's year of self-humiliation. The common decision-making organs, the Council and the meetings of Ministers under the Community's so-called "Political Cooperation" - less binding and more ambitious - have become periodical gatherings which produce no results. In these, each Minister expresses his own Government's point of view, and declares that he has little or no freedom to negotiate or strike a compromise. The President then notes that it is impossible to reach agreement and puts off the decision until a later meeting, where the game is once more repeated. What is the use of the Commission's continuing

to make proposals, even if of only minor importance? What is the use of the European Parliament's continuing to express Opinions and ask questions? Whenever problems are tabled with a bearing upon the life of all our peoples - precisely those problems which require a European context - the Council and its "Political Cooperation" equivalent are as incapable of deciding upon the Commission's proposals as of formulating common policies on their own account.

As a result of this paralysis, there has been a growing tendency in each of the member countries to think in solely national terms and to make decisions through the national organs. Even the language is changing. Expressions which it was hoped would no longer be uttered by our statesmen are heard without causing any scandal: "We must keep our options open ... we do not want to pay our money for other countries' problems ... we must think first of saving our own skins ... we must withdraw more into ourselves to heal our own wounds ... we must renegotiate the commitments rashly undertaken with the Community", etc. The danger of a return to nationalism has been mentioned. Let us tell the truth, however: the return to nationalism is already taking place in the words and actions of all the Governments concerned in the European venture. I say "all", even if some are more guilty than others.

When contemplating this depressing situation, it is tempting to say that our Governments, and, behind them, the political and economic forces of our society, have already in a way decided to put an end to the European venture and to return to the old practice of completely sovereign national policies. But things are not really like this. Those very politicians who are urging their countries back towards renationalization of their policies are at the same time deeply worried, not to say terrified, about the consequences this would have.

To make what were intended to be common policies into national policies would mean bringing back economic, and by extension, ideological and political nationalism. Some of our States would then seek salvation by agreeing to become the willing satellites of a great power and/or by fitting in with the demands of the large multinational companies or of those who control the immense profits and royalties from oil. Another would react by dreaming of autarchy and Lebensraum, or, as they are called today, bilateral barter agreements. But none of them could possibly have any great influence upon the course of world events, and they would find themselves more and more acted upon by, rather than being actors in, world politics.

The world market and the European Common Market, the world monetary order and the Community's own monetary order, already gravely threatened, would not be able to survive the re-emergence of nationalism on the territory of the most important world centre of commercial and financial transactions. But the dependence of our well-being on intra-Community and international trade is such that everywhere in our countries the collapse of the monetary and commercial order would mean a halt to growth and unemployment. Profound economic, social, political and -- in not a few countries -- institutional, crises would break out all over Europe. And the apparatus of the nation-State, being the only political centre to which appeal could be made to endeavour to emerge from these crises, would secrete from all its pores ever more nationalistic poison.

The younger generations may be rather insensitive to this outlook. The older ones, on whom for a certain time to come the responsibility of directing our society rests, know what the point of arrival is: from the nationalism that refuses any solidarity with one's neighbour to aggressive nationalism towards him, from Nationality to Bestiality. And in order to escape this curse, let our Governments, despite everything, continue to meet in one Council after the other and in one Summit after the other.

Behind them the great majority of political, economic, and social forces desires, sometimes with a clear mind and sometimes in confused fashion, that the European venture should be continued and deepened.

True, in the countries which last entered the Community, the theme is a more controversial one. But let us not forget that at the birth of the Communities there existed a similar sharp controversy at least in the three major member countries. Only in European hagiography were Schuman, Adenauer, de Gasperi and Spaak surrounded and supported by general consensus. In reality their European action was contested by many political and social forces which today have gone over or are going over to the European camp.

The attitude of the political and economic forces in our countries towards the European idea can today be briefly summed up as follows: the doctrinaire nationalists on the Right and Left are decisively against the very idea of European unity. The main body of political forces and professional and trade union organizations confesses pro-European positions and is beginning to manifest with regard to them, even if, and often with reason, critical, this or that policy or absence of policy of the Community. If there is one sector of our society in which the European idea has advanced most in the

last five or six years, this is the one commonly known as the Left, that is to say the one which is most interested in changing existing societies. And it is logical that this should be so because European union is not a method for preserving what exists but for transforming it deeply.

True, not all formulate the same criticisms of the present European policies and not all desire the same solutions. But everywhere we meet with awareness of our political and economic interdependence and of the need to find common responses to common challenges.

And, nevertheless, this diffused Europeanism of today has very much less incidence on the European activities of the Governments and Community institutions than the Europeanism of certain movements and men who were forerunners influenced the Governments of 20 years ago.

If today the construction of the European institutions and their policies could be founded on debates and decisions in which all the real political forces in our countries with the roots which they have in society were to participate in a determinant fashion this political inertia would disappear.

True, there would be contradictory ideas and political struggles; true, there would be opposition to this or that Community policy, but without any doubt there European solutions and not national counterpositions would be sought for because, in all parties, the European orientation is either dominant or at least strong and because the various political currents would look for transnational political affinities beyond the national affinities. The overall result of such participation would be refusal of the tendency to renationalize and a strengthening of the European will.

An experience, so to say in vitro, confirms the exactness of this hypothesis: the European Parliament welcomes in its precincts all the political forces present in the national Parliaments. Since the stupid exclusion of the Communist parties was abandoned no

constraint is any longer exercised in the choice of its members. Today the only group absent is that of the British Labour MPs by a free decision of their party. Well then, among all the institutions of the European Community, the Parliament, which is the most independent of government choices, has always been the one most capable of developing transnational groupings of political forces, the most impregnated with European spirit and the most decided when it comes to demanding limitations on national sovereignties and supernatural developments. And, with the passing of the years, this trend has continued to become stronger, while it was weakening in the other institutions. It has gone on gathering strength on the Right and on the Left, where initially it was weakest: in the European Democratic Group and in the Communist Group.

I said "if the political forces were to participate". The fact is that hitherto they have always been excluded from any direct and real participation in the construction of Europe. This lack of democratic participation is the deep-seated and ultimate reason for the present powerlessness, and until it is corrected this initial defect will paralyse the process of building Europe and renationalizing will continue.

The defect is really an initial one and has never been corrected so far. Monnet, Schuman, and the other statesmen who answered

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their call, well understood that the profound meaning of their initiative resided entirely in a simple and strong idea: if different States wish to pool certain matters on a permanent basis, they must transfer certain competences to a common authority distinct from that of the States.

Between '51 and '53 the great European Ministers explored this idea and arrived at its logical conclusion: it was not sufficient to build specialized authorities but a political Community had to be set up, i.e. a European government democratically controlled by the European people and by representatives of the Member States.

Having then met with strong political resistance, they fell back on what we are wont to call a pragmatic solution, that is to say an incoherent one, and created a Community in which what should have been common was defined, but the common authority distinct from the governments received only the power to propose what should be done, while the power to decide remained in the hands of the representatives of the individual Governments meeting in the Council.

This was perhaps all that could be achieved at the time. But what was born in this way was born to be doomed in the medium term. The Europe of offices was born, the Europe of secret sessions, the Europe of perpetual intergovernmental negotiation, the Europe of the refusal of democratic participation, the Europe in which, admittedly, a European Parliament was set up but one which was refused any real power and in which even the undertaking to have it elected directly was suddenly forgotten.

It is a strange thing to say that the Community's greatest success was precisely the one which it had not aimed at achieving: it has contributed, by the mere fact of its existence, to spreading the idea that united Europe is a reality in the course of construction and that this construction has to be promoted. Europe has thus become a permanent constituent datum, even if still a confused one, in the popular mind of the six original member countries and has then led three other countries to join.

On the other hand its greatest failure has been its own functioning. "To hope - Hamilton wrote about two centuries ago - for the maintenance of harmony between several and neighbouring States would be to lose sight of the uniform course of human events and to go against the experience of the centuries". The Community was founded on this hope and the result has been that foreseen by Hamilton.

As long as it was a matter of carrying out common commitments already defined and accepted in the Treaties, an intergovernmental conference such as the Council is, was still capable of listening to the Commission and getting things moving. But when joint action programmes had to be formulated in new fields and then approved, implemented, adapted to changing reality, modified and even abolished and replaced by others, the machinery proved to be powerless by nature and every appeal to political will turned into superficial rhetoric.

The Council is a consensus of nine Ministers who decide in secret on the Community's policy, its laws and its spending after having

made a show of examining the opinions of the European Parliament, and degrading the Commission to the level of an office which prepares working documents or of an honest broker between the Governments. If the Council does not draw down on itself the odium which any similar oligarchy would attract this is only because the apparent excess of powers is cancelled out by its actual impotence.

When in fact the nine Ministers find themselves face to face with the draft common decision each is conditioned by long and complex national policy and decision-making. National administrations, national pressure groups and the national Government have participated in defining the particular national interest which each Minister must go to the Council to support. All this process expresses and defines only the national point of view since this is its very aim. When the Minister receives the dossier to be dealt with in Brussels all he has to do is to employ his eloquence to explain his thesis to his colleagues. But at this time the bets have already been laid and with dice (Würfel) loaded in the national sense. The Commission proposal with which the Council is confronted has, indeed, been prepared by a supranational procedure and thus as a rule expresses the common interest, but it is only a weak working document by which the Council sets very little store because no European political force stands behind it.

It is simply absurd to believe that nine distinct decision procedures, based on nine different political, administrative and economic equilibria, can always arrive at converging results by a sort of preestablished harmony.

We often hear it said that all the trouble comes from the fact that majority voting has been abolished in the Council and that if it were reintroduced the whole machinery would start up again.

Criticism must be much more radical. Above all, the important cases in which the Treaties do not provide for unanimous voting are quite rare and all the new policies - regional, energy, industrial, monetary, environment, enlargement of international powers, etc. - would have in any case to be decided on unanimously under the Rome Treaty.

In the second place, for as long as the States as such retain the power to decide, unanimous consensus, the liberum veto, is a logical necessity, as anybody can read in any treatise on international law.

The evil resides in the fact that, although having recognized that this or that matter was of common interest, the power of decision on it has been retained in the hands of the State, i.e. that it continues to be dealt with as a subject of international law when it should now be a subject of internal Community law.

The down-grading of the Commission, the refusal of democratic participation, the secrecy of negotiations in the Council, and the final paralysis, are the inevitable consequences of a system in which there is no real balance between the national interests and the interests of the Community as such. All the real powers

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have been allocated to the national Governments, even those that they are unable to exercise, and all the real powers have been refused to the Community, even those which it alone could and should exercise.

This is the point, to speak with Hegel, to which the spirit of the European Community has got ("ist der Gemeinschaftsgeist fortgeschritten"(?)). And at this point it will languish and in the end will die if a leap forward is not made and made quickly.

The substance of a real new take-off for Europe today is implicit in the analysis I have made of the Community's illness. We must decide to bring about the immediate and genuine participation of all the political forces in the construction of Europe. The moment has come to bring European democracy to birth because it is now an act of inadmissible hybris on the part of the bureaucratic, Eurocratic and ministerial oligarchies to claim that they are still the protagonists in this undertaking.

Please allow me to explain briefly and precisely what the act of birth of European democracy should be in practice.

Our Governments are at present engaged on renationalizing their policies and simultaneously on preparing, in the course of the '70's, what they have called European Union. For this latter purpose they have invited the President-in-office of the Council, Herr Scheel, to speed up and define the procedures to be followed.

Our governments, and in particular our Heads of State or Government, who meet periodically at Summits to impart impulses and invoke initiatives should first of all say solemnly and clearly, after all that has happened, whether or not they wish to maintain for their peoples a prospect of growing solidarity and joint identity vis-à-vis the outside world.

If the reply to this question should be positive they should declare that such solidarity and such identity can be based only on the principle that matters recognized by all as of joint interest must be placed in the hands of a genuine European Government with powers, limited to these affairs but real, and having its own administration and resources and democratically controlled.

May I be permitted to recall here that the demand for a European Government has for some time ceased to be a demand of extreme federalists and has been formulated with clarity by President Pompidou and Chancellor Brandt in particular.

To will a European Government will mean drawing up and ratifying a treaty containing the Constitution of such a government and of the other institutions which must complete it. Such a Treaty-Constitution once framed will have to be submitted to the Parliaments or to national referendums for ratification, since it is only in this way that it will be possible to decide on transfers of powers from the national level to that of the Union. But who should draw up the Treaty and approve it before it is ratified? The

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preliminary report on the European Union asked for by the Paris Summit and which the Copenhagen Summit asked should be brought forward, is bound to contain the reply to this question. This will in fact be the crucial point where the heads of State or Government will show whether they intend seriously to engage their countries in a new relance or whether they merely wish to reiterate verbal declarations which are not followed by action.

Certain people believe that the best method for preparing the draft Constitution is the "Community" method: the Commission prepares and proposes a draft, the Parliament is consulted and, finally, the Council, that is to say the intergovernmental conference of their Permanent Representatives do the serious work, i.e. the actual drafting in accordance with the instructions they receive from their capitals.

Others believe that each Community institution should prepare its own good draft. After which all this paper would be transmitted by the Governments which once again would entrust the serious work to a Conference of their representatives.

Others, finally, would like purely and simply to sidestep the Community institutions and entrust preparations to a group of senior national officials, since in any case it is with these that we land in the end.

We thus see before our eyes how a third-class funeral is being prepared for the European Union even before it is born. The fatal intergovernmental machinery which is strangling the Community would come into action once again and generate, under the name of European Union, another large Council of national Ministers authorized to talk of practically everything and incapable of deciding on anything.

But if sufficient political pressure is brought to bear on the Governments in good time it will be possible to obtain of these that the first pass towards European democracy is opened.

This cannot happen in any other way than by entrusting the mandate to draw up the draft treaty to the only European institution in which all the political forces are really represented, that is to say the European Parliament.

So that this constituent mandate of the European Parliament can be exercised to the full political extent, it will be appropriate that in the very act of giving it to the Parliament the heads of State or Government should ask their respective national Parliaments to reelect their delegations in Strasbourg in such a way as to reinforce the authority of the European Assembly. Between the beginning of this constituent procedure and its conclusion, i.e. ratification of the draft by the national Parliaments, there will elapse a period, which may be calculated at 12 to 18 months, during which European problems will have to continue to be handled in the present institutions and according to the present methods.

But, beginning from the day on which a Summit Conference will have invited the national Parliaments to renew the composition of the European Parliament and the latter to propose a draft constitution to be submitted for national ratification, beginning from this moment the European political climate will change radically.

The present institutions will then be able to administer a provisional power pending the emergence of the real European Government.

Finally, the European Parliament, with its public debates, will be a forum in which the European forces will be able to do battle with growing probability of success, a forum in which not all the rules of the game will have been falsified in favour of national conservatism.

The objections to this plan can all be divided into two groups.

Those in the first group will say in substance that it is irresponsible to give a European Parliament the task of framing a treaty since this is a prerogative of the Governments and in particular of their Foreign Affairs Ministries. But in this case the treaty is merely the form. The content is a constitution which shall define powers and institutions. However, in all our countries it is a universally accepted rule that, irrespective of the final form of ratification, the framing of a constitution must be done by a political assembly of a parliamentary type and not by secret committees of senior officials.

The second group of objections concerns the political moment and expresses disbelief that the present Governments and their Heads, at a time when they are in fact also renationalizing Community policies, could accept such a plan. But we should not tire of repeating that the current decomposition of Europe is not due to a rebirth of nationalistic feelings. It is due to political machinery which allows only national trends to express themselves and clips the wings of those European trends which however less still exist and are vigorous. This decomposition is for this reason accompanied by a bad conscience and fear for the future. New ideas, efforts of imagination, acts of courage usually emerge in such circumstances and not when everything is plain sailing. For all those who are attached to the future of Europe it is therefore a matter of concentrating their action in such a way that the scandal of a Europe which should and can emerge and which, nonetheless, is in the process of destroying itself may become intolerable.

President Rey recently said that in Europe we have reached the day of anger. I hope that this address of mine may be my contribution to stirring up this anger and, at the same time, my sober contribution to indicating that the road of salvation exists for Europe and that in any case it is not so very difficult to follow it.

EMBARGO: 18.00 hrs.
12.3.1974

Brussels, 12 March 1974

EXTRACTS OF SPEECH GIVEN BY MR. ALTIERO SPINELLI, MEMBER OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, AT THE PRESENTATION OF
SCHUMAN PRIZE* AT THE RHEINISCHE FRIEDRICH-WILHELM UNIVERSITY OF
BONN, ON 12 MARCH 1974

The European Community at the crossroads

It is with great emotion that I have come here to receive this impressive prize which recalls the work of Robert Schuman and sets my name alongside that of Jean Monnet and others who have laboured greatly for Europe.

For some years now the course of events has not been kind to Europe, especially in the last year. The only successes have been the accession of the three new members to the Community, and the fact that all the States of Black Africa, without exception, have sought to open general negotiations for association with the Community. Apart from these two positive points, there have been only defeats and setbacks.

The unsatisfactory and divergent way in which the individual States have dealt with inflation has robbed of all effective substance the commitment to co-ordinate national economic policies and channel them towards economic unity.

The oil crisis has had increasingly serious repercussions upon the Community. In a fit of bad conscience, the Community countries voiced a few principles of European identity, and then decided to take a united stand at the Washington discussions with other consumer countries. This identity dis-integrated, however, at the very moment when it should have asserted itself.

The common decision-making organs, the Council and the meetings of Ministers under the Community's so-called "Political Co-operation" - less binding and more ambitious - have become periodical gatherings which produce no results. In these, each Minister expresses his own Government's point of view, and declares that he has little or no freedom to negotiate or strike a compromise. The Chairman then notes that it is impossible to reach agreement and puts off the decision until a later meeting, where the game is once more repeated.

Among all the institutions of the European Community, the Parliament, which is the most independent of government choices, has always been the one most capable of developing transnational groupings of political forces.

Between 1951 and 1953 the great European Ministers explored this idea and arrived at its logical conclusion: it was not sufficient to build specialised authorities but a political Community had to be set up, i.e. a European government democratically controlled by the European people and by representatives of the Member States.

Having then met with strong political resistance, they fell back on what we are wont to call a pragmatic solution, that is to say an incoherent one.

The Europe of bureaucrats was born, the Europe of secret sessions, the Europe of perpetual intergovernmental negotiation, the Europe of the refusal of democratic participation.

The down-grading of the Commission, the refusal of democratic participation, the secrecy of negotiations in the Council, and the final paralysis, are the inevitable consequences of a system in which there is no real balance between the national interests and the interests of the Community as such.

Our governments, and in particular our Heads of State or Government, who meet periodically at Summits to impart impulses and invoke initiatives should first of all say solemnly and clearly, after all that has happened, whether or not they wish to maintain for their peoples a prospect of growing solidarity and joint identity vis-à-vis the outside world.

If the reply to this question should be positive they should declare that such solidarity and such identity can be based only on the principle that matters recognised by all as of joint interest must be placed in the hands of a genuine European Government with powers, limited to these affairs but real, and having its own administration and resources and democratically controlled.

To will a European Government will mean drawing up and ratifying a treaty containing the Constitution of such a government and of the other institutions which must complete it.

This cannot happen in any other way than by entrusting the mandate to draw up the draft treaty to the only European institution in which all the political forces are really represented, that is to say the European Parliament.

Between the beginning of this constituent procedure and its conclusion, i.e. ratification of the draft by the national Parliaments, there will elapse a period, which may be calculated at 12 to 18 months, during which European problems will have to continue to be handled in the present institutions and according to the present methods.

The present institutions will be aware that they have provisional power pending the emergence of the real European Government.

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*The Robert Schuman Prize is awarded every year in Bonn for distinguished services in the cause of European unity in the political, scientific or journalistic field. Its value is 25,000 DM.

It has previously been awarded to: Jean Monnet (1966), Joseph Bech (1967), Sicoo Mansholt (1968), Walter Hallstein (1969), Denis de Rougemont and Silvius Magnago (1970), Alan Pöcher (1971), Roy Jenkins and Jens Otto Krag (1972).

This year's award recognises several decades of effort on the part of Mr. Spinelli towards European union.

(While deported from Italy during the war he wrote 'Manifesto for a Free and United Europe', from 1948 to 1962 he was General Secretary of Federal European Movement in Italy, and at the beginning of the 1950's collaborated in the founding of the European Community.)