



OSW REPORT

OSW



NEW IDEAS FOR TOTAL DEFENCE

COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY IN FINLAND AND ESTONIA

Piotr Szymański

NEW IDEAS FOR TOTAL DEFENCE
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY
IN FINLAND AND ESTONIA

Piotr Szymański

© Copyright by Centre for Eastern Studies

CONTENT EDITORS

Mateusz Gniazdowski, Wojciech Stanisławski, Justyna Gotkowska

EDITORS

Tomasz Strzelczyk, Katarzyna Kazimierska

CO-OPERATION

Małgorzata Zarębska, Szymon Sztyk

TRANSLATION

Jon Tappenden

GRAPHIC DESIGN

PARA-BUCH

CHARTS

Urszula Gumińska-Kurek

DTP

IMAGINI

PHOTOGRAPH ON COVER



pernsanitfoto / Shutterstock.com



Centre for Eastern Studies

ul. Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw, Poland

tel.: (+48) 22 525 80 00, info@osw.waw.pl

  www.osw.waw.pl

ISBN: 978-83-65827-48-7

Contents

MAIN POINTS | 5

INTRODUCTION | 9

**I. FROM TOTAL DEFENCE TO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY:
THE NORDIC AND BALTIC REGION | 11**

II. FINLAND: THE LEADER IN COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY | 16

1. Development of the comprehensive security system | **16**
2. Threats | **18**
3. Implementing a comprehensive security strategy:
theory and practice | **20**

III. ESTONIA: THE PATH TO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY | 36

1. Development of the comprehensive security system | **37**
2. Threats | **39**
3. Implementing a comprehensive security strategy:
theory and practice | **40**

SUMMARY | 51

MAIN POINTS

- Due to Russia's aggression in Ukraine, there is growing interest in the concept of comprehensive security in the Nordic and Baltic region. A comprehensive approach to security, which hails from the Cold War total defence doctrine, incorporates military and non-military aspects of national security and crisis management. It is seen as a means of making a state and the society more resilient to external pressure, and of creating a favourable operational environment for national defence.
- Since 2014, Sweden, Norway, Lithuania, and Latvia, have been implementing, to varying degrees, the concept of comprehensive security. In addition to a return to tried-and-tested Cold War solutions, this also includes development of new capabilities in response to threats that have not been encountered in the past, such as cyber-attacks. Finland and Estonia stand out with respect to comprehensive security matters. Finland is the Nordic country with the longest continuous tradition of a comprehensive approach to security, rooted in its strategic culture and societal and historical background, while Estonia was the first of the Baltic states to begin building a comprehensive security system, as early as 2008.
- In Finland, the concept for comprehensive security is part of a philosophy of good public governance, in which the state plays an important role and has a broad range of security-related responsibilities. A political and public consensus around the issue of strengthening comprehensive security for the state and the society has firmly empowered the Finnish authorities to act accordingly. A regional pivot to reinforcing territorial defence and society's crisis resilience has resulted in the Finnish comprehensive security system being held up more and more as a model.
- Finland's comprehensive security strategy is based on the principle of crisis preparedness. The strategy identifies seven key areas that need to be secured during times of peace, crisis, and war, which are: leadership, international activities, defence capabilities, internal security, security of supply, functional capacity of the population and services, and psychological resilience. Countering hybrid threats (in which respect Finland is an advocate for international cooperation), terrorism, and illegal immigration, are playing an ever-greater part in Finland's security policy.

- At the same time, Finland is not neglecting the military dimension of comprehensive security, and has announced plans to significantly increase defence spending. In recent years, it has raised the level of the military's combat readiness, expanded the scale of the refresher exercises for reservists and increased the armed forces' wartime strength (to 280,000 troops). Most of the changes are intended to reduce the armed forces' response time to peacetime threats and during the phase prior to completion of the time-consuming mobilisation of the reserve.
- Civil defence and the mechanism for ensuring security of supply, which is crucial for a country located on the periphery of the EU and dependent on trade by sea, are hallmarks of Finland's comprehensive security system. Finland has an extensive network of shelters for the population, able to accommodate approximately 65% of its residents. The body responsible for maintaining the state's emergency stockpiles, vital for producing energy and food, providing medical care, and conducting defence operation, is the National Emergency Supply Agency.
- The factor binding the Finnish comprehensive security system together is social capital. Civil-military cooperation is well-developed in Finland. Because there is still general conscription, many decision-makers are familiar with defence-related issues. The civil-military relationship has also been facilitated by the National Defence Courses, during which the military leadership meet with representatives of the civil society, business, central administration, and local authorities, and also by the activities of the National Defence Training Association, which channels the voluntary contribution to defence. Another important factor is the high level of education, which bolsters societal resilience to disinformation and the ability to adapt to the changing social and economic reality.
- Estonia's comprehensive national defence concept is based on six pillars, which are: military defence, the civilian support for military defence, international action, internal security, continuous operation of the state and society, and psychological defence. Building a comprehensive security system in Estonia is not a finalised process – it is being phased in as a long-term endeavour, and in parallel to other defence policy priorities, such as modernisation of the armed forces. This requires significant spending, and Estonia's defence budget is kept at a steady rate of a minimum of 2% of GDP.

- In recent years, Estonia's comprehensive approach to national security has been focused on concentrating responsibility for oversight of the comprehensive security system in the Government Office, reviewing and updating the legal basis for it, expanding the scope of cooperation between the uniformed services, and developing civil-military cooperation. As a result, Estonia has been able to streamline the decision-making processes, and include the entire central administration in crisis and wartime planning. Besides, there is increasing awareness of the importance of civil defence in the country. The civil protection concept was approved in 2018 and focuses on improving crisis communication and the public's awareness and skills in responding to crises.
- Estonia aims to involve the society in defence as much as possible, in order to demonstrate to Russia its readiness to maintain its independence. Estonia achieves this through general conscription, the National Defence Courses (modelled on the Finnish version) and by promoting membership in a voluntary national defence organisation (Defence League). The Defence League is an important point of liaison between the armed forces and civil society, and between national defence and internal security.
- Estonia's strength lies in strategic communication and diplomatic measures to promote its national defence solutions. One example is Estonia's choice of cyber-security as its area of expertise in NATO and the EU. This has enabled Estonia to build an image of an innovative country that is competent and well-managed with respect to security issues.
- From the military perspective, Host Nation Support remains one of the most important capabilities for Estonia. For this reason, in recent years, Tallinn has increased expenditures on development of military infrastructure for NATO forces. Allied military reinforcements to Estonia would benefit from its ability to rapidly mobilise reservists to shield NATO forces. In 2016, to this end, the Estonian government began to regularly hold snap military exercises for reserve troops, in which particular subunits were mobilised.
- Finland's and Estonia's comprehensive security systems are not free of shortcomings. In the case of Finland, this concerns strategic communication, which on several occasions has been undermined by miscommunication between the president, government, and parliament regarding military cooperation with NATO, or exercises of US forces on Finnish soil.

In Estonia, in turn, financial and personnel shortages are the main problems affecting its comprehensive security system. This has led to delays or postponement of implementation of some initiatives. Further shortfalls might be revealed by the coronavirus pandemic in both countries. In March 2020, Finland and Estonia announced a state of emergency and took extraordinary measures to curb the spread of COVID-19 and limit damage to public health and the economy.

INTRODUCTION

A comprehensive approach to the country's security requires incorporation of a broad range of military and non-military aspects of national security and of crisis management principles – stretching from wartime civil-military cooperation to countering epidemics in peacetime. Comprehensive security comes about as a result of activities of many institutions, and involves the state authorities and armed forces, as well as NGOs and local communities. The aim of this report is to present the concepts for comprehensive security in the Nordic and Baltic countries, using mainly Finland and Estonia as examples, and to analyse the practical ways in which comprehensive security is achieved in the two countries. This report addresses the issues of how the concept of comprehensive security is understood in Helsinki and Tallinn, what role it plays in Finland's and Estonia's security policies, how perception of threats together with internal and external security factors shape Finland's and Estonia's comprehensive security systems, how the two countries implement a comprehensive security strategy, and what difficulties and dilemmas this presents. The main research method employed when producing this report was analysis of official documents (strategies, plans, released statements, etc.), papers produced by think-tanks and academia, and press articles. The historical analysis, institutional and legal approach, and interviews conducted during research trips to Helsinki and Tallinn, played an important part as auxiliary methods.

In recent years, in the Nordic and Baltic region, there has been increased interest in the concept of comprehensive security, which hails from the Cold War doctrine of total defence. This is mainly a result of greater regional focus on strengthening territorial defence and countering hybrid threats. In this context, a comprehensive approach to security is considered a means of making the state and society more resilient to external pressure (relating for example to energy or information) and of ensuring the best possible operational environment for the armed forces in the event of war. The concept of comprehensive security will grow in importance, due to the lessons learned from the coronavirus pandemic (for instance related to crisis management, uniformed services and civil-military cooperation, and emergency stockpiles), or the harmful effects of climate change (for instance natural disasters), but also due to restrictions on free trade caused by growing international rivalry, which could disrupt the global supply chains.

Confidence in the stability of the liberal international order and of peaceful European integration from 1991 onwards led to some areas of security policy,

such as civil defence or emergency supplies, to be moved down the agenda. In the Baltic Sea region, Finland is an exception as a country with a long-standing tradition and continuity of a comprehensive approach to security. Finland is considered a role model due to the solutions it has adopted in this respect, and these solutions might inspire other countries to take a broader view of national security. The capacity to deal with threats and crises is symbolised by the Finnish word *sisu* (a word which is gaining in popularity internationally), meaning ‘strength of will and endurance’. On the other hand, Estonia began to build its own comprehensive security system relatively recently (sometimes from scratch), in around 2008. The Estonian case can therefore illustrate the challenges and difficulties involved in introducing a comprehensive approach to national security. The neologism *kerksus*, an Estonian word meaning ‘resilience’, is a symbol of Estonia’s aspirations in this respect.

For the sake of clarity, the term ‘comprehensive security’ is used in this report in most cases even when various terms may be used in particular countries, for example the security strategy for society in Finland, or the principle of comprehensive national defence in Estonia.

I. FROM TOTAL DEFENCE TO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: THE NORDIC AND BALTIC REGION

The term ‘comprehensive security’ has evolved from the concept of ‘total defence’ that emerged in Sweden at the beginning of the 1950s. During the Cold War, ‘total defence’ meant extensive military and civil preparations to defend a country, requiring close cooperation and coordinated activities of the armed forces, other public institutions, and the society. The principle behind total defence is that the entire human, material and moral capabilities are subordinated to an armed effort. This also encompassed, for instance, protection of the population or national assets.¹ Total defence was a crucial element of the security policies of neutral or non-aligned countries – Austria and Finland have introduced similar concepts as well. This signified a readiness to undertake a credible defence even though there was a huge imbalance in capabilities between the small states and great powers. It was also intended as a deterrent to a potential aggressor due to raising the cost of hostile activities.

Even as early as the 1960s, it was increasingly common for the term ‘comprehensive defence’ or ‘comprehensive approach to defence’ to be used instead of ‘total defence’ (given the negative connotations with totalitarianism and total war). One sign of these changes was the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (the Helsinki Accords, 1975). In addition to a political and military dimension, it also encompassed economic issues, environmental protection, or human rights. When the Cold War came to an end, the concept of total defence was gradually expanded to include crisis management, non-military threats, and peacetime challenges for the country and its population.² This led to the emergence of the notion of comprehensive (integrated, all-embracing) security, which is a broader term. This can be defined as reduction of threats to the state and society through the cooperation of all security policy actors and sectors.³ A comprehensive approach to security involves government and non-government actors, and ensures the proper functioning of public institutions, political system, the economy, society, and

¹ Definition based on: F. Lindgren, A. Ödlund, ‘Total Defence at the Crossroads’, *Strategic Outlook*, 2017, vol. 7, FOI Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, foi.se; R. Penttilä, *Finland’s search for security through defence, 1944–89*, London 1991, pp. 89–92.

² This new approach manifested itself in the ‘Copenhagen School’ of security studies, which listed five security sectors: military, political, societal, economic, and environmental, see V. Veebel, I. Ploom, ‘Estonia’s comprehensive approach to national defence: origins and dilemmas’, *Journal of Baltic Security*, 2018, no. 4(2), pp. 1–13.

³ (MINI)SŁOWNIK BBN: *Propozycje nowych terminów z dziedziny bezpieczeństwa*, National Security Bureau, www.bbn.gov.pl.

individual citizens.⁴ Unlike total defence, comprehensive security is a continuous endeavour, implemented not only during armed conflict.

Comprehensive security is a broad concept that encompasses the issues of crisis management, civil defence, and resilience. This terminology is often used in Nordic and Baltic countries' strategic documents in the context of comprehensive security, and thus needs to be clarified. Crisis management, which has now become an integral part of national security, is action taken by public authorities aimed at crisis prevention, crisis control, crisis response, and recovery from crisis (this includes rebuilding of resources and critical infrastructure).⁵ NATO and the EU, however, use the term 'crisis management/response' which means the capability to respond to various stages of a crisis which affect the security of members of these two organisations but originate beyond them.⁶

Civil defence is measures aimed at protecting the population, employment establishments, public utilities, and cultural goods, rescue and provision of aid to victims of war, and cooperation to deal with natural disasters and environmental threats and their aftermath.⁷ NATO uses the term 'civil preparedness', which means ensuring that the state administration functions properly in times of crisis and war. The crucial capabilities in this respect are ensuring continuity of government and public services, and support from the civil sector for NATO military operations.⁸ In the EU, there is the term 'civil protection', which is cooperation between the member states in response to natural and man-made disasters (within the EU and elsewhere).⁹

'Resilience' can be defined as a country's ability to resist and survive a hostile attack due to defence preparedness of society, inaccessibility of territory for an enemy's operational purposes, irregular warfare, and support from various state structures for the armed forces.¹⁰ NATO requires its members to strengthen resilience to aggression under art. 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

⁴ T. Jermalavičius, P. Pernik, M. Hurt, H. Breitenbauch, P. Järvenpää, *Comprehensive Security and Integrated Defence: Challenges of implementing whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches*, International Centre for Defence and Security, 12.02.2014, pp. 85–87, icds.ee.

⁵ *Crisis Management Act of 26 April 2007*, prawo.sejm.gov.pl.

⁶ *Crisis management*, NATO, 27.02.2018, www.nato.int; *Crisis management and Response*, EEAS, 15.06.2016, eeas.europa.eu.

⁷ *Obrona cywilna obecnie*, Obrona Cywilna Kraju, www.ock.gov.pl.

⁸ *Civil preparedness*, NATO, 7.06.2018, www.nato.int.

⁹ *EU Civil Protection Mechanism*, European Commission, 25.07.2019, ec.europa.eu.

¹⁰ (MINI)SŁOWNIK BBN..., *op. cit.*

Within NATO, resilience is understood as populations' capacity to deal with crises such as natural disasters, breakdown of critical infrastructure, and armed attacks, and to restore the *status quo*. Thus, resilience is an outcome of civil preparedness and military capability. According to NATO, resilience consists of: preserving continuity of government and critical public services, security of supplies of energy, food, and water, a capacity to manage uncontrolled movement of people, an ability to deal with mass casualties (health service), cyber-security and durability of civil communications systems, and functional transport (vital for military mobility and maintaining critical services).¹¹ 'Resilience' is defined in a similar way in the EU. The NATO definition of resilience resembles the idea of comprehensive security.

The concepts of total defence and comprehensive security are characteristic for Nordic and Baltic states. They are often used contemporaneously in their strategic documents.

(1) In Lithuania's 2016 military strategy, both concepts are introduced. Total defence encompasses unconditional defence by Lithuanian armed forces and NATO allied forces, mobilisation of all national resources for defence activities, and resistance by all citizens and the entire nation against the aggressor. In turn, a comprehensive approach to security is defined as a combination of military and civil capabilities, for instance cooperation between the armed forces and other public institutions.¹²

(2) The term 'total defence' is not used in Latvia's 2016 National Security Concept, while it does mention the need for a comprehensive approach to preventing threats by employing all available military and non-military resources in a coordinated and integrated way. Since 2019, Latvia's defence policy priority has been introducing a comprehensive national defence system. This is intended to enable the government and non-government sectors to be better prepared for: crisis management and recovery process, ensuring resilience to external pressure, and threat prevention. The system includes increasing the public awareness and skills related to national defence, and strengthening the country's capability to function during crisis (with respect to continuity of government, energy supply, the health service, or logistics). Comprehensive national defence is intended to be based on seven pillars, which are: military

¹¹ W.-F. Roepke, H. Thanky, 'Resilience: the first line of defence', NATO Review, 27.02.2019, www.nato.int.

¹² *The Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania 2016*, Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, 17.03.2016, kam.lt.

capabilities, public-private cooperation, education of society, civil defence, strategic communication, economic resilience, and psychological resilience.¹³

(3) Estonia's 2011 national defence strategy lists the principles of total defence and an integrated approach to defence. The former is defined as commitment of all available means to prevent armed action of any kind against Estonia. The latter goes beyond the *stricta* military dimension – this is the commitment of military and non-military resources to counter hybrid threats (including the most important state institutions, in particular those responsible for internal security), both during wartime and peacetime.¹⁴ The most recent National Security Concept of 2017 expands these tasks to include activities of the private sector and civil society, introducing the principle of comprehensive national defence (*riigikaitse lai käsitus*) – see chapter III.¹⁵

(4) Denmark's strategic documents do not currently include the concepts of total defence and comprehensive security. In the past two decades, Copenhagen has focused on expeditionary warfare, and dismantled the Cold War total defence system, holding a conventional attack on Danish territory to be unrealistic. The last document to mention total defence was the defence agreement for the years 2005–2009.¹⁶ Its goal was to use of all available resources to maintain an organised and properly functioning society and protect the population and national assets. While the defence agreement for the years 2018–2023 uses the term 'total defence force', this should be understood as the wartime strength of armed forces (professional soldiers, mobilised reservists, territorial defence).¹⁷

(5) Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Sweden returned to thinking about national security in terms of defence of its own territory (2015 defence strategy). Stockholm has been rebuilding elements of the total defence system that was dismantled when the Cold War came to an end, which until

¹³ *Comprehensive National Defence in Latvia*, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia, 23.08.2018, www.mod.gov.lv.

¹⁴ *National Defence Strategy*, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, 2011, www.kaitseministeerium.ee.

¹⁵ A notion of broad security is used in this concept. It is defined as the capability of the state and the people to defend their crucial values and objectives against external threats (political, military, economic, social) and to neutralise those threats. To do this, the involvement of governmental and non-governmental institutions has to be coordinated in shaping and maintaining a stable and peaceful security environment. See *National Security Concept 2017*, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, 2017, www.kaitseministeerium.ee.

¹⁶ *Defence Agreement 2005–2009*, Danish Ministry of Defence, 10.06.2004, www.fmn.dk.

¹⁷ *Agreement for Danish Defence 2018–2023*, Danish Ministry of Defence, 28.01.2018, www.fmn.dk.

the 1990s was a trademark of Swedish security policy. In Sweden, total defence is a combination of military and civil defence (civil support for the armed forces, protection of the population, and functioning of society in crucial areas during a crisis). This concept emphasises the importance of: psychological defence (in times of peace, crisis, and war), countering hybrid threats and hostile propaganda, cyber-security, territorial defence, and effective intelligence.¹⁸ Total defence actors include not only the armed forces, but also parliament, the government, public administration, local authorities, businesses, voluntary organisations, and citizens.¹⁹

(6) During the Cold War, the Norwegian total defence system was based on close cooperation between military and civilian institutions. The purpose was to ensure the civil sector support for the armed forces in the event of an armed conflict. From 1991 onwards, like in Sweden, this system went from gradual dismantling to partial reconstruction. Currently, total defence is defined as the sum of all of the civilian and military resources put to use for crisis management and in the event of aggression. The foundation for the system continues to be mutual support and cooperation between the armed forces and civil sector.²⁰ Norway is focusing on increasing crisis response readiness, involvement of the civil society, and armed forces support for public authorities, the police, and the population.²¹ The NATO Trident Juncture 2018 exercises were a recent test of Norway's total defence system.

(7) The 2017 Finnish defence report uses the term 'comprehensive security', which means readiness to use military and non-military means to counter the increasingly intertwined external and internal threats.²² The aim of the concept for comprehensive security is to secure the vital functions of state and society (see chapter II).²³ In this case, the actors are the government, business, NGOs, and the public.

¹⁸ *The Swedish Defence Bill 2016–2020*, Government Offices of Sweden, 8.05.2015, www.government.se.

¹⁹ *Swedish Defence Commission presents report on total defence concept and civil defence*, Government Offices of Sweden, 20.12.2017, www.government.se.

²⁰ *Exercise Trident Juncture 2018 (TRJE18): facts and information*, Norwegian Armed Forces, 2018, www.forsvaret.no.

²¹ *Support and Cooperation: A description of the total defence in Norway*, Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2018, www.regjeringen.no.

²² *Government's Defence Report*, Prime Minister's Office Publications 7/2017, Helsinki 2017, www.defmin.fi.

²³ *Security Strategy for Society. Government Resolution*, Security Committee of Finland, 2.11.2017, www.turvallisuuskomitea.fi.

II. FINLAND: THE LEADER IN COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

In Finland, the comprehensive security system, which has been under development since the 1950s, is rooted in the country's strategic culture and social and historical background. The key to understanding the Finnish way of keeping the country and population safe is *sisu*. This is a word-symbol that cannot be directly translated, and conveys a set of the Finns' national character traits. *Sisu* is the Finnish *virtù* – fortitude, will power, courage, perseverance, and tenacity in pursuit of a goal, making it easier to endure in times of hardship.²⁴ Historically, *sisu* enabled the Finns to overcome the trials of both the harsh climate and northern winters²⁵, and external threats in times of war. Finnish determination in strengthening the society's resilience and comprehensive security can in fact be interpreted as a sign of *sisu*. In addition, Finnish writers point out the influence of the Nordic welfare state, with its extensive social protection and redistributive powers, on the concept of comprehensive security in Finland. This is because this concept is characterised by the strong position of the state and public institutions (combined with a high level of involvement NGO network). Finland's peripheral geopolitical location, at the point where the West and Russia meet, is also a major factor. From the Finnish perspective, given its small population and large territory, this location determines the need for effective and integrated management of limited resources, in order to survive in a world dominated by major powers.²⁶

1. Development of the comprehensive security system

Finland has a long tradition of a comprehensive approach to national security, dating back to the interwar period and the Winter War with the USSR (1939–1940). For Finland, this was total conflict, requiring commitment of all available resources and spheres of life to the defence effort. Subsequently, the lessons learned were applied during the Cold War, when Finnish military doctrine was based on the principle of total defence, executed in four areas, which were military, economic, civil (protection of the population and infrastructure)

²⁴ J. Nylund, *Sisu: The Finnish Art of Courage*, London 2018; J. Adamczewski, M. Obrębska, 'Sisu – emocja kulturowa, schemat poznawczy czy słowo klucz do tożsamości Finów?', *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska*, 2018, vol. 31(4), pp. 51–63.

²⁵ A. Kivi, *Siedmiu Braci*, Poznań 1977.

²⁶ M. Aaltola, T. Juntunen, 'Nordic Model Meets Resilience – Finnish Strategy for Societal Security' [in:] M. Aaltola, B. Kuznetsov, A. Sprüds, E. Vizgunova (eds.), *Societal Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Expertise Mapping and Raising Policy Relevance*, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2018, pp. 26–42, www.liia.lv.

and psychological (maintaining the will to defend the country).²⁷ For Finland, a credible deterrent for a potential aggressor was designed to remain outside the conflicting interests of the great powers.

In the military sphere, Finland's solution was a reserve army with a large mobilisation capability, and territorial organisation of land forces covering the entire country (territorial defence). In 1975, the country's wartime strength of armed forces was 700,000 troops, which was approximately 15% of the whole population. Among the non-military aspects of total defence, the greatest importance was attributed to strengthening civil defence. In 1958, an ambitious programme was launched to build shelters capable of housing almost half of the population. Finnish decision-makers saw this as a way of limiting civilian losses, as in the event of a global conflict they envisaged that due to the proximity of strategic Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula, the country would not avoid nuclear strikes. More attention was also paid to preparations for shifting the economy to a wartime footing, by increasing raw materials and materiel stockpiles. From the perspective of Finnish total defence, the crucial capabilities were mobilisation of the country's entire resources in the event of an attack, withstanding air strikes and nuclear explosions, and safeguarding the economic potential (including if isolated internationally).²⁸

Following the collapse of the USSR, Finland, unlike Sweden, did not dismantle its total defence system. On the contrary, it was gradually developed by institutionalising Cold War solutions (establishing the National Emergency Supply Agency and the National Defence Training Association in 1993, and the Security Committee in 2013), as well as by adaptation to a broader spectrum of challenges and threats (relating for example to the functioning of the financial sector and public services, environmental protection, terrorism, cyber-security, and security of supply). Thus there was greater focus on non-military aspects and a comprehensive approach. This process involved not only the armed forces and central authorities, but also the EU, NGOs, and individual citizens

²⁷ Systemic solutions began to be introduced in the 1950s. An organisational breakthrough was made when the Defence Council was reintroduced (1957). It gathered the country's political and military leadership, and was responsible for implementing the total defence concept. Since 1964, for political reasons, the term 'total defence' has been avoided in official documents. Also, training soldiers for irregular combat became increasingly important, making guerrilla warfare part of the defence doctrine. P. Visuri, *Evolution of the Finnish Military Doctrine 1945-1985*, 'Finnish Defence Studies 1', War College, Helsinki 1990, pp. 30-34, www.core.ac.uk; R. Penttilä, *Finland's search for security...*, op. cit., pp. 89-92.

²⁸ P. Visuri, *Evolution of the Finnish Military Doctrine...*, op. cit., pp. 42-48.

in local communities.²⁹ As total defence was expanded in terms of scope and actors, this notion gave way to society's security (*yhteiskunnan turvallisuus*). The security strategy for society (comprehensive security) evolved in subsequent documents of 2003, 2006, 2010, and 2017. From the point of view of Finland's security, in recent years the questions of countering hybrid threats and terrorism, and illegal immigration, have increased in importance. This is due to Russia's aggressive policy, a series of terrorist attacks in Europe (including in the Nordic countries) and an immigration crisis.

2. Threats

An overview of the threats that a comprehensive security strategy is intended to address is conducted every three years by an interministerial team supervised by the Ministry of the Interior. This is a requirement under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. The 2018 National Risk Assessment report presents threats in a broad way – at state, society, and individual level. The document points out the main factors that affect Finland's security environment, which is shaped by global and local megatrends, hybrid threats, challenges related to technological advances, and climate change.³⁰

Among the harmful megatrends, Finland makes special mention of antidemocratic tendencies, violation of human rights, and a return to power politics (at global level), as well as growing inequality and divisions in society, an aging population, and deteriorating physical fitness of Finns (at local level).³¹ Among hybrid threats it counts disinformation (influencing public debate using social media), cyber-attacks, and also use of property in Finland for espionage and sabotage.³² The third group of threats originates from advances in digitisation and robotics and increasing reliance of public institutions, the economy, and the population on artificial intelligence, the Internet of things, smart transport, and big data. The risks in this regard include disruption to the GPS signal, interference with ICT systems, Internet crime, or large-scale abuse of personal

²⁹ The greater international engagement of the Finland's armed forces has led to the incorporation of the principle of comprehensive security into foreign deployments as well. In 2007, Finland set up the Crisis Management Centre to provide support for civilian participation in foreign operations, and a year later the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management was established to develop joint and all-embracing involvement of civil and military personnel in foreign operations.

³⁰ *National Risk Assessment*, Ministry of the Interior of Finland, 2019, julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi.

³¹ The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) lists the following as megatrends: globalisation, climate change, shifts in the global balance of power, shrinking natural resources, digitisation, technological advances, demographic changes and urbanisation.

³² Relates to the Finnish debate on real estate in Finland owned by Russians located in the vicinity of military installations and critical infrastructure.

data. In turn, global warming is having a harmful effect on the environment and social and economic issues. Power cuts, damage to infrastructure, threats to forests and agriculture, fires, floods, and population migration, caused by climate change and anomalies, are an ever-greater problem.

Finland is seeing a greater threat to national security and the population in a number of areas.³³ These include: information operations (undermining trust in the authorities, interfering in elections), external pressure (political, financial, military), large-scale immigration (risk of greater anti-immigrant feelings and collapse of the asylum system), interference with ICT networks and cyber-crime, antimicrobial resistance (less effective treatment and greater risk of epidemics), disease among animals and plants, disruption of food and water supplies, and a risk of a Baltic shipping disaster (due to transportation of oil or chemicals). Another source of information about perceived threats in the country is the annual reports produced by the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO). These reports are focused on foreign intelligence activities (indicating an interest on the part of Russia's and China's secret services in Finland) and on extremism and terrorism (there is an elevated terrorist threat in Finland).³⁴

An unwillingness to attribute threats to specific countries has been an integral part of Finland's strategic culture. This is due to Helsinki's aim of acting as mediator in the international arena and broker in relations between the US and Russia. The perception of Russia is affected by the legacy of the Cold War policy of finlandisation³⁵, when threats from the USSR were not debated publicly, and by the policy of good bilateral political and commercial relations, which was continued after 1991. However, an analysis of Finland's military doctrine and changes to its security policy in response to the Russian-Ukraine war, which include intensification of military cooperation with Sweden, the US, and NATO, in fact reveals that from the Finnish perspective Russia remains a major threat.

³³ The threat of armed aggression, terrorism, rioting, disruption of the economy and the financial system, power supply disruptions, inaccessibility of natural resources, logistics difficulties, and nuclear power plant accident remains at the same level. *National Risk Assessment*, *op. cit.*

³⁴ *Supo's Jubilee Year Book: The new intelligence legislation will significantly enhance Supo's intelligence capacities*, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, www.supo.fi.

³⁵ The term 'finlandisation' is used to describe the policy of building special Finnish-Soviet relations during the presidency of Urho Kekkonen (1956-1982). It was based on respecting the Kremlin's interests in foreign and security policy so that Finland could maintain political pluralism and a free-market economy. The top Finnish politicians sought the Kremlin's support in order to gain leverage in domestic politics. J. Lavery, 'All of the President's Historians: The Debate over Urho Kekkonen', *Scandinavian Studies*, 2003, vol. 75, no. 3, pp. 378-381.

3. Implementing a comprehensive security strategy: theory and practice

Finland's concept of comprehensive security is laid down in the 2017 Security Strategy for Society. Preparing the strategy was the task of the Security Committee (see below). The document was produced in a joint effort by representatives of public administration, local authorities, the private sector, and NGOs. Social participation was guaranteed in the form of public consultations. The Finnish comprehensive security system is based on the principle of 'preparedness'. This means all of the activities – at central, regional, and individual level – aimed at ensuring vital functions of society and effective crisis management (including recovery from crisis). The strategy identifies seven vital functions of society that need to be protected regardless of the circumstances, whether in a normal or crisis situation.

A. Leadership. The foundation for comprehensive security is ensuring effective cooperation between the central and regional authorities, business, NGOs, research institutions and universities, and the public. Effective management of a comprehensive security system entails in particular the proper legal solutions, clear division of responsibilities, duties and powers, a clear decision-making process, situational awareness and crisis management and crisis communication mechanisms (interministerial, with the media, and with citizens).³⁶

The main coordination role is taken by the prime minister's office, responsible among other things for situational awareness (the Government Situation Centre) and crisis communication. At the central level, the comprehensive security strategy involves all ministries. In each ministry, there is an official – Head of Preparedness – responsible for crisis readiness.³⁷ Since 2013, the government and each ministry is supported by the Security Committee (which has a permanent secretariat in the Ministry of Defence) in the implementation of the comprehensive security strategy. The committee is essential to the Finnish comprehensive security system as it monitors and coordinates implementation of the Security Strategy for Society and the Cyber Security Strategy, analyses changes in Finland's security environment and society, evaluates institutional cooperation concerning comprehensive security, draws up recommendations, and in the event of a crisis serves the government as an expert advisory body.

³⁶ *Security Strategy for Society...*, *op. cit.*

³⁷ T. Jermalavičius, P. Pernik, M. Hurt, H. Breitenbauch, P. Järvenpää, *Comprehensive Security and Integrated Defence...*, *op. cit.*; *Comprehensive Security*, Security Committee of Finland, www.turvallisuuskomitea.fi.

The committee is made up of twenty members and four experts. These are representatives of the prime minister's office (three) and president's office, and the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, justice, interior (two), finance, education and culture, agriculture and forestry, transport and communication, economic affairs and employment, social affairs and health, and environment, and the police, armed forces, border guard, customs, National Emergency Supply Agency and Council, National Rescue Association, and the intelligence agencies. The committee meets once a month.³⁸


Proper civil-military cooperation is indispensable for management of a comprehensive security system. In Finland, which has never switched to having a professional army, the armed forces are not separate from society. In fact, many politicians and state officials are familiar with the issues related to national defence because they themselves have done military service. For example, in 2011–2015, as many as 90% of male members of parliament had military rank (including five who had the rank of major).³⁹ The long tradition of the civil-military relationship is also preserved by the National Defence Courses organised since 1961 under the auspices of the National Defence University. To date, more than 65,000 people have done the courses⁴⁰, which are a platform for meetings between the military leadership and representatives of civil society, business, central administration and local authorities, and cover the subjects of international affairs, security and defence, the armed forces' activity, crisis management, security of supply, civil defence, or communication and transport. Each year, four national and a couple of special courses are held (there are also regional courses).

³⁸ The committee also holds seminars and public debates with NGO partners – it works for instance with the National Rescue Association, Marta Organisation (promoting home economics), the Red Cross, or the National Defence Training Association.

³⁹ President Sauli Niinistö is captain of the reserve, like former prime minister Juha Sipilä. The wife of former prime minister Antti Rinne Heta Ravolainen-Rinne served in the Savo Brigade and has been deployed to Bosnia. S. Holopainen, 'Nämä ovat kansanedustajien sotilasarvot – katso lista!', *Ilta Sanomat*, 3.06.2014, www.is.fi.

⁴⁰ V. Valtonen, 'The Finnish Concept for Comprehensive Security', Security Committee of Finland, 14.06.2017, www.defmin.fi.

Chart 1. Organisation of the comprehensive security system in Finland



Source: *The Security Strategy for Society*, Government Resolution, The Security Committee of Finland.

B. International activity and activity in the EU. For Finland, comprehensive security starts beyond its borders. It needs to be supported by activities in the international arena, primarily in the EU. Finland’s foreign policy ambition is to support sustainable development, human rights and democracy, the fight against global warming, and international law. Due to its peripheral location, Finland sees the EU as a natural security community in both an internal and external dimension. From the perspective of Finland’s comprehensive security system, it is crucial to be able to obtain international assistance in the event of a natural disaster, crisis, or armed conflict promptly. Stability of the eurozone and a single market, and safeguarding trade connections, is also important here. Helsinki stresses the importance of the solidarity clause and mutual assistance clause (Art. 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Art. 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union).

Finland is one of a group of countries that advocates closer cooperation within the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).⁴¹ Finnish interim support comes from ongoing changes in its security environment related to terrorist attacks in Europe, the immigration crisis, growing international tensions, and Brexit. In the medium term, Finland is investing in development of the CSDP as a platform for strengthening military cooperation with European partners, because it is not a member of NATO (which remains the most important security organisation in the Euro-Atlantic area).⁴² Finally, from the long-term

⁴¹ *Franco-Finnish statement on European defence*, French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 15.06.2016, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr; *Prime Minister Juha Sipilä: Developing the EU’s defence dimension is in Finland’s interest*, Prime Minister’s Office, 7.06.2017, www.vnk.fi.

⁴² Although Finland is not seeking NATO membership, it is developing close military cooperation with the organisation. It participates in NATO exercises and operations, contributes to the NATO

perspective, the Finns are concerned about a return to a global rivalry between the major powers (the US, China, and Russia), as in such a case the smaller countries would inevitably suffer. Therefore, in the future, Finland's security could be reinforced by strengthening European foreign and defence policy in a way that transforms the EU into a global player able to protect its interests effectively.⁴³ In recent years, Finland has been able to influence the debate on the CSDP due to Finns holding functions in EU structures – Vice-President of the European Commission Jyrki Katainen (2014–2019) and General Esa Pulkkinen, Director General of the European Union Military Staff and Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC).

Finland is also involved in EU training missions and military operations. In 2019, these were training missions in Mali (two soldiers) and Somalia (six soldiers) and operation Sophia on the Mediterranean (ten soldiers). In addition, in 2017, when France activated the EU mutual assistance clause following the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, Finland doubled its UN UNIFIL contingent in Lebanon to 340 soldiers, which helped relieve some of the French forces.⁴⁴ Finland plays an active role in EU Battlegroups – to date it has provided troops five times. Within PESCO it is participating in five projects (European Secure Software defined Radio, Military Mobility, Cyber Rapid Response Teams, Integrated Unmanned Ground System, and Space-based Theatre Surveillance).⁴⁵

Improving resilience to hybrid threats

Following Russia's aggression towards Ukraine (2014), Finland started to promote international cooperation in countering hybrid threats. Finland's interest in this issue is a result of increasingly complex nature of modern conflict (blurring the lines between peace and war, and between internal and external security, the involvement of state and non-state actors, difficulties with detection and attribution). For a long time, the

Response Force, joined the Enhanced Opportunities Partnership, and signed a Host Nation Support agreement with NATO (2014). There are also meetings in the NATO plus Sweden and Finland format. J. Gotkowska, P. Szymański, *Between co-operation and membership. Sweden and Finland's relations with NATO*, OSW, Warsaw 2017, www.osw.waw.pl.

⁴³ [Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassadors' Conference on 20 August 2019](#), President of the Republic of Finland, 20.08.2019, www.presidentti.fi.

⁴⁴ Despite focusing on defence of its own territory, Finland plays an active role in UN, EU, and NATO operations, and in responding to global challenges. Under Finnish regulations, up to 2,000 troops can be deployed abroad at the same time. *Osallistuminen kriisinhallintaan*, Puolustusvoimat, www.puolustusvoimat.fi.

⁴⁵ *Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)'s projects – Overview*, European Council, Council of the European Union, 7.05.2019, www.consilium.europa.eu.

country's comprehensive security system was responding primarily to traditional conventional threats. Meanwhile, countering hybrid threats requires national resilience to a broader range of hostile activities, such as: cyber-attacks, disinformation, attempts to paralyse critical infrastructure, economic and energy pressure, or irregular warfare. This has made it necessary to ensure better situational awareness, maintain rapid response capabilities and enhance intelligence sharing with foreign partners.

Finland would like to become a major centre of expertise and exchange of lessons learned and know-how on countering hybrid threats. Therefore, in 2017, it established the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki. The centre is open to EU and NATO members. It conducts international research and training on development of best practices in combating hybrid threats. For Finland, it is important to respond to them not only at a national, but also EU level. It also supports closer EU-NATO cooperation in this field. In the latter half of 2019, when Finland held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, one of the key elements of its programme was comprehensive protection of EU citizens. This consists of effective external action taken by the EU, European security and defence cooperation, and bolstering resilience to hybrid and cyber-threats.⁴⁶ With respect to countering hybrid threats, the focus was improving protection of critical infrastructure (such as power stations and banking systems) and against CBRN weapons, as well as combating disinformation. Also, EU decision-making exercises and simulations for heads of interior and finance ministries, based on hybrid scenarios, were conducted under the auspices of Finland.⁴⁷ Helsinki makes sure that the issue of hybrid threats is not left off the agenda at EU defence and foreign minister meetings.⁴⁸

C. Defence capabilities. Finland's defence, aimed at conventional deterrence, consist of military capabilities, society's will to defend the country, involvement of public administration and international military cooperation. The latter also

⁴⁶ *Sustainable Europe – Sustainable Future*, Finland's Presidency Programme, Presidency of the Council of the European Union, www.eu2019.fi.

⁴⁷ *Common action to counter hybrid threats*, Finland's Presidency of the Council of the European Union, www.eu2019.fi; *Internal security and combatting hybrid threats*, Ministry of the Interior of Finland, www.intermin.fi.

⁴⁸ Finland would also like to create an expert working group on hybrid threats, made up of representatives of the EU Member States. E. Zalan, 'Finnish presidency to war-game hybrid threat response', EU Observer, 27.06.2019, www.euobserver.com.

includes the capability of receiving and providing military assistance, which was included in the responsibilities of armed forces in 2017 (in addition to territorial defence, support for public authorities and participation in international crisis management efforts). This is a significant change in Finland's defence policy, as it has traditionally been militarily non-aligned and attached to the principle of independent defence.

Finland maintains a reserve army focused on territorial defence. Military service lasts between 165 and 347 days. Following reform in 2017, planned wartime strength is 280,000 troops. Each year Finland trains 20–25,000 conscripts (approximately 75% of the annual cohort of male citizens), who then become part of the reserve. Moreover, in order to maintain the necessary level of reserve soldier training, the armed forces conduct refresher exercises for approximately 18,000 reservists annually. Due to the fact that professional soldiers make up just under 3% of the armed forces' wartime strength, it is vital that a large portion of society believe in successful military resistance, and thus that public readiness to play a part in national defence remains high. It is no coincidence that opinion polls show that the percentage of Finns willing to fight for their country (74% in 2015) and who have confidence in the armed forces (94% in 2019) is the highest in Europe.⁴⁹

Due to Russian aggression towards Ukraine, Finland decided to raise the level of combat readiness of its armed forces, to improve its rapid response capabilities. These measures are a result of the time-consuming reserve mobilisation process, making Finland vulnerable to a sudden attack, and of reserve army structures not being suitable for combating certain kinds of hybrid threats. The changes made include for instance updating the reservist database, increasing the number of refresher exercises for reserve soldiers, and assigning some conscripts to the rapid manning of units in the event of a crisis or conflict. In addition, in 2016, the president was also given the right to call up as many as 25,000 reservists for snap drills (without the required three months' notice).⁵⁰ The Finnish armed forces have a significant artillery, armoured, and air combat capabilities.⁵¹ The most important ongoing modernisation programmes, for which Finland intends to allocate more than EUR 10 billion (its annual defence

⁴⁹ WIN/Gallup International's global survey shows three in five willing to fight for their country, Gallup International, 7.05.2015, www.gallup-international.bg.

⁵⁰ P. Szymański, *With Russia right across the border. Finland's security policy*, OSW, Warsaw 2018, www.osw.waw.pl.

⁵¹ These are approximately 800 pieces of artillery, including 75 multiple rocket launchers (with 41 M270 MLRS), 100 Leopard 2A4 and 100 Leopard 2A6 tanks, and 62 F/A-18 Hornet fighters (55 version C and 7 version D).

spending comes to approximately EUR 3 billion) are purchase of new fighter jets for the air force (to be selected in 2021) and construction of four multi-role corvettes for the navy.⁵²

National Defence Training Association of Finland (MPK)

The activity of the National Defence Training Association is aimed at shaping pro-defence attitudes in society as well as promoting and updating defence-related knowledge and skills. This is a non-governmental organisation that has been active since 1993. It has regional and local offices, and has approximately 60 permanent staff. The number of registered volunteer instructors is 2,000. Approximately 50,000 people take part in MPK training each year.

The association works closely with the armed forces and coordinates volunteer national defence activity. It organises additional exercises and training for reservists (promoting the role played by women), conducts educational activities with respect to national defence, and monitors exercises organised by other voluntary defence organisations (of which there are fifteen). The MPK also provides training for civilians and instructors, and even for minors (with parental consent), which was the subject of political dispute.⁵³

The training the association had on offer for 2019 included: survival skills (orientation, finding food, building a shelter), self-defence, firefighting, first aid and military medical aid, search and rescue, shooting, dealing with explosives, driving (including for a driving licence), road safety, maritime navigation, and using radio equipment.⁵⁴ The MPK also organises specialist leadership courses and training for regional and local authorities, which cover among other things evacuation of the population and organising shelter and supplies for large numbers of civilians.⁵⁵

⁵² There were US (F-35 and F/A-18 Super Hornet), French (Dassault Rafale), UK (Eurofighter Typhoon) and Swedish (Saab Gripen) bids in the tender. Ships will be built by Finland's shipyard Rauma Marine Construction. Combat system and torpedoes (Torped 47) will be supplied by Sweden's Saab, anti-missile and anti-aircraft system by the US Raytheon (RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile), and anti-ship missiles by Israel's Gabriel.

⁵³ V. Parikka, 'Sdp:n edustajat vaativat puolustusministeriltä selvitystä MPK:n "sotilaallisia valmiuksia alaikäisille opettavista koulutuksista" - Niinistö: "Kursseja ei voi pitää nuorison militarisoimisena"', Helsingin Sanomat, 17.03.2018, www.hs.fi.

⁵⁴ [Koulutuskalenteri, Maanpuolustuskoulutusyhdistys, www.mpk.fi](http://www.mpk.fi).

⁵⁵ *Voluntary defence training in Finland*, National Defence Training Association of Finland, www.mpk.fi.

D. Internal security. This is the most complex area of the comprehensive security strategy, encompassing highly diverse tasks – from combating organised crime to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Although the main role in ensuring internal security is played by the Ministry of the Interior, it requires a cross-domain approach and joint efforts of almost all of the ministries and government agencies. Moreover, in some situations – for example sea rescue operations – public institutions are supported by NGOs.⁵⁶

Civil defence

Civil defence is one of the hallmarks of Finland and an intrinsic element of its internal security. Civil defence consists of a warning system, evacuation procedures, and an extensive network of shelters for the population.⁵⁷ In Finland, there are currently approximately 45,000 shelters (85% are private) with a capacity for approximately 3.6 million people, which is 65% of the population.⁵⁸ Shelters are located primarily in the largest urban centres (mainly the Helsinki metropolitan area). In Finland, every building of an area of more than 1,200 square metres must have a shelter, and the responsibility for constructing the shelter lies with the developer, resulting in higher property prices (in Helsinki, shelters are also drilled in the bedrock). Major public institutions, such as the government, parliament, and ministries, also have shelters.⁵⁹

On a daily basis, some shelters are used as public facilities (car parks, sports halls, or metro stations).⁶⁰ They are fitted with the vital amenities (beds, sanitation installations, water, food, medicine). Each shelter must have the capacity to take in people within 72 hours. They are envisaged to be used not only in case of armed conflict, but also if there is a danger of a building collapsing, radiation, or when hazardous substances are detected. In Finland, new shelters are continually under construction, and the existing ones are being upgraded. Evacuation plans are also being reviewed (including necessary exercises) and cooperation with businesses is being

⁵⁶ *Security Strategy for Society...*, op. cit.

⁵⁷ Civil defence involves the fire brigade and rescue and medical services. *Civil defence protects the civilian population*, Ministry of the Interior of Finland, www.valtioneuvosto.fi.

⁵⁸ *Civil defence shelters would be used during military threat*, Ministry of the Interior of Finland, www.valtioneuvosto.fi.

⁵⁹ N. Niitra, 'Shelters in Estonia good for nothing', Postimees, 21.04.2014, www.news.postimees.ee.

⁶⁰ M. Chance, E. Burrows, 'Helsinki's bunker city: How Finland has survived in Russia's dark shadow', CNN, 15.07.2018, www.edition.cnn.com.

improved. Each shelter undergoes a general inspection every ten years (minor inspections are conducted with greater frequency).⁶¹ Also, there is a highly developed market of firms that provide shelter maintenance services. They offer overhaul and renovation services and replenishment of supplies, and provide new equipment.

In recent years, Finland has undertaken a series of important initiatives to improve internal security, prompted among other things by a terrorist attack in Turku in 2017, carried out by a 'lone wolf' – a knife attacker inspired by ISIS ideology (two people were killed and eight injured). Another major reason for this was the 2015/2016 immigration crisis, which resulted in a record number of applications for asylum in Finland (32,500). It polarised Finnish society with regard to receiving refugees and increased activity of the extreme right.⁶² Fear of hybrid threats from Russia is also a factor.

As part of measures to combat terrorism and radical organisations, Finland is focusing on developing cooperation between the uniformed services. This includes wider collaboration between the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) and the police, and seeking greater synergy between the police and armed forces, for example in providing security at mass events (such as by blocking access roads using military trucks). For Finland, legal measures aimed at safeguarding the rule of law are also exceptionally important. In this respect, the banning of the neo-Nazi Finnish Resistance Movement⁶³ – in a 2018 ruling by the Turku appeal court – was a breakthrough. Finland also intends to be ready in advance for further waves in the immigration crisis. On the international level, Helsinki has stressed the importance of EU cooperation (Frontex) and cooperation with Russia (a common border of 1,340 km). Domestically, from 2020 onwards, the Finnish Immigration Service will be responsible for coordinating preparations for a possible uncontrolled influx of immigrants

⁶¹ *Civil Defence Shelters*, Rescue Team Finland, www.rescueteamfinland.fi.

⁶² This relates to the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement (Finnish branch) and the Soldiers of Odin. Nordic Resistance Movement is a pan-Nordic organisation. Its 2016 manifesto contains nine points, which are: stopping immigration to the Nordic countries, fighting the global Zionist elites, fostering Nordic integration (creating a self-sufficient Nordic Nation), which also includes leaving the EU immediately, establishing a powerful government, takeover of the media by Nordic Nation representatives, sustainable development (strengthening of environmental protection and animal rights), building a National Socialist society, reinstating military service, strengthening the armed forces, and establishing a constitutional state. The Soldiers of Odin are groups formed during the immigration crisis (2015), which organised street patrols to 'protect' Finns against immigrants. *Our Nine Political Points*, Nordic Resistance Movement, 17.11.2018, nordicresistancemovement.org.

⁶³ 'Ban on neo-Nazi group upheld by Turku appeal court', Yle, 28.09.2018, www.yle.fi.

(working with regions, which are required to draw up their own crisis plans⁶⁴). Faced with an asylum crisis since 2016, Finland has begun to apply a two-pronged approach to the problem of immigration. On one hand, it is focusing on combating illegal immigration by speeding up repatriation in cases when asylum is not granted. On the other, it is providing greater support for integration of people granted a residence permit or asylum and taking measures to prevent them being socially excluded.

With respect to building resilience to hybrid threats, in addition to improving the combat readiness of the armed forces, Finland has given the border guard more powers. Legislative amendments in 2019 enabled the border guard to: perform police tasks (when the police service is unavailable), provide the police with armed assistance in counter-terrorism activities in Finnish territorial waters, at border crossings and in the border zone, shoot down drones, restrict waterborne traffic, restrict movement, revoke border zone permits and take temporary possession of property.⁶⁵ In Finland, there was also broad debate on the issue of employees of the uniformed services who have dual citizenship. Ultimately, the ban on employment of people with dual citizenship – due to fear of infiltration by Russia – was only introduced in the armed forces (applies to both military and civilian posts).⁶⁶ At the same time, the Finland's intelligence and armed forces began to look more closely at purchases of property in Finland by individuals and entities from Russia. A report by the Security Committee of 2016 described Russian real estate located in the vicinity of military installations and critical infrastructure as a potential threat to national security (due to the possibility of disruption of mobilisation).⁶⁷ From 2020 onwards, individuals and entities from outside the EU and EEA who purchase property in Finland will be required to obtain a permit from the Ministry of Defence.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ The border guard, police, armed forces, regional agencies, the health service, rescue services, and the Red Cross are also involved in this contingency planning.

⁶⁵ *Powers of the Finnish Border Guard to intervene in hybrid threats to be strengthened*, Finnish Government, 10.01.2019, www.valtionuuvosto.fi.

⁶⁶ The new regulations provide for exceptions, but this requires a special procedure of additional 'vetting' of an applicant. 'Dual citizens now barred from military posts, with exceptions possible', Yle, 1.07.2019, www.yle.fi.

⁶⁷ P. Szymański, 'Finland: suspicious Russian properties', 7.11.2018, www.osw.waw.pl.

⁶⁸ *Non-EU and non-EEA buyers need permission to buy real estate as of 2020*, Ministry of Defence of Finland, 28.10.2019, www.defmin.fi.

Greater powers of the intelligence service

Due to an increased terrorist threat, the immigration crisis, and intensified activity of foreign secret services, Finland decided to expand the powers of the Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO). This was due to Finnish intelligence techniques failing to keep up with technological advances for years. This related the most to limitations in network traffic intelligence (with the Internet being used at the same time ever more frequently by terrorists and foreign services).

In order to remove these constraints, Finland has resorted to unusual legal means. After painstaking negotiations with the opposition, the government secured the majority needed to employ a fast-track procedure to change the constitution, which requires the approval of 5/6 of members of parliament. In October 2018, the section concerning secrecy of correspondence⁶⁹ was amended in this procedure, giving the SUPO greater surveillance powers under the new Civilian Intelligence Act, which came into force in June 2019. Primarily, this concerns intelligence-gathering on specific locations and obtaining and processing of information on data communications crossing the Finnish border.⁷⁰ The SUPO was also authorised to gather intelligence abroad, which made it not only a domestic security and counterintelligence service, but also a civil intelligence agency. These changes were accompanied by strengthening of parliamentary oversight mechanisms – a new Intelligence Ombudsman post was established.⁷¹

These developments are part of a greater scheme to reform the SUPO, which was initiated in 2015, when the Finnish parliament ruled that it would be an independent agency directly subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior. In the past, the SUPO had been part of the Finnish police. This change made the service autonomous, and gave it the ability to reach decision-makers more quickly. Also, there was a systematic increase in the SUPO budget (from EUR 17.7 million in 2013 to EUR 44.2 million in 2018) and in the number of officers at the agency (from 288 in 2015 to 410 in 2018).⁷²

⁶⁹ According to the new wording of section 10 of the constitution, “limitations of the secrecy of communications may be imposed by an Act (...) for the purpose of obtaining information on military activities or other such activities that pose a serious threat to national security”. *Constitution of Finland*, Ministry of Justice of Finland, www.oikeusministerio.fi.

⁷⁰ *Civilian Intelligence Act to improve Finland’s national security*, Ministry of the Interior of Finland, 11.03.2019, www.intermin.fi.

⁷¹ *New powers of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (SUPO)*, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, www.supo.fi.

⁷² *Supo’s Jubilee Year Book 2018*, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, 2018, www.supo.fi.

E. The economy, infrastructure and security of supply. This area of comprehensive security strategy relates mainly to a range of security of supply tasks. Issues such as security of airports and seaports, or the supply chain for construction and industrial materials, are exceptionally important to Finland which is dependent upon uninterrupted trade via the Baltic Sea. Helsinki defines security of supply as the capacity to maintain the vital functions of the economy (necessary for the livelihood of the population), comprehensive functioning and security of society, and material support for national defence (under all circumstances).⁷³ Thus, in Finland, security of supply is a broader concept than in other countries, where it often amounts to supply of energy resources.⁷⁴ Essentially, it covers two kinds of tasks, relating to security of critical infrastructure and security of crucial branches of production and services. The first group concerns: energy (production, transmission, and distribution), communication systems, financial services, transportation and logistics, water supply, maintaining and constructing infrastructure, and waste management. The second covers: food supplies, medical care, industrial manufacturing, and production and services supporting the armed forces.⁷⁵

Centralised management of security of supply

The main organisation responsible for security of supply in Finland is the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA), working under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. The NESA was set up in 1993. The entire security of supply system is financed by the extra-budgetary National Emergency Supply Fund. The fund (approximately EUR 1.2 billion) is maintained by a special energy tax of 0.5% of the retail price of petrol, diesel fuel, heavy and light fuels, electricity, coal, and gas. This levy generates revenue of approximately EUR 50 million per year.⁷⁶

The agency's *modus operandi* requires cooperation between the central and local authorities, and business and industry.⁷⁷ The NESA is mainly responsible for maintaining the country's crisis reserves needed to produce energy and food, provide medical care, and conduct military defence.

⁷³ *Government Decision on the Objectives of Security of Supply (1048/2018)*, National Emergency Supply Agency, www.huoltovarmuuskeskus.fi.

⁷⁴ M. Aaltola, J. Käpylä, H. Mikkola, T. Behr, *Towards the Geopolitics of Flows: Implications for Finland*, 'FIIA Report 40', Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 9.06.2014, www.fiia.fi.

⁷⁵ *Security of Supplies in Finland: Objectives*, National Emergency Supply Agency, www.nesa.fi.

⁷⁶ *Funding and Legislation*, National Emergency Supply Agency, www.nesa.fi.

⁷⁷ The NESA issues recommendations, provides training, and organises exercises for businesses. Some firms are required to draw up their own crisis plans.

It also ensures situational awareness throughout the entire system. Helsinki has adopted its own restrictive regulations on fuel reserves – there has to be five months’ supply at the average rate of consumption (approximately 160 days). As a result, Finland has the largest crude oil reserves (based on the daily consumption equivalent) in the entire EU.⁷⁸ It is compulsory for firms that import fuels, and the agency itself (state reserves), to maintain emergency stockpiles. Power stations also store a six-month supply of peat for the purpose of producing energy and heat in a crisis. The NESAs provide planning, technical, and financial support for operators of key IT, data transmission, mass communication and financial systems (with respect to protecting infrastructure and continuity of operation). It also provides support for production of specific goods and services needed in case of a crisis, including military conflict (working closely with the armed forces). At the moment NESAs’ strategy is focused on energy supplies, digitisation, logistics, and cyber-security.⁷⁹

A modern country and society are also increasingly reliant on banking and financial sector services, telecommunications, fast data transfer, and access to the Internet. This is linked to cyber-security issues and an urgent need to improve data protection. Finland is having to deal with the problem of cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage more and more frequently. According to SUPO reports, cyber-espionage is becoming a common tool used by foreign intelligence agencies. Both government institutions and private business and individual citizens fall victim to cyber-espionage. The most serious case to date came to light in 2013. An investigation revealed that a Russia-linked group Turla was behind an advanced hacking operation, which intercepted Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs communications for around three years.⁸⁰ Since that time, Finland has adopted a Cyber Security Strategy (2013) and has increased investments in this field in order to bolster the resilience of the country’s IT infrastructure and to raise public awareness of cyber-security issues.⁸¹

⁷⁸ The EU directive of 2009 requires governments to keep minimum oil and/or petroleum stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of average daily imports or 61 days of consumption.

⁷⁹ *Finland’s new security of supply goals focus on energy supplies, digitalisation, logistics and cyber security*, Finnish Government, 5.12.2018, www.valtioneuvosto.fi.

⁸⁰ K. Giles, ‘Cyber Attack on Finland is a Warning for the EU’, Chatham House, 8.11.2013, www.chatham-house.org; ‘Russian group behind 2013 Foreign Ministry hack’, Yle, 13.01.2016, www.yle.fi.

⁸¹ The Government ICT Centre Valtori and the state-owned Suomen Turvallisuusverkko Oy (STUVE) are major actors with respect to cyber-security. The former is responsible for the government’s IT services and communication, state-owned companies, public institutions, and parliament. In thirty offices throughout the country, it employs approximately 1,300 people. The latter is responsible for

F. Functional capacity of the population and services. The Finnish concept of comprehensive security emphasises continuity of public services to ensure that society functions properly. This is a question for instance of social benefits, the health service, or education – anything that makes up the Finnish model of welfare state. In normal situations, its task is to prevent poverty and exclusion, thereby increasing social stability, national unity, and building a resilient society.

The comprehensive security system in Finland is intended to maintain the basic functions of a welfare state in an emergency, including in cases of serious accidents and disasters. In such a situation, issues of electricity and water supplies (for example for the health service), a well-functioning patient records system, operation of blood banks, and the capacity to deliver social benefits, become essential.⁸² Another major task is ensuring the continuity of education for children and young people. In this section of comprehensive security, compared to the other six, regional and local authorities play a greater role.

VALVE exercises and restoring power supplies

Finland attaches great importance to energy security. Due to the long transmission distances and decentralised production of electricity, the Finnish power grid is exposed to accidents and disruptions, which could have a negative impact on functioning of society and public services. This is not only a question of the risks connected with storms and snowfalls, but also of a cyber-threats. Therefore, Finland organises exercises to test the ability of the authorities, the power and heating grid operators, and other actors to manage serious disruptions in energy supplies. In 2014, during a unique disturbance exercise, VALVE, a controlled electricity outage in Rovaniemi (city of over 60,000) was conducted. Electricity was restored using alternative supplies, namely hydropower from northern Finland.⁸³ The exercise scenario simulated a breakdown of the national power grid in a situation in which it was not possible to import electricity from Sweden.

servers, databases, IT services, and information flow in the armed forces, the police, rescue and health service, welfare system, emergency notification system, local authorities, and firms crucial for security of supply.

⁸² The planning also includes the risk of cyber-attacks and interference in banking payment systems. *Security Strategy for Society...*, *op. cit.*

⁸³ 'Transmission grid and system security', *Fingrid Corporate Magazine*, 2014, no. 3, www.fingrid.fi.

Stockpiling medicines

Maintaining reserves of drugs is compulsory for both the public and the private sectors. Under Finnish regulations, the public sector is required to provide supplies of antibiotics for the population for six months (for health service needs). The same applies to pharmaceutical companies, but for a ten-month period. Supplies of antibiotics for bred livestock have to be sufficient for three months. The medicine market in Finland is prone to disruptions and to a potential global breakdown in antibiotic supplies (production of antibiotics is concentrated in a few pharmaceutical concerns). Experts estimate that in Finland production of antibiotics from scratch would take between six and twelve months, and any crisis or conflict in the Baltic Sea region would significantly reduce the availability of those materials in the country.

G. Psychological resilience. According to Finns, this is an individual and social ability to withstand a crisis and a capacity for recovering from crisis.⁸⁴ It is signified by the public's will to defend the country, as well as the government's determination to preserve the life and security of the population regardless of the circumstances. From the Finnish perspective, the foundation of psychological resilience is developed in peacetime, in normal conditions, and public trust in the authorities is a major element here. Psychological resilience is built through: civic engagement (for example in the form of voluntary work), education, sport, communication between the authorities and the public, religious practices⁸⁵, or nurturing cultural heritage, which reinforces the national identity. On the other hand, social exclusion and inequalities, and disinformation may undermine psychological resilience. In the former case, the remedy is a welfare state system, and in the latter promoting media literacy, digital skills and education, as well as providing support for trustworthy journalism.

Finland combats disinformation campaigns conducted both by state-sponsored actors (for example the Russian information operations) and by non-state organisations (terrorist or radical anti-immigration groups). Monitoring and countering disinformation is the responsibility of a special team of experts

⁸⁴ H. Välivehmas (ed.), *Secure Finland: information on comprehensive security in Finland*, Helsinki 2015, pp. 127–134.

⁸⁵ The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland is one of the comprehensive security actors. It is responsible for psychological support for the public, and management of cemeteries through a network of parishes.

and officials made up from people at the prime minister's office and ministries, set up in 2015. The team's work is coordinated by the head of the communication department at the prime minister's office, who is a member of the Security Committee. Its task is to identify disinformation targeted at Finland, quickly deny false information, prevent its dissemination, and organise training for government officials.⁸⁶

Grass-roots fight against disinformation

In Finland there are also grass-roots initiatives to fight disinformation – through journalism, NGOs, and civic engagement. Examples are the Faktabaari website, which performs fact-checking in Finnish political debate, and Huhumylly, which detects false information about immigrants. In 2016, editors at 21 of the largest Finnish media outlets issued a joint statement condemning the spreading of fake news relating to the immigration crisis. Another important initiative was a campaign carried out in schools, *Faktana, kiitos!* (*Facts, please*), aimed at developing a critical approach to use of the media among young people. Between September and December 2017, 124 journalists conducted workshops for approximately 7,200 school children.⁸⁷ Civil society involvement and education were reflected in the Media Literacy Index of 2018, in which Finland was ranked first place in Europe.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ P. Szymański, 'UE na wojnie z kremłowską dezinformacją', EC Representation Office in Poland, 18.12.2018, www.ec.europa.eu. *Idem*, 'Finland: the fight against disinformation', 24.10.2018, www.osw.waw.pl.

⁸⁷ H. Koponen, 'Finland remains resistant to 'fake news', disinformation', International Press Institute, 24.01.2018, www.ipi.media; *Idem*, 'New Finnish project brings journalists to schools to teach media literacy', International Press Institute, 24.01.2018, www.ipi.media; M. Trimborn, 'Finnish editors speak out against defamatory 'fake media'', European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, 4.03.2016, www.ecpmf.eu.

⁸⁸ M. Lessenski, *Common Sense Wanted: Resilience to 'Post-Truth' and its Predictors in the New Media Literacy Index 2018*, Open Society Institute – Sofia, 2018, www.osis.bg.

III. ESTONIA: THE PATH TO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

After restoration of its independence, Estonia perceived NATO membership and close military cooperation with the US as the most important security guarantees. Although Estonia has made different strategic choices than military non-aligned Finland, in many aspects of organisation of national defence, it followed the Finnish solutions. One way in which this was evident was the maintaining of a reserve army and conscription, adoption of the principles of total defence and territorial defence, promoting voluntary involvement in national defence (Kaitseliit, the Defence League with female section and youth sections for boys and girls) or introduction of defence courses (Estonian National Defence Courses) to strengthen civil-military cooperation.⁸⁹ The idea of a comprehensive approach to security was present in Estonian security policy debate, however it was conceptualised and systematically implemented only after a more aggressive posture was taken in Russian policy.

The increasing importance of non-military aspects of Estonia's security policy is demonstrated by the popularity gained by the word *kerksus*, which means 'resilience'. In Estonian, there was no suitable equivalent to the English word 'resilience', which is a word commonly used in NATO. The solution to this linguistic problem came at the same time as Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. The word *kerksus* was officially placed in the dictionary, and – unusually for a neologism – became a term used by government and in security and defence debate.⁹⁰ *Kerksus* was defined as a society's capacity for quick recovery from crisis (restoring its strength, flexibility and success). Another word that conveys very well the Estonian approach to comprehensive security is the code-name for a series of national defence exercises, *Siil*, which means 'hedgehog'. These rehearse a comprehensive defence operation involving the armed forces, territorial defence (Defence League), other uniformed services, central and local authorities, and allied troops. The symbolism and strategic messaging conveyed are plain – little Estonia is not capable of stopping the Russian bear, but it can considerably injure the bear's paw with its spikes when it takes up a defensive posture.

⁸⁹ Estonia has conducted the National Defence Courses since 1999. They are organised by the ICDS think tank, located in Tallinn (established in 2006, affiliated to the Ministry of Defence). The courses are conducted twice a year for one week and are attended each time by several dozen people from the armed forces, politics, local authorities, academia, business, media, and NGOs. People considered to play a leading role in a particular field, who can then spread information about national defence in their professional environment, are invited.

⁹⁰ I. Juurvee, 'Estonian Approach to Societal Security' [in:] M. Aaltola, B. Kuznetsov, A. Sprüds, E. Vizgunova (eds.), *Societal Security in the Baltic Sea Region...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–117.

1. Development of the comprehensive security system

In the 1990s, Estonia focused on being admitted to NATO and building an independent defence capability, in particular reconstruction of its armed forces. While the principle of total defence was incorporated into Estonia's defence doctrine, it soon proved insufficient. Due to the bitter experiences of 2007–2008⁹¹, it was expanded to include the concept of comprehensive security. At that time, Russia demonstrated not only its willingness to use conventional military force against its neighbours (Georgia), but also to employ hybrid means. In 2007, the moving of a memorial to Soviet soldiers in Tallinn caused protests by the Russian minority which were inspired by Moscow. These were combined with rioting and cyber-attacks which paralysed Estonia's public institutions.⁹² As a result, already the 2010 National Security Concept introduced the notion of integrated security – comprehensive involvement of the entire government and the whole society in issues of national security.⁹³ It covered the military and civilian spheres, internal security, public services, the international dimension, and psychological defence.

Estonian experts have pointed out numerous challenges connected with implementing an integrated security strategy. The vulnerabilities included: a shortage in financing, gaps in civil-military communication, lack of common understanding of 'integrated security' within public administration, problems with information flow and coordinating activities between ministries, an unwillingness to transfer powers to other actors, difficulties in long-term planning and consistent implementation of a strategy, inadequate involvement of local authorities, businesses, and the society, insufficient emergency stockpiles, and vague procedure for transition of state structures from peacetime to wartime (including mobilisation).⁹⁴ Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 prompted Estonia to step up efforts in introducing comprehensive approach to national security.

⁹¹ The abduction of Estonian Internal Security Service officer Eston Kohver by the Russian FSB (2014) was a warning sign as well.

⁹² In Estonia, this was inevitably associated with a Moscow-orchestrated communist attempt at a coup d'état in Tallinn in 1924. M. Maigre, *Nothing New in Hybrid Warfare: The Estonian Experience and Recommendations for NATO*, German Marshall Fund, 12.02.2015, www.gmfus.org.

⁹³ *National Security Concept of Estonia*, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, 12.05.2010, www.kaitseministeerium.ee.

⁹⁴ T. Jermalavičius, P. Pernik, M. Hurt, H. Breitenbauch, P. Järvenpää, *Comprehensive Security and Integrated Defence...*, op. cit., pp. 47–71.

In recent years, Estonia has managed to deal with many of the above mentioned problems, which were hindering the implementation of the comprehensive security concept in its initial stage. The Government Office's role in coordination and oversight of the comprehensive security system was strengthened (until 2015 it was the Ministry of Defence task). The responsibilities of the National Security and Defence Coordination Unit were expanded, which was followed by hiring new staff.⁹⁵ In addition to advising and providing organisational support for the Government Security Committee⁹⁶ and coordinating the security and intelligence agencies, the unit was given the extra tasks of coordinating defence planning, ensuring government situational awareness, and advising the prime minister on national security issues. In 2015, the Government Communication Unit – responsible for strategic communication – was also set up at the Government Office. Moreover, from 2014 onwards, Estonia reviewed and updated the legal basis for its comprehensive security system. The most important examples of measures taken in this respect were the passing of the National Defence Act (2015), which replaced the previous separate peacetime and wartime regulations, and amendment of the Emergency Act (2017). The new National Defence Act simplified, unified, and streamlined the decision-making process, eliminating the division into the peacetime and wartime line of command, as well as regulated the issue of mobilisation.⁹⁷ Besides, the competences of all of the ministries in the event of a crisis and armed conflict were laid down or clarified. The entire crisis management system is tested during annual decision-making exercises held at the governmental level (often at the same time as live-fire exercises, such as Spring Storm). Adoption of the civil protection concept in 2018 was also an important development.⁹⁸


⁹⁵ *The coordination of national security and defence management*, Government Office of Estonia, www.riigikantselei.ee.

⁹⁶ The Government Security Committee is made up of the prime minister and heads of the foreign, defence, interior, justice, and finance ministries. It makes the key decisions concerning security and defence policy.

⁹⁷ K. Jõgeva, T. Koch, 'In time of war, Prime Minister to take the wheel', Postimees, 23.07.2014, news.postimees.ee.

⁹⁸ *Strategic communication*, Government Office of Estonia, www.valitsus.ee; *Government Communication Handbook*, Government Office of Estonia, 2017, www.valitsus.ee; *The government approved a comprehensive approach towards developing civil protection*, Government Office of Estonia, 15.02.2018, www.valitsus.ee.

Chart 2. Organisation of the comprehensive security system in Estonia



Source: *The management structure of national defence*, Government Office, Republic of Estonia.

2. Threats

The threats and challenges addressed by the Estonian comprehensive security system are described in annual reports by the special services (Internal Security Service and Foreign Intelligence Service⁹⁹) and in a biennial risk assessment (under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior).¹⁰⁰ These documents provide an overall picture of Estonia's perception of internal and external challenges to national security. They are mainly concerned with the threats from Russia, which include: propaganda directed towards the Russian-speaking minority, disinformation (such as creating a negative image of Estonia in the international arena¹⁰¹), activities of Russia's special services, Moscow-backed cyber-attacks, export of corrupt practices, enhanced presence and military capabilities of Russia's armed forces in the Baltic Sea region, making countries dependent on supply of energy resources from Russia (Nord Stream 2), increasing the Kremlin's control over Belarus, or continuing aggression against Ukraine. The Estonian comprehensive security system centres around military threats to a greater extent than the Finnish one. In addition, the reports mention a terrorist threat, illegal immigration to Europe, and the risk posed by Chinese investments and technologies.¹⁰²

Risk assessments by the Ministry of the Interior apply meanwhile to emergency situations and crisis management. In this respect, until recently, Estonia

⁹⁹ The Estonian Internal Security Service (overseen by the Ministry of the Interior) has published reports since 1998. The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (overseen by the Ministry of Defence) has published reports since 2016. *Annual reviews*, Estonian Internal Security Service, www.kapo.ee; *Security environment assessment*, Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, www.valisluureamet.ee.

¹⁰⁰ *Kriisireguleerimine*, Siseministeerium, www.siseministeerium.ee.

¹⁰¹ For example, allegations of glorification of Nazism in Estonia and of attempts at falsification of history are used for this purpose.

¹⁰² *International Security and Estonia*, Estonian Foreign Intelligence, 2019, www.valisluureamet.ee.

listed as many as 27 types of emergency covering a broad range of risks – from an armed attack to epidemic.¹⁰³ Currently, this overview has been simplified – it focuses on risks in six main areas and on institutions responsible for providing security. These are firefighting (the Rescue Board), police operations (the Police and Border Guard Board activities in the case of mass influx of immigrants, terror attack, rioting, a fire on a cruise ship and sea pollution), cyber-security (the Information System Authority), radiation and nuclear incidents (Environmental Board), public health (Health Board – the risks mainly concern contagious diseases and mass poisoning) and animal diseases (Veterinary and Food Board).

3. Implementing a comprehensive security strategy: theory and practice

The most recent 2017 National Security Concept list six pillars of Estonia's comprehensive national defence: military defence, the civilian support for military defence, international action, internal security, continuous operation of the state and society, and psychological defence.¹⁰⁴ Two long-term documents are key to implementing the principle of comprehensive defence. These are the National Defence Development Plan for 2017–2026 (RKAK), issued by the Ministry of Defence, and the Internal Security Development Plan for 2015–2020 (STAK) prepared by the Ministry of the Interior. EU and NATO regulations and guidelines are also an important point of reference for Estonia in this respect.¹⁰⁵

A. Military defence. There is political consensus in Estonia regarding defence policy. The armed forces are guaranteed steady financing of just over 2% of GDP. During the financial crisis of 2009–2014, Estonia, despite having smaller economy, maintained higher defence spending than Lithuania or Latvia.¹⁰⁶ The Estonian defence model is based on a reserve army with small regular component (one fully professional combat battalion) and on voluntary engagement (territorial defence provided by the Defence League). Following mobilisation, the armed forces wartime strength is approximately

¹⁰³ Including extreme weather, mass influx of refugees, flooding, fire, traffic accidents, mass rioting, epidemics, cyber-incidents, radiological or chemical accidents, environmental contamination, mass poisoning, a nuclear accident. *Risk Management Capabilities: Estonia*, European Union Civil Protection, 2016, www.ec.europa.eu.

¹⁰⁴ *National Security Concept*, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁵ In the case of NATO this concerns for instance implementation of the Civil Emergency Planning Committee guidelines (civil preparedness requirements).

¹⁰⁶ Estonia's total defence spending in this period came to USD 2.316 bn, while for Latvia it was 1.548 bn and Lithuania USD 2.048 bn. *Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries*, NATO, 4.07.2016, www.nato.int.

21,000 troops. Society's involvement in defence system (conscription, Defence League) is aimed at demonstrating Russia that Estonia is ready to defend its independence despite limited military capabilities. Estonia sees NATO membership as the most important guarantee of its security. Thus, it focuses on improving its Host Nation Support (HNS) capacity, and developing military infrastructure for multinational NATO forces deployed in the country (UK-led NATO battalion-size battlegroup).

The priorities in Estonia's National Defence Development Plan for 2017–2026 are full mechanisation of the 1st Infantry Brigade and gradual increase of the armed forces' size (from 21,000 to 25,000 in terms of wartime strength)¹⁰⁷ and of the number of conscripts (from 3,200 to 4,000 per year). The plan states that further investment is required in HNS and military infrastructure, and that the formation of the 2nd Infantry Brigade needs to be finalised. It also mentions establishing the Cyber Command in the armed forces, which was inaugurated in 2018.¹⁰⁸

Exercises for reservists

Operational success of Estonia's defence depends on the capability to quickly mobilise reserves. For this reason, since 2016, the government has been conducting snap readiness exercises for reserve soldiers under the code-name *Okas*, which means 'quill'. Drills' goal is to mobilise reserve forces in forty-eight hours. During the first short-notice exercises, two companies (approximately 300 troops) were activated, but already in 2018 more than 1,200 reservists (an entire battalion) were summoned. Upon joining their unit, the troops undergo a few days of refresher exercises.¹⁰⁹

Initial Estonian experiences with snap drills were encouraging – more than 70% of the reservists called-up were mobilised and manned the units. The *Okas* exercises are a good opportunity not only to rehearse the chain of command and military mobilisation mechanisms, but also to test decision-making processes within the government. In addition, they require cooperation of the armed forces and businesses, which have to adapt to the absence of employees who attend the exercises.

¹⁰⁷ Including the Defence League, which will gain another ten companies (1,000 new members). Estonia also intends to increase the number of women in the armed forces.

¹⁰⁸ *Estonian Military Defence 2026*, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, www.kaitseministeerium.ee.

¹⁰⁹ *The government announced the additional reservist training Okas 2018*, Government of the Republic of Estonia, 31.10.2018, www.valitsus.ee.

B. The civilian support for military defence. A crucial element of this pillar of comprehensive defence is involvement of civilian structures in receiving allied reinforcements (HNS) in Estonia. This includes making available civil infrastructure such as airports, roads, sea ports, or hospitals, as well as cooperation with public administration, local authorities, and businesses (providing essential services for NATO forces). In Estonia, the civil-military partnership in this field has been considered well-functioning for many years.¹¹⁰ The Estonian government adopted the HNS concept in 2010. It contains guidelines for the armed forces and other state institutions (ministries of defence, interior, economy and communication, social affairs, foreign affairs, and finance) with respect to planning and providing the *HNS package* for allies.¹¹¹ The Estonian HNS Steering Committee, working under the Ministry of Defence, is responsible for coordinating the cross-government activities in this area.¹¹²

Since 2014, HNS became even more important for Tallinn due to the deployment of allied units (troops, armament and military equipment) and NATO fighter jets (as a part of the Baltic Air Policing mission) to Estonia. In principle, each rotation of the NATO battalion-size battlegroup and BAP detachment is an opportunity for civilian and military structures to practice HNS tasks. For this reason, in recent years, Estonia has simplified military mobility procedures for the cross-border movement of allied forces. New military exercises' scenarios and the strain on the training grounds meant that armed forces' drills had to be carried out outside the military areas as well, which requires cooperation with local authorities and owners of private properties.¹¹³ Being too small to have adequate logistics and transport capabilities, Estonian armed forces also have to rely on support from various levels of the state administration.¹¹⁴ Finally, international infrastructure projects that will provide better communication with the other EU and NATO countries (Rail and Via Baltica) are vital to strengthening Estonia's defence capability.

¹¹⁰ T. Jermalavičius, P. Pernik, M. Hurt, H. Breitenbauch, P. Järvenpää, *Comprehensive Security and Integrated Defence...*, *op. cit.*

¹¹¹ *Government approved new Host Nation Support concept*, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, 23.12.2010, www.kaitseminister.net.

¹¹² Under the Estonian International Military Co-operation Act, the government has an obligation to maintain a database of resources necessary to provide HNS. M. Attrill, 'NATO Force Integration Unit Estonia', *The Three Swords Magazine*, 2018, no. 33, www.jwc.nato.int; *International Military Co-operation Act*, Riigi Teataja, 6.11.2013, www.riigiteataja.ee.

¹¹³ E. Skvariks, 'Siil 2015: Inside Estonia's biggest military exercise', *Defence Matters*, 1.06.2015, www.defencematters.org; D. Cavegn, 'Large-scale military exercise Siil starting Wednesday', *ERR*, 2.05.2018, news.err.ee.

¹¹⁴ V. Oztulis, Ž. Ozoliņa, 'Shaping Baltic States Defence Strategy: Host Nation Support', *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2016-2017*, vol. 15, p. 80.

Civil-military cooperation

Since 2009, the Baltic states have conducted series of annual military-civilian Baltic Host exercises. It is an example of unspectacular but very useful command post exercise aimed at testing their HNS procedures and capabilities. Usually, a few hundred of the Baltic states' military personnel and officials from civilian institutions take part, as well as representatives of allied countries and NATO structures. In the past, Baltic Host has been integrated with live-fire exercises held at the same time in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, for example the US-led Saber Strike. Each year, it is hosted by one of the Baltic states on rotational basis. The exercises are an element of broader HNS cooperation between the Baltic states.¹¹⁵ In the case of Estonia, they involve, the Government Office, the ministries of social affairs, economy and communication, the Defence Resources Agency, the Police and Border Guard Board, the Rescue and Health Boards, the Maritime and Road Administrations, the Internal Security Service, and selected state and private firms (such as an power grid operator, Estonian Railways, the Port of Tallinn and Tallinn Airport). Since 2015, the NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) have taken part as well.¹¹⁶

In order to enhance civilian support for the Estonian land forces, the Defence Resources Agency has created a database of approximately 2,700 vehicles and machinery owned by individuals and businesses that could be used during wartime. These include for instance bulldozers (building the barricades and trenches) or trucks and coaches (transport, evacuation). The owners were notified that their vehicles and machinery had been placed in a register and the resulting obligations. They are required to handover equipment listed by the armed forces, with a full tank, at pre-determined location and specified time.¹¹⁷

C. International action. Within NATO, Estonia calls for strengthening deterrence against Russia through an increased allied military presence in the Baltic Sea region and on its territory. According to Tallinn, NATO – both in terms of its doctrine and structure (NATO's Command and Force Structure) – has to

¹¹⁵ *Baltic Host 2014 rendering host nation support*, Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, 12.06.2014, www.kam.lt.

¹¹⁶ The NFIU is responsible for facilitating movement of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and NATO Response Force (NRF) to enhance Allied rapid response capabilities.

¹¹⁷ A. Vahtla, 'In event of crisis, EDF may utilise thousands of private vehicles', ERR, 11.02.2019, news.err.ee.

focus mainly on collective defence. EU membership is seen in Estonia primarily from the perspective of economic security (single currency and market) and civilisational choice (being part of the West), although Tallinn is also in favour of working more closely within the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. It is important for Estonia that issues such as cyber-security, security of supplies, or countering disinformation and hybrid threats are a matter of increasing interest to the EU.

Cyber-security in Estonia's international activity

Estonia is promoting its expertise in cyber-security in the international arena. Tallinn has developed cyber-security as its niche capability in NATO and the EU. Its new Cybersecurity Strategy for 2019–2022 mentions Estonia's leading role in innovations and international cooperation in the cyber-security field.¹¹⁸ Due to its small population, limiting the capacities of administration and economy, Estonia is pursuing an ambitious digitisation policy. Therefore, cyber-resilience is of great importance for its comprehensive security system.¹¹⁹

Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), established in 2008, plays a vital role in Estonian cyber-security expertise. NATO's emphasis on cyber-space defence can be seen by the fact that CCDCOE gathers 25 member nations making it the largest expert institution of this kind in NATO (recently further countries expressed an interest in joining). An example of the CCDCOE's activity is organisation of NATO's most advanced cyber-defence exercises, Locked Shields. This has been held annually since 2010, and is attended by approximately 1,200 experts.¹²⁰ In addition, Tallinn is also home to the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems (EU-LISA). Cyber-security was a priority of Estonia's Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2017.¹²¹ The Estonian Ministry of Defence organised at that time the first cyber-defence exercises for

¹¹⁸ *Cybersecurity Strategy 2019–2022*, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications of Estonia, www.mkm.ee.

¹¹⁹ The global interest in Estonia's model can be seen by the fact that in 2015 the prime minister of Japan Shinzō Abe became an e-resident of Estonia.

¹²⁰ *Locked Shields*, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, www.ccdcoe.org; *NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence grows to 25 members*, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, www.ccdcoe.org.

¹²¹ An EU cyber-security centre will also be established in Tallinn. It will be responsible for coordinating EU cyber-security projects in third countries, and advising the European Commission.

the EU defence ministers – EU CYBRID 2017. As an addition to multilateral efforts, Estonia has also signed numerous bilateral agreements on cyber-security cooperation.¹²²

D. Internal security. Estonia's priorities in this field are stipulated in the Internal Security Development Plan for 2015–2020 (STAK). In countering threats to Estonia's public order, it stresses the importance of: ensuring that institutions responsible for internal security are staffed with professional and well-motivated personnel, investments in infrastructure and technologies (procuring equipment for the uniformed services, improving border surveillance and management of immigration, building capacity to combat weapons of mass destruction, and fighting organised crime more effectively), enhanced threat prevention (improving public awareness, ensuring key public services), better cooperation between internal security actors (inclusion of non-state entities, updating contingency plans, creating a single situation centre).¹²³

For this reason, the plan envisages: support for volunteer activities and NGO involvement in security of local communities (in 2016 volunteer crews were involved in 4372 rescue operations¹²⁴), additional investment in rescue services and the emergency notification system, intensification of counterintelligence efforts and fighting organised crime, balanced citizenship and immigration policies (support for immigration of people contributing to the country's development, combating illegal immigration, increasing capacity to relocate refugees to Estonia), development of the digital identity management system (secure electronic signature and circulation of documents) and improving protection of the border of the Schengen Area (Estonian-Russian).¹²⁵

Moreover, Russia's annexation of Crimea and hybrid warfare against Ukraine highlighted the necessity for enhanced cooperation between the uniformed services – the armed forces, special forces, police, border guard, fire service, and territorial defence forces. Since 2014, the updated scenarios of military exercises in Estonia – such as the Spring Storm series – have involved personnel from other uniformed services to a greater extent. Different exercises simulate asymmetric and conventional conflict scenarios, protection of critical infrastructure, or urban warfare.

¹²² *Cyber Security*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, 18.05.2018, www.vm.ee.

¹²³ *Siseturvalisuse arengukava 2015–2020*, Government of the Republic of Estonia, www.valitsus.ee.

¹²⁴ Compared with 585 cases in 2009. *Internal security 2016*, Ministry of the Interior of Estonia, www.is-suu.com.

¹²⁵ *Siseturvalisuse arengukava 2015–2020*, Siseministeerium, 9.08.2019, www.siseministeerium.ee.

The Defence League as a military and internal security actor

The Defence League (Kaitseliit) plays an important role in the Estonian comprehensive security system. This voluntary territorial defence organisation links the armed forces and the civil society, as well as national defence and internal security. It has approximately 16,000 members, not counting the women's and youth sections.

The Defence League's primary responsibilities concern territorial defence, and this includes provision of HNS for allied reinforcements in case of military conflict, and irregular warfare aimed at stalling enemy's actions (the League also has a cyber-security unit). In peacetime, however, the Defence League can be involved in crisis management and rescue operations, supporting the other uniformed services (according to the Emergency Act and The Estonian Defence League Act).¹²⁶ Assisting the police in safeguarding Barack Obama's visit to Tallinn in 2014, to which 300 League members were assigned, is an example.¹²⁷ In addition, during that visit, Estonia temporarily reintroduced border controls with Latvia, where the border guard was also bolstered by territorial defence volunteers. In peacetime, the League also has a standard duty of protecting the defence and foreign ministry buildings.

These tasks make the Defence League an organisation which is active in the domain of both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior. This is clearly manifested in the training of its members. On one hand, they take part in exercises with the regular forces (including NATO troops), protecting amphibious landing zones, providing anti-tank support, or safeguarding critical infrastructure (sea ports, airports, government buildings). On the other hand, they are trained to cooperate with the police, prison service, border guard, and fire service to enhance internal security. In this instance, exercises focus on patrolling streets and restoring public order in the case of riots (for example the Kilp and Põhjatäht exercises of 2018).¹²⁸ This inter-institutional approach is also

¹²⁶ *Emergency Act*, Riigi Teataja, 13.06.2017, www.riigiteataja.ee.

¹²⁷ A. Einmann, 'Obama visiidi turvamisel võib osaleda kuni 300 kaitseväelast', Postimees, 21.08.2014, www.postimees.ee.

¹²⁸ During these exercises, the League protected the Toompea hill, which is the location of the Parliament of Estonia and the Government Office. 'Kaitseliit, police conducting internal defines exercise involving 1,000 in NE Estonia', LETA, 23.11.2018, www.leta.lv; 'Estonia: Police officers, members of Kaitseliit to rehearse cooperation in joint exercise', LETA, 30.11.2018, www.leta.lv.

intended to pay dividends in future in the case of natural disasters, power outages, evacuation of the population, or for example search and rescue operations.

E. Continuous operation of the state and society. A comprehensive approach to security requires the government and providers of vital public services to be able to function during times of crises and war. For this reason, in Estonia, all of the most important public institutions have been assigned wartime responsibilities, and during exercises they test the transition to continuous 24/7 operational mode (this applies equally to some private service providers). Estonia categorised fourteen vital services which have serious consequences for the state and society if disrupted.¹²⁹ These include: ensuring essential supplies (electricity, gas, fuels, water, and heating), providing emergency medical care, maintaining the critical infrastructure (sewer system, national and local roads, the telephone network, data transmission, payment services and cash circulation, e-governance).

Preparations for crisis situations also include maintaining emergency stockpiles of energy resources, food, water, and medicine. In Estonia – unlike in Finland – the system is decentralised, and powers are spread over various ministries. Due to insufficient financing, reserves are not as large as those of the Finland’s National Emergency Supply Agency. For example, maintaining food and water supplies is the responsibility of the Ministry of Rural Affairs. Producers receive funds from that ministry’s budget to keep a week’s surplus of certain products. In 2019, Estonia carried out an analysis and issued recommendations for development of the national emergency reserve system.

Back to civil defence

In Estonia, there is a growing awareness that civil defence has to be an important element when ensuring continuous operation of the state and society. Over the last thirty years, this sphere has been neglected, leading to a decision (2015) to appoint a task force at the Government Office to devise a civil protection concept.¹³⁰ The document that was eventually adopted, in 2018, recommends that families maintain a week’s supply of

¹²⁹ *Estonia*, UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, www.undrr.org.

¹³⁰ *The government approved a comprehensive approach towards developing civil protection*, Government of the Republic of Estonia, 15.02.2018, www.valitsus.ee.

vital products and materials in case of emergency, and envisages development of a threat notification system which uses mobile telephones, and extensive evacuation plans (working with local authorities). It also envisages healthcare system preparations for situations in which it has to deal with mass casualties. The concept stresses improving crisis communication as well as public awareness and skills necessary to act appropriately in emergencies.¹³¹ For this reason, optional classes on crisis preparedness have been introduced in schools, and also, following the Lithuanian and Swedish examples, in 2019 instructions on procedures and conduct during crisis situations were electronically distributed among the public. These materials addressed conduct in cases of: extreme weather, flooding, fire, a chemical accident, radiation, an explosion, shooting, or an armed attack.¹³² An interesting example of an inventive approach is release of a smartphone app with advice for emergency situations, created by the women's section of the Defence League (Naiskodukaitse), available in Estonian, Russian, and English.¹³³

There was wider debate within the government on the question of shelters for the population. In 1993, Estonia abolished the post-Soviet civil defence system, which was developed with nuclear war in mind. An analysis of the Cold War shelter capacity revealed that they would have been sufficient for only 5% of the population. Ultimately, it was decided that Estonia would not start to build its own system of shelters similar to Finnish shelters. This was due not only to the substantial cost of such a solution, but also due to the limited capacity for a successful mass evacuation given the short time between alert and any missile strike. Instead, the authorities plan to use the existing infrastructure as shelters – public administration and private buildings (such as underground car parks) in key locations (mainly in the largest cities). Certain facilities will be adapted for use as shelters, and the rescue service will be responsible for maintaining them (provided with extra funding for this purpose).

F. Psychological defence. In the world of social media and new tools for manipulation, psychological defence is becoming more important. Estonia is

¹³¹ *Elanikkonnakaitse Kontseptsioon*, Riigikantselei, 2018, www.riigikantselei.ee.

¹³² *Code of conduct for crisis situations*, Ministry of the Interior and the Government Office of Estonia, Tallinn 2018, Estonian Rescue Board, www.rescue.ee.

¹³³ “‘Ole valmis!’ (Be Prepared!) Mobile App Now in Three Languages”, *Kaitseliit*, 23.03.2019, www.kaitseliit.ee.

particularly vulnerable to disinformation campaigns orchestrated by Russia due to a local Russian-speaking community (about 30% of the population)¹³⁴ and due to the popularity of the Russian media in the country.

Estonia understands psychological defence as preservation of the values shared by a certain society, its identity, and ontological security (endurance of the state and nation).¹³⁵ This helps to improve self-confidence and the will to defend the country, as well as to avoid panic in crisis situations. Estonia's 2011 National Defence Strategy distinguishes key aspects of psychological defence, which include: identifying hostile influences and countering them, enhancing resilience of public broadcasters to cyber-attacks, strengthening the public will to engage in defence and security-related thinking, preventing and dealing with the aftermath of crisis situations, involving the civil society, improving crisis communication (coherence of government information) and Estonia's international image.¹³⁶

The 2017 National Security Concept places psychological defence in the context of the society's resilience and cohesion. It points out the link between proper functioning of the state and society in normal circumstances and maintaining morale in a crisis situation. The document states that increasing public awareness about propaganda and disinformation, and providing the society with real and trustworthy information, is of key importance. This needs to be supplemented with tailored government strategic communication, which serves two purposes – it ensures public support for the country's security and defence policy (including for NATO membership and the presence of allied forces in Estonia) and NATO's approval of decisions made by the Estonian authorities.

Estonia has been a target for Russian disinformation campaigns since it restored its independence. Russian propaganda against Estonia depicts NATO as a threat to Russia, ridicules the idea of a Russian threat, promotes the narrative that the 9th of May is commemorated globally, alleges instrumental treatment of Russia as a means of increasing defence spending, depicts immigrants and refugees as a danger, highlights the harm caused to the Baltic states due to sanctions against Russia, and alleges persecution of minorities and glorification

¹³⁴ Approximately 24% of the population are Russians, but the Russian language has a broader impact.

¹³⁵ The Estonian Song Festival is a tradition that reinforces national identity. It is held once every five years and is the country's largest mass event featuring choirs, dance troupes, and thousands of spectators.

¹³⁶ I. Juurvee, *Estonian Approach...*, *op. cit.*

of Nazism.¹³⁷ Like many other countries, Estonia is concerned that Moscow will be able, using disinformation, to undermine public trust in the authorities, influence the outcome of elections, and even provoke rioting.

Countering disinformation

Estonia has adopted a different strategy for counteracting Russian disinformation to Lithuania and Latvia. Taking into account the freedom of speech and the reality of universal access to the Internet, it decided not to ban Russian-language broadcasters, but to launch its own state television channel in Russian – ETV+ (since 2015).¹³⁸ It is intended as a credible alternative to the Russian-language, pro-Kremlin media. In 2015 as well, a decision was made to set up a Government Communication Unit within the Government Office. It was tasked with coordinating, planning, and shaping the government’s strategic communication. The unit participates in various exercises and is capable of switching to high-alert crisis mode, establishing a government communication centre.

Estonia’s example demonstrates that anticipating an adversary’s actions and taking pre-emptive measures can be an effective means of combating disinformation. This is illustrated by an incident involving an Estonian conscript in March 2018.¹³⁹ The local media reported that the man had shot himself in the shoulder to get a ‘gunshot scar’, and this was found to be true in the inquiry. A few days later, the Estonian branch of the Russian state-controlled website Sputnik sent queries to Estonia’s armed forces, suggesting that the conscript was Russian-speaking and had been shot while trying to escape due to Estonian-Russian tensions in the land forces, and that army doctors do not treat conscripts who do not speak Estonian. In response, the armed forces decided not to reply to Sputnik’s insinuations, but released them to the public, together with the facts about the incident, thus foiling the attempted Russian propaganda attack. Sputnik did not write an article, and society was properly informed of the events (the Russian media still tried to accuse Estonia of disinformation, but little attention was paid to this).¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ E. Lange-Ionatamišvili, I. Bērziņa, M. Cepurītis, D. Kaljula, I. Juurvee, *Russia’s Footprint in the Nordic-Baltic Information Environment*, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2018, www.stratcomcoe.org.

¹³⁸ S. Tambur, ‘Estonia launches its first Russian-language TV channel’, ERR, 28.09.2015, news.err.ee.

¹³⁹ D. Cavegn, ‘Kremlin-controlled Sputnik attempts to spin EDF gun incident as propaganda’, ERR, 15.03.2018, news.err.ee.

¹⁴⁰ U. Eslas, ‘Estonian Defence Forces Neutralize Disinfo Attack’, CEPA Briefs, 4.04.2018, infowar.cepa.org.

SUMMARY

Prior to 2014, the Finnish comprehensive security system was often seen as obsolete. General conscription, exercises for reservists, the maintaining of emergency stockpiles, or drilling out more shelters in an age of expeditionary operations away from Europe on various fronts of the fight against terrorism seemed out of touch with the post-Cold War reality. The Russian-Ukraine conflict and increased military activity on the part of Russia in the Baltic Sea region have changed this perception. Currently, Helsinki is visited less and less as a museum of European defence and more as a laboratory for best practices in strengthening national resilience to modern threats.

In Finland, the concept for comprehensive security is part of a philosophy of good public governance, and is a doctrine that defines the state's role and duties with respect to security. Particularly noteworthy is the Finnish political and social consensus on the issue of enhancing comprehensive security of the state and population, giving the authorities a firm mandate to take action in this area. This is why, in recent years, Helsinki has focused not on changing strategy, but adapting its comprehensive security system to meet new challenges. This 'tightening of the system' encompassed expanding the powers of the intelligence and border guard, fighting disinformation, and adapting the armed forces to counter hybrid threats. The Arctic Lock large-scale national defence exercises scheduled for 2021 could be a good opportunity for testing in practice various aspects of the Finnish comprehensive security system. However, the details of the scenario for the exercises are not known yet and it is not clear whether it will include to a greater extent mobilisation of reservists and tasks such as civil-military cooperation, host nation support, protection of critical infrastructure, or civil defence.

For Finland, strengthening the societal resilience to crisis situations will be increasingly important.¹⁴¹ The key issues in this respect are prevention of social inequalities and polarisation, and investment in education (creating an inclusive society). This is intended as a means of building individual resilience against crisis situations (*sisu*). This social capital plays an important part in the comprehensive security system, because it shapes the nation's ability to constantly adapt. In a world of which crisis (climate, immigration, epidemic,

¹⁴¹ A. Hyvönen, T. Juntunen, H. Mikkola, J. Käpylä, H. Gustafsberg, M. Nyman, T. Rättilä, S. Virta, J. Liljeroos, *Kokonaisresilienssi ja turvallisuus: tasot, prosessit ja arviointi*, Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 7.02.2019, julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi.

demographic, etc.) is an inherent part this capacity will be of fundamental importance, for example in the process of social adaptation to the effects of global warming. In the future, ensuring sustainable management of shrinking resources, expanding and modernising infrastructure, strengthening public trust and reinforcing democratic institutions, and maintaining a welfare state (and the related social benefits and services) will also be matters of greater interest to the Finnish comprehensive security system. All of this demonstrates that the Finnish comprehensive security strategy is not static and will develop due to the influence of new trends and technological advances (for example developments in artificial intelligence and use of big data).

At the political level, the problem concerning Finland's comprehensive security system is strategic communication. In recent years, certain misunderstandings have occurred between the president, government, and parliament regarding security policy. The parliamentary defence committee criticised the government among other things for the lack of information about exercises of US forces on Finnish territory.¹⁴² Some members of parliament expressed concerns at that time about maintaining the policy of military non-alignment while the government was demonstrating its readiness to enhance military cooperation with the US. Finland's difficulties in strategic communication are due to its efforts to act as a broker between the West and Russia. On one hand, Finland wishes to develop close defence cooperation with NATO and the US (intended to be a deterrent to Russia), but is not seeking NATO membership. On the other, it does not perceive Russia solely in terms of threats, but also opportunities (trade, energy cooperation). Through its special political relations with Moscow, involving regular meetings at presidential and prime minister level, Finland is striving to maintain good bilateral contacts, and this leads to more moderate rhetoric *vis-à-vis* Russia.

Since 2008, Estonia has managed to build the foundations of a comprehensive security system. The measures taken have primarily encompassed legal and institutional changes, empowerment of the Government Office in managing the comprehensive security system, development of cooperation between the uniformed services, a return to civil defence, and enhancement of awareness of crisis management issues among officials and the public. The improvement in cooperation and better mutual understanding between the civil and military sectors is a major achievement, as is the involvement of the entire central administration – including ministries and institutions, which do not

¹⁴² 'President Niinistö: US joint exercises are for military and technical practice', Yle, 24.02.2016, yle.fi.

deal with questions of national security on a daily basis – in exercises and contingency and wartime planning. Building a comprehensive security system in Estonia is certainly not a finalised process, because it proceeds at the same time as pursuit of other defence policy priorities. A lot of funds are consumed for instance by mechanisation of infantry or development of military infrastructure. Therefore, the comprehensive security strategy is being introduced gradually and in the long-term. The implementation of the civil protection plan can serve as an example, with some proposals already completed, some being carried out, and some remaining on paper. In the future, Estonia will also face tasks relating to broader incorporation of local authorities into the comprehensive security system and starting a public early warning and risk notification system. A sense of threat from Russia will remain the main reason for developing a comprehensive approach to state security. Due to the growing scale of disinformation and cyber-attacks, Estonia's comprehensive security system will probably focus more and more on securing elections (almost half of Estonians voted online in the 2019 parliamentary elections).

The small area (approximately 45,200 square kilometres) and population (approximately 1.3 million) makes it easier for Estonia to coordinate and monitor implementation of the comprehensive security concept. In Estonia, a narrow group of people deal with security issues, who rotate through a variety of functions in public administration and often know each other personally. This network enables efficient information flow and quick communication, and improves situational awareness. Moreover, in its defence policy, Estonia can afford to plan long-term as there is a political consensus, which ensures continuity. Strategic communication and diplomatic activities promoting national defence solutions, such as cyber-security or the Defence League, are also a strength of the country. Despite the low military potential, this enables Estonia to build an image of an innovative, competent, and well-managed country with respect to security.

In Estonia, the most serious hurdle to building a comprehensive security system is inadequate funding. This prevents the uniformed services being provided with better equipment, increase of emergency stockpiles of key goods such as medicine, and introduction of a more ambitious civil defence programme. Estonia cannot afford an institution similar in scale to the Finnish emergency supply agency, or to construct large number of shelters. Budget limitations, combined with other more immediate needs, have stalled implementation of some initiatives related to comprehensive security. There are also difficulties caused by understaffing in public administration – the excessive workload

is hampering additional projects. Furthermore, the differences between the Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking communities with respect to national defence pose a challenge for the comprehensive security system in Estonia. In particular, this affects the forming of pro-defence attitudes and psychological resilience. Opinion polls commissioned by the Estonian defence ministry show that only half of the Russian-speaking citizens are willing to defend their homeland. There are also distinct discrepancies in perception of Russia as a threat. Among Estonian speakers, Moscow's revisionist policy is second on the list of the greatest threats to global security (following cyber-attacks), while Russian speakers are most worried about terrorism, and Russia's activities are at the bottom of the list (a concern for 52% of Estonians, and for only 11% of non-Estonians).¹⁴³

In both countries, the assessment of measures taken during the coronavirus pandemic will bring new lessons learned and recommendations related to comprehensive security. These recommendations will concern functioning of central and local authorities, public institutions and society in crisis situations. The principal issues will be the general capacity of the healthcare system, emergency stockpiles, security of supplies, cooperation between uniformed services, armed forces' support to civilian authorities, government's communications, society's psychological resilience, and the government's intervention in economy and post-crisis recovery.

PIOTR SZYMAŃSKI

¹⁴³ *Public Opinion and National Defence*, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, 29.05.2019, www.kaitseministeerium.ee.