Institutions, Emergent Interests, and Bargaining Power:
The European Community and Its Member States in Global Politics

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Introduction

Across a broad and growing range of issues, the European Community (EC) acts as a single unit in the international political economy. Yet to date, most studies devoted to this phenomenon have not systematically assessed the effects of EC corporate action on either the member states' ability to achieve their external goals or on international outcomes. This study asks about those effects by addressing the following questions: how does working through the EC affect the international bargaining power of EC member states, and how in turn does such altered bargaining power affect international outcomes? I answer by developing a spare institutionalist model which focuses on both the EC and international bargaining contexts. I argue that the changes in members' international bargaining weight which result from working through the EC are a function of the arrangement of their preferences, their bargaining resources and, most importantly, the decision rules by which EC common positions are reached. Whether or not this affects members' bargaining power depends upon the arrangement of preferences and bargaining resources of third states and the decision rule in use internationally. Depending upon the influence and substance of the EC corporate position, international outcomes may be different because of the EC's "presence" than they would be if it were absent. I explore these expectations with evidence from EC involvement in international environmental politics.

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1 I would like to thank Christine Ingebritsen, Karen Litfin, and Jon Mercer for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
2 Allen and Smith 1990.
The study is important in a number of respects. Empirically, although international environmental affairs are increasingly important both in general and for the external relations of the EC, this area of EC activity remains understudied. Politically, it imposes some rigor upon our understanding of the EC's effects on its members' external influence, which has been the subject of much politicization and rhetorical manipulation. Conceptually, it sheds some light on the recently-emerging question of the EC's causal impact on international outcomes. By altering certain members' international bargaining power, I argue, the EC can lead to outcomes which differ from those which would occur if its members acted on their own behalf in international affairs. The EC's potentially important causal effects on international outcomes remain largely unexamined in IR and IPE theorizing.

After the introduction, the paper proceeds in five parts. In the second section, I survey alternative approaches to understanding the EC's international role and influence. In the third section, I develop a simple model of the EC as an "embedded institution." Here I specify the conditions, paths, and directions of EC effects on its members' international bargaining power and thereby its causal effects on international outcomes. The fourth and fifth sections consist of case studies, in the form of two paired comparisons, from the area of EC involvement in international environmental politics. As noted, this area has received very little attention from political scientists, and the cases are selected to provide needed variation in the independent variable and to control for the confounding effects of other variables. The final section summarizes the argument and

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3 A sector-specific exception is ozone, for which see Jachtenfuchs 1990 and Benedick 1991. See more generally Sbragia 1996 and Jupille and Caporaso forthcoming.
the findings, assesses the strengths and limitations of the "embedded institutions"
approach to understanding EC influence on its members' influence and on international
outcomes, and places the study within the broader context of international relations and
international political economy research.

Alternative Approaches to EC Influence

Three answers to the question of the EC's independent effects on international
outcomes suggest themselves. First, one can approach the EC as an independent and
purposive actor.\(^4\) This presents a number of analytical problems, however, including
distinguishing the EC from its member states and specifying exactly what it means to be
an actor.\(^5\) More promisingly, from a two-level games perspective one can view the
European Commission as the self-interested and partly autonomous agent of the member
states, able to effect outcomes which are different from those which would result if the
member states acted on their own behalf or if the Commission were the perfectly faithful
or controlled mouthpiece of the member states.\(^6\)

Second, one might see the EC as a social arena in which its member states'
interests and identities are transformed.\(^7\) Whether they act individually or collectively,
socially-embedded member states may espouse different external positions than they
would as free agents, for example seeking to maximize their interdependent utilities to the

\(^4\) For early efforts see Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970; Sjöstedt 1977.
\(^5\) On the "boundary problem" posed by distinguishing the EC from its member states see Smith 1994, 294.
On the more general problem of assessing "actorhood" in corporate entities see Campbell 1965 and Frey 1985.
\(^7\) Wendt 1994.
detriment of third states outside of the EC group.\textsuperscript{8} Because of their interdependent preferences and bargaining strategies, such member states might thus take different positions and shape different outcomes than would have occurred in the absence of the EC.

Third, one might analyze the EC as an "embedded institution," or as an arena in which the exogenously-defined preferences of member states which would otherwise act on their own behalf are quite simply filtered and incorporated through established decisionmaking rules and procedures. The EC here is seen as a corporate actor, whose interest "emerges" from a process of agglomeration and which does not equal the simple summed interests of its constituent parts.\textsuperscript{9} Depending upon their preferences, resources, and the EC decision rules, certain member states may experience either amplification or attenuation of their international bargaining power, which can alter the substance of international outcomes.

This third approach is the one adopted in this paper, not because it captures all of the EC's independent effects, but because it is theoretically spare and offers a first-cut measure of EC influence. Examining the EC as an institutional arena provides a baseline measure of the EC's effects where member states' foreign policy preferences are defined exogenously to EC interaction and where the Commission faithfully negotiates on its principals' behalf. If later research justifies a focus on endogenous member state preferences, EC and international institutions will still matter as intervening variables.

\textsuperscript{8} Mercer 1995.  
\textsuperscript{9} Kenis and Schneider 1987.
between those preferences and international outcomes. Alternatively, if the Commission does have its own preferences and some means of promoting them -- or if the EC is in some other way an independent "actor" in its own right, rather than a simple arena -- then to measure its effects we need to understand what would have happened in the absence of such autonomy, which will be a function of member state preferences and resources and formal decision rules.

This approach is a starting point for considering how the EC can alter international outcomes in ways not captured by more traditional, state-centric IR theory. It is similar in focus to Meunier's analysis of the EC's international bargaining leverage. Meunier deduces EC bargaining leverage and likely strategies from an understanding of the degree of integration in the area subject to international negotiation (which is itself a function of decision rules and Commission autonomy), and the nature of the demands embodied in the EC common position. The current approach differs in three main respects from Meunier's model. First, it is negotiation-structural, rather than behavioral. In developing the model below I assume that strategies are not important and that outcomes result from the simple filtering of preferences and power through decision rules, both in the EC and internationally. Second, the current approach includes international negotiation-structural variables, which are necessary to move from an understanding of EC corporate preferences to influence over outcomes. Discussion of capabilities, which are the focus of Meunier's analysis and which are referred to here as

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10 See however Snidal 1995, who discusses the simultaneous endogeneity of actors and institutions.
11 A good exposition of the standard distinction between IOs as actors and arenas is Underdal 1994.
12 Meunier forthcoming.
bargaining *weight*, needs to be augmented with an account of effects on international outcomes, referred to here as bargaining *power*. Such influence, I contend, cannot properly be assessed without an understanding of third states' interests and their means of promoting them. Third, by incorporating member states' preferences and measuring EC influence through changes in member states' bargaining power, I attempt to gain a clearer picture of the content of EC positions and a clearer measure of the EC's net effects on international outcomes.

**Embedded Institutions, Emergent Interests, and International Outcomes**

In the following section, I define and operationalize the notion of power, sketch out the concept of embedded institutions, and offer propositions about the ways in which the EC can affect the international bargaining power of its member states and thereby the content of international outcomes.

**Bargaining Power**

In discussing "power" or "influence," I draw on concepts developed in studies of voting power in legislatures and international organizations. Power in this context means quite simply ability to shape outcomes, and it depends fundamentally upon whether an actor is "pivotal" or "critical" to the winning or blocking coalitions which define collective decisions.\(^{13}\) An actor is powerful if its defection from either a winning or a blocking coalition causes the coalition to become losing. In the most commonly-used formulation, voting power concerns the "number of situations in which [an actor] is able

\(^{13}\) Brams 1985, 98; Shapely and Shubik 1954.
to determine the outcome.  Given a set number of actors with a set number of votes and a specific decision rule, Banzhaf voting power is calculated as the ratio of the number of potentially-winning coalitions in which the actor is critical to the total number of critical defections. The result is a quantitative figure which captures an actor's power over all possible issues and coalitional configurations within a single institutional structure.

While I draw on voting power approaches, my own approach differs importantly from them. Similar to them, I use the concept of bargaining power to denote an actor's ability to influence bargaining outcomes. However, my interest is not in gaining a quantitative representation of a state's overall power (i.e. across the universe of possible coalitions) within a single bargaining structure (where bargaining structure is conceived as the configuration of actors [preferences], resources [votes], and rules). My interest is at once more broad and more narrow. It is more broad in the sense that I am interested in making abstract statements about the EC's effects across many international fora. Because different fora are characterized by different bargaining structures, measures applying to single structures are irrelevant and measures applying across many are exceedingly difficult to construct.

While this still leaves open the possibility of measuring power on a forum-by-forum basis, my focus is also more narrow than that dictated by traditional voting power approaches. Even within single fora I focus less on overall power (across the universe of

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14 Banzhaf 1965, 231.
16 Johnson 1995b, 571.
possible coalitional configurations) and more on bargain-specific power, i.e. ability to alter outcomes where specific coalitions exist or are likely to form. Voting power analysts are increasingly sensitive to the need to contextualize their approach by taking account of likely coalitional behavior, thereby calculating "probabilistic" voting power indices. But I wish to be even more context-specific, probing the EC's and its members' power within specific and actual (or likely) bargaining structures.

In a sense, then, I skip the voting-power index "step" on the "ladder of abstraction," moving from broad generalizations to real-world applications in which specific coalitions are already in place or are likely to form. An actor's overall voting power is less relevant here than is the context-specific combination of the number of actors and their bargaining weights, the relation of the actor's preferences to other parties', and the voting rule in operation. In my effort to offer both general statements and specific illustrations, I eschew grandiose schemes for constructing quantitative measures of voting power over several bargaining structures, content instead to outline the abstract dynamics of outcomes with embedded institutions and to illustrate them with reference to specific cases.

**Embedded Institutions**

Where an issue to be discussed or negotiated internationally falls within the competence of the European Community, the EC acts either alongside or on behalf of its member states. The extent of its competence and how this is determined are vexed

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17 Widgrén 1995; Johnston 1995a:250-253; Hosli 1996a. They are thus beginning to incorporate probable real-world preference configurations into their calculations of overall voting power. On the importance and possible confounding effects of preferences in power measures see Garrett *et al.* 1995; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996.
questions which fall outside the scope of this paper. Where member states have to act through the EC in the conduct of their external relations, they do not independently defend their preferences, but rather the collectively-defined EC "common position." At a minimum, then, the EC serves as a simple institutionalized arena, a layer of decision-making rules and procedures which filters and incorporates the preferences of its members before defining a common external position to which all are bound. The EC is "embedded" in international institutions because it constrains its members' free agency prior to or during international bargaining. Under Articles 113 and 228 of the Rome Treaty, where external agreements are to be negotiated, the Commission first proposes the negotiation. The Council then authorizes the Commission to negotiate an agreement (with the "assistance" of a special committee appointed by the Council [the "113 Committee"]) which must be in keeping with the Council-defined EC common position. The decision rule governing definition of EC positions is given in the article of the Rome Treaty covering the substantive issue at hand. The Commission then negotiates and the Council approves the conclusion of the agreement.

Assuming "one state, one vote" and dichotomous ("either-or") policy choices, working through the EC can have one of two implications for a member state's formal bargaining weight in international negotiations. On the one hand, if the EC common position is identical to the member's position, the member effectively has 15 international votes rather than one. On the other hand, if the EC position is opposed by the state, it effectively has zero international votes behind its preferred position, because it is

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18 Neuwahl 1991; O'Keeffe and Schermers 1983.
compelled to respect the EC common position by voting with it. Instead of their single vote, EC member states effectively have either the summed weight of all EC members or no weight at all.

Bargaining power may not be amplified or attenuated accordingly, however. As a large body of empirical and theoretical work has shown, there is not necessarily a linear, or even a positive, relationship between the resources (e.g. votes) that a state can muster and its ability to shape outcomes.\(^\text{19}\) Bargaining or voting weight does not necessarily translate into bargaining or voting power. In addition to resources, influence over outcomes is also a function of factors such as the number and preferences of third parties and the decision rule in use. In assessing the EC’s impact on its members’ bargaining power, we must move beyond assertions that the EC simply multiplies members’ international power by the number of EC member states.\(^\text{20}\) We must specify the conditions under which EC membership indeed amplifies, attenuates, or does not affect members’ global bargaining power, and how in turn the member state positions so affected can and cannot shape international outcomes.

**Emergent Interests**

Depending upon the arrangement of preferences, the bargaining resources of the various actors (e.g. votes), and the decision rule by which EC common positions are reached, a given member state may or may not be pivotal in the definition of the EC common position. The EC, in turn, may or may not be pivotal internationally. A rough way of measuring the EC’s effects on international outcomes is to examine the impact

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\(^\text{19}\) Shapley and Shubik 1954; Banzhaf 1965; Brams and Affuso 1985; Johnston 1995a.

\(^\text{20}\) See for example Fernandez Sola 1992, 805.
that EC membership has on member states' international bargaining power, because the state positions so altered may shape or fail to shape outcomes differently than if they were expressed individually. To do this, one needs to know two things. First, what would be the member's power in the absence of the EC, or its free agent power? This will be a function of its position in the global bargaining structure, and provides a baseline expectation against which EC-present power can be measured. Second, what is the member state's actual power when working through the EC? Alternatively, this second question can ask about the member's counterfactual power had EC decision rules been different. The answer to either question will depend upon the member's ability to define EC common external positions and the ability of the EC position to shape international outcomes. Comparing a member's free agent and actual/counterfactual power provides a rough measure of the EC's effects on its ability to shape international outcomes.

Three main decision rules characterize international negotiations: either some form of majority vote or one of two variants of consensus decisionmaking pertains. Under the first, positive agreement by some pre-determined threshold of states (usually two-thirds of those present and voting) is necessary to enact substantive measures. Voting can follow the principle of "one state, one vote" or can be based on a weighting formula which gives different states different numbers of votes as a function of their deemed importance, material power or relevance, or some other consideration. Under consensus decisionmaking, all parties ostensibly must agree to an outcome before it takes

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effect. However, consensus need not imply unanimity—it can also mean that certain states (usually qualitatively unimportant players) can be overridden if their position contradicts the "sense of the meeting." I will distinguish between situations in which consensus is actually a de facto unanimity requirement, and others in which it means that decisions are taken by a more vague "sense of the meeting" criterion. In addition, many observers have noted first that consensus decisionmaking is fundamentally different under the "shadow of the vote" than under the "shadow of the veto." Here too the form of decisionmaking needs to be specified in order to generate accurate expectations over member state and EC influence and international outcomes.

In the EC, decisions are taken either by qualified majority vote (QMV) or by unanimity. Under unanimity rules, any single member state can formally block common measures. In the absence of linkages, side payments, or other bargaining dynamics, outcomes tend to reflect the lowest common denominator. Under QMV rules, each member state has a predetermined number of votes, weighted roughly as a function of population. There are currently a total of 87 votes distributed among the 15 member states, with 62 required to pass decisions and 26 constituting a blocking minority. The only previous arrangement encountered in this paper is the 1986-1995 regime (prior to the entry of Austria, Finland, and Sweden), in which there were 76 total votes, with a qualified majority of 54 and a blocking minority of 23. Although numerous studies have

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25 France, Germany, Italy, and the UK: 10 votes each; Spain: 8 votes; Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, and Portugal: 5 votes each; Austria and Sweden: 4 votes each; Denmark, Finland, and Ireland: 3 votes each; Luxembourg: 2 votes.
calculated voting power under these arrangements,\textsuperscript{26} as noted above my interest is not in members' overall voting power but in their bargaining power both in the abstract and within real-world configurations of actors, weights, and rules.

Of course, many observers have noted that even where QMV is called for, consensus--\textit{qua de facto} unanimity--tends to remain the predominant decision rule in the EC.\textsuperscript{27} However, as noted above consensus operates differently depending upon whether the formal alternative to it is unanimity or QMV. According to Wallace, the "knowledge that a vote could be taken," even in what are agreed to be consensus situations, has changed the "language" of EC decisionmaking from one of "negotiation" to one of voting.\textsuperscript{28} Because the EC is institutionally thick, an appeal to consensus by a minor player on a given issue which could be taken to a vote can be overridden, and the default decision rule will be the one called for in the Rome Treaty. However, as Meunier demonstrates, such an appeal by a major EC player, or one with particularly intense preferences (e.g. France in the intra-EC negotiations over the GATT Uruguay Round in 1992-93), leads to the \textit{de facto} use of a decision rule that is not called for \textit{de jure}.\textsuperscript{29}

Six possible combinations of EC and international rules result from these specifications: the EC rule of either QMV or unanimity will be embedded within international rules of either majority voting, consensus (\textit{qua} "sense of the meeting"), or \textit{de facto} unanimity. Three assumptions are used to generate the propositions which follow. First, I assume that preferences, bargaining positions, and decision rules are

\textsuperscript{28} Wallace 1990, 222.
\textsuperscript{29} Meunier forthcoming.
specified exogenously—they will not change during the course of interactions.

Bargaining and, for the most part, sociological dynamics are assumed not to operate. No account is taken of compromises in state positions, suasion, issue-linkage, package deals, side payments, leadership, and the like. Second, I assume sensitivity to the status quo ante and preference by all players for any bargained outcome to it. Finally, I assume that outcomes are "either-or" in nature, as are preferences over them and, ultimately, as is power to shape them.  

Within the confines of the present model, the EC alters international outcomes by amplifying or attenuating the international bargaining power of certain of its member states. Amplification occurs quite simply where an EC member state would have had no free agent bargaining power, but has actual power because it is pivotal to an EC common position which is itself critical internationally. In QMV-MV and unanimity-MV situations, winning the EC bargain can bring a state's position sufficient international resources (e.g. votes) to become critical internationally. In QMV-consensus and unanimity-consensus situations, EC weight-added gives the member state position sufficient qualitative importance to constitute an international veto position. By construction, amplification cannot occur where the international consensus rule is a de facto unanimity rule, because gaining additional votes will not render a position internationally lowest-common denominator if it was not so originally. Ceteris paribus,

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30 In reality, the EC may allow for or create international outcomes which conform more closely to a member's preferences than would result if the member were a free agent. As Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) have demonstrated, when one organizes preferences spatially one sees that "centrist" members may affect the proximity of outcomes with their preferences, even if the actual outcome is not identical to the one they most prefer. While Garrett and Tsebelis give leverage on the conformity of outcomes with states' preferences, my concern is with states' power to shape outcomes, and how they would be different in the absence of the EC or under different decision rules, rather than with the content of those outcomes.
amplification under EC QMV rules will tend to push international outcomes toward "doing more," because the EC's emergent interest is not defined by its lowest common denominator member and is thus farther from the status quo ante. Conversely, EC unanimity rules will tend to pull international outcomes toward doing less by the same logic.

**Attenuation** occurs where a member state would have had free agent power in the absence of the EC, but has no actual power because it loses the EC bargain. Here, the member state would have been a critical member of an international winning or blocking coalition, but cannot play the part because it is bound to support an opposed EC common position. This can occur either where it is outvoted in the EC (QMV-MV) or is undercut by a more minimalist EC partner (unanimity-MV). Bargaining power can also be attenuated in international consensus situations.\(^{31}\) Here, the free agent member state would be sufficiently important acting alone as to cause international negotiators to accommodate its preferences, but it cannot express them and so its position loses "voice." The EC common position, which may itself warrant deference in international consensus situations, would not have critically depended upon the member state in question. Attenuation will tend to move international outcomes away from the status quo under EC QMV rules and toward the status quo under EC unanimity rules.

By construction, the EC will have no effect if a member state would have had (or would not have had) international bargaining power with or without the EC. This is an artifact of the assumptions I make and of the limitations of this sparse institutional model.

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\(^{31}\) Unless the EC rule is unanimity and the international rule is equivalent to it. It would be impossible to be the lowest common denominator globally but not in the EC.
Banzhaf notes that "When legislator X is part of a large majority voting for a particular bill, it makes little difference how many votes he can cast because his voting power is not tested in such a situation.\textsuperscript{32}\textsuperscript{32} The focus only on static and given situations leaves unaddressed the important issue, which would be apprehended by a more traditional voting power approach, of the ability of EC membership to increase or decrease the number of situations in which a member state, with the added weight of the EC, might be critical to a winning or a blocking coalition.

In sum, in the previous section I have attempted to specify in the abstract the conditions under which the EC will and will not affect its members' international bargaining power, the direction of those effects, and their likely impact on international outcomes. The assumptions are restrictive, and the overall intent is to gain first-cut measures, inspired by the voting power literature, of the effects of the EC as an embedded institution. In the following sections, I explore these expectations with case studies, in the form of two paired comparisons, from international ozone protection and hazardous waste negotiations. The cases are selected first because they are empirically important instances of EC action in international environmental bargaining. In addition, they closely approximate several of the conditions assumed in the abstract derivation of the model's properties. In general, the issues and positions are zero-sum in nature (either-or), and the issues tend to be single-stranded (i.e. unlinked to other issues). Third, the cases offer variation in EC decision rules which can reveal how different configurations of embeddedness can alter different states' power and international outcomes. Finally,

\textsuperscript{32} Banzhaf 1965, 331.
because I have selected the paired cases to be as comparable as possible on all attributes except those that are of interest to me, I minimize the confounding effects of third variables which are not part of the model. Though not constituting a test of the model, the cases allow me to probe its plausibility as a step prior to more systematic evaluation.

In order to illustrate the operation of these properties in as many situations as possible, I will at times employ counterfactual reasoning to explore likely outcomes under different combinations of rules. Although the expectations are deduced from a set of postulates, I only employ this tactic where the counterfactual situation was historically possible, or even likely. I thus aspire to both deductive and idiographic accuracy in my use of counterfactual reasoning. With the counterfactual scenarios, I am able to hold preferences constant and imagine the effects that historically-possible (or plausible) variations in EC decision rules would have had on members' bargaining power and on international outcomes, with the expectation that "different institutions yield different results out of the same set of preferences." My intent is to illustrate the effects that different configurations of embeddedness can have on members' power and on international outcomes, and to assess the range of applicability, but also the limitations, of such a sparse institutionalist framework.

**International Ozone Layer Protection**

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33 Lijphart 1975.
34 King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 10-11.
35 Tetlock and Belkin 1996, 10-12.
36 Gourevitch 1996, 350.
The EC has been a prime mover, for good and for ill, in international ozone politics since global negotiations opened in 1982.\textsuperscript{37} In 1985 it signed the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, in 1987 it signed the Montreal Protocol to the Convention, and in 1988 it ratified and enacted implementing legislation for both treaties. Both of the instances discussed here involve meetings of the parties to the Montreal Protocol, which could be amended by two-thirds vote of the parties present and voting or adjusted with a concurrent voting system representing two-thirds of the voting parties and 50\% of the consumption of the controlled substance in question. Both the Convention and the Protocol call for use of consensus where possible, specifying voting as a measure of last resort. In both of the cases discussed here, consensus procedures ("under the shadow of the vote") were operative internationally.

\textit{Copenhagen, 1992}

The Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol was held in November 1992 in Copenhagen. Because the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced QMV into EC environmental policymaking, was not yet in force, the EC common position was defined by unanimity. In this unanimity-consensus situation, negotiations focused primarily on the introduction of control measures on methyl bromide and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs).\textsuperscript{38} I concentrate on the methyl bromide discussions here, as the issue was starkly dichotomous--to set a reduction and elimination timetable, or not to do so.

Methyl bromide is an ozone-destructive chemical used in the agricultural sector as a soil fumigant. On the question of whether or how much to control this substance,

\textsuperscript{37} Jachtenfuchs 1990; Benedick 1991; Gehring 1994.
\textsuperscript{38} Rowlands 1993.
Greece was the European Community lowest common denominator. While all 11 of its EC partners were willing to reduce and ultimately eliminate methyl bromide use, differing only in the stringency and rapidity of action they would support, Greece was initially unsure if it could even support listing the chemical as a controlled substance and calling for a freeze in its production and use.39 After lengthy Council debate, however, Greece agreed that the EC could support the addition of methyl bromide to the controlled substances list, but that it could not support any binding reduction. The EC negotiating mandate prepared for the Copenhagen enshrined this minimalist position.40

Acting as a free agent, Greece arguably would have had no international bargaining power. This is especially likely given that the history of the ozone regime is one of establishing different levels of regulation for developed and developing countries, so that the resistance of the latter to cutting methyl bromide would not necessarily have impeded the former group from adopting more stringent measures. Israel, a handful of developing countries, and, to a lesser extent, some of its southern EC partners supported the Greek position on methyl bromide. Numerous northern EC members and, crucially, the United States strongly opposed the Greek position.41 The US had committed itself to eliminating methyl bromide production and consumption under its 1990 Clear Air Act, and in Copenhagen it exerted considerable pressure on third states to agree to a binding and rapid methyl bromide phase-out. The Copenhagen outcome on methyl bromide,

41 “Ozone layer left at risk by new global agreement,” ENDS Report no. 214 (November 1992), 14.
however, reflected the Greek position: the parties listed methyl bromide as a controlled substance, agreed to freeze its consumption and use at 1991 levels by 1995, and established no binding timetable for elimination of the substance.\textsuperscript{42}

I argue that with its paltry handful of allies, Greece would have been unable to prevent more stringent action on this chemical, but that with the weight of its EC partners, whom it had held back with respect to methyl bromide regulation, its position became critical and it was able to prevent a more maximalist consensus from forming. Thus, in this unanimity-consensus situation, EC membership served to amplify Greece's international bargaining power and to pull the international outcome toward the status quo. Failure to win agreement on this point was a significant setback for the US, and a bloc of industrialized countries, including numerous EC members, would likely have moved forward with "minilateral" methyl bromide restrictions but for the minimalism of the (Greek-defined) EC common position.\textsuperscript{43} The bargaining power of Greece's maximalist EC partners, which included the Netherlands and the UK, may thereby have been attenuated, although it is difficult to know whether or not they would have had free agent power (i.e. would have been critical members of the advanced bloc) in the absence of the EC.

It is worthwhile considering what might have happened had EC rules been different. In a QMV situation, Greece and its southern go-slow partners Italy and Portugal would not have constituted a blocking minority and thus would have been

unable to prevent adoption of a more stringent EC common position. Available evidence suggests that a more maximalist EC common position would have helped shape a more progressive international outcome, one which established a binding reduction and elimination schedule for methyl bromide. The minimalists would likely not have seen their international power changed in such a situation—they would have been powerless to prevent that outcome acting as free agents. But, because Greece was able to "win" the EC bargain and thereby garnered the formal support of its more progressive EC partners, and because the 12-vote EC bloc could not be overridden in the international negotiations, its power was amplified and the international outcome reflected its preferences.

Vienna (1995)

The Seventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol was scheduled for December 1995 in Vienna, ten years after signature of the original ozone treaty in that city. In contrast with 1992, the EC decision rule had changed to QMV, and the ozone regime was still operating by consensus--this was thus a QMV-consensus situation. As in 1992, the main items on the agenda were methyl bromide and HCFCs, further regulation of which would require adjustment to the Montreal Protocol. Of the two, methyl bromide was the more contentious.44 The EC had taken further steps toward restricting both substances in 1993-94, and numerous member states, the Commission, and the Parliament wanted to push for more stringent controls at international level. However, on

44 Krueger and Rowlands 1996, 246.
both scores they met with stiff resistance from the EC's Mediterranean bloc. After the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) announced in the autumn of 1995 that the hole in the ozone layer had reached the size of the European continent itself, calls for action on ozone-depleters intensified, and Environment Commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard called for immediate action to phase-out methyl bromide.

In the EC, maximalists Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, and Sweden sought a total phase-out by the year 2001. (Indeed, the Netherlands and Germany had already banned agricultural use of methyl bromide in domestic legislation.) Middle-of-the-road players Belgium and the UK sought a 50% reduction by that date. The go-slow members--France {10 votes}, Spain {8}, Greece {5}, Portugal {5}, and Ireland {3}--who favored a 50% reduction only by 2005, now constituted a veto coalition on methyl bromide, comprising 31 votes where 26 were needed to block common measures. Only France and Spain were critical to this blocking coalition.

On 6 October 1995, under the leadership of the minimalist Spanish Council Presidency, the Council adopted a mandate which called on the EC to push for a 25% reduction by 1998 and a 50% reduction (on 1991 levels) by 2005, reflecting the thrust of the blocking coalition's preferences. (Note here that preferences are not perfectly

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constant. What is constant, however, are the preference orderings of the relevant states.)

While the Council "recognized the ultimate objective of the elimination" of methyl bromide, it favored that goal only as long as substitutes were available and scientific evidence supported such action.\(^49\) The bargaining, and indeed the outcomes, at Vienna were differentiated with respect to countries' level of economic development, but because the two issues were unlinked to each other I deal only with the relevant (developed-country) bargaining here.\(^50\) Developing countries agreed to a 2002 freeze at 1995-98 average production and consumption levels, more than what had been sought by the EC minimalist.

The international bargaining structure was similar to 1992. Consensus decisionmaking was still the order of the day.\(^51\) The US, which produced a third of the world's methyl bromide but was bound by the 1990 Clean Air Act, supported stringent measures in the form of a 2001 elimination date.\(^52\) The EC was even more divided than in 1992. In particular, the EC minimalist drew the wrath of environmental NGOs Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, which accused them of "balking at any talk of total elimination."\(^53\) EC maximalists Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden were

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\(^{50}\) This is not to say that all of the issues dealt with at Vienna were taken in isolation, only that the developed and developing country methyl bromide cuts were not linked. Indeed, the developing country issue was tightly linked to the issue of multilateral funding, but these bargains are outside the scope of the present analysis.


\(^{52}\) "Protection de la couche d'ozone: l'in trouvable consensus," Agence France Presse, 3 December 1995.

portrayed as favoring the US position, and were bitterly disappointed at the "minimal compromise" reached in Vienna which was made necessary by consensus decision rules.  

Assessing bargaining power in this case is necessarily speculative. However, given the US' strong maximalist stance, its importance as the world's main methyl bromide producer, and the support it received from numerous other states including EC members, it is likely that in the absence of the EC a maximalist critical mass would have resulted in a more stringent phase-out schedule. In that situation, the EC minimalists would have had no international bargaining power and the position of the maximalists would have been unclear. Because it allowed the minimalists to define the EC common position, however, and because in turn that position was critical to an international winning coalition, I contend that EC membership in this situation amplified the bargaining power of the EC's go-slow states, although with caveats not perfectly consistent with the theory. In the absence of the EC, the minimalists would likely have been overridden or dragged along in support of more progressive measures. In the presence of the EC, they had sufficient international power to resist successfully such pressures and compel less-stringent international action. The caveat results from the fact that the outcome went further than the minimalists had hoped for, suggesting a limitation of the theory to which more attention will be paid in the concluding section.

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International Hazardous Waste Trade

Thirty-five states and the European Community signed the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal in March of 1989.\textsuperscript{55} According to the rules of procedure, consensus was to be the decisionmaking norm, but if it failed decisions of the parties could be taken by a two-thirds vote of those present and voting (i.e. not abstaining), following the concept of one state, one vote. The Convention itself could be amended by three-fourths majority of those parties present and voting, although again consensus was the preferred mode of decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{56} Like many international environmental agreements, the Basel Convention regime is a "dynamic" one, characterized not just by initial Treaty-writing, but by periodic Conferences of the Parties (COPs) at which detail is added to the initial framework agreement.\textsuperscript{57}

The most contentious issue throughout the history of the regime has been the stringency of controls on waste shipments, roughly split along North-South lines.\textsuperscript{58} Developing countries have generally sought a total ban on hazardous waste shipments from rich to poor countries. Developed countries have generally supported restricting shipments of waste for final disposal, but allowing shipments of waste for recycling or reuse.\textsuperscript{59} The question has been framed dichotomously, as either to ban or to allow shipments of hazardous waste for recycling. The European Community reached political agreement on legislation implementing the Convention in October 1992, and finalized it

\textsuperscript{55} Kummer 1992, 534.
\textsuperscript{56} UNEP/IG.80/3, Art. 17, para. 3.
\textsuperscript{57} Gehring 1994.
\textsuperscript{58} Krueger 1996, 12.
by enacting the Waste Shipment Regulation on February 1993. The Regulation strictly regulated exports to poorer countries of waste for disposal, but was relatively lax regarding shipments of waste destined for recycling. The two instances discussed introduce variation into EC decision rules while preferences remained largely constant, allowing an assessment of changes both in member states' international bargaining power and in international outcomes.

**Piriapolis 1992**

COP-1 was held in November-December 1992 in Piriapolis, Uruguay. Whether legally or not, EC member states acted as *de facto* free agents at the Piriapolis meeting. Britain fell staunchly on the side of the US and Canada in the camp opposing a total ban on rich-poor waste shipments, favoring instead to ban only shipments of waste for disposal. Denmark, on the other hand, firmly supported a total ban.\(^{60}\) At the end of the Piriapolis meeting, Denmark, Italy, and six other EC members voiced their support for a Swiss text which would implement a total ban, but against the opposition of the other industrialized nations, including the UK, they were unable to win passage of the measure under the operative consensus rules.\(^{61}\) The outcome at Piriapolis broadly favored the ban-opposing camp, as the compromise outcome simply "requested" waste exporters to cease their shipments of waste for disposal and did not take a decisive stance on waste for

\(^{60}\) MacKenzie 1992c.

\(^{61}\) Puckett 1994. It should be noted that this case violates the assumption of unlinked issues that I employ throughout this paper. Of fundamental importance to the Piriapolis outcome was the fact that the industrialized nations, including all EC members except France, had not yet ratified the Basel Convention. Ban supporters feared that enactment of the ban would lead these states never to ratify the Treaty, an important bargaining chip in the latter parties' hands.
recycling.62 Because the preferences over outcomes of the various parties remained largely unchanged between COP-1 and the next COP, scheduled for March of 1994, the Piriapolis outcome provides a useful baseline measure of member state free agency which can be compared with the 1994 outcomes where the EC acted as a single unit.

COP-2: Geneva, 1994

As noted, EC unity on the ban issue unraveled at the end of COP-1, with Denmark defecting from the EC common stance and declaring its intention to push for a total North-South waste shipment ban.63 Preferences remained constant: Denmark's efforts at redefining EC policy while it held the EC Council presidency during the first half of 1993 met with strong resistance, which did not wane as the March 1994 Second Conference of the Parties approached.64 Denmark sought a total ban on waste shipments to poor countries, and in mid-March it had the support of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain. On the other side of the ledger, Germany, France, the UK, and the Netherlands opposed the ban idea.65 Within a few days of the conference, only Germany and the UK were left as EC members strongly opposing the Danish ban proposal.66 Because the EC now decided such matters by qualified majority vote, the common position defended at Geneva was defined by Denmark and the maximalists. After

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Germany and the UK realized that they were going to be outvoted in defining the EC common position, they reluctantly threw their weight behind the EC ban proposal.67

Internationally, the G-77 countries, strongly unified and with the support of a number of industrialized states, had expressed their intention to bring the ban issue to a vote during the Geneva meeting.68 Thus, COP-2 was a QMV-MV situation. The international outcome reflected the preferences of Denmark and the G-77 countries. In Decision II/12 taken at Geneva, the parties agreed halt all shipments from OECD to non-OECD shipments of waste for recycling from 1998 onward. According to UNEP officials, the EC vote "had been crucial in enabling [the ban decision] to happen, because two of the major exporters of toxic wastes to non-OECD countries were Germany and the United Kingdom."69 Unlike Piriapolis, these two recalcitrant states found themselves dragged along behind a more progressive common position by virtue of changed EC decision rules.

Working through the EC arguably amplified Denmark's, and attenuated Germany's and the UK's, international bargaining power. The EC as an embedded institution, i.e. one through which all of its members had to work, also arguably changed the international outcome from a minimalist, export-allowing one, to a maximalist, export-prohibiting one. However, this assertion must be qualified with reference to one's baseline expectation. Let us first imagine what might have transpired had all EC states

been free agents. In such a situation, Denmark would have supported the G-77 in favor of a total ban, and Germany and the UK likely would have opposed it.\textsuperscript{70} Greenpeace analysts noted that "it takes only one country to call a vote and the numbers were clearly there [even without the EC ban proponents] to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority to win."\textsuperscript{71} Their estimation is doubtless correct--of the 64 signatories present, it is unlikely that the necessary 22 could have been mustered to block adoption of the ban decision. According to this baseline, the EC had no effect on the international outcome.

However, if we use the different baseline of an alternative EC decision rule, this conclusion changes. If the EC had operated by unanimity, the 10 other EC members would have been legally compelled to line-up behind the minimalist German-British position.\textsuperscript{72} The twelve EC votes opposing a ban would have been joined by Australia, Canada, Finland, and Japan, bringing the anti-ban camp to 16 votes. With the patronage of the United States, which joined these four non-EC states, Germany, and the UK in what Greenpeace dubbed the "Sinister Seven" waste exporters, countries representing some 95% of the world's hazardous waste generation would have thrown their weight to the ban-opposing camp, as they had decisively done at COP-1 at the end of 1992.\textsuperscript{73} Either of two outcomes might plausibly have resulted. First, if the international decision rule had remained majority voting (resulting in a unanimity-MV configuration), the ban


\textsuperscript{71} Puckett and Fogel 1994.

\textsuperscript{72} Denmark made it clear that it did not agree with this legal interpretation. See "Danish Hazwaste Ban Proposal," "Denmark Formalizes Hazwaste Export Ban Proposal Despite EU Commission Warning," \textit{Environment Watch-Western Europe}, 4 March 1994, 5-7.

\textsuperscript{73} Greenpeace International 1992; MacKenzie 1992b.
opponents might have had sufficient critical mass to win some fence-riders over to the ban-opposing side, and the 22 votes necessary to block may have been forthcoming. Second, different EC rules might have resulted in the use of different international rules. Given the qualitative importance of the ban opponents, the international rule may have endogenously shifted to consensus (resulting in a unanimity-consensus configuration), which would have swung the informal and political, if not the formal and legal, tide against the waste export ban. In either of these counterfactual scenarios Germany and the UK would have seen their international bargaining power amplified, and Denmark's power would not have been affected--but the international outcome would have been drastically different from what in fact came about.

Conclusion

In sum, I have developed a simple institutional model of the EC's effects on international outcomes, focusing on its ability to amplify or attenuate the international bargaining power of certain of its member states. Under a strict set of assumptions, I have specified the conditions allowing and the directions of those effects. The model suggests that the EC can amplify members' international bargaining power where the international weight-added to their position by virtue of winning the EC bargain renders them critical to an international winning or blocking coalition, where as free agents they were not. If the EC amplifies the preferences of its "minimalist" members, extensive international progress may be blocked. This is more likely to occur under unanimity than under QMV rules. If it amplifies the maximalists, international outcomes will tend to
move away from the status quo. This is more likely, I contend, under the QMV decision rule. Conversely, the EC can attenuate members' international power where they fail to define the EC common position though they would have been internationally critical as free agents.

To evaluate these claims empirically, I have conducted two paired-comparisons involving instances of EC involvement in international environmental bargaining. The cases were selected according to "most similar systems" design criteria, i.e. in order to hold the effects of confounding variables constant while introducing variation on the variables of interest. In this model, changing member state and third party preferences are the most plausible rival hypothesis to explain variations in international outcomes. By pairing cases closely in time which deal with the same issue area, I have attempted to control for the effects of changes in preferences.

The cases broadly support the claims made in this paper. The first waste case offered a baseline of member state free agency against which member states' actual power could be compared. The outcome where members had to work through the EC was diametrically opposed to the outcome where they acted on their own behalf. In particular, in 1994 the maximalist Denmark likely saw its international bargaining power amplified by virtue of winning the EC qualified majority vote, and minimalists Germany and Britain likely saw their power attenuated. I argue that these differences, and indeed the international outcome itself, can be ascribed to the operation of the EC as an embedded institution. Generally, the direction of EC effects depends upon who is doing the dragging (under unanimity rules) and on who is being dragged (under QMV). All of
these effects depend primarily upon the arrangement of preferences within the EC and internationally, and on the configuration of the EC's embeddedness within the international bargaining structure.

In the ozone cases, the Copenhagen example showed how unanimity rules could amplify the international bargaining power of a minimalist state such as Greece, and how this could alter international outcomes. The Vienna example offers mixed support for the theory. Recall my expectation that, all other things being equal, EC QMV rules tend to amplify the power of maximalist member states if they are to have any effect at all. Here, because they were numerous and weighty enough to form a blocking minority, EC minimalists were able to define the common position and arguably saw their international power increased.

Two explanations, which are not included in, but are consistent with, the current approach, suggest themselves. They are offered here not to try to "save" the approach, but rather to suggest avenues for future refinement. First, the need to form a relatively large coalition may have resulted in the watering-down of Spain and Greece's strong minimalist preferences in order to win the support of less-insistent potential coalition partners. Although they may have violated Riker's "size principle" of coalition-building in so-doing --according to which only minimal winning coalitions, with no superfluous members, should form\textsuperscript{74}-- the fact that QMV rules place greater demands on minimalist states may thus reduce their likelihood of success, even if that eventuality did not transpire in this instance. Second, although I do conclude that the power of the

\textsuperscript{74} Riker 1962, 47.
minimalists was amplified in this instance, the current sparse model is too blunt an instrument to pick up quantitative changes in member state power. In other words, this model can only pick-up the presence or absence of bargaining power, rather than degrees of it. Accordingly, the Vienna outcome, which broadly reflected but was not identical to the preferences of the EC minimalists, is not fully accounted for by the present model.

The foregoing suggests some of the limitations of the current model. First, the assuming-away of bargaining dynamics may lead to incorrect predictions such as changes in states' revealed preferences. Second, and related, the assumption of dichotomous issues and choices fails to predict mixed or nuanced outcomes which may be the result of compromise, issue-linkage, side payments, and the like. Third, and unrelated to the first two, the characterization of consensus decisionmaking as entailing the "sense of the meeting," rather than unanimity as is conventionally understood, is unorthodox and may decrease the "determinateness" of predictions. My intent is to explore just how far such a sparse framework takes us, and while it certainly does not account for all of the variance in outcomes, it seems to account for a good portion of it.

On the positive side, the embedded institutions approach can fruitfully be applied to all areas of EC external relations. Furthermore, it is useful for the broader study of IR in at least three respects. First, embedded institutions extends the logic of "second image" theories of IR. "Domestic" structures are indeed important in shaping actors' external policy stances. However, exclusive focus on them leaves unanswered the question of how variations in domestic institutions (and thus in the content of external

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stances) can affect international outcomes. By embedding "domestic" (EC) institutions within international bargaining structures, the current approach augments second-image theorizing. EC institutions are doubly relevant because they preclude activity by EC members (foreclosing on alternative bargaining processes involving different actors) and because they exert independent effects (creating different outcomes). Unlike the subunits of federal states, the status quo default for EC member states is not absence from international bargaining, but free agency within it.

Second, the approach highlights the EC's potential for independent causal importance in international relations. Traditional IR approaches in the neorealist or neoliberal traditions maintain the state as actor assumption even where the EC is involved, viewing it as characterized either by a perfect hierarchy of constituent subunits or by perfectly stable winning coalitions of member states. Grieco, for example, holds that the EC external policy preferences are reducible to the preferences of the most powerful member states: Germany, France, and Britain. However, this need not be the case: depending upon the EC bargaining structure, EC stances may either reflect or diverge from the preferences of at least one of these states. International outcomes, contrary to the expectations of materially-oriented realist scholars of IR, can counter the wishes of large and powerful states such as the US and reflect those of small, ostensibly insignificant states such as Denmark and Greece.

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76 See Cowhey 1993 for a suggestive approach to this problem.
77 Skjaerseh 1995.
Third, and related, the current approach suggests a new way of thinking about the importance of non-state actors in global, and indeed in *interstate*, politics. Prevailing analyses focus on non-state activity which parallels or precedes state decisionmaking. Wapner, for example, convincingly establishes that there is a realm of politics existing alongside of the governmental.\(^{79}\) While this is undoubtedly true, and while it arguably coexists quite comfortably with state-centric analyses, it does not frontally challenge state-centric perspectives. In the analyses of Haas and Litfin, on the other hand, the activities of non-state actors precede state action, serving to define problems and solutions in ways which are not accounted for in state-centric analyses.\(^{80}\) Theirs are accounts of state preferences formation. However, because these approaches posit a causal chain which works in the last instance through states, they are open to *post hoc* subsumption by rationalist accounts. State-centrists can read back from outcomes and induce preferences, arguing either that their approaches are unimpeached because preference formation is exogenous to their models or that non-state activities are epiphenomena which reflect and conform to the wishes of states. Where states act on their own behalf, demonstrating that they do not control outcomes is a daunting task indeed. By driving an institutional wedge between states and outcomes, the current approach represents a fundamental challenge to state-centric theorizing.

Neither the EC nor its member states are soon to disappear from global politics. Indeed, as the EC continues to develop internally, there is every evidence that its external role will grow. Assessing the mutual impacts of the EC and its members, and their

\(^{79}\) Wapner 1996.

\(^{80}\) Haas 1990; Litfin 1994.
interactive effects on international outcomes, is thus of importance not only to students of European integration, but also to those interested in global politics broadly defined. As the world grows more institutionalized, and regional and functional groupings proliferate, the embeddedness of bargaining structures may increase, and the effects of embeddedness on international outcomes will need to be assessed. For example, there is a strong functional argument to be made that common rules formed by regional trade blocs will required the staking out of common external positions capable of affecting them. The task ahead lies not in assessing whether institutions matter, but the conditions under and the ways in which they matter. The EC should prove fertile ground for such inquiries.

References


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81 Schmitter 1969; European Court of Justice 1971.
82 Keohane and Martin 1995.


