The Europeanization of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
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DRAFT: NOT FOR CITATION

In Ian Bache’s introductory paper, Europeanization was characterized as the impact of the European Union on the ‘politics and policy of its member States’ (p.1). The study of the FCO will concentrate mainly on what one might describe as the impact on the UK polity (in this case the FCO and its changing role in UK policy-making and implementation) rather than on UK politics or UK foreign policy. It may well be the case that the book chapter would benefit from being expanded to include an evaluation of the impact of EU membership on British foreign policy.

Defining Europeanization as taking place when ‘something in the national (UK) political system is affected by something European’ or as the ‘administrative adaptation of the national (UK) state to membership of the EU’ or as ‘domestic change caused by European integration’ serves to clarify what is meant by Europeanization (although it raise some interesting questions about how easy it is in practice to make the distinction between the EU and Europe more generally) but it still leaves unresolved the question of cause and effect. The FCO has been affected by UK membership of the EU but the specific nature of the EU’s foreign policy competences and procedures (especially the CFSP) have themselves been affected by the input of the FCO and its diplomats. The FCO has played a major role in the evolution of the CFSP (? from an intergovernmental to a transgovernmental mode of policy making) but it is the very nature of the CFSP (in particular its recent ‘Brusselsisation’) that we might
then want to identify as having a specific impact on the FCO. Thus
europeanization is not just about the impact of one level of governance (EU) on
another (the UK central government); it is inevitably about a circular process
with constant feedback.

Even if one agrees that to look for evidence of europeanization is to look for
evidence of domestic change related to EU membership one is still left with the
problem of establishing cause and effect. Many of the changes /adaptations that
the FCO has experienced in recent years coincide with Britain’s’ EU membership
but they can also be seen as responses to broader trends in international
relations such as interdependence, globalization and the general ‘blurring of
boundaries’ between the domestic and the foreign. The difficulty of identifying
the causes of change in this area are nicely illustrated by the recent publication
of two similar volumes. In *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation* (Macmillan
1999) Brian Hocking has edited a book of contributions that examines changes
in a selection of foreign ministries and diplomatic services drawn from all
corners of the world. The introduction and conclusions seek to generalise about
the impact of globalization, interdependence etc on diplomatic organisations and
procedures. In *European Foreign Ministries: Integrating Diplomats* (Palgrave
2002)) the same editor Brian Hocking (with David Spence) has produced a
similar volume, this time limited to the foreign ministries of the EU member
states, which has as its implicit focus the europeanization of EU member state
foreign ministries. It is thus hard to be clear about the extent to which significant
changes in the FCO are related specifically to EU membership or more generally
to changes either to national circumstance or the broader international context.
Thus we shall see that the FCO’s role in the management of UK policy towards
the EU is potentially challenged by the further development of devolution in the
UK if the devolved authorities seek more autonomous international relationships.
It is hard however to explain UK devolution in terms of europeanization (despite
the European Commission’s enthusiasm for the idea of a Europe of the Regions)
and the problem of the hollowing out of the state is not restricted to EU member states. Foreign ministries and national diplomatic services face a general problem of losing control over international relations between sub-national authorities. Similarly the blurring of boundaries between the domestic and the foreign presents a formidable challenge to national foreign ministries which is highlighted and emphasized by EU membership but by no means limited to it. UKREP is an exceptional external representation but its role as a kind of mini-Whitehall is to be found to a lesser extent in a number of UK embassies abroad and not just in those in other EU member states.

This paper examines the changing role of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as it has adapted to a transformed world. Particular attention is given to the impact of Britain’s membership of the European Union which was anticipated in the 1960s but which did not take place until 1973.

The current structure and role of the FCO reflects a cumulative adjustment to change over a considerable period of time, although the pace of that change has quickened since Britain became a member of the European Union. In the past fifteen years, the FCO has been faced with major international changes - the collapse of communism in Europe, the end of the cold war international system, the widening and deepening of the European Union and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia - as well as a major domestic change - the election of a Labour Government in May of 1997, after a prolonged eighteen year period of successive Conservative administrations.

The history and role of the Foreign Office in the making and implementation of British foreign policy has been told in a number of places and needs only a brief rehearsal here. The Foreign Service can be traced back to 1479 and the Foreign Office to 1782. Until the mid-1960s the UK chose to handle its imperial and post imperial relationships separately from its dealings with the rest of the world. The Colonial Office, the India Office, the Dominions Office and
the Commonwealth Relations Office have all evolved and merged over time to form the Commonwealth Office and, in 1968, the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office themselves merged to form the present FCO. The present Diplomatic Service was established in 1965 amalgamating the Foreign Service, the Commonwealth Service and the Trade Commission Service.

The administration of British aid has a complex history of semi-detachment from the FCO. Overseas aid was traditionally administered by the Foreign Office but in 1964 the Labour Government created a separate Ministry of Overseas Development headed by a Cabinet minister. Since then Conservative governments (1970-1974 and 1979-1997) have chosen to handle aid through an Overseas Development Administration (ODA) under the overall control of the FCO whilst Labour governments (1964-1970 and 1974-1979) preferred a separate Ministry. In 1997 the incoming Labour government maintained this pattern by establishing a Department for International Development headed by Claire Short with a seat in the Cabinet.

The Foreign Office and now the FCO have always had a central role in the management of Britain’s external policies. This role has been challenged by the relative decline of Britain’s position and role in the international system throughout the twentieth century (most spectacularly since 1945) and by the changing nature of international relations - the shifting agenda, the changing basis of power and influence and the growth of interdependence and of multilateral attempts to manage that interdependence. Despite these trends, which have tended to blur the distinction between foreign and domestic politics and policy, the FCO has managed to retain a central role in the shaping and management of Britain’s external policies. The most significant example of Britain’s involvement in multilateral management is, of course, its membership of the European Union that has both challenged and, in many ways, enhanced the role of the FCO. The continued strength of the FCO has, in recent years, played a major part in enabling Britain to ‘punch above its weight’ in the international system in general. Britain has always been a major player within the European
Union but it is perhaps only since the election of the Labour government in 1997 that Britain has aspired to a significant ‘leadership’ role. Even before he was elected Mr Blair established a clear link between Britain’s world role and the significance of its EU membership when he argued that the aspiration to be ‘a major global player’ would be forfeit unless we accepted Europe as our base. Faced with the contradictory pressures of changing demands and diminishing resources, the FCO has firmly resisted ‘external’ attempts to reform it whilst demonstrating an effective willingness and ability to make the necessary internal adaptations. It is a measure of the FCO’s adaptive ability that the Diplomatic Service has successfully retained its separate and unique status within the British administration and that successive Foreign Secretaries have preserved their senior position within the British Cabinet hierarchy. The position of Foreign Secretary remains one of the most important posts in the British government although the particular importance of the relationship between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary has been modified in recent years by the growing power of the Prime Minister’s office in Downing Street. This can in part be attributed to the impact of Britain’s membership of the EU and the external policy leadership and coordinating role that the expansion of the power of European Council gives to the head of the government and his office.

The general expansion in the number of states in the international system has challenged the FCO’s determination to preserve Britain’s global power status by retaining a global representation. This FCO managed to do this in response to the proliferation of states as a result of decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s; the new challenges posed by the emergence of new states following the break-up of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia in the 1990s have proved more testing and the FCO has struggled to keep up with its major European rivals. In 2003 Britain maintained 233 posts of which 153 are embassies (compared with just 136 countries in 1968) whilst Germany maintained 208 posts and France 279 posts. In April 1999 the FCO had a total of 5635 UK-based staff of whom 2295 were serving overseas (whilst Germany had 3361 and France 5669 staff serving
Although these figures partly reflect a continuing British tradition of, and preference for, employing quite high numbers of local staff in its missions abroad. The rapid expansion of tourism and travel along with an increase in the number of states has increased certain of the demands on overseas posts whilst the increased ease and speed of both travel and communications has raised contradictory doubts about the purpose of, and need for, overseas posts. These and other issues relating to both change and Britain’s declining resources have meant that the FCO has been the subject of a number of formal inquiries and reviews in recent years. The Plowden\textsuperscript{11}, Duncan\textsuperscript{12} and Berrill\textsuperscript{13} Reports in 1964, 1969 and 1977 respectively all made recommendations which the FCO was inclined to resist whilst more recently the 1992 Structural Review, the 1995 Fundamental Expenditure Review and the 1996 Senior Management Review were all conducted ‘in house’, albeit with the participation of outside consultants, and produced recommendations that the FCO was more inclined to accept. The latter reviews were partly occasioned by a self-perceived need to rethink certain aspects of the FCO’s work (its staffing policies in the face of demands for racial and sexual equality of opportunity and for more rapid career advancement in a Diplomatic Service that had become ‘top-heavy’ as a result of various administrative reorganisations; its postings policies as more FCO spouses were reluctant to sacrifice their own careers in order to accompany FCO staff abroad and its staff training and development policies as the demands for functional expertise increased) partly by the need to find further financial savings and partly by the general trend of governmental reform (market testing, financial devolution, delayering, performance targeting and analysis etc.) which has developed in recent years.

During Mrs Thatcher’s period in office, the FCO was subjected to a continuous level of criticism by a dominant Prime Minister who became increasingly interested, as all long-serving prime ministers tend to, in playing a major role in foreign affairs\textsuperscript{14}. Mrs Thatcher’s frustration and problems with the European Union, which she associated with the pro-European leanings of the
FCO, led her to contemplate, but in fact never to seriously implement, the possibility of building up Downing Street’s foreign policy capabilities as a counter to the central role of the FCO. In Charles Powell, a career FCO official, who became increasingly politicised during his time at No.10, Mrs Thatcher had an ambitious and effective Private Secretary for Overseas Affairs who was more than capable of assisting her in her occasional forays against the FCO - his part in the drafting of her attack on the EU and its President, Jacques Delors, in a speech made at the College of Europe in 1988 is a case in point. Mrs Thatcher also appointed a succession of ex-ambassadors to advise her but, by and large, they were always careful not to undermine their previous employers when briefing her. Under Mrs Thatcher, plans for the establishment of a Foreign Affairs Unit along similar lines to the American National Security Council were overtaken by the events that led to her eventual resignation. John Major showed no real inclination to side-step either the Foreign Secretary or the FCO in the handling of foreign policy in general or the EU specifically. In April 1998 Mr Blair rejected proposals put forward by some of his colleagues for creating a powerful prime minister’s department based upon a reconstructed cabinet office. However there was a small controversy over the revelation that the Prime Minister had appointed several overseas personal envoys (Lords Levy, Paul and Ahmed). Press comment saw these appointments as indicative of ‘an American style of foreign policy’ and noted the fact that these envoys were unaccountable to parliament and could be seen to be part of a process that bypassed the FCO. When Mr Blair was returned to office in 2001 however he did take significant steps to enhance the role of Downing Street over both EU policy and foreign policy towards the rest of the world. Mr Blair chose to move two of the Cabinet Office Secretariats (dealing with Overseas and Security policy and with the EU) into Downing Street under the control of his two foreign policy advisors – Sir Stephen Wall (ex head of UKREP) and Sir David Manning (ex head of the UK Delegation to NATO).
The FCO is staffed largely by members of the Diplomatic Service but with some members of the Home Civil Service. Before the 1997 Labour Government established the Ministry for International Development, the FCO had a Diplomatic Wing and an Aid Wing (Overseas Development Administration). The Diplomatic Wing is staffed by around 6000 UK-based personnel (around 4000 in the Diplomatic Service and 2000 Home Civil Servants mainly in support roles in London) who serve both at home and abroad. In 2003 there were around 2295 UK-based staff serving abroad and they were assisted in posts by 7841 locally engaged staff. The FCO have been forced to accept considerable reductions in budgets and overall staffing levels (21% since 1980) in recent years. The FCO vote (minus the variable costs of peacekeeping operations) is around £1 billion at 1995 prices whilst the Department for International Development (DFID) receives around £2.2 billion (the fifth largest aid budget in the world). The FCO thus has a relatively small budget in contrast to the £20+ billion allocated to the Ministry of Defence or the nearly £100 billion expenditure of the Department of Social Security. The FCO has hardly any programme expenditure (unlike the DFID) and so budget cuts can be directly translated into staff slots or overseas posts. As a consequence FCO morale has been quite badly affected in recent years by the constant budgetary pressures. Staff who have become disillusioned, either by budget reductions, seemingly inconsiderate postings policies or the lack of opportunity for career advancement have been able to find better paid and often less demanding employment in the private sector.

The FCO is headed by the Foreign Secretary who is always a senior member of the Government. There are usually at least three junior ministers (four when ODA is situated within the FCO) one of whom, in recent years has been designated Minister for Europe. The FCO is headed by a Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) who is responsible both for the administration of the FCO and the work of overseas posts through a Board of Management and for strategic policy advice to ministers through a Policy Advisory Board. In recent years the work of the PUS has become
increasingly focussed on the management of the FCO in London. The post of Political Director, which was initially created so that Britain could play its part in the EU’s system of European Political Cooperation, is now effectively the top policy advisory post. Whereas twenty years ago the PUS would always accompany the Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister on his travels overseas now it is usually the Political Director who clocks up the air miles whilst the PUS stays at home to look after the shop – the specific job of Political Director can be explained in terms of Europeanization but the role that he or she plays is the result of both EU membership and other factors.

The basic FCO unit remains the geographical desk within a geographical Department and Command. Although there has been a considerable growth in functional departments in response to the ‘internationalisation’ and ‘Europeanization’ of a number of traditional domestic issues and to the growth of multilateral forums, the FCO has resisted suggestions that, as a multi-functional organisation, it should reorganise itself around its functions although in the case of EU membership this is now changing. The Fundamental Expenditure Review of 1995 argued for the preservation of a structure based on regional and multilateral organisation partly because of the high estimated cost of restructuring the FCO and partly because of the continuing logic of geographical specialism. The FCO believes that its knowledge of specific countries and its development of bilateral relationships that span across a number of specific functions, adds significant value to the advancement and coordination of British interests. If the FCO were to be reorganised along functional lines then the fear would be that a number of functions could then be ‘hived off’ to domestic ministries along the lines suggested by the CPRS Report (see below). In January 2000, shortly before he became Minister for Energy in the reshuffle that followed the resignation of Peter Mandelson, Peter Hain, then a Foreign Office Minister, published a pamphlet in which he advocated the scrapping of Departments based on geographical divisions in favour of ‘issues’ departments dealing with subjects such as human rights, the environment and conflict prevention.
extent that the ‘desks’ for other EU member states have recently been removed from a geographical command and placed within functional (EU) departments then Hain’s proposals seem to be gaining acceptance at least as far as the management of European multilateral and bilateral policies are concerned.

The FCO faces two types of coordination problem in its management of Britain’s external relations. Firstly it has to ensure effective internal communication and coordination both within the FCO in London and between London and the network of overseas posts. Secondly, as the agenda expands to directly involve many Home Departments in both the shaping and execution of external policy (of which the EU is the most obvious example), the FCO has a major responsibility to ensure coherence and consistency across Whitehall. In pursuing this second objective, the FCO also has a clear interest in retaining as much overall control over British foreign policy-making and implementation as is possible.

Within the FCO, the problems raised by the proliferation of functional and multilateral commands cutting across the geographical divisions is best illustrated by reference to arrangements for dealing with the countries of Western Europe and the EU (see above and in the next section). Across Whitehall the coordination of British foreign policy is not in the exclusive control of the FCO. Long gone are the days when all contacts with the outside world were handled by the FCO. Nowadays just as the FCO has sprouted a number of functional departments that in many ways ‘shadow’ the work of Home Departments so, in turn, most Home Departments have developed their own international and European sections. The FCO continues to play a major role in the coordination of all these different aspects of Britain’s external policy but the British system also recognises that, with reference to a number of cross-cutting issues, the FCO is not the unchallenged sole determinant of the overall British interest but merely an ‘interested’ department amongst many others. In these cases, the Cabinet system and the work of the Cabinet Office provide consistency and coherence. At the very top of the decision-making process, the British Cabinet is meant to be
collegial and the doctrine of collective responsibility pertains. In practice many decisions are delegated down to Cabinet Committees of which the Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) and the Committee on the Intelligence Services both chaired by the Prime Minister and the Sub-Committee on European Questions ((E)DOP), chaired by the Foreign Secretary, are the most important in relation to foreign policy.

The work of these ministerial committees and of their official counterparts is supported by the Cabinet Office, headed by the Secretary of the Cabinet who is also the head of the Home Civil Service. There were five separate Secretariats within the Cabinet Office of which three (the Overseas and Defence Secretariat, the Joint Intelligence Secretariat and the European Secretariat) had external relations coordination responsibilities. Two of these Overseas and defence and Europe have now been moved from the Cabinet Office to the Prime Ministers Office in Downing Street. The Secretariats are quite small, staffed mainly by home civil servants but also by members of the diplomatic service. The relationship between the FCO and the staff of the relevant secretariats is a close one; in no sense are they rivals although on issues where the FCO is in dispute with other government departments it is the Secretariat staff who record the minutes of the meetings at which government policy is thrashed out.

It might be expected that the FCO would fit uneasily into the broader Whitehall picture because of the separate recruitment, training and career structure of the diplomatic service and because so many members of the diplomatic service spend so much of their careers in posts overseas. However, whilst there is undoubtedly some rivalry and whilst some members of both the diplomatic service and the home civil service clearly retain prejudiced and stereotyped views of each other, it is hard to find examples of external policy being adversely affected by internal bureaucratic conflict involving the FCO as one of the warring parties. On the contrary, the most spectacular inter-departmental dispute of recent times, which had major external overtones, was the Westland crisis, which centred on a dispute between the Department of
Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Defence. As we shall see below, the FCO is in almost permanent conflict with the Treasury over the allocation of government resources but no more so than any other government department in recent years.

The FCO has been the subject of a number of formal enquiries in recent years. The Plowden Report delivered in 1964 ‘provoked the most radical changes and the least controversy’.\textsuperscript{28} It was responsible both for the creation of the unified diplomatic service and for the eventual amalgamations that led to the establishment of the FCO. Despite the obvious decline in British global influence that was apparent by the mid 1960s the Plowden report was ‘friendly’ towards the FCO in its assumption that Britain should nevertheless maintain the foreign policy capability of a global power. To this end, Plowden recommended improved conditions of employment for the diplomatic service which it felt should be maintained at a level approximately 10% above basic requirements so as to allow for enhanced training, leave and travel. These proposals were never implemented and subsequent inquiries were never so generous in their recommendations.

In 1969, after the traumas of devaluation and the military withdrawal from east of Suez, the Duncan Report\textsuperscript{29} was much tougher on the FCO. It set out to achieve savings of between 5 and 10 per cent by distinguishing between two distinct areas of British attention. Duncan recommended that the countries of western Europe plus North America should be grouped together in an Area of Concentration whilst the rest of the world (including Japan and the whole of the Middle East!) would form an Outer Area. Countries within the Area of Concentration and one or two other ‘special cases’ would be served by Comprehensive Posts, which would be staffed in the traditional way, but most of the countries that fell within the Outer Area would be served by much reduced Selective Posts from which there would be virtually no political reporting. The main emphasis of diplomacy was to be on commercial work and the Duncan Report made it clear that it did not consider a foreign policy apparatus suitable
for a global power with comprehensive political and commercial interests any longer appropriate for Britain. This view of the role of the FCO and the Diplomatic Service was of course strongly contested by the FCO, whose delaying tactics were all that were required as the change of government that occurred in June of 1970 led to the shelving of the Duncan Report.

Even more radical however was the report produced by the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) under Kenneth Berrill. Charged with recommending ‘the most suitable, effective and economic means of representing and promoting British interests both at home and overseas’ the CPSR team came up with a proposal that the Diplomatic Service and the Home Civil Service be effectively merged creating a Foreign Policy Group. This suggestion was based on the assumption that the necessary specialisms required to advance British interests were to be found in the Home Civil Service and that the essentially political advice, expensively provided by the Diplomatic Service, was no longer relevant to British needs. Were this advice to be made today it would almost certainly be regarded as ‘europeanization’! In addition, the CPSR Report called for the closing of 55 posts on top of the 30 that had been closed since Duncan reported. The CPRS Report was nothing more than a direct attack on the FCO and all that it stood for and it provoked an enormously hostile response. Typical was the reaction of one of Britain’s senior Ambassadors whose Paris embassy was singled out for particular attack for the ‘lavishness’ of its hospitality. In his diaries, Nicholas Henderson records ‘This is the third such enquiry in the past fifteen years. True, Plowden and Val Duncan did the service no harm but the setting up of yet another and outwardly more hostile enquiry has not been good for morale. The FCO produced a line by line rebuttal of the entire report and they were supported in their endeavors by Jim Callaghan, the Prime Minister, who had fond memories of his time as Foreign Secretary. The CPRS Report provoked such a hostile reaction, with hundreds of serving diplomats threatening to resign rather than face incorporation into the Home Civil Service, that it probably never stood much chance of being implemented. Despite its spirited and successful
defence, the FCO showed in later years that it recognised some of the problems highlighted by the CPRS Report, even if it rejected the proposed solutions.

More recently, the FCO has been given a more searching examination by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, particularly over its response to new commercial challenges in the Far East and over its management of Public Diplomacy via the BBC World Service and the British Council (both of whom are FCO responsibilities and paid for under the FCO vote). In the 1990s the FCO has responded to the general climate of government reform by holding its own internal Structural Review in 1992, a Fundamental Expenditure Review (FER) in 1995 and a Senior Management Review (SMR) in 1996. The acceptance and implementation of these more recent reports are part of the FCO’s response to a changing European and international environment although it is hard to distinguish between the two or to isolate influences which are specifically European or EU.

In recent years the FCO has faced a number of specific issues in addition to the general problem of managing the consequences of Britain’s general decline in the international hierarchy. The biggest external challenge has arisen from the need to adjust both the procedures and substance of British foreign policy to the growing importance of the European Union. Participation in the European Union has given particular emphasis to the blurring of the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy. A considerable amount of EU business is conducted by officials from the Home Civil Service working in domestic ministries such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department for the Environment, Food and Agriculture (DEFRA) Where once all dealings with foreign governments were conducted through the FCO and Britain’s embassies abroad, now there are direct dealings between domestic ministries and their opposite
numbers in the other EU member states. This has highlighted a number of issues of both coordination and control that have challenged the FCO’s dominant role in the identification and pursuit of the British interests overseas.

In the past a separate European Ministry has been proposed and, under Edward Heath in the 1970-74 Conservative administration, a Cabinet minister with EU responsibilities (Geoffrey Rippon) was appointed to support the Foreign Secretary, although, once the accession negotiations were completed, the post was soon abolished. The FCO has always resisted attempts to separate EU business from the overall responsibilities of the FCO and successive Foreign Secretaries have shown little enthusiasm for suggestions that the present Minister of State for Europe be elevated to Cabinet rank. A Foreign Secretary stripped of his EU responsibilities would suffer an enormous loss of stature so central is the EU to so many internal and external policy issues. Nevertheless the idea was raised again and was discussed also at the Convention on the Future of Europe with the suggestion that senior cabinet ministers (Jacques Delors even suggested deputy prime ministers!) reporting directly to prime ministers might be permanently based in Brussels and charged with sustaining the authority of the European Council between the six-monthly summits. This would indeed have called into question the role of the FCO and of the Foreign Secretary, especially if, as was mooted at the time, the UK candidate had been Peter Mandelson. Proposals to transfer the management (as opposed to the coordination and strategic consideration) of European business to the Cabinet Office or to Downing Street would have had the same effect.

The FCO has undoubtedly gained from the centralising tendencies that EU membership has encouraged and Smith has identified the rise of ‘an informal, yet powerful elite comprising Number 10, the FCO, the Cabinet Office and the UK permanent representation (UKREP). However the British system of coordination, whilst it gives the FCO by far the major role, is also designed to ensure that where necessary the FCO is treated as another interested Department and not as the sole determinant of the UK national interest. The role
of the European Secretariat which arranges, chairs and records the results of interdepartmental discussions at all levels\textsuperscript{16} ensures that the FCO can not claim sole ownership or authorship of EU policy. The Cabinet Office is also responsible for the process whereby Parliament is informed and consulted about EU legislation. The FCO is usually represented in the European Secretariat but only with one official in a team of about seven – the rest coming from the home civil service.

However one has to be careful about making too much of the restraints on the FCO’s role in EU policy-making and coordination. The European Secretariat is quite small, although large by Cabinet Office standards, and it does rely heavily on FCO support. Similarly whilst UKREP is indeed an unusual embassy, with more than 50% of its staff being drawn from the home civil service, it has always been headed by an ambassador from the FCO and the FCO retains the right to oversee its instructions. The position of Permanent Representative is an extremely powerful one with the incumbent responsible for the day to day management of EU business in Brussels as well as usually playing a pivotal role in Treaty negotiations within the Intergovernmental Conference framework\textsuperscript{17}. The UK Permanent Representative, additionally gets to return to London each Friday to participate in EU policy-making meetings both within the FCO and the Cabinet Office – an opportunity resented by many home based officials and much envied by all other UK ambassadors.

Thus, despite the constraints mentioned above and elsewhere in this chapter, the FCO probably has succeeded in retaining a predominant EU role within the UK system. This is partly because in its competent handling of EU business the FCO has earned the respect of those working within other government departments and partly because the FCO itself has been quite relaxed about allowing other government departments to get on with EU business that clearly lies within their exclusive competence. Although Smith argues that ‘as EU business increases, the FCO and the Cabinet Office are losing control and departments are increasingly conducting business with the
Commission and other member states directly and that the FCO is incorrect in its belief that it still controls contact with Brussels, it is the contention of this chapter that, on the important EU matters, the FCO retains a significant degree of control and that it is probably wise to not try and take on business that it is beyond both its competence and its resources.

Within the FCO, following several recent reorganisations, EU matters and bilateral relations with individual EU member states are now handled within the same Command - the EU Command which now has four departments (CFSP, EU Internal, EU External and EU Bilateral) who report to the FCO Director EU and then (except for CFSP Dept, who report to the Political Director) to the Director Economic and EU. CFSP Department, in effect, provide a secretariat for the FCO Political Director who has chief operational responsibility for the UK’s input into the CFSP process. The Wider Europe Command brings together all the Departments dealing with Central and Eastern Europe (except the Balkans, which has a separate Command) and Western European countries which are not in the EU. NB THIS HAS NOW CHANGED BUT I AM STILL TRYING TO SORT OUT THESE CHANGES. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING TO NOTE IS THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER EU MEMBER STATES ARE NOW MANAGED FROM WITHIN EU DEPARTMENTS

The Labour Government’s devolution policies may well eventually have an impact on the way that the UK relates to the EU although the Government seems determined to try and retain London’s control over these matters. Each of the devolved administrations has agreed a concordat with the Westminster Government covering their role in international relations in general and the EU in particular. These were agreed without undue difficulty and the arrangements so far seem to be working well. The anticipated problems and disagreements have not so far materialised, with the result that the FCO has now disbanded its short-lived Devolved Administrations Department. Whilst the UK government is determined to remain responsible for international relations, including relations with the EU, it may well find itself under pressure form the devolved
administrations as their work develops. Already there have been suggestions that Scotland might seek to expand the level of its separate representation in Brussels and this would eventually threaten the role of UKREP and the UK Permanent Representative. Comparison with the growing EU role of the German Länder in this context may well be instructive in the future. In the long term, of course, the possibility of devolution leading to independence would challenge the whole concept of UK foreign policy and the role of the UK FCO.

Finally we should mention the recent efforts made by Mr Blair to broaden the nature of the UK government's relationship with its EU partners because these too may challenge the role of the FCO in the future. The Prime Minister has always been keen to establish stronger links between the centre-left parties in power in a number of the 15 EU states although in recent years their number has declined and Mr Blair's willingness to develop bilateral relationships with almost anybody regardless of political stance has increased. For a brief period Mr Blair appointed Mr Mandelson, seemingly with Mr Cook's blessing to act as a 'roving ambassador' but this did not appear to last long or bear much fruit. For his part Mr Cook when Foreign Secretary set up a powerful committee to increase the Labour party's influence in Europe. The committee, which is chaired by the Minister for Europe (a post which has had a surprising number of incumbents since Labour returned to power and which is clearly not regarded as significant by either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary), included policy advisors from Downing Street, the FCO and the Treasury. It represents the kind of development that the FCO has to embrace but, one suspects, with the intention of smothering rather than nurturing a potential challenger to its control of UK relations with European governments. The idea of someone like Mr Mandelson becoming a 'roving European Ambassador' was about as pleasing to the mandarins within the FCO as the idea of a foreign policy unit in Downing Street or a Minister for Europe in the Cabinet Office.
The FCO has responded reasonably well to change whether the stimulus comes from within, from Europe or from the wider international system. As we noted above, its basic tactic has been to strongly resist all attempts to impose reform from outside, whilst internally making some quite radical adjustments to the way that it organises itself and carries out its work. The changes in the substance of foreign policy and the blurring of boundaries between foreign and domestic policy have forced the FCO to work much more closely with other government departments, both within Britain and abroad, and to organise itself for the demands of multilateral (of which the EU is the most significant) as well as bilateral diplomacy and negotiation. The FCO has sought to manage the interface with other government departments as smoothly as possible, it has considered and sensibly rejected the idea of charging them for the work that its overseas posts carry out for them; it has instructed those of its departments, such as European Union Department (Internal), who ‘face’ domestic ministries to consult with them about their requirements vis-a-vis FCO posts overseas and it has sought to maintain its position, if not of supremacy, then at least of ‘primus inter pares’ in the overall direction of British foreign policy. Foreign policy is increasingly about coordination and the FCO is clearly the most important of the coordinating departments and has made considerable efforts to maintain this position, whilst continuing to argue the case for its separate identity. This has not been seriously challenged since the 1977 CPRS Report; instead the FCO position was endorsed by the 1994 White Paper on the Civil Service which stated that “The Diplomatic Service is a separate branch of the public service with its own particular needs and structure.”

The growing complexity of the foreign policy agenda has forced the FCO to develop more and more functional competences but it has responded to this challenge by firmly sticking to an organisational structure that subsumes functional expertise to geographical and multilateral Commands and therefore
emphasises the importance of the FCO’s coordination role in relation to other government departments. This however may at last be changing. Similarly the FCO, by preserving the pivotal role of the ambassador in overseas posts, has resisted the argument that domestic specialists who are posted overseas should report directly to their ‘home’ departments. Thus, in the name of coherence and consistency, the FCO has successfully defended its role as ‘gatekeeper’ both at home and abroad, even though the participants in the foreign policy process are increasingly drawn from a number of non-FCO sources. This is most clearly seen in the key roles that the FCO and the UK Permanent Representation to the EU (UKREP) play in the overall management of British policy towards the EU.

Changes in British society and in the approach to work and working conditions have forced the FCO to reconsider the way that it recruits staff and carries out its business. Attempts to open up the recruitment process have had mixed results; whilst the FCO can point to figures that suggest a steady increase in the employment of women and in the decline of candidates from private schools, its record on the employment of representatives of ethnic minorities is not impressive and it attracted highly unfavorable publicity in January of 1996 when its most senior woman, Pauline Neville-Jones, resigned ‘noisily’ after being denied the position of ambassador to Paris, on the face of it because she was both female and unmarried even though there have been women ambassadors in several countries, eg Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Chile and South Africa. On a variety of staff matters the FCO is increasingly in competition with a number of other employers for the talents of the young high flyers that it used to recruit with ease. Relatively poor pay, poor conditions of service, long working hours, slim chances of rapid promotion in a service where a number of senior posts have been cut on efficiency and economy grounds have all taken their toll and the FCO has been relatively slow to respond, leading to reports of growing dissatisfaction and low morale. Whether a Labour Government intent on ‘opening up’ the FCO to a wider recruitment base and more open and modern working practices is likely to restore the once high morale of the Diplomatic
Service remains to be seen. Many of the most unpopular changes to the nature of the work, and thus to the prospects of a satisfactory career, have been driven by the constant need to find financial savings rather than by the nature of the work. It does not seem very likely that this pressure will be significantly eased in the foreseeable future and so the FCO will continue to be handicapped in its efforts to create a modern service capable of attracting and retaining high quality staff. This may well force the FCO in the future to give much more serious consideration to moves within the EU to create a European diplomatic service involving both Commission and Council officials and those from EU national diplomatic services.

Recent reports have recognised the fact that, in a number of areas the FCO has been relatively slow to move with the times and efforts have been made to catch up. In its use of information technology the FCO has been slow, in comparison to other government departments and other EU governments to adopt advanced methods of electronic communication. However, whilst it has taken a long time to introduce a secure e-mail system, the FCO was one of the first British government departments to provide a public service on the Internet. The FCO Web Site was first established in 1995 and is generally regarded as first rate – a new site was added in December 1997 to serve the UK Presidency of the EU during the first half of 1998 and another was created to handle the interface with the public over the debate on the Future of Europe. The FCO web site serves both to enhance the ‘public diplomacy’ side of the FCO’s work and to provide instant access to non classified information for overseas posts. The aim is get everything online as soon as its embargo is lifted and most speeches or reports delivered to Parliament are now available before they are released to the media through traditional channels.

As well as seeking to preserve its central role in Whitehall by improving its links with other government departments, the FCO has also had to develop strategies for reforming its own internal structure and management practices, partly in response to changes in the foreign policy environment including the EU.
and partly in response to the general pressures for governmental reform that have developed in the last decade. The FCO strategy seems to have been to try and be seen to participate in this process of change and reform with as much enthusiasm as possible, whilst preserving its separate status and warding off any attempts to downgrade its overall significance by placing organisational emphasis on functional rather than geographical and multilateral coordination tasks.

To this end, as well as reemphasising, reinforcing and, where appropriate in Europe and South Asia, reorganising, its geographic Commands, the FCO has also sought to implement a policy of devolving both financial and management responsibility down through Commands to departments and to overseas posts in line with similar developments elsewhere in the government service. The FCO has sought over time to remove a complete layer of senior management (DUS level) by making geographic Commands directly answerable to the PUS and to give more responsibility at departmental level to officials, by encouraging them to brief ministers directly rather than moving documents through several layers of authorisation and control. Attempts have also been made to improve the role of policy planning in the FCO (partly in association with other EU foreign ministries), to better associate the work of the Research Analysts with their customer departments and to reorganise the management structure so that those responsible for policy planning and advice and those responsible for the management of resources are more closely associated with each others work. This latter objective has been partly achieved by devolution and partly by unifying the Policy Advisory Board and the Board of Management and strengthening their links with the Commands as well as their ‘visibility’ to the rest of the FCO. A number of these reforms can be tracked around the Foreign Ministries of the other EU member states but whether this can be described as europeanization, adaptation, emulation or policy transfer is a debatable point.

The FCO has revised its mission statement three times in recent years so as to relate its corporate objectives more clearly to its core functions and also to facilitate better monitoring of those objectives and their attainment. The FCO
Annual Departmental Report is now replete with lists of objectives and targets with regard to political and economic work as well as commercial, consular, entry clearance and information work and with records of their achievement. In 2003 the FCO produced for the first time a Strategy Report which maintained a trend to show due significance to the role of the EU but also to make it clear that the UK also operated as an independent actor in the wider international system - the FCO continues to want to have its cake and eat it! The UK strategy document suggest that whilst the FCO may well have been subjected to europeanization it is not necessarily either integrating or converging with the foreign ministries of the other EU member states.

Another area where the FCO has been forced to respond to change in recent years concerns the growing interest of the wider public, both at home and abroad, in foreign policy. Domestic publics, particularly in the developed world and, particularly of late within the EU member states, are now less trusting of governments and more aware of what they are up to in the foreign policy area. Britain is no exception to this general post-war trend which has, if anything, accelerated since the end of the cold war. The FCO must now pay more attention to both Parliament and the wider public in Britain whilst the state of public opinion in those countries which Britain seeks to influence is now also a factor that needs to be given far more attention than in the past. Recent meetings of the European Council and the last three IGCs have been notable for the concern of individual European leaders for public opinion and reaction back home. The FCO can be criticised for being slow to react to this phenomenon. Commentators noted the persistent refusal of the FCO to either acknowledge or seek to reach a consensus with the significant ‘Falklands lobby’ which nevertheless exerted influence on British attempts to change its policy on the ownership of the Falkland Islands and the FCO and the British government in general can be faulted for their failure to seek a broad domestic consensus on a whole host of European Union issues. Similarly the FCO was heavily criticised for its recent attempts to cut the budget and restrict the activities of both the BBC World
Service\textsuperscript{4} and the British Council at a time when the importance of this type of ‘public diplomacy’ was becoming more rather than less significant. The FCO and the UK government in general continue to struggle to find a way of creating a domestic consensus for the EU policies that they wish to pursue and the EU structures that they wish to support.

However, the issue of public diplomacy has now begun to be addressed by the FCO. The Fundamental Expenditure Review devoted a whole section to the growing importance of public diplomacy and to the need for the FCO to develop a public diplomacy strategy statement as well as individual country strategies. The BBC World Service and the British Council are to have their objectives reevaluated with a view to aligning them more closely to the FCO’s aims and objectives and the FCO Information and Cultural Relations Departments have been restructured. The FCO now has a Public Diplomacy Dept and EUD(I) a Public Diplomacy Section. At a recent seminar of all the UK’s present and former ambassadors to the EU the present incumbent and his immediate predecessor both commented on their changing roles with much less time being spent in COREPER and much more time being spent on more traditional ambassadorial work with interest groups and members of the EP.

The growing interest of the wider public in foreign policy has given foreign policy making and implementation an additional dimension which the FCO and its political masters have yet to fully understand. The pressures from the public often seem irrational; over Somalia, the Falklands invasion, atrocities in Bosnia, the question of European integration or the sale of arms to undesirable regimes, the British public seemed and seem to be calling for action and intervention by the British Government but they also have made it clear that additional costs, whether human or financial will not be tolerated. In the face of these contradictions the Government has been inclined to vacillate and to allow public opinion to gain the upper hand. It is by and large a failure of leadership and of will by government that has left the FCO exposed to the whims of public
opinion and the media. The problems that it has faced in pursuing a consistent policy towards the European Union in recent years is a case in point. The FCO alone can not be expected to master this new foreign policy environment but, given a clear lead by government, it can be expected to provide the necessary support. At the time, many observers saw the replacement of Tony Blair’s first Minister for Europe (Douglas Henderson) by Joyce Quin as an indication that the FCO would “henceforth play a much bigger role in “selling” Europe to a sceptical British public” and this was also a task entrusted to various of her successors - all have failed although none have proved as disastrously antagonistic as the present incumbent!

Conclusions

In most of the areas discussed above, the FCO has developed strategies for responding to change in recent years. The critical question of course is the extent to which this need for change can be seen as resulting from British membership of the EU. These responses tend to resemble ‘fine tuning’ rather than radical reform but they have enabled the FCO and the Diplomatic Service to retain their central position in the making and implementation of British foreign policy. Indeed it has been argued that EU membership has provided opportunities for the FCO, along with the DTI and MAFF to ‘increase their role and autonomy’. It is certainly the case that British influence in the world has continued to decline although participation in the European Union has, to a certain extent, halted that decline by enabling Britain to benefit from the its collective power. In many ways Britain still aspires to maintain the foreign policy of a world power; little attempt has been made in recent years to significantly cut back Britain’s global responsibilities or ambitions. Indeed in 1995 the British Government went to considerable lengths at its ‘Britain in the World Conference’ to emphasise the fact that Britain retained its global role and should not be thought of as ‘merely’ a European power. It is probably not that
surprising, therefore, that Britain should continue to attempt to maintain a foreign ministry and diplomatic apparatus appropriate to a power with global pretensions, albeit at reduced cost. THIS MAY WELL MEAN THAT THE CHAPTER WILL NEED TO SAY A BIT MORE ABOUT THE EUROPEANIZATION OR NOT OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY.

One area of possible change/adjustment which previous governments have resisted, concerns developments in the EU and the institutional consequences of pursuing a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The British government, despite finding it increasingly difficult to devote the necessary resources to its foreign policy machine, has not been tempted by the European option of pooling resources particularly overseas although Britain and France have recently (outside the EU framework) announced plans to work more closely together in Africa. Proposals to establish joint EU embassies and eventually to establish a full blown European diplomatic service have been stoutly resisted by Britain in favour of retaining a national foreign ministry and diplomatic service, even though, recently, Britain has gone along with an increasing concentration of CFSP activity in Brussels. In keeping with this approach, in March of 1999, the Foreign Secretary proposed the establishment of a permanent committee of deputy political directors in Brussels to steer and reinforce the CFSP. The idea of this committee was clearly to keep control of the CFSP firmly in the hands of national foreign ministries by boosting the Council of Ministers and the Council Secretariat rather than enhancing the Commission’s external powers. This British proposal led in time to the creation of the Political and Security Committee which is a good example of what has been described as the ‘Brusselsisation’ of the CFSP process. This is a good example of the circular nature of Europeanization as the FCO having advocated the establishment in Brussels of something like the COPS now has to adjust to its existence!

Since Labour came to power there have been reports that the Treasury would like the FCO to consider merging its consular work with that of other EU countries. However even if this were to be taken seriously, the FCO has made
it clear that commercial work, immigration control and some aspects of political work would have to remain under separate national control. In the 1998 spending review, which saw the budget of the Ministry for International Development rise by £1.6 billion over three years, the FCO also did rather well with a £220 million increase in its own budget – the first real increase for a decade\footnote{62} and this despite fears that the Chancellor would make the FCO pay for its rumored excesses.\footnote{63} In November of 1998 the Foreign Secretary announced that the increase in FCO funding, in combination with additional resources gleaned from the sale of overseas assets, would be used to increase UK representation in countries applying to join the EU (Europeanization?) as well as in the Caspian region and the Far East.\footnote{64}

The FCO is more likely to counter the Treasury proposals about consular work by giving further consideration to plans, that already exist, to shut down certain consulates and replace them with a telephone hotline to officials based in London. It would take a bigger swing towards further EU integration than the Labour government has so far been willing to consider for the FCO to come under any serious threat from a Brussels-based alternative.

This paper has raised some questions about the ability and willingness of the FCO to adjust to the general challenge of a transformed world and the specific challenge of EU membership. The conclusion would seem be that, whilst the FCO has undoubtedly proved itself to be a foreign ministry capable of both responsiveness and flexibility (although Peter Hain when an FCO Minister talked of his ‘frustration that the (FCO) machine is geared to responding to new circumstances mostly by incremental shifts in emphasis\footnote{65}, it has yet to be fully tested by, or called upon to serve, a government willing to adopt a consistently proactive EU policy. If the Labour administration is to actively pursue the objectives, laid out in Robin Cook’s mission statement,\footnote{66} of ‘exercising leadership in the European Union, protecting the world’s environment, countering the menace of drugs, terrorism and crime, spreading the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy and using its status at the UN to secure more
effective international action to keep the peace of the world and to combat poverty’ then the FCO just might find its organisation and working practices more fundamentally tested than it has to date.

At the start of the Labour administration it seemed as if the impact of EU membership was going to be felt more strongly in the FCO. Most observers seem to accept that the EU defence initiative, launched by Tony Blair at the close of the twenty-first Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998[^67] has given real substance to his oft-stated desire to exert British leadership within the EU[^68]. The proposals which had been flagged for some time arose from a paper written inside the FCO by a senior diplomat charged with finding ways of revitalising the UK Presidency and maximising the potential of Britain’s future in Europe[^69]. One of the key recommendations of Robert Cooper’s (N.B IF EVER THERE WAS AN EUROPEANIZED BRITISH DIPLOMAT IT IS ROBERT COOPER) memorandum (a paper, which was worked on by the Cabinet Office and which was also discussed in a series of seminars on EU policy involving both British academics and officials[^70] was to use British military assets to develop ‘a European capacity to act independently in the defence field’[^71]. The subsequent development of the defence initiative, along with notable British achievements recorded in both the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties as well as at a number of recent meetings of the European Council, suggests that the FCO is still capable of chalking up successes and defending its turf as Britain faces up to the challenges posed by Europe and the wider world in the twenty-first century. Whether this means that it is successfully resisting europeanization or whether it means that is its skillfully embracing it is something for us to debate

[^67]: Ian Bache, ‘Europeanization: A Governance Perspective’

[^68]: Maarten Wink, ‘What is europeanisation and other questions on a new research agenda’, European Political Science Autumn 2003 p. 63
3 See in particular: William Wallace (ed.) *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain*, (London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1975); John Dickie, *Inside the Foreign Office*, (London,
Chapmans, 1992); Michael Clarke, *British External Policy-Making in the 1990s*, (London,
Macmillan for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), Simon Jenkins and Anne Sloman,
Martin and John Garnett, *British Foreign Policy; Challenges and Choices for the 21st Century*,
(London: Royal Institute for International Affairs/Pinter, 1997)

4 Clarke, *British External Policy-Making*, p.77

5 Martin Smith reports that the FCO was ‘thought by many to have had a new lease of life from
membership (of the EU) after the shock of the decline of Empire’, Martin J Smith, *The Core

6 Speech at Chatham House, London, 5 April 1995 cited in Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot: Britain

7 See Lord Owen, ‘The ever growing dominance of No 10 in British Diplomacy’, lecture delivered
at the LSE, 8th October 2003.

8 For instance the FCO has just 2 diplomats in Uzbekistan compared with France’s 17 and
Germany’s 26. In Kazakhstan the UK has 3, France 10 and Germany 18, see *Financial Times*, 16
July, 1998

Paper, 2003

10 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1999 *Departmental Report*, p.121

11 *Report on the Committee on Representational Services Overseas*. (1962-64), (Plowden

12 *Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation* (1968-69) (Duncan Report),
Command 4107 (London: HMSO, 1969)


14 For an analysis of Mrs. Thatcher’s role in foreign policy-making see in particular Christopher
Hill, ‘United Kingdom: Sharpening contradictions’ in Christopher Hill (ed) *The Actors in Europe’s
Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major*, (London, John
Murray, 1997)

15 Dickie, *Inside the Foreign Office*, pp. 280-283

16 Dickie, *Inside the Foreign Office* p. 283

17 Robert Preston and George Parker, ‘Cabinet Office to keep role as independent mediator’,
*Financial Times*, 21 April, 1998


20 Andrew Parker ‘Cook moves to cut costs at Foreign Office’, *Financial Times*, 5 February, 1999


22 Nicholas Watt, ‘Hain seeks to end “nationalist” line on foreign policy’, *Guardian*, 23 January 2001

23 This view is robustly challenged by David Owen who argues that Blair’s ‘presidentialism’ especially with regard to EU policy-making is significantly undermining the role of the cabinet to the detriment of the UK interest. See Lord Owen, ‘The ever growing dominance of No 10 in British Diplomacy’, lecture delivered at the LSE, 8th October 2003.

24 For a detailed account of the work of the various cabinet committees in the making of European policy see Alisdair Blair, ‘UK Policy Coordination during the 1990-91 Intergovernmental Conference’, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 9, No. 2, especially pp. 161-167


26 See Martin J. Smith, *The Core Executive in Britain* .p.234


28 Dickie, *Inside the Foreign Office*, p.62


32 Martin J Smith, *The Core Executive in Britain*, pp. 234-235


34 See Donald Macintyre, ‘Making Europe more democratic will also make it too powerful’, *The Independent*, 19 March, 1999

35 Martin J Smith, *The Core Executive*, p. 233
36 See Alisdair Blair, ‘UK Policy Coordination during the 1990-91 Intergovernmental Conference’, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 9, No. 2, especially pp. 161-167 for a detailed description of official and ministerial EU committees

37 Alisdair Blair, ‘UK Policy Coordination during the 1990-91 Intergovernmental Conference’,

38 Martin J Smith, *The Core Executive in Britain*, p.234

39 See ‘Devolution and Foreign Affairs’ a speech by FCO Minister of State, Ms Joyce Quin, to the Northern Ireland Assembly, Belfast, 26 February 1999


41 ‘Blair pushes EU links’, *Guardian*, 26 October 1998

42 *Financial Times*, 16/17 January, 1999


45 For an example of the sort of challenge that the FCO has had to rebuff see Tessa Blackstone, ‘Too many Britons abroad’, *Guardian*, 21 May, 1993

46 Clarke, *British External Policy-Making in the 1990s*, pp.102-104


52 See Dan Jellinek, ‘Civil Surfers’, *Guardian*, 30 October, 1997


54 See John Tusa,‘A Dismal Volte-Face’, *The Observer*, 17 January, 1999
Andrew Parker, ‘A bright light to illuminate us all on European policy’, Financial Times, 6 July, 1998

Martin J Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, p.235


David Buchan, ‘Cook to propose EU foreign policy committee’, Financial Times, 13 March 1999

John Kampfner, ‘Call to share consular tasks’, Financial Times, 2 February, 1998


Ian Black, ‘Cook to recruit 200 envoys in fight for global markets’, Guardian, 28 November 1998

Guardian, 23 January 2001


Robert Preston, ‘UK aims to take leading role at heart of Europe’, Financial Times, 2 October, 1998


Foreign Office memorandum, cited in The Economist, 10 October, 1998