2024-03-29T07:37:14Zhttp://aei.pitt.edu/cgi/oai2
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1860
2011-02-15T22:20:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D46:46303332
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303032
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Turkey’s Performance in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment: Implications of EU Enlargement. ENEPRI Working Paper No. 8, November 2001
Loewendahl, Henry
Ertugal-Loewendahl, Ebru.
enlargement
IMF
Turkey
This paper analyses Turkey's performance in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). The paper is divided into three main sections. The first section analyses FDI in Turkey over time and relative to Central and Eastern Europe. The second section identifies the key factors determining investment location and on the basis of these factors assesses Turkey's competitive position. The third section examines the impact of EU enlargement on FDI in Turkey and explores whether the IMF agreement is sufficient for reducing obstacles to investment. The paper concludes that Turkey has under-performed in attracting FDI due to the slow pace of privatisation and political-institutional obstacles, of which chronic inflation is a manifestation. Structured interviews with global companies also highlighted lack of investment promotion as a major obstacle. While the IMF agreement will increase privatisation and reduce inflation, EU membership is vital if Turkey is to successfully compete for foreign investment.
2001-11
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1860/1/ENEPRI_WP08.pdf
Loewendahl, Henry and Ertugal-Loewendahl, Ebru. (2001) Turkey’s Performance in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment: Implications of EU Enlargement. ENEPRI Working Paper No. 8, November 2001. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1860/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:3176
2011-02-15T22:25:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D45:45303036
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303138:656C6D656D706C6F796D656E74756E656D706C6F796D656E74
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706768646F63
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Resolving Deadlock: Why International Organizations Introduce Soft Law"
Schaefer, Armin.
OECD
employment/unemployment
historical development of EC (pre-1986)
IMF
decision making/policy-making
[Introduction]. With the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), the European Union added a new mode of governance to existing policy-making instruments. Instead of introducing joint competencies, the OMC consists of multilateral surveillance of national policies. Supporters of the OMC claim that it was developed to reconcile legitimacy with effectiveness since it takes into account the diversity of national welfare states while facilitating trans-border policy learning. In contrast, this paper seeks to show that EU member states mainly use soft law in response to substantive disagreements. This mirrors earlier developments of the OECD and the IMF, where multilateral surveillance was also introduced to resolve deadlocks. In each case, member states opted for a non-binding procedural solution to overcome competing visions of the organizations’ purposes. Hence international organizations select soft law less for its effectiveness than for its capacity to foster compromises. Based on case studies, this paper juxtaposes the inauguration of soft coordination in the OECD, the IMF and the EU during the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s respectively. In all cases member states opted for soft law in times of ‘institutional crisis’ when more substantial agreements proved unattainable. As shown elsewhere, soft law policy coordination in the European Union shares many features with multilateral surveillance of the OECD and the IMF (Schäfer 2004). Hence we can obtain a broader view on why soft law was introduced to the EU by also looking at its origins in these organizations. A central argument of this paper is that existing approaches fail to convincingly explain the choice of soft law. They are much better at understanding harder forms of delegation and legal integration. Before we proceed, we have to clarify the notion of “soft law.” In general, we use it if there are neither binding rules nor sanctions to enforce compliance. In terms of the concept of legalization (Abbott et al. 2000), soft law scores low both on obligation and delegation but sometimes can be quite precise. More specifically, we stick to the following definition of soft law: “Rules of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed at and may produce practical effects”(Senden 2004: 112, emphasis deleted). The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 looks at possible theoretical explanations for the choice of soft law. Recent contributions in the principal-agent framework are a good starting point to trace the question when governments decide to delegate or pool sovereignty. Since delegation always goes along with agency losses – principals cannot completely control agents – governments shy away from it if there is policy conflict. Based on this insight, section 3 offers a historical reconstruction of the introduction of soft law, in this case procedures of multilateral surveillance, in the OECD, the IMF, and the EU. Section four concludes.
2005
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/3176/1/Resolving_Deadlock.pdf
Schaefer, Armin. (2005) "Resolving Deadlock: Why International Organizations Introduce Soft Law". In: UNSPECIFIED, Austin, Texas. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/3176/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:7071
2011-02-15T22:46:09Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:656661454D55454D536575726F
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Revision of the SDR: an external consequence of Europe's monetary union."
Jensen, Keith Christian.
EMU/EMS/euro
IMF
In this paper 1 consider a revision of the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR) that may result from the adoption of the' European Currency Unit (ECU) by the European community in their program of Monetary Union. I develop data representing the monthly average exchange value for this new basket I call the SDR(ecu). This data is compared to the actual SDR series for the period January 1981 through December 1990. While these two baskets maintain essentially similar values over the period in question, the percentage rate of change in the SDR(ecu) is found to have a significantly smaller volatility than the SDR (as found by an Analysis of Variance test) . Using Sharpe's Index Model (1970) (a modified version of the capital asset pricing model) the reduced exchange rate risk is decomposed into components of "systematic" and "non-systematic" risk. The result I find suggest that although the overall exchange rate risk is small in the SDR(ecu), this risk is much more composed of the non-diversifiable "systematic" risk, than is the SDR. This leads me to recommend that a revision of the SDR to my SDR(ecu) would be an improvement over the existing arrangements. Second, the adoption of a coordinated effort among the G-3 (Dollar, Yen and ECU) monetary authorities, such as an exchange rate mechanism, would help manage the relative increase in "systematic" exchange risk. These recommendations would enhance the position of both the SDR and ECU as international reserve currencies.
1991
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/7071/1/002467.PDF
Jensen, Keith Christian. (1991) "Revision of the SDR: an external consequence of Europe's monetary union.". In: UNSPECIFIED, Fairfax, Virginia. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/7071/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:7677
2011-02-15T22:49:28Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D46:46303036
7375626A656374733D45:45303036
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303039
7375626A656374733D45:45303037
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303032
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:676C6F62616C69736174696F6E676C6F62616C697A6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"La Règle du Jeu: France and the Paradox of Managed Globalization"
Abdelal, Rawi
Meunier, Sophie.
EU-US
OECD
common foreign & security policy 1993--European Global Strategy
GATT/WTO
globalisation/globalization
France
IMF
Globalization is often portrayed as a tidal wave that originated in the US and its policy of laissez‐faire liberalization. This paper argues, however, that globalization is not made only by striking down regulations, but also by making them. During the 1980s, French policy makers began to develop the doctrine of "managed globalization," or what World Trade Organization (WTO) head Pascal Lamy calls today "globalization by the rules." Central to the doctrine has been the French – and European – effort to make rules and build the capacity of international organizations such as the European Union (EU), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and WTO. These organizations then would have the authority to govern commercial and financial globalization. These organizations, however, have also used this capacity to promote liberalization. Thus, the practical effect of the doctrine of managed globalization has been to create a more liberal world. It is a world with rules, a world that is organized, to be sure. But it is also a more globalized world, and one inevitably more liberal as well. This is paradoxical for a number of reasons, including: the traditional French ambivalence about globalization; the creation of the doctrine by the French Left; and the antipathy of American policy makers for these liberalizing and organizing agendas. Most remarkably, the concept of managed globalization has been grossly misrepresented and misinterpreted over the years in the French political and intellectual discourse. Most often, managed globalization is understood to be synonymous with taming globalization to make it less liberal. We explain and restore the more literal meaning of the phrase, which is about ordering and mastering globalization. In doing so, we can also highlight the complex links between globalization and European integration, which can be seen as both a Trojan Horse of laissez‐faire liberalism in the heart of Europe and as the best tool available to France to shape the world of its own choosing.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/7677/1/abdelal%2Dr%2D12e.pdf
Abdelal, Rawi and Meunier, Sophie. (2007) "La Règle du Jeu: France and the Paradox of Managed Globalization". In: UNSPECIFIED, Montreal, Canada. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/7677/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:8042
2011-02-15T22:51:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65666167656E6572616C
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303035
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303231
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C6166666169727362706561
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303130
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303437
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666706F6C69746963616C70617274696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"What Are the ‘Right’ Incentives for Reform? A Panel Analysis of the Quality of Banking Sector Reform in the Post-communist Region"
Spendzharova, Aneta B.
EU-South-Eastern Europe (Balkans)
EU-Central and Eastern Europe
EU-Baltics
political parties
culture policy
general
IMF
business/private economic activity
This paper uses pooled cross-sectional time series analysis to examine the factors that push governments in the post-communist region to pursue good quality banking sector reform. I probe the impact of two important characteristics of the domestic political system: partisan politics and domestic alliances. I also test the effect of conditionality programs promoted by the IMF. The paper considers two alternative explanations of banking sector reform that are based on economic development and intrinsic cultural differences.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/8042/1/spendzharova%2Da%2D12b.pdf
Spendzharova, Aneta B. (2007) "What Are the ‘Right’ Incentives for Reform? A Panel Analysis of the Quality of Banking Sector Reform in the Post-communist Region". In: UNSPECIFIED, Montreal, Canada. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/8042/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:8903
2011-02-15T22:57:34Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303035
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65666165636F6E6F6D6963706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65666153696E676C654D61726B6574:65666153696E676C654D61726B65746361706974616C676F6F64737365727669636573
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform in the Post-Communist Region after 1989: Assessing the Impact of Domestic Politics, International Conditionality, and Economic Development. IHS Political Science Series Paper No. 116, June 2008
Spendzharova, Aneta B.
capital, goods, services, workers
economic policy
EU-Central and Eastern Europe
IMF
This paper connects the literature on market liberalization in advanced industrialized countries and that on economic reform in transitional countries. It tests three important theoretical frameworks in the analysis of policy change—domestic politics, international pressures, and economic development—using time-series cross-section analysis of 25 post-communist states. The findings reveal a complex causal pattern where factors from all three theoretical frameworks are substantively important. On the domestic level, curbing corruption is strongly related to more banking sector liberalization. The higher the presence of foreign banks in the country, the more banking sector liberalization. On the international level, exposure to stricter IMF conditionality has a positive effect on the extent of banking sector liberalization. The analysis also confirms the salience of structural factors: Measures of economic development such as GDP per capita and stock market capitalization are important predictors of the extent of banking sector liberalization.
2008-06
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/8903/1/pw_116.pdf
Spendzharova, Aneta B. (2008) Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform in the Post-Communist Region after 1989: Assessing the Impact of Domestic Politics, International Conditionality, and Economic Development. IHS Political Science Series Paper No. 116, June 2008. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/8903/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:9582
2014-04-08T15:13:16Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032696E7465726E6174696F6E616C65636F6E6F6D79
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65666153696E676C654D61726B6574:65666153696E676C654D61726B65746361706974616C676F6F64737365727669636573
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
Will the current crisis trigger a revival of the IMF? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2008/06, November 2008
Pisani-Ferry, Jean.
international economy
capital, goods, services, workers
IMF
[From the Introduction]. As recently as a few weeks ago, a widely held view was that the IMF had lost its relevance in a world of increasingly free capital mobility where the financing needs of more and more developing countries were covered by capital markets. At the same time its legitimacy was at stake as a large part of the developing world openly questioned the sincerity of its advice and the structure of its governance. Even the governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, echoed the queries, commenting that “the Fund’s remit is unclear. Its lending activities have waned, and its role in the international monetary system is obscure” (King, 2006). Suddenly, however, calls for a “new Bretton Woods” have again put the Fund at the centre of the discussions on the reform of global financial and monetary arrangements. This note discusses the main challenges it faces and some options for reform1. Its main conclusion is that while the financial crisis and the revival of international cooperation put an end to existential questioning about the future of the Fund, it is unlikely to recapture the central role it once had and must rather adapt to a fragmented and changing landscape.
2008-10
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/9582/1/IMF%2Dfuture%2DPC%2D0ct%2D2008%2D1.pdf
Pisani-Ferry, Jean. (2008) Will the current crisis trigger a revival of the IMF? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2008/06, November 2008. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/9582/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:11092
2011-02-15T23:12:38Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032696E7465726E6174696F6E616C65636F6E6F6D79
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
Reforming global governance: How to make the IMF more independent. CEPS Commentaries, 2 April 2009
Gros, Daniel
Klüh, Ulrich
Mauro, Beatrice Weder di.
international economy
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
IMF
The world needs a watchdog institution for global economic stability. Most agree that the IMF is the only serious candidate, but IMF management and staff need more independence. This column argues that this could be achieved by having separate Executive Board voting procedures for lending and analytic decisions, and some independent members on the Board.
2009-04
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/11092/1/1822[1].pdf
Gros, Daniel and Klüh, Ulrich and Mauro, Beatrice Weder di. (2009) Reforming global governance: How to make the IMF more independent. CEPS Commentaries, 2 April 2009. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/11092/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:14458
2011-02-15T23:33:49Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65666153696E676C654D61726B6574:65666153696E676C654D61726B65746361706974616C676F6F64737365727669636573
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
What determines euro area bank CDS spreads? National Bank of Belgium Working Paper, No. 190, May 2010
Annaert, Jan
De Ceuster, Marc
Van Roy, Patrick
Vespro, Cristina.
capital, goods, services, workers
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
IMF
This paper decomposes the explained part of the CDS spread changes of 31 listed euro area banks according to various risk drivers. The choice of the credit risk drivers is inspired by the Merton (1974) model. Individual CDS liquidity and other market and business variables are identified to complement the Merton model and are shown to play an important role in explaining credit spread changes. Our decomposition reveals, however, highly changing dynamics in the credit, liquidity, and business cycle and market wide components. This result is important since supervisors and monetary policy makers extract different signals from liquidity based CDS spread changes than from business cycle or credit risk based changes. For the recent financial crisis, we confirm that the steeply rising CDS spreads are due to increased credit risk. However, individual CDS liquidity and market wide liquidity premia played a dominant role. In the period before the start of the crisis, our model and its decomposition suggest that credit risk was not correctly priced, a finding which was correctly observed by e.g. the International Monetary Fund.
2010-05
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/14458/1/wp190En.pdf
Annaert, Jan and De Ceuster, Marc and Van Roy, Patrick and Vespro, Cristina. (2010) What determines euro area bank CDS spreads? National Bank of Belgium Working Paper, No. 190, May 2010. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/14458/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:14509
2011-02-15T23:34:10Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303038
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
Who can save Greece? CEPS Commentaries, 15 April 2010
Gros, Daniel.
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
IMF
Greece
After two months of heated debate, the basic conditions for the joint IMF/EU rescue operation for Greece have now been decided. In this latest Commentary, CEPS Director Daniel Gros takes a closer look at the figures and shows that the magnitude of the funds under discussion can at best tide the country through a rough patch. The key issue that will remain for years to come is whether Greece is willing to undertake the huge domestic effort required to achieve a sustainable fiscal position.
2010-04
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/14509/1/Who_can_save_Greece.pdf
Gros, Daniel. (2010) Who can save Greece? CEPS Commentaries, 15 April 2010. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/14509/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:14513
2011-02-15T23:34:13Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303038
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
Greece and the IMF. CEPS Commentaries, 24 March 2010
Gros, Daniel.
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
IMF
Greece
The stand-off among the members of the eurozone over whether to come to the aid of fellow member Greece has prompted a lot of speculation that Greece might turn to the IMF for support, an approach that now seems to be favoured by the German government. This Commentary by CEPS Director Daniel Gros finds, however, that while the IMF may have fewer political constraints in giving cheap money, it is unable to provide enough to make a lasting difference to Greece. Against modest gains, he asks in what position would Greece be if it went to Washington now and then had to come back to its EU partners later in the year? Gros acknowledges, however, that a loan from the IMF might serve the purpose of providing the EU with a convenient smoke screen to temporarily obscure the fundamental differences among the members on how the euro area should be run.
2010-03
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/14513/1/DG_on_Greece_and_the_IMF.pdf
Gros, Daniel. (2010) Greece and the IMF. CEPS Commentaries, 24 March 2010. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/14513/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:15035
2011-02-15T23:37:52Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:656661454D55454D536575726F
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
Europe in the IMF. CEPS Commentary, 4 October 2010
Gros, Daniel.
EMU/EMS/euro
IMF
This commentary points to the IMF as a prime example of the over-representation of Europeans in international fora, which has the effect of actually diminishing Europe’s influence. The representatives are often instructed to defend (frequently divergent) national interests and the net effect is that common European interests are not represented at all. The author argues that the only sensible long-term solution is to pool the IMF quotas of all eurozone countries. thereby giving the eurozone one constituency, or seat, on the Fund’s executive board, filled by a candidate nominated by the eurozone group of finance ministers.
2010-10
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/15035/1/October_DG_on_Europe_in_the_IMF.pdf
Gros, Daniel. (2010) Europe in the IMF. CEPS Commentary, 4 October 2010. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/15035/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:15049
2011-02-15T23:37:56Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032696E7465726E6174696F6E616C65636F6E6F6D79
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Reform of the Global Financial Architecture. Bruegel Working Paper 2010/05, October 2010
Schinasi, Garry J.
Truman, Edwin M.
international economy
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
IMF
This paper examines the implications of the global financialcrisis of 2007-10 for reform of the global financial architecture and identifies institutional and substantive reforms by organizations such as the IMF and Financial Stability Board. The publication was prepared for a conference sponsored by Bruegel and the Peterson Institute for International Economics (8 October 2010), as part of a project sponsored by the European Commission.
2010-10
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/15049/1/wp_2010_10_reform.pdf[1].pdf
Schinasi, Garry J. and Truman, Edwin M. (2010) Reform of the Global Financial Architecture. Bruegel Working Paper 2010/05, October 2010. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/15049/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:15452
2011-02-15T23:40:53Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:656661454D55454D536575726F
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303039
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
What size is the fire exit? CEPS Commentary, 7 December 2010
Gros, Daniel.
European Central Bank
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
IMF
EMU/EMS/euro
In his latest Commentary, CEPS Director Daniel Gros draws an analogy between the situation in the eurozone for investors today and a crowded cinema with only one emergency exit: everyone knows that in case of fire, only the first to leave will be safe. To avoid a stampede, he calls upon the IMF and the ECB to show investors that they have enough funding to finance the simultaneous exit of all short-term investors by immediately widening the exit door and by prominently displaying huge fire
2010-12
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/15452/1/Dec_DG_on_Size_of_Fire_Exit.pdf
Gros, Daniel. (2010) What size is the fire exit? CEPS Commentary, 7 December 2010. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/15452/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:29746
2011-02-23T03:10:10Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032696E7465726E6174696F6E616C65636F6E6F6D79
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303039
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
From convoy to parting ways? Post-crisis divergence between European and US macroeconomic policies. Bruegel Working Paper 2011/04, February 2011
Pisani-Ferry, Jean
Posen., Adam S.
EU-US
international economy
IMF
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
The response in 2008-09 to the global financial crisis was in many ways a high water mark for transatlantic policy coordination. The major economies of the EU and the US rapidly agreed on a series of measures to limit the crisis. However, the common approach has since unraveled. This paper explores why the ‘London consensus’ has not survived for much more than a year.
In response to this situation this working paper suggests a critical quantum of coordination. Key measures include a commitment to avoiding deliberate currency depreciation and unilateral intervention; agreement to give the IMF an enhanced monitoring role; the adoption by parliaments of medium-term fiscal plans; and cooperation on the issue of Chinese undervaluation.
2011-02
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/29746/1/110221_From_convoy_to_parting_ways_WP%2D1.pdf
http://www.bruegel.org/nc/publications/show/category/working-papers.html
Pisani-Ferry, Jean and Posen., Adam S. (2011) From convoy to parting ways? Post-crisis divergence between European and US macroeconomic policies. Bruegel Working Paper 2011/04, February 2011. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/29746/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:32651
2011-11-25T17:34:14Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:443030316C61776C6567616C61666661697273
7375626A656374733D45:494C4F
7375626A656374733D45:45303130
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:4C6973626F6E547265617479
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303032
74797065733D626F6F6B
Upgrading the EU's Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy. CEPS Paperbacks. January 2011
Balfour, Rosa
Corthaut, Tim
Wouters, Jan
Emerson, Michael
Kaczyński, Piotr Maciej
Renard, Thomas
law & legal affairs-general (includes international law)
common foreign & security policy 1993--European Global Strategy
IMF
UN
ILO
Lisbon Treaty
The international order is experiencing fundamental changes driven by globalisation and the multipolarity emerging from the new balance of power. In response, a new book by a team of experts assembled by CEPS argues that the EU should build up a world-class diplomatic corps, capable of becoming a major actor in global affairs, drawing on enabling provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon.
The report investigates two prerequisites for achieving this goal: first, enhancement of the status of the EU in numerous multilateral organisations, international agreements and fora (the UN, IMF, etc.) and second, a restructuring of European diplomacy, involving a reallocation of functions and resources between the new European diplomatic corps (the European External Action Service) and the diplomatic representations of the 27 EU member states worldwide.
Recommendations are formulated on where and how to upgrade the EU’s status in the international arena. Scenarios are presented for the build-up of the EU’s diplomatic corps, alongside a slimming down of national diplomacies. The authors warn that failure to act along these lines will result in an increasingly irrelevant, obsolete and wasteful European diplomacy.
2011-01
Book
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/32651/1/74._Upgrading_the_EU's_Role_as_a_global_actor.pdf
http://www.ceps.eu/book/upgrading-eus-role-global-actor-institutions-law-and-restructuring-european-diplomacy
Balfour, Rosa and Corthaut, Tim and Wouters, Jan and Emerson, Michael and Kaczyński, Piotr Maciej and Renard, Thomas (2011) Upgrading the EU's Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy. CEPS Paperbacks. January 2011. Series > Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) > CEPS Paperbacks <http://aei.pitt.edu/view/series/SMCEPSPaperbacks.html> . UNSPECIFIED. ISBN 9789461380524
http://aei.pitt.edu/32651/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:32864
2016-01-30T17:14:54Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:656661454D55454D536575726F
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
An evaluation of IMF surveillance of the euro area. Bruegel Blueprint 14, 31st October 2011
Pisani-Ferry, Jean
Sapir, André
Wolff, Guntram B.
IMF
EMU/EMS/euro
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
The euro-area crisis has exposed deep deficiencies in the governance of European Economic and Monetary Union. However, crisis prevention in, and surveillance of, the euro area are not only the responsibility of European authorities. As members of the International Monetary Fund, all euro-area countries are also subject to regular bilateral IMF surveillance. The currency union as a whole is also subject to regular IMF surveillance. This report analyses the IMF’s surveillance of the euro area. We find that it suffered from severe shortcomings in the run-up to the financial crisis, but after the start of the crisis in 2008, IMF surveillance of the euro area greatly improved, with the IMF correctly proposing measures to counter depression risks and warning about banking sector problems. By the time the sovereign-debt crisis hit the currency union in early 2010, the IMF was ready to play an influential role. The slow European response meant this was indispensable.
2011-10
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/32864/1/An_evaluation_of_IMF_surveillance_of_the_euro_area_(English).pdf
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/629-an-evaluation-of-imf-surveillance-of-the-euro-area/
Pisani-Ferry, Jean and Sapir, André and Wolff, Guntram B. (2011) An evaluation of IMF surveillance of the euro area. Bruegel Blueprint 14, 31st October 2011. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/32864/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:33180
2014-04-08T16:19:43Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
7375626A656374733D46:46303131
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
The gloomy scenario of Italy’s default. ECMI Commentary No. 31, December 2011
Valiante, Diego.
IMF
Italy
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
This Commentary explores what will happen if Italy is not able to implement structural reforms and if international institutions, such as the EFSF and the IMF, do not intervene with sufficient resources to prevent Europe’s second-largest economy from defaulting on its debt. It warns that the Italian economic system would certainly embark on a perverse path that would follow three phases: liquidity crisis and insolvency; deflationary pressures; and finally inflationary pressures and economic and political instability.
2011-12
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/33180/1/No_31_DV_Gloomy_scenario_of_Italy's_default.pdf
http://shop.ceps.eu/book/gloomy-scenario-italy%E2%80%99s-default
Valiante, Diego. (2011) The gloomy scenario of Italy’s default. ECMI Commentary No. 31, December 2011. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/33180/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:33370
2014-07-18T00:47:39Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032696E7465726E6174696F6E616C65636F6E6F6D79
7375626A656374733D45:45303033
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Financial reform after the crisis: an early assessment. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/01, January 2012
Véron, Nicolas.
international economy
G7/G8/G20
IMF
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
This paper takes stock of global efforts towards financial reform since the start of the financial crisis in 2007-08, and provides a synthetic (if simplified) picture of their status as of January 2012.
Underlying dynamics are described and analysed both at the global level (particularly G-20, International Monetary Fund and the Financial Stability Board) and in individual jurisdictions, together with the impact the crisis has had on them. The possible next steps of financial reform are then reviewed along several dimensions including ongoing crisis management in Europe, the new emphasis on macroprudential approaches, the challenges posed by globally integrated financial firms, the implementation of harmonised global standards and the links between financial systems and growth.
2012-01
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/33370/1/Financial_reform_after_the_crisis__an_early_assessment_(English).pdf
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/680-financial-reform-after-the-crisis-an-early-assessment/
Véron, Nicolas. (2012) Financial reform after the crisis: an early assessment. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/01, January 2012. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/33370/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:42198
2018-01-30T18:00:04Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303038
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
7375626A656374733D46:46303138
7375626A656374733D46:46303130
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
EU-IMF assistance to euro area countries: an early assessment. Bruegel Blueprint No. 19, 16 May 2013
Pisani-Ferry, Jean
Wolff, Guntram B.
Sapir , André
IMF
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
Three years ago, in May 2010, Greece became the first euro-area country to receive financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in exchange for implementing an economic programme designed by the Troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. Within a year, Ireland and Portugal went down the same path.
This study provides an early evaluation of these assistance programmes implemented by the Troika in these three countries. The study assesses the economic impact of the programmes and the consequences of their particular institutional set-up.
2013-05
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/42198/1/EU%2DIMF_assistance_to_euro%2Darea_countries__an_early_assessment_(English).pdf
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/779-eu-imf-assistance-to-euro-area-countries-an-early-assessment/
Pisani-Ferry, Jean and Wolff, Guntram B. and Sapir , André (2013) EU-IMF assistance to euro area countries: an early assessment. Bruegel Blueprint No. 19, 16 May 2013. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/42198/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:42914
2013-07-23T19:12:35Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
The response speed of the International Monetary Fund. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/03, 16 July 2013
Mody, Ashoka
Saravia, Diego
IMF
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
The more severe a financial crisis, the greater has been the likelihood of its management under an IMF-supported programme and the shorter the time from crisis onset to programme initiation. Political links to the United States have increased programme likelihood but have prompted faster response mainly for ‘major’crises. Over time, the IMF’s response has not been robustly faster, but the time sensitivity to the more severe crises and those related to fixed exchange rate regimes did increase from the mid-1980s. Similarly, democracies had tended to stall programme initiation but have become more supportive of financial markets’ demands for quicker action.
2013-07
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/42914/1/The_response_speed_of_the_International_Monetary_Fund_(English).pdf
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/786-the-response-speed-of-the-international-monetary-fund/
Mody, Ashoka and Saravia, Diego (2013) The response speed of the International Monetary Fund. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/03, 16 July 2013. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/42914/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:52863
2019-12-30T13:57:12Z
7374617475733D7375626D6974746564
7375626A656374733D45:45303033
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303032
74797065733D70726F63656564696E6773
The Paradox of EMU's External Representation: The Case of the G20 and the IMF
Hodson, Dermot
common foreign & security policy 1993--European Global Strategy
G7/G8/G20
IMF
This paper revisits claims about the euro area‟s fragmented system of external relations in multilateral settings in the light of the global financial crisis. Focusing on the involvement of the EU and euro area in the G20 and the IMF Executive Board, it offers a case study of European influence during the most turbulent period for the international economic system since the Great Depression. Its central finding is that the euro area has been an influential international actor in these fora in spite, and in some cases because, of its fragmented system of external representation.
2011
Conference Proceedings
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/52863/1/HODSON.pdf
Hodson, Dermot (2011) The Paradox of EMU's External Representation: The Case of the G20 and the IMF. [Conference Proceedings] (Submitted)
http://aei.pitt.edu/52863/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:58315
2014-12-11T19:20:38Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303335
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
Ukraine's cooperation with the IMF - unfulfilled hopes for deeper reforms. OSW Commentary No. 52, 2011-06-15
Matuszak, Slawomir
IMF
Ukraine
The Party of Regions took power in early 2010, after Ukraine had been
plunged deep in economic crisis. Over the next year, with the external
markets recovering, the country’s economic situation started to improve
gradually. Ukraine’s economic stabilisation was also strengthened by its
resumed cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, which provided
for a loan worth $15.1 billion. The issuing of successive tranches of
the loan was made dependent on the implementation of a comprehensive
reform programme. The cooperation went quite smoothly at first; however,
as the economic situation in Ukraine improved, the reformist zeal of
the Ukrainian government started to fade, and obstacles began piling up.
As a result, Ukraine was refused the third tranche, scheduled for this
March, and for the moment the credit line remains frozen. Even though the
IMF has numerous reservations about the Ukrainian government’s economic
policy, the fundamental condition for resuming cooperation is reform
of the pension system, which the parliament should adopt.
The difficulties with fulfilling the obligations made to the IMF reflect the
wider problem with implementing reforms in Ukraine, as the Party of Regions
promised after taking power. Changes which do not affect the interests
of influential lobbies are quite easy to carry out. Often, however,
these changes are not conducive to the economy’s liberalisation; moreover,
the influential lobbies are successful in blocking reforms that could harm
their businesses. Another impediment to the changes is that some reforms
are likely to bring about painful social consequences, and that can affect
public support for the ruling group.
Even though theoretically possible, it does not seem likely that Ukraine’s
cooperation with the IMF will be terminated. But even if this cooperation is
continued, deeper reforms in Ukraine are likely to be postponed until after
the parliamentary elections in autumn 2012.
2011-06
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/58315/1/commentary_52.pdf
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-06-15/ukraines-cooperation-imf-unfulfilled-hopes-deeper-reforms
Matuszak, Slawomir (2011) Ukraine's cooperation with the IMF - unfulfilled hopes for deeper reforms. OSW Commentary No. 52, 2011-06-15. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/58315/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:76465
2020-02-28T15:13:10Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303038
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
IMF Go Home. CEPS Commentary, 10 June 2016. No pdf available-see document at Official URL
Gros, Daniel.
IMF
Greece
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
The curtains have gone up on yet another act of the Greek debt drama. Eurozone finance ministers and the International Monetary Fund have agreed with Greece to begin, per the IMF’s demands, providing some debt relief to the country, and to release €10.3 billion in bailout funds. Greece, for its part, has agreed to another round of austerity and structural reform.
2016-06
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/imf-go-home
Gros, Daniel. (2016) IMF Go Home. CEPS Commentary, 10 June 2016. No pdf available-see document at Official URL. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/76465/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:79183
2016-09-01T13:45:52Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
The IMF’s role in the euro-area crisis: financial sector aspects. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue No. 13, August 2016
Véron, Nicolas.
IMF
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
Nicolas Véron reviews in-depth the role played by the IMF in understanding the financial-sector dynamics of the euro-area crisis. The IMF was the first public authority to acknowledge the role of the bank-sovereign vicious circle and to articulate a clear vision of banking union as an essential policy response. At national level, the IMF’s approach to the financial sector was appropriate and successful in Ireland and Spain, more limited in the Greek Stand-By Arrangement, and less compelling in Portugal.
2016-08
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/79183/1/PC%2D13%2D2016.pdf
http://bruegel.org/2016/08/the-imfs-role-in-the-euro-area-crisis-financial-sector-aspects/
Véron, Nicolas. (2016) The IMF’s role in the euro-area crisis: financial sector aspects. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue No. 13, August 2016. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/79183/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:80020
2016-09-27T15:18:55Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6663723230303839
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
The IMF’s role in the euro-area crisis: financial sector aspects. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n˚13 | 2016
Véron, Nicolas.
IMF
financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
Nicolas Véron reviews in-depth the role played by the IMF in understanding the financial-sector dynamics of the euro-area crisis. The IMF was the first public authority to acknowledge the role of the bank-sovereign vicious circle and to articulate a clear vision of banking union as an essential policy response. At national level, the IMF’s approach to the financial sector was appropriate and successful in Ireland and Spain, more limited in the Greek Stand-By Arrangement, and less compelling in Portugal.
2016-09
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/80020/1/PC%2D13%2D2016.pdf
Véron, Nicolas. (2016) The IMF’s role in the euro-area crisis: financial sector aspects. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n˚13 | 2016. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/80020/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:97463
2019-11-29T21:14:39Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032696E7465726E6174696F6E616C65636F6E6F6D79
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
The IMF and precautionary lending:
An empirical evaluation of the selectivity
and effectiveness of the flexible credit line. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 323
Essers, Dennis
Ide, Stefaan
international economy
IMF
This paper provides an empirical evaluation of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the IMF's prime
precautionary lending instrument since 2009 to which so far only three emerging market economies
have subscribed: Mexico, Colombia and Poland. We consider both questions of selectivity and
effectiveness: first, which factors explain the three FCL countries' participation in such
arrangements? And second, to which extent have the FCL arrangements delivered on their promise
of boosting market confidence in their respective users? Based on a probit analysis we show that
FCL selectivity can be explained by both demand- and supply-side factors. The probability of
participation in the FCL was greater in countries that experienced larger exchange market
pressures prior to the creation of the instrument, that had lower bond spreads and inflation, that
accounted for higher shares in US exports, and that exhibited a higher propensity of making political
concessions to the US. Our estimation of the effects of the FCL employs the ‘synthetic control’
methodology, a novel counterfactual approach. We find evidence for some but not spectacular
beneficial effects on sovereign bond spreads and gross capital inflows in FCL countries. Overall,
our results suggest that any economic stigma eligible countries still attach to entry into an FCL
arrangement is unwarranted. Conversely, the apparent link of FCL participation with US interests
may not be conducive to overcoming political stigma.
2017-06
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/97463/1/wp323en.pdf
https://www.nbb.be/en/articles/imf-and-precautionary-lending-empirical-evaluation-selectivity-and-effectiveness-flexible
Essers, Dennis and Ide, Stefaan (2017) The IMF and precautionary lending: An empirical evaluation of the selectivity and effectiveness of the flexible credit line. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 323. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/97463/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:103259
2020-11-09T15:03:23Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303035
7375626A656374733D46:46303335
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
Six years after Ukraine’s Euromaidan: reforms and challenges ahead. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n ̊14 | June 2020.
Dabrowski, Marek
Domínguez-Jiménez, Marta
Zachmann, Georg
EU-Central and Eastern Europe
IMF
Ukraine
Since the Euromaidan protests (2013-2014), Ukraine has had two presidents and four governments. They have initiated various reforms in the economic, institutional and political spheres, with the aim of bringing the country closer to the European Union, boosting eco- nomic growth and international competitiveness, and building a liberal democracy.
Reforms have been implemented in a difficult environment of external aggression, which has led to human and material losses and has caused loss of control over part of the country’s territory. However, resistance to aggression and fresh memories of the kleptocratic regime
of the former president Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014) have helped to unite society and Ukraine’s political forces in favour of the reform programme.
Although many important policy and systemic changes have been implemented, the reform agenda remains unfinished. It must be continued despite the dramatic new challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
International financial support and especially International Monetary Fund con- ditionality have been instrumental in pushing the Ukrainian authorities to carry out major reforms (including of banking law, the gas sector and land ownership). This was done despite these reforms being opposed by old elites, or running counter to populist instincts (such as gas price reform and pension reform). The dominant role of old elites still holds back home- grown reform, leading to reformers having an unhealthy reliance on outside pressure.
2020-06
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/103259/1/PC%2D14%2D2020%2Dfinal.pdf
Dabrowski, Marek and Domínguez-Jiménez, Marta and Zachmann, Georg (2020) Six years after Ukraine’s Euromaidan: reforms and challenges ahead. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n ̊14 | June 2020. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/103259/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:103265
2020-11-11T15:09:15Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C6166666169727362616E6B73
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303137
7375626A656374733D45:45303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6566616D6F6E6574617279706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65666166697363616C706F6C696379
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
COVID-19’s reality shock for external-funding dependent emerging economies. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n˚10 | May 2020.
Garcia Herroro, Alicia
Ribakova, Elina
EU-ACP
IMF
banks/financial markets
fiscal policy
monetary policy
COVID-19 has brought to light a reality that had been mostly forgotten in an era of ample dollar liquidity: the excessive dependence of emerging economies on external financing. The sudden increase in global risk aversion arising from COVID-19 has caused investors to rush to safe assets and to the dollar, away from no-reserve currencies. The COVID-19 shock has also sharply reduced emerging markets’ access to dollars, exports, tourism receipts and even remittances, as the shock also affects the countries where migrants earn their incomes. The fiscal and monetary room emerging economies have to respond is limited, and the lack of automatic stabilisers on the fiscal side also means that fiscal policy does not have the same redistributive effects during a severe shock as in the developed world.
In principle, various options are available to confront liquidity problems: domestic monetary policy, capital controls, dipping into foreign exchange reserves, regional schemes such as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation, central bank swap lines, and International Monetary Fund programmes.
But not all these options are available to most countries. Central banks’ responses to the pandemic have been much less aggressive in the emerging world than in the west, as their currencies have plummeted in many cases, increasing the cost of dollar liabilities. Capital controls are temporary and costly. Self-insurance and regional insurance schemes are unavailable to many economies, particularly in Latin America. The United States Federal Reserve has reacted quickly with swap lines to key central banks, but this is only a partial option because the Fed risks being overburdened in its attempt to provide cross-border dollar liquidity. The IMF remains the most obvious lender of last resort for emerging economies, but needs to make two changes to become more effective: a more targeted set of facilities with quicker disbursement and less conditionality; and increased financial resources.
2020-05
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/103265/1/PC%2D10%2D2020.pdf
Garcia Herroro, Alicia and Ribakova, Elina (2020) COVID-19’s reality shock for external-funding dependent emerging economies. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n˚10 | May 2020. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/103265/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:103769
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Timely measurement of real effective exchange rates. Bruegel Working Paper December 2021.
Darvas, Zsolt
IMF
economic and financial affairs
trade policy
globalisation/globalization
We demonstrate that short-run real exchange effective rate changes are dominated by nominal effective exchange rate changes, while inflation rates are sticky and contribute little to short-run real exchange rate changes. These observations allow a rather accurate real-time approximation of the real effective exchange rate using actual nominal exchange rate data and forecast inflation data. We measure the approximation error and find it is minor for most countries and sizeable only for a few countries experiencing high and volatile inflation. For a set of countries, the revision in our estimates using real-time data is slightly lower than the revision in World Bank estimates and much lower than International Monetary Fund estimates. By considering two widely studied economic issues, unit root testing in real exchange rates and nominal exchange rate forecasting with the real exchange rate, we find that using a version of real exchange rates based on approximated monthly price level data instead of actual price level data hardly changes the conclusions on unit roots and forecasting. By combining alternative data sources for exchange rates and consumer prices, we calculate up-to-date monthly real effective exchange rates for 177 countries and the euro area. Our dataset, which is frequently updated, includes more than twice as many observations as the second most comprehensive dataset.
2021-12
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/103769/1/WP%2D2021%2D15%2D231221%2D1.pdf
Darvas, Zsolt (2021) Timely measurement of real effective exchange rates. Bruegel Working Paper December 2021. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/103769/