2024-03-29T09:46:04Zhttp://aei.pitt.edu/cgi/oai2
oai:aei.pitt.edu:62
2011-02-15T22:14:45Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303438
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303434
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:643030314C6973626F6E6167656E6461
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303335:737067656E6572616C
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303131
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74797065733D72657669657765737361797375626A656374
The Lisbon European Council and the Future of European Economic Governance
Rhodes, Martin
Goetschy, Janine
Mosher, Jim
employment/unemployment
general
information technology policy
Lisbon StrategyAgenda/Partnership for Growth and Employment
information society
European Council
decision making/policy-making
[Introduction by Mark A. Pollack, series editor]. THE PORTUGUESE PRESIDENCY, WHICH organized the work of the Council during the first six months of the year, was tasked with the heavy responsibility of organizing the opening months of the 2000 IGC (see Dinan and Vanhoonacker, this issue), yet the Portuguese also embarked on a major campaign to sponsor an academic and political debate on economic reform, and on the future of European economic governance. Throughout their presidency, the Portuguese sought to stimulate a debate on both the substance and process of European economic policymaking, proposing a "new strategic goal for the Union in order to strengthen employment, economic reform and social cohesion as part of a knowledge-based economy." Toward this end, the presidency commissioned a series of papers from both distinguished academics and EU institutions on subjects ranging from employment policy to the reform of the welfare state, modernization of public services, social inclusion, and the information society and e-commerce (for an on-line listing and texts of these reports, see Portuguese Presidency 2000). In March, the presidency organized a special European Council, which largely endorsed the Portuguese program of economic reform, with particularly detailed statements on the information society and the promotion of e-commerce. As important as the substance of the proposed reforms, however, is the process proposed by the Portuguese presidency, and endorsed by the Lisbon European Council, dubbed "open coordination." As Jim Mosher explains below, open coordination involves the establishment of common social policy guidelines, indicators and "benchmarks," which are intended to guide national policies through a process of policy coordination and peer evaluation. Although the practice of open coordination is not itself new, having been pioneered in recent years in a trio of joint policy processes (namely the Luxembourg Process on employment, the Cardiff process on structural reforms, and the Cologne process on macroeconomic policy coordination), the explicit endorsement of open coordination in Lisbon raises a number of important questions about the future of European economic governance, which are addressed by three ECSA members in this Forum. In the first essay, Martin Rhodes analyzes the outcome of the Lisbon European Council as a pragmatic effort by the EU to find a "Third Way" between the traditionally conflicting imperatives of economic efficiency and equality, and between the extremes of European harmonization and national autonomy. In the process, he suggests, the presidency has created a "new European architecture for social policy" which will rationalize existing processes under the umbrella of a broader economic strategy and an annual Spring meeting of the European Council. In the second essay, Janine Goetschy looks back at the record of open coordination in the most developed of the three current processes, the European Employment Strategy, noting both the strengths and the weaknesses of the process during its formative years. In the third and final essay, Jim Mosher places the emerging process of open coordination in the context of a broader move to "post-regulatory governance," which promises both functional and political advantages to member governments eager to cooperate in a flexible fashion, but also the familiar dangers of "voluntarism" and weak or uneven national implementation of common EU goals. Despite differences in emphasis and in levels of optimism about the future, all three essays echo Rhodes' conclusion that the Lisbon European Council is likely to emerge as a watershed in EU social policy, in terms of both the articulation of a new set of common policy goals for the member states, and the endorsement of new policy processes which may-or may not-serve to facilitate the achievement of those goals in the coming years.
European Community Studies Association
Staats, Valerie
2000
Review Essay
PeerReviewed
text/html
http://aei.pitt.edu/62/1/lisbonforum.html
Rhodes, Martin and Goetschy, Janine and Mosher, Jim (2000) The Lisbon European Council and the Future of European Economic Governance. [Review Essay]
http://aei.pitt.edu/62/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:87
2011-02-15T22:14:47Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303339:4430303130333968756D616E726967687473
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303035
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F70676D7369
74797065733D61727469636C65
Intergovernmental Conference 1996: Which Constitution for the Union?
Nentwich, Michael
Falkner, Gerda.
IGC 1996
multi-speed integration
human rights
decision making/policy-making
This paper addresses the five major structural issues on the agenda of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of the Member States of the European Union: the option of replacing the treaty framework by a European constitution; the issue of fundamental rights in the Union; the future of the three-pillar structure; the puzzling question of how to allow for variations in European integration without endangering unity; and, finally, the political `evergreen' of the division of competencies between the Union and its Member States. The analysis is based on the contributions by EC institutions and a series of prominent (groups of) experts and scholars which were published before the political bargaining started with the establishment of the so-called reflection group preparing the formal agenda of the conference.
1996
Article
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/87/1/1996%2Delj.pdf
Nentwich, Michael and Falkner, Gerda. (1996) Intergovernmental Conference 1996: Which Constitution for the Union? European Law Journal, 2 (1). pp. 83-102.
http://aei.pitt.edu/87/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:151
2011-02-15T22:14:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:443030316C61776C6567616C61666661697273
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303132
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D41:41303239
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Member States Governments and the European Court of Justice: Governments as Repeat Players in Judicial Decision Making at EU Level"
Granger, M.P.F.
law & legal affairs-general (includes international law)
integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
decision making/policy-making
European Court of Justice/Court of First Instance
Is the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ or the Court) like a puppet in the hands of Member States governments? Or has it run wild, following its own interests and agenda, so as to independently influence the course of events in European integration? Or are the judges so compelled by the rule of law, by the spirit, scheme or terms of the Treaties and secondary Community law, that they cannot be under much influence from political actors such as governments? Or is the ECJ decision-making a complex social process in which legal actors, including governments lawyers, have a predominant role to play? These questions represent schematically the dominant political and legal approaches which consider the possibility for governments to influence ECJ decisions. This paper proposes an integrative big picture perspective of the ECJ decision-making process and of the role played by governments in that process, with the view to assess more comprehensively the influence of governments on the making of the Community case law. It suggests the use of a structurationist approach to the process of decision-making at the ECJ, so as to reveal the multiple structural dynamics of that process and the wide range of actors which can play a part in it. Adopting such standpoint makes it possible to identify a wide variety of means by which governments can influence ECJ decisions, beyond the formal control means which are the center of focus of much of the political science literature. One of these means consists in participating in proceedings before the Court. Governments participation strategies, that is their rationale, policies and organizational, procedural, human and material resources are analyzed so as to provide some indications as to whether governments can be considered as Repeat-Players capable of substantially shape legal change at the level of the European Union (EU), through their influence on the ECJ judicial decision process.
2003
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/msword
http://aei.pitt.edu/151/1/MPGEUSAPaper.doc
text/plain
http://aei.pitt.edu/151/2/MPGEUSAPaper.txt
Granger, M.P.F. (2003) "Member States Governments and the European Court of Justice: Governments as Repeat Players in Judicial Decision Making at EU Level". In: UNSPECIFIED, Nashville, Tennessee. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/151/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:236
2011-02-15T22:15:02Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy Making without Legislating? IHS Political Science Series: 2002, No. 81
Héritier, Adrienne
governance: EU & national level
decision making/policy-making
The article analyzes new modes of governance in Europe. Firstly, different types of new governance, the open coordination method and voluntary accords, and their individual elements are identified. The theoretical discussion about them points out the reasons of their emergence, their mode of operation and the links to the ‘classical’ forms of decision-making. Secondly the simple question of the relative importance of new modes of governance in European policy-making is raised. Looking at the policy measures from the beginning of 2000 until July 2001, the analysis found that only a minority of measures can be considered new modes of governance, defined in the above terms. A third question raised concerns political institutional capacity. Finally the question or instrumental capacity or effectiveness is raised.
2002-03
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/236/1/pw_81.pdf
Héritier, Adrienne (2002) New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy Making without Legislating? IHS Political Science Series: 2002, No. 81. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/236/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:238
2011-02-15T22:15:02Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303432
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303436
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Much Ado About Nothing? Comitology as a Feature of EU Policy Implementation and its Effects on the Democratic Arena. IHS Political Science Series: 2001, No. 78
Neuhold, Christine
public health policy (including global activities)
European Parliament
consumer protection policy
decision making/policy-making
The previously neglected phenomenon of governance by committees has recently received increasing attention in the academic literature. This paper focuses on the consequences of the arrangements prevailing in the committees active in the implementing phase of EU-legislation on the practice of democracy and legitimacy. The so-called "comitology committees" can be seen as a good example of the tension between input- and output-based sources of legitimacy. On the one hand the EP has demanded its increased involvement in this system ever since these committees were established. On the other hand (preliminary) studies have shown that Members of the European Parliament seem to be overwhelmed with the scrutiny or even the filing of draft implementing measures. This gives rise to the question of increasing the legitimacy of committee work and at the same time preserving the "efficiency" of this (presumably) cooperative form of decision making. This phenomenon is illustrated by means of a case study of committees active in the field of health and consumer protection.
2001-10
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/238/1/pw_78.pdf
Neuhold, Christine (2001) Much Ado About Nothing? Comitology as a Feature of EU Policy Implementation and its Effects on the Democratic Arena. IHS Political Science Series: 2001, No. 78. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/238/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:281
2011-02-15T22:15:04Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303235
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:7061666664656D6F637261637964656D6F63726174696364656669636974
7375626A656374733D46:46303236
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Ein Maß für Demokratie: Europäische Demokratien im Vergleich = A Measure for Democracy: European Democracies in Comparison. IHS Political Science Series: 2001, No. 76
Abromeit, Heidrun
U.K.
democracy/democratic deficit
decision making/policy-making
Switzerland
Can you measure democracy? Based on previous attempts to operationalise the term "democracy" in such a way that it can be used as a measuring instrument (especially on David Beetham’s indicator-system which forms the basis for his "democratic audit"), a concept will be presented that does not (mis-)understand democracy from the outset as a specific set of institutions but (1) connects democracy firmly to the self-determination of individuals and (2) puts the political institutions in relation to the respective societal structure. Several political systems are then measured by applying this "measure for democracy:" the "motherland of democracy" Great Britain, the "half-direct" democracy of Switzerland and the still evolving political system of the European Union. The following points will be up for examination: - the centres of decision-making and the main actors (inter alia with respect to the question: who takes the final decision?) - the societal structure - the "opportunity structures"; i. e.: where do the "people" come in?
2001-05
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/281/1/pw_76.pdf
Abromeit, Heidrun (2001) Ein Maß für Demokratie: Europäische Demokratien im Vergleich = A Measure for Democracy: European Democracies in Comparison. IHS Political Science Series: 2001, No. 76. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/281/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:383
2011-02-15T22:15:26Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303230
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:676C6F62616C69736174696F6E676C6F62616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
European integration and environment: are we going towards a cleaner federal State? JMWP No. 02.96, December, 1996
Barbagallo, Valentina
governance: EU & national level
European Parliament
globalisation/globalization
decision making/policy-making
environmental policy (including international arena)
The purpose of this paper is to find out the link existing among globalization, fragmentation and integration within the European Union, with special reference to the protection of environment. The basic assumption is that for the reason why environmental protection requires a strengthening of co-operation among member states, the EU represents an unique arena to analyse the way environmental problems are faced and (possibly) solved. At the same time, making use of the multi-level governance model, we aim at analysing the general process of integration affecting the Union, under the pressures coming both from globalization and fragmentation, showing how environmental protection has contributed to the process itself. The multi-level governance model, stating that "European integration is a polity creating process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government", perfectly suits with EU environmental policy since contacts between multiple levels of government are required, especially in the stage of implementation. The paper is made up of three main parts. In the first one a general insight on globalization, fragmentation and European integration is provided: the starting point is that the process of globalization affecting the planet and challenging the Nation-state as main actor of international politics needs to be taken into account when analysing the process of European integration. In the same way, pushes towards fragmentation are taken into account. The second part deals with multi-level governance and the way it explains the evolution of the European Union. In the third part a general view of the evolution of EU environmental policy is provided, lingering on the main instrument used by the Union to reach its environmental targets. The final part analyses the processes taking place within the EU and bringing to an effective environmental policy; focusing on the role played by the European Parliament and its Environmental Committee, in shaping EU environmental policy, the multi-level governance lens will be used to discuss the Union approach to environment. As stated in the title, there is a dominating question in the paper: are we going towards a cleaner federal state? Reading through the lines, it will be possible to perceive an inclination towards a federalist interpretation of the EU evolution, though the federalist process is not conceived as a compulsory target, but a "suggested" model chosen for its suitability with the multi-level structure that characterises the EU today.
1996-12
Working Paper
PeerReviewed
text/html
http://aei.pitt.edu/383/1/jmwp02.htm
Barbagallo, Valentina (1996) European integration and environment: are we going towards a cleaner federal State? JMWP No. 02.96, December, 1996. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/383/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:391
2011-02-15T22:15:28Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303337
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:4430303170707061
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6566616D6F6E6574617279706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:6D656469616D65646961
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Policy Transfer in The European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy. JMWP No. 10.97, September 1997
Radaelli, Claudio M.
tax policy
media
public policy/public administration
monetary policy
European Commission
decision making/policy-making
The paper examines public policy in the European Union (EU) by drawing upon the conceptual framework of policy transfer, which has been recently refined by comparativists, and the concept of isomorphism developed within organizational theory. Three case studies of EU policy transfer - namely monetary policy, tax policy, and media ownership policy - are discussed and compared for assessing the potential of isomorphism for the analysis of policy diffusion. The author argues that European institutions, which have a serious political limitation in terms of legitimacy, stimulate policy transfer by catalysing isomorphic processes which diffuse throughout the EU national policy solutions to collective problems. By contrast, policy transfer is severely constrained when there are no national cases to be imitated. In this circumstance, however, European institutions, most notably the European Commission, can overcome the problem by ‘inseminating’ solutions into national political systems.
Barbagallo, Valentina
1997-09
Working Paper
PeerReviewed
text/html
http://aei.pitt.edu/391/1/jmwp10.htm
Radaelli, Claudio M. (1997) Policy Transfer in The European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy. JMWP No. 10.97, September 1997. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/391/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:405
2011-02-15T22:15:32Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:7061666664656D6F637261637964656D6F63726174696364656669636974
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:6575726F7065616E69736174696F6E6575726F7065616E697A6174696F6E6E6174696F6E616C6964656E74697479
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666706F6C69746963616C70617274696573
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Strategies for Democratising the European Union and the Issue of the Election of the President of the Commission. JMWP No. 19.98, November 1998
Attina, Fulvio
governance: EU & national level
democracy/democratic deficit
europeanisation/europeanization & European identity
European Parliament
political parties
decision making/policy-making
The issue of building democracy in multi-state political systems is examined in the first section of the essay. Three options for multi-state democracy are analyzed. The second section analyses how the reform of the decisional procedures of the European Union has advanced the role of the European Parliament and the political parties. The third section examines the debate on the role of national parliaments in the European Union because this is an issue of great importance for the European Union as a multi-state democracy. Finally, the paper analyses the issue of the accountability of the EU executive because this is the crucial issue of the democratisation of the European Union in the years ahead.
Barbagallo, Valentina
1998-11
Working Paper
PeerReviewed
text/html
http://aei.pitt.edu/405/1/jmwp19.htm
Attina, Fulvio (1998) Strategies for Democratising the European Union and the Issue of the Election of the President of the Commission. JMWP No. 19.98, November 1998. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/405/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:440
2020-01-07T22:22:34Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:4430303173706F727473
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303132
74797065733D70726F63656564696E6773
"Sport Governance and European Integration"
Barani, Luca
sports
European Court of Justice/Court of First Instance
decision making/policy-making
governance: EU & national level
This paper is concerned with the issue of interaction between Sport governance, performed by private sporting authorities at the national and trans-national levels, and the dynamics of European integration promoted by the Community institutions. The object of the paper is going to be the functioning of the decision-making mechanism in the European Union (EU) in a specific case study, namely the Sport regulation. A special attention is given to the role played by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in connection with other EU institutions, in the making of the regulatory framework to apply to the Sport field. This paper will try to make a contribution to the discussion, initiated before the Maastricht Treaty, about the likely process of re-politicization of the integration process, which was expected to happen as a consequence of this highly significant step. The period taken in consideration stretches from the Bosman ruling, December 1995, to the Nice Treaty, December 2000.
2003
Conference Proceedings
NonPeerReviewed
application/msword
http://aei.pitt.edu/440/1/Nashville.doc
text/plain
http://aei.pitt.edu/440/2/Nashville.txt
Barani, Luca (2003) "Sport Governance and European Integration". [Conference Proceedings] (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/440/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:459
2019-11-01T15:24:55Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706768646F63
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE AND EUROPEAN CHAUVINISM: A GENEALOGY
Silvia, Stephen J.
Sampson, Aaron Beers
decision making/policy-making
historical development of EC (pre-1986)
This paper argues that a full understanding of the significance of the acquis communautaire for European and international politics requires an analysis that extends beyond the spatial and chronological confines of postwar Europe. It posits that the provenance of the acquis communautaire can be traced back to the concept of “standard of civilization,” which the European colonial powers crafted during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to justify colonial rule. The genealogy of the acquis communautaire reveals that the concept is embedded within a discourse that necessitates the construction of a less-than-civilized, non-European “other.” By definition it places EU members above other nations and precludes the acceptance of difference as equal. Moreover, the acquis communautaire as currently constituted and employed invests the European Union as the exclusive author of the values and practices of “civilization,” and the sole judge determining which nations belong to the club of the “civilized.” Using the acquis communautaire as the cornerstone of European integration is therefore particularly problematic for the conduct of EU foreign policy. The construct, which is inherently hierarchical and hegemonic, risks encouraging a revival of European chauvinism.
2003
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/msword
http://aei.pitt.edu/459/1/Acquis%2DEUSA03rev.rtf
Silvia, Stephen J. and Sampson, Aaron Beers (2003) ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE AND EUROPEAN CHAUVINISM: A GENEALOGY. In: UNSPECIFIED, Nashville, TN, USA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/459/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:491
2011-02-15T23:43:41Z
oai:aei.pitt.edu:544
2011-02-15T22:15:43Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303138:656C6D656D706C6F796D656E74756E656D706C6F796D656E74
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Soft Governance, Agile Union? Analysis of the Extensions of Open Coordination in 2000. EIPA Paper: 18.IV-2001
Ahonen, Pertti
governance: EU & national level
employment/unemployment
decision making/policy-making
This is a study of the open method of coordination of European Union policies. Open coordination is studied here as a "soft" method of European policy-making from the perspective of European governance and related networks. The method’s first field of application were the European employment policies. The 2000 European Councils expanded the method to several new policy fields. The Commission’s policy plans imply further expansions of the method. It is possible to analyse aspects of the method right now and to spell out its first evaluations. However, it is necessary to elaborate upon the analyses and expand the evaluations while the method’s applications mature and while the method covers further policy fields.
2001
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/544/1/01PAH.pdf
Ahonen, Pertti (2001) Soft Governance, Agile Union? Analysis of the Extensions of Open Coordination in 2000. EIPA Paper: 18.IV-2001. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/544/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:546
2011-02-15T22:15:43Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303138:656C6D656D706C6F796D656E74756E656D706C6F796D656E74
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303038
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303330
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Incremental Synergies or Growing Fragmentation between the Luxembourg Process and EU Cohesion Policy? EIPA Working Paper: 2002/W/1
Hartwig, Ines
regional policy/structural funds
cohesion policy
employment/unemployment
decision making/policy-making
[Fron the Introduction]. As stated by both the Council and the European Commission, the European Union's actions concerning employment follow two main tracks: on the one hand, there is the European Employment Strategy (EES), embodied in the employment title which was incorporated into the Community Treaty at Amsterdam in 1997 and developed further at the Extraordinary European Council in Luxembourg later in the same year. On the other hand, many Community actions to assist employment are taken in the framework of the Structural Funds. However, there are quite some differences between these two instruments. Whereas for the EES there is direct and explicit link to support employment, the involvement of the Structural Funds in the EU’s support of employment is much less explicit. This is not only due to the fact that the Structural Funds are much broader in scope and not only limited to support employment. It is also due to differences between these two instruments which are more fundamental in nature. The European Employment Strategy as such - that is, the so-called "Luxembourg Process" - is one of the main fields in which the "open method of coordination" is used, based upon policy coordination and benchmarking rather than legally-binding acts. This "third way" in EU governance is used when harmonisation is unworkable but mutual recognition and the resulting regulatory competition may be too risky.
2002
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/546/1/EIPA_WorkingPaper_Dec20021.pdf
Hartwig, Ines (2002) Incremental Synergies or Growing Fragmentation between the Luxembourg Process and EU Cohesion Policy? EIPA Working Paper: 2002/W/1. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/546/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:548
2011-02-15T22:15:44Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303131
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:706166666C65676974696D616379
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706767656E6572616C
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Governance by Committee: The Role of Committees in European Policy Making and Policy Implementation. EIPA Research Paper 00/GHA
Neuhold, Christine
Schäfer, Günther F.
Haibach, Georg
Türk, Alexander
Larsson, Torbjörn
Maurer, Andreas
general
European Council
European Parliament
legitimacy
decision making/policy-making
[From the Introduction]. The objective of the state of the art report is to provide an overview of the state of knowledge in each of the subprojects and to sketch briefly how the research to be carried out will complement and contribute to this body of knowledge. Since there has been very little research on the objects of the subprojects on Parliament, Council and comitology, their reports are relatively brief. It is an entirely different story with the theoretical project on legitimacy and EU-committees, where the authors have tried to focus on the key issues, referring only to publications that are most relevant for our research. The subject matter could easily fill a book. Table of Contents: 1. General Introduction; 2. Subproject 1: The Standing Committees in the European Parliament, by Christine Neuhold; 3. Subproject 2: Committees and Working Parties in the Council; 4. Subproject 3: Policy Implementation and Comitology Committees, by Günther F. Schäfer, Georg Haibach and Alexander Türk; 5. Subproject 4: The Committee System, Legitimacy, Citizen’s perceptions and Acceptance of the EU-system of Governance, by Torbjörn Larsson and Andreas Maurer.
2000-05
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/548/1/main.pdf
Neuhold, Christine and Schäfer, Günther F. and Haibach, Georg and Türk, Alexander and Larsson, Torbjörn and Maurer, Andreas (2000) Governance by Committee: The Role of Committees in European Policy Making and Policy Implementation. EIPA Research Paper 00/GHA. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/548/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:728
2011-02-15T22:16:09Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303335:737067656E6572616C
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303138:656C6D656D706C6F796D656E74756E656D706C6F796D656E74
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
The European Employment Strategy as a new governance paradigm for EU level social policy and its implementation through the Open Method of Coordination
Velluti, Samantha
governance: EU & national level
employment/unemployment
general
decision making/policy-making
The paper looks at the European Employment Strategy (EES) within the discourse of New Governance. In particular, I focus on three main research questions. Does the EES, implemented through the 'Open Method of Co-ordination,'(OMC) represent a new mode of policy-making? What is the impact of benchmarking, peer pressure and exchange of best practices at the national level? What is the contribution of the EES and OMC to the extant EC Social Policy regulation in terms of policy transfer? I then suggest a series of amendments to Title VIII and XI of the EC Treaty in order to strengthen the institutional framework of the EES and EC Social Policy sensu lato.
2002
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/728/1/C2W3_Velluti_bibliography.pdf
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/728/2/C2W3_Velluti.pdf
Velluti, Samantha (2002) The European Employment Strategy as a new governance paradigm for EU level social policy and its implementation through the Open Method of Coordination. In: UNSPECIFIED, Florence, Italy.
http://aei.pitt.edu/728/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:764
2011-02-15T22:16:14Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Policy Networks. IHS Political Science Series: 2003, No. 90
Peterson, John
decision making/policy-making
Modern democratic governance occurs only rarely via traditional Weberian hierarchies or pure ‘markets’. Rather, public policies are made via some kind of hybrid arrangement involving a range of different actors, including some representing private or non-governmental institutions. The concept of policy networks - clusters of actors, each with an interest, or ‘stake’ in a given policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure - has been developed and refined as a way to try to describe, explain and predict the outcomes of policy-making via such hybrid arrangements. Governance by policy network is rife at the level of the European Union because it is such a highly differentiated polity which is dominated (in important ways) by experts and highly dependent on ‘government by committee’. Research on EU policy networks has produced useful results but we remain some distance away from an agreed, plausible ‘theory’ of policy networks.
Michalowitz, Irina
2003-07
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/764/1/pw_90.pdf
Peterson, John (2003) Policy Networks. IHS Political Science Series: 2003, No. 90. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/764/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:781
2011-02-15T22:16:16Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
74797065733D61727469636C65
Governance by Committee: The Role of Committees in European Policy Making and Policy Implementation
Haibach, Georg
governance: EU & national level
decision making/policy-making
[From the Introduction]. The European Institute of Public Administration is currently conducting a two-year research project on "Governance by Committee: the Role of Committees in European Policy Making and Policy Implementation". The research is partly funded by the key action "Improving Human Potential and the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base" within the Fifth Framework Programme for Research of the European Community. The proliferation of different types of committees performing different functions in the political process characterises contemporary governance at the national, sub-national (regional and local) and supranational (European) levels of government. The increasing role of committees can be seen as a response to the need for an ever-higher level of technical expertise, which stems from the growing complexity of regulating contemporary western societies. In multi-level governance systems such as federal political systems, committees also perform another function: they are mechanisms ensuring efficient co-ordination between the different levels of government. The growing regulatory tasks of the European Community and the need for multi-level co-ordination explain why the committee system is so highly developed in the EC.... Committee structures and processes vary from one policy area to another. The research concentrates on five different policy fields (internal market – in particular telecommunications, the environment, research and development, social affairs and culture). Furthermore, it focuses on committees in the legislative process (the standing committees of the European Parliament and the committees and working parties of the Council) and in the policy implementation process (comitology committees). These three types of committees will be analysed in different subprojects. In addition, a forth subproject will focus on the legitimacy of as well as citizens’ perceptions of the EC Committee system.
2000
Article
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/781/1/2000_2_7.pdf
Haibach, Georg (2000) Governance by Committee: The Role of Committees in European Policy Making and Policy Implementation. EIPASCOPE, 2000 (2). pp. 1-4.
http://aei.pitt.edu/781/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:784
2011-02-15T22:16:17Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303230
74797065733D61727469636C65
The Secret Life of Comitology or the Role of Public Officials in EC Environmental Policy
Demmke, Christoph
decision making/policy-making
environmental policy (including international arena)
The object of this article is not to describe the Comitology decision 87/373/EEC or to explain the different committee procedures as this has already been done elsewhere. The intention is more to look into the "daily life" of the comitology committees from the point of view of a national civil servant and to analyse their working methods, rules of procedure, style of negotiation and composition. There will be a critical assessment of the comitology committees in the environmental sector in terms of their efficiency and effectiveness, and against the background of the discussions on the democratic deficit in the EU. The article will conclude with some realistic proposals as to how the comitology system can be reformed.
1998
Article
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/784/1/scop98_3_2.pdf
Demmke, Christoph (1998) The Secret Life of Comitology or the Role of Public Officials in EC Environmental Policy. EIPASCOPE, 1998 (3). pp. 1-10.
http://aei.pitt.edu/784/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:787
2011-02-15T22:16:17Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303035
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303031
74797065733D61727469636C65
A Contemplative View on the First Pillar of the New European Union
Guggenbühl, Alain
IGC 1996
Amsterdam Treaty
decision making/policy-making
[From the Introduction]. The Amsterdam Summit of the European Council on 16 and 17 June this year was awaited with great anticipation. With the prospect of enlargement in sight, the institutions and the decision-making procedures of the European Union needed to be revised whilst maintaining a careful balance between flexible integration on the one hand and social and political legitimacy on the other hand. For this reason, the Member States submerged themselves in a long bargaining process, which has resulted in a text larded with political compromises.... Below, you will find a first analysis of parts of the draft Treaty by three EIPA Faculty members who also presented their views during the IGC-afternoon. Due to the publication date of this EIPASCOPE issue, their comments naturally concern the draft in circulation prior to the date of signing due to take place in Amsterdam in October 1997.
1997
Article
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/787/1/Scop97_2_1.pdf
Guggenbühl, Alain (1997) A Contemplative View on the First Pillar of the New European Union. EIPASCOPE, 1997 (2). pp. 1-5.
http://aei.pitt.edu/787/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:792
2011-02-15T22:16:18Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D46:46303136
74797065733D61727469636C65
The Challenge of Being an "Active Observer": Some Experiences from Norway
Malterud, Tore Chr.
Norway
decision making/policy-making
[Opening reflections]. I would like to start by asking "what makes it so special for politicians and civil servants to work at an EU level?" How does it differ from working in other international organisations or in the public sector at home? There are some significant differences. In addition to the workingstyle, the roles and the interaction between the political and permanent administrative levels are different. In a well-established democracy there is a clear division of power and distinction of roles between the government, the permanent public administration and the parliament. The government proposes and the parliament decides. Proposals are presented according to internal rules and procedures, and decisions are taken according to the constitution. Time is devoted to evaluating the consequences of different actions and defining the political implications. Here we clearly see the first main difference between EU and national politics: namely, that when working on EU matters Member States face an externally imposed timetable. Only to a limited extent is it possible to influence the tempo, the rules of procedure and the agendas of meetings. Unless, of course, a Member States is in the "lucky" situation of holding the Presidency.
2003
Article
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/792/1/scop2003_2_3.pdf
Malterud, Tore Chr. (2003) The Challenge of Being an "Active Observer": Some Experiences from Norway. EIPASCOPE, 2003 (2). pp. 1-6.
http://aei.pitt.edu/792/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:817
2011-02-15T22:16:23Z
7374617475733D707562
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7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303335:737067656E6572616C
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303230
74797065733D61727469636C65
Alternative Regulations or Complementary Methods? Evolving Options in European Governance
Best, Edward
general
decision making/policy-making
environmental policy (including international arena)
[Summary]. Long gone are the days when the only choice for pursuing a Community objective was law, and law was adopted according to one main procedure. In many areas EU policy is formulated and implemented through a mixture of methods both legal and non-legal, European and national, public and private. After a flashback to recall some the main reasons why all these new methods have emerged, this article outlines the main features of two areas in which "self-regulation" and "co-regulation" are significant: environmental agreements and the social dialogue. It then gives an overview of the very different ways in which the "open method of coordination" is in fact being pursued. The final section then addresses some of the main issues which have been raised regarding the effectiveness and legitimacy of these new methods, and looks to the future.
2003
Article
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/817/1/scop2003_1_1.pdf
Best, Edward (2003) Alternative Regulations or Complementary Methods? Evolving Options in European Governance. EIPASCOPE, 2003 (1). pp. 1-10.
http://aei.pitt.edu/817/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:820
2011-02-15T22:16:24Z
7374617475733D707562
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7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303032
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303133
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706767656E6572616C
74797065733D61727469636C65
The Treaty of Nice: Not Beautiful but It’ll Do
Best, Edward
Nice Treaty
general
enlargement
decision making/policy-making
[Summary]. After long and difficult negotiation, a Treaty was agreed at Nice in December 2000, concluding the Intergovernmental Conference convened to deal with the ‘left-overs’ from Amsterdam. There were criticisms of the conduct and tone of the discussions. Yet the basic goal was achieved: the possible institutional obstacles to enlargement were removed. There was an agreement to have one Commissioner per Member State as of 2005 and a reduction to an unspecified number less than that of the Member States once there are 27 countries in the EU; a complex system of reweighting of votes with a triple threshold for qualified majority; a limited extension of qualified-majority voting; and some relaxation of the conditions for 'enhanced cooperation'. It is not possible to foresee exactly how the new arrangements may work, and they may be modified before they come into force. Nonetheless, there are concerns that decision-making will not be easier while transparency may suffer; that attention has been distracted from non-treaty reforms and other issues of policy management; and that solidarity may have been weakened. The limited scope and particular nature of this agenda made it inevitable that bargaining should often seem zero-sum, while national positions proved unusually difficult to change. Any EU Presidency would have had great difficulty in managing these questions. For the future, improvements to the way in which Intergovernmental Conferences are structured and managed can be envisaged. Equally important will be how effectively diplomacy can be prepared and accompanied by other forms of European public deliberation.
2001
Article
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/820/1/scop2001_1_1.pdf
Best, Edward (2001) The Treaty of Nice: Not Beautiful but It’ll Do. EIPASCOPE, 2001 (1). pp. 1-8.
http://aei.pitt.edu/820/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:822
2011-02-15T22:16:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
74797065733D61727469636C65
The Experience of Member State Officials in EU Committees: A Report on Initial Findings of an Empirical Study
Schaefer, Guenther F.
Egeberg, Morten
Korez, Silvo
Trondal, Jarle
decision making/policy-making
[Introduction]. Committees are an essential part of the functioning of modern governance. Some are official, whilst others are unofficial or even ad hoc. They play a crucial role in the daily operation of the European system of governance by providing expertise in policy development and decision-making, linking Member States’ governments and administrations with the European level, as well as increasing the acceptance of European laws and programmes in the Member States. In various guises, committees are active at every stage of the European political process – assisting the Commission in drafting legislation, preparing the dossiers on which the Council takes decisions and supervising the implementation of EC law by the Commission. The latter are generally referred to as comitology committees, although the term is sometimes extended to include all committees. Since 1995, EIPA has organised seminars for Member State officials on the role of committees in the EC political process. In the spring of 1997 we started to distribute a questionnaire to those participants in the seminars who have been involved in one or more committees at EC level. It was designed to get an overview of the experience of Member State officials in EU committees: in what kind and how many committees they were involved, how frequently meetings were taking place, how long they lasted, what languages were used, etc. The major part of the questionnaire focussed on the question of how Member State officials viewed the roles they performed in these committees and how they perceived the roles performed by other participants. The paper reports some initial findings. The first part will summarise some practical aspects: time spent on EU matters; availability of documentation and interpretation facilities; language use. The second part concentrates on: officials’ loyalties and identities; their role perception when participating in EU committees; the question of coordination.
2000
Article
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/822/1/scop2000_3_5.pdf
Schaefer, Guenther F. and Egeberg, Morten and Korez, Silvo and Trondal, Jarle (2000) The Experience of Member State Officials in EU Committees: A Report on Initial Findings of an Empirical Study. EIPASCOPE, 2000 (3). pp. 1-7.
http://aei.pitt.edu/822/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:824
2011-02-15T22:16:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706768646F63
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706767656E6572616C
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D61727469636C65
Council Decision 1999/468 – A New Comitology Decision for the 21st Century!?
Haibach, Georg
European Parliament
general
European Commission
historical development of EC (pre-1986)
decision making/policy-making
[Introduction]. On 28 June 1999 the Council adopted a new "Comitology" Decision which contains several significant changes with respect to the previous Decision of 1987. The term "comitology" which is well known today was apparently coined in the European Parliament in 1987. It refers to law-making procedures in the EC which have, however, existed since the 1960s and which involve committees composed of the representatives of the governments of the Member States at the level of civil servants. Comitology in the last 40 years has been probably the most fervently contested interinstitutional battleground between the Commission, Council and the European Parliament. It is the purpose of this article to assess whether the new Decision can put an end to that long-lasting struggle. For a better understanding of the underlying reasons of this power struggle and the positions of the different institutions, first a brief overview of the most important steps from the establishment of the first committees in the 1960s up to the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 will be given. This is followed by a detailed presentation of the major changes introduced by the new Decision, based on a description of the positions adopted by the Commission and the European Parliament.
1999
Article
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/824/1/scop99_3_2.pdf
Haibach, Georg (1999) Council Decision 1999/468 – A New Comitology Decision for the 21st Century!? EIPASCOPE, 1999 (3). pp. 1-9.
http://aei.pitt.edu/824/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:825
2011-02-15T22:16:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:443030316C61776C6567616C61666661697273
7375626A656374733D46:46303236
7375626A656374733D46:46303036
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D46:46303037
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706767656E6572616C
74797065733D61727469636C65
Comitology after Amsterdam: A Comparative Analysis of the Delegation of Legislative Powers
Haibach, Georg
U.K.
general
France
law & legal affairs-general (includes international law)
European Commission
Germany
decision making/policy-making
[From the Introduction]. The purpose of this article is thus to examine whether executive law-making in the EC is fundamentally different from that in France, Germany, the UK (which shall be used as examples of Member States) and the U.S. with regard to the following questions: Is there a principle of separation of powers in EC law? Why is a delegation of powers from the Council to the Commission possible? Are there any limits for such a delegation of powers? What justification is there for the comitology committee structure? Should the European Parliament have more rights in controlling the Commission in its law-making?
1997
Article
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/825/1/scop97_3_1.pdf
Haibach, Georg (1997) Comitology after Amsterdam: A Comparative Analysis of the Delegation of Legislative Powers. EIPASCOPE, 1997 (3). pp. 1-7.
http://aei.pitt.edu/825/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:842
2011-02-15T22:16:30Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65666153696E676C654D61726B6574:65666153696E676C654D61726B657467656E6572616C
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65666153696E676C654D61726B6574:65666153696E676C654D61726B65746361706974616C676F6F64737365727669636573
74797065733D61727469636C65
The Need for an Internal Market Ombudsman
Harris, Stephen
capital, goods, services, workers
general
decision making/policy-making
[Foreword]. This article arises from private conversations with industry and other sources over the past 5 or so years about their general impressions of the workings of the European Union (EU) Internal Market. Those discussions concerned primarily the development and cementing of the level playing field in the manufacture, sale and use of products subject to EU New Approach directives intended to abolish technical barriers to trade. Those directives are made under Article 100A of the Treaty of Rome and provide a framework for the manufacture and supply of such products. Whilst the directives themselves are considered generally to be working well, making the level playing field a clearer reality is proving more troublesome. There are many possible reasons for this. One of the most likely is that serious attention is only just starting to be paid to the need for concerted action by the current 15 EU member States to ensure that measures are in place and working properly to check that directives are being fairly and evenly implemented and administered across the EU. However, who or what checks the enforcers to ensure that they understand directives’ requirements properly and place no unnecessary burdens on those affected by them? Government officials in the Member States have policy responsibility for ensuring that directives are implemented and administered faithfully. But disputes concerning a product’s right to bear the CE marking or alleged barriers to trade in such products, for example, are more likely to be referred to lawyers …… and ultimately the Courts, ending with the European Court of Justice. This is a lengthy and expensive process. Business is calling increasingly for measures to avoid such experiences; to provide faster remedies, and to weed out only the most contentious cases for consideration by the Courts. An Internal Market Ombudsman (IMO) possibly provides one remedy. Such a facility is not without precedent and could hold one of the keys to Making the Internal Market Work! Further dedicated research is required to crystallise the issues and to assist informed debate. If papers such as this start that ball rolling, they will have achieved much.
1999
Article
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/842/1/scop99_1_4.pdf
Harris, Stephen (1999) The Need for an Internal Market Ombudsman. EIPASCOPE, 1999 (1). pp. 1-7.
http://aei.pitt.edu/842/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1470
2011-02-15T22:18:44Z
7374617475733D707562
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7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Inter-organizational Negotiation and Intra-organizational Power in Shared Decision-making: Early agreements under codecision and their impact on the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. IHS Political Science Series: 2004, No. 95
Farrell, Henry
Héritier, Adrienne.
European Parliament
Council of Ministers
decision making/policy-making
In this article we argue that closer attention should be paid to the inter-organizational rules of decision-making and their implications for intra-organizational processes. We claim that exogenous changes in macro-institutional rules, which result in a move from formal and sequential to informal and simultaneous interaction between collective actors will lead to changes in individual actors’ respective influence over outcomes within organizations. Certain individuals, in particular ‘relais’ actors, controlling information flows between organizations, will see an increase in their power over legislative outcomes. This begs the question of how organizations will respond to these shifts in their internal power balance. We argue that collective actors that centralize coordination over dealings with external actors will respond effectively through internal rule change. In contrast, collective actors with multiple, ill coordinated links to other organizations, will find it difficult to change internal rules. We empirically explore the general argument by analyzing the relationship between the Council and the European Parliament in the process of codecision and its implications for intra-organizational processes.
2004-03
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1470/1/pw_95.pdf
Farrell, Henry and Héritier, Adrienne. (2004) Inter-organizational Negotiation and Intra-organizational Power in Shared Decision-making: Early agreements under codecision and their impact on the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. IHS Political Science Series: 2004, No. 95. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1470/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1624
2011-02-15T22:19:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:4430303170707061
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:676C6F62616C69736174696F6E676C6F62616C697A6174696F6E
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
What Future for the European Administrative Space? EIPA Working Paper 03/W/05
d'Orta, Carlo
public policy/public administration
globalisation/globalization
decision making/policy-making
[From the Introduction]. This publication of mine is entitled "What future for the European administrative space?" But wondering about this possible future implied a preliminary question: what do we understand by European Administrative Space? Further on I shall try to formulate a possible definition.
2003
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1624/1/2003w05.pdf
d'Orta, Carlo (2003) What Future for the European Administrative Space? EIPA Working Paper 03/W/05. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1624/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1625
2011-02-15T22:19:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:4430303170707061
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:676C6F62616C69736174696F6E676C6F62616C697A6174696F6E
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Quel avenir pour l'espace europeenne administratif? = What future for the European Administrative Space? EIPA Working Paper 03/W/06
d'Orta, Carlo
public policy/public administration
globalisation/globalization
decision making/policy-making
[From the Introduction]. This publication of mine is entitled "What future for the European administrative space?" But wondering about this possible future implied a preliminary question: what do we understand by European Administrative Space? Further on I shall try to formulate a possible definition.
2003
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1625/1/2003w06.pdf
d'Orta, Carlo (2003) Quel avenir pour l'espace europeenne administratif? = What future for the European Administrative Space? EIPA Working Paper 03/W/06. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1625/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1642
2011-02-15T22:19:27Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:706166666C65676974696D616379
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D64697363757373696F6E7061706572
Between Forces of Inertia and Progress: Co-decision in EU-Legislation. ZEI Discussion Paper: 2003, C 119
Iral, Hubert.
European Parliament
legitimacy
decision making/policy-making
[Introduction]. Many observers claim that the implementation of the Co-decision mechanism with the ESA (1987) and its manifestation in the Maastricht/Amsterdam Treaties (1992/97) could be interpreted as a significant step towards more democratic legitimacy in European policymaking. This conclusion could come close to reality under two conditions: The first, if the EP as the only directly elected decision-making body is comprehensively involved as an equal-footing Co-legislator beside the Council. The second, and even more important, is if the Co-decision procedure is sufficiently transparent for the European Citizens. Therefore, this paper aims to explore, whether these two requirements are fulfilled. The following is that a too optimistic assessment of the Codecision procedure, as a tool for more legitimacy cannot be justified. In order to demonstrate my thesis, I will firstly discuss the general problem for European Citizens with legislation at the national and European level, specifically regarding the critical question, of how the EU can bring the people closer to the Union. Secondly, it seems useful to deliver a more comprehensive description of the history of the Co-decision procedure, because this gives an insight into the development of legislation in the Community.
2003
Discussion Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1642/1/dp_c119_iral.pdf
Iral, Hubert. (2003) Between Forces of Inertia and Progress: Co-decision in EU-Legislation. ZEI Discussion Paper: 2003, C 119. [Discussion Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1642/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1667
2011-02-15T22:19:32Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666706F6C69746963616C70617274696573
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D64697363757373696F6E7061706572
The Difference Between Real and Potential Power: Voting Power, Attendance and Cohesion. ZEI Discussion Paper: 2004, 130
Faas, Thorsten
Raunio, Tapio
Wiberg, Matti.
European Parliament
political parties
decision making/policy-making
[From the Introduction]. Applying power indices to the political process of the European Union has become fashionable. An increasing range of scholars has applied power indices to studying the institutions of the European Union (EU). However, their work has not gone without criticism. Critics argue that the use of power indices is of little value, since they ignore the preferences of the actors, such as party groups, and also the political dynamics of the decisionmaking processes, such as the EU legislative procedures (see particularly Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, 1999, Tsebelis and Garrett 1996). Advocates of power indices reply by arguing that one cannot know the preferences of the relevant actors in all possible contingencies. We do not always know the preferences of the actors, but we can still say something meaningful about their potential influence (see for example Lane and Berg 1999, Holler and Widgrén 1999).... This article analyses the distribution of voting power in the 1999-2002 EP, taking into account differential levels of attendance and cohesion among party groups. It does so – using the Shapley-Shubik -index (Shapley and Shubik 1954) – for two different kinds of votes: First, votes taken under absolute majority rule (i.e. a majority of all MEPs is necessary for a proposal to pass), second – and this is nowadays the empirically more relevant case – votes taken under simple majority rule (i.e. only a majority of the votes cast is necessary for a proposal to pass). However, before we start the actual discussion of the distribution of power, a few remarks concerning party groups in the EP – and especially their levels of cohesion and attendance – seem appropriate.
2004
Discussion Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1667/1/dp_c130_wiberg.pdf
Faas, Thorsten and Raunio, Tapio and Wiberg, Matti. (2004) The Difference Between Real and Potential Power: Voting Power, Attendance and Cohesion. ZEI Discussion Paper: 2004, 130. [Discussion Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1667/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1869
2011-02-15T22:20:26Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303233
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:436F6E7374346575726F7065
7375626A656374733D46:46303137
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:696367303033
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
The Draft Constitutional Treaty’s Voting Reform Dilemma. CEPS Policy Brief No. 44, November 2003 (With Postscript of 7 December 2003)
Baldwin, Richard
Widgren, Mika.
IGC 2003-4
Constitution for Europe
Spain
Council of Ministers
decision making/policy-making
Poland
[Introduction]. The ongoing Intergovernmental Conference (IGC 2003) must re-shape Giscard d’Estaing’s draft into a Constitutional Treaty that can be signed and subsequently ratified by all 25 members of the enlarged European Union. Things are not going well. The most obvious sticking point concerns the reform of voting rules in the EU’s key decisionmaking body, the Council of Ministers. Here is the problem. As it turns out, the voting scheme that Giscard d’Estaing’s Praesidium put into the draft Constitutional Treaty is not politically acceptable to all EU members (it concentrates power in the hands of the four largest EU members at the expense of Spain, Poland and many small members). Indeed, Giscard’s system is so impolitic that any draft Constitutional Treaty that contains it will almost certainly fail to garner the necessary unanimous support. Yet, if the ongoing IGC does not find an alternative to Giscard’s system, the EU will face decision-making paralysis because the fallback position is the blotched voting system from the Nice Treaty. Hence the dilemma: papering over problems with Giscard’s unpopular voting rules puts the whole draft Constitutional Treaty at risk, but failing to agree an alternative voting scheme risks decision-making paralysis. In this policy brief, we summarise the findings of our research that uses the quantitative tools of voting game theory to show: Why Giscard’s scheme is politically unacceptable to many nations; How various modified voting rules may solve the dilemma. Specifically we identify two possible solutions to the dilemma. First, changing Giscard’s double-majority thresholds from 60% of population and 50% of membership to 60% and 60% respectively would go a very long way to reducing the concentration of power in the hands of the four largest nations (‘Big-four’), yet still maintain the EU’s ability to act; a ratio of 50%-50% would also work. Second, if the IGC decides to stay with the Nice Treaty’s triplemajority voting system, modestly lowering two of the three majority thresholds would maintain efficiency without further shifting power to big nations. Before turning to possible solutions, the first task is to show that the Nice voting reforms will not work, and, in the process, to show why Spain and Poland are so attached to the Nice system.
2003-11
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1869/1/PB44.pdf
Baldwin, Richard and Widgren, Mika. (2003) The Draft Constitutional Treaty’s Voting Reform Dilemma. CEPS Policy Brief No. 44, November 2003 (With Postscript of 7 December 2003). [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1869/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1884
2011-02-15T22:20:30Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65666165636F6E6F6D6963706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031696E74656C6C65637475616C70726F7065727479
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Economic Policy Coordination and Policy Regimes in the European Union. EPIN Working Paper No. 2, July 2002
Micossi, Stafano.
economic policy
intellectual property
decision making/policy-making
[From the Introduction]. This paper discusses three regimes for the coordination of economic policies in the EC Treaty – "pillar one" of the European Union – namely the Single Market, macro-economic policy coordination, and the Open Coordination Method increasingly applied to a broad range of social policies to foster their "convergence". For each regime, the paper highlights the relationship between policy goals and institutional design, and the evolutionary forces at work. An overall assessment of their interaction in shaping "pillar one" economic policies concludes the paper.
2002-06
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1884/1/EPIN_WP2.PDF
Micossi, Stafano. (2002) Economic Policy Coordination and Policy Regimes in the European Union. EPIN Working Paper No. 2, July 2002. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1884/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1885
2011-02-15T22:20:30Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303136
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303032
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303131
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706767656E6572616C
74797065733D776F726B696E677061706572
Towards Effective and Accountable Leadership of the Union: Options and Guidelines for Reform. EPIN Working Paper No. 3, January 2003
Coussens, Wouter
Crum, Ben.
general
European Council-Presidency
enlargement
European Commission
European Council
European Convention
decision making/policy-making
[From the Executive Summary]. The success of the Convention on the future of the EU will to a great extent depend upon on its answers to the institutional questions. Among these questions, the issue of EU leadership plays a crucial role. In this paper, we identify three challenges for the re-organisation of leadership in the Union: 1. Union leadership has to be more effective. The Union’s growing responsibility for truly governmental tasks (e.g. EMU, CFSP, JHA) makes this an imperative. Enlargement will further add to this necessity. 2. Leadership in the Union should contribute to the democratic character of the Union. Indeed, leadership reform may offer an opportunity to increase the engagement of the people and the visibility of the Union. 3. Leadership reform should not fundamentally distort the Unions institutional balance. The Union is no longer a normal international organisation but neither is it a sovereign political system. Leadership reform must maintain the precarious balance between on the one hand the European general interest and on the other the diversity of national interests. In view of these three challenges, we consider the two main strands of debate that touch upon the issue of leadership in the EU: first, the debate on the election of the Commission President and, secondly, the different proposals for reforming the Council Presidency.
2003-01
Working Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1885/1/EPIN_WP3.pdf
Coussens, Wouter and Crum, Ben. (2003) Towards Effective and Accountable Leadership of the Union: Options and Guidelines for Reform. EPIN Working Paper No. 3, January 2003. [Working Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1885/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1939
2011-02-15T22:20:38Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:436F6E7374346575726F7065
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
EU Decision-making after the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. European Policy Papers #9, July 2004
Devuyst, Youri.
Constitution for Europe
European Convention
decision making/policy-making
[From the Executive Summary]. This paper offers an institutional analysis of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. It identifies the Treaty-Constitution’s main implications for the decision-making process in the European Union (EU). While the aim was to streamline EU decision-making in light of the expansion from 15 to 25 Member States, the Treaty-Constitution is characterised by numerous safeguard mechanisms. These are designed to preserve a high degree of Member State control over what is decided in terms of new constitutional, legislative or budgetary commitments in the EU. Veto-rights and blocking options have been retained, notably in procedures for the adoption and revision of the Treaty-Constitution as well as in a number of crucial policy fields. This is unlikely to foster a dynamic decision-making process in an expanded European Union of 25 Member States.
Staniland, Martin.
2004-07
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1939/1/Devuyst_8%2D9%2D04.pdf
Devuyst, Youri. (2004) EU Decision-making after the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. European Policy Papers #9, July 2004. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1939/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1975
2011-02-15T22:20:43Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:443030316C61776C6567616C61666661697273
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:436F6E7374346575726F7065
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:696367303033
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
Decision-Making and the Constitutional Treaty: Will the IGC discard Giscard? CEPS Policy Brief No. 37, August 2003
Baldwin, Richard
Widgren, Mika.
IGC 2003-4
Constitution for Europe
law & legal affairs-general (includes international law)
decision making/policy-making
[Introduction]. The EU’s draft Constitutional Treaty proposes the most radical reform of EU institutions ever put forward – more radical than those in the Single European Act, the Maastricht and Nice Treaties combined. Many of the changes have been debated, but little notice has been paid to what is perhaps the most critical reform: the change in the EU’s decision-making procedures. Decision-making rules are the heart of any constitution and the EU is no exception. Most EU laws are adopted on the basis of majority voting. These laws are binding in all member states, including those that had opposed them. Consequently, nations should take great care when crafting such rules. Nations should also be very alert to changes in their power shares in the decision-making process, since this share has a big influence on how often they will end up having to adopt laws that they voted against in the EU institutions.
2003-08
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1975/1/PB37.pdf
Baldwin, Richard and Widgren, Mika. (2003) Decision-Making and the Constitutional Treaty: Will the IGC discard Giscard? CEPS Policy Brief No. 37, August 2003. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1975/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1978
2011-02-15T22:20:44Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:436F6E7374346575726F7065
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
Optimising the Mechanism for ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ within the EU: Recommendations for the Constitutional Treaty. CEPS Policy Brief No. 33, May 2003
Philippart, Eric.
Constitution for Europe
European Convention
decision making/policy-making
[Executive Summary]. Policy development in the EU is often impeded by member states being either unwilling or unable to participate. One way to overcome that problem is to resort to flexible approaches accommodating diversity. Convinced that an enlarged Union would require more flexibility, the current member states agreed in 1997 to introduce a new safety valve in the treaties, named ‘enhanced cooperation’. Thanks to that mechanism, a group of member states may be authorised to use the EU framework to further their cooperation or integration in policy areas under EU competence whenever it appears impossible to do so with all of the member states. There are a number of reasons why the Constitutional Treaty under negotiation should not only uphold such a mechanism, but should improve it in various respects. The future treaty should start by suppressing redundant preconditions for authorisation, introducing the possibility for a group of willing and able to gear up (i.e. adopt more efficient decision-making procedures and embrace higher ambitions), as well as extending the scope of enhanced cooperation to foreign and defence matters. It should also suppress the minimum participation threshold and clarify the last resort stipulation. As to authorisation, the future treaty should simplify the proposal procedure, specify what may be included in the proposal, streamline the consultation and deliberation procedures, and provide that, for CFSP too, the authorisation is given by the Council acting by qualified majority or superqualified majority. Participation in enhanced cooperation should be open to all, provided that objective criteria are met. The same conditions should apply for initial and subsequent participation. Admission to enhanced cooperation should be managed by the Commission under a single procedure. Regarding enhanced cooperation’s operating mode, the future treaty should stick to the current system of ‘institutional isomorphism’ (no variable geometry in the European Parliament or the Commission). Nevertheless, participating member states should be allowed to decide, acting unanimously, that enhanced cooperation shall be governed by qualified majority instead of unanimity and/or by codecision procedure. They should also be authorised to hold restricted meetings at an informal level. The future treaty should further introduce the possibility to differentiate between the ‘pre-in’ (member states willing to participate but unable to do so from the start) and the ‘out’ (member states unwilling to participate). Finally, the status of the acts and decisions resulting from enhanced cooperation could be revisited. In any case, the future treaty should authorise the Council to decide by a qualified majority that the Union’s budget will support enhanced cooperation’s operational costs.
2003-05
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1978/1/PB33.PDF
Philippart, Eric. (2003) Optimising the Mechanism for ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ within the EU: Recommendations for the Constitutional Treaty. CEPS Policy Brief No. 33, May 2003. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1978/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1980
2011-02-15T22:20:44Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
Constitutionalising the Open Method of Coordination: A Note for the Convention. CEPS Policy Brief No. 31, March 2003
de Búrca, Gráinne
Zeitlin, Jonathan.
European Convention
decision making/policy-making
[From the Introduction]. Within the Convention process, the final reports of no less than four separate working groups – those on Simplification, Complementary Competences, Economic Governance and Social Europe – have come out in favour of including the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC) within the Constitutional Treaty. The relevant sections of these reports are attached in an annex. [AEI Editor's comments: This report discusses each of these reports].
2003-03
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/1980/1/PB31.pdf
de Búrca, Gráinne and Zeitlin, Jonathan. (2003) Constitutionalising the Open Method of Coordination: A Note for the Convention. CEPS Policy Brief No. 31, March 2003. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/1980/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2041
2011-02-15T22:20:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303236
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D46:46303036
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D46:46303037
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031727270
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365:70616666676F7665726E616E63657375626E6174696F6E616C726567696F6E616C2F7465727269746F7269616C
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Multi-level implementation networks: The case of medical devices and patient care"
Altenstetter, Christa.
governance: EU & national level
U.K.
regulations/regulatory policies
France
Germany
subnational/regional/territorial
decision making/policy-making
One objective of this paper is to understand the nature and the role of policy networks and multi-level regulatory decision-making systems in the field of medical devices, their composition and activities in a global context. The emphasis is on reconstructing the basic structure of the actors involved in multi-level regulatory processes rather than a systematic examination of the structure of each network type. This paper grows out of an ongoing cross-national research project entitled “Regulatory Regimes in Transition: The Medical Device Sector and Patient Care.” In 1995, it started out as an exploration of the implementation of regulatory policy specific to medical devices in the European Union, focusing on two levels of rule-making and rule-application and drawing a distinction between the formulation of policy and operations to carry it out: 1) the EU level of rule-making and implementation, and 2) the level of national and sub-national implementation. Through focused case studies of domestic implementation in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, the crossnational comparison has intended to identify similarities and differences in the implementation of European legislation, and shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of their responses at both the policy and levels of implementation from national to local.
2001
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2041/1/001535_1.PDF
Altenstetter, Christa. (2001) "Multi-level implementation networks: The case of medical devices and patient care". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2041/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2044
2011-02-15T22:20:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303138:656C6D656D706C6F796D656E74756E656D706C6F796D656E74
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"The European employment strategy: Policy integration by the back-door?"
Ardy, Brian
Begg, Iain.
governance: EU & national level
employment/unemployment
decision making/policy-making
Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has paid increasing attention to employment creation, yet has few formal powers in this area. A series of agreements, known as “processes” and named after the city where they were agreed, has been made to co-ordinate employment policy. This paper will examine how the “Luxembourg processes,” under which member states structure their employment policies, works and will offer a critique of the ‘open co-ordination’ approach to the employment policy. The focus will then shift to the extent to which the OMC represents simply a first stage in the eventual communiterisation of policy or new method in its own right. It will also confront the question of whether this form of policy can be expected to go far enough to constitute a sufficiently robust “real” economy counterpart to monetary union.
2001
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2044/1/002093_1.PDF
Ardy, Brian and Begg, Iain. (2001) "The European employment strategy: Policy integration by the back-door?". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2044/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2058
2011-02-15T22:21:02Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D46:46303233
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D46:46303138
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303230
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365:70616666676F7665726E616E63657375626E6174696F6E616C726567696F6E616C2F7465727269746F7269616C
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Policy networks and multi-level interactions: Environmental policy in Spain and Portugal
Bukowski, Jeanie.
governance: EU & national level
Portugal
Spain
subnational/regional/territorial
environmental policy (including international arena)
decision making/policy-making
In this paper I provide a framework that may help to move us closer to an answer to [the “so what”] question. Using policy networks analysis as a conceptual and descriptive tool, I first “map” the multiple and overlapping levels of authority characteristic of the multi-level governance structure. Within this structure, I then propose to track policy decisions from their formulation at the EU level through their implementation at the state and subnational levels. Determining the actors involved in the policy networks at the various levels, their policy preferences, their interactions, and the diplomacy outcomes across states and policy domains will provide empirical data necessary to build inductively toward an answer to the “so what” question.
2001
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2058/1/002028_1.PDF
Bukowski, Jeanie. (2001) "Policy networks and multi-level interactions: Environmental policy in Spain and Portugal. In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2058/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2062
2011-02-15T22:21:03Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303236
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D46:46303136
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303436
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706768646F63
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"EU policy-making and policy networks: The impact of EU level policy-making on British and Norwegian offshore health and safety policies"
Cavanagh, Michael.
U.K.
public health policy (including global activities)
Norway
historical development of EC (pre-1986)
decision making/policy-making
The EU should serve as a major influence on offshore health and safety policy. The historical role of the EU and its earlier variants in health and safety extends back to the ECSC and Treaty of Paris. Indeed, the post-SEA escalation on social legislation was for a period dominated by health and safety. With such levels of activity the membership and outcomes of offshore health and safety policy networks in Britain and Norway should have altered to reflect the institutional developments associated with the alteration of existing centers of competence. The expansion of EU level competencies since the ratification on the Single European Act undermines Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith in their classification of the 'basic legal structure' as a stable external parameter serving as a constant external influence for policy oriented relationships. The integration of Europe is a developing process that necessitates adaptation on the part of governments and societal interests.
2001
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2062/1/002029_1.PDF
Cavanagh, Michael. (2001) "EU policy-making and policy networks: The impact of EU level policy-making on British and Norwegian offshore health and safety policies". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2062/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2095
2011-02-15T22:21:13Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303131
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:443030316C61776C6567616C61666661697273:443030316C61776C6567616C61666661697273636F6D706E6174696D70
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Policy implementation and comitology committees: Differentiating between policy legislation and policy implementation"
Haibach, Georg
Schaefer, Guenther F.
Tuerk, Alexander.
European Parliament
compliance/national implementation
European Council
decision making/policy-making
The research questions to be addressed by this subproject should contribute to a constructive solution to this important issue of the institutional balance by first establishing criteria for an operational demarcation between legislative and implementing measures, and secondly by assessing a large number of EC implementing acts to determine whether and in which cases implementing measures have in fact violated the prerogatives of the legislators Council and Parliament. The subproject therefore concentrates on the following questions, divided into a theoretical and an empirical approach: How can the line that separates implementing measures from those with legislative implications be drawn? How can that differentiation between legislative and implementing legal acts be made operational? How could an effective system of control be established that limits the implementing powers of the Commission and safeguards the prerogatives of the legislators, especially Parliament? Have the prerogatives of the legislative authorities been generally respected in implementing decisions in the course of the past years or have decisions with important legislative implications been decided upon according to comitology procedures? In which policy arenas has this primarily occurred? In what way have these possible "transgressions" affected the institutional balance?
2001
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2095/1/002111_1.PDF
Haibach, Georg and Schaefer, Guenther F. and Tuerk, Alexander. (2001) "Policy implementation and comitology committees: Differentiating between policy legislation and policy implementation". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2095/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2124
2011-02-15T22:21:20Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303335:737067656E646572706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Promoting gender balanced decision-making in the European Union: International and transnational strategies for parity democracy"
Krook, Mona Lena.
European Parliament
gender policy/equal opportunity
decision making/policy-making
In this paper I aim to address a number of gaps in the current literature on women's political representation. First, I present a genealogy of international efforts to target "decision-making" as a policy area crucial to promoting substantive equality between women and men. While I signal the vital role of two UN documents-the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women from 1979 and the Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing from 1995-in placing "women in decision-making" on the international political agenda, I stress how actions in Western Europe have further developed the normative principles and the practical strategies necessary for effecting changes in patterns of representation ... I next discuss the shift in feminist strategy that I argue lies behind the sudden international concern with gender balanced decision-making. I trace the evolution of feminist attitudes towards politics, which I link to changing interpretations about the source of inequalities based on gender, and I note how women's activists have developed a new normative argument calling for "parity democracy" which has proven to be quite effective in bridging differences among women across the political spectrum. In the final section, I then catalogue the various practical strategies employed by the European Union to increase women's representation in the European Parliament and, by extension, in national and local assemblies.
2001
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2124/1/002182.PDF
Krook, Mona Lena. (2001) "Promoting gender balanced decision-making in the European Union: International and transnational strategies for parity democracy". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2124/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2132
2011-02-15T22:21:22Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303036
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303436
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303039
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Science and public participation in regulating genetically-modified food: French and American experiences"
Lynch, Diahanna
Da Ros, Jérôme.
EU-US
public health policy (including global activities)
France
decision making/policy-making
The paper is divided into two sections. The first section considers the role of science and policy, contrasting it with understandings of participatory policymaking. It suggests resolving the tension between these two modes by turning to regulatory officials. Regulators are often portrayed as empty vessels reflecting the preferences of either scientists or the public, but in fact can possess considerable discretion in resolving tensions. We then suggest a set of ideal types of policymaking. The second section turns to the analysis of our cases. We consider the Citizen Conference and the Commission du Génie Biomoléculaire in France, and the Food and Drug Administration public meetings in the United States. We conclude with some reflections on how well these three cases integrate and moderate expert and public participation.
2001
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2132/1/002186_1.PDF
Lynch, Diahanna and Da Ros, Jérôme. (2001) "Science and public participation in regulating genetically-modified food: French and American experiences". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2132/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2136
2011-02-15T22:21:22Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666706F6C69746963616C70617274696573
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Committee work in the European Parliament: The distribution of rapporteurships among party groups and national delegations"
Mamadouh, Virginie
Raunio, Tapio.
European Parliament
political parties
decision making/policy-making
The paper analyses the distribution of reports and rapporteurships in the 1989-99 European Parliament among party groups and national delegations. The data consists of all reports and rapporteurships in the third (1989-94) and fourth (1994-99) Parliament and of interviews with committee staff. We show that the size of a group predicts well its share of the reports. Correlations coefficients between the number of members in a group and the number of reports they produced are very high, generally over .950. Party groups are, within certain limits, willing to make trade-offs and to cede reports to smaller groups, but on the whole they compete hard over the reports in order to influence the EU policy process. The procedures for allocating committee chairs (d'Hondt system), committee seats (proportionality rule), and reports (points system based on groups' share of seats) can be interpreted as mechanisms for the party groups to control the committees in a situation where the former are relatively weak (compared to European national parliaments). The two largest groups, PSE and PPE, control legislative reports. There is considerable variation in the distribution of rapporteurships between national delegations. Scattered distribution over several groups, with weak presence in the core groups, correlates positively with low report production.
2001
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2136/1/002187_1.PDF
Mamadouh, Virginie and Raunio, Tapio. (2001) "Committee work in the European Parliament: The distribution of rapporteurships among party groups and national delegations". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2136/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2138
2011-02-15T22:21:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:656661454D55454D536575726F
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6566616D6F6E6574617279706F6C696379
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Policy co-ordination and economic adjustment in EMU: Will it work?"
Mayes, David G.
Viren, Matti.
monetary policy
EMU/EMS/euro
decision making/policy-making
The EU has set in place a series of mechanisms to try to co-ordinate fiscal, "structural" and monetary policies in order to achieve the objectives of EMU for the 12 members. All of these mechanisms are unique and untried. There is single monetary policy run by the combination of the national central banks and the new European Central Bank under the umbrella of the Eurosystem. There are restrictions on the scope of the member states' fiscal policies, which remain a national responsibility, and attempts to encourage co-ordination and discourage tax competition. Structural policies are governed by the processes of "soft co-ordination,"involving the setting of objectives and mutual surveillance. In comparison with the U.S. these measures look rather limited. The basis for their structure owes more the practicalities of what could be agreed than to some careful assessment of the needs of efficient and effective policy. This paper reviews the mechanisms and provides an empirical assessment of this policy structure in practice. We show that while there are problems in running a single monetary policy for a diverse area, the main problems do not relate to co-ordination among macro-economic policies. The policy balance is not necessarily going to be biased and fiscal policies are not inhibited from the diversity necessary to reconcile the differences among the member states. Co-ordination provides a benefit particularly to smaller countries. Initially the incentives behind soft co-ordination appear to be having an effect but structural change is traditionally the most difficult to effect.
2001
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2138/1/002189.PDF
Mayes, David G. and Viren, Matti. (2001) "Policy co-ordination and economic adjustment in EMU: Will it work?". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2138/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2176
2011-02-15T22:21:31Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303139
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"The Commission's bureaucratic sectorisation: Resource or constraint for a European form of interest representation?"
Saurugger, Sabine S.
governance: EU & national level
European Commission
energy policy (Including international arena)
agriculture policy
decision making/policy-making
Having chosen to compare a very integrated policy-sector, which is agriculture, with a policy field based on national competences (nuclear energy), the research attempts to determine if there is more convergence between the national policy styles in the sectors in a very integrated policy field than in a policy area where policy-making is mainly based on intergovernmental bargaining. I argue that looking systemically at the sector specific characteristics of European policy-making, we observe sectorally divergent styles of public-private interaction, which are mediated by the interaction style forged at the national level. Contrary to Gerda Falkner's study we do thus not observe "rather more convergence than before between the geographic layers of the European Union and between the Member States."
2001
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2176/1/002254.PDF
Saurugger, Sabine S. (2001) "The Commission's bureaucratic sectorisation: Resource or constraint for a European form of interest representation?". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2176/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2177
2011-02-15T22:21:31Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303335:737067656E6572616C
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"The theory and policy of an EU social federation: Towards laboratory federalism"
Schelkle, Waltraud.
general
decision making/policy-making
The EU has become a loose kind of social federation. Yet the political support for a distinct social policy agenda of the EU remains doubtful. This paper re-examines the cases both for concerted efforts in social policy and for the EU level to play an indispensable role. A theory and policy of "laboratory federalism" is suggested that takes into account that the EU has yet to build consensus as regards its role in social policy matters. The corresponding method of social policy coordination, laboratory standardization, is contrasted to the Open method of Coordination adopted at the Nice Summit.
2001
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2177/1/002684_1.PDF
Schelkle, Waltraud. (2001) "The theory and policy of an EU social federation: Towards laboratory federalism". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2177/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2212
2011-02-15T22:21:43Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031727270
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C6166666169727362706561
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:443030316C61776C6567616C61666661697273:443030316C61776C6567616C61666661697273636F6D706E6174696D70
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“European Integration and National Governance: A Comparative Analysis of the Implementation of EU Regulatory Policy on Medical Devices”
Altenstetter, Christa.
governance: EU & national level
regulations/regulatory policies
compliance/national implementation
business/private economic activity
decision making/policy-making
Regulatory integration is a central aspect of European integration. Yet the debate about a “European regulatory state” (Majone 1996, 1992; McGowan and Wallace 1996; Begg 1996; and Wilks 1996) largely avoids a fundamental question: who in this emerging “European regulatory state” translates the intent of EU decisions into action? Who disposes of the capacities-organizational, professional, financial, information and communication-necessary for implementing EU regulatory policy? While recent research on the role of European agencies begins to address this issue at the European level (Shapiro 1997; Majone 1997; Dehousse 1997; Kreher 1997; McGowan and Wallace 1996), the findings are often specific to the policy sector (Héritier et al. 1996; American Institute of Contemporary German Studies 1997; Vogel 1997). The following research contributes empirical information to this debate through a detailed discussion of one policy sector-medical devices.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2212/1/002659_1.pdf
Altenstetter, Christa. (1999) “European Integration and National Governance: A Comparative Analysis of the Implementation of EU Regulatory Policy on Medical Devices”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh Pennsylvania. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2212/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2227
2011-02-15T22:21:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303033
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“How Supranational is Supranationalism? National and European Socialisation of Negotiators in the Council of Ministers”
Beyers, Jan.
Council of Ministers
decision making/policy-making
The central purpose of this paper is to explain why some officials involved in Council working groups have a more positive disposition towards European integration than others. The paper is inspired by the fact that many studies on European integration deal only occasionally with the attitudes and ideas of the men and women involved in daily negotiations. Consequently most studies employ member-states of European institutions (e.g., the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament) as central units of analysis and the description of European policy-making is therefore often based on a limited number of observations (small n analysis). In this paper we propose to desegregate the Council in multiple observations, the officials involved in the Council working groups. In doing so we hope to obtain a more profound understanding of the Council negotiator’s attitudes. This systematic empirical analysis leads to the conclusion that the interaction between domestic and transgovernmental experiences explains a significant proportion of the variance along the supranational-intergovernmental continuum.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2227/1/002224_1.PDF
Beyers, Jan. (1999) “How Supranational is Supranationalism? National and European Socialisation of Negotiators in the Council of Ministers”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2227/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2232
2011-02-15T22:21:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303230
7375626A656374733D41:41303239
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“Institutions Matter: An Institutional Perspective on Decision-Making Configurations in the EU: The Case of the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive”
Bursens, Peter.
integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
environmental policy (including international arena)
decision making/policy-making
This paper examines the preferences and the strategies (and the resulting interaction patterns and organisation structures) of actors that participate in regulative decision-making within the first pillar of the EU. Following [a] distinction made between integration and policy-making, answers will be sought by using Comparative Politics approaches. The main hypothesis is that preferences and strategies of both private and public actors are to a large extent shaped by the institutional context they operate in. To test this hypothesis, a two-step research strategy was set up. First of all, this paper examines whether, and if so which, institutional variables are relevant to explain decision-making patterns. Secondly, and this will be the main part, it explores how institutional variables influence preferences and strategies of participating political actors. The latter will be illustrated by the Packaging and Packaging Waste-Directive. The paper ends with the presentation of a neo-institutionalist model which can help to understand preferences and strategies during decision-making in general.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2232/1/002219_1.PDF
Bursens, Peter. (1999) “Institutions Matter: An Institutional Perspective on Decision-Making Configurations in the EU: The Case of the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2232/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2240
2011-02-15T22:21:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:443030316C61776C6567616C61666661697273
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“The Spaces of European Union Government”
Chalmers, Damian.
governance: EU & national level
law & legal affairs-general (includes international law)
decision making/policy-making
The first two sections of this article consider the two pillars on which most of the claims for the foundations of EC governments are based, namely that it has established a sovereign system of law and new forms of governance structures. I argue that for a variety of reasons neither of these can explain how EU government actualizes itself. For this, I argue in the third section, one must look to the techniques of problem-solving that the EC has adopted. These not only structure the style of EC policy-making but decenter power far more radically than the multi-level governance literature would suggest. This leads to a corresponding centering of social relations, with the center of gravity of much of EU government being vested in two forms of social institution, the locale and those organisations that institutionalise expertise. The fourth section examines the manner in which this feature is exacerbated by the resources available to the EU institutions to affect change. Legal instruments are the central resource available to the EU institutions, but a quality of this resource that differentiates it from other forms is that it transforms government into a dialectical, mutually constitutive process. In the fifth section I argue that much of the crisis of confidence in EU government stems from the style of problem-solving that it has adopted, which creates a fissure between interests and identities. I then examine how EU government could possibly ‘legitimise’ itself through being more receptive to the politics of identity.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2240/1/002644_1.PDF
Chalmers, Damian. (1999) “The Spaces of European Union Government”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2240/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2243
2011-02-15T22:21:52Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D41:41303239
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“Framing the European Commission’s Role: From Autonomy to Influence”
Cini, Michelle.
European Commission
decision making/policy-making
integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
While the application of agency theory to the EU case has explained the conditions under which supranational autonomy occurs, it fails (or rather, does not seek) to account for the conditions under which the supranational institutions influence policy outcomes. This is because it focuses exclusively on the relationship between member states and the EU institutions, ignoring other external and internal factors which may be of relevance. Yet the principal-agent model does focus our attention of the issue of supranational agency and, in the case of this paper, on the agency of the European Commission. This is important. However, there is a danger that such a focus on agency could draw attention away from the particular institutional attributes of the Commission. It is argued in this paper that an understanding of both agency and structure and the relationship between them is necessary if Commission influence is to be fully comprehended and a theory of Commission influence constructed. Hay and Wincott’s recent contribution to this debate (1998) is particularly interesting as it focuses attention on the concept of ‘strategy’ (combining and integrating notions of strategic action and strategic context), providing a useful starting-point, if not a solid theoretical base, for case-study research.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2243/1/002216_1.PDF
Cini, Michelle. (1999) “Framing the European Commission’s Role: From Autonomy to Influence”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2243/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2270
2011-02-15T22:21:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D41:41303239
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706768646F63
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“Control of the Commission’s Executive Functions: Uncertainty, Conflict and Decision Rules”
Franchino, Fabio.
European Commission
historical development of EC (pre-1986)
integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
decision making/policy-making
The literature on implementation committees predominantly emphasizes their informational role and relies on a sui generis characterization of the European Union. This article reasserts their control function and locates these committees within the core tenets of rational choice and agency theory. It takes McCubbins and Page’s (1987) propositions about the determinants of legislators’ control of executive functions and applies these to the Member States’ control of the Commission’s executive powers. The likelihood of establishing ex-post control procedures and the stringency of control are positively correlated with 1) the uncertainty facing legislators about the optimum policy actions, 2) the conflict among legislators and 3) the need of unanimous agreement in the Council of Ministers. Using logistic regressions and a cumulative logic model applied to a stratified sample of non-amending secondary legislation adopted between 1987 and 1998, the article concludes that unanimity, conflict and uncertainty relevantly increase the likelihood of procedural control of the Commission’s activities. Conflict and uncertainty are also relevant factors affecting the stringency of control.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2270/1/002345_1.PDF
Franchino, Fabio. (1999) “Control of the Commission’s Executive Functions: Uncertainty, Conflict and Decision Rules”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2270/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2277
2011-02-15T22:22:02Z
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“Of What Use is the New Institutionalism? An Analysis of the Institutionalization of the Social Dialogue”
Gorges, Michael J.
general
general
industrial/labour relations
integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
decision making/policy-making
The inclusion in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of the “social dialogue provisions” giving employer and trade union representatives a privileged role in the elaboration of EU social policy represents a noteworthy change in policy-making procedures in this area. This paper tests new institutionalist hypotheses on institutionalization by applying them to this change. The new institutionalist perspective fails to provide an adequate explanation of institutionalization in general, and of the institutionalization of the social dialogue in particular. By relying on such variables as “critical junctures,” “path dependency,” “leadership” or “the role of ideas,” new institutionalist analyses leave institutions behind and resort to a grab bag of explanations proponents of almost any theoretical perspective could use. One is left wondering what is new and what is institutionalist about new institutionalist explanations for institutional change and institutionalization.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2277/1/002629_1.PDF
Gorges, Michael J. (1999) “Of What Use is the New Institutionalism? An Analysis of the Institutionalization of the Social Dialogue”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2277/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2284
2011-02-15T22:22:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:627564676574706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budgetary Process within Europe”
Hallerberg, Mark.
European Parliament
decision making/policy-making
budgets & financing
Recent theoretical work on the US Congress has focused on two different conceptions of the function of committees. The “distributional” perspective posits that committees are established to guarantee deals made among legislators to distribute spending across different policy areas. The “informational” perspective in contrast contends that committees are designed primarily to provide information to the legislature at large about a bill. Building upon Mattson and Strom (1995), which expands the consideration of these theories to European parliaments, this paper considers why differences across European parliaments exist. It argues that the key difference concerns the regularity of one-party versus multi-party governments. In countries that experience one party governments regularly, weak committees develop that have neither the power to make significant changes to government bills nor to collect information on the compliance of the ministers. In countries where coalition governments are common, however, and, importantly, where fiscal contracts are the norm, committees will be more likely to be strong information providers because they will provide a forum for coalition partners to monitor each other. These patterns are particularly apparent when one examines the budgetary process.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2284/1/002624.PDF
Hallerberg, Mark. (1999) “The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budgetary Process within Europe”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2284/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2286
2011-02-15T22:22:05Z
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74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“The Power of Procedure: Explaining the Role of Secretariats in the European Union”
Hamlet, Lawrence.
Council of Ministers
decision making/policy-making
In the case of the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, I argue that the secretariat is designed to address the key cooperation problem which EU member states in the Council of Ministers face: distribution problems, or issues of how to allocate gains and losses from European integration. Thus, the design of the Council Secretariat is geared towards enabling it to facilitate the negotiation process between states. However, the delegation of duties, capacities and staff to the Council Secretariat is not without limits; rather, the Council Secretariat can only exercise its delegated authority within tightly-drawn boundaries. Thus, the power of the Council Secretariat does not rely on its ability to circumvent or flout the wishes of states, but rather lies in its ability to carry out its delegated tasks well and respect the boundaries set by the member states which control it. By following procedure-and remaining active, yet closely controlled-the Council Secretariat can maximize its influence on EU decisionmaking.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2286/1/002622_1.pdf
Hamlet, Lawrence. (1999) “The Power of Procedure: Explaining the Role of Secretariats in the European Union”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2286/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2289
2011-02-15T22:22:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D46:46303037
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303330
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“Managing Structural Funds: Institutional Constraints to Efficiency”
Hartwig, Ines.
regional policy/structural funds
Germany
decision making/policy-making
In the framework of the structural funds the European Commission is promoting the spread of best practices in order to thus make efficient and successful examples of the implementation of structural funds widely known. In this respect the Commission implicitly assumes that lessons can be drawn from examples of other Member States and that institutional structures can be created or changed on the basis of criteria relating to efficiency and usefulness. This paper will analyse the implementation of the structural funds in the new Länder of Germany and will consider the way in which it has drawn lessons with a view to increase its efficiency. The case study will focus on an Objective 1 region, i.e. Sachsen-Anhalt (D). The concluding remarks will analyse the process of drawing lessons undertaken by Germany in general and will pose the question of whether and to what extent it has contributed to increasing the efficiency of management structures.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2289/1/002620_1.PDF
Hartwig, Ines. (1999) “Managing Structural Funds: Institutional Constraints to Efficiency”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2289/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2305
2011-02-15T22:22:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303230
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706768646F63
7375626A656374733D41:41303239
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“Innovative and Responsive? A Longitudinal Analysis of the Speed of EU Environmental Policy Making, 1967-1997”
Jordan, Andrew
Brouwer, Ray
Noble, Emma.
integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
environmental policy (including international arena)
historical development of EC (pre-1986)
decision making/policy-making
In institutional terms, the European Union (EU) is considerably ‘thicker’ than it was thirty years ago, with many new layers of decision-making procedure and myriad new actors, including almost twice as many Member States. Conventional wisdom suggests that policy systems in which policy development depends upon securing agreement among a concurrent majority of actors, are generally slow and collectively sub-optimal. However, a longitudinal analysis of the time taken to adopt environmental proposals in the period 1967-1997 reveals that the policy process has become slightly faster not slower. This is despite an enormous growth in the scope and ambitiousness of the environmental acquis and a significant increase in the number of actors involved. The obvious conclusion is that actors have become steadily more effective at achieving consensus. These empirical findings are analysed against a number of predictions derived from macro- and middle-range theories of the EU.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2305/1/002333.PDF
Jordan, Andrew and Brouwer, Ray and Noble, Emma. (1999) “Innovative and Responsive? A Longitudinal Analysis of the Speed of EU Environmental Policy Making, 1967-1997”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2305/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2307
2011-02-15T22:22:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303131
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“Procedural Politics in the European Union”
Jupille, Joseph.
European Parliament
European Commission
European Council
decision making/policy-making
In this paper, I take initial steps toward a fuller account of the “dual nature” of institutions, whereby they simultaneously constitute objects of human choice and sources of human constraint (Grafstein 1988). In the following five sections I develop and empirically probe three basic claims: 1) institutions matter; 2) actors have derived preferences over rules as a function of their preferences over outcomes; and 3) actors seek to ensure the usage of rules that favor them in the political process. The first section very briefly surveys current institutional analyses of the EU. The second section analyzes nine EU legislative procedures to assess their impacts on the influence of the Commission, Council, and Parliament as well as on policy outcomes. The third section builds on these findings to generate these actors’ preference rankings over existing procedures. The fourth section conducts a preliminary empirical assessment of the extent to which they act on these procedural preferences. The conclusion sets out an agenda for future research that theorizes the conditions under which, the ways in which, and the effects with which actors manipulate rules for political gain.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2307/1/002608_1.PDF
Jupille, Joseph. (1999) “Procedural Politics in the European Union”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2307/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2320
2011-02-15T22:22:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
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7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303033
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“Administrative Rivalry in the Council’s Infrastructure: Diagnosing the Methods of Community in EU Decision-Making”
Lewis, Jeffrey.
Council of Ministers
decision making/policy-making
I have organized this paper into two main sections. In the first I will summarize the main empirical findings from a research project on Coreper’s role in EU decision-making. Drawing from a series of empirical case studies, I present evidence which supports the existence of a distinct bargaining style in Coreper. In the second, I will extend these findings to a more tentative set of comparisons with the other preparatory bodies within the Council’s infrastructure. This comparison will reveal that the Council’s administrative infrastructure contains a fairly robust level of intra- and interadministrative rivalry-and that of the other EU committees, only the Economic and Finance Committee (formerly the Monetary Committee) approximates the dense norms of interaction, thick trust, and culture of compromise found in Coreper. In a nutshell, this paper is designed to extend a series of findings on Coreper to broader generalizations about decision-making styles in the Council and how different preparatory bodies cooperate and compete in this system.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2320/1/002328_1.PDF
Lewis, Jeffrey. (1999) “Administrative Rivalry in the Council’s Infrastructure: Diagnosing the Methods of Community in EU Decision-Making”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2320/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2332
2011-02-15T22:22:17Z
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74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“Interagency Processes in the Federal Republic of Germany: Dynamics Towards Growth, Differentiation and Fusion”
Maurer, Andreas
Wessels, Wolfgang.
Germany
decision making/policy-making
The German administrative mechanisms which connect government, administrations and governmental agencies with Brussels have a low reputation: the conventional wisdom among academics (Sasse 1975, Regelsberger and Wessels 1984; Bulmer and Paterson 1988; Bulmer, Jefferey,, and Paterson 1998; Janning and Meyer 1998) identifies a low degree of competitiveness. Compared to their French (Lequesne 1996) and British (Armstrong and Bulmer 1996) counterparts the performance of the German interagency process suffers from horizontal and vertical fragmentation, old-fashioned and cumbersome procedures and institutional pluralism if not “cannibalism,” “negative co-ordination”(Scharpf 1997) and Politikverflechtung-“political interwovenness” or “interconnectedness” (Scharpf 1985). Those features highlight a lack of forceful strategies, late preference building and position taking and-as a result-to minority positions in the Council of Ministers. To get an impression for the complexity we should look at the constitutional and legal bases: Articles 23 and 65 of the Basic Law and subsequent laws, agreements and rules of procedure between the different branches of the Federal Government, but also between the Länder, the Bundesrat and Bundestag on the one hand and the Federal Government on the other, which altogether form a “fine-tuned” piece of balancing different interests for the characteristics of participation and power.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2332/1/002592_1.PDF
Maurer, Andreas and Wessels, Wolfgang. (1999) “Interagency Processes in the Federal Republic of Germany: Dynamics Towards Growth, Differentiation and Fusion”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2332/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2346
2011-02-15T22:22:22Z
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7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“Justifying Comitology: The Promise of Deliberation”
Neyer, Jürgen.
European Parliament
European Commission
decision making/policy-making
The purpose of this paper is twofold: in the following section, it provides some basic data on comitology and introduces the normative concerns voiced by the European Parliament. Responding to the interinstitutional debate and reacting to the Commissions' proposal concerning a reform of comitology, the paper proceeds by asking for adequate normative justifications of supranational governance and their implications for a reform of comitology. It is argued that convincing normative justifications must not be developed in the void of general reflections about the procedural and substantive requirements of a democracy but need to take account of the very nature of the European polity.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2346/1/002585_1.PDF
Neyer, Jürgen. (1999) “Justifying Comitology: The Promise of Deliberation”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2346/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2362
2011-02-15T22:22:25Z
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7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303039
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031727270
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706768646F63
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"A Comparison of Biotechnology Regulatory Policy in the United States and the European Union"
Patterson, Lee Ann.
EU-US
regulations/regulatory policies
historical development of EC (pre-1986)
decision making/policy-making
Polities are increasingly faced with competition in the regulatory arena as well as the market place. Several authors have argued that regulatory competition leads to regulatory harmonization or convergence. However, significant differences in biotechnology regulations in the United States and the European Union remain. These differences have resulted in profoundly different technology trajectories. This paper compares the historical development of guidelines and regulations in the US and the EU. Specific attention is paid to 1) differing philosophies of regulation, 2) the affect of varying societal views of the technology on the regulatory structure, 3) the degree of inter-agency or inter-Directorate-General coordination in the policy making process, and 4) the ability of both regulatory systems to adapt to new scientific information. Finally, the impact of these different regulatory structures on the technology trajectory of bio-industries in the US and the EU is examined.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2362/1/002581_1.pdf
Patterson, Lee Ann. (1999) "A Comparison of Biotechnology Regulatory Policy in the United States and the European Union". In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2362/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2376
2011-02-15T22:22:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D46:46303037
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303032
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“The Negotiation Process in the European Union: The Mediation-Role of Structures in Negotiations Between Social Actors and the Community re: the Eastern Enlargement Process”
Saurugger, Sabine S.
governance: EU & national level
enlargement
Germany
decision making/policy-making
The paper, drawing on evidence from a case study-German actors’ strategies in the Eastern enlargement discussions-argues that approaches focusing on the macro-level of analysis, and thus following conventional wisdom in enlargement studies, can too easily neglect the subtleties of a policy-making process. These subtleties can be seen more clearly in an analysis of routine, rather than “constitutional or historical,” decisions. These processes of elaboration of public policies on the European level are characterised not only by the interaction of a number of national actors, both public and private, but also by the complexity of the negotiation process and, finally, by the weak formalisation of decision-making procedures. This form of governance and policy-making in the European Union makes it necessary, in order to analyze actors’ strategies in the decision-making processes, to take policy-making structures on both the national and the European levels into account. In defining a different legitimate order and, therefore different ways to exercise political power, these structures mediate the activities of actors and allow for both the Commission and the social actors to intervene on various decision-making levels. Yet, at the same time, there is substantial evidence to suggest that national governments still enjoy a great deal of leverage in shaping the social and economic conditions of their societies according to prevailing political preferences.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2376/1/002533_1.pdf
Saurugger, Sabine S. (1999) “The Negotiation Process in the European Union: The Mediation-Role of Structures in Negotiations Between Social Actors and the Community re: the Eastern Enlargement Process”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2376/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2383
2011-02-15T22:22:31Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"The Politics of Codecision"
Shackleton, Michael.
European Parliament
Council of Ministers
decision making/policy-making
Codecision has been central to the efforts and energy of the European Parliament throughout the 1990s. But to what effect? This paper considers the extent and nature of the influence that the Parliament had on legislation covered by the codecision provisions of the Maastricht Treaty (Article 189B). It suggests that this influence can be explained in general terms, by the growth of shared norms between Council and Parliament, and in particular, by the specific characteristics of the distributive and regulatory policies covered by codecision. It concludes that the new Amsterdam provision (Article 251) will reinforce the procedure as part of the acquis communautaire, but also open a broader debate about the position of the Parliament within the EU.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2383/1/003781.1.pdf
Shackleton, Michael. (1999) "The Politics of Codecision". In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2383/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2406
2011-02-15T22:22:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303131
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706767656E6572616C
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“Legislative Procedure in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis”
Tsebelis, George
Jensen, Christian B.
Kalandrakis, Anastassios.
Kreppel, Amie.
European Parliament
general
European Commission
European Council
decision making/policy-making
The article uses the legislative history of some 5,000 Parliamentary amendments to analyze the role of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union: cooperation and codecision (I). These procedures have been the subject of theoretical controversies, because according to conventional wisdom codecision increases the powers of the European Parliament, but according to revisionist approaches, the conditional agenda setting powers accorded to the Parliament by cooperation are more important than the veto powers ascribed by codecision.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2406/1/002900_1.PDF
Tsebelis, George and Jensen, Christian B. and Kalandrakis, Anastassios. and Kreppel, Amie. (1999) “Legislative Procedure in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2406/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2407
2011-02-15T22:22:38Z
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7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303132
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:6575726F7065616E69736174696F6E6575726F7065616E697A6174696F6E6E6174696F6E616C6964656E74697479
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706767656E6572616C
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
“The Institutional Determinants of Supranationalism in the European Union”
Tsebelis, George
Garrett, Geoffrey.
europeanisation/europeanization & European identity
general
European Parliament
European Commission
decision making/policy-making
European Court of Justice/Court of First Instance
In this article, we demonstrate that the notion of a pervasive and linear increase in supranationalism in the EU is inappropriate and conceals more than it reveals about the dynamics of European integration. We propose a unified model of integration with three distinctive features. First, we analyze the effects of the EU’s treaty base-from Rome to Amsterdam-on the relations among the Union’s three supranational institutions (Commission, Court and Parliament), and between these supranational actors and the intergovernmental Council. Second, our approach distinguishes and analyzes the interactions among three functional elements of the emerging EU polity-legislation and the creation of policy, administration and the implementation of policy, and the judiciary and the adjudication of policy disputes. Finally, we demonstrate that the effective power of each of the EU’s three supranational institutions is different; that each institution’s influence has changed considerably over time (and not in linear fashion); and, that each institution’s power base can be understood in terms of its location in the European political system we describe.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2407/1/002899_1.PDF
Tsebelis, George and Garrett, Geoffrey. (1999) “The Institutional Determinants of Supranationalism in the European Union”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2407/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2418
2011-02-15T22:22:41Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"‘If I’d Wanted You to Understand I Would Have Explained It Better’: What is the Purpose of the Provisions on Closer Co-operation Introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam?"
Weatherill, Stephen.
decision making/policy-making
The provisions on "closer-co-operation" introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam are of major potential significance. They attempt to establish an EU framework within which new endeavors may be pursued by some, but not all, Member States of the Union. They are intimately connected with the quest to identify what is central to the Union’s mission and accordingly deserving of protection from splinter groups.
1999
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2418/1/002518.PDF
Weatherill, Stephen. (1999) "‘If I’d Wanted You to Understand I Would Have Explained It Better’: What is the Purpose of the Provisions on Closer Co-operation Introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam?". In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2418/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2527
2011-02-15T22:22:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031727270
7375626A656374733D41:41303239
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303130
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Honey, I shrunk the legislation!"
Armstrong, Kenneth A.
regulations/regulatory policies
competition policy
decision making/policy-making
integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
Reform of EU regulatory policy has been guided by two distinct policy streams in the wake of the legislative explosion of the Single Market program. Whereas the principle of subsidiary gave rise to a program of legislative review, concerns as to the competitiveness of European business also prompted greater attention towards legislative and administrative simplification. The paper argues that these reform movements have failed to bring about a radical, horizontal change to regulatory culture. Rather, the political forces which have been unleashed have been mediated by the institutional (organisational, procedural and normative) structure of EU governance. An institutionalist approach is taken to argue that institutional structures mediate political forces even when the object of the force is the institutional structure itself. The European Commission's Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market (SLIM) initiative and changes to Commission standard operating procedures are used as case studies for the institutionalist approach.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2527/1/Armstrong.pdf
Armstrong, Kenneth A. (1997) "Honey, I shrunk the legislation!". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2527/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2528
2011-02-15T22:22:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D41:41303239
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706767656E6572616C
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"New institutionalism and policy change in the European Union"
Aspinwall, Mark.
general
decision making/policy-making
integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
This essay examines the role of institutions in policy change in the European Union. The timing of policy change is attributed to the "pull" of increasing supranational competence and the "push" of converging practices in the international political economy of transport. The nature of change is attributed to three factors: the existence of both state and supranational institutional environments, the structure of the supranational institutions (privileging certain actors and ideas over others), and the agency role played by supranational institutions. The essay applies neo-institutional theories to this sector, finding that historical/sociological institutionalism is best suited to explaining change, though elements of rational choice institutionalism are also important.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2528/1/002875_1.PDF
Aspinwall, Mark. (1997) "New institutionalism and policy change in the European Union". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2528/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2530
2011-02-15T22:22:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303236
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365:70616666676F7665726E616E63657375626E6174696F6E616C726567696F6E616C2F7465727269746F7269616C
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303330
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"The extended gatekeeper: Central government and the implementation of EU regional policy in the UK"
Bache, Ian.
governance: EU & national level
regional policy/structural funds
subnational/regional/territorial
U.K.
decision making/policy-making
The policy networks approach is used to evaluate the merits of multi-level governance as a model of EU decision-making. According to the multi-level governance model, "decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by state executives" (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996: 346). This model is tested in relation to the implementation of EU regional policy in the UK for two reasons. First, that regional policy, along with other EU structural policies, is considered to be at "the leading edge of multi-level governance in which supranational, national, regional, and local governments are enmeshed in territoriality overarching policy networks" (Marks, 1993: 402). And second, that "multi-level governance is prominent in the implementation stage" (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996: 365). In the terms specified by the advocates of multi-level governance, there would appear to be no better case study than the implementation of EU regional policy.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2530/1/002874_1.PDF
Bache, Ian. (1997) "The extended gatekeeper: Central government and the implementation of EU regional policy in the UK". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2530/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2540
2011-02-15T22:22:53Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303236
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303230
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365:70616666676F7665726E616E63657375626E6174696F6E616C726567696F6E616C2F7465727269746F7269616C
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Multi-level and cross-level governance and the implementation and revision of European Union water legislation"
Brown, M. Leann
Garman, Julie.
subnational/regional/territorial
U.K.
environmental policy (including international arena)
decision making/policy-making
National domestic factors, members' interests and power, negotiating dynamics, transnational interest groups and regional actors and structures may be important shapers of EU policy. No single interest factor adequately explains its complicated politics and procedures--the more important objective is to identify a model sufficiently nuanced to explain how these factors interact to yield regional policy. This qualitative study delineates the panoply of actors, the interactions, and strategies associated with British-EU disputes over the implementation and revision of water quality directives between 1985 and the mid-1990s, to explore the possibility that the evolving concept of "governance" may very well provide an umbrella broad enough to account for EU decision making. The data suggest that governance is a heuristically useful and empirically valid way to conceptualize EU water politics. Political interactions to affect the water legislation were based on an intersubjective consensus that clean water is a worthy policy objective. A multiplicity of factors influenced the policy process: many actors, interactions and strategies; power assets and coalitions; consensual knowledge, informational and propaganda factors; institutional procedures; etc. Activities to influence policy moved outwardly toward regional actors such as EU bodies and transnational alliances, and inwardly toward subnational interest groups rather than remaining strictly confined to those with legal and constitutional authority to negotiate and legislate.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2540/1/002863_1.PDF
Brown, M. Leann and Garman, Julie. (1997) "Multi-level and cross-level governance and the implementation and revision of European Union water legislation". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2540/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2541
2011-02-15T22:22:53Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D46:46303233
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303230
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365:70616666676F7665726E616E63657375626E6174696F6E616C726567696F6E616C2F7465727269746F7269616C
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Policy networks and complex interactions in the European Union: Environmental policy in Spain"
Bukowski, Jeanie.
governance: EU & national level
Spain
subnational/regional/territorial
environmental policy (including international arena)
decision making/policy-making
This paper address governance and decision-making in the European Union. It takes a multi-level governance perspective; that is, it assumes that governing authority is diffused across levels (supranational, national and subnational) within the European Union. Units within this emerging structure increasingly share resources, interests and influence over policy decisions. Similar to what Grodzins recognized in his "marble cake" conceptualization of the American federal system, the emerging decision-making structure in the EU is fragmented and characterized by "many overlapping governments (and I would argue non-governmental actors) involved in many overlapping functions" and by multiple points of access to decision-making processes (1966: 25). Policy network analysis is a realistic tool for analyzing the complexity of interactions within the multi-level structure of this evidence. This study 1) establishes policy network analysis as a tool within the multi-level governance framework; 2) provides preliminary empirical evidence within the structure of policy network analysis through an investigation of environmental policy in Spain; and 3) discusses the theoretical implications of this evidence.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2541/1/002509_1.pdf
Bukowski, Jeanie. (1997) "Policy networks and complex interactions in the European Union: Environmental policy in Spain". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2541/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2543
2011-02-15T22:22:53Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65666153696E676C654D61726B6574:65666153696E676C654D61726B657473686F
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D46:46303033
7375626A656374733D46:46303136
7375626A656374733D46:46303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Multi-level governance: With or without the state? The changing governance of technical standardization in Europe"
Bundgaard-Pedersen, Torben.
governance: EU & national level
Denmark
harmonisation/standards/mutual recognition
Netherlands
Norway
decision making/policy-making
The literature on multi-level policy making and governance in the European Union (EU) displays many apparently contradictory processes. This examination of the changing governance of technical standardization in Europe and in Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, over time, and across issue-areas, using a comparative policy and institutional approach, shows that all of these processes are part of contemporary social life in the EU. Of special importance are the contrasting effects of European integration on national arrangements of technical standardization which raise further doubts about the capacity of states and of state actors to pursue goals and shape societal structures that can possibly promote their future development and legitimacy.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2543/1/002861_1.PDF
Bundgaard-Pedersen, Torben. (1997) "Multi-level governance: With or without the state? The changing governance of technical standardization in Europe". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2543/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2549
2011-02-15T22:22:55Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303335:737067656E6572616C
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"The 'European Social Model'"
Carter, Caitriona A.
general
decision making/policy-making
In the wake of the Treaty on European Union, there has been renewed interest in social policy within EU circles. Much of this renewed interest has materialised in high profile political arenas with appeals to the 'European social model.' The phrase is used in a large number of documents emanating from various Community institutions, European-level organisations and national Governments. This paper establishes an analytical framework to consider alternative conceptualisations of the 'European social model' and asks two key questions: how is the 'Europeans social model' being conceptualised in high level EC/EU discussions and in the policy documents themselves? What is significant about the way in which it is being conceptualised? Why, for example, are the Commission's and European Council's conceptualisations of this model significant? In fact, the phrase 'European social model' is misleading. Instead, the paper starts by talking about the 'European social bargain,' rather than the 'European social model,' and in particular, considers a crisis in the European social bargain. The paper does not attempt to consider in any detail the nature of both internal and external pressures on social policy in Europe. The focus is rather on the process of policy-making and the consideration of the 'European social bargain' as it is being conceptualised as a framework for further development of policy. There are two parts to the paper: the first establishes the analytical framework for the discussion of the 'European social bargain.' The second examines the slogan of the 'European social model' as developed at the Community level and as detailed in policy documents. The key question developed in the course of the paper is whether it is indeed possible to reconcile multi-tiered governance--and its policy output--with the rhetorical slogan of the 'European social model.'
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2549/1/002870_1.PDF
Carter, Caitriona A. (1997) "The 'European Social Model'". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2549/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2553
2011-02-15T22:22:56Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303130
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Discretionary policy-making in the Commission: The politics of EU state aid control"
Cini, Michelle.
competition policy
European Commission
decision making/policy-making
The premise upon which this paper is based is that the political input into state aid control is not only the preserve of the College of Commissioners in controversial and well-publicised high profile aid cases, but occurs (directly and indirectly via the medium of discretion) at many stages and in different ways within the Commission's state aid regime. It occurs directly through the many 'instances of discretion' that exist during the state aid decision-making process; and it occurs indirectly, through the self-imposed restriction of that discretion, that is, in the formulation of policy, through codified guidelines and the use of principles which serve as criteria during the decision-taking process. This paper explores the European Commission's capacity for supranational discretionary decision-taking through the lens of its state aid policy. It begins by introducing the state aid regime and by highlighting the inter-institutional autonomy of the Commission. It then charts the incidences of discretion that occur throughout the state aid decision-taking process, providing at the same time an introduction to the way in which such decisions are taken in this policy area. The paper then goes on to identify a separate Commission policy-making process, highlighting the Commission's use of guidelines which form the basis of its policy applied to individual decisions. The paper ends by addressing two sets of questions: on the interplay of discretion and criteria in the state aid regime on the one hand; and on the lessons to be learnt not just about state aid matters but also about the European Commission on the other?
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2553/1/002848_1.PDF
Cini, Michelle. (1997) "Discretionary policy-making in the Commission: The politics of EU state aid control". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2553/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2554
2011-02-15T22:22:56Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:6566617472616465706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303230
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706768646F63
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Balancing trade and the environment in the EU: The importance of non-state actors in emerging policy networks"
Cloutier, Michelle.
historical development of EC (pre-1986)
environmental policy (including international arena)
trade policy
decision making/policy-making
Beginning with a brief tracing of EU environmental policy from 1972 to the post-Maastricht period, I will show how the EC, and now the EU, has tried to resolve the apparent contradiction between its primary free-trade goals and the protection of the environment. Using the policy network approach of Coleman and Skogstad (1990), I investigate the growing role of the EU's non-state institutions (Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice) and non-state societal actors in this balancing act. Evidence from a case study on the 1994 Directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste reveals that these non-state actors play an increasingly important role in the environmental policy-making process, which traditional intergovernmentalist approaches to EU policy-making cannot capture. Investigating and describing this interaction between non-state and state actors has become increasingly important for a clear understanding and explanation of day-to-day EU governance, and the use of a policy network approach to flesh out the policy-making process can enhance the usefulness and applicability of newer theoretical approaches to the EU, such as multi-level governance (Marks 1993; Marks, Hooghe et alia 1995a). This paper concludes that one must look beyond both the official language of the Treaty and the actions and preferences of the member states to understand who holds the ball in the juggling act between trade and the environment in the EU.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2554/1/002847_1.PDF
Cloutier, Michelle. (1997) "Balancing trade and the environment in the EU: The importance of non-state actors in emerging policy networks". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2554/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2559
2011-02-15T22:22:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D46:46303037
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:6575726F7065616E69736174696F6E6575726F7065616E697A6174696F6E6E6174696F6E616C6964656E74697479
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"'Europeanization' of national policies: Linking the multi-level-governance approach with theories of policy learning and policy change"
Conzelmann, Thomas.
governance: EU & national level
europeanisation/europeanization & European identity
Germany
decision making/policy-making
"Multilevel governance" (MLG) has become an increasingly important concept for describing the institutional development of the European Union and the political processes between its different territorial levels. Yet, while much attention has been paid to the implications of MLG for the constitutional and political order of the European nation state (i.e., questions of polity and politics), there is still very little discussion regarding the possible transformation of member states' public policies through MLG. This paper tries to establish a link between the MLG literature and contributions of a policy analytical nature in order to fill this gap. The hypothesis is that EC policies may trigger domestic policy reforms through several transmission belts, namely 1) the mushrooming of transgovernmental networks which provide the arenas within which policy learning may take place, 2) changing preferences of important actors within the national policy networks, and 3) changes in the domestic policy networks themselves, in particular with respect to the upgrading of hitherto underrepresented actors. To test this explanatory model, the paper takes the EC's regional policies and their impact on the regional policy domain in Germany as an example. It is demonstrated that in some instances a clear effect of EC policies on the development of the corresponding national policy seems to exist, and that the transmission belts identified above provide a useful way of thinking about these changes. Among the important limitations of this effort are the impossibility to demonstrate unambiguous causal links between the presence of the EC's regional policy and transformations in the national policy domain. Furthermore, empirical evidence from other countries and/or other policy domains is needed in order to specify the conditions under which "learning" or "power" is more important.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2559/1/002842_1.PDF
Conzelmann, Thomas. (1997) "'Europeanization' of national policies: Linking the multi-level-governance approach with theories of policy learning and policy change". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2559/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2562
2011-02-15T22:22:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:656661454D55454D536575726F
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:65666165636F6E6F6D6963706F6C696379
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Macroeconomic policy during the transition to monetary union"
Crowley, Patrick.
economic policy
EMU/EMS/euro
decision making/policy-making
The transition to European Monetary Union (EMU) may start in 1999. The transition phase, as outlined in the European Commission green paper on the practical arrangements for the introduction of the single currency, will, however, be spread out over a period of up to three years and six months. During this period participating member state exchange rates will be irrevocably fixed and monetary policy will be implemented by the European Central State Bank. Conversely, fiscal policy will be guided by the Maastricht convergence criteria but implemented at the member state level. This paper evaluates the possible problems in formulating macroeconomic policy as participating member states proceed to adopt a single currency, and considers policy coordination and objectives, seigniorage, cohesion and dynamic economic and political considerations during the transition period.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2562/1/002507_1.pdf
Crowley, Patrick. (1997) "Macroeconomic policy during the transition to monetary union". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2562/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2563
2011-02-15T22:22:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Reforming the CAP: The roles of policy networks and broader institutional structures"
Daugbjerg, Carsten.
agriculture policy
decision making/policy-making
The paper develops an analytical framework in order to analyse how policy networks and the broader organizational context in which they are embedded influence reform outcomes. The framework is applied in a study of the European Community's agricultural policy reform in 1992. Firstly, it is shown that the EC agricultural policy network led agricultural policy makers in the direction of moderate rather than fundamental reform. Secondly, the paper shows how the broader organisational structure of the European Community made radical reform an almost hopeless objective to pursue because the whole decision making structure allowed the existence of many veto opportunities which could be used to block radical changes.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2563/1/002506_1.pdf
Daugbjerg, Carsten. (1997) "Reforming the CAP: The roles of policy networks and broader institutional structures". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2563/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2572
2011-02-15T22:23:01Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:65636F6E6F6D696366696E616E6369616C61666661697273:656661454D55454D536575726F
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706768646F63
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Jacques Delors and the relaunch of Economic and Monetary Union: A study of strategic calculation, brokerage and cognitive leadership"
Dyson, Kenneth
Featherstone, Kevin.
EMU/EMS/euro
historical development of EC (pre-1986)
decision making/policy-making
The paper employs a contingency mode, stressing the connection between strategic dynamics (bargaining games), cognitive dynamics (learning by interaction, policy entrepreneurship) and the specific institutional milieu, to help explain the nature of the role played by the European Commission and Jacques Delors in relation to the initiation and negotiation of the EMU project. It thus covers the period 1988-91, and the focus is more on agency than on the wider structural factors affecting EMU. It is based on the results of some 250 elite interviews with leading policy actors across Europe and on the contents of private papers concerning the Intergovernmental Conference made available to the authors. The paper stems from research funded by the Economic and Social Research Council in the UK.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2572/1/002835_1.PDF
Dyson, Kenneth and Featherstone, Kevin. (1997) "Jacques Delors and the relaunch of Economic and Monetary Union: A study of strategic calculation, brokerage and cognitive leadership". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2572/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2577
2011-02-15T22:23:03Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D46:46303236
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303335:737067656E6572616C
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706768646F63
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Multi-level plus multi-actor: Co-operative governance in the European Union"
Falkner, Gerda.
historical development of EC (pre-1986)
U.K.
governance: EU & national level
general
decision making/policy-making
This paper aims to shed light on an area where particularly far-reaching changes in the participation of non-state actors occurred during the 1990s: EC social policy. There, we witness some signs of what was called neo-corporatism or 'social partnership' at the national level, i.e. a decision modus based on the collective agreement of organised interests and on their participation in governance and social guidance as co-responsible 'partners' (Schmitter 1981). This development is embedded in other changes in governance: the move towards cooperative public-private governance is only the most prominent aspect. The process of change in EC social policy concerned basically all characteristic elements of a 'system of governance' (Kohler-Koch). Thus, innovations occurred on the levels of: 1) belief systems about appropriate principles of action (shared responsibility between the European and the national levels with horizontal and vertical subsidiarity principles); 2) actor constellation (a few privileged interest groups are incorporated in EC decision-making on public policies); 3) decision-making routines (very specific processes are established); and 4) boundaries (territorial exclusion of the UK; functional exclusion of various aspects of social policy). This contribution will first outline the traditional patterns of EC social policy and briefly analyse failed efforts towards more co-operative governance patterns during the 1970s and 1980s. Only when a major change in EC social policy was believed inevitable during the 1991 IGC, the employers agreed to participate in a quasi-corporatist modus of governance. The changes in EC social policy governance brought about under the Maastricht Treaty will be outlined in detail before their practice shall be discussed . Subsequently, the changes will be put into the wider perspective of European governance.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2577/1/002833_1.PDF
Falkner, Gerda. (1997) "Multi-level plus multi-actor: Co-operative governance in the European Union". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2577/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2580
2011-02-15T22:23:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D41:414E474F73
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:6C6F626279696E67696E746572657374726570726573656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706768646F63
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"The institutional terrain of the European Union"
Fligstein, Neil
McNichol, Jason.
historical development of EC (pre-1986)
lobbying/interest representation
European Commission
Council of Ministers
NGOs
decision making/policy-making
Policy domains form where there exists a constitutional agreement to create legislation, a collective definition of what issues are and who gets to be an actor, and procedures to mobilize the production of new rules in the domain. Policy domains may be entirely constituted by government organizations or may also include nongovernmental groups. We explore the EU as a set of policy domains. We demonstrate that the Treaty of Rome and its subsequent revisions defined the issue arenas. We also show how the organizational structure of the European Council of Ministers and the Commission mirror these domains. Finally we plot the expansion of pressure groups and legislative output to domains over time. We show that the Treaty changes, which changed the decisionmaking rules in the domains, tended to be in domains where there were a large number of nongovernmental organizations and where legislative output was high. For example, the largest number of pressure groups in the EU circa 1980 were attached to the Single Market domain. We view this as a kind of spillover. By our calculations, at least 13 of the 17 policy domains in the EU exhibit a supranational character.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2580/1/002831_1.PDF
Fligstein, Neil and McNichol, Jason. (1997) "The institutional terrain of the European Union". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2580/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2587
2011-02-15T22:23:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:706166666C65676974696D616379
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Political rhetoric and European integration"
Gaffney, John.
legitimacy
decision making/policy-making
This paper aims to examine the role of discourse in the EU integration process, and in particular its function and importance as a political, not just rhetorical, resources for the provision of legitimacy and in particular as a resource for political leaders. We shall argue that questions concerning the effectiveness and appropriateness of any European discourse or discourses are fundamental to the issue of political legitimacy in the European context, and that the legitimacy of the European Union depends upon the emergence of a European-level political discourse. National discourses are embedded and are effectively exploited by political leaders in the national contexts. At the European level, that is, within the European framework of political exchange between elites and non-elites, the interactions and mediations of languages, histories, cultures, symbols and myths are more fractured and less organised, while the absence of strong central institutions constrains the effective use of discourse by EU leaders. Anti-European discourse as a political resource challenges and counters claims to European legitimacy. Nevertheless, there exists a European discourse, even though it lacks institutional encadrement and strong mass allegiance. The developing trans-European party families are experiments in a shared and institutionally supported, and therefore politically oriented, European identity. It is the relation of Europe to national discourses and their evolution, in conjunction with the development of its own institutional setting, which will inform the process of legitimation of European integration. This paper will discuss some of the political problems surrounding the question of discourse.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2587/1/002572_1.PDF
Gaffney, John. (1997) "Political rhetoric and European integration". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2587/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2590
2011-02-15T22:23:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D41:41303239
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Policy networks and the European Union"
George, Stephen.
decision making/policy-making
integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
This paper is written as an introduction to the panel on Policy Networks and European Integration at the 1997 Conference of the European Community Studies Association. It defines the way in which the term 'policy network' is used in the other papers in the panel, and indicates some ways in which the concept might be applied to the study of the European Union (EU), thus providing a framework within which the other papers can be situated. It also reviews some criticisms that have been made of the application of the concept to the study of the EU. The paper draws heavily on the work of R.A.W. Rhodes, who first developed the theoretical approach, and of John Peterson, who pioneered its application to the study of the EU. It also in parts reproduces arguments and even phrases from an earlier paper written jointly by the present author with R.A.W. Rhodes and Ian Bache (Rhodes, Bache, and George, 1996). Full acknowledgment is made of the contribution of the two co-authors of that paper, although where this paper differs from it, the changes represent the thinking only of the present author.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2590/1/002824_1.PDF
George, Stephen. (1997) "Policy networks and the European Union". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2590/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2601
2011-02-15T22:23:09Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303335:737067656E6572616C
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:6C6F626279696E67696E746572657374726570726573656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D41:41303239
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706767656E6572616C
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Interest groups, European integration, and the new institutionalism"
Gorges, Michael J.
lobbying/interest representation
general
general
integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
decision making/policy-making
A new institutionalist perspective is the best framework for analyzing interest intermediation in the European Union (EU). Four institutional variables are crucial to the analysis: the EU's policy-making authority, formal institutions, policy-making procedures, and decision-making rules. These constitute the next context within which interest groups formulate their responses to integration. Nevertheless, these institutions do not determine interest groups' responses. Intraorganizational factors, such as intragroup bargaining, cost-benefit calculations by member, membership preferences and cohesion, the role played by national-level interest groups or firms, skillful leadership, learning, and simple desire to overcome national, regional, sectoral, ideological, cultural, and policy differences also shape a group's ability to respond to increased integration. While a new institutionalist perspective helps us understand the variety of patterns of interest intermediation in the EU, it also makes it difficult to predict the evolution of interest intermediation in the way the neo-functionalists did. We will, however, be able to answer two important questions: What institutions matter? How do they influence interest intermediation? We can thus explore the nature of policy-making and governance in the EU and shed new light on the ways the EU manages conflict between competing interests. After examining the role institutions play and the interest group response, this paper focuses on the possibilities for rationalization of interest intermediation and on a recent institutional change--the Social Policy Protocol--and its implications for interest intermediation.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2601/1/002822_1.PDF
Gorges, Michael J. (1997) "Interest groups, European integration, and the new institutionalism". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2601/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2615
2011-02-15T22:23:13Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303132
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:4430303170707061
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303436
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303039
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303230
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706768646F63
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"The changing role of science in regulatory decision-making in the European Union"
Heyvaert, Veerle.
EU-US
public health policy (including global activities)
public policy/public administration
historical development of EC (pre-1986)
environmental policy (including international arena)
decision making/policy-making
European Court of Justice/Court of First Instance
Expert advice to policy-makers is everything but a new phenomenon. Throughout the ages, governments of every type and denomination have consulted people and organisations which were considered the producers, preservers and guardians of specific kinds of knowledge, whether engineers, astrologists, military strategists or economists. What is particular about the second half of this century is therefore not so much the existence of expert policy advisors as such, but the growing importance of one specific community as a source of knowledge and expert information in policy-making processes: the scientific community (Brooks et al., 1987). These introductory remarks refer to a development that is thoroughly studied and documented in contemporary scholarship. It is almost equally well-established that not every country receives, processes and uses expert policy advice in the same manner. In other words, policy studies differ according—to name but a few influences—to historical developments, institutional arrangements, and the different substantive urgencies which policy-makers are confronted with. This paper started as a reaction to one of the works which discuss the difference in use and integration of scientific expertise into policy decision-making between European countries and the United States, more in particular in the area of environmental and health and safety policy. It asks whether the emergence and maturing of a new level of policy-making in Europe, the European Union level, affects the way in which scientific expertise is used for the development of public policy and, if so, whether these changes could be expected to render this new policy-style more or less similar to the US model of integrating expertise into decision-making. In this analysis, particular attention is paid to the role of the European Court of Justice in re-shaping European styles of health and environmental science-policy decision-making, both at the EU and at the Member State level. If, as the paper argues, an approximation of styles is indeed to be expected, it becomes important for the European Union to look with renewed interest at the current problems faced in the United States relating to the acceptance of science as prevalent input into public policy, to anticipate an emergence of similar issues in Europe and to consider possible solutions.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2615/1/002812_1.PDF
Heyvaert, Veerle. (1997) "The changing role of science in regulatory decision-making in the European Union". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2615/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2621
2011-02-15T22:23:15Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303033
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Negotiating orders: Initiating EU Commission legislative drafting"
Hyjberg, Erik.
European Commission
Council of Ministers
decision making/policy-making
According to the policy network perspective on European integration the Commission's legal monopoly to propose new legislation is among its most powerful tools. Paradoxically, however, how legislative drafting is actually initiated and organized, and in what ways it influences the negotiations in the Council is 'virgin soil' within this approach. Hence, there is a general lack of systematic knowledge concerning who takes what initiatives, on what conditions and with what effects. The paper aims at contributing to a theoretical understanding of this uncultivated field of research by suggesting a methodology, or point of observation, referred to as 'negotiated orders' in which the gradual and interactive articulation, selection, and stabilizing of political ideals frame the processes of initiating legislative drafting, simultaneously enabling and constraining the possibilities of politicization in subsequent Council negotiations.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2621/1/002808_1.PDF
Hyjberg, Erik. (1997) "Negotiating orders: Initiating EU Commission legislative drafting". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2621/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2624
2011-02-15T22:23:15Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D41:41303239
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Serving 'Europe’: Political orientations of senior Commission officials"
Hooghe, Liesbet.
governance: EU & national level
European Commission
integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
decision making/policy-making
Most European integration theories have perceived the Commission as a unitary actor with a pro-integration agenda. Yet, empirical studies have shown that Commission actors harbor contending views about European governance. These findings raise a theoretical problem for European integration models, and an analytical puzzle for elite studies. European integration theories claiming an independent impact of the Commission on European decision making, need to disaggregate Commission motivations, which is the central purpose of this article. Consistent with recent elite studies, I employ an institutionalist lens to analyze how rules may impact orientations, but I refine the lens to assess institutional socialization and choice in multi-layered institutional settings. I formulate six hypotheses about the interplay between three settings relevant to top Commission officials: Commission, multi-level governance, European public space. Analytically, Commission officials appear reasoned individuals capable of selecting incentives rather than passive subjects of socialization. Evidence comes from 130 interviews and 80 questionnaires, collected in 1995-1996 from A1-2 officials, analyzed through interpretative and quantitative analysis. I find that Commission officials constitute a special microcosm of the European public space: less nationalist than most citizens, but divided on the mix of intergovernmental and supranational architectural principles; center-left of the average political actor, but disagreeing on the desirable mix of market and state, opportunity and equity.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2624/1/002566_1.pdf
Hooghe, Liesbet. (1997) "Serving 'Europe’: Political orientations of senior Commission officials". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2624/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2625
2011-02-15T22:23:16Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"The making of a polity: The struggle over European integration"
Hooghe, Liesbet
Marks, Gary.
decision making/policy-making
Our point of departure is that economic developments in Western Europe during the past two decades--internationalization of markets for goods and especially capital, decline of traditional industry and industrial employment, pressures toward flexible specialized production, decentralization of industrial relations, declining international competitiveness and high levels of long-term unemployment--have transformed authoritative decision making as well as economic policy and political-economic institutions. We argue that these big questions have generated a structure of contestation that cannot be reduced to differences among national states about distributing pareto benefits among themselves or lowering transaction costs or enforcing inter-state agreements. European integration, we believe, is an irreducibly political, as well as an economic, process.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2625/1/003775.1.pdf
Hooghe, Liesbet and Marks, Gary. (1997) "The making of a polity: The struggle over European integration". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, Washington. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2625/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2633
2011-02-15T22:23:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Legislative co-decision: A real step forward?"
Jacobs, Francis.
European Parliament
decision making/policy-making
Legislative co-decision for the European Parliament in certain areas of EU competence was one of the key changes introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. Further extension of the co-decision procedures to all EU legislature is probably the single most important European Parliament demand for itself at the current Intergovernmental Conference. And yet certain academic commentators have suggested that the co-decision procedure is less satisfactory than it first seems for the European Parliament, and that the latter's power to influence policy making may, in fact, be great under the cooperation procedure than under the co-decision procedure. The paper begins by placing the co-decision procedure in context by means of a survey of the evolution of the European Parliament's legislative powers and of the main features of the consultation, cooperation and co-decision procedures. There then follows an assessment of the co-decision procedure compared to the parallel cooperation and consultation procedures, especially with regard to its impacts on EU legislative efficiency, on the overall functioning of the European Parliament and on the balance between the EU institutions. The paper concludes with a brief look at the European Parliament's calls for extension and simplification of co-decision at the present IGC, and the member states' responses to that request. The paper concludes that it is still hard to measure the longer-term impacts of the procedure but that its unprecedented combination of a veto power and a negotiating mechanism have already had dynamic effects, such as greater professionalization of the European Parliament's work and a reinforcement of its position vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council, that have been underestimated by its critics.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2633/1/002564_1.PDF
Jacobs, Francis. (1997) "Legislative co-decision: A real step forward?". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2633/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2641
2011-02-15T22:23:19Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303236
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303033
7375626A656374733D46:46303036
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D46:46303037
7375626A656374733D46:46303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303230
7375626A656374733D46:46303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Agenda-setting and greening of the CAP"
Just, Fleming.
U.K.
Denmark
France
Netherlands
Germany
agriculture policy
decision making/policy-making
environmental policy (including international arena)
The paper is a pre-study to a broader project on agenda-setting and policy-making as regards agri-environment in EU and five member states. The main hypotheses are that: 1) traditional agricultural agenda setting and policy-making takes place in a rather closed segment characterised by a fixed institutional set-up both in member states and at EU level, despite the many differences otherwise between national and EU policy-making; 2) that environmental agenda setting and policy-making is characterised by a much weaker segmentation and firm institutional set-up and that this will vary depending upon which environmental issue is on the agenda. It is claimed that this is the situation both in member states and at EU level; 3) that agri-environmental questions--together with other new issues like animal welfare and health--will contribute to erode the traditionally strong agricultural policy segment. Both in member states and at EU-level, agri-environmental issues are usually decided upon in the ministries of agriculture and at DG VI (agriculture) respectively. The new issues are in many cases put forward with so much vigour by environmentalists, experts--and some member states in the case of EU--that the old segments have been forced to open for new agendas, new lobby groups and new institutions if the ministries and DG VI want to keep the new issues within their authority. The paper leaves it as an open question if the policy network model will be the most appropriate theoretical point of departure when looking at the EU level. As long as the agri-environmental question is relatively new, it seems that the ‘garbage can model’ best captures the vivid reality.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2641/1/002799.PDF
Just, Fleming. (1997) "Agenda-setting and greening of the CAP". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2641/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2684
2011-02-15T22:23:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:443030316C61776C6567616C61666661697273
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:6575726F7065616E69736174696F6E6575726F7065616E697A6174696F6E6E6174696F6E616C6964656E74697479
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"European identity(ies) in matters of institutional law: 1st and 3rd pillars: Proper community identity versus classic intergovernmental identity of the European Union"
Nagant De Deuxchaisnes, Didier C.
europeanisation/europeanization & European identity
law & legal affairs-general (includes international law)
decision making/policy-making
Is there a European identity? This is the question addressed in this panel dedicated to "European Identity." So, as I’m asked if there is a European identity, I will try to answer the question, "Is there a European identity in matters of institutional law?" But what does this question mean exactly? First of all, let’s remember that European law is part of international law. Let’s also remember that the European Community is an international organization just like NATO, the Council of Europe, and so on. If we want to see if there is a European identity in matters of institutional law, we will have to compare the European Union with other international organizations, and compare its institutional law with general international law. In other words, we will try to see if there are some specificities in European law in comparison to general international law. And we will try to detect if there are particularities in the European Union in comparison to other international organizations. Therefore, let’s have a look at five aspects of European institutional law: 1) the community legal order; 2) the community institutions; 3) the decision-making process; 4) the relations with the member States; 5) the relations with the sub-national level. After looking at the facts, we will try to draw some conclusions.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2684/1/003754.1.pdf
Nagant De Deuxchaisnes, Didier C. (1997) "European identity(ies) in matters of institutional law: 1st and 3rd pillars: Proper community identity versus classic intergovernmental identity of the European Union". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, Washington. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2684/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2686
2011-02-15T22:23:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Political representation in the European Union: A common whole, various wholes, or just a hole?"
Neunreither, Karlheinz.
European Parliament
decision making/policy-making
Who represents whom in the European Union (EU)? And what is actually represented? The composing parts of the EU are well provided for: the member states are represented via their governments in the Council, the peoples of the same member states are represented in the directly elected European Parliament, the regions in the Committee of the Regions, and finally various economic and social groups in the respective Committee. But is there a political representation of the EU as a whole? A purely theoretical and perhaps slightly out of date (looking at some research paradigms) question, were it not for the notion of flexibility or differentiated integration, which will make its entry in the EU treaty. How will flexibility affect political representation in the EU, especially the European Parliament (EP)? The paper argues that despite the dynamic evolution of the EP it might have major difficulties in remaining indivisible, that is to act with all its members on all EU politics, even if in the future they will only be endorsed by a limited number of member states.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2686/1/002766_1.PDF
Neunreither, Karlheinz. (1997) "Political representation in the European Union: A common whole, various wholes, or just a hole?". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2686/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2689
2013-11-03T02:25:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303032
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"The Commission and the European Union’s external policies"
Nugent, Neill.
common foreign & security policy 1993--European Global Strategy
European Commission
decision making/policy-making
This paper comes out of a study of the Commission in which I am currently engaged. The main focus of my study is the Commission’s institutional and decision-making structures. As part of the study, I am taking a particularly close look at external relations policy areas and am focusing most of my attention therein on the following questions: what are the Commission’s responsibilities?; how and why have these responsibilities changed over the years?; what are the structural arrangements within the Commission for handling the responsibilities; and how does the Commission deal with the potential problem of policy coordination, given the wide scope of its external relations responsibilities and the many different parts of the Commission which are involved with external relations in some way? In this paper I set out my early observations on these questions. Particular attention is focused on the difficulties which the Commission has experienced in creating organizational arrangements that enable it to handle its increasing responsibilities in an efficient manner.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2689/1/002763_1.PDF
Nugent, Neill. (1997) "The Commission and the European Union’s external policies". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2689/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2700
2011-02-15T22:23:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303130
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Regulating biotechnology in the European Union: Institutional responses to internal conflict within the Commission"
Patterson, Lee Ann.
European Commission
decision making/policy-making
The European Union has targeted biotechnology as a key technology for future global competitiveness. Unlike traditional sectoral policies, biotechnology policy cuts across several sectors including agriculture, medicine, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and processed foods and is of interest to environmentalists, ecologists, industry, and researchers at both the pure and applied levels. Consequently, the multi-dimensional nature of biotechnology requires a paradigm shift, for policy-making purposes, from sector specific governance to horizontal governance. This paper explores successive institutional attempts to overcome the inherent structural fragmentation both among the various Directorate Generals (DGs) and between the political and technocratic levels of decision making within the Commission. This fragmentation is exacerbated by the existence of widely differing beliefs and perceptions about biotechnology and the extent to which biotechnological processes require regulation. Early attempts at coordination in the form of the Biotechnology Steering Commission and the Biotechnology Regulatory Interservices Committee were largely unsuccessful, leading to a highly criticized regulatory framework. The Biotechnology Coordination Committee, however, has been largely successful at coordinating inter-DG biotechnology policy. The paper identifies the existence of a policy arbiter with high level political backing and the ability to move freely between the bureaucratic and political sides of the Commission as a key variable in the successful coordination of biotechnology policy.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2700/1/002756_1.PDF
Patterson, Lee Ann. (1997) "Regulating biotechnology in the European Union: Institutional responses to internal conflict within the Commission". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2700/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2701
2011-02-15T22:23:37Z
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"The Santer Commission: Pillarised, nationalised or just ‘normalised’?"
Peterson, John.
governance: EU & national level
general
European Commission
decision making/policy-making
In retrospect (and following recent publications by Ross, Grant and Cockfield) it is now clear that the early Delors years were an unusual period in the life span of the Commission. It was united behind a single purpose, subject to strong central leadership and granted a rare window of opportunity of key member states (argued by Moravcsik) to take the initiative in designing market liberalisation as well as ‘flanking policies.’ Commission activism ended before the end of the Delors Presidency, but this paper focuses on the changes under the Santer Presidency and asks what are the implications for theorizing about European integration. Is the Santer Commission unusually weak or just a more ‘normal’ Commission? The central argument is that the extent to which ‘multi-level governance’ explains decision-making in policy sectors depends on how deeply the Commission must reach into the fabric of national civil services and interest group structures in order to accrue valued resources, and thus act as ‘ring-leader’ of policy networks which are effective in asserting their interests.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2701/1/002755_1.PDF
Peterson, John. (1997) "The Santer Commission: Pillarised, nationalised or just ‘normalised’?". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2701/metadataPrefix%3Doai_dc%26offset%3D2702%26set%3D7375626A656374733D44%253A44303035%253A69646F7067%253A69646F7067646D706D