2024-03-28T23:38:44Zhttp://aei.pitt.edu/cgi/oai2
oai:aei.pitt.edu:3020
2011-02-15T22:25:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303134
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303034
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74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Networking with National Authorities: Information Sharing and Bureaucratic Accountability in the European Union"
Kourtikakis, Kostas.
European Ombudsman
compliance/national implementation
Court of Auditors
How can European Union (EU) institutions ensure that member-state public officials implement Community policies? Given the diversity of administrative traditions and the variation of bureaucratic effectiveness among member states, does the EU simply trust national accountability mechanisms to guarantee a uniform application of its policies? I argue that the EU seeks additional guarantees. Specifically, I focus on the informal networks of those officials form with both EU and national institutions, who investigate accounting irregularities and citizen complaints. Unlike the traditional hierarchical mechanisms of bureaucratic control, not only do networks make the typically insulated bureaucratic activity more transparent, but also they overcome an EU-specific problem, namely that supranational institutions are prohibited from exercising control on member-state authorities. In particular, I examine the networks created around the European Ombudsman and the European Court of Auditors. In those networks, national officials share information with their EU and member-state counterparts as equals. I find that, as a result, national officials become more informed about and more sensitive to the application of EU policies. Consequently, they are more prone to enforce Community policies or refer any instances of insufficient or deficient EU policy application to the appropriate national or EU bodies.
2005
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/3020/1/Kourtikakis_EUSA2005.pdf
Kourtikakis, Kostas. (2005) "Networking with National Authorities: Information Sharing and Bureaucratic Accountability in the European Union". In: UNSPECIFIED, Austin, TX. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/3020/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:6512
2011-02-15T22:42:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303135
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Using one agent to control another? The European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors"
Jun, Hae-Won.
European Parliament
Council of Ministers
Court of Auditors
I organize this paper as following. In the next section I discuss the inter-institutional relationship of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) in the light of studies of oversight mechanisms. Then I compare the attitude of the European Parliament toward the ECA with that of the Council in the establishment and strengthening of the ECA, and appointment of its members. The difference in the usage of the information from the ECA between the two institutions is examined next. After that I turn to how the ECA responds to their different attitudes. Finally, I conclude.
2003
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/6512/1/001334_1.PDF
Jun, Hae-Won. (2003) "Using one agent to control another? The European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors". In: UNSPECIFIED, Nashville, TN. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/6512/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:6959
2011-02-15T22:45:28Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706767656E6572616C
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303330
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"Subsidiarity, Accountability and the Management of EU Programmes"
Levy, Roger.
regional policy/structural funds
general
Court of Auditors
governance: EU & national level
The Maastricht Treaty on Political Union (TEU) confirmed the principle of subsidiarity by which the implementation of Union policies should be allocated to the most appropriate level of administration authority. This has been widely interpreted as a means of reining in the power of the European Commission in favour of national governments and their agents. This raises a number of important issues concerning the management of Union programmes. Already under stress from what Metcalfe (1992, 1994) has termed the management deficit, the subsidiarity principle will arguably exacerbate existing weakness in the management process by allocating both day-to-day management and review and evaluation functions to beneficiary agencies in the member states. The objective of this paper is to analyse the implications of the devolved management of Union programmes for the desire for greater accountability expressed by the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors and the member state governments themselves. The paper focuses particularly on audit, and the management of the Structural Funds as a case study area.
1995
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/6959/1/levy_roger.pdf
Levy, Roger. (1995) "Subsidiarity, Accountability and the Management of EU Programmes". In: UNSPECIFIED, Charleston, South Carolina. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/6959/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:74895
2016-06-14T13:38:28Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303034
74797065733D6F74686572
Information Guide: European Court of Auditors
Cardiff EDC, .
Court of Auditors
A guide to information sources on the European Court of Auditors (ECA), with hyperlinks to further sources of information within European Sources Online and on external websites.
2013-11
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/74895/1/European_Court_Auditors.pdf
https://www.europeansources.info/showDoc?ID=1041976
Cardiff EDC, . (2013) Information Guide: European Court of Auditors. UNSPECIFIED.
http://aei.pitt.edu/74895/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:103710
2021-11-10T20:32:03Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:706F6C69746963616C6166666169727331323334:70616666676F7665726E616E6365
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303034
74797065733D6F74686572
More important than ever – EU agencies in times of crisis. EIPA briefing November 2020.
Kaeding, Michael
Court of Auditors
governance: EU & national level
The latest European Court of Auditors (ECA) Special Report on EU agencies is worth a thorough read. This audit is the first overall assessment of the conditions put in place to ensure that EU agencies are effectively delivering policies to the benefit of all citizens.
In brief, the ECA finds that ‘EU agencies are playing an increasingly important part in the Union, but their role in serving EU citizens effectively needs to be evaluated more carefully’. Consequently, the Commission and the agencies should:
ensure the relevance, coherence and flexibility of the set-up of agencies;
allocate resources in a more flexible manner;
improve governance, accountability and reporting on performance; and
strengthen the role of agencies as centres of expertise and networking.
The ECA’s special audit comes at a time when EU agencies are considered more than ever to be solutions to European problems. With more and more agencies all over Europe and their increasing prominence in terms of power, visibility, staff and budget, one needs to understand what agencies are and how to work with them in order to contribute to a functioning European Union in times of crisis.
2020-11
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/103710/1/EIPA%2DBriefing_Michael%2DKaeding_More%2Dimportant%2Dthan%2Dever%2D%E2%80%93%2DEU%2Dagencies%2Din%2Dtimes%2Dof%2Dcrisis_2020%2D8.pdf
Kaeding, Michael (2020) More important than ever – EU agencies in times of crisis. EIPA briefing November 2020. UNSPECIFIED.
http://aei.pitt.edu/103710/