2024-03-28T18:04:23Zhttp://aei.pitt.edu/cgi/oai2
oai:aei.pitt.edu:2731
2011-02-15T22:23:45Z
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"What’s wrong with the CFSP? The politics of institutional reform"
Smith, Michael E.
common foreign & security policy 1993--European Global Strategy
general
European Commission
COREPER
Council of Ministers
Inaugurated with much fanfare in November 1993, the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has not lived up to most expectations. Although many point to a lack of political will and preoccupation with other problems as reasons for the CFSP’s lackluster performance, there is a high degree of consensus that institutional mechanisms might play a role here. This paper focuses on these institutional problems. The first section stresses the fear of member states that they could be locked into future courses of action based on today’s decision. The greater binding nature of CFSP actions (as compared to its predecessor, European Political Cooperation), the clearer specification of CFSP obligations, the more legitimate involvement of EC actors in the CFSP, and the inclusion of controversial areas in the CFSP (chiefly security and defense policy) contribute to this fear, which leads to tense ideological arguments between and within EC actors about the proper functioning of the CFSP. The second section focuses on bureaucratic politics within EC institutions involved in the CFSP, chiefly the Commission and COREPER. The final section of the paper addresses the question of institutional reform for the CFSP, a major priority of the current Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union. It assesses proposals toward this end now circulating in the EU, and the likely outcome given the negotiating positions of the major actors (states and EC actors) involved.
1997
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/2731/1/002546_1.pdf
Smith, Michael E. (1997) "What’s wrong with the CFSP? The politics of institutional reform". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/2731/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:3046
2011-02-15T22:25:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303032
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303033
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
"COREPER: Stealthy Power Brokers or Loyal Servants to Their Government Masters? The role of the Committee of Permanent Representatives in a changing Union. Report from an Ongoing Research Project"
Heinisch, Reinhard
Mesner, Simone.
COREPER
Council of Ministers
decision making/policy-making
This paper represents a first and thus preliminary account of an ongoing research project on the EU’s Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). The objective is to interview a significant number of current and former ambassadors and staff-members of Coreper and associated working groups in light of the research program outlined below. The interviews, reflecting a representative sample of old and new member states, began in 2004 following the presentation of the EU’s draft constitution and the accession of the new member states. The following report provides an overview of the findings thus far.
2005
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
text/plain
http://aei.pitt.edu/3046/1/COREPER%2DEUSA2005.TxT%2Dwp.txt
application/msword
http://aei.pitt.edu/3046/2/COREPER%2DEUSA2005.TxT%2Dwp.doc
Heinisch, Reinhard and Mesner, Simone. (2005) "COREPER: Stealthy Power Brokers or Loyal Servants to Their Government Masters? The role of the Committee of Permanent Representatives in a changing Union. Report from an Ongoing Research Project". In: UNSPECIFIED, Austin, Texas. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/3046/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:7949
2011-02-15T22:51:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F7067646D706D
7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303032
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303032
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303033
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:69646F7067:69646F706767656E6572616C
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
Supranationalization through Socialization in the Council of the European Union
Lempp, Jakob,
Altenschmidt, Janko.
general
COREPER
enlargement
Council of Ministers
decision making/policy-making
It is an academic truism that enlargement affected the functioning of the European Union and its institutions, and that effects of enlargement are especially noticeable in the Council and its sub-structures. Many researchers expected procedures in the Council to become more intergovernmental and decision-making to become more complicated. However, enlargement also contributed to institutional change in the Committee of Permanent Representatives in quite another—unexpected—way: it strengthened the influence of supranational and “quasi-supranational” actors within the Council, such as the Commission, the Presidency and the General Secretariat, and it made decision-making considerably easier in cases where profound national interests of the newcomers were not directly concerned. Four institutional mechanisms can be identified that contributed to this unexpected institutional evolution: The mechanism of socialization, the mechanism of specific and unspecific reciprocity, the mechanism of lack of interest and the mechanism of presidential impartiality. These mechanisms helped to overcome the cleavage between old and new as well as to uphold the strong and often cited esprit de corps within the Council and its preparatory bodies. The paper analyzes these processes and tries to answer the question: how did these mechanisms contribute to a kind of supranationalization of the Council and its substructures after the last rounds of enlargement? The analysis is based on 51 semi-structured, intensive interviews with experts from the Council General Secretariat and from member states’ Permanent Representations.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/7949/1/lempp%2Dj%2D11b.pdf
Lempp, Jakob, and Altenschmidt, Janko. (2007) Supranationalization through Socialization in the Council of the European Union. In: UNSPECIFIED, Montreal, Canada. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/7949/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:7973
2011-02-15T22:51:19Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303032
7375626A656374733D41:41303239
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Negotiating Agents and Bargaining Processes: Maximizing Member State Interests in COREPER
McKibben, Heather Elko.
COREPER
Council of Ministers
integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
How can rational political actors maximize their interests when bargaining through representatives? This project challenges the conventional argument of the canonical principalagent and rationalist international relations (IR) bargaining literatures, arguing that the importance of constraining representatives’ actions and choices varies depending on the type of bargaining process in which they are involved. I argue that in “cooperative bargaining processes”, giving representatives a high degree of autonomy will lead to the maximization of interests. On the other hand, in more “competitive bargaining processes”, constraining one’s representatives will lead to the maximization of interests in decision-making outcomes. Using original interview evidence with member state representatives in COREPER, I demonstrate that agent autonomy is crucial for the ability of deputy and permanent representatives to forward the interests of their principals – the various ministries of their member state – within a cooperative bargaining process.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/7973/1/mckibben%2Dh%2D03f.pdf
McKibben, Heather Elko. (2007) Negotiating Agents and Bargaining Processes: Maximizing Member State Interests in COREPER. In: UNSPECIFIED, Montreal, Canada. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/7973/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:7974
2011-02-15T22:51:20Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303136
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7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303033
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
The Rotating Council Presidency: Solution to the Negotiation Dilemma
McKibben, Heather Elko.
COREPER
Council of Ministers
European Council-Presidency
What role does the rotating Council Presidency play in the European Union (EU)? A debate exists in the literature as to whether the Council Presidency is neutral and weak, or plays a strong role in the European Union, through its agenda-setting powers and leadership role in negotiations. Drawing on the mechanism design literature, I argue that the rotating Council Presidency plays a central role in the negotiation of EU legislation within the Council institutions, helping to solve the ‘negotiation dilemma.’ Further, addressing this debate in the literature, I argue that, rather than expected neutrality representing a weakness of the Presidency position, a large part of the important role that the Council Presidency plays in the EU stems directly from this characteristic. To evaluate this argument empirically, I draw on interview evidence gathered in 2005 and 2006 with members of COREPER and the Working Groups of the Council institutions.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/7974/1/mckibben%2Dh%2D05c.pdf
McKibben, Heather Elko. (2007) The Rotating Council Presidency: Solution to the Negotiation Dilemma. In: UNSPECIFIED, Montreal, Canada. (Unpublished)
http://aei.pitt.edu/7974/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:8369
2011-02-15T22:53:35Z
7374617475733D707562
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7375626A656374733D44:44303033:44303033303032
7375626A656374733D44:44303035:44303035303033
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
"Coreper Enlarged": how enlargement affected the functioning of the Committee of Permanent Representatives. European Political Economy Review No. 6 (March 2007), pp. 31-52
Lempp, Jakob.
enlargement
COREPER
Council of Ministers
Before enlargement, many experts expected that the functioning of most EU institutions would be severely affected by the accession of the ten new member states in 2004. Compared to these expectations, effects that actually occurred were relatively moderate. Especially in the Committee of Permanent Representatives, enlargement took place smoothly and without major disturbances. However, some changes are noticeable. The paper analyses the way how enlargement influenced the functioning of Coreper. The analysis is based on 41 qualitative interviews with experts from the Council General Secretariat and from Permanent Representations from both ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states.
2007-03
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/8369/1/lempp.pdf
Lempp, Jakob. (2007) "Coreper Enlarged": how enlargement affected the functioning of the Committee of Permanent Representatives. European Political Economy Review No. 6 (March 2007), pp. 31-52. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/8369/