2024-03-29T07:10:39Zhttp://aei.pitt.edu/cgi/oai2
oai:aei.pitt.edu:519
2011-02-15T23:43:55Z
oai:aei.pitt.edu:1639
2011-02-15T23:44:51Z
oai:aei.pitt.edu:5725
2011-02-15T23:45:41Z
oai:aei.pitt.edu:8900
2011-02-15T23:46:39Z
oai:aei.pitt.edu:9358
2011-02-15T23:46:44Z
oai:aei.pitt.edu:9885
2011-02-15T23:46:57Z
oai:aei.pitt.edu:68585
2019-05-15T20:12:07Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:45303035
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303038
74797065733D65755F72656C61746564
Republicans Urge Major Reform of Atlantic Alliance (Press Release). Republican Committee on Western Alliances, House of Representations, Congress of the United States. August 14, 1967
Halpern, Seymour
Esch, Marvin
security/external-general
NATO
Press release discussing official statement from the House Republican Committee on Western Alliances recommending reforms for NATO. Includes text of original statement from the Republican Committee on Western Alliances.
1967
EU Related
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/68585/1/MAT0004.pdf
Halpern, Seymour and Esch, Marvin (1967) Republicans Urge Major Reform of Atlantic Alliance (Press Release). Republican Committee on Western Alliances, House of Representations, Congress of the United States. August 14, 1967. [EU Related]
http://aei.pitt.edu/68585/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:68591
2019-12-05T18:30:56Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:45303035
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303038
74797065733D65755F72656C61746564
U.S. Under Secretary of State Richardson's address on Western Europe, NATO. Address made to the Chicago Council on
Foreign Affairs, January 21 1970
Richardson, Elliot
security/external-general
NATO
.
1970
EU Related
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/68591/1/MAT0019.pdf
Richardson, Elliot (1970) U.S. Under Secretary of State Richardson's address on Western Europe, NATO. Address made to the Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs, January 21 1970. [EU Related]
http://aei.pitt.edu/68591/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:103308
2021-02-15T16:06:02Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303031:44303031303339:4430303130333963796265727365637572697479
7375626A656374733D45:45303035
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303038
74797065733D6F74686572
Towards greater resilience: NATO and the EU on hybrid threats. OSW Commentary 2020-04-24.
Szymański, Piotr
cybersecurity
security/external-general
NATO
In recent years, NATO and the EU have taken greater responsibility for countering hybrid threats. This group of threats covers a wide range of hostile methods used by states and non-state actors. It includes both military and non-military activities, for instance special forces operations and irregular warfare, and also disinformation and cyberattacks. NATO and the EU are involved in facilitating international cooperation on countering hybrid threats and protecting their own structures and institutions against them. In this way, both organisations reinforce the efforts at the national level, since fighting hybrid threats is primarily a task of the member states. Nevertheless, NATO’s and the EU’s actions in this respect are constrained by insufficient financing, and by the member states’ unwillingness to enhance the sharing of intelligence and sensitive information related to, for example, critical infrastructure protection or cybersecurity. The recent spike in anti-Western COVID-19 disinformation campaigns clearly shows that both NATO and the EU could do more to counter hybrid threats.
2020-04
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/103308/1/Commentary_328.pdf
Szymański, Piotr (2020) Towards greater resilience: NATO and the EU on hybrid threats. OSW Commentary 2020-04-24. UNSPECIFIED.
http://aei.pitt.edu/103308/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:103309
2021-02-15T16:13:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303035
7375626A656374733D46:46303034
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303038
74797065733D6F74686572
New ideas for total defence: Comprehensive security in Finland and Estonia. OSW Report 2020-03-31.
Szymański, Piotr
security/external-general
Estonia
Finland
In recent years, the Nordic and Baltic region has witnessed a growing interest in the concept of comprehensive security, which hails from the Cold War doctrine of total defence. This originates from the regional pivot to territorial defence and countering hybrid threats. A comprehensive approach to security is considered a driver for enhancing national resilience and for ensuring the best possible operational environment for armed defence. It incorporates military and non-military aspects of national security, and crisis management. Finland and Estonia stand out with respect to a comprehensive security strategy. Among the Nordic countries, Finland has the longest continuous tradition of a comprehensive approach to security, rooted in its strategic culture and societal background, while Estonia was the first of the Baltic states to begin building a comprehensive security system (already in 2008). The aim of this report is to present the concepts for comprehensive security in the Nordic and Baltic states, focusing on Finland and Estonia as case studies, and to analyse the practical ways in which comprehensive security is achieved in the two countries.
2020-03
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/103309/1/OSW%2DReport_New%2Dideas%2Dfor%2Dtotal%2Ddefence_net_0.pdf
Szymański, Piotr (2020) New ideas for total defence: Comprehensive security in Finland and Estonia. OSW Report 2020-03-31. UNSPECIFIED.
http://aei.pitt.edu/103309/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:103383
2021-05-10T14:14:32Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303032
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303038
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
The Trap of Geopolitics: Rethinking EU Strategic Communication. College of Europe Policy Brief March 2021.
Valenza, Domenico
common foreign & security policy 1993--European Global Strategy
security/external-general
As part of the European Union’s current ‘geopolitical turn’, strategic communication – combining reactive messaging and proactive narrative-building – is a key element of the EU’s response to increasing global contestation.
Through its reactive component, the EU’s strategic communication is very much focussed on Russia, but still largely neglects that many other foreign and domestic actors deploy disinformation techniques, too.
With its proactive component, the EU uses narrative-building and, in so doing, resorts to aggressive ‘othering’ – disregarding the role of ‘listening’ practices in building trust and mutual understanding with third parties.
Instead of focussing on Eurocentric and securitising narratives, the EU should engage with the world on an equal footing in order to communicate even more strategically.
To this end, a more self-reflexive top-level political discourse should be coupled with a holistic and joined-up approach to disinformation and a greater emphasis on ‘listening’ practices.
2021-03
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/103383/1/valenza_cepob_3_2021_final.pdf.pdf
Valenza, Domenico (2021) The Trap of Geopolitics: Rethinking EU Strategic Communication. College of Europe Policy Brief March 2021. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/103383/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:103617
2021-09-29T17:25:16Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303032
7375626A656374733D45:45303035
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303038
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
Belgian Defence: Put your trust in people. Egmont Commentary 20 July 2021.
Biscop, Sven
security/external-general
NATO
Belgium
Problems such as those exposed in Belgium’s military intelligence service ADIV/SGRS cannot find a structural solution unless Defence can hire sufficient personnel, with the right qualifications, to fulfil all of its tasks.
For the Armed Forces first of all consist of people. Alas, that is precisely the aspect that has been politically ignored for years. Recently, Defence fortunately can recruit more people again, but the fact is that this came too late. Important gaps had already fallen in the structures.
“People our Priority”, Defence Minister Ludivine Dedonder’s plan that puts people front and centre, is more than necessary, therefore. A core dimension, a general salary increase, is but normal. Defence was lagging too far behind (notably as compared to the police) to attract qualified people on a highly competitive job market.
Putting people at the centre also means putting trust in people, though. In an organisation in which men and women can be asked to put their lives at risk, the role of the “chief” is crucial, at all levels, including at the top: the generals and admirals.
2021-07
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/103617/1/Belgian_Defence_Put_your_trust_in_people_%2D_Egmont_Institute.pdf
Biscop, Sven (2021) Belgian Defence: Put your trust in people. Egmont Commentary 20 July 2021. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/103617/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:103619
2021-09-29T17:37:44Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:46303032
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303038
74797065733D706F6C6963797061706572
The Strategic Committee on Belgian Defence: How to Read the Report. Egmont Commentary 28 June 2021.
Holslag, Jonathan
Wilén, Nina
Biscop, Sven
security/external-general
Belgium
A band of hardliners with a shopping list: that is how we came across after the debate in the media and in the defence committee of the Belgian Federal Parliament last week. We, that is the Strategic Committee on Belgian Defence: ten academics, including the three of us, and two co-chairs who wrote a report at the request of Defence Minister Ludivine Dedonder.
2021-06
Policy Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/103619/1/The_Strategic_Committee_on_Belgian_Defence_How_to_Read_the_Report_%2D_Egmont_Institute.pdf
Holslag, Jonathan and Wilén, Nina and Biscop, Sven (2021) The Strategic Committee on Belgian Defence: How to Read the Report. Egmont Commentary 28 June 2021. [Policy Paper]
http://aei.pitt.edu/103619/
oai:aei.pitt.edu:103814
2022-02-10T16:55:21Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:45303035
7375626A656374733D46:46303234
7375626A656374733D44:44303032:44303032303038
74797065733D6F74686572
Sweden’s security: The long way towards total defence. OSW Point of View Number 81 Warsaw January 2021.
Gotkowska, Justyna
security/external-general
NATO
Sweden
Since 2008, Swedish security policy has drawn keen interest from the countries of the Nordic and Baltic states, NATO, as well as the US and Russia. The allied member states have hoped to see Sweden join NATO, while Russia has sought to convince the Swedish government and public that it would be better to abandon integration with the trans-Atlantic security structures. Sweden, confronted with the increasingly aggressive policy of the Kremlin, has faced a major challenge in the last decade: how to pursue the security and defence policy of a non-aligned country with limited military capabilities? For a country that is part of the West, but not NATO, would the option of returning to its Cold War neutrality be viable? Or would it be possible for Sweden to become a member of the Alliance?
Stockholm has found its own answer to the security dilemmas. It is currently neither neutrality nor accession to NATO. Sweden is weaving an ever tighter network of military cooperation with the Alliance, the US, its Nordic neighbours and others to complement the limitations in defence capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces, and restoring the ability of its society and economy to function in times of crisis and war. While this is admittedly not an optimal answer, it is nonetheless satisfactory given the domestic political circumstances.
2021-01
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://aei.pitt.edu/103814/1/PV_Swedens%2Dsecurity_net.pdf
Gotkowska, Justyna (2021) Sweden’s security: The long way towards total defence. OSW Point of View Number 81 Warsaw January 2021. UNSPECIFIED.
http://aei.pitt.edu/103814/