The Bosnian War and the New World Order: Failure and Success of International Intervention. EU-ISS Occasional Paper 1, October 1997

Andreatta, Filippo (1997) The Bosnian War and the New World Order: Failure and Success of International Intervention. EU-ISS Occasional Paper 1, October 1997 .

Abstract

[Executive Summary]. The war in Bosnia has witnessed a broad swing in the moods of the "international community" and of European nations particularly. In the wake of the end of the Cold War and of the victory in the Gulf War, expectations run high at the outbreak that collective security would have been able to deal with regional disturbances. Three years later, the "international community" had accumulated many frustrations and the IFOR operation which put an end to the fighting was regarded as a highly specific one which was unlikely to be repeated in other contingencies. This paper argues that both the initial and the final attitudes toward the Bosnian War have been excessive and, somehow, related. The initial optimism rested on uncertain foundations and was very likely to fail. The delusion, in turn, produced a cynical mood in which the initial mistakes were reversed and substituted with a pessimistic assessment of the prospects for long term stability. A more balanced attitude would not have produced such extremes and would have maintained a consensus in the "international community" for a wise and moderate engagement in regional stability. The initial enthusiasm brought about an unrealistic strategy which did not adequately balance ends and means. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan, despite the fact that it was bitterly criticized at the time for rewarding aggression, required a Bosnian Serb retreat from 27% of Bosnian territory to a total 43%, while the various cantons assigned to the three communities were displayed in a patchwork and would have therefore required post-war cooperation. With hindsight, these objectives were overly ambitious for an "international community" which did not have the willingness to upgrade its military presence and which was therefore limited to a peacekeeping mission. In these circumstances, UNPROFOR's presence was not geared to reverse aggression and to stabilise the area, but only to avert the worst humanitarian disasters. Three years later, the "international community" finally applied sufficient force to stop the violence and impose a settlement. However, the objectives had in the meantime been scaled down dramatically, as the Republika Sprska retained control of 49% of the territory and enjoyed territorial continuity, which is a fundamental prerequisite for partition. The point is that the chosen objectives and the available resources must be compatible in order for the international intervention to be credible and effective. The gap between UNPROFOR's limited capabilities and the ambitious objectives of the "international community" was further exacerbated by the institutional framework which has been selected for the negotiations. The fact that the first negotiators, Cyrus Vance and (after Lord Carrington) Lord Owen, represented international organizations rather than sovereign states fuelled the divorce between diplomacy and the use of military force as the mediators had a mandate only regarding the first. Furthermore, the fact that prime diplomatic responsibility was endowed to the international organization without the control of military options stimulated a process of adverse substitution which was responsible for the underproduction of security in the Balkans. In the presence of the EU-UN initiatives, many national governments felt no direct incentive to take the lead in the diplomatic and military efforts. It is no coincidence that the governments which most criticized the international mediators also contributed least to the military operations for the first three years. Eventually, these problems where overcome with the creation of the Contact Group, which attributed primary responsibility back to national governments and with the direct involvement of NATO countries with Operation Deliberate Force. In the year of the Inter-Governmental Conference, it is necessary to analyse these processes in order to avoid the mistakes of the past. In particular, the danger is that European institutions will be given too much responsibility without the necessary means for implementation. In such a crucial area for democratic public opinions and national sovereignty as foreign policy, the scope for gradualism is more limited than in other issue areas because institutions must be weighed against developments which depend on other actors as well. If European foreign policy is to be more than the mere sum of the policies of individual states, it is therefore essential that some executive powers be given to the European policy makers. If on the contrary the time is not yet ripe for a true European identity and European institutions are to be merely restricted to a spokesperson's role, then it is better that expectations for the emergence of a new European role are kept under control. The danger is otherwise that the ensuing delusion would erode the consensus also for those common policy which could be effective.