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FOR THE TOTAL STATES OF AMERICA

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I. SUMMARY OF THE WORKING SESSIONS

1. <u>First working session of delegations - Friday 20 January 1984</u>, 09.30-12.40

1.1 Political Affairs Committee

Mr HAAGERUP, Vice-Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee reviewed the activities of his committee as regards relations between the Community and the United States. He mentioned the work done on security and arms procurement which began with his report, was followed by Mr FERGUSSON's and was now being followed up by Mr KLEPSCH's report. He cited the debates in plenary on the disarmament talks, the reports prepared on the situation in the Middle East, Central America and the work of the subcommittee, in particular on human rights and institutional affairs.

He introduced <u>Mr HANSCH</u>, rapporteur of the Political Affairs

Committee preparing the final report on EC=US relations. In his introduction

Mr HANSCH emphasised the importance of adequate

and effective communication and drew out the differing evaluations of

the European Community and the United States on the East-West conflict,

which was due to the geographical and military differences between the

two groups. He recognised the frequency of misunderstandings arising

because the Europeans were unable to speak with one voice. It was an

obligation to aspire to be a true and equal partner with the United

States and to maintain the Atlantic Alliance.

Mr WINN wondered whether there was lack of communication between the European leaders and Members of Parliament, since his enquiries showed that there was adequate communication between executives in the EC and that in the US. Mrs GREDAL commented that not all EC Member States' governments had close links with MEP's from those countries. Mrs VEIL agreed that there could be inadequate communication between the executive and the legislatures. She nevertheless felt that, on occasions, the US seemed to act independently of all other's views, except perhaps those of the USSR. She was unsure of the consultation concerning the US invasion of Grenada but felt that this criticism might apply there.

Mr COLEMAN had read much in the US press about European criticisms of the lack of consultation regarding Grenada. He was surprised that such consultation was required in these circumstances, for even the US Congress had not been informed, so as to avoid putting in danger the US invasion force.

Mr LANTOS added that despite the War Powers Act which required consultation with Congress, the US President had not consulted with Congress before the invasion, and it was only subsequently that in a closed session, the Secretaries of State and Defense met with Congressmen to describe the events leading to the invasion and its aftermath. The War Powers Act gave Congress the right and authority to call for the withdrawal of troops. But in this case the action had been largely supported. He counselled against making a fetish about consultation and whilst recognising parliaments as the finest manifestation of free men and women, criticised rather the lack of political will to make decisions.

Mrs VEIL clarified misinterpretation of her preliminary remarks agreeing that distinctions between Executive and Legislature were important in communication and Mr HAAGERUP added his support to the words of Tom LANTOS.

While recognising the difference between communications at executive and at parliamentary level, <u>Mr LANGE</u> suggested that information was needed to assist consultation so that unfortunate surprises were avoided. Reflecting certain of the views put by Mr HANSCH, <u>Mr AIGNER</u> believed that the main obstacle to the existence of a clear European view was the diversity of political opinion in Europe, which was at times difficult to assess. Errors could arise both in Europe and the United States by confusing minority opinions which were expressed loudly and quickly with the less clear majority opinions which were formed subsequently. <u>Mr THOMAS</u> added that two groups of people existed, those who needed to know and those who wanted to know. Everyone wanted to be in the first, though were often in the second.

Concluding the discussion, <u>Mr HÄNSCH</u>, underlined the differences between consultation at Executive and Legislative levels, but in his view, the US Administration and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Community should consult more. He accepted that the diversity of views in the Community was confusing and recognised the need for political results.

1.2 Committee on Agriculture

Mr PROVAN, Spokesman for the Committee on Agriculture, described the broad range of interests within the committee. He felt that decisions of the Committee on Agriculture tended to seek the highest common denominator. This meant often high prices for agricultural products so as to maintain rural populations on the land. But Europe had relatively little land and relied on high input for its high output. The US had large amounts of land and was able to produce with low input. He recognised that the PIK Programme and the high value of the dollar took pressure off the Community and gave it time to resolve the major internal problems of the CAP.

Mr COLEMAN felt that the rural areas were over represented in the Committee on Agriculture judging from its decisions. He felt that certain of them were unjustifiable. Mr THOMAS recognised that though Europe had fortuitously been given some time, an adequate response was nevertheless expected. Mr AIGNER explained that the current price proposals for farm produce for the coming year meant an effective decline of 8% in farmers' income in his district. In an electoral year, this was a major liability. In the last thirty years many agricultural units in the EC had ceased to exist. The transfer from the land to the service industry was, however, no longer possible. His comments provoked an exchange between Mr HERMAN and Mr THOMAS on the price of milk in the US and the EC and Mr PROVAN then responded by denying the over-representation in the Committee on Agriculture of rural interests though he accepted that it was one of the most influential organs of the Parliament. The agricultural sector in the Community was significantly greater than that in the US. The committee generally over-represented agricultural interests which affected the Parliament's views which tended to follow committee advice. The high price policy being followed, though regrettable in certain respects, was the only one that would encourage European unification. He underlined again the diversity of opinions in the committee on surpluses and food for development. Mr FRENZEL considered it time to put the CAP House in order. The PIK and the strong dollar had not been created to give the Community time. He wondered whether the Parliament was going to take advantage of the relief that those currently afforded

the Community. The US had tried the policies being followed by the Community and had found them wanting. He wondered what Community policies would be followed in the next years. Mr PROVAN replied that the US had one Federal authority, while the Community had ten national governments which made policy-making much slower. He concluded that in one or two product areas, self-sufficiency had been largely exceeded, but restrictions affected more particularly those on difficult land and the smaller farmers. He felt that a quota system and penal taxation could probably be agreed for sectors in surplus but he wished for a proper pricing policy rather than these restrictions.

Mrs VEIL intervened to clarify a point made by Mr PROVAN on the proportion of the working population in agriculture in her country.

1.3 Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

Mr MOREAU, Chairman of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, described the major areas of activity of his committee, competition policy, the internal market, and free movement of workers. He also mentioned the Parliament's work on European economic recovery and on financial matters. A number of these sectors were affected by relations with the US. 1983 had been declared 'Year of the Small and Medium-Sized Undertakings and Craft Industries' and Mr DELEAU, rapporteur on this matter was also present. He concluded by pointing out the sensitive electoral problems posed by high unemployment, by poor investment and by stagnation in the Community. Mr FRENZEL put two questions, one on the world monetary system and the other on unemployment in the Community, but before replying, Mr DELEAU was recognised and described briefly, as President of the European Year of the Small and Medium-Sized Undertakings and Craft Industries, the activities that had taken place and promised to forward to the Members of Congress, the final Conference report which had called for Community-wide programmes facilitating access to finance and and markets for the SNU's. Mr NOTENBOOM asked a question about SMU's in the US.

Mr MOREAU replied to Mr FRENZEL's questions by explaining that proposals for a new Bretton Woods System for international monetary matters had not received full support in his committee, but it was still being discussed. He felt that unemployment problems within the Community would not be resolved simply by reducing working hours and promoting work sharing. Compared with the US, Europe had been unable to create jobs in the last twenty years. Specific unemployment questions were, however, dealt with by the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment of the European Parliament.

Mr von WOGAU recognised that central bank intervention to support currencies could not entirely prevent fluctuations in currency values but the creation of a world monetary system would help to reduce such fluctuations. He pointed out that the ECU was becoming a popular international currency and was being used in certain private transactions. A European Central bank would provide a new stimulus to its use.

Mr LANTOS, replying to Mr NOTENBOOM, agreed that SMU's had been in the forefront of US industrial innovation, and Mr DELEAU then added that the high interest rates in the Community had a very dampening effect on SMU's activities. The EIB had been asked to increase its loan efforts with SMU's and to extend exchange rate risk cover. In Mr LANGE's view, the delegation's contacts should not be restricted simply to Congress on this matter but should be extended to the Small Business Administration, and Mr THOMAS added the NFIB (National Federation of Intermediate Businesses). However, he counselled against introducing priority to SMU's in every circumstance but advised preference for SMU's where reasonable.

Mr WELSH raised a question on the US economic situation and its prospects, but the Chairman referred the matter to the Saturday morning session. She then introduced Mr HERMAN, rapporteur of the Ad hoc Special Committee on European Economic Recovery. He sketched out the three major activities that would figure largely in the recovery plan. These were the removal of structural obstacles to growth, the reduction of internal barriers and the encouragement of high technology use. He pointed out the higher fiscal or parafiscal burden borne by EC citizens as compared to those in the US or Japan and emphasised the Community dimension of this recovery programme.

1.4 Committee on External Economic Relations

Sir Fred CATHERWOOD, Chairman of the Committee on External Economic Relations Committee, reported that since the last meeting nothing had got better but nothing had got catastrophically worse in EC-US trade relations. The US still had an overvalued dollar, he commented. He outlined the various initiatives that had been taken by the Commission and the Parliament to stop developments towards protectionism. Certain US initiatives appeared to be encouraging protectionism, such as the Trade Remedies Reform Bill of 1983 (introduced by US Congressman Sam GIBBONS). These measures would be extraordinarily damaging if ever implemented. The present world trade system was entirely dependent on relations between the two major trading blocks, on the will in the European Community and the United States to keep trading while recovering from the depression. The Bill's proposals differed from the spirit of the GATT. Legal tangles could arise if the letter of the law was followed. He pointed out the risks of a failure of the trading system. While accepting that the European Community was not entirely innocent, the Commission had put forward proposals, with which the Parliament had agreed, on trade control measures. These proposals were currently blocked by the West Germans and the United Kingdom in Council. They were designed to match current US trade controls. The GIBBONS' proposals amounted to an extension of extraterritoriality, and of coverage and obscured current definitions, such as material injury. If passed, the measure would stimulate protectionism in the European Community. He concluded by underlining the commercial overvaluation of the dollar, the high interest rates in the United States which provided a 25% extra cost on US industry and therefore stimulated protectionist pressure within the United States.

Mr FRENZEL, apologising for Mr GIBBON's absence due to the 'Superbowl' taking place in his district, said that measures proposed were to counteract industrial targetting such as that of the Japanese in machine tools. US law had always allowed the threat of injury to be used as defense against

trade practices. He congratulated the Community MEP's for their work against the oils and fats tax proposals, and accepted that the US needed to reciprocate. The European Community had got its message across to Congress. In his view, Sir Fred and Mr LANGE should write to Sam GIBBONS on the matter.

Mr WELSH then gave two concrete examples of the effects of the GIBBONS' proposals. They would enforce unilateral definitions of unfair trade practices, and would cover upstream and downstream subsidies or dumping which had not been accepted by the Commission on US fibres exports to the EC. Such matters would provoke Community reaction of a similar sort.

Mr MOREAU warned against assuming that the oils and fats tax would not be adopted since parliamentary opinion was divided and the Commission and Council were still undecided. Mr THOMAS commented that the Sam GIBBONS' bill was not yet passed into law. He stressed that the oil and fat question was a very sensitive one to US farmers and would provoke immediate reaction if the Community took measures. Mr HERMAN asked how the Community could convince its electorate on reform of the CAP if it was deprived of tools to make those reforms. And Sir Fred added that many people in the Parliament did support an oils and fats tax. As Commissioner HAFERKAMP, had said, no-one had told him what industry was going to be subject to possible countervailing duties allowed under GATT. Twenty per cent of US exports were agricultural, while only 10% of EC exports were and much of these were subsidised. The US had more to lose in any agricultural trade war. After significant EC pressure on the Japanese, voluntary restraint agreements had been made. Ad hoc measures were necessary but the whole free system had not been destroyed. Interest rates in the US were 50% higher than those in West Germany and capital was moving from Europe to the US, not as front money, but attracted by the high interest rates. Mr FRENZEL assured Members that the US Congress would not pass a law which did not conform to GATT, and would not pass a law that provoked retaliations. He pointed out that the US had been very accommodating on the Export Administration Act. Mr HERMAN concluded the session by pointing out the arguments for oils and fats taxes. He noted that the increase in milk surplus was directly related to the increase in imports of fatty matters. The EC milk "factory" bought cheap fats on the international market and resold the milk at guaranteed prices. When taxes were levied on such fats or oils, then other EC agricultural fodder would become profitable, which would mean increased employment of the European labour force. It was for these reasons that the proposals had been made.

- Second working session of delegations Friday 20 January 1984,
 15.00-18.30
- 2.1 The State of the European Community and European Security and Disarmament

Mrs VEIL opened her remarks by saying that many MEP's had not been surprised by the failure of the Athens Summit. Since 1979, the European Parliament had foreseen the budget crisis which was not coming to a head. Even then expenditure of the Community was close to the 1% VAT limit and the burden of VAT was growing. The European Parliament also desired to expand Community policies. Community expenditure however was less than 3% of government expenditure of all EC Member States. Enlargement to include Spain and Portugal would mean that current Community resources would be insufficient. Though the Athens Summit had been a failure, it had been a technical not a political one, for all party leaders remained convinced of the need to pursue European union and to agree on a wider set of Community policies. The risk of running out of money this year would push the crisis to a conclusion. The world needed a political Europe and the Community needed to be firm on the problems that beset it. The expenditure on the Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was rising more quickly than inflation. Clearly the solutions to the problem should ensure that the United Kingdom's understandable concern would not be frustrated. The Community had to accept that Member States should not only be given financial solutions to the budget problem but also some direct political involvement in the future development of the Community. The Community was a saving and it should be demonstrated as such once more.

Mr SEIBERLING introduced his written paper entitled "A Democratic Perspective on the Immediate Range Nuclear Weapons Negotiations". In it he underlined American commitment to the defense of Western Europe, including deterrence of a nuclear attack there. He doubted that this commitment would falter, as long as it was desired by the Europeans. He then sketched out the evolution of NATO's defense policy, including the twin-track decision of 1979 to deploy intermediate range nuclear missiles while seeking agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce or eliminate such missiles on both sides. The Congressional delegation had been impressed by the increasingly precarious political situation in Western Europe and in his view the continuation of such trends could well lead before too

long to the end of NATO as a viable military alliance. While criticising the Reagan Administration for insufficient flexibility in the Geneva negotiations. Mr SEIBERLING felt that "the walk in the woods proposal" had presented the best opportunity to negotiate reductions in Soviet missiles and this had not been taken up by the Administration. He described NATO's flexible response strategy, including the first use of nuclear weapons if necessary, and explained the rationale. The theory of deterrence underpining it would avoid decoupling of the US strategic nuclear deterrent from the defense of Europe. He criticised this theory and suggested alternatives. He pointed out that one of the proposed remedies to this theory of deterrence, was to increase the role of non-nuclear forces in NATO strategy so as to move to a policy of deterrence through conventional forces. In his view, Pershing IIs tended to invite pre-emptive nuclear strikes by the Soviets given their accuracy and speed. But the first priority was to revive negotiations on INF weapons and halt the deployment of additional Soviet weapons in Europe. This could be brought about by a prompt offer to extend the pause in the deployment schedule for a reasonable time if the Soviets imposed a comparable moratorium and agreed to return to negotiations. He criticised the Cruise Missiles as extremely de-stabilising, given their small size and their mobility. He felt proposals could only be considered if they dealt with the British and French intermediate range missiles also. He felt that the INF and START talks might be combined, given their inter-dependence. He counselled against bellicose and militaristic rhetoric, which upset negotiations.

He considered the anti-satellite proposals, made by the Reagan Administration as taking a "jump" on the other side, and likely to lead to a further spiral in the arms build-up. He felt the ASAT weapons deployment would greatly increase the risk of accidental nuclear war. The Reagan Star Wars anti-missile satellite defense programme was another such provocation. It cast doubt on the seriousness of the Administration's commitment to arms control. He did warn against the unilateral elimination of nuclear weapons, since deterrence was still an important aspect of security in defense policy. He voiced his horror at the immense numbers and appalling destructive power of nuclear weapons stock piles. He concluded by calling for the end of the continuing nuclear arms build up.

Lord BETHELL, Mr LANGE, Mrs VEIL, and Mr MOREAU then put points of order or questions concerning the agenda. Mrs GREDAL made it clear that defense issues were outside the scope of the delegation's discussions. The Chairman, Mr LANTOS, agreed that there would be a discussion on the themes raised by Mrs VEIL followed by the topics raised by Mr SEIBERLING

which would be preceded by Mr SILJANDER's paper.

Mr LANGE pointed out that many technical Community issues were in fact basically political since they raised the question as to what extent each national government was responsive to European concerns. Many Member States found the European Parliament, in his words, a nuisance. He doubted whether governments would be keen to increase Community expenditure, though it would be possible to expand expenditure coverage without any cost increase.

Lord BETHELL congratulated Mrs VEIL on her sagacious assessment of current Community developments. British Ministers wished to speed up EC development after the resolution of various problems. He pointed out that development policy in the third world, where the US was the largest contributor, offered the Community the chance to play a greater role. The CSCE process could be improved, though the ten EC Nember States already cooperated a great deal in this forum, and incidentally worked well with the United States. In his view, the political will of the Ten was unchanged. There was no retreat from the politics of Europe in spite of the British budget problem.

Mr MOREAU pointed out that several different concepts of what the Community was and what it should be existed in each of the Member States. A basic consensus did exist, but some still tried to dissociate economic from political matters. In his view true cooperation could not exist without basic economic cooperation which did not currently exist in many areas.

Congressman Mark D SILJANDER then introduced his paper on "INF Deployment: Victory for NATO". He argued that NATO had scored a victory on the deployment of Pershing IIs and Cruise missiles which set back Soviet attempts to intimidate Europe. The victory was that the West had stood together in the face of these threats, and disinformation and manipulation of public opinion. He then described the historical background that had led to this deployment. He described the set-backs to European concerns in the SALT II talks, leading to the dual-track strategy in 1979. He pointed out the damage to the Alliance that would have come about by a decision by European Governments against deployment. He underlined the extent of the increase in the number of Soviet SS-20's deployed since 1979. He outlined

the major elements of the INF negotiations leading finally to breakdown. He contested the argument that the new missiles deployed in Europe would be de-stabilising. In his view, the Soviets could no longer count on their ability to destroy a large enough number of missiles in a pre-emptive strike to make the cost of NATO retaliation either predictable or tolerable. This strengthened in his view, deterrence against Soviet attack. He contested the statement that Pershing IIs were first-strike weapons. He argued that the deployment of these missiles did not increase the chances of a limited nuclear war in Europe, since US controlled weapons fired from wherever would be seen as a US attack by the Soviets. He concluded by saying that the United States had provided the weapons that Helmut Schmidt had wanted, and the Europeans had provided the will to deploy them, when arms reduction negotiations did not succeed.

Larry WINN was then recognised by the chair and introduced his paper on "US-European Relations: Comments on Pieter DANKERT's Foreign Policy Article - 'Europe Together, America Apart'". Mr WINN contested many of the major statements that had been made in this article which, in his view, had a disturbingly negative tone. He disputed the contention that the problems within the alliance were so severe that NATO was finished as a defensive alliance. He disagreed that perspectives, interests and objectives on each side of the Atlantic seemed to diverge more than they coincide. He contested the balance of responsibility between the US and the USSR for East-West tensions, which in his view lay more with the USSR. He contended that consultation, though not perfect, had been better than depicted, and agreed that the nuclear threshold in Europe was too low, but felt that NATO's non-nuclear defense needed to be made credible and an effective deterrent to Soviet attack. He felt that the value of the allies was recognised, and no amendment to end the US presence in Europe, in his view, would pass Congress. A stronger Europe was more likely and the stronger the better, if it was allied to the United States rather than if it went its separate way. The Chairman, Mr_LANTOS, subscribed to every word of Mr WINN's paper. Mrs VEIL commented that the European Parliament had discussed the INF in November and had rejected the proposal for a moratorium on the stationing of Pershing and Cruise missiles in Europe. In her view, INF and security were now part of the European Community's competences, following Stuttgart, and would be an electoral issue at the European elections in June. Public opinion, in her view, was not pacifist and the polls were very contradictory. Europe was united at government level on the INF and was in favour of stationing them. On the French and British nuclear missiles, the French

position was that these missiles could be counted, but on a comparable basis, not as tactical weapons but as strategic ones. Europe was concerned that the US was shifting its priorities from Europe to the Pacific and it would not in the future be as reliable a defense partner as a result. She agreed that Europe must assume a greater degree of responsibility for its defense, maintaining its solidarity with the United States.

Mr LANGE then intervened using as a background paper a note prepared by Mr HAAGERUP entitled "Security and Disarmament: A European Perspective". This underlined the deep split in public opinion between political parties in many Western European countries provoked by the missile issue. The Socialist parties of seven European countries, all currently in opposition, coordinated their efforts with the Greek Socialist Government, to delay and possibly block the deployment of these US missiles. The French, Italian, Portuguese and partly Spanish Socialists, all in Government, had all taken a different position on this issue. NATO as such had not become an issue, though certain fringes of the peace movement were now advocating withdrawal as protest against President Reagan's aggressive foreign policy, as they called it.NATO, in his view, was the only organisation that could defend and provide for security of the West. He noted the trends towards anti-Americanism in Europe stimulated by the fears of the nuclear arms race. In Germany, both the previous Federal Chancellor, and in principle, the current one, believed that a war should never start on German soil. Both parts of Germany followed the same line on this. He believed that there should be an increase in conventional arms, maintenance of nuclear weapons, but a change in the security concepts that were currently NATO strategy in the US and Europe. Security he recalled did not only cover defense but also economic matters.

Mr GAUTIER wholeheartedly agreed with Mr SEIBERLING's analysis.

The European Community did not treat the USSR in the same sort of way as they viewed the United States. In his view, the deployment of medium-ranged nuclear missiles had raised the cost of defense to self destruction.

Defense was normally designed to maintain not to destroy. A working group of the SPD had been constituted and would be examining various possibilities on arms policy and reporting in May 1984. In the long run there was no point in the arms build up. He looked to Stockholm as the beginning of the dialogue and he expected that in the European elections there would be much talk of peace and security.

Mr SEIBERLING who had not yet seen Mr DANKERT's article, did not disagree with Mr WINN. He asked whether it was desirable to re-open the INF if possible, and if so how? He wondered what the political effects in Europe would be if negotiations were not re-opened. He wondered how NATO's non-nuclear capabilities could be strengthened. Mr PAPAEFSTRATIOU felt that President DANKERT was probably expressing his personal views. He, himself, was for maintenance of the US bases and forces in Greece. The economic crisis in Europe had stimulated concern about defense and security and America's role. He believed that 1984 would witness an improvement in relations between the United States and the European Community.

Mr LANGE hoped that his statement would be interpreted as approving Mr SEIBERLING's proposals. He sincerely believed in conventional reinforcement. He noted that none of the partners had yet taken a stand on this matter.

Mr WELSH said that in the United Kingdom deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles had been an important factor in the Conservative Party's victory at the General Election in 1983. If there was no progress, then that conviction might be threatened. He felt that Mr SILJANDER had cried victory too early. He was darned if he knew how to get the negotiations going again. He counselled care in the rhetoric of the President. He wondered who was in control of the USSR administration and believed that a firm stand needed to be made by NATO. He questioned the feasibility of an increase in conventional forces, given the considerable financial burden implied by that. If the European Community was working well, then there might be less pressure on finance. Even the three per cent real growth on defense expenditure could not be maintained in the UK. He did not believe that the conventional alternative should be seriously considered.

Mr SILJANDER then came back on certain of the comments that had been made concerning his presentation. Recent speeches by the President had been relatively low key, he pointed out. The atmosphere was favourable to serious negotiations.

Mr MOREAU pointed out the tremendous gap between the general population and its leaders. He felt most were in favour of overall disarmament but there was a need for agreement on how to implement this objective. He did agree that Europe must think about what it could do about its own security. We could now talk of European defense and security, even if we were unable to know how to defend ourselves better, he concluded.

2.2 The Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East

The discussion was opened by Mrs VEIL who highlighted the different sensitivities within each political group in the European Parliament, on the Middle East, unlike on the previous issue. Until 1980, the European Parliament had virtually avoided serious discussion, but since then the Middle East situation had been debated regularly. The European Parliament had condemned all forms of terrorism. The European Parliament had indicated its interest and concern in these matters and its belief that Europe had a special role to play. The majority had approved of the multi-national peace keeping fprce deployment and for its maintenance until all foreign forces were withdrawn from Lebanon. In November 1983, the European Parliament had condemned Syria's attitude towards the conflict. He looked forward to the Greek Government taking a somewhat different position on the matter, especially in the Council. She pointed out the special dangers of a deterioration of the Iran-Iraq conflict for the region.

Lord BETHELL circulated a paper entitled "The Cyprus Problem"- from the Friends of Cyprus, of which he was Chairman. The Cyprus dispute was of particular concern to one Member State, Greece, and two associates of the European Community, Turkey and Cyprus. Everyone in the European Parliament had been asked to commit themselves to either Greece or Turkey. These were two fellow European nations. 1984 was the tenth anniversary of the war in Cyprus, which had created a barrier more impenetrable than the Berlin Wall. A large number of refugees were still living in Cyprus, there were complex compensation claims and the problem of missing persons -1,600 people were still unaccounted for. Cyprus remained an unpleasant irritant between Greece and Turkey and did the Atlantic Alliance no good. The United States had given the matter low priority. Some had been surprised by the autonomy move in northern Cyprus, but now the illegal regime existed. He hoped that the United States Congress would press the US Administration to consider the matter with more urgency. The United States was uniquely situated to effect changes in the area through its military and other supplies. The European Community was not in the military business but its economic assistance had been linked to democratic developments in Turkey and it had an active agreement with Cyprus.

Mr LANTOS expressed his deep commitment to democracy in Turkey and to the removal of troops from Cyprus. The House Foreign Affairs Committee had forwarded a letter expressing its disapproval of the autonomy move in Cyprus.

Turkey was now on the road to full democratic government. The Orzul regime represented, to him, the last opportunity for democracy in the country. (Mrs LANTOS nodded approval.) It was not realistic to expect standards of democracy similar to those in Denmark, in Turkey. He did not believe in setting unattainable standards. Three years ago, Turkey was faced by terrorism of an enormous scale. The Orzul victory was a considerable surprise to the regime. The government party had come in third at the elections. The Orzul Government which had taken office was liberalising the economy and attempting to reintegrate Turkey into Europe. He felt it was ultimately shortsighted to ignore Turkey's NATO role. He urged Europe to be open-minded about Turkey and reminded the Members that he was deeply committed to the protection of human rights and the resolution of the Cyprus issue.

Mr PICKLE concurred completely with the views expressed by Mr LANTOS. Turkey and Greece must resolve their problems. The United States would help if asked, but those two countries were in a critical area under threat from the USSR.

Mr PAPAEFSTRATIOU said that Greece was interested in the existence and maintenance of democratic systems, in Turkey and elsewhere. The matter was a difficult and sensitive one in a region that was also difficult and sensitive. Greece had supported the United Nations' decisions on Cyprus. He urged the protection of human rights, and the independence of Cyprus. Who was attacked in Cyprus? he asked. Who was the victim? Who were the refugees? He insisted that international law needed to be respected.

Mr THOMAS noted that Turkey was strategically important for the Atlantic Alliance and for the United States. He had been most impressed during the visit that the US delegation made to Turkey by the professionalism of Orzul and his advisors and his election campaign. He was dedicated to the rule of law, to pragmatism in ruling, and above all to democracy. In his view, the current regime represented the last best chance for Turkey for some time. He asked Europe to reconsider its views on Turkey.

Mr LAGAKOS pointed out that the new EC Member State, Greece, had no common border with other EC Member States. It felt more threatened by the NATO member next to it than by other countries in the region. This led Greece to adopt an independent position on matters concerning the Middle East. In the Lebanon he felt that the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli troops was

essential, that the Palestinians had to be protected to some extent. The United Nations' role must be to avoid the build up of too many troops in the Lebanon. On the Camp David Agreement, he felt that a peaceful solution to the Middle East could not be expected without recognition of the demands of the Palestinians with Arafat as the representative of them. He agreed that the new independent state of Cyprus could never be recognised and should be condemned. He felt that the United Nations' voice should be listened to, for there it was clear there was only one guilty party, Turkey. Yes, Orzul had been victorious, but he advised members of the Congressional delegation not to take positions for or against Turkey or for or against Greece since in his view, the US had always been for Turkey. The PASOK Members were not asking anthing from Turkey, Greece wanted its territorial integrity to be maintained at all levels.

Mr SEIBERLING commented that he had voted for the original arms embargo of Turkey in 1974 but he completely agreed with Chairman LANTOS' views on supporting the efforts of the Orzul Government in Turkey. He condemned the moves to independence of the northern Cypriots, but was not impressed entirely by the United Nations on these matters.

Mr LANTOS noted that the Friends of Cyprus were highly critical of the UK's lack of intervention at the time of the Greek Colonel's coup and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus which contradicted its Guarantee. There were two peoples in the world, the Greeks and those who would like to be Greek. Everyone was a cultural child of Greece. Many Americans were sick of the voice of the United Nations which in his view was made up of a majority of two bit dictators. Americans had had enough of that. He advised using other arguments since the majority votes of the United Nations did not impress US Congressmen whatsoever. He said that the positions and statements of an anti-American sort made by the Greek Government had shifted Congress' and the Administration's opinion. With empathy in Athens it would be a different story. He hoped that the MEP's from Greece could improve matters. He did comment that there was no Turkish lobby in the United States though there was a large Greek lobby which was most effective.

The discussion then turned to Central America. On this matter, Mr SEIBERLING raised the issue of consultation between the US and the EC on Grenada. He emphasised that not even the leadership of the US Congress had been consulted, even though the War Powers Act required the President

to do so.

Mrs VEIL commented that if Europeans were to show solidarity, then they needed to be well agreed on what, and at what level. The events in Grenada had posed certain institutional difficulties to one of the Member States, because of the constitutional position of the Governor. She recognised that there was a difference between consultation between executive and legislature but nevertheless recognised that both levels should always be borne in mind. She accepted that a certain press campaign could and had created a feeling of anti-Americanism in the Community, but it was important for parliamentarians that this information was seen to be deficient and she hoped that this was well understood.

Mr WELSH was reminded of comments made by Larry EAGLEBURGER in September in Washington when he said that one should not confuse consultation with agreement. On Grenada, the British Prime Minister had been phoned by the United States President just before the US landing. She had expressed some reserve but on this occasion he had decided against her advice and went ahead with the invasion. The UK Foreign Minister initially had great difficulty but within two or three weeks, public opinion in Britain and indeed in much of the Community was very much for the invasion, largely because the Grenadian community in the UK were so overjoyed at the liberation of their homeland.

Mr LANGE referred to the discussion that had taken place in September on Central America and emphasised that economic and social instability in the Central American region posed very great problems to those in the region and to their neighbours and friends. He appealed for policies that reduced social instability and improved economic progress in the region. There being no further speakers on this issue, the session was then brought to a close.

Third working session of delegations - Saturday 21 January 1984, 09.00-13.00

3.1 Economic Topics

- Impact of the US economic recovery on world economic recovery

Mr MOREAU, introducing the item, asked whether the current economic recovery was real or merely temporary. In 1983-84, GDP was on its way up, inflation and unemployment was down and the level of savings was dropping. Some of these trends were evident in Europe also, but not to the same extent as in the US. US economic recovery was important not only for Europe, but also for the developing countries. The US economic recovery was currently characterized by high interest rates and a large budgetary deficit. Current low inflation levels might not last. The high value of the US dollar jeopardized European recovery. The attractiveness of the US dollar for European investors meant that much capital needed for investment in new European industries was simply not available.

Mr <u>FRENZEL</u> noted that 1984 was likely to see a continuation of the current US recovery, with slightly increased inflation and concomitant

rates. Employment levels were likely to remain stable. The US deficit was likely to rise again. The United States has succeeded in creating 13 million new jobs while Europe had watched its own jobs market continue to decline.

Mr NOTENBOOM wondered whether the US Congress had any influence on US monetary policy, and whether there was not a case for increasing the money supply.

Miss <u>DE VALERA</u> felt that the European Community would continue to lag behind the United States in growth throughout the eighties. In Europe, long-term unemployed represented some 30% of the total, while the comparable figure for the US was less than 10%. Europe needed an industrial policy based on a unified internal market. European productivity was also extremely low compared to its major industrial competitors, the US and Japan. Europe's best chance for recovery lay in the pursuit of a common industrial and economic policy, including fiscal and social security arrangements.

Mr WELSH pointed out that the US recovery was less than healthy, involving stagnant productivity, rising inflation and a huge budgetary deficit and was likely to come to a full stop in the foreseeable future.

Mr LANTOS referred to the increasing use of the "commission" form of government in the United States which was intended to remove decision—making from the ideological constraints of the political party in power. The decrease in political rhetoric in the US was giving way to more political pragmatism. The Japanese, with their consensus politics, provided a good example of successful, non-ideological government. The speaker shared the view that the US recovery would certainly slow down in the coming years, although it would be unlikely to stopaltogether. The budgetary deficit would eventually act as a dampener on the US economy.

Mr AIGNER said that, although excessive rhetoric would be damaging, it nevertheless had a role in encouraging economic confidence among entrepreneurs. Psychological considerations should not be underestimated as regards their effects both on industry itself and the trade unions.

Mr <u>PICKLE</u> spoke about the high cost of social security and the need to take account of this in economic policy. The dimension of the current problems were such that minor tinkering with the system now needed to be replaced by a fundamental overhaul.

- IMF and IDA

Mr TYRRELL was glad that the US had finally agreed on its contribution to the IMF. Current funding of the IDA, at 9,000 million dollars, fell far short of what had been proposed or what was needed. The US once contributed 42% to IDA funds, but that figure was now down to 27%. The EC contribution had gone up from 42% to 45%. Even the Japanese had increased their contribution to 15% of the total. The current, sixth funding, due to expire in June 1984, was still only two-thirds utilized and it was debatable whether the remaining funds would be allocated before the new seventh funding started next year. The European Parliament had debated the matter during the January 1984 part session, and had been critical of the likely stagnation in the size of the seventh IDA funding, which took no account of the numerous new recipient countries. In the circumstances, it was imperative that present cut-backs should be regarded as temporary and not permanent. He hoped that the current view prevailing in the US which had led to the decision to withdraw from UNESCO did not indicate similar feelings towards the IDA.

Mr <u>LOWERY</u> was optimistic about the development of the economy throughout 1984 and, indeed, beyond. The current recovery was based on growth and not on money management. He did not agree that the budget

deficits in the US were being used to finance low unemployment, as had been suggested. However, dealing with the deficit in the absence of tax increases would be difficult. There was more likelihood that they would be handled through a reduction in social security and even defence spending. He defended the use of the "commission" system in the US as a means to break through the strict political gridlock that existed.

Mr SILJANDER felt that recovery could not last unless the United States' financial house was put in order. Federal spending at current levels could not continue indefinitely. Similarly, sustained recovery would require more political consensus than had existed in the past. An alternative to tax increases and minor spending cuts would be the implementation of a three-year budget freeze, based on the 1984 budget. This could eliminate the current budgetary deficit. A stable dollar would, similarly, help to promote economic stability.

Mr LANGE noted that industrial recovery required investment. Investment in industry would only take place provided the return on invested capital was of a similar order to that in other areas. The vast differences between interest rates in the US and Europe needed be reduced to prevent a continued flight of capital from Europe to the United States.

Referring to IDA replenishment and development aid, Mr LANTOS, pointed to US generosity in the past. Current reductions in spending were linked to the political difficulties that the United States had in providing assistance to countries which were extremely anti-American. Instead, the US was shifting increasingly to bilateral aid: it was illogical to suppose that the Americans would continue to give hand-outs to countries which then condemned all aspects of US policy.

Mr <u>SEIBERLING</u> pointed out that the US had more industrial policies than were good for it. What was missing was a national economic strategy. However, a national economic strategy commission was now being proposed in bills before Congress (the LaFalce and Wirth bills).

Mr <u>COLEMAN</u> spoke of the need to re-examine the international monetary system with a view to returning to more stable exchange rates. Recent fluctuations had caused major difficulties for the United States and for its trading partners.

Mr <u>FRENZEL</u> felt that, in the foreseeable future, there was little likelihood that the Federal Reserve would change its policies, although this was extremely regrettable. It was unlikely that US contributions to the seventh IDA funding would be more generous than in the past.

- Export Administration Act

Mr NOTENBOOM said he felt that the Export Administration Act (EAA) was a symptom of current US uncertainty about the best way to handle its general approach to international trade.

Mr LOWERY noted that the recent technological explosion had led to extreme sensivity on behalf of the Administration as to what could be exported and what not. This policy had led to numerous contradictions, in which many openly available products were listed as non-exportable. After considerable initial restrictions, a new element of realism was now becoming apparent.

Mr <u>LANGE</u> said that the objection to the EAA was its attempt to extend US jurisdiction beyond US territory. It was unworkable, as well as illegal, to try to tell non-Americans what they could and could not do.

Mr <u>AIGNER</u> did not agree. Security was no longer a national matter and was the responsibility of the entire Atlantic Alliance. Where security was concerned, certain economic sacrifice might need to be made.

Mr LOWERY felt that it was appropriate for the US to ask its allies to which it exported high technology to be restrictive in its use. The problem with the EAA was that listed items often remained restricted long after the reason for restricting them had disappeared.

From a legal point of view, Mr NOTENBOOM argued, it was impossible to tell firms based in other countries what they could or could not do. Mr FRENZEL described current US policy as "very fuzzy". The current EAA had expired in September 1983. The President was now trying to extend it. The Senate's approach was more restrictive than that of the House of Representatives.

Mr WELSH expressed the thanks of the delegation to Mr Frenzel and Mr Bonker for their efforts in having a more equitable EAA bill passed. Their sensitivity to European concerns on this issue showed how valuable the EP-US interparliamentary exchange could be.

- Unitary taxation

Mr WELSH referred to the resolution passed by the EP on unitary taxation and requested the US delegation to have it written into the US Congressional Record. During his recent visit to the US, Mr WELSH said, it had become clear that the States regarded unitary tax as a means of supplementing state income. Although there seemed little likelihood that the present Congress would make any progress in the near future, he hoped that members of the US delegation would continue to keep up pressure on the issue. The most practical step at present might simply be for individual states not to implement unitary taxation laws. Opposition to unitary taxation was unanimous among EC governments and it was remarkable, in the face of such opposition, that one US state after another nevertheless went ahead in passing unitary taxation bills.

Mr LOWERY described unitary taxation as taxation without representation. He himself was opposed to it. But the US Supreme Court had accepted the principle. There were numerous proponents of the tax, not least because of its economic value (half a billion dollars revenue in California alone in 1983). However, one of the major reasons for abolishing it was that it discouraged investment in the United States. The unitary tax issue was being looked at at present by an Administration working group on world-wide taxation. He hoped that a legislative solution would emerge in due course. Mr LOWERY said he would be pleased to support the inclusion of the EP resolution in the Congressional Record.

Mr FRENZEL attributed the widespread use of unitary taxation to the feeling among state tax legislators that the tax was an easy source of revenue which was not electorally unpopular, since it did not affect local interests. He did not expect action this year by the Reagan Administration, since in an election year the President would not wish to risk antagonizing State governors.

- Agriculture

Mr <u>GAUTIER</u> referred to the numerous issues which were at present in contention between the Community and the United States. On the question of corn gluten, he suggested that negotiations under Article 28 of the GATT could help to resolve this issue, and the Council was likely to give the Commission a mandate to this effect. The issue was not so serious that it could not be resolved. On oils and fats, the proposal for a tax had given rise to some dispute. However, with the Community budget likely to run out in October or November 1984, the temptation

to apply a levy on the import of oils and fats, which could raise up to 600 million dollars, was tempting. Accession of Spain and Portugal to the Community would involve new rules on Mediterranean products and this could have an effect on trade in such products, particularly from California. In general, it could be said that current disputes between the EC and the US on export subsidies had cooled down and it was an encouraging sign that moves were now being made to find a settlement within the GATT.

Mr AIGNER noted that the long-standing Community discussions on reforming the CAP had now assumed a particular urgency in view of the impending budgetary crisis. One of the reasons for the Community's food surpluses and its need to export at subsidized prices, to which the Americans objected, was the fact that it imported large quantities of cheap feedstuffs from the United States. Limit these and surpluses would drop.

Mr THOMAS said the US was satisfied with the prospect for resolution of the corn gluten problem and with the agreement on wine labelling. There appeared to be static consumption of many EC products which were in surplus, and a promotional campaign might make it possible to reduce surpluses without resorting to exporting them. He was encouraged by the apparent desire in the Community at present to attempt to reform the CAP rather than simply increase VAT and use the additional funds to continue as before.

Mr AIGNER noted that in Europe average farm size was approximately 17 hectares, in the US about 100 hectares. Far more individual livelihoods depended on farming in Europe than was the case in the US. The problem was to assure those livelihoods.

Mr <u>PAPAEFSTRATIOU</u> said there was a broad awareness now in the Community that the CAP needed to be reformed. However, sight could not be lost of the need to ensure that Europe's farmers, and particularly those in the South, could continue to be assured of certain minimum incomes. Structural changes might provide part of the answer, but income guarantees would continue to be essential. Spain and Portugal, whose accession to the Community was inextricable linked, would bring with them new problems for the existing Mediterranean countries of the Community.

3.2 Miscellaneous

- Visa reciprocity

Introducing the item, <u>Mrs GREDAL</u> underlined the importance which the European Parliament attached to this issue.

Mr SEIBERLING said that Chairman MAZZOLI of the US House Immigration, Refugees and International Law Subcommittee, agreed that the proposed legislation on visa reciprocity should be enacted as soon as possible. Mr MAZZOLI had agreed that the visa issue could be separated from the Immigration Bill if the latter were unlikely to come to the floor of the House. However, at present it appeared that the Immigration Bill, in a modified form, would be introduced in the near future. If this did not happen, the Speaker said, he would remind the Chairman about his undertaking.

Mr THOMAS said that the Speaker of the House had agreed to consider moving the Immigration Bill so that a debate on the floor could take place by April 1984. However, no separate visa reciprocity action could be expected until the fate of the Immigration Bill as such was known. One way or the other, the visa issue could not be resolved before the summer Olympics.

Lord <u>BETHELL</u> said it would of course be desirable for action to be taken on this issue before European elections in June so that the European electorate would have some indication of the value of the work of the European Parliament. He realized, however, that this was now unlikely.

- Human rights

Lord <u>BETHELL</u> referred to the desire to link human rights achievements with decisions on the disbursement of development aid to countries with whom the Community had links, i.e. in the case of the ACP countries. Parliament was hoping that it would force the Council to report to it on this issue before taking aid decisions. Parliament had adopted a large number of resolutions on human rights violations by the East bloc and these decisions were broadcast by the media and had had a measurable impact on countries such as the Soviet Union.

Mr <u>SEIBERLING</u> said that one of the most encouraging events in 1983 was the election of a democratic government in Argentina committed to redressing some of the human rights violations in that country in the past. Resumption of US arms exports to Argentina showed the Argentine military the benefits of democratic government committed to human rights. The speaker suggested the European Parliament might wish to adopt a resolution expressing its support for the new government.

- The Biden Amendment

Mr WINN explained that the House of Representatives has not passed the Biden amendment because its terms were less favourable than those under which the exchange currently operated. For instance, it suggested limiting the size of the House delegation to twelve members. While the Senate was also to be given twelve seats, Senators were known to prefer individual mission rather than in joint congressional groups. The financial shares foreseen in the bill were also a constraint to the House.

Mrs GREDAL wondered how the Senate might be encouraged to intensify its relations with the European Parliament.

<u>Lord BETHELL</u> wondered whether it would be advisable for the European Parliament to approach the Senate directly.

Mr WINN replied that the Senate's policy appeared to be not to have group exchanges, but individual, top-level contacts only. He suggested that the European Parliament should write to Senator PERCY to suggest a joint meeting on a subsequent European Parliament visit to Washington. He himself undertook to support such a proposal.

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The Chairmen of the two delegations, Mr LANTOS and Mrs GREDAL, concluded the meeting and expressed the hope that the twenty-fourth meeting could take place at a convenient time, following elections in the Community and in the United States during 1984.

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PROGRAMME OF THE VISIT

Thursday 19 January 1984

5.35 p.m. Arrival at Strasbourg (Entzheim) airport of US

Congress delegation.

6.00 p.m. Transfer to Palais de l'Europe, Main Entrance.

6.30 p.m. Meeting with Mr François-Xavier ORTOLI, Vice-

President of the Commission of the European

Communities

Room 5, Palais Tel: 4176

7.45 p.m. Return to Hotel Hilton.

8.40 p.m. Depart Hotel Hilton for

9.00 p.m. Dinner given in honour of the delegation from

the US Congress by the President of the European

Parliament, Pieter DANKERT, at:

Le Crocodile, 10 rue de l'Outre,

Strasbourg.
Tel: 32 13 02

Friday 20 January 1984

9.00 a.m.

8.40 a.m. Depart hotel.

8.50 a.m. Arrival at European Parliament

Palais de l'Europe, Allée de la Robertsau,

Strasbourg.

Tel: (88) 37 40 01 Telex: 89 01 29/30

US Congress delegation attends the plenary sitting in the Distinguished Visitors' Gallery and is welcomed from the Chair by the President.

NOTE All working sessions will take place in:

Room 1, IPE Tel: 5069

9.30 a.m. <u>First Working Session</u>

(This working session will take the form of a round-table discussion with the Chairmen and rapporteurs of the following parliamentary

committees, as follows:

09.30-10.15 : Political Affairs 10.15-11.00 : Agriculture

11.00-11.45 : Economic and Monetary Affairs

11.45-12.30 : External Economic Relations)

Friday 20 January 1984 (cont'd)

12.40 p.m. Depart IPE Main Entrance for:

Hôtel de la Préfecture, Place Petit Broglie,

Strasbourg.

Tel: 32 99 00

1.00 p.m. Working Luncheon given by the President-in-

Office of the Council, Mr Henri EMMANUELLI, State Secretary at the French Ministry of Economy, Finance and Budgets, responsible

for the Budget.

3.00 p.m.-6.30 p.m. Second Working Session

Political topics - see draft agenda (PE 88.267)

6.45 p.m. Return to hotel.

7.45 p.m. Depart hotel for

8.00 p.m. Dinner in honour of the US Congress delegation

given by the Chairman of the European Parliament

delegation, Mrs Eva GREDAL at:

La Würtzmühle, 17 rue des Moulins, Petite-France, Strasbourg.

Tel: 32 80 16

Return to hotel.

Saturday 21 January 1984

8.45 a.m. Depart hotel for European Parliament (IPE

Main Entrance)

9.00 a.m.-1.00 p.m. Third working session

Economic topics - see draft agenda (PE 88.267)

1.00 p.m.-2.30 p.m. Buffet lunch for all participants at:

IPE Restaurant

2.30 p.m. Individual departure of European Parliament

Members

5.00 p.m. US Congress delegation departs from Strasbourg

(Entzheim) airport.

LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PARTICIPATING IN THE MEETING

Mrs Eva GREDAL, Chairman of the Delegation

S, Denmark

Mr Heinrich AIGNER '

Lord BETHELL

Miss Sile DE VALERA

Mr Fritz GAUTIER

Mr Niels HAAGERUP

Mr Leonidas LAGAKOS

Mr Erwin LANGE

Mr Jacques P MOREAU

Mr Harry NOTENBOOM

Mr Efstratios PAPAEFSTRATIOU

Mr Alan TYRRELL

Mrs Simone VEIL

Mr Michael WELSH

Mr Karl von WOGAU

PPE, Germany

ED, United Kingdom

DEP, Ireland

S, Germany

L, Denmark

S, Greece

S, Germany

S, France

PPE, Netherlands

PPE, Greece

ED, United Kingdom

L. France

ED, United Kingdom

PPE, Germany

Also participating at the first working session (20 January 1984, 09.30-12.30)

Sir Fred CATHERWOOD, Chairman of the Committee on External Economic Relations

Mr Gustave DELEAU, Member of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, and Rapporteur on Community policy in support of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

Mr Klaus HANSCH, Member of the Political Affairs Committee, and Rapporteur on political relations between the European Community and the United States

Mr Fernand HERMAN, Rapporteur of the Ad hoc Special Committee on European **Economic Recovery**

Mr James PROVAN, Representative of the Committee on Agriculture

Mr Helmut RIEGER, Member of the Committee on External Economic Relations, and Rapporteur on economic and trade negotiations between the EEC and the US

Ms Ann CLWYD, Member of the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT STAFF

Secretariat of Interparliamentary Delegations

Mr Théo JUNKER, Head of Division
Mr James SPENCE, Principal Administrator
Mr Chris PIENING, Principal Administrator
Mrs Penny WATSON, Assistant
Miss Michèle DELACOUR, Secretary
Miss Elaine WHITWORTH, Secretary
Miss Anne-Marie GENSØ, Secretary

Secretariat of Committees

Mr Henrik OLSEN, Political Affairs Committee
Mr Carlo CHICCO, Committee on Budgets
Mr Claude BRULANT, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Mr Peter WOLTERSDORF, Committee on External Economic Relations

DG V - Research & Documentation

Mr David MILLAR, Head of Division Mr Anton LENSEN Mr Charles ROOVERS

President's Office

Mr David LOWE

Political Group Secretariats

Mr Jean-Pierre FOURNIER, Socialist Group
Mr Bruno OHLS, Group of the European People's Party
Mr Anthony TEASDALE, European Democratic Group
Mr Gérard LAPRAT, Miss Francesca RATTI, Communist and Allies Group
Mr Massimo SILVESTRO, Liberal and Democratic Group
Miss LALIEVRE, Group of European Progressive Democrats

Council of the European Communities

Mr Jean MESTDAGH Mr NICOLL

Commission of the European Communities

Mr Jim TALBOT

LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS DELEGATION PARTICIPATING

Mr Tom LANTOS, Chairman of the Delegation

Mr Larry WINN Jr., Co-Chairman of the Delegation

Dem., California

Rep., Kansas

Mr Thomas COLEMAN

Mr Bill FRENZEL

Mr Bill LOWERY

Mr J J PICKLE

Mr John F SEIBERLING

Mr Mark D SILJANDER

Mr William M THOMAS

Mr Guy VANDER JAGT

Rep., Missouri

Rep., Minnesota

Rep., California

Dem., Texas

Dem., Ohio

Rep., Michigan

Rep., California

Rep., Michigan

LIST OF STAFF ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS DELEGATION

Mr Chips CHESTER, Senior Staff Consultant, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Ms Elizabeth DAOUST, Staff Coordinator/Protocol, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Mr Kenneth MOSS, Staff Consultant, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East
Mr Don FORTIER, Director, Western Europe and NATO, National Security Council
Mrs Alison FORTIER, Minority Consultant, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
on Europe and the Middle East

Ms Roxanne PERUGINO, Staff Assistant, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East

Ms Dawn JACKSON, Staff Assistant, Committee on Foreign Affairs

Ms Sue ECKERT, Staff Assistant, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade

Ms Anne STOUT - Department of Defense

Mr Leon PFEIFFER - Department of Defense

Mr Louis MURRAY - Department of State

Military Escort

Col. Wendy WINSLOW

Col. Ira MEHLMAN

Sqt. Lawrence CANADA

Sgt. Alexander HODGE