PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
OF THE COMMISSION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
AND ITS SERVICES

Report
made at the request of the Commission
by an Independent Review Body
under the chairmanship of
Mr Dirk Spierenburg

Brussels, 24 September 1979
# Table of contents

**Preface**

Terms of reference and composition of the Review Body  
Organization of the work  
Layout of the report  

**Part One : General Observations**  
9–25

**Part Two : The Commission and its Services**

The Commission : role  
The Commission : portfolios  
The Commission : work–programming and coordination  
The Commission : composition  
The Commission : permanence of the proposed structure  
The Commission : appointment of Members  
The Services : administrative structure  
The Services : position of the Directors-General  
The Cabinets : role  
The Cabinets : staff  
The Cabinets : working methods  

**Part Three : Administrative Policy**

Introduction  
Efficiency of the organization  
Structures and organization of work  
Allocation of staff  
Careers  
Recruitment  
Mobility  
Career development  
Introduction of outside experience  
Staff structure  
Other staff categories
Preface

Terms of reference and composition of the Review Body

1. The Independent Review Body was appointed by the Commission in January 1979 with the following terms of reference:

"... In view of the changing character of the Community and the different categories of task the Commission will face in the 1980s, to examine how the Commission’s organization and staff resources can best be adjusted to meet future needs, and thus cope with a rapidly changing workload in the light of defined priorities.

- With the objective of maintaining a permanent Community civil service of the highest quality, to examine the ways in which the Commission can further develop its policies in respect of staff recruitment, career development and provisions for retirement.

2. Ambassador D. P. Spierenburg chaired the Review Body, and Mr K. Buschmann, Mr P. Delouvrier, Mr G. Petrilli and Mr D. Taverne were appointed members.

3. The Review Body was assisted in its work by Mr Noël, Secretary General, Mr Baichère, Director-General for Personnel and Administration, Mr Cardon de Lichtbuer and Mr Verheyden, general Rapporteurs, and Mr Lambert and Mr Olivier, to whom the Review Body entrusted in particular a study on questions of administrative organization. Mr Nuttall was Secretary.

Organization of the work

4. We held meetings on twenty days between February and September 1979, at which we had discussions with Members of the Commission, senior officials and representatives of the Trades Unions and Professional Organizations. In addition, the Chairman and Members of the Review Body individually had many private contacts with a wide range of opinion both inside and outside the Commission, and in particular with Commission staff at all levels.
Two meetings were held to exchange views with the Three Wise Men appointed by the European Council to examine the workings of the Community institutions.

**Layout of the Report**

The Report is divided into three parts. The first consists of general observations, which give our view of the Commission's fundamental role in the interplay of Community institutions and the effectiveness with which it carries out that role. These observations set out the principles on which are based the second and third parts of the Report, of which the former deals with the organization and structure of the college itself and of its Services, while the latter discusses administrative policy.

In the second part of the Report, we recommend keeping the number of Commissioners to a strict minimum, and dividing among them portfolios of comparable weight. The Presidency should be reinforced to allow it to exercise effective coordination of the Commission Services and ensure a better distribution of staff. The number of administrative units should be reduced, and the position of Directors-General further strengthened.

In the third part of the Report, we put forward a package of measures designed to improve administrative efficiency and to give staff more regular career prospects, while ensuring that the Commission can benefit from a current of outside experience. There are also proposals for encouraging mobility of staff among the Commission services and placing greater emphasis on management qualities.
9. The Commission plays a vital and unique role among the institutions of the European Community. It must represent the interest of the Community as a whole. That is why under the Treaty it is responsible for making proposals to the Council of Ministers, which cannot deliberate in their absence. It also administers important areas of Community policy. Whatever view is held about the future development of the Community, it is in everyone's interest that the Commission should perform its many tasks efficiently and effectively.

10. In order to carry out these tasks, the Commission is assisted by an Administration whose structure and organization are inevitably complex. It is staffed by officials from nine different countries with their own traditions and styles of administration, and works in six different languages. Among these different factors the Commission seeks to preserve some kind of balance, and to forge the officials into a European civil service. Moreover, the Commission depends for the resources which it needs to perform its tasks on the Council and on Parliament, which authorize, not an overall appropriation for staff expenditure, but a specific number of posts at different levels.

11. The total number of Commission employees is smaller than is generally realised. Excluding staff paid from research appropriations, it amounts to 8,300 officials, of whom some 40% are directly or indirectly concerned with linguistic work*. Taken as a whole, these numbers do not seem excessive when compared with national central administrations.

12. In carrying out its work the Commission is therefore subject to a number of constraints. In spite of these, and of the inherent difficulties of its task, one should not underestimate the success of the Commission in fulfilling its duties under the Treaty. These results could not have been obtained without a generally devoted and

* See Annex I.
capable staff. In the years since the founding of the Community the proposals worked out by the Commission have led to the customs union, the common agricultural policy, free movement of persons and the common commercial policy. The Commission has applied an effective competition policy. It has played an important part in the GATT negotiations and made an essential contribution to the new type of relationship which has been evolved with developing countries. The present Commission, and more particularly its President, have been tireless in urging greater monetary cooperation, and it is of great political importance that through its President the Commission takes part in the European Council and the economic summits.

13. But these remarkable successes should not blind us to the fact that over the last ten years the Commission's influence, effectiveness and reputation have declined. This has been partly for external reasons, which lie principally in a change in the political and economic environment, and which are not the concern of this Report.

14. Some of the difficulties the Commission faces are outside its control; we have referred to them in para. 10. Other constraints derive from the nature of the college itself. Its members have widely varying political backgrounds, are not likely to know each other personally before their appointment and do not necessarily complement each other. Finally, the President of the Commission can control them only to the extent of his personal authority, since he is only primus inter pares.

15. Nevertheless there are internal weaknesses, of which the present Commission is well aware; hence the appointment of our group to review its organization and workings and suggest reforms.

16. We have found that there is a certain lack of cohesion in the college of Commissioners, an imbalance between portfolios, insufficient coordination among senior officials, a maldistribution of staff between departments, and shortcomings in the career structure of the civil service of the Commission. The fact is that the Commission is being managed in a manner and with techniques which are inappropriate in present circumstances and can only be more so after further enlargement.
17. Since the entry into the Community of Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom and the increase in the number of Commissioners from 9 to 13, the importance and workload of the portfolios given to the different Commissioners have inevitably varied. Some portfolios have grown in importance. Others, some newly created, have not yet realised their full potential. This imbalance in the importance of different portfolios is not conducive to the cohesion of the college. At the same time there has been a tendency for responsibilities to be personalised and the outside world has sometimes been left with an impression that the Commission as such lacks a sense of collective purpose and a taste for joint action, with the consequence that priorities and selectivity in the development of the Commission's programme of work are not as clearly established as they should be.

18. The lack of adequate coordination among Members of the Commission and a certain lack of encouragement from them for central coordination and planning among senior officials are particularly evident. The result has been a lack of structural coordination among Directors-General and a growing emphasis on the roles of the personal staffs of Commissioners.

19. While the total amount of work has inexorably grown, the distribution of staff between Directorates-General does not accurately reflect the differential growth of departmental burdens. A reallocation of staff between Directorates-General, and sometimes even between Divisions within Directorates-General, has proved difficult to achieve, and has intensified the problem of a lack of mobility on the part of officials.

20. Furthermore, for reasons of the distribution of age based on the accident of time at which they were recruited, relatively few top civil servants will retire in the next six years. As a result, prospects for promotion are at present poor and morale has inevitably suffered.
21. Other factors affect morale. Managerial inadequacies in the Commission Services inevitably lead to dissatisfaction among the staff. The failure of the Council to adopt proposals which have required months of hard work to prepare is the source of much frustration. Finally, the limited scope of many officials' work and their excessive specialisation, their lack of information about Commission policy in general and especially the feeling that they are too remote from the decision makers, all act as disincentives.

22. We believe that these weaknesses need to be urgently remedied. The energy crisis provoked by difficulties in the supply of oil, inflation, unemployment and the restructuring of industry forced by the emergence of rapidly developing countries are presenting the world in general and our countries in particular and the Community institutions with unprecedented problems. Moreover, the imminent enlargement of the Community can only complicate the difficulties.

23. As regards the most noteworthy developments which have occurred in recent years in the institutional structure of the Community — the creation of the European Council and the direct election of the European Parliament — they have in no way changed the tasks and the powers entrusted to the Commission by the Treaty.

24. For all these reasons, the Commission must be able to act as a real college, strong, resourceful and efficient, in order to be in a position to play its full part in the dialogue with the Council and the Parliament.

25. The reforms we propose in this report will have to be decided on by a variety of Community bodies. We commend them for urgent implementation to the Commission, the governments of the Member States and the representatives of the people of the Community in the European Parliament.
The ability of the Commission to carry out successfully the duties assigned to it by the Treaties, and in particular to exercise its powers of initiative, is, then, of supreme importance. Enlargement of the Community may multiply administrative problems, but it must not be allowed to weaken the exercise of these powers.

The Commission exercises its powers of initiative by making formal proposals to the Council. In formulating these proposals it can ask the opinion of government officials, industry and the Trade Unions, but must ensure that these discussions do not turn into prenegotiations in which the proposals lose their specific nature and already become compromises at this stage. The real debate begins within the Council on the basis of formal proposals from the Commission as provided for in the Treaty. Informal discussion papers, such as the Commission has tended to send to the Council in recent years, should only be resorted to in order to give a coherent general explanation of a new policy which is then given concrete form through a series of formal proposals. The Commission may, of course, amend its proposals after they have been sent to the Council, but even so should avoid compromise for its own sake.

In order to put its proposals in a general perspective, the Commission must draw up, in the work programme it presents to the European Parliament, specific objectives and priorities to be reviewed at regular intervals. It must indicate the policies it intends to follow to attain these objectives as well as the means which it will require.

The Commission must act as a college. This means that on all important matters decisions can only be taken following a debate in the college, and they commit the Members of the Commission. At the same time, the Commission must be aware of the political role conferred on it by the Treaties, its responsibility as their guardian and its duty to explain continuously to public opinion the
decisions which are taken. This is the only way in which the Commission can lose its present technocratic image.

The Commission: portfolios

30. The Commission organizes its work by assigning portfolios to its Members; in other words each Commissioner is responsible for a given sector and thus for the corresponding services. The number of portfolios has therefore varied with the number of Members of the Commission. Each time a new Commission has been appointed, the make-up of the portfolios has given rise to protracted discussion resulting in a redistribution of portfolios, which have been of unequal weight. These fluctuations have led to uncertainty about where services belong, with damaging effects on their efficiency.

31. The system of portfolios is not in question, and indeed seems to be the only sensible way of organizing the work of the Commission and of its Services. But the number of portfolios cannot be increased indefinitely without losing coherence. For the system to work smoothly, duties must be shared out more or less equally among Commissioners (to avoid internal friction and frustration) and the division of portfolios must be stable. This is not the case today.

32. Some portfolios, like external relations and agriculture, are clearly homogeneous and of considerable importance. If the other portfolios are to be of comparable importance, their number must be limited. We have made a careful examination of ways of dividing up the Commission's present areas of activity. This has shown that in a Community of Nine, soon to become Ten, there is not scope for more than eight portfolios of sufficient content. When Spain and Portugal join, there could be a small increase in this number especially since the workload and importance of some services are likely to grow. In that case, there should not be more than ten portfolios. To create artificially a greater number would mean that some portfolios would be lightweight, and would introduce a
distinction between first- and second-class portfolios. In addition, the greater the number of portfolios, the more difficult coordination becomes, whereas good coordination is essential for the efficient operation of the college.

The Commission: work-programming and coordination

33. If the portfolio system is not to weaken the collegiate nature of the Commission, it must be accompanied by strong coordination procedures and proper machinery for arbitrating between the claims of competing sectors. Coordination within the Commission itself is at present insufficient. It cannot be replaced by coordination at administrative level, which is then too often a formality and takes place too late a stage in the decision-making process.

34. Effective coordination at the political level can be achieved by systematic and permanent working parties of Commissioners with the participation of Services. This has been tried in various forms but, since the merger of the executives in 1967, has not given the results hoped for, because of the heavy workload of Members of the Commission and because no-one was made officially responsible for seeing that coordination actually took place.

35. These drawbacks could be remedied by a Presidency actively responsible, with the right organizational backing, for directing coordination. This has never been tried as a regular system, although successive Presidents have intervened when no agreement can otherwise be reached. However, to achieve systematic, day-to-day coordination, involving Commissioners and Services alike, would place too great a personal burden on the President, who must also devote himself to the other tasks of the Presidency, which are becoming more and more onerous as the Community develops.

36. The President should therefore be assisted by a Member of the Commission who alone would exercise the functions of Vice-President. They would together form a strengthened Presidency, which would improve the allocation of resources, make for a better selection of
priorities and improve the general functioning of the Commission. They would control all horizontal services. How the various tasks were shared out between them would depend on the personal preferences of the two individuals, but it would be logical for the President to be responsible for presiding over the Commission and representing it in important matters both inside and outside the Community and for the Vice-President to be responsible for work programming, coordination and supervision of the organization (matching of available resources with work to be done). He would also be the permanent deputy to the President. The Vice-President's key role would be his responsibility for coordination. The right procedures for this will have to be worked out and approved by the Commission; they will include frequent meetings with Commissioners and Directors-General, and the flexible use of ad hoc working parties on major topics.

The Commission: composition

37. We note that Article 10 of the Merger Treaty provides that the Commission must include at least one national of each of the Member States, but may not include more than two members having the nationality of the same State. The number of Members of the Commission, at present fixed at thirteen, may be altered by the Council acting unanimously.

38. Immediately before 1973, the Commission was composed of nine Members with eight portfolios, there being two Members of the Commission from each of the larger Member States. At the first enlargement, this principle was continued by adding two Commissioners from the United Kingdom and one each from Denmark and Ireland. These thirteen Members share twelve portfolios. (The President does not normally have a portfolio of his own.) If the same principle continues to be applied in the future, the enlargement of the Community to include Greece, Spain and Portugal will lead to a Commission of seventeen Members (of whom one would be Greek, two Spanish and one Portuguese) sharing sixteen portfolios.

39. We believe that such a large Commission would be undesirable.
A Commission of fewer Members is preferable because:

(i) a smaller Commission will ensure better coordination;

(ii) it will enable matters to be more thoroughly discussed and facilitate clear conclusions;

(iii) it can constitute a genuine team and allow its Members to have a better personal knowledge of each other, thus creating a better collegiate spirit;

(iv) it will project a better image of itself;

(v) for the reasons we have already given, it will not be possible in a Community of Nine or Ten to create more than eight portfolios of genuine content and equal weight to be divided among the Commissioners (leaving aside the functions of President and Vice-President), nor later in a Community of Twelve to create more than ten portfolios.

Against this position and in favour of a larger Commission the following arguments have been put to us:

(i) that, especially after further enlargement of the Community, Commissioners will be required to travel more frequently over greater distances and that extra demands will be made on them by the increased need, in the wake of direct elections, to cultivate political links with their country of origin and with Parliament;

(ii) the dispersal of the Community’s activities in three different places will continue, with its attendant barriers to efficient functioning;

(iii) political considerations might argue in favour of a larger Commission, which would allow the relative size of the Member States and the political balance in them to be reflected in the composition of the Commission.
41. The difficulties arising from the Commissioners' heavy workload can be countered by observing an order of priorities in their duties. The three tasks which should be given priority are work in the college, relations with the Council and relations with the Parliament. Other tasks, for example representative engagements in the home country, political contacts and preparing the ground for Commission proposals during tours of capitals, could be performed by making more use of high level cabinets, especially for political contacts, and by upgrading the role of the Directors-General to relieve Members of certain tasks directly concerned with the management of their portfolios.

42. As regards the political arguments, we note that the Treaties specifically provide for national weighting in two Community institutions, in the Council by weighted voting and in the Parliament by differentiated numbers of seats. No such specific provisions exist for the Commission and the Court which are both more particularly concerned with safeguarding the Community interest. The assumption that Members of the Commission should in some way represent the points of view of the Member States whose nationals they are runs counter to their obligation of independence. Indeed, the Commission's role of defining the interest of the Community as such does not require the number of Members to be weighted by nationality. As regards the political composition of the college, it is up to governments to continue their previous practice of concertation.

43. We therefore believe that the arguments for a small Commission of twelve Members (one from each Member State), must prevail over those for a larger Commission of, for example, seventeen Members.

44. Since it can be fairly assumed that all three candidate countries will become Members of the Community during the lifetime of the next Commission (1981-1985), the principle that the Commission should be composed of not more than one Member from each Member State should be applied from its inception in January 1981, which coincides with the entry of Greece. Thus, for the period before further enlargement,
the Presidency and the eight portfolios will be divided among ten Members. When Portugal and Spain join the Community, and the number of Members of the Commission rises to twelve, the number of portfolios will have to be increased by two by detaching some sectors of activity from what will by then be eight portfolios. Indeed, the likely increase in the workload after this further enlargement will justify increasing the number of portfolios to ten without impairing the quality of the administration and without entailing an imbalance in sharing out duties among Members of the Commission. The choice of the sectors to be detached should be made in the light of the development of the Commission's work and of Community policy.

45. If nevertheless governments nominate, for reasons of their own, a Commission of fourteen Members on the entry of Greece, and of seventeen Members, or in any case of more than twelve Members, on the entry of Spain and Portugal, it will still be necessary, for the reasons given above, to maintain a maximum of eight and ten portfolios respectively. The Review Body has carefully examined various ways of sharing the work among the Members of the Commission in such a situation, and has come to the conclusion that the only viable solution is for four or five Commissioners without portfolio (who would be the second Members from the four or five big Member States) to assist four or five of their colleagues in the management of portfolios which involve a particularly taxing workload.

The Commission : permanence of the proposed structure

46. The rule that there should be a maximum of ten portfolios must be permanent. The content of these portfolios must be as stable as possible and not subject to negotiation each time the Commission is renewed. If this rule were not followed, the administrative structure corresponding to the portfolios would be subject to periodic upheaval and its consequent unsettling effects. The stability of the portfolios does not, however, mean the same thing as rigidity; the portfolios have been framed sufficiently broadly to enable them to adapt to the evolution of the Commission's tasks.
In order to ensure continuity, the division of portfolios should be formally adopted by the Commission as part of its rules of procedure.

The Commission : appointment of Members

47. The clearly defined nature of the portfolios will make the formation of the Commission easier for the President-elect. Indeed, the practice has already begun of nominating the President in advance of the other Members of the Commission and sounding him on the choice of his future colleagues. In our opinion, governments should not persist in seeking the appointment of the candidate they first propose if the President-elect makes an objection. In that case, they should nominate a second candidate. The wishes of the President are particularly important when it comes to the Vice-President, who with him will form the strengthened Presidency.

The Services : administrative structure

48. At present there are in the Commission 29 separate administrative units, most of which are Directorates-General divided into Directorates and Divisions. Some of these administrative units have "horizontal" duties (Legal Service, Budget, Personnel and Administration etc.), while the others are "vertical", i.e. they are concerned with policy sectors (agriculture, external relations, etc.).

49. As in the case of the Commission itself, a limited number of Services and of Directors-General makes for solidarity and cooperation. The principle of dividing the college's work into a limited number of portfolios (leaving aside the horizontal sectors) should be applied in a similar way to the operational Directorates-General. The merger of several Directorates-General into a small number of large administrative units would facilitate coordination between related sectors, remove some obstacles to the mobility of officials inside these units and contribute to the stability and efficiency of the organization.
50. We therefore propose that in 1981 the vertical units should be regrouped in 12 Directorates-General corresponding to 8 portfolios each covering a sector of Community policy, the horizontal units being put under the sole authority of the Presidency, as we have already suggested. In a second phase, on the entry of Spain and Portugal, the number of these Directorates-General would be reduced to 10 to coincide with the 10 portfolios which would then form the final structure of the Commission. (It should be added that within the Directorates-General some small services would retain a measure of autonomy.) This two-phase approach is in order to avoid re-grouping administrative units which would only have to be split again later.

51. The effect of the above proposals on the structure of the Commission and its Services, as from January 1981, is shown in Table I.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Portfolios</th>
<th>Existing administrative units composing the portfolios</th>
<th>New administrative units</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Presidency:</strong> representation of the Commission</td>
<td>Secretariat General</td>
<td>Secretariat General</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Legal Service</td>
<td>Legal Service</td>
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<td></td>
<td>DG X (Information/Spokesman's Group)</td>
<td>Information/Spokesman's Group</td>
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<td>DG IX (Personnel and Administration)</td>
<td>Personnel and Administration</td>
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<td>DG XIX (Budgets)</td>
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<td>DG XX (Financial Control)</td>
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<td>Statistical Office</td>
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<td>Office for Official Publications</td>
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<td>Security Office</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Coordination of Funds (Task Force)</td>
<td>- Coordination of Funds (Task Force - attached to the Secretariat General for administrative purposes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vice-Presidency:</strong> work-planning, coordination, supervision of the organization including allocation of resources, permanent deputy of the President</td>
<td>DG I (External Relations)</td>
<td>DG External Relations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>DG II (Economic and Financial Affairs)</td>
<td>DG Economic and Financial Affairs</td>
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<td>DG XV A (Financial Institutions)</td>
<td>DG Credit and Investments</td>
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<td>DG XVIII (Credit and Investments)</td>
<td>DG Credit and Investments</td>
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<td>DG III (Internal Market and Industrial Affairs)</td>
<td>DG Industrial Affairs</td>
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<td>Customs Union Service</td>
<td>DG Industrial Affairs</td>
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| | DG XIII B (Information Management) | |}

1 Interinstitutional service attached to the Commission for administrative purposes.
| 4. Competition and Transport | DG IV (Competition) | DG Competition |
| 5. Social and Regional Affairs | DG V (Employment and Social Affairs) | DG Social Affairs |
| 6. Agriculture and Fisheries | DG VI (Agriculture) | DG Agriculture and Fisheries |
| 7. Energy and Research | DG XVII (Energy) | DG Energy |
| 8. Development | DG VIII (Development) | DG Development |

1. The Supply Agency retains its status provided for in the Euratom Treaty.
The Services : position of the Directors-General

52. As was previously said, the position of the Director-General should be given renewed weight. He should be solely responsible for the management of his Directorate-General in direct and regular contact with the Commissioner responsible for the sector; coordinate its work with that of other Directorates-General, if necessary when no agreement can be reached, by means of the coordination meetings chaired by the Vice-President; play a central role in the appointment of his staff; and be invited to attend Commission meetings when papers from his department are being discussed. Moreover, it would be an advantage and even indispensable in view of the reduced number of Commissioners, if Directors-General could be entrusted by specific mandate with high-level missions for representation or negotiation. The links thus forged between the Commission itself, the Commissioner and the Director-General (who is often of a different nationality from the Commissioner) give an added European dimension to the Commissioner's work. It is clear that in order to perform this function, the Director-General must be of the highest quality.

53. The Director-General is of course responsible for directing the conceptual work of his department, but he should not on that account neglect his duties of management, which are equally important. He should hold frequent meetings with his Directors and other officials, to ensure a continuous flow of guidance and of information in both directions, and should, with his Directors, take a personal interest in staff matters. He will of course rely heavily in this on his personal assistants, who form a small administrative unit at the summit of the Directorate-General, but the responsibility is his alone.

54. This does not mean that Commissioners can abandon all contact with their staff to the Directors-General. Indeed, we have found that officials are not sufficiently aware of the policy of the college on the important issues of the day. Members of the Commission should have regular contacts at least with the senior officials in their sectors. In addition, we propose that there should be regular informal meetings between the Presidency and a small group of representatives of the staff and of the unions and professional organizations, in order to fill the gap referred to above.
The Cabinets: role

55. Commission Members have had private offices, or Cabinets, since the earliest days of the Community. Although the Cabinet is not traditional in all Member States, it seems particularly suitable in the Commission context. It would be difficult for individual Commission Members to carry out their collegiate tasks if they could not count on the assistance of competent, completely trustworthy staff when dealing with the wide range of the Community's activities.

56. Our analysis of the current situation has shown that although the usefulness of these private offices is not disputed, some aspects of their operation are starting to cause difficulties and are even threatening to disrupt, quite substantially, the smooth running of Commission Services: Cabinets "shielding" Members from their Services, Chefs de cabinet usurping the responsibilities of Directors-General, meetings of Chefs de cabinet (and indeed of junior Cabinet staff) questioning proposals without consulting the officials responsible for them, interference in appointment procedures with undue weight being given to nationality factors, and so on.

57. The strengthening of the role of Directors-General recommended above should help to remedy this state of affairs. Further improvement could be obtained by strict observance of the Cabinet's threefold function;

(i) to act as the trusted assistant of the Member in order to facilitate his management of his portfolio;

(ii) to help the Member in his personal political work, standing in for him whenever he thinks it possible;

(iii) to ensure that the Member is fully briefed on matters covered by his colleagues' portfolios to enable him to meet the demands of collective responsibility.
The Cabinets: staff

58. The size of the Cabinets should be strictly limited and Cabinet staff should be selected by the Commissioners themselves. Cabinet staff are either recruited from outside or seconded from within the institutions. There is no reason why Commission officials should not be reinstated in their former posts at the end of their secondment. They should not, however, be entitled to be appointed to a post on promotion without actually taking it up. As for Cabinet staff brought in from outside, if they wish to apply for appointment as a permanent official, the same procedures should apply to them as to other external candidates for posts in the Commission (see paras. 106 to 108 below).

The Cabinets: working methods

59. If the function of a Cabinet is defined as above, the object of the weekly meetings of Chefs de cabinet becomes quite specific, viz. to prepare the ground for Commission meetings. The weekly meetings of Chefs de cabinet which are chaired by the Secretary-General should be attended by the Chefs de cabinet themselves or by their deputies in case of absence. Directors-General or their representatives should be present when matters falling within their competence are being discussed.

60. The purpose of the weekly meeting would then be:

(i) to review items on the Commission's agenda and decide which items could be approved without further discussion (A items) or subject to statements which the Commission could formally note;

(ii) to establish, where appropriate, what minor amendments could be made to a proposal to enable it to be adopted by the Commission;
(iii) on more sensitive issues, to provide as full a picture as possible of the viewpoints expressed at the meeting, so that each Member can contribute to the discussion from the outset in full knowledge of the facts.

61. It follows from the above that a matter which has been properly coordinated beforehand can legitimately be settled by the Chefs de cabinet. They should not however make changes to a paper without consulting the relevant Director-General, and they should not depart radically from its main policy line. If the work of Chefs de cabinet cannot be kept within these bounds, it is clear either that preliminary coordination has not fulfilled its purpose (a frequent occurrence at present which obliges Chefs de cabinet to step outside their proper role in order to fill the gap) or that issues are involved on which the Commission itself must take a decision.
Part Three: Administrative Policy

Introduction

62. Unlike Member States, the Commission has a young administration, which is still growing, having been formed in less than thirty years in conditions which made precise long-term planning difficult. Staff have been recruited in waves, and the shape of the organization has been determined by the accretion of tasks.

63. This process is not yet over. In the next five years the Community will be enlarged to include first Greece and then Portugal and Spain. The implications of this for the organization of the Commission's work have been discussed above, but it will also be necessary to make provisions for the recruitment of officials from those countries. We believe that the reorganization which this will entail provides an opportunity for ensuring that the European Civil Service makes the transition from a period of unplanned development to one in which it can go forward on a more even keel, with a more rational and therefore more efficient use of staff and more regular careers.

64. The object of the Commission must be to make the most efficient use possible of the limited resources at its disposal. As we pointed out at the beginning of this Report (see para. 10), the Commission seeks to maintain a geographical balance among its staff. This is desirable not so much to ensure an equilibrium at a given moment by earmarking posts by nationality, but to benefit in a positive, dynamic way from the varied experience which officials of different nationalities can bring and to achieve a balance over a period of time. This is the only way in which the Commission will maintain a uniformly high quality of staff, if its role is to be effectively performed.

65. In the remainder of this Report, we propose some measures to deal with special difficulties which will arise in the short term and others
which are designed to be of benefit in the longer term. We should like to emphasize that these measures are closely inter-related. If only some measures, and not others, are put into force, not only will they fail in their object but they could prove positively harmful.

**Efficiency of the organization**

(i) **Structures and organization of work**

66. We have been struck by the large number of Divisions and Specialised Services - the basic administrative units - in the structure of the Commission services. There are at present 339, of which 247 are Divisions and 92 Specialised Services. These units are of very unequal size, the number of officials with conceptional duties - A officials - in a unit ranging from one (the Head of the unit being the only A official) to over 30. It must be admitted that the varying nature of duties performed necessitates units of differing sizes. This calls for two remarks:

(a) as a general rule Divisions should not be set up with only one or two Category A officials. Of course, depending on the type of its work a Division can legitimately include a considerable number of B and C officials.

(b) we nevertheless believe that in many cases Divisions are too small to allow effective staff management. The staff complement of a Division should be such that it can be coordinated by a head who is able to organize the work of those under him and report back to the level above.

67. We therefore recommend that the Commission should conduct a detailed review of the organization of its departments with a view to reducing the number of Divisions and Specialised Services where necessary. This

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1. We have shown in footnotes the type of action required to put each measure into effect (Commission decision, Council decision, amendment of the Staff Regulations etc.).

2. Internal decision of the Commission.
in turn would imply a reduction in the number of Directorates. We have ourselves conducted a test review of one Directorate-General, and have come to the conclusion that, without abandoning any of the activities at present being carried out, the number of its Divisions and Specialised Services can be reduced from 29 to 20 (a reduction of nearly one third), and the number of Directorates from 7 to 6.

68. The reduction of the number of administrative units entails a corresponding reduction in the number of Heads of units (Heads of Division or Heads of Specialised Services) and consequently in a certain number of A3 and A4 posts in the list of posts. This reduction will not present major difficulties if the following precautions are taken. The Heads of Specialised Services are normally Principal Administrators (A5/4) who can be relocated in the enlarged Divisions. The arrangements for early retirement and the disengagement of staff proposed later in the Report, particularly in connection with the entry of Greece, will make possible the necessary reduction of A3 posts. If in some special cases this kind of arrangement seems inappropriate or is not applicable, the Commission will have to seek transitory arrangements until the new rules for A3 officials, proposed in the context of career development (para. 98), are applicable.

69. The key to the efficient working of a streamlined system of this type is greatly increased emphasis on management qualities\(^1\). It should not be possible for anyone to be appointed Head of Division (and a fortiori to a higher position) unless he has shown aptitude for management, fostered by the Commission through suitable training programmes. A Head of Division should also have had experience throughout his career of several different sectors of the Commission's activities, acquired through an active policy of mobility (see para. 92 below), especially in the A5/4 career bracket.

70. In this context the Specialised Services\(^1\) can serve a useful

\(^{1}\)Internal decision of the Commission.
purpose. They can provide a convenient forum for testing the management qualities of an official who appears suitable for appointment as Head of Division. They can also enable the Commission to try out a new activity before taking a decision on whether it merits setting up a Division. Specialised Services should, however, be few in number in proportion to full Divisions; the review proposed in para. 67 above should make it possible for them to be considerably reduced.

71. We have heard criticism from Commission officials themselves of the standards of discipline\(^1\) in the Commission Services. We would remark that in that case, the blame is as likely to lie with senior staff failing to exercise adequate control as with their juniors with whom fault is found. A good manager should ensure that discipline is observed, to the general satisfaction of all his staff. We believe that an improvement in standards of management will bear fruit in this respect too. The manager will be helped in his task if the matching of staff to needs is carried out properly, as we have suggested in para. 76 below. Problems of discipline are less likely to arise if officials are satisfied with the atmosphere in which they work, and if a more effective system of reporting is properly applied, as we propose in para. 81 below.

72. We have noted that some cases of absenteeism are more medical questions than a matter for the rules of discipline. With this in mind we recommend that the Commission should review the present rules for the application of the invalidity scheme.

(ii) Allocation of staff

73. The staff of the Commission does not appear to be excessive in number, but it is badly distributed among different sectors. This means that some people are underworked, while others are grossly overworked. The only body which should arbitrate on conflicting claims for staff made by different sectors is the college itself. But the Commission's

\(^1\) Internal decision of the Commission.
existing procedures are not suited to dealing with this type of question in the absence of a proper arbitration procedure. We have therefore attempted to make proposals for changing these procedures so that the Commission can efficiently carry out its functions in this area.

74. First of all, we consider that, without going so far as to introduce a system of management by objectives which would be unsuited to an institution which has a substantial policy-making function and must be in a position to react flexibly to changing circumstances, a degree of work programming must be organized in the Directorates-General. We therefore propose that within the framework of the annual programme that the Commission adopts and presents to the European Parliament each Directorate-General should establish its work programme for the year, setting the guidelines for all its activities and determining its precise objectives and schedule.

75. It would be for the strengthened Presidency to check each year that these programmes are properly prepared in terms of internal consistency and of compliance with the Commission's priorities, and to arrange for coordination. The full Commission could be consulted if necessary. The review would extend also to activities undertaken in pursuance of past decisions (and even of Community legislation) whose continued utility may with the passage of time be open to doubt; proposals could be put to the Commission for revoking the decision and discontinuing the activity. In practice these tasks would be handled by the Vice-President, assisted by the Secretariat-General.

76. The strengthened Presidency (generally the Vice-President) would likewise be responsible for preparing and proposing to the Commission measures for improving the deployment of its manpower and other resources.

11Internal decision of the Commission.
In the preparation of these decisions the Presidency would be assisted by the Screening Group set up in the Directorate-General for Personnel and Administration, which already does valuable work in regularly reviewing the functioning of the Services. In future it could base its review both on priorities decided by the Commission (acting in accordance with instructions from the Vice-President) and on the Directorate-General's programme of work (see above). It would have to be given extra staff to cope with its extra responsibilities.

77. As regards requests for additional staff which the Commission makes to the Council, after preparation by the Vice-President, we propose that the Commission should set up an external body composed of three members appointed by the Commission, possibly after consulting the Court of Auditors, for a period of three years, renewable. The duties of this body would be to give an opinion on requests for additional staff which the Commission intends to make to the budgetary authority, after due consideration of existing staff resources throughout the Commission Services. It is not proposed that this body should appear before the European Parliament or the Council, but its written opinion should, on request, be annexed to the Commission proposals.

78. Having thus recast its working methods, the Commission may expect its requests for staff to be thoroughly examined by the budgetary authority, and for the position taken by the budgetary authority to be properly reasoned. We note that the Parliament has adopted the successful method of appointing a Rapporteur to investigate the Commission's requests in informed detail. We hope that the organs of the Council will adopt working methods which in the future will make for better cooperation between the Council, the Parliament and the Commission.

79. As regards the Commission, it is not sufficient to provide machinery to enable posts to be transferred to priority sectors; it is

\^1 Internal decision of the Commission.

\^2 Internal decision of the Council.
essential that the right person should be moved to the right job. In
the small Commission administration of the early days, when officials
were well known to each other, it was not difficult to lay one's hands
on the right person to fill a particular post. Because of the greater
size of the Commission staff today and the complexity of its work, this
is no longer possible. We therefore propose that a central staff
register should be set up which should list official's qualifications,
training and experience and their aptitude for particular jobs. This
will not only encourage the better use of staff available but by making
possible an active policy of staff mobility improve career planning and
increase job satisfaction.

80. The corollary of the central staff register is a series of job
descriptions, which will be drawn up in the light of the tasks of the
respective administrative units. Without this full exploitation of the
register is not possible. At present, jobs are described only in the
more general terms required for the publication of vacancies.

81. The remaining tool which should be put at the disposal of the
Vice-President and the screening group is a better system of staff
reporting. Reports at present are not informative. Staff can be
graded only as average, above average or below average. The Commission
has recently adopted a measure with the effect of increasing these
categories of appreciations from three to five to allow a more finely
tuned assessment of staff. The reports should also give staff the
possibility of commenting on their work and expressing preferences for
their career development. A system of double reporting should be
followed, whereby the principal report is made by the official's
immediate hierarchical superior and a further report added by his next
superior but one. It goes without saying that the more elaborate system
of reporting which is envisaged will not be effective unless it is
properly used by those responsible for making reports. It is ultimately
in the interest of no-one, not even the official being reported on, if
favourable or non-committal reports are made, when these are not deserved.

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1 Internal decision of the Commission.
Careers

(i) Recruitment

82. It is clearly important that the Commission should recruit the best staff. While it is acknowledged that in general the standard of staff recruited through open competitions is high, a number of improvements to the current procedures and greater flexibility in the eligibility requirements would make for fuller attainment of the above objective and for a better geographical balance from the start.

83. Improvements to the recruitment procedures¹ should be made above all in the following aspects:

- advertising of competitions in the different Member States, particularly through more regular contacts with universities and public authorities designed to make the advertising more effective;

- greater decentralization of the places in which the tests are conducted;

- appointment of outside assessors so that the diverse national cultures are better represented; they would assist the single selection board at all stages of the competition process but especially on questions of eligibility and in the preparation of the reasoning test.

84. Community staff are recruited for the most part by open competitions at present organized separately by the various institutions. This has a number of disadvantages both for the institutions and for candidates. The Commission should explore the possibility of organizing joint competitions with the other institutions² for the recruitment of certain categories of staff. An effort should also be made, with the agreement of the Council, to arrive at some measure of planning as regards competitions, or at the possibility of early recruitments in anticipation of likely increases in staff numbers. This would in

¹Internal decision of the Commission.
²Decision of the institutions.
many cases cut out the lengthy waiting periods imposed on those on the list of suitable candidates which frequently lead the best of them to withdraw their applications altogether.

Moreover, the Commission should not deny itself access to an important part of the highly-educated labour market. At present, open competitions for administrators are restricted to university graduates either with two years' professional experience or with postgraduate qualifications. This effectively excludes young graduates from entering Category A. Nor can they take the Category B examination, from which they are excluded by the mere fact of having a degree, which in itself seems unfair. They are thus completely lost to the Commission.

We therefore propose that there be a change of policy to allow the possibility of recruiting graduates to Category B. In Category A, the present system should be continued, except that Grade A8 should be revived as the starting grade for new recruits. Competitions would be open to candidates aged less than 28 with high-level university qualifications or some form of working experience since graduation. Recruitment to Grade A7 would be available only in really special cases for candidates with proven experience or exceptional qualifications. Such candidates could be eligible and recruited between 28 and 32.

It has been objected that graduates in Category B will soon be dissatisfied with their work and clamour for transfer to Category A. It is clear that candidates for Category B must be left in no doubt about the type of work they will be asked to do. But we note that in some cases B officials are already doing work of greater responsibility than some junior A officials.

At the same time the conditions for transfer from Category B to Category A must be clearly set out. The possibility of transfer exists at present, but is little used. A fixed percentage of the annual intake into Category A should be reserved for established B officials, whether

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1 Amendment of the Staff Regulations.
2 Internal decision of the Commission.
they are graduates or non-graduates, who have shown their aptitude for carrying out Category A duties and passed appropriate tests. A difficulty may arise here from the fact that entry in Category A should be at the lowest grade, while some B officials may be earning more than bottom grade A officials. Practical arrangements should be made to ensure that such officials who transfer to Category A do not lose by it financially.

89. Following recruitment, the new official undergoes a probation period\(^1\) of nine months for Category A and six months for other categories. This is not sufficient for the employer to make an informed judgment about the qualities of the official. It should be increased to one year in all cases. In addition, we have observed that probationer officials rarely fail to be established after their probation period. Those responsible for reporting on them should take their duties very seriously and not hesitate to recommend that a trainee who is not up to the mark should not be made a permanent official.

(ii) Mobility

90. One of the gravest drawbacks of the present administrative structure is that it positively discourages staff from moving from one job to another and thus acquiring the variety of experience which we have said must be a condition for appointment to positions of higher responsibility. An official who wishes to acquire varied experience finds that his promotion prospects are impaired as a result, while an official who prefers to remain in one post can successfully resist attempts by his superiors to move him to another.

91. Mobility\(^2\) must be made a right and a duty. In the career brackets A8–A6, after the expiry of a minimum period (say three years) in any one assignment an official should automatically be put on a transfer list and have the right to change jobs if he wishes. On the other hand, he

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\(^1\) Amendment to the Staff Regulations.

\(^2\) Internal decision of the Commission.
should not be eligible for promotion to A5 if he has not had experience in at least two assignments. An official can thus no longer be prevented by his superiors from moving to another post, and has a strong incentive to do so.

92. Mobility should also be encouraged in the A5/A4 career bracket, although it would not be appropriate to put into force as inflexible a system as is suggested for the lower grades. It should be recalled that diversity of experience at this stage of an official's career has been proposed as a condition for appointment as Head of Division (see para. 69 above).

93. In connection with mobility, emphasis should continue to be placed on adequate staff training, especially vocational training, language training and management training. In particular, the existing exchange scheme between Commission officials and national civil servants should be reinforced.

(iii) Career development

94. The career development of the Category A official suffers from four factors which are unrelated, but whose cumulative effect is to make it irregular and even haphazard. These factors are the uncertainty from year to year about the number of posts which will be authorised by the budgetary authority, the irregular shape of the career pyramid caused by successive waves of recruitment, direct recruitment from outside in the intermediate and higher grades and the fact that the Commission's own promotion procedures cause more rapid promotion in expanding Directorates-General and less rapid promotion in stationary ones. (The situation of B and C officials is slightly better in that their promotion procedures are more centralised, but they obviously remain subject to the other constraints.) The series of proposals which follow are designed to achieve the object, mentioned in the introduction to this section, of ensuring the transition from a period of unplanned development to a steadier one with better career opportunities.

95. Grade A8 should be used once more for the recruitment of aspiring

1Internal decision of the Commission.
officials. The average A official's career beginning in Grade A8 should bring him to Grade A4 at the retiring age of 65. There should be a "career plan" which would in general allow the average official to reach the last step in Grade A4 between 60 and 65, when he can choose between retirement at the official retiring age or early retirement. A more regular promotion policy of this type would give these officials right up to the end of their career salary increases linked to length of service as provided for by the system of two-year steps.

96. To achieve this object, we propose that an indicative career profile should be applied showing the age ranges in which the average official can normally be promoted. We propose the following ranges for admission to grades:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Age Range</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A8</td>
<td>up to 28 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A7</td>
<td>28 to 32 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A6</td>
<td>32 to 38 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5</td>
<td>36 to 44 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>44 to 50 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

97. We do not of course intend that this career profile should be the norm for all A officials. Because of the shape of the career pyramid, not all A staff can reach positions of A3 and above. The particularly able should be promoted more rapidly than the norm, in order to enable them to be appointed A3, A2 and eventually A1 at a sufficiently early age. Similarly, staff who are below the average should be promoted more slowly than the norm, so that they reach A4, if at all, shortly before retirement.

98. We said above (para. 69) that appointments to the post of Head of Division (Grade A3) should be confined to officials who have shown aptitude for management. Other officials may well not be suited for management duties as Heads of Division, but be very capable of carrying out other duties, for example of conception, of a sufficient level of

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1. Internal decision of the Commission.
responsibility to merit an A3 post. Widely experienced and highly qualified officials in a given sector can make an important contribution to the work of the Commission Services in a senior position, which is not a position of management responsibility. To make the best possible use of the capacities of these officials, we propose that measures should be taken to allow the appointment of A3 officials to posts within a Division and under the authority of a Head of Division. We wish to emphasize that appointment to A3 posts of this type should not be seen as a reward for a long career, but as involving the carrying out of duties at a higher level of responsibility than that previously exercised by the official concerned. The importance of precise job descriptions, referred to in para. 80 above, will be easily understood in this context.

99. This more regular promotion policy should be put into effect through the existing promotion and appointment procedures, which however the Review Body proposes should be changed at two points.

100. For promotion from A6 to A5, we propose that a selection committee should be established, made up of a number of Directors-General by rotation but including the Director-General for Personnel and Administration, which would periodically draw up a promotion table listing in order of merit officials deserving promotion (including the qualification of varied experience, see para. 91 above). From this list Directorates-General will be able to select the officials best suited to the vacancies to be filled. This ensures that an official's chances of promotion are not damaged by the accident of working in a particular Directorate-General, and at the same time leaves Directorates-General an element of choice in their staff, which is important as a management tool.

101. All officials on the promotion list should normally be promoted within two years from the date of their first appearance on it, unless there is a change in their behaviour after that date. If an official on the promotion list is repeatedly passed over for promotion by the failure of Directorates-General to appoint him to a post in the higher amendment of the Staff Regulations.

1Amendment of the Staff Regulations.
2Internal decision of the Commission.
grade, the Directorate-General for Personnel and Administration, under the authority of the Vice-President, should intervene to determine the reason and take suitable action.

102. For the appointment to A3 posts a selection committee should be set up composed of the Secretary-General, the Director-General of the Directorate-General in which the appointment is to be made, the Director-General for Personnel and Administration, a third, "neutral" Director-General by rotation and the Chef de cabinet of the Vice-President. This Committee, which will normally be chaired by the Secretary-General, will draw up for the Presidency a list in order of preference of Commission officials who are suitable for appointment. In the case of external candidates, the Committee would present a "liste d'aptitude". The Presidency, together with the appropriate Member, would make a proposal to the Commission, which would decide.

(iv) Introduction of outside experience to the Commission

103. In the earlier days of the Community, staff were recruited at all levels, and therefore brought with them experience acquired in other walks of life which was very valuable to the Commission. Now that the European civil service is becoming more stable, and staff are making their life's career in the service of the Commission, this advantage is lost. If the Commission is not to become increasingly divorced from experience of the world outside, it is essential that it should be able to benefit from a current of staff having such experience. Such people may come from national administrations, both sides of industry or other sectors, although most of them will probably prove to be national civil servants. In the latter case, the Commission will benefit from the more informed view of its activities which they will take back to their home administrations at the end of their time in the Commission. The proposals which follow are designed to achieve this object. It goes without saying that they

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1Internal decision of the Commission.
have been framed in such a way as to maintain the complete independence of Commission staff from outside control and not to impair the career prospects of established staff.

104. Appointments at A3 are frequently influenced by political or geographical considerations and at this level staff inevitably have to be recruited from outside. As there are no special rules like those for Grades A1 and A2, these recruitments are made by devious procedures, the appointee being brought in on a temporary contract and subsequently established as a full official by means of an internal competition at which because of his special experience he is sure of being successful. A similar procedure also operates for appointment of outsiders at A5/A4, which has a generally disruptive effect on career prospects. These purely formal competitions — the so-called "rigged competitions" — are understandably unpopular with staff; and they do not even provide a guarantee that the Commission will select the best possible candidate.

105. The situation ought to be remedied by a solution along the following lines; the Commission would then have access to valuable outside experience while safeguarding the interests of staff already in the house by complying more closely not so much with the letter as with the spirit of the established recruitment procedures:

(i) possibility of direct recruitment from outside at A3, subject to a strictly limited annual quota;

(ii) as for Grades A3 to A4, external recruitment, only to the lowest grades, to be exclusively by open competition, and subsequent appointment to higher grades to be solely by internal promotion;

(iii) internal competitions to be open exclusively to established officials.

The changes that we propose for this purpose are set out in the paragraphs below.
The procedure laid down by Article 29(2) of the Staff Regulations for Grades A1 and A2 should be extended to Grade A3 but applicable to a maximum of 20% of all appointments to that grade in any one year. The appointment to permanent posts of Cabinet staff (para. 58) would be included in this quota. The posts should be properly advertised throughout the Community and applications should be considered by the selection committee proposed at paragraph 102 above. The probationary period should be one year. It is essential that the officials thus recruited should be at least as well qualified as officials already serving with the Commission. Appointments to all other A3 posts should be reserved for established officials.

Appointments in the A8–A4 range should be made only by external recruitment, only to the lowest grades, through open competition, and by subsequent internal promotion to higher grades. To achieve this, it should be made clear that access to internal competitions (at all levels and for all categories) is restricted to established officials. This will put an end to the purely formal competitions. The only exception to this rule would be the use of Article 29 para. 2 of the Staff Regulations to recruit from outside to jobs requiring highly specialised qualifications, within the present strict interpretation of the Court of Justice. Exceptional appointments of this kind should be closely controlled by the existing committee whose duty it is to ascertain that a request for specialised staff reflects a real need, and that there is sufficient publicity to attract a good range of candidates. (This does not apply to the scientific and technical staff.)

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1. Amendment of the Staff Regulations and internal decision of the Commission.
2. Amendment of the Staff Regulations.
108. Lastly, the Commission could obtain the services of A officials recruited from outside for strictly limited periods. They could be appointed on temporary contracts to new temporary posts created specifically for the purpose by the budgetary authority. These posts would generally be in the A5/A4 career bracket and paid direct by the Commission, and would be renewed annually a third or a quarter at a time, depending on the duration of the contracts which would be between two and five years. As a result of the restriction to permanent staff of access to internal competitions, they would not be able, as at present, to become permanent officials. In order to avoid difficult personal problems, the Commission would, in the case of officials from national administrations or public enterprises, have to extract from the employer specific undertakings about the conditions in which the official would return to his employment on the expiry of his contract with the Commission. As in the case of directly recruited A3 officials, proper selection procedures must be applied to ensure that the temporary staff are suitably qualified.

109. For this programme to be carried out the budgetary authority would have to add each year for the first years of the operation of the scheme a fixed number of temporary A5/A4 posts to the Commission's table of posts. These posts could only be used for this type of recruitment. After the preliminary period the departure of temporary staff as their contracts expired would ensure that the system functioned normally. For example, assuming that the average length of contract is four years, the addition of 50 posts a year for a period of four years would result in 200 temporary staff, about 20% of the total number of A5/A4 Commission officials. To exceed this proportion would distort the European character of the Community administration.

1Amendment of the Staff Regulations and internal decision of the Commission.
2Amendment of the Staff Regulations.
3Decision of the budgetary authority (Parliament and Council).
It should be made clear that this operation is entirely different in nature from the employment in the Commission Services of national experts\(^1\), who are seconded from their home administrations for periods ranging from one month to one year. These experts, who continue to be paid by their home governments but receive a daily subsistence allowance from the Commission, are mainly employed in sectors requiring technical expertise like the customs union and agriculture. In 1979 the Commission will have employed 120 such experts. It is possible that the work done by some of these experts will be able to be done instead by temporary staff recruited under the arrangements proposed in paras. 108 and 109; much of the work, however, is of a short-term technical nature and will not be affected by these arrangements. The Commission should, however, ensure that the use made of national experts does not rise significantly above its present level, or again the risk is run of distorting the European character of the administration.

(v) Staff structure

We have already said that the staff of the Commission has been recruited in waves over a fairly short period. The result is a very uneven age distribution and, until 1985/86, a fairly limited number of retirements. In Category A, the number of retirements will be 120, which is totally insufficient to keep up a normal rate of promotions. From 1986 the number of retirements each year will rise considerably.

\(^1\)Internal decision of the Commission.
In order to absorb this abnormal and temporary blockage of careers, the Commission has already proposed to the Council an amendment to the Staff Regulations which will, in particular, facilitate retirement at 60 instead of 65\(^1\). Although it is not easy to estimate the number of voluntary departures which will result, we believe that this arrangement, which will also bring down the average age of staff, is a step in the right direction but will still not provide a complete solution to career problems.

Furthermore, just when the effect of this arrangement on career development tells, the reduction in the number of administrative units we propose will lead to a narrowing of career possibilities.

We believe therefore that it is indispensable to make further temporary arrangements to remain in force until 1986\(^2\). These would consist in giving A3 and A4 officials who have been in the highest step in their grade for at least two years and are aged 55 or over early retirement with an allowance worth 70\% of their basic salary; at 65 they would become eligible for a pension calculated in such a way that the period during which they received an allowance was reckoned as if they had remained at work\(^3\).

It should be noted, however, that the same period will see enlargement to include Greece first of all, and in all probability Spain and Portugal later. As matters stand, it is not possible to foresee the effect of this enlargement on staffing levels. It is nevertheless clear that the arrival of these new member countries would upset the arrangements described above if it were entirely at the expense of vacancies in the existing staff posts.

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\(^1\)See Annex II.

\(^2\)Decision of the budgetary authority.

\(^3\)This arrangement differs from that made at the last enlargement by being strictly limited to officials at the end of their career and by the allowance being held at the level of the pension.
116. The budgetary authority should therefore create the posts needed to take in the new nationalities and make sure that the posts are properly distributed so that the grade pyramid is maintained. Failing this, the reform of career structure will be jeopardized. A review each year by the Council and the Commission together should make it possible to judge whether the structure of this pyramid is in accordance with the career development we have recommended.

117. The combined effect of the arrangements for the release of staff and the solutions found by the budgetary authority for the problems of enlargement should make it possible to bring career development within the profile we have recommended in para. 96. It will then be up to the Commission to apply this profile by means of a regular promotion policy according to the ranges for admission to grades we propose. This promotion policy and the use of Grade A8 should normally bring officials to retiring age (60 to 65), with regular two-yearly steps right up to retirement.

118. If after this reform the Commission indulges in a batch of rapid promotions, once retirements as a result of age structure become more frequent, it will fall again into the vicious circle and a difficult operation in both financial and human terms will have been to no avail.

119. We should like the Commission to take contact with the other institutions about the way to make sure that career development is coherent as between one institution and another.

1Internal decision of the Commission.
Staff in other categories

120. We acknowledge that we have had to devote most of our attention to questions concerning Category A staff. This is because the questions of organization and operation that we were asked to consider mainly involve policy matters handled by staff in that category. We are aware that there are problems at other levels and for other Services. Since we could not go into all these aspects in the time available to fulfil our task, we recommend that the Commission should make arrangements for these problems to be studied as soon as possible in a perfectly objective way.
ANNEX I

Permanent staff of the Commission excluding research staff but including language staff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category and grade</th>
<th>Permanent posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A 1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 2</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
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<td>318</td>
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<td>A 5</td>
<td>501</td>
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<td>A 6</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 7</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 8</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 145</strong></td>
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</table>

| B 1                | 415             |
| B 2                | 462             |
| B 3                | 461             |
| B 4                | 243             |
| B 5                | 142             |
| **Total**          | **1 723**       |

| C 1                | 441             |
| C 2                | 977             |
| C 3                | 1 004           |
| C 4                | 281             |
| C 5                | 94              |
| **Total**          | **2 797**       |

| D 1                | 185             |
| D 2                | 161             |
| D 3                | 77              |
| D 4                | -               |
| **Total**          | **423**         |

| LA 3               | 17              |
| LA 4               | 207             |
| LA 5               | 440             |
| LA 6               | 265             |
| LA 7               | 284             |
| LA 8               | 1               |
| **Total**          | **1 214**       |

| Grand Total        | **8 302**       |
Explanatory note to Annex I

Category A comprises eight grades, divided into career brackets ordinarily containing two grades each for staff engaged in administrative and advisory duties which require university education or equivalent professional experience.

Category B comprises five grades, divided into career brackets ordinarily containing two grades each for staff engaged in executive duties which require an advanced level of secondary education or equivalent professional experience.

Category C comprises five grades, divided into career brackets ordinarily containing two grades each for staff engaged in clerical duties which require secondary education or equivalent professional experience.

Category D comprises four grades, divided into career brackets ordinarily containing two grades each for staff engaged in manual or service duties which require primary education, if necessary supplemented by some technical training.

Posts of translators and interpreters are grouped in a Language Service designated by the letters L/A, comprising six grades equivalent to Grades 3 to 8 of Category A and divided into career brackets ordinarily containing two grades each.

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<tr>
<td>A 1</td>
<td>Director-General</td>
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<td>A 2</td>
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<td>Administrator</td>
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<td>A 7</td>
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<td>A 8</td>
<td>Assistant Administrator</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX II

The Commission's proposals to the Council may be summarised as follows:

1. Bonus on pension for officials who leave at 60.

2. Voluntary purchase of additional pension rights.

3. Voluntary retirement between 50 and 60 without reduction of pension rights for selected officials on the occasion of the entry of a new Member State.