



**Report of a
European Movement
conference
arranged by the
Central & Eastern
European commission**

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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Report of a Conference of the
European Movement arranged by
the Central and Eastern European
Commission, Brussels, January,
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WHAT THE CONFERENCE ACHIEVED

THE conference was held to assist in defining the viewpoint of the European Movement on the problems of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in the light of the changes which have taken place since the Commission held its last conference more than ten years ago. It had the further object of stimulating greater interest in these problems among Parliamentarians in the Western European countries.

These objects were achieved. Most of the main political parties in the countries of Western Europe were represented in the various delegations. Mr. Theo Lefevre, the Prime Minister of Belgium, joined the delegates for dinner on the first evening, together with many leading Belgian Parliamentarians, including Monsieur Pierre Wigny, former Foreign Minister. And the conference reached important conclusions which are being conveyed to the Executive of the European Movement.

SIR Edward Beddington-Behrens, President of Honour of the Commission, presided on the first day, and Senator Etienne de la Vallée Poussin, the Commission's Chairman, on the second day. The general conclusions were as follows:

The principle of the European Movement that its ultimate objective is the unity of all Europe, including the Central and Eastern countries, was re-affirmed. The ideal of the European Movement that every individual should have the right to personal liberty, and that all countries should have the right to national self-determination, was upheld.

As a means of lessening tension between East and West, and as a practical measure assisting the realisation of the above aims, the conference supported increased economic exchanges and more cultural contacts between Eastern and Western Europe.

A MESSAGE TO THE CONFERENCE

By **THE RT. HON. HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P.**

*President of Honour, Central and Eastern European Commission
of the European Movement*

I AM glad to learn that the Central and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement is holding a conference in Brussels to discuss trade and cultural exchanges between Eastern and Western Europe.

Though always affirming that a United Europe, to include all European countries, was its ultimate aim, the European Movement began its work by seeking to create unity and understanding among peoples in the West. When we look at Eastern and Western Europe we see two groups of countries which have developed since the war in very different ways. This difference in recent experience calls for a special effort to bridge the gaps in our understanding of each other.

The influence of the European Movement in Western Europe has powerfully aided the efforts of governments to reduce the barriers between our countries. Your conference is concerned with extending this influence into the field of relations between Eastern and Western Europe. In this, I wish it every success.

If, as I hope, the tension between East and West continues to diminish, one of the results should surely be a growth in personal and institutional initiative in the countries of Eastern Europe. I am convinced that such development would contribute to the peace of the world.



The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan,
M.P.



Sir Edward Beddington-Behrens, President of Honour of the Central and Eastern European Commission, addressing the conference dinner. On his right are Mr. Theo Lefevre, Prime Minister of Belgium, and Senator Etienne de la Vallée Poussin, Chairman of the Commission. On his left are Monsieur René Mayer, former Prime Minister of France, and Lord St. Oswald, Vice-Chairman of the Commission.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CONFERENCE

Address by

SIR EDWARD BEDDINGTON-BEHRENS, C.M.G., M.C.

President of Honour, Central and Eastern European Commission
of the European Movement

EIGHTEEN months ago, the European Movement held one of its biggest conferences in Munich. It was attended by more than 1,000 delegates, and lasted for three days. Only one delegate from a Western country, during this conference mentioned in his speech the problem of the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

Now this did not happen by design. It happened because other problems, such as the enlargement of the Common Market were uppermost in the minds of the delegates at that time. And I must

stress that this omission was quite contrary to the whole tradition of the European Movement which, from its inception, has proclaimed that its ultimate aim is the union of all European countries. Today one of the greatest contributions which the European Movement can make towards achieving this union is to seek practical means of lessening of tension between East and West.

The conference has set up two Commissions, which will examine practical steps for increasing economic exchanges between East and West and for intensifying cultural relations. And in the cultural field it is not sufficient to exchange famous international stars of opera, ballet and music, but to share cultural ideas at all levels of society. We want to extend to these countries the hand of friendship, so that if they are able and willing to join with us in drawing the countries of Eastern and Western Europe closer together, they may know the strength of the support in the West for this policy. I hope that this endeavour will be appreciated in Eastern Europe as much as I know it is supported here in the West.

We must consider the plight of our European friends in Eastern Europe, who live under regimes very different from those we enjoy in our own countries. If we were not concerned in our hearts about

the future of these large populations — including the people of East Germany — then our enjoyment of our freedom and prosperity would be based on quicksand. Because the strength of democratic countries has always been their unquenchable belief in the right of personal freedom and their hatred of tyranny in any form.

Naturally, it would be absurd to imagine that any evolution would bring back the pre-war regimes in Eastern Europe. I am sure that none of us are thinking along these lines. Nor is it to be assumed that, if Eastern European countries had greater freedom they would turn against Russia. One thing which impressed me, when I was in Bulgaria before the last war, was the devotion of the Bulgarian people to Russia, which had been responsible for their emancipation from the Turks. These are feelings which extend deep into national consciousness. If today the Bulgarians were given greater freedom to determine their destiny, this bond between the Bulgarians and the Russians might even be renewed and strengthened.

Indeed, we should remember that experience in Austria has shown that the granting of freedom, and the consequent removal of tension from a particular area, can be of enormous benefit to Russia, just as it benefits all of us in Europe.

It is my hope that, if the tension between East and West continues to diminish, Russia herself may see great advantage in allowing more freedom in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As you all know if the nuclear bomb means anything as a deterrent, it is no longer necessary for Russia to be protected by hundreds of miles of satellite territory in order to feel secure. I myself believe that tension will continue to diminish, and that the less menacing atmosphere of recent months will become a permanent feature of relations between East and West.

I believe this, for the simple reason that a war of conquest to spread Communism would be abhorrent to the Russian people. This is particularly true of the younger generation of industrial leaders and technicians in Russia, for whom the Communist ideology and the ascetic philosophy which goes with it, no longer provide the impelling force which moulds peoples, lives, and actions. The demand in Russia is for greater personal liberty, for more consumer goods, for better education and for more access to the ideas of the outside world. This newly entrenched class in Russian

society is a powerful barrier against any return to the ideas of the Stalin period. The generation which experienced the ardour of the revolution is passing, and policies based on ideology are passing with them. In their place there is developing a new, more pragmatic approach to foreign policy and to economic problems. In this respect, the Russian revolution is following the pattern of other great revolutionary movements in history. There is a certain inevitability about this historical development.

This is the background to our conference, and it must give us hope that the ideal which we have had before us all these years of a unity of the whole of Europe can eventually be attained. But we have to work for it, and that is why we are here.


In recent years we may have underestimated the potentiality of courageously stating our political beliefs to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. This was because of a feeling that we in the West were impotent to do anything to improve the situation in those countries; and the tragedies of Eastern Germany and of Hungary naturally increased this feeling of helplessness. But, when I look back, I feel sure that this attitude was a profound error.

BY upholding the cause of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe we shall not only bring comfort to their peoples by extending to them the hand of friendship, but we shall also be advancing our own ideas of freedom and democracy. In these days, through the power of radio, television and other means of mass communication, ideas travel very fast and with enormous political force wherever they are boldly proclaimed.

I have been working in the European Movement since its inception. And one of the lessons which all this work has taught me can be summed up in three words: **Never give up.** In spite of the difficulties which we face in the West today in our efforts to unite our nations, I remain convinced that we shall in the end resolve our problems and bring unity to this Continent. Looking around at this great gathering, honoured by the presence of the Belgian Prime Minister who is at my side, I feel hopeful that our message — “that we extend the hand of friendship to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, and work to include them in our unity” — cannot fail to penetrate into every corner of those countries and with far-reaching results.

Address by SENATOR ETIENNE DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN

Chairman, Central and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement



Senator de la Vallée Poussin

WESTERN ATTITUDE TO THE COMMUNIST WORLD

WHEN, in 1952, the Commission for Central and Eastern Europe held its first congress in London, no one could guess what the principal consequences of nuclear armament would be. In this field, the power of the United States was still far greater than that of the Russians, but it was morally impossible for America to make use of that power except in a case of manifest aggression. At the level of conventional armaments, however, Europe had not yet established a balance of power. I remember saying then: "At this moment, confronted by an enemy who knows nothing but force, we cannot, without making ourselves ridiculous, brandish a sword that is not yet forged."

Nevertheless, the situation appeared to be fluid. Some people talked about 'rolling them back', others were counting upon a revolt of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe with such support as the West might be able to render. The Communist terror had broken all resistance inside Eastern Europe. Contacts with countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain were more completely severed than at any other time. Still it was believed that this paroxysm could not last and that better days would come.

Few had yet understood that, from the moment when both East and West were in possession of nuclear arms, war had in fact become impossible. With this consequence: that there no longer existed any means by which the Slav nations invaded in 1945 could be wrested out of the Russian bloc by force. From that moment,

all speculation about the oppressed nations re-entering Europe, about the economic order it might be possible to propose to the liberated peoples and about the resumption of cultural relations with them — all this turned out to be nothing but idle speculations.

We now face a fundamental reality that we must learn to recognize: the line marked by the Iron Curtain separating the powers of the East from the free world is a militarily insuperable barrier. Moreover, the present frontier marked by that fateful line will endure, more or less, so long as the two greatest Powers are strong enough to hold the nations in their orbits. The examples of Jugoslavia, of Albania and of Cuba have shown, however, that it is growing more and more difficult for those Powers to use their military forces to prevent the peoples within their zones from changing their political régimes.

What is all this leading to?

The Iron Curtain is becoming partly transparent; its stability remains. The great Europe is for the present out of sight. In compensation, other prospects are opening up. A policy better adapted to the circumstances is conceivable, and allows us to entertain some hopes, limited, but reasonable.

The Western world seems to have completely escaped the Communist menace by which we were still deeply disquieted a few years ago. It is more prosperous than ever and, thanks to prodigious advances in science and techniques, still has marvellous pros-

pects of development. The capitalism of 1960 bears little resemblance to that of the last century. Our society, which is perhaps contacting new vices, is more and more immune to the criticisms of a Leninist ideology. In years to come it will be even more transformed.

No one can guess the lines of its future development. Everyone may hope the civilization of the free countries will maintain its progress in the forefront of human evolution.

On the other side of the Iron Curtain, a harsh climate of ideological and racial intolerance still prevails. Religions, and especially the Orthodox religion, are still persecuted, and the tyranny of the State is all the more cruel because it is enveloped in mystery and employed with methodical cunning. The policy of the régime towards the Jews also calls for condemnation. Their synagogues are closed, the use of the Hebrew language is forbidden, the assimilation of the Jews is prevented, and so is their emigration to Palestine. Yet, in spite of all, the light of faith still shines within millions of souls; and in Communist society the spiritual values of justice and charity survive, as forces no less powerful and revolutionary than in our own. Their activity and fertility are, on a longer view, incalculable.

What is important is that the Stalinist tyranny has vanished. The Communist world has ceased to be monolithic and immobile. Everything has begun to move, and the forces now at work in free Europe are also acting very powerfully upon the peoples further east. It is in the light of these inevitable and increasingly rapid changes that we must envisage the future of the nations of Central Europe and consider how we can help their people, whom we regard as brothers. For they, like us, are people of Europe, who since the Middle Ages have shared with us in all the transformations, the trials and the triumphs that heralded the birth of the modern world. It is, therefore, not only a question of helping them, but rather of how Europe can recover and maintain, with such vital centres of European culture as Warsaw, Prague, Budapest and Moscow, those relations that were so fertile in past centuries, and without which our Western cultures will soon feel diminished and mutilated.

If we consider the Soviet society of today, we can see several forces at work. The Communist Party is still its political pillar. The head of the Party continues to exercise a more or less absolute

authority, which is rarely held in check. Krushchev, however, has no longer the power of Stalin. It would be extremely difficult for him to re-establish the reign of terror. He, therefore, has to face, and cope with, forces of opposition that we in the West are unable to estimate. The old Stalinist groups have not been destroyed; there are embers that might yet flare up again.

On the other hand, the rising standard of living, the increasing opportunities of movement, the resumption (albeit partial) of intellectual contacts with the West, the growth of schools and culture — these things are causing the intelligentsia to blossom out into more and more independent and audacious opinions.

The intelligentsia is beginning to constitute, as it did under the Tsars, a political class, animated by a critical and often a rebellious spirit. Of course it has no authority in political affairs. But no one can now prevent the radiation of its anonymous and penetrating influence. All classes, and the Party itself, are exposed to this contagion. Anyone who believes in the dynamism of ideas and the power of the mind must attach outstanding importance to this new development which, barring unexpected developments, may be regarded as irreversible.

FACE TO FACE WITH REALITIES

APART from the intelligentsia, other novelties are appearing in the midst of the ideological conformity which was the pride and the strength of Communism. Coteries and movements are emerging. The Party and the 'apparatchiki' do not always take the same point of view. A ruling class is being created, which tends to perpetuate itself by heredity, and is already provoking some restiveness in the masses.

The development of the Soviet economy also brings it face to face with realities. Marx-Leninism was inspired fundamentally by the vision of large-scale industry, thanks to which the Soviet record has been marked by successes in the heaviest industry and technical progress in vast public works. American industrialists, who cannot be suspected of any partiality towards Communism, have reported that in metallurgy the achievements of the régime are such as American industry might well emulate.

Nevertheless, some other results have been lamentable, and there are problems for which valid solutions have yet to be found. The relative enrichment of the country demands a rapid multiplication of goods for consumption. This cannot be refused to a society exasperated by privations for nearly half a century. But does the Marxist ideology provide a blueprint for producing, within the framework of State supremacy and bureaucracy, the abundance of goods needed to satisfy a public which is growing ever more numerous, varied and exigent? From some points of view, this is the most important aspect of the economy, since industry is made for man and not man for industry, and it would seem that it has not yet found its master mind.

There is another problem. Confronted by our European Communities, the Communist world also wants to organize itself. Between Russia and the 100 million inhabitants of Central Europe, it would like to set up some kind of Common Market like our own. One would think that it might be easier to regulate the exchanges and promote division of labour between states that practise the methods of authoritarian planning. But the Russian experience, so far, is that its Comecon lags far behind free Europe, and that the division of labour and production between the satellite states and Russia is difficult to organize. Russia's power might enable it to impose upon these other nations plans that were scientifically conceived and at least apparently reasonable. But whether that would satisfy the peoples in question is doubtful. Anyhow, the Russians are not aiming at this. It would mean the virtual incorporation of all these economies into Russia's national planning, which not even Stalin dared to attempt. As it is, each country makes a plan of its own, and the Comecon endeavours, by successive approximations, to establish rules for co-ordinated and complementary production. Up till now, after a very bad start between 1946 and 1950, the results of the new policy appear to be very limited.

Lastly, there is one sector in which the failure of the Communist ideology seems to be demonstrated by the facts; that is, in agriculture. When Krushchev came to power he was already urging the vital necessity of correcting Stalin's agricultural policy. The subject had always interested Krushchev, and one cannot doubt that he has given it his closest attention. Anyhow, he has frequently changed both the methods and the planning. And yet this Russia,

CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMISSIONS



Monsieur Pierre Abelin
Former French Minister
*Chairman of the Economic
Commission*
His report appears on Page 22



Monsieur Hans Oprecht
Swiss Federal Counsellor
*Chairman of the Cultural
Commission*
His report appears on Page 23

which was the granary of Europe under the Tsars, this Russia which then lived in oppression but not in hunger, lives today in a state of chronic food shortages. The good soils of the Ukraine seem to be deteriorating.

When we survey the Communist world and its present problems, we cannot but draw some significant conclusions.

First, that Soviet Russia is beyond all doubt the country upon which the burden of military expenditure weighs most heavily, and threatens in time to become intolerable. Today, such expenditure in the case of the seven Powers of Western European Union represents five per cent of their national income, in the case of America 11.25 per cent and in the case of Russia eighteen per cent. Since Russia is also the country which has the most pressing need of economic and social investment, everything points to its having arrived at the parting of the ways. Since it does not choose war, it must seek disarmament, and play the card of peace and internal development.

This means that, in the near future, the Russian authorities will have to cope with an irresistible upsurge of nationalist demands. As soon as a little liberty is doled out by an oppressive régime, people's appetite for freedom becomes irrepressible and is bound to take the form of nationalism in regions which were once States and where national groups have long been leading a minority existence. Even the Communist governments of Central and Eastern Europe, as the dominant Russian Communist Party is left with less powerful means of action at its disposal, and as their own peoples recover the instruments of freedom, thanks to the development of culture and the growth of contacts with the free world — even these governments must yield more and more to the popular demand for emancipation and independence. With Krushchev's advent, the Russian power has tended to withdraw. But an authority delegated to the local governments is not enough. For when they have to act on their own responsibility, the only basis of popularity they can count upon is the awakening national consciousness of the Eastern peoples. So they inevitably fall back upon the politics of a nationalist Communism, oriented towards more and more explicit independence.

What, on a more or less long-term view, will be the outcome of this irreversible evolution, already so largely under way? It might provoke, especially if it went too fast, a shock of recoil. The Russian power, with its Communist regimentation and the innumerable means of action at its disposal, provides Krushchev and his successors with all they would need, in order suddenly to interrupt or even annihilate any movement of national revival.

And if, by misfortune, it should ever appear to the Russian authorities that the Western Powers are playing this card in order to demolish the military power of Communism, it is practically certain that the Russian government, at whatever cost, would react without mercy. But on the other hand, if the internal evolution of the Communist world remains no more than internal, if it owes nothing to any direct support from the forces of the West, such a reaction from the Russian State would be considerably less likely. In fact, its régime is caught in a dilemma. It must either tolerate a normal evolution which, in the nature of things, must finally establish freedom and independence in the Communist world itself. Or else, from fear of that emancipation, it must interrupt that progress, break up what has developed — and, by doing so, con-

demn the régime and the whole world of the East to flounder in immobilism and inertia, for the sake of an ideology that is becoming more and more obviously artificial.

In view of these prospects, sufficiently well-defined to be the basis for a policy, what should be the attitude of the West?

First of all, the West must remain true to itself. It wants peace and security. It has decided to take no aggressive action and it has the greatest interest in convincing the Russians of its will for peace. At the same time, it should vigorously affirm its determination to make no concessions which might endanger the security of the free world. One point of importance would be gained if the Russians could be convinced that they are under no threat of military action from America and her allies so long as they, for their part, give no sign of wanting to upset the present balance of power by force. The second point upon which Western policy should be affirmed without reservation, is a determination to keep its moral ideal, its principle of freedom, flying over the world like a flag. The rights of the individual, the right of peoples to decide their own destiny, the whole philosophy of the rights of man, belong to the West, not as its property to be cultivated for itself, but as the ideal that the West proclaims everywhere and always. Just as, in regard to armaments, the West must maintain its will to peace, so in the realm of ideas the West must always remember its message.

THIRDLY, in European affairs, it is impossible for our communities to disown, as foreigners, nations which have always formed part of the life and culture of our continent. There is nothing imperialistic in that affirmation. We are not concerned to define the frontiers of some ideal or possible Europe. We are simply concerned to re-state that nothing which is or has been European can be foreign to us, and that the whole of Europe is still open to all those who freely wish to profess themselves European.

These three ideas determine the practical position of Europeans. To the nations of Eastern Europe, they offer no aggressive action. On the other hand, they remain champions of the rights of man, especially of the right of self-determination of peoples. They should give their political and diplomatic support to all peoples who share their moral values, and they should undertake always to

pursue economic and cultural policies adapted to the needs and the pre-occupations of their friends in the East.

The economic union of Europe may present trading difficulties to countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Such difficulties will arise in the nature of things, and we cannot postpone or even slow down the building of Europe on their account. On the other hand, the Communities should always take care to study every means of maintaining the closest relations with the peoples behind the Iron Curtain, compatible with the building of Europe.

The same is true on the cultural plane. European culture must be a radiating culture. It cannot be stopped at any frontier, or by any Iron Curtain. In itself, it is but the disinterested opening-up of ways towards the conquest of the mind and the knowledge of the world. Europe should, therefore, in complete reciprocity, allow all possible exchanges between all men. The richness and the development of our own culture depends on it. We have more and more to learn from the experience accumulated in the East.

Europe offers this opportunity without ulterior motive. She no longer fears the contagion of Communism. Her own doctrine requires her to seek, everywhere, whatever may widen her knowledge, improve her vision of the world and elevate her ideals. Culture cannot be imposed: it offers itself. Whoever refuses it, or cannot understand or cannot bear it, only shows his weakness.

Nothing could be more embarrassing for Communism, nothing more destructive of its prestige in its own sphere, than an indefinite maintenance of the mentality of the ghetto. The Communist world and the free world confront one another. The future alone can decide between these antagonists and say which has responded better to this challenge of history. In this present time, at all events, to take up this challenge is a proof of strength; to refuse it would be to betray doubt about one's cause.

To conclude: the policy of Europe, deprecating all aggression and any threat of it, should present itself, on the other side of the Iron Curtain, as the will to a peaceful confrontation, in which Europe offers herself as she is, with all her successes, her defeats and insufficiencies, to the judgment of her adversaries. By the fact of doing so, she is capable of shaking to their foundations all opposing ideologies if they do not measure up to the challenge.

On the economic plane, if we really want to serve the countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain, and to do so effectively, the

Communities and the other European nations must define the action they propose to take, and agree as to what they can ask. It is clear, especially in our view, that relations with the nations of the East will become progressively easier on the economic plane, step by step with their attainment of certain amount of political liberation. Without this no real human contact is possible.

At the cultural level, on the other hand, there are relations which, if they are to be fruitful, have to be organized and, in certain sectors, organized methodically. Can each of the European countries, alone and separately, pursue its own policy of cultural relations with countries behind the Iron Curtain. That is doubtful.

It would be advisable, that as a minimum measure, the heads of departments dealing with cultural relations in the various Western countries, should meet periodically to agree on common policies.

THE attitude that we propose is not meant to obtain a determinate result. Any enterprise of that kind would be beyond our reach. It is simply a matter of trying to find out what relationship between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe will be most conducive to the desirable evolution of the Communist world. Trusting in the value of our ideal, we believe that the forces at work must lead the world of the East along the path of progress, and that this progress will facilitate relations with them. From a purely idealist point of view this policy is, without doubt, the most — and even the only — practical one we can pursue today.

One final word: The great obstacle in our way, which is paralyzing the resumption of more normal relations between East and West, is obviously the present status of Berlin. This certainly presents a particularly delicate political problem, and there can be no question, in this domain, of Europe making any concession to the principle she most firmly maintains: the right of peoples to self-determination. However, I did not want to touch upon this question, because it requires a special study. Here I would only observe that the problem of Germany cannot be isolated, nor separated from the whole. But some progress in the normalization of East-West relations, and the overcoming, little by little, of the fear of aggression and the present baleful mistrust, is the most useful — and indeed the most necessary — result to be hoped for from any fruitful negotiations on the German problem.

THE INSTRUMENT OF PERSUASION



Address by LORD ST. OSWALD

Vice-Chairman, Central and Eastern European Commission

WE are gathered here from a number of European countries to seek some steps towards restoring independence to some of the oldest and most illustrious nations of the civilised world. There can be no disguising the implication in our theme that at present their rightful independence is being refused to them. There can be no pretence as to where we place the responsibility for this refusal.

Clear as this must be in our theme, and central to our deliberations, we are also agreed that the cure for this condition will not be found through bellicose speeches or proposals, still less through bellicose actions. It will come through persuasion, which breaks no bone and spills no blood. There has been too much breaking of bone and spilling of blood in this Europe of ours — some of it in our own experience — for civilised men to contemplate any more, if it can humanly be avoided. Our instrument is, therefore, that of persuasion, and it must be as highly developed and finely tempered as the most sophisticated weapon of war. Our strategy must be one of deep penetration, directed to the minds and

reasoning capability of the Soviet leaders and the satellite rulers.

A short while ago, the British Prime Minister stated his opinion, once again, that we could be entering a new and better era in relations with the Soviet Union. We who are observantly acquainted with Sir Alec Douglas-Home know that he does not speak for effect. He speaks from conviction, backed by reason. A statement of that nature from him is something from which we can all draw significant hope.

The most obvious benefits of such an achievement, to the mind of the individual, must be, firstly, what it represents in terms of increased security for his own countrymen and, secondly, for the world at large. For all of us here, there is a third and vital human dividend to be obtained. In particular, those of us who feel ourselves to be Europeans cannot congratulate ourselves while Europe remains divided by an arbitrary and deeply resented frontier. It would be no favour to the Soviet leaders to leave them in doubt about this. It is so positively in their interests to be aware of it, that we owe it to them, and to our mutual hopes of peace, to make it plain.

We, in the West, have put our beliefs to the test. In the past six years, in Africa alone, twenty-five countries — one hundred and twenty-six million people — have been given their national independence by the willing act, the deliberate and coherent policy, of European Governments: seventeen of those millions by Belgium, forty-nine millions by France, and sixty millions by Britain. The same has been happening in Asia, also as deliberate policy by the former colonial powers of Europe. The more widely and comprehensively these policies are applied and applauded throughout the world, the more tragically out of twentieth century context the situation of Eastern European nations is seen to be.

Free nations produce great men, and the world is richer for these men. None of us doubt that the new African and Asian nations will provide the world with men and women who will contribute to the well-being and the aspirations of humanity. But, however uplifting our hopes may be as to the contribution to be made by the new nations of Asia and Africa, we remain poignantly aware that, in our own continent, there are nations which have helped to build the glorious past of Europe, without which the world we live in would be an infinitely poorer place — but which are now prohibited from making their true contribution to the still

greater hopes and the greater needs of the developing world around us.

It is in the interests of Russia, as well as of ourselves, that the proud nations of Eastern Europe, which through history have given so richly to the understanding, the culture and the progress of civilised man, should be able to resume their proper role in our affairs. At present, these nations are constricted, and prevented from offering the world still more out of their store of active wisdom and genius. This is bad for the world. It is tragic for the people of these countries, whether living in them or not.

Some members of those nations are at liberty among us, a few at this conference. Their voices are heard less than ours, in the plenary sessions. That is not because they have little to say, and still less because we have learned all we can from them. It is because the initiative must be ours, the spur to action must be our conscience. Each one of them here is a listening post for his people in the other half of Europe. They have come to hear the conscience of Free Europe speak and, through their ears, those peoples now beyond immediate reach will hear our words, and judge us by the sort of consciences we reveal. And they will try to measure how soon they can hope that this unnatural, mutually harmful separation may be brought to an end.

THE FULL POTENTIAL OF EUROPE

TO those in honoured exile among us, may I say that so far as lies within the power of our imagination and our sympathy, we join you in your yearning. Beyond that point none of us can pledge anybody's effort but his own. But I hope you will think that both the tone and the content of what is being said in this Conference shows that there are those in the West who understand and who care. I hope you will feel that there are those who will go from here, to their different capitals, and apply their energies, their intelligence and their influence, to secure that your yearning is not endless or unavailing.

When that day comes, we can look forward to exploiting the full potential of this remarkable Continent. That day must come. Its expedition is to some extent in our hands.

EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE PART OF OUR UNITY

By **PIERRE WIGNY**

Former Foreign Minister of Belgium and
Vice-President of the European Movement

THE feeling I have in attending this meeting of Western and Eastern Europeans is of participating in a family reunion where one understands each other so much better.

We have met first of all to bear witness: The countries of Eastern Europe are not isolated, since in our eyes they belong to our family. This family has never been very united; Europe has not to be reconstituted, it has to be created. A beginning has been made, however, and its success should convince us not to be afraid of the Eastern countries, even if they are Communist governed.

Europe has the advantage of being dynamic. It must also have the imagination to spread out, conciliating in its unity all its manifold diversities.

The Eastern European countries are part of this unity. In the long run, I see them as full members. Before that, they will become associated or, anyway, will be linked in some way, in spite of difficulties which imagination will have to overcome. And in that way we shall implement that old formula which struck me so much: "Europe, this old Continent; the Continent of the Future."

EXTRACTS FROM OTHER ADDRESSES TO THE CONFERENCE

MONSIEUR JEAN REY: The year 1963 and the beginning of 1964 will surely go down in history as a time remarkable for the confrontation of religions — a time when they approached one another, not in the hope of mutual conversions, but in an extraordinary endeavour to re-define their reciprocal attitudes. In the face of this great example, we may well ask ourselves whether political convictions ought not to do likewise; whether the time has not come for them to enter into a dialogue, not in order to convince one another, but to define the position of each in relation to the other. That is the spirit in which this conference seems to me to be useful. It may not be a bad thing that we, in Western Europe, should take a closer look at what we think of these problems, in preparation for later meetings with those in power in Eastern Europe.

My own contribution will be a modest one. I shall concentrate upon what is specifically the aim of the Common Market in its relations with the Eastern European countries. The situation could be summed up in this contrast: that the countries of Eastern Europe continue to ignore the Common Market altogether; yet, at the same time, they have never carried on so much trade with us as they do now.

It is curious to see how these countries persist in ignoring the Common Market. We have no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or with any of the Eastern European countries. The only meeting ground, apart from private conversations, is the United Nations, and more specifically, the Economic Commission for Europe. Up to now, sixty-five countries have accorded diplomatic recognition to the Common Market; that is, two-thirds of the world. The only two groups which still ignore us are the countries of Eastern Europe and some of the Arab countries.

This abnormal situation creates increasing difficulties, not for us, but for the Eastern European countries. One fine day the

Russians will just have to perceive that the European Community exists. What, then, must we do?

If the countries of the East take this first step of establishing diplomatic relations with us, we should be able to reach a further stage, that of a comparison of their attitudes and ours towards the external world. For it is certain that we have different policies with regard to the “third world” and to world relations as a whole. It would be most useful if we and the countries of the East could compare our attitudes. We shall have an opportunity at the world conference of the United Nations to be opened in Geneva in April.

The countries of the Community, the Community institutions, our Parliament at Strasbourg and our Commission in Brussels are prepared for this dialogue, whenever the occasion presents itself and wherever it may lead. Will this yield results? I would rather not anticipate, for obviously all this is bound up with political questions. We saw this plainly enough in our negotiations with Britain. It was political and nuclear difficulties which broke up these negotiations and the same thing may well happen with the Eastern countries, leaving our economic difficulties unresolved. That is no reason for not taking up the problems of each sector separately, whenever we can do so.

MONSIEUR RENE MAYER: As Chairman of the French Council of the European Movement, I applaud the initiative in organising this conference, and would like to thank all those who have prepared it, and made it possible. They have allowed us to restate what has been a constant doctrine of the European Movement from the very beginning: Namely, the refusal to acknowledge the amputation of Europe. This is a fundamental concept which one should never give up, and the European Movement, since it

was formed, has never accepted the amputation of which Europe became a victim.

We know that the situation has changed in the West, where Europe has become organized, and in the East it changes every day. Above all else there are facts which we cannot but acknowledge: for instance, a few days ago the *New York Times* carried a picture of a Soviet-American cultural commission sitting in Moscow. I think that such a picture would not have been seen a few years ago. One might say that it is good, bad, favourable, or risky, but, it is a fact that the situation has changed.

Free Europe must uphold the rights of man and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny. But we also have to think of the citizens who inhabit the countries of Eastern Europe. This means that we have to choose, and the choice is difficult. Our Commissions must study the risks and advantages of alternative courses of action. One can always criticise any action which the West could undertake to promote improvement in the Eastern countries. On the one hand, it can always be said that we are not doing enough; on the other, that by doing more we should only be consolidating the present regimes. I cannot imagine a policy which would not be open to one or other of these objections.


Consequently, efforts of this kind are difficult to improvise and a conference such as this is very important for the light it sheds on these problems. In the field of economics especially, it is clear that an evolution in the relations between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe is under way and will necessarily proceed further. Must we reject this on the ground that these countries have not yet been liberalised? I believe that there should be some way of promoting material progress of a kind which would also tend towards the freedom of the individual. If one does not believe that, one must assume that it is better to accept a policy of isolation. I am not of that opinion.

We are, in fact, helping these countries to liberate themselves when we trade with them. We are enabling them to grow stronger, more resistant. We want Europe to have a policy in her dealings with the countries of the East. But the real question which must be faced, before deciding upon a European policy, is whether Europe exists. That is not the subject of our conference, but only progress towards a political Europe will enable us to have a common policy towards the countries of the East.

AMONG THE SPEAKERS



Monsieur Jean Rey
Member of the EEC Commission



Monsieur René Mayer
Former Prime Minister of France

MONSIEUR PAUL DE AUER: We must do all we can to find a European solution to our problems, and one which will make possible the re-union of the two Europes. Our policy, and the attitude we take up, cannot be the same as in 1952. But the aims and objects of our Commission must remain always the same. Namely, to ensure, in our countries, respect for the rights of man and for the fundamental freedoms and for self-determination. We want to live as good neighbours and in friendly relations with the Russian people. We are not Communists, and we think it is our peoples who should decide the social and economic institutions which best correspond to their interests and aspirations. They should be given the opportunity to make that decision freely.

We do not want to re-establish out-of-date institutions, against which, moreover, we were in revolt before we left our countries. Nor do we want to destroy those institutions of Communist creation which truly serve the interests of the workers and the peasantry. We also have social justice at heart. Vengeance, resent-

ment and hatred have no place in our hearts. It is the future of our peoples that is our concern.

We believe in contacts with Soviet Russia, for they provide us with a useful political barometer. We do not, however, believe that the time for important negotiations has yet arrived. And we must take care to avoid such contacts as may be misinterpreted, or create in Eastern Europe a false impression that peaceful co-existence can be organized and ensured without the previous solution of the problems of Central and Eastern Europe.

Cultural exchanges are highly desirable, but on the condition that they are reciprocal. We are not opposed to trade agreements with the countries of Eastern Europe, so long as they do not include the sale of strategic materials, but promote contacts likely to raise the living standards of the people of our countries. Each case, however, should be studied from the political point of view. In the granting of facilities, such as long-term credits, the principle of *quid pro quo* should not be lost sight of.

What we ask of our friends in the West now, when the hour has not yet struck for the negotiation of our problems, is some reassurance that they are not indifferent to our case. That they do not feel it to be a matter of detail which could be overlooked in some package deal. We would ask them not to conclude any agreement by which the unwilling vassalage of our people might be prolonged. President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard agreed, on December 29th, 1963, that no agreement should be made which might perpetuate the division of Germany. We would urge that this principle be held no less valid for the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, divided from the West by the Iron Curtain.

SIR JAMES HUTCHISON: When we consider planning for a new and wider economic approach to the countries of Eastern Europe, we have to bear in mind Krushchev's statement that he intends to bring down the West by political and economic means. But will not increased contact with the West open the eyes of people in the Communist countries? Will not a realisation of our standard of living and the freedom which we enjoy cause the fanatical belief in their own rightness to fade? So we should start with the assumption that all contacts are beneficial. Each contact makes a tiny dent in the Eastern armour.

Let us look at the present trading position. The trade of the O.E.C.D. countries with the East is on the increase, and taken overall, has doubled between 1955 and 1962, in money values. Consistently, the East has sold more to Western Europe than vice versa. Whether this will continue to be so with the food shortages of the current year, remains to be seen. These shortages are being made good from America and not from Europe. But the answer to this question will be very important.

Western imports from the East have been mainly raw materials and semi-finished goods, with finished goods tending to increase. Trade with the West represents for the Eastern bloc a high proportion of their total exports — for the Soviet Union, twenty-nine per cent; for Poland, forty-one per cent. Western exports to the East amount to only four per cent of our total overseas trade. This should give us a strong bargaining position.

In the East, tentative steps are being taken to widen the system of trading, through COMECON. This was set up in 1949 as a reply to the Marshall Plan. It now aims at a more compact organization, covering a population of 300 million people. It has not the same wide aims as EEC, with a customs union and freedom of movement of capital and labour. But it aims to become a co-ordinating influence in foreign trade, with interchange of information on the political, economic, technical, scientific, administrative and military fronts. Also, it seeks to promote specialisation in industry, and standardisation, and to create, within the system of bilateral trading, an area of multilateral payments.

National perspective plans will be subject to centralised direction and with overall Soviet influence. This overall influence is by no means welcome in some of the Eastern European countries. Recently, there has been set up the Moscow International Co-operation Bank, linked with COMECON, and providing machinery for trading between members. But will it provide convertible finance for trading with the West? And will the Eastern European countries submit to the dominance of the Soviet Union, which is implicit in the COMECON conception?

What then of the future, from the Western point of view? Clearly, foodstuffs, semi-finished and finished goods from Eastern Europe will suffer from the Common Market outer tariff, in the same way as goods from other countries not in EEC will suffer.

Incidentally, former British and no doubt French territories, now independent and in the early stages of development, will turn to Communist countries to sell, with the attendant political risks, if they are shut out of Western markets. In 1962, trade between COMECON and developing countries rose nineteen per cent.

If we are to sell more to Eastern Europe, we must also be prepared to buy. Should we not make a close examination as to whether we could, for example, switch some of our oil purchases from Arab countries, which are poor customers and very unstable. Indeed, this whole problem needs a co-ordinated examination by all the O.E.C.D. states, including an examination of Western agricultural policies.

Until prices and a market economy play a proper role in the East, it would be unwise to dismantle quota systems for defence against dumping. Simple tariff agreements would give the East an advantage. The West should cut out the constant under-bidding now taking place, and should seek to agree a system of fair-trading rules, including credit granting. E.E.C. have made a start on a co-ordinated policy. But that is not wide enough. The E.F.T.A. countries should also be brought in. We should also consider where the U.S.A. and China stand in all this.

May I end by emphasising that all contacts play their part in lessening tension. We should encourage them by all the means at our disposal.

PROFESSOR HENRI BRUGMANS: It seems to me that we should make this concrete proposal: that the cultural advisers attached to each of our Embassies and Legations in the countries of Eastern Europe should meet to consider what our cultural strategy should be. But please note what I mean by this. There can be no question of aggressive intention. There must be no thought of "selling" the culture of any West European country to the people of Eastern Europe. The aim must be to maintain the fundamental unity of European civilisation. But it needs to be done according to a plan conceived as a whole.

One has often been asked whether we in the West are not in need of an ideology to oppose that of Marx-Leninism. For my part, I think it is a blessing not to be cramped in the yoke of any dogmatic ideology. However, we do have certain methods of

approach, and our experiments in European co-operation are important, not only for their economic and social results, but also because they demonstrate the value of a certain method of pragmatic federalism: that is, of respect for legitimate autonomies on the one hand and, on the other, the organization of great associations. In Eastern Europe, where the problems of cultural diversity have been, and still are, so acute, the application of this method of pragmatic federalism has the authentic value of a mission to those on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

MR. CHRISTOPHER MAYHEW, M.P.: My feeling is that, at this time, the most practical step forward towards the unity of Europe as a whole is to revive the conception of the unity of European culture. This is something which is widely understood on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The great figures of European culture speak the same language in East and West — a profoundly un-Marxist phenomenon on which we can base great hopes for the future. May not the European Movement have a role to play here? So far East-West cultural relations have been organised on a bilateral basis in Europe, nation by nation. They have undoubtedly contributed a great deal towards lessening tension and misunderstanding, and even though they have necessarily been of a one-sided character — in view of the control of travel and thought still exercised in Communist countries — they have on balance undoubtedly worked to the advantage of the non-Communist countries. Might not these contacts now be developed on a multi-lateral basis? Why should it not be possible to have meetings not merely between Soviet and British students, as now happens on a wide scale, but between students of Eastern and Western Europe?

The youth and student festivals organised by the Communist side have proved themselves worse than useless. Instead of being organised between representative people in East and West they were organised by Communists in the East and Communists and Fellow-travellers in the West. But why should we adopt a negative attitude to the basic idea of these festivals? Might not the European Movement consider bringing together the youth and students of East and West Europe on a representative basis? Could not visits of influential people from Eastern European countries be organised not simply to one Western European country,

but to Western Europe — to examine, for example, the institutions of European unity at Brussels and Strasbourg?

Hard experience in the field of British-Soviet cultural relations over many years has taught me the difficulties and limitations. Nevertheless, I feel sure that in this field there is a positive role for the European Movement if it wishes to undertake it.

DR. JOHANN B. GRADL: The German delegation welcomes this Conference. The Federal Republic would like to be especially associated with the granting of the right to self-determination to the peoples of Eastern Europe.

The papers submitted to the Conference are based on the assumption that considerable changes are taking place in the Communist countries of Europe. It is believed that a certain rapprochement to the Western way of life can be noticed in the Soviet world and it is thus hoped that the political regime might undergo a change.

Such changes cannot be denied. But our hopes should not be raised too high. It would be an error to assume that the Communists are about to cease being Communists. They are still Communists and wish to remain Communists. The question for them is merely, how and in what way they can remain Communists. If today we notice changes in the Eastern block, these are not due to a better understanding, to changes of opinion or an internal revolution, but to political conditions in the world. The implications of an atomic war are known. It is also no secret that if journeys between East and West are made easier, this is because of the need for foreign currency. That is why we must not pin our hopes on this development. We know that the Communists will act against us provided the risk involved is limited; Berlin is an example of this.

We must, therefore, not be misled by the prospect of further changes. The result would be a policy of waiting, of the status quo, of a de facto recognition of the situation in Eastern Europe. The West should, of course, keep a close watch on all the changes taking place within the Eastern block, but should remain flexible in its reactions; the West should pursue a policy aiming at helping the peoples of Eastern Europe to obtain the freedom and rights in all spheres which we ourselves enjoy. In such a situation it is

advisable not to make any concessions without counter-concessions. Otherwise only the other side would gain advantages. At the same time our credibility would be impaired.

I am grateful that M. de la Vallée Poussin at the end of his report touched upon the question of Germany. We can only agree with his remarks. But I should like to make one further point: The problem of Germany cannot be adjourned for ever. There is a difference between Germany and the other European countries which only increases tension in Europe. There is a difference, if a whole nation through adverse circumstances is placed in an unfortunate situation, such as the East European nations, or whether a nation is divided and the large majority demand emphatically that the other part should be free as they are themselves. The temporary opening-up of the Berlin Wall, in one direction only, does not change the situation. At the same time a youth wishing to pass through the Wall in the opposite direction, was shot.

There is a further aspect: A whole generation is growing up in Germany who cannot be held responsible for the crimes of the previous generation. This generation hears about their fathers' guilt; they know that we put up with everything and offered too little resistance. They will ask themselves whether, in view of the German fate, they themselves might one day be guilty of the same crime.

It may be thought by some people that we speak only of our own problems. But I consider it my duty to mention facts which may lead to a conflict, before it is too late. Otherwise you might, quite rightly, reproach us one day: Why did you not tell us — you must have known.

COUNT EDWARD RACZYNSKI: I have agreed to take part in this conference because I believe it is in the interests of my country to have with the free world a contact as close and as constant as possible. In matters of trade and economics and in the cultural field, we should do all we can to promote contacts with Central and Eastern Europe. For, I must say that what has been done hitherto has not been enough. I do not wish here to preach prudence, but, on the contrary, to advise a little generosity. There are many initiatives which fail to achieve their desired ends, while others do so. What I would like to see would be the successful

initiatives developed and substantial sums raised to enable a much greater number of young people from Central and Eastern Europe to study or to complete their studies in the West. Such scholarships are rewarding only if they are for at least two years. Something more than a brief stay in the West is needed and, for the young people, it is possible to do much more than that.

As regards economic relations, the view that they should be extended has been supported on many occasions by my fellow countrymen residing in the free world. In particular, they have suggested granting of credits for the purchase of consumer goods and raw materials, and of equipment needed for the development of production.

Speeches made during this conference have shown that we all know how to distinguish between the peoples behind the Iron Curtain and the Governments which have been imposed upon them. In the cultural field, assistance has to be administered in such a way as to benefit those who are really worthy of it, rather than the minions of the regime.

MONSIEUR GERARD JAQUET: Today, the Soviet world no longer presents itself as it did. It has not the unity it used to have. Certain fissures are appearing. This means that it will gradually become possible for the countries of Eastern Europe, not, indeed, to free themselves, but at least to have regimes which are not those of former days. How can we facilitate this evolution? I think we must avoid two opposite errors.

First, the policy of isolation, based on the idea that the more these countries are isolated the quicker they will throw off their present regimes. I believe the reverse of this would happen, and that such a policy would rapidly bring about greater cohesion in the Communist world. On the contrary, we should establish relations on the cultural plane and on the commercial and economic planes. This is indispensable.

The second mistake to be avoided is that of complacency about the present situation. We can never deny the necessity for these countries to live in freedom. We must, at every opportunity, demonstrate the superiority of free regimes over authoritarian regimes. We should affirm this to everyone we meet in Eastern Europe. We said this in Moscow without the slightest equivocation and we are firmly resolved to repeat it over and over again.

We must let it be understood that the return of these countries to freedom will not be a return to their old regimes. If liberation could be achieved only by going back to their former economic systems, there would be no chance of that achievement. If men thirst for freedom, they thirst for social justice too. We must therefore reconcile the notion of justice with that of freedom. It is not to the Bolshevik, nor to the old capitalist system that we must commit ourselves, but to a new way altogether.

MR. ION RATIU: One can see at a glance that economic and cultural relations between Eastern and Western Europe have been growing constantly during the last few years. But the question has been raised whether Eastern Europeans, who are dedicated to serving their countries, should concern themselves with this. It is said that trade between East and West is growing because this is precisely what the East now wants and campaigns for and cultural relations, as far as the East is concerned, are almost always limited to sending to the West propagandists for the regimes. My friends and I have come to the conclusion that there must be a flaw in this argument. Framed in this way, the question is what is good for the rulers of Eastern Europe. But our concern must be what is good for the people of Eastern Europe. We believe in a pragmatic, functional approach. We feel that a constructive policy must not be concerned with fruitless recrimination about the past. It must look forward, eager to acknowledge and support any measures destined to serve the good of the people in our much-trying countries. We should recognise it as such, from whatever quarter it may come.

We do not regard the whole of Eastern Europe, either as a unit, or as a conglomeration of uniform states. We recognise a significant difference between them and plead that they be treated by the West independently, each on her own merits.

An increase in trade inevitably increases the welfare of the people engaged in it. Consequently, we do not fear more trade between East and West. But this trade must not be conducted for political purposes. Contact between peoples across frontiers, the exchange of ideas and first-hand acquaintance with other people's way of life and ideals, cannot but enrich all those who participate in it. Increased trade and cultural relations are not, and cannot be,

bad for our peoples. They can be used, as they have been used at times by unscrupulous rulers, for their own exclusive benefit and in defiance of the interest of the people. But should both East and West conduct their trade and cultural relations, not as weapons in an ideological war, but as substantive elements in an ever-increasing effort to bring about a richer, fuller life, we are for them.

DR. W. JAKSCH: A duel between optimism and pessimism has taken place. Many questions were put; not all were answered. It is agreed that contact with the East European countries is desirable. But the possibilities of such contacts vary from country to country. For example, Switzerland has not experienced a war. We have had Hitler, and the memory of this war affects our relationship with East Europe. The fact that the Soviet block has common Communist aims presents a further difficulty. We must examine the implications of this different situation in the West and East.

Above all nothing should be done which might help the regimes beyond the Iron Curtain. The decisive factor still remains the will for freedom of the East European peoples, the tacit allies of the West. Furthermore, in our relations with the Eastern countries, we must respect a certain minimum of Western solidarity. This applies particularly to cultural exchanges. In Canada I saw a propaganda film of Polish origin which disparaged the Federal Republic in Canadian eyes.

It will be very difficult to find a common initiative. Each country already possesses its traditional contacts. It would be desirable if the Cultural Committee could investigate how we could best co-ordinate these efforts.

We in Germany and in Berlin are not afraid of contacts with the Soviet block. We see no disadvantages in such contacts, even if we regret that certain circles of young people on the other side have no possibilities of paying counter-visits. The important thing is that we stick to our principles and do not lose ground when such contacts are established.

I should like to make a comment regarding the economic problems. I feel that the EEC is far too modest regarding its success. Mr. Rey expressed regret that the Eastern block had not yet recognized the Common Market. This will largely depend on the

EEC activities. In our relationship with the East we should consider European developments very much more.

A last remark: I regret that it was not possible to address a message to the peoples of Eastern Europe. Mr. Khrushchev circulated his memorandum about peaceful co-existence. We are satisfied with a few statements. We should have drafted a Message which might have given the peoples behind the Iron Curtain fresh impetus.

MONSIEUR MAURICE DEWULF: Any initiative taken in whatever field may clearly have important consequences for Europe. The present-day reality is that tension is lessening. Mr. Khrushchev speaks of peaceful co-existence, while President Kennedy spoke of active co-operation. If the two super Powers have a different political approach, their meeting point seems to be the desire to make some progress. It is necessary that Europe, as such, should show an active presence in every initiative and every dialogue.

MONSIEUR ANDRE BOURGEOIS-VOISON: In our cultural exchanges between the West and East we should emphasise the indispensability of communicating what we have achieved together since the last war. We, the members of the European Movement, conceived the re-birth of Europe and created a communal movement which has led to results of great importance. Thanks to the European institutions, a new method of economic research has led us to new conclusions. We approach problems in quite another manner, discussing them not only as between separate European countries but with the realisation that our countries share a common destiny. This profoundly modifies our intellectual reactions. It is very important to direct attention to this in our exchanges between West and East. It amounts to an economic revolution, but one which is intellectual and scientific, as well as technical. We shall be making a profound mistake if we do not urge its importance.

MR. PAVEL TIGRID: It would be a gross over-simplification to maintain that no dangers are involved in East-West contacts. For the West, it means accepting at face value the Khrushchev concept of peaceful co-existence and, indeed, of peace; for the Communist

countries, it means opening the gates to a confrontation of an outdated ideology to the realities and experience of a modern world. But it is not with fear but with knowledge, not with creeping suspicion but with missionary zeal that we should engage in this confrontation, this dialogue, this ascertaining of mutual positions and mutual possibilities. Of necessity, we shall be concerned with principles rather than with policies, with research rather than with persuasion, with an analysis of problems rather than their practical solution.

A lot of preparatory work is needed, on our side. This conference has revealed not only the scope of the problem but also the amount of work and research which is necessary to eliminate false notions and out-dated dogmatic concepts. It is here that we who come originally from Central and Eastern Europe can help. I hope that this help will be accepted by the European Movement in the spirit in which it is offered, not in terms of the cold war, not in terms of illusions of some social orders of the past, but as an intelligent, pragmatic, unbiassed approach to this experiment. For an experiment it is.

MONSIEUR KONRAD SIENIEWICZ: It seems to me that the essential objective of economic exchanges between West and East is to prevent the complete integration of the Central European countries in the economic system of the Soviet Union, and to provide them with an alternative conducive to economic expansion.

I am also in favour of cultural exchanges between West and East because I regard this as the best way of persuading Communists to recognise their mistakes.

The leaders of our great political movements in the West, Christian Democrat, Socialist, Liberal and others, should enter into discussions with representatives of Communism in order to convince them of the impotence of Communist teaching in the face of the scientific progress of the 20th century, and by that means to accelerate an intellectual development within Communism itself.

It seems to me that, in the existing situation, economic and cultural contact with Central Europe has become a duty incumbent upon Europeans, in order to re-create Europe as a whole, and to restore the economic and political equilibrium of this Continent. We must bring about direct relations between the countries of Central Europe and the institutions at Strasbourg. In this con-

nection, it may be opportune to create within our Commission of the European Movement, a third Commission — let us call it a legal sub-committee — which should be charged with the study of the possibility of including these countries in the legal system of Europe.

SUMMING - UP

By Senator Etienne de la Vallée Poussin

YOU have come here from the four corners of Europe, all bearing tidings from the Greater Europe. In an atmosphere of goodwill and collaboration, of research and obedience to truth, you have manifested your will to work for the good of all Europeans, those who are with us and those who are still separated from us.

I think we can draw one very general conclusion from our discussions. After a long interval of time, this Central and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement has been able to show its vitality. It has, indeed, reappeared on the surface with some splendour, affirming its intellectual vitality and its ability to understand the future and to work out appropriate lines of policy for the European Movement.

The business of your Commission is, first and foremost, to advise the European Movement. And in a field as important as that of relations between West and East, and facing a problem as delicate as that of the help we should give to friendly peoples divided from us by the Iron Curtain, the service we seek to render to the European Movement can be of very great importance.

We do not forget the peoples of the East, and it is important that they should know this. Of course, we are obliged to adapt our activities to time and circumstance. We have, all the time, to consider what efforts on our part will be most beneficial to them, and will most probably correspond to their wishes. For the present, what we are seeking, is the most effective way of helping them to healthier economic and cultural conditions. For, as they make economic and cultural progress, they will be better able to become masters of their own destiny and therefore more likely to attain self-determination. We seek to strengthen them in body, so that they themselves can save their souls.

REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION

By **PIERRE ABELIN**

Chairman of the Commission

THE Commission appointed to study economic relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has considered various possible views of the subject. It has rejected two of them and adopted a third. The first of these views was that it would be better not to develop economic relations with the countries of the East, in case this should reinforce an international Communism which is more eager to gain foreign markets and extend its influence than to raise the standard of life of its population. This view was rejected. The second view was that to extend economic relations with the Eastern countries would not be to the advantage of these countries, since they are tied willy-nilly to an over-ruling economy and have managed to achieve a certain equilibrium in their exchanges. This view, also, was rejected.

The third view was that the development of exchanges with the countries of Eastern Europe would improve their own economic situation, and the standard of living of their peoples, inasmuch as it would enable them to obtain from the West some of the equipment, materials and technical skills which they need for the fulfilment of their plans of industrialisation. This was the view we adopted.

The expansion of trade will lead these countries progressively to modify their foreign trade methods and their economic structures, which are at present too closely modelled on the Soviet system. Some adjustments in their internal and external methods would enable the Eastern European countries to take advantage of international division of labour, which has proved an effective means of increasing national income. Thus they would achieve, stage by stage, a certain degree of multilateralism in their foreign trade. A further step would thereby have been taken towards better international understanding and a relaxation of tension between East and West.

The expanding economy of Western Europe, and its progressive unification, impose new duties upon us in our relations with Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, it also relieves us of certain economic and financial anxieties.

Having agreed these general considerations, the Commission examined methods conducive to the development of trade with individual Eastern European countries. Note was taken of the changes in the flow of West European trade which have occurred since the war, and which have been accentuated by the setting up of EEC, and by important developments in agricultural production.

The principal obstacle to an increase in our trade with the countries of Eastern Europe is the difficulty they find in obtaining, through their exports, the foreign currencies they need to pay for their growing import needs. Various remedies were examined by the Commission, in particular:

(1) Defining by agreement with each of the Eastern European countries the criteria for evaluating trade exchanges, so as to permit their increase.

(2) The granting of credits, co-ordinated at a European level, as regards their object, which would enable the countries of Eastern Europe progressively to adapt their production to increased trade with the West, which will be chiefly in manufactured products.

(3) A triangular solution, proposed by Professor Byé whereby, through European credits granted to Africa, Eastern European countries could supply Africa with both consumer and capital goods, thereby acquiring financial means which would make it possible for West European industry to contribute to the development of trade with the East, without financial risk.

Solutions which would have been impossible a few years ago are doubtless becoming easier to apply in view of the

evolution which has taken place in Africa as well as Western Europe, and which seems to have begun in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Commission thinks it desirable that these suggestions, with any others likely to supplement them, should be passed on for further study to O.E.C.D., the Commission of E.E.C. and to E.F.T.A.

Moreover, the development of exchanges with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will necessitate a more and more extensive dialogue with representatives of those countries. This dialogue will have to be pursued in a truly European spirit and will thus contribute to the unity of Europe, which is so ardently desired.

REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CULTURAL COMMISSION

By **HANS OPRECHT**

Chairman of the Commission

IN summing up the discussion resulting from the reports presented to the Cultural Commission, I would say that, by and large, members expressed the hope that practical consequences would be drawn from the recommendations of both reports. Some sceptical voices were heard, mainly from the representatives of exiled political organizations, who believed that cultural exchanges carried more dangers than advantages for the West. However, even among the exiled politicians and diplomats, there were those who supported the broad principles stated in the reports. This was the opinion of Ambassador Edward Raczynski and Ambassador Gaetan Morawski.

I should like to emphasise the views expressed by the rapporteur during the discussion, with which I myself agree, that the very notion of cultural exchanges implies reciprocal advantages. The West has much to offer to the East, but one should not forget that the countries of Eastern Europe have a very rich and ancient culture. Their contribution is essential if we are to develop in all its richness and diversity the whole of the European cultural heritage. During the last few years, there has been an intellectual revival in Eastern Europe, in spite of the still existing limits on intellectual freedom, and Eastern Europe can offer an original contribution to the solution of the problems of our times. One must,

therefore, underline the element of reciprocity in cultural exchanges.

How can we define European culture? It goes beyond the notion of "Western culture" and beyond the notion of "Christian culture". What we are defending is essentially a pluralist notion, no element of which should be lost, whether it be Greek, Judeo-Christian, Germanic, Mediterranean, Slavonic, Byzantine, or Materialistic. If that is the case, a federalist conception would be best suited to our type of culture, and I propose that we should adopt a federalist viewpoint in our projects for cultural exchanges.

BI-LATERAL cultural agreements between governments are, of course, indispensable, but the cultural exchanges between East and West would gain a lot if they had also other bases — wider, through international organizations, and narrower, between local authorities. Private cultural organizations also have their part to play in these exchanges.

I suggest that the secretariat of the Central and Eastern European Commission should select from the reports and from the contributions to the discussion, some concrete proposals which the European Movement should adopt and help to implement.

APPENDIX A

REPORT PRESENTED TO THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION

THE Central and Eastern European Commission believes that in the present conditions the development of trade relations with Eastern Europe is useful and necessary and should be encouraged.

We believe that today the cause of freedom will best be served, if, rather than isolate these countries, we draw them closer to the West and develop our links with them, particularly in the field of economic relations.

Eastern Europe is not lost to the West. The Communist doctrine has made surprisingly little impact on the minds of the people. The young generation refuses to be taken in. The structures are proving ill conceived and ill adapted to the economy which becomes more complex as it becomes more industrially developed. Far-reaching reforms will have to be carried out.

The improved East-West relations will make it easier for the Eastern European governments to carry out the necessary changes. On our part, we in the West can help facilitate the changes so as to alleviate the lot of the Europeans in the East, defend the values and the principles we believe in and help shape the evolution of the Communist structure to something more in line with our own. This might have been an unrealistic task in the years gone by. It is no longer so today. In the years to come, in the economic as in other domains, it might well be that a constructive dialogue might be possible with these countries which could bring this about. We would welcome such a development.

The European Movement believes in the ultimate unity of the whole of Europe, including countries, such as those in the East, which so far have been kept out. The day will come when the unity of the whole of Europe will become a reality. However remote it might seem now we should prepare for it and do all we can to bring it about.

Problems resulting from the division of Europe must be approached and studied in the European spirit. Economic relations

with the countries of East Europe are one of them. The growing economic unity of Western Europe, and particularly the development of the Common Market, makes it both necessary and possible.

Trade with Eastern Europe is primarily a political problem.

During these last few years, as the climate of East-West relations has improved, Western Europe has shown increased readiness to develop her economic relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. Our countries have approached the resulting problems in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill. On our side few areas of trade still remain restricted by political or strategic considerations. In most fields the doors are now open. This is not only the case in Europe but also in the United States where obstacles to East-West trade are being increasingly relaxed. The sales of surplus agricultural products and particularly wheat is significant.

COMMUNIST BLOCK EFFORTS TO DEVELOP TRADE

A VAST political problem arises, however, on the Eastern side. Since the end of the war the East European countries, for political reasons, have been making a sustained effort to develop trade within the Communist block. The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (C.M.E.A.) has been set up to carry out this policy and co-ordinate the economies of the member countries. Until recently its chief concerns were the confrontation and co-ordination of national plans, promoting specialization throughout both industry and agriculture of the member countries, standardization, co-ordination of research, disseminating technical information and gathering statistics. In all these fields it can claim certain achievements to its credit. It has also attempted to co-ordinate and sponsor new investments and as a result the character, location and sometimes financing of new major industrial undertakings as

well as the marketing of their products is jointly planned within the framework of this organisation. In more recent years it has attempted to remove certain monetary obstacles to trade by trying to create within the system of bilateral trade agreements between block countries an area of multilateral payment, and by setting up a bank to facilitate clearings. Although the C.M.E.A. has succeeded in eliminating some of the more blatant absurdities in the inter-block trade, it cannot in any respect be thought of in terms of an Eastern Common Market, nor can it ever become one. Rather it can be compared to the O.E.C.D. in the West.

COUNTRIES MUST BE CONSIDERED INDIVIDUALLY

HOWEVER similar their economic structures and the problems that arise therefrom, even in the case of Yugoslavia who never belonged and of Albania who dropped out of the C.M.E.A., we should always consider these countries individually and never as a group. From the political point of view this distinction is even more important as the interests, aspirations and attitudes of the East European countries vary and the differences between them become more pronounced.

As a result of this policy of concentration on inter-block trade, the pre-war patterns of trade have been radically changed. These changes have been further accentuated by the post-war agricultural evolution in the West which limits Western Europe's needs for imported foodstuffs.

It will, therefore, require a deliberate and sustained effort on the part of these countries to expand their trade with the West.

There are strong economic reasons why they should want to do so. Only in the West can they quickly acquire much of the equipment, materials and manufacturing know-how needed for their ambitious industrial plans. The very development of their industrial production, unavoidably accompanied by increased specialisation, creates new import requirements. It also requires contact with foreign methods and techniques. Finally, the pressure for an increased standard of living, more, better quality and more varied consumer goods — which has been too long suppressed — is beginning to make itself felt and will call for an expansion of foreign

trade. The Western world is far and away best placed to satisfy these needs. All these economic reasons press for an expansion of trade with the West.

The difficulty lies, however, in the capacity of these countries to earn through exports the foreign exchange needed to pay for their very considerable import requirements.

It is unlikely that much increased earning could result from greater exports of agricultural products or fuels to Western markets. The difficulties in this respect are well known. It can only come about through an expansion of exports of manufactures. Indeed, as the post-war history of Western Europe shows, economic growth and industrial expansions tend to be accompanied by a considerable expansion in the foreign trade in manufactures. Greater exports from Eastern Europe of these categories of goods would be in keeping with this natural tendency.

While awaiting payments many Western countries are led to grant credits to the East European countries in order to finance trade. These credits cover the sale of both consumer and capital goods. They are, however, but a transitory measure equally awkward for both sides. In order to prevent a credit race a common attitude is presently tending to develop among Western countries, though not without some difficulty. The problem, however, arises today for the whole of the Western Alliance.

NECESSARY CHANGES IN ECONOMIC POLICIES

THE improved climate of East-West relations will have a favourable influence on trade. It will create better confidence in the future and greater stability which will help both sides to plan ahead. It should also help the Eastern European governments to carry out necessary changes in their economic policies, methods and structures in order to develop their foreign trade. Such changes are necessary and unavoidable, since they hamper their economic relations, not only with the free world, but also with one another.

Most of the difficulties stem from their very economic structure, which is modelled on the Soviet pattern. This was originally devised by the Soviet Union, which aimed at achieving economic self-sufficiency. It is inappropriate, however, if advantage is to be

taken of the international division of labour which proves again and again to be one of the most effective means of increasing the national income and hence the standard of living of the people. Nor is it suitable, for that matter, to the needs of a modern industrialised economy.

Under the Communist system physical planning of production and distribution has taken the place of the market forces regulating the development of free economies. Prices no longer play the same function as in the free world and do not provide the yardstick for commercial exchanges. The Eastern European countries, therefore, do not have the same criteria that we have in the West, and indeed, it is doubtful if they have any but the roughest means of estimating the profitability of foreign trade. In the absence of the price criteria there is no way of fixing a generally applicable rate of exchange for any one of their currencies. This prevents multilateral trade, and the implementation of a multilateral system of payments. Instead, they have to operate a wasteful system of bilateral trading through trade treaties defining the value of the goods to be exchanged and regulating payments.

By the same token, the total export earnings within any one system of payments matters more than the earnings of any one product, the price of which can be adjusted at will, without reference to its price on the home market. Such adjustments can be carried the more easily as all the foreign trade is done by the State through a handful of state trading organisations.

CONTROLS CANNOT LIGHTLY BE DISCARDED

THE countries of Western Europe have liberalised their payments with the countries of Eastern Europe so that they can freely convert into other currencies the proceeds of their export earnings. Although the trade treaties with the West indicate the value of each category of Western export, this is largely meaningless as only in exceptional cases does any one of them still carry any export restriction. They can, therefore, switch their purchases as they like as the lists of goods to be exchanged are on the whole indicative and not binding. The Western countries, however, can hardly lightly discard controls, such as import quotas, on Eastern European exports.

Cases of unfair trading, and particularly of dumping, on the part of Eastern European countries have fortunately not been very frequent in the past. Neither have there been many cases in recent years of using trade to promote illegitimate political ends. It is generally in the interest of the Eastern European countries, chronically short of foreign exchange, to sell at a fair price and maximise their earnings. As long, however, as they are in a position to act differently the free economy countries must be on their guard.

So long as the exports of the Eastern European countries play only a marginal part in the foreign trade of the free world — as they do at present — the resulting problems are relatively minor. Should these countries wish, however, substantially to develop their trade with the West — as we hope they will — the absence of common criteria for fair trading will be one of the main difficulties to be overcome.

FREE ACCESS TO BUSINESS CONTACTS NEEDED

ATENTION should also be drawn to certain practices of the Eastern European countries. Normal contact with Western traders, industrialists and bankers is limited to the bare minimum. All the alleged political and security reasons are manifestly absurd. Western businessmen should have free and unrestricted access to all their business contacts in these countries — including the possibility of establishing agencies and trading outposts. Only through widespread and sustained contacts can new business opportunities be discovered and trade developed.

The solution to all these problems will require a great deal of good will and understanding on both sides.

The countries of Western Europe in the formulation of their trade policies should take into account the interest of Eastern Europe, take steps to develop trade and generally help these countries to work out satisfactory solutions to their export problems.

It will be up to the East European Governments however to make the greater effort to develop trade as they will have to expand and diversify their export production with all that this implies as regards investments and modification of plans. Moreover they will have to take steps to encourage foreign trade and create

the necessary climate of good will and confidence. These countries will be the first to reap the advantages.

They should in particular establish close links with the great European institutions and organisations, such as the E.E.C., the E.F.T.A., and O.E.C.D., in order to study and work out solutions to all the numerous problems resulting from an increased trade.

The European Economic Community has already intimated that it would welcome the establishment of diplomatic channels with the Eastern European countries. This is indicative of the spirit in which a united Europe will approach these questions and the Eastern countries should avail themselves of this offer.

We have indicated above some of the principal problems, but many more will arise. As trade develops a wide-ranging dialogue on all these matters, carried on at all levels, should prove of great benefit in that respect. It should be carried on in the true European spirit since it will be held between fellow Europeans and concerns European problems. In that way the painful division of Europe, at least in this particular economic field, will be lessened and a process set in train to prepare the ground for a better future which will carry us nearer to our ultimate aim of the unity of the whole of Europe.

Rapporteur : JOHN POMIAN

APPENDIX B

REPORT PRESENTED TO THE CULTURAL COMMISSION : I

CONFRONTED by the problem of cultural exchanges with the communist world, the West had apparently to choose between two solutions: isolation or communication. By a curious paradox, isolation was recommended, in the West, by the most virulent of the anti-communists ranging from the advocates of encirclement down to the McCarthyists. But Stalin alone was in a position to impose isolation by substituting an impenetrable iron curtain for an intermittent and penetrable *cordon sanitaire*. In fact it seems clear that for the West, this choice was only apparent: isolation can be enforced only by a totalitarian régime, which is why Stalin so easily managed to do it. The West could not do this effectually without renouncing the pluralism and the freedoms which are the real justification of the case. The Western advocates of isolation were not only shackled by this contradiction. Their choice was the product of two convictions which they shared with the orthodox communists. First, it was affirmed on both sides, with opposite emotional emphases, that the communist bloc was monolithic and unchangeable — or rather, that its inherent purpose was to develop unilaterally, towards the paranoiac world of '1984' (as seen from

the one side) or towards the universal classless society (as seen from the other). And what is more, those Western anti-communists who advised isolation, the *cordon sanitaire*, showed that they shared the communists' own faith in the magnetic power of what seemed to them to be, apparently, an idea incarnate, a revolution on the march.

Today however it is obvious to everyone that the communist world is neither monolithic nor unchangeable. And it is quite equally clear that communism has lost the force of attraction with which its millenarian fascination endowed it, though to some eyes this was as horrible as the 'Medusa face' described by Thierry Maulnier. No longer a Siren nor a Medusa, the Soviet Empire now appears to most men in its true and de-sanctified image as a powerful but deeply disunited empire, in no way exempt from evolution.

Finally, all judgements of value apart, only the prospect of 'liberation' could give even a semblance of logic to the position taken up by the advocates of isolation. As the events of 1956 demonstrated, the Western powers have renounced any implementa-

tion of a policy of forcible liberation of peoples under communist domination, even if those people themselves revolt and call for help. Soviet policy in the Cuban crisis showed that in the opposite camp also, any idea that the schism between the two worlds can be overcome by physical victory is excluded. So we are henceforth committed to that co-existence called 'peaceful' which is really competition by all means short of war.

Mr. Krushev has expressed his conviction that our children will be communists. Probably it is no longer so clear to him as it was before the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet schism, that the world need only become communist to enjoy lasting peace. Our own position is less bound up with a particular ideological conception: the communist régime would have only to admit the plurality of the world, to allow its subject countries the free choice of their destiny, and accord freedom of thought and expression to all its subjects, and a lasting international order would begin.

MYTH OF THE PAST AND A MYTH OF THE FUTURE

THE attractive power of communism may be said to have been based upon a myth of the past and a myth of the future. The myth of the past was that every decision taken by the Party was not only necessary, but the only right decision. In the eyes of enlightened communists this ineluctable necessity excused the crimes of which they were active or passive accomplices. Krushev's 'secret speech' of February 1956 exploded this myth of the past. The myth of the future was that the victory of communism on the universal scale would amount to the arrival of a unified world. The official revelation of the Sino-Soviet conflict in June 1963 has exploded the myth of the future.

The lifting of the curtain over the past ushered in the revisionist epoch of communism; for if the Party was not always right, that means it *is* not always right. If it has not always incarnated the meaning of history, it has no monopoly of that meaning. And, although the Party has admitted much, it has not been able to explain, in terms compatible with its ideology, how what it admits could have happened.

The lowering of the curtain over the future is the beginning of

the polycentrist epoch of communism. Accentuation of the Sino-Soviet conflict has been followed by an increase of autonomy in the countries which seemed to be the most irrevocably committed to the fate of 'satellites': in Rumania, in Czechoslovakia, even in Bulgaria. Among communist countries only Albania and Yugoslavia seem to hope for the definitive 'excommunication' of the U.S.S.R. by China or of China by the U.S.S.R., and they do so for analogous reasons, for it is they who would pay the costs of an apparent 'reconciliation'. Though all the other communist countries multiply their 'good offices', that is not in order to reconcile the antagonists, but because if there is, at the centre of the communist world, 'an hour that is Moscow's' and 'an hour that is Pekin's', all the other hours on the dial are now at their disposal.

NEW PLURALISM OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD

THIS new pluralism of the communist world is of particular interest to us here, at this Conference of the European Movement's Commission on Central and Eastern Europe. In the domain of cultural exchanges, Poland played the part of a pioneer. But, whilst the tacit agreement that binds the Polish communist régime to the real country has hardly ever been infringed in fundamental matters — the non-collectivization of agriculture and the *modus vivendi* with the Catholic Church — in the domain of cultural liberties, Poland is no longer in the forefront of the bloc. It is the contrary evolution that we see in Hungary, where the Kadar régime, after accomplishing its sad task of repression, seems to have granted its subjects freedoms which are not negligible in their cultural exchanges abroad. In the course of 1963, those Eastern countries that seemed the most docile in their behaviour as satellites have taken unexpected advantage of their freedom of manoeuvre since the Sino-Soviet schism. Czechoslovakia is in full intellectual ebullition, and quite new prospects for cultural relations appear to be opening up with Rumania and Bulgaria.

In an accompanying Report you will find factual data and particulars about the cultural exchanges between the West and the Eastern European countries. But if we wish to outline here a 'policy' of cultural exchanges, if we want to discuss the spirit in

which such exchanges ought to be conceived, we must first speak about the U.S.S.R. Indeed, it is only by force that the U.S.S.R. is present in the countries of the communist world; and in the end it is upon the internal evolution of the U.S.S.R. that developments in those countries will depend, even if the degree of their alignment is no longer the same as before.

The communist world is in a profound crisis — of régime, of ideology and of structure. Underlying this crisis there is a thirst for knowledge, a thirst for objective information, a thirst for truth. There lies the indisputable advantage of the Western world in the domain of cultural exchanges. For what is in question — freedom for individual thought and enquiry — is a reality in the democratic countries of the West. The Stalin régime was inaccessible to reason, invulnerable to the truth. But from the moment when the Party decided, if it were but to ensure its own collective security, to renounce sanguinary purges, it had abandoned the permanent state of terror which alone could assure the smooth working of that monstrous closed shop.

POINTS TO EXAMINE IN KRUSCHEV'S SPEECH

IT is true that nothing in the social or political system of the U.S.S.R. guarantees that this change of climate is irreversible. Indeed, sceptical voices are sometimes heard in the West, casting doubt upon the long-term value of cultural exchanges with the East. If such exchanges are really dangerous to the Soviet régime, they say, if they really tend towards an intellectual liberalism which would undermine the orthodox ideology, who can assure us that at the first warning the Soviet machine may not go into reverse and 're-Stalinize' after having 'de-Stalinized'?

Upon that point, it is instructive to examine the speech made by Mr. Krushev on the 8th March 1963 before an audience including the Praesidium of the Party and the majority of the most distinguished personalities in Soviet cultural life; and also to note the consequences of this discourse—which in the West was at once interpreted precisely as the sign of a 're-Stalinization' of the cultural life. To realize the range of the threats that Mr. Krushev uttered, one must have recourse to some quotations:

'Let us analyse what would happen to Soviet art if the partisans of peaceful co-existence between different ideological tendencies had their way with literature and art. In the first place a blow would have been struck at our revolutionary conquests in socialist art. According to the logic of the struggle, things would not stop there. There is no certainty but that these people having regained strength would try to attack the achievements of the Revolution'.

The importance that Mr. Krushev accords to literature and art (which seem to him — these are his own words — a veritable 'Trojan Horse' menacing the foundations of the régime) finds expression several times over in his speech:

'Our people and our Party will not tolerate any assault upon our monolithic unity. The attempt to impose peaceful co-existence of ideologies upon us is the manifestation of such an attempt. That is why we open fire upon these harmful ideas and against their supporters . . .'

'Abstract art and formalism, whose right to existence in socialist art is demanded by some of its advocates, is one of the forms of bourgeois ideology. It is to be deplored that certain people, including some artists instructed by experience of life, do not understand this'.

Note, in particular, that when Mr. Krushev speaks of the 'abstract' and 'formalism' he is using a kind of semantic confusion developed in the U.S.S.R. under Stalin. Just as everything which was opposed to the Stalinist dogmas was dubbed 'fascist', the terms 'abstract' and 'formalism' are now arbitrarily attached to anything in art or literature that does not blindly follow the directives of the Party. Only that confusion can explain why abstract art, the origin of which is anti-bourgeois and revolutionary, is in Mr. Krushev's opinion synonymous with bourgeois art. Mr. Krushev did not stop at these generalities. He said that:

'It sometimes happens that the journeys of our writers in foreign countries far from being useful, turn out to be against our country . . . the visits to France of the writers Nekrassov, Paustovsky and Voznessensky have left disagreeable impressions. Kataiev made some ill-considered reflections during his journey across America'.

Other artists and other writers were belaboured in Krushev's speech. Foreign observers waited with some disquietude for expulsions or punishments to follow. The reactionary 'aparatchiki' of literature and the arts in the U.S.S.R. and those who were nostalgic for Stalinism did not conceal their joy. Thus, writing in the *Pravda* of 3 April, 1963, Leonid Sobolev made this comment upon the speech of 8 March:

'An attack — it is what we were waiting for; an attack along the whole front, in the matter of teaching, on the plane of ethics, in art, in the attitude towards work; an attack on the grand scale, well-organized, irresistible! The offensive has been launched, and here are the first successes . . .'

Yet none of these artists, none of these writers whom Mr. Krushev attacked by name has been expelled from the Party or from his professional union. Most of them have made ambiguous self-criticisms, which leave them entire freedom for future creation. Some have refused any self-criticism.

For example, let us look at an especially striking case, that of the sculptor Ernest Neizvestny. Here we have an artist who (whatever Mr. Krushev says) is not at all abstract, but who uses the language of modern sculpture in an expressionist spirit. The English Marxist critic John Berger described him in the *Observer* as 'a great modern sculptor'. In the speech of the 8 March, Mr. Krushev said of him:

'We saw last time the loathsome confections of Ernest Neizvestny, and we are indignant that this man, who is not without aptitude, who has passed through a superior Soviet school, can be so ungrateful to the people. Unfortunately he is not alone in this among artists. We have seen other products of abstract art too'.

On the 15 March, Neizvestny declared, in a self-criticism:

'The artist should strive to attain to the expressive, and to nourish his art with ideas. In fact, the idea has always been the cornerstone of expressionism . . . Once again I have said to myself: One must work harder yet, one must work better, commit oneself more deeply to the idea, put more expression into one's work. Only in that way can the artist serve his country and the people.'

What is this artist saying here, which is not in confirmation of the style that is his own?

On the 21 June, Mr. Krushev, speaking of Neizvestny before the Central Committee of the C.P., said:

'I want to believe that this is an honest and gifted man . . .

Perhaps it is out of place, when one is speaking about the abstracts, to refer everything back to the sculptor Neizvestny.'

On the 20 November, the Tass Agency announces that Ernest Neizvestny has received orders for the portraits of several Soviet leaders . . .

Since that speech by Krushev, fear has often been expressed that cultural exchanges with the U.S.S.R. will lose much of their value, if Soviet art and literature are represented by such as Sobolev, Kotchetov and Serov. But the Soviet cultural delegation to the United States last November included the excellent young poet Rojdestvensky — the same who, after the end of 1956, wrote in his poem 'The Morning' about 'a terrible being who subjected men to his power without mercy and who obliged them to serve him and him alone'.

THE VOICE OF A NEW GENERATION

IF this is the way of things — if despite all the cries of 'Halt!', the setbacks and the counter-attacks of the reactionaries, the live forces in the Soviet intelligentsia show such a remarkable power of resistance — it is certainly not due to the 'clemency' or 'liberalism' of the leaders, but rather because the authors who get reprimanded are no longer isolated in Soviet society, for they represent the voice of a new generation living in a social environment which is no longer that of a closed totalitarian system. That indeed is just why they get blamed. It is also the reason why it will doubtless be impossible to impose any lasting silence upon them.

If we take it as proven that: (1) The communist world is no longer monolithic and that henceforth there is a problem of cultural relations between different communist countries, and that these in their turn have relations with the Western and with the uncommitted countries — relations which are not absolutely synchronized; (2) The Soviet bloc (apart from communist China)

is in the throes of a profound crisis, manifest in every domain, one corollary of which is a growing desire for individual knowledge, for freedom of thought and authentic creation; (3) The cultural exchanges between the East and the West are in themselves an influence that favours the evolution of the communist world — we have yet to consider the spirit which, on our side, ought to govern those relations.

TWO EXTREME WAYS OF LOOKING AT EXCHANGES

FIRST of all, we must avoid two extreme ways of looking at the problem of these exchanges: that of the propagandist, and that of the flatterer suffering from an inferiority complex. The propagandist approaches the Eastern countries as though they were still totalitarian, denying the transformations they have undergone since the death of Stalin. And he claims to address them in the name of 'Christian civilization' or of 'humanism', as though these conceptions of life or of society were, on our side, fully realized by the facts. He talks thus in terms of a Manichaeic dualism, as if there were on the one side a totalitarian hell, and a Utopian democratic society on the other. In doing this, the propagandist is throwing away the principal advantage that Western civilization can offer to men of the East — the conception of it as the climate most favourable to individual knowledge, to the formation of objective judgments: whereas, if we admit from the start that this dialogue is taking place between two social systems which are both imperfect, we are giving prominence to one of the most positive elements in our society — the ability to admit its own imperfections, a prior condition for the power to remedy them. At that point, our interlocutor who, as an individual, wants to study and even discuss with us the imperfections of his own society, finds himself confronted with the very worst thing he has to endure every day — the pretensions of a uniform, obligatory ideology that tries to disguise if not deny the facts.

Need we add this: that in the West there are men (and indeed régimes) that oppose communism with a virulent hatred, but did not, and do not put up any resistance to other totalitarian methods? Obviously such persons cannot be representatives for

the West, any more than the 'aparatchiki' nostalgic for Stalinism could speak for the Soviet intelligentsia.

At the opposite pole to the propagandist is the Westerner who is so fascinated by the very possibility of conversation with the East that he hates to formulate the slightest criticism in face of his interlocutor for fear of bringing the dialogue to an end. It must not be supposed that this type of 'flatterer' is recruited only from the so-called 'progressive' Western intelligentsia. We know of certain international associations, which exist expressly to promote the dialogue with the East and which include Western persons of every kind of political and cultural outlook; but whose leaders, naturally seeking to perpetuate their work, try to exclude all real discussion from the dialogue. In its stead they pay mutual homage to Peace, to Culture and to Man, regardless of the numberless ambiguities that these well-worn words convey to the one side and the other.

A PARADOX ONLY IN APPEARANCE

AMONG men of the Left in the West, it is those who profess Marx or Marxism who are usually least inclined to flatter their Soviet interlocutors. This is paradoxical only in appearance. 'Orthodox' Marxism as it is taught in the U.S.S.R., degraded into an ideology, has lost all hold upon reality; and it is not surprising that it exasperates the Western adherents to a Marxism that is still living and therefore heretical.

On the other hand, among the best Western writers there are some who, without being Marxists, remain fascinated by its original project of a communist society, and their attitude of apparent respect for the Soviets' cultural achievements conceal an unconscious contempt for the Soviet intellectuals, or for their public! They seem, in effect, to be saying: 'Over here we have good literature but no public. You have a poor literature, but it is what your enormous public wants, and we approve of your sacrificing the quality of your work to your public.' Several declarations of this tenor were made by good Western minds at the encounter in Leningrad during September 1963. It seems incomprehensible that intellectuals who criticize the low standards obtaining in the

means of mass-communication in the West, and condemn them for 'contempt of the public', should think that an analogous attitude in the U.S.S.R. is a kind of respect for the public . . . In the U.S.S.R. itself, voices have been raised against that sort of sophism.

Even an old producer of films like Ivan Pyriev, in an article in *Pravda* in December, 1963, put the critics on guard against underestimating the spectators. And the 'Almanac of the Soviet Film' of 1957 stated that the conceptions imposed upon producers in Stalin's time 'had transformed the art into something redolent both of a newspaper and of a class-room'.

A word remains to be said about one quite understandable and respectable scruple that is rather prevalent in the West, and makes some writers hesitate whether or not to speak well of another writer or artist of a communist country, for fear that praise published in the West might do him harm. It seems to us that this scruple would have less weight, but for the existence of an analogous and less scrupulous tendency to praise every work from a communist country that expresses opposition to the régime, regardless of its quality. Dialogue between writers, between intellectuals and between artists of the East and the West — we do not now speak, of course, of that of cultural officials — ought to be based upon a mutual respect which excludes propaganda, which excludes flattery, and it should be governed by the same critical standards as they employ professionally.

IDEOLOGY DERIVED FROM THE FORCE OF A WESTERN IDEA

LET us not forget, lastly, that in speaking to communist intellectuals of the East we are dealing with men subjected to an ideology that has grown sclerotic, but is derived from the force of an idea which was one of the products of Western thought.

That is what Herbert Luthy underlined in his article published in *Preuves* in October, 1963: it is with a quotation from that article that we will terminate this exposition:

'The spiritual crisis of communism in power, which has been implicit throughout its whole history, in its discords and its purges, and is now in full view, has always been the contradiction between the noble project and the abject reality, between

the end and the means, between the humanist inspiration and the technique of totalitarian power, between faith and fact. For, as it is expressly said in the new programme of the Soviet Communist Party, communist society, unlike all the spontaneously formed societies of history, is precisely that society which wills to be consciously invented and constructed. In communist doctrine, man is a thing that remains to be made. 'The fundamental problem of communist society lies in this challenge that it presents to the spontaneity of the social process. It is a problem worthy of reflecting upon. For we ought not too easily to believe that the Western model, of a society delivered over to the spontaneity and even to the mere muddle, of material desires, is patently and indisputably convincing. If we consent to ponder this problem, or these two complementary problems, and if we refrain from reducing the debate to the elementary polemics of efficiency and of quantitative standards of life, we shall discover that, between the communist aim and ourselves there still remain traces of a common language, of common origins and values which may render the dialogue possible and productive. Whereas Nazism, which erected brute force into an end, never knew these problematics nor these crises. In confronting the East, let us beware that, by denying all community of spiritual origination and therefore all possibility of dialogue, we do not also renounce part of our own heritage, which is not reducible simply to the apophthegms of a pragmatic liberalism.'

We have restricted ourselves by design, in this Report, to a study of the possible incidence of East-West cultural exchanges upon the evolution of the communist world, and we have indicated what is, to our mind, the spirit that should preside over such exchanges. A number of practical problems remain, which certain participants in the Cultural Commission of our Conference know very well, by having had to face them. Their experience is precious, and it would be a happy thought if this Conference enabled them to share in it, with others who are pursuing the same aims in Western Europe. Our Commission might even, perhaps, outline the methods, not so much of 'co-ordination' as of communication between men who, at the heart of governments, in international organizations and private associations are directing and organizing

the contacts between East and West on the practical plane; not forgetting the Slav language experts, the sociological specialists in the problems of the East, and the writers who have special experience of Eastern Europe.

Finally, our Commission could no doubt point out once again how urgent it is for Western Europe, today so prosperous and so

justly proud of that prosperity, which it often adduces as a pragmatic argument in discussions with the East, to find the funds, governmental or private, which may at last enable it to undertake a programme of study grants and of cultural radiation, comparable to that which the United States has been pursuing, and steadily developing, for several years.

Rapporteur : K. A. JELENSKI

APPENDIX C

REPORT PRESENTED TO THE CULTURAL COMMISSION : 2

The purpose of this document is to illustrate the pattern of existing cultural exchanges between the countries of Eastern Europe and the United Kingdom, France and the German Federal Republic.

The above countries were chosen as most representative for Western European attitudes towards the problem. Other countries, like Austria or Sweden, may develop a slightly different pattern due to their special position vis-a-vis the communist world. Nevertheless, it is adequate to consider the material presented herewith in the general context of continuous development of East-West contacts in the cultural, scientific and tourist sphere.

UNITED KINGDOM

THE programme of cultural exchanges between the United Kingdom and the countries of Eastern Europe shows steady progress. Poland has taken a marked lead with several hundred scholars, specialists and students visiting each country every year. According to the British Council, there are far more candidates on the Polish side, wishing to visit the U.K., than there are available funds and places. The difficulties of the British side are centered

upon finding a sufficient number of candidates wishing to travel to East European countries for the purpose of study — for it is the general policy of East European governments to adhere to the principle of reciprocation.

Exchanges with Hungary have been particularly fruitful in the past three years and show a definite tendency for further development. Bulgaria, Rumania and Czechoslovakia are falling behind, yet the latter seems to show more interest in cultural contacts, following the recent visit to Britain of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister.

Another interesting observation regarding the pattern of exchanges with Eastern Europe concerns the Eastern European Governments' insistence on promoting the visits of technical and scientific personnel, rather than the representatives of arts and other humanities. The British government, however, is of the opinion that the exchanges must cover all fields of arts and sciences without favouring either of them.

GERMANY

THE cultural relations of Western Germany with the countries under 'popular democracy', which hardly existed during the Stalin era, have begun to develop since 1956, the year of the first instal-

ment of the 'thaw' and of 'liberalization' in the Soviet bloc. At first, it seemed that the only way of arranging these exchanges would be through official channels, under bi-lateral agreements between the respective governments. Such was in fact the case in regard to cultural contacts with the Soviet Union. Cultural relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the U.S.S.R. were regulated by the agreement of the 30 May 1959 (the text of which is published in the official bulletin 'Bundesanzeiger' Nos. 160 and 195), which had been settled in principle during the visit of the Federal Chancellor Adenauer to Moscow in September 1955. This agreement fixes exactly, for a definite period (two years), all the categories of cultural exchange to be effected, the number of exchanges, the numbers of participants and the technical means of carrying them out — the organizing of journeys, granting of visas, financing, etc. On the German side, supervision of the implementation of the treaty devolves upon the 'Zentrale Austauschstelle' (central office of exchanges) at Bonn, which in its turn comes within the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

There was some expectation that the forms agreed upon between the Soviet Union and Western Germany would serve as an example for the organisation of cultural exchanges between the latter and the other communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Things took a different course however. The method of bilateral agreements proved impracticable because of the difference of opinion between the governments concerned as to the interpretation of the status of West Berlin. The Federal Government of Western Germany desires that cultural exchanges with the old capital of the Reich — which constitutes one of the provinces (Länder) of Western Germany — should be included in every international treaty to which it is an interested party.

The communist régimes, on their side, are bound by the Soviet theory of the 'three German states', which treats West Berlin as a 'free city' separate from the rest of Federal Germany. In consequence, they have not agreed, up till now, to put their signatures upon any document recognizing the right of the German Federal Government to exercise any power over the territory of West Berlin. Similar difficulties have also arisen during negotiations between the G.F.R. and the U.S.S.R. over the renewal of the agreement of the 30 May 1959 that we have just mentioned: the

conclusion of a new treaty is still awaited. Naturally the obstacle appears all the more difficult to surmount in the case of the satellite countries where there are no precedents to build upon nor even any diplomatic relations in the proper sense of the term. That is why, for example, the purely informative talks on the subject of an eventual agreement between Poland and the German Federal Republic, begun two years ago by the intermediation of the Polish commercial mission at Frankfurt, had so soon to be given up.

STILL, it is not impossible that the latest development in the relations between Western Germany and the communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where we now see commercial missions established on both sides, may bring about a change in the situation. In the commercial agreements that Poland, followed by Hungary and Rumania, have signed with the Federal Republic of Germany, the 'Berlin clause' in the Bonn Government's version has been explicitly recognized. Will this break-through on the commercial front facilitate an accord in the cultural domain? At the moment no one can tell. However, we learnt at the end of November 1963 that the Rumanian representatives had exchanged views with the authorities of Federal Germany upon the possibility of a cultural agreement between the two countries.

One might, therefore, conclude, with reason, that if the cultural contacts of the German Federal Republic with the Central and Eastern countries of Europe depended solely upon co-operation upon the official plane, the situation today would be practically unchanged in comparison with the beginning of the 'fifties'. In reality, however, obstacles of a political and diplomatic order have been powerless to prevent the growth of these contacts. On the contrary, the absence of the governmental element has if anything facilitated them. Today nearly all the 'popular democratic' countries carry on cultural relations with Western Germany as well as with West Berlin.

The intensity of these exchanges varies, of course, from country to country. And obviously, cultural relations with Federal Germany were not resumed by all at the same time. For instance, in the case of Poland, the first contact made dates from 1955, whereas Western Germany's cultural exchanges with Czechoslovakia were

at that time rather rare. It is only since 1958/59 that these began to gain momentum; which can be explained, in great measure, by the different pace of de-Stalinization in these two countries. And apart from this, there are other factors that determine the amount and the frequency of cultural exchange between a 'popular democracy' and Western Germany: geographic proximity, traditional relationships prior to the rupture provoked by the communist régime; and above all the degree of interest that the West German public takes in a satellite country's cultural products. It is probable, for example, that — other conditions being equal — the German Federal Republic's cultural exchanges with Czechoslovakia will always be more intensive than those with Bulgaria; Czechoslovakia being its only immediate neighbour, linked by numerous cultural traditions, whereas Bulgaria is remote and has in the past belonged rather to the cultural orbit of France.

It is of interest to note that the political and ideological schism that has now come to light in the communist bloc is also reflected in the cultural relations of the Central and Eastern European countries with the German Federal Republic. For example, the fact that Yugoslavia had disengaged herself from the grip of the Soviets fifteen years ago made it possible for her cultural exchanges with the free world, including Western Germany, to develop more normally, though without attaining their pre-war level or intensity. On the other hand, the political rapprochement between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia which, among other things, has brought about the latter's diplomatic and juridical recognition of East Germany, has provoked a rupture of her official relations with the German Federal Republic because of the Hallstein doctrine; and this rupture in turn compromises, for some time, their cultural relations. Nevertheless, when the Soviet Union embarked upon a policy of easing the situation, the majority of the satellites followed suit, and this has also eased the resumption of cultural relations between these countries and the West. Meanwhile, the circumstance that Albania finished by taking the 'dogmatic' side in the ideological quarrel that so convulsed the Communist camp and never underwent the two waves of de-Stalinization that the other countries were subjected to, may explain why Albanian cultural relations with Federal Germany remain at the level of the Stalin epoch — namely, at absolutely zero.

FRANCE

THE year 1962 saw the confirmation of the hopes born in 1961 of exchanges with the countries of Eastern Europe. If, in some of them, the activities of France are still less than they sometimes were in the past, there are others, the U.S.S.R. in particular, where the position gained by France is not only very favourable but privileged. France is in fact the only Western country which has lecturers teaching in the great Soviet Universities and educational institutions: six in 1961 and eight in 1962. Nor is their work limited to the educational domain. They respond actively to the many invitations they receive; give addresses on various aspects of contemporary France, act as producers of theatrical companies and collaborate with the Soviet Universities in works upon literature, civilization and philosophy. Each one of them is thus, in himself, a centre of diffusion not only of the language but of the civilization of France. It is not without significance that the one French representative in Leningrad should be a cultural representative; and we can measure the results by the fact that in Leningrad University one can hear Molière played in French by Soviet students.

There is also French collaboration in the domain of science since the nomination of a scientific attaché to the Cultural Service at the French Embassy. Charged primarily with the organization of the exchanges of scientists between the two countries in accordance with the protocols of scientific agreement, this Professor, a Doctor of Science, has been cordially welcomed by his peers in the various Soviet organizations.

French cultural activity has continued to develop favourably in Poland: new lectureships were reserved for French teachers, and a perfecting course for Polish teachers of French, held at Sulejowek, met with very great success. There is no doubt that this kind of co-operation, which is to be continued, gives the best results for improving the diffusion of the French language.

Rumania and Bulgaria have, for their part, shown a wish to increase the number of lecturers in their Universities. Both these countries have, during the summer, organized courses intended

for the teachers of French in their secondary education. Teachers coming from France have brought their foreign colleagues information that they wanted about the latest pedagogical methods of teaching living languages, endeavouring at the same time to present various aspects of the France of today, often little known in the countries of Eastern Europe.

Czechoslovakia itself, shortly afterwards, asked for the organization of a similar course during the summer of 1963; so it seems that pedagogical assistance can be rendered to the teachers of French in that country also.

In Yugoslavia, the application of a system of control to the French Institutes, to which the Jugoslave authorities had recourse in 1962, did not too badly affect the traditional positions in the universities. This year twelve French have taught our language and literature throughout the country, from Belgrade to Zadar.

In Hungary the French Institute, installed in new localities, has been developing further. Notably, it has been made responsible for the courses for the officials of the Hungarian Ministries. Moreover, a certified teacher was called upon, at the beginning of this scholastic year, to undertake the duties of lecturer at the University of Budapest.

TOURISM

ALTHOUGH the importance of professional and university-type exchanges between Eastern and Western European countries should not be underestimated, the tourist traffic is beginning to play an important part in the developing East-West contacts.

In the past few years the patterns of Western travels to the countries of Eastern Europe has steadily increased. The relaxation of political tension and a growing interest in the countries under Soviet domination, combined with a natural search for new and "unexplored" tourist areas in Europe have been the main causes of this phenomenon.

The official policy of East European governments is to encourage Western tourism in an attempt to gain Western currency, the shortage of which is felt so acutely throughout the bloc. Even countries like Bulgaria and Rumania, with a retarded pace of de-

Stalinization, have developed their Black Sea resorts in order to attract thousands of Western tourists each summer. Until very recently, the governments concerned were reluctant to allow their citizens to come into contact with Western tourists, let alone to organize tourist excursions to the West. Yet, a wind of change has also been felt in those countries and it may be expected that at least some Bulgarian and Rumanian tourists will appear on this side of the Iron Curtain. We must admit, however, that the problem is not entirely political. The serious currency shortage may act to the detriment of tourist traffic from these countries.

In contrast, the tourist traffic between Poland, Hungary and the West has developed steadily since 1956 (in Hungary since 1958). Each year tens of thousands of Polish and Hungarian tourists find themselves in the West as guests of their friends and relations living abroad.

In principle, the full expenses of their trips have to be met by their Western sponsors. According to the present regulations, the total "spending allowance" which an individual traveller is permitted to take out of his country amounts to five U.S. dollars (or equivalent). Such a procedure is not only regrettable, but humiliating to the visitors, who are thus entirely dependent on their sponsors' generosity. Nevertheless, the urge to visit the West often proves stronger than financial embarrassment, and this is the reason why the number of individual visa applications recorded by Western consulates in Poland and Hungary is growing.

Polish and Hungarian State Travel Agencies arrange occasional "conducted tours" of Western capitals for private citizens. The prohibitive cost of the trips and their irregular schedules (e.g. Polish tours to the West were recently held up for over a year due to currency shortage) makes them available only to a limited number of candidates. (No more than 1,500 tourists per annum in the case of Poland).

It may, therefore, be said that the present tourist traffic between Poland, Hungary and the West depends almost entirely on the financial support of Polish and Hungarian emigrés and Western citizens originating from those countries.

Tourist traffic from Czechoslovakia can be regarded as a comparatively new phenomenon. It concentrates mainly in Austria, and to a lesser degree in France, where a number of tourist groups have appeared. Individual tourists are still very few.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

THE state of affairs considered above can be interpreted by the optimist as "highly satisfactory", since at least a sound beginning has been made. Others might come to the conclusion that the results achieved so far are modest, taking into account the "back log" of contacts with the Eastern European countries which, after all, form part of the same continent.

We might, perhaps, ask whether the present situation has developed in the right direction and whether the authorities are doing everything they should in the circumstances?

Mr. Jelenski has explained in his report how differently East-West cultural relations could be interpreted in the East and in the West. Cultural agreements are certainly insufficient in relation to Western aims, particularly since the Eastern side do not always adhere to the spirit of the agreements.

In the light of political realities we are led to the following conclusions:

(a) Further development of cultural relations with countries of Eastern Europe serves the cause of freedom in those countries and the future unity of the European continent.

(b) The present frame-work of official cultural agreements is in many respects insufficient for the fulfilment of this task.

(c) More attention should be paid on the Western side to the importance of the developing East-West tourist traffic.

(d) European nationals travelling to the West should be offered more help in taking full cultural and educational advantage from their trip.

(Unfortunately, there are very few institutions in Western Europe today which take an active interest in promoting East-West ex-

changes. We have recorded in the past cases where students, scholars and distinguished visitors from Eastern Europe were forced to return home soon after their arrival in the West for lack of funds, interest and attention. It would, therefore, be desirable to form a European body to raise funds to help Eastern Europeans visiting the West. Such help would, naturally, be given on the condition that the beneficiary returned home on completion of his studies).

(e) The relaxation of passport restrictions in Eastern Europe could be matched with similar facilities on the Western side. The present involved formalities and, above all, high cost of visas to Western European countries should be revised at the earliest stage. (Recently the Danish Government took the initiative by abolishing entry visas for all East European nationals, and this step towards lowering the barriers of Europe could, perhaps, be imitated by all Western European countries).

(f) In the book exchange programme special attention should be paid to subjects dealing with European integration, particularly as the people of Eastern Europe have been mis-informed on this subject for many years.

(g) Cultural relations with Eastern Europe should not only be considered as an aim in themselves, but should also serve a purpose. Whenever we find that the East European Governments do not respect the basic freedom of cultural exchanges — as still occasionally happens — we in the West should not hesitate to condemn this in the strongest terms, particularly if it happens in violation of the cultural agreements. Experience has shown that this often produces the desired effect in the East.

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