Abstract

The discourse on multiculturalism range from debates in political philosophy on what multiculturalism is and should be in theory to public debates by politicians and lawmakers on how to carry out multicultural policies. This background brief will make clear both the academic and political debates on multiculturalism, particularly as it pertains to the European Union. Unlike other western countries like the USA, Canada, and Australia, European nations only began to accept cultural diversity as a fact in the late 20th Century. This was preceded by postwar immigration and country-specific strategies taken to integrate the incoming foreigners. Hence, in discussing multiculturalism in Europe, I will focus on multicultural policies as they are related to integration of immigrants who came during the postwar migration wave. The measures taken by European countries to integrate immigrants are also pertinent to understanding current populist
reactions and public discussions on the failure of multiculturalism. Since the 2015 migrant crisis, fault lines have been opened up in Brussels on how to handle the migration crisis and refugee settlement. The influx of asylum seekers has also been met with polarizing politics and the rise of identity and security concerns in various countries. This brief is a look at the narrative of multiculturalism in Europe and how it intersects with policies on migration and integration.

What is multiculturalism?
Multiculturalism, which first appeared in the American context in the 19th Century, is a variegated term that is hard to pin down because it is used in descriptive, strategic, and normative senses. It denotes, on an empirical level, demographic and cultural diversity in a society. It also appears in political discourse and official programs for managing cultural diversity. As an idea, it is set apart from monoculturalism—the presence of one single culture in a society—on the one end and from cultural pluralism on the other end. Here, I would like to point out that the concept of multiculturalism, as it will be used and explored in this paper, is not equal to cultural pluralism. German Sociologist Christian Joppke (2004) argues that cultural pluralism is differentiated from multiculturalism by voluntary group membership and reciprocal recognition of parties involved. This is the more appropriate designation for those whose national identity is built on cultural diversity itself—for example, Canada. An apt metaphor used to describe this state is “the melting pot” where distinct groups of people, who identify as belonging to different cultures, recognize and accept their differences as part of their collective life. The situation in European societies, where the national identity is built around a dominant culture that forms the majority in the nation, is quite different. As we will see later, the construction of different identities based on racial and religious backgrounds have caused social conflicts that need to be managed politically.

Thus, when we discuss multiculturalism, we need to look into the different approaches in which diversity in a population is managed by the state. Is multiculturalism a descriptive or strategic term? These two usages do not have to be mutually exclusive. In this background brief, multiculturalism has two distinct meanings, though they may overlap: 1) as a descriptive term that encapsulates demographic diversity that make up the population in the country; 2) as a collection of policies, responses, and strategies that is aimed at managing diversity and the conflicts that could arise from heterogeneity. It is even pertinent to say that multiculturalism as a state of affairs to be grappled with requires that we look at it in light of integration and other normative challenges for Europe that has arisen due to immigration from other parts of the world. To paint a clearer picture of what has transpired in Europe with regards to multiculturalism, (i.e., the narrative arc of multiculturalism), we have to understand it within the context of immigration and the integration of these migrants. This is because multiculturalism in Europe is inseparable from migration as a driver of ethnic diversity.

There is also a stronger notion of multiculturalism which has been explored in the political philosophy surrounding it. This is a concept that is closely intertwined with other normative issues regarding the construction of identity and difference. Jeffrey C. Alexander (2013) examines multiculturalism as immigrant integration within a conception of the civil sphere as a source for solidarity as well as moral principles. He observed that collective identities have a role to play in...
the civil sphere. The reason immigrant integration proves such a divisive topic is because difference presents challenge to solidarity. His definition of “solidarity is about the sense of connection, a matter of feeling and meaning. How a community responds to immigration is a matter of collective identity”. What brings people together is a sense of belonging to the community and this involves emotional connection to one’s identity. In other words, immigrants to any society present the challenge to the perception of who forms the “we” of collective identity. However, Alexander also claims that the civil sphere is “aspirational” and imposes “collective moral responsibility” to those who are here, whether or not they just arrived. Hence, the unique challenge of integration is how to balance the criteria of group membership in a community with principles of equality and moral accountability that are both bastions of the normative civil sphere. In other words, what can be reasonably expected in incorporating immigrants from different cultures into an already existing way of life in the host country? How should immigrants be integrated into European society? Does integration necessitate, and if so, to what extent do newcomers have to give up their own identity—religious and cultural values—in adopting those of their host country? How does their presence alter the societies into which they are incorporated?

Post-war migration in Europe: former colonial subjects and guest workers

Immigration as a matter of large numbers of third country nationals coming into European societies is seen as a post-World War II phenomenon. That is not to say that there was no cultural diversity or immigration prior to the post war reconstruction period. The narrative that European societies were homogenous and peaceful is largely discredited when we look at the history of industrialization in Europe since the 19th Century, where urban-rural and international migration took place. (Chin 2017, Castles 1986) The postwar period, however, saw a new kind of immigrants moving to Europe’s shores. They were ethnically diverse and brought with them their own religious and cultural practices; many of them were looking for their place in the new world order. Some of these immigrants came from colonies of retreating European empires during the post-war era of decolonization; others arrived under guest worker programs when Western European countries introduced them during reconstruction efforts. Hence, the legacy of empire as well as official foreign labour recruitment programs contributed to forming the narrative of multiculturalism in Europe that arose from post-war immigration.

Several European countries like Britain, Netherlands and France who had their nationals living in other parts of the world had their status as centers of emigration reversed when they started receiving waves of migrants from their former colonies. According to Rita Chin (2017), the management of empire became the main approach taken to address migration in Britain. For instance, the Atlee government sought to symbolically maintain UK’s status as the leader of the Commonwealth by passing the British Nationality Act of 1948. This granted Commonwealth subjects the right to immigrate to Britain and conferred citizenship on all those who were not citizens of an independent country (Ashcroft and Bevir, 2017). The famous first arrival of immigrants from the West Indies was marked by SS Empire Windrush in June 1948. Encouraged by their new legal status, many of the passengers were former servicemen who had fought in the war as British subjects and hence saw themselves as British citizens returning to their “mother
country” (Chin, 2017). Arrivals soon followed the Windrush from the West Indies and then Asia; immigration was further propelled by India’s independence from the UK in 1947, and then the partition of India, as arrivals from India and Pakistan rose in the 1950s, marking the beginning of postwar multicultural Britain.

Britain’s postwar multiculturalism is commonly attributed to its relationship with the Commonwealth as it received only a small percentage of labour migrants through the European Voluntary Worker (EVW) scheme—the British equivalent of temporary guest worker program. However, it was not the only country that dealt with colonial relations and economic worker schemes at the same time. France, with its long and tortured history with Algeria, established the National Immigration Office (ONI) in 1945 to recruit foreign labourers from Italy, Spain, and Belgium. According to a study on guest workers by Stephen Castles (1986), two million European migrant workers entered France from 1946 to 1970. Included in these figures were those who came as “clandestines” (as tourists or without passports) and their percentage rose from 26 in 1948 to 82 percent in 1968. Labour shortage during reconstruction was ubiquitous in Western Europe and with competition for labour from countries like Germany and Switzerland, ONI could not meet the demand from employers who then resorted to recruit workers through other means.

Around this time, in 1946, under the newly constituted Fourth Republic of France, Algerians were given political rights and allowed to keep their religion as “French Muslims from Algeria”. The government re-opened the borders between France and Algeria in 1947 resulting in unrestricted movement between the two; this made recruiting French Algerians easier than going through ONI for European migrant workers. “By 1970, there were over 600,000 Algerians in France, as well as 140,000 Moroccans and 90,000 Tunisians.” (Castles, 1986). Hence France’s postwar cultural diversity was driven by French-Muslims from Algeria and other colonial holdings, as well as labour migrants from other parts of Europe.

Labour recruitment practices were also an important source of immigrants in Europe. The prime example of the guest worker program was in West Germany, which saw the largest amount of labour migrants in postwar Europe (Castles 1986). The guest worker programs across Europe all ended by 1973 (with the exception of Britain that passed the Commonwealth Immigrant Act in 1962) because of the oil crisis which led to a global recession. Many of these immigrants became permanent settlers after the guest worker programs were terminated. Family reunification, although antithetical to the initial aim of these recruitment practices, became the norm. However, the German government only acknowledged that Germany was an immigrant nation in 1998.

In summary, it is clear that multiculturalism in Europe is driven by the arrival of foreign labourers and their families as well as conferring of citizenship to colonial subjects. Often, these two processes overlapped and the formation of new multicultural societies inevitably caused social conflict and tensions between the newcomers and the nationals of host countries. How did Europe deal with the newly formed multicultural societies as a result of postwar immigration? The answer lies in the widespread acknowledgment that overall civil and political rights had to be
granted to the new settlers; thus, the central focus of debate in many countries shifted from controlling immigration to integration.

Managing integration of immigrants in multicultural societies
With the migration waves come political, economic, and social challenges of integrating newcomers into their host societies. European countries took their own approaches to immigrant integration; thus, policies ranged from “state-sponsored” multiculturalism to more assimilationist frameworks. Although they can be viewed under the broad term of multicultural policies, strategies for integration and promoting social cohesion have been called by different names such as “race relations” in Britain, “insertion” in France, and “pillarization” in the Netherlands. However, this is not mere difference in nomenclature; each approach takes a different view of the integration process and outlook for managing differences between the immigrants and citizens of host countries.

Britain is said to have taken the approach that is closest cultural pluralism. The Race Relations Act was proposed in 1965, which outlawed race-based discrimination practices in public places. This was followed by two additional legislation which extended anti-discrimination to housing and employment in 1968 and established the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) in 1976. However, these bills were only tabled after the Conservative government passed the Commonwealth Immigrant Act of 1962, which was prompted by the 1958 Notting Hill racial riots, and is cited to restrict immigration by race. Postwar British multiculturalism is described as “Janus-faced” because it imposed tough restrictions on newcomers along racial lines but provided ample provisions to protect the rights of those who were already inside (Ashcroft and Bevir, 2017). Hence, Britain’s response to race relations in the country was heralded by social tensions and meant to aid the integration of immigrants into British society without making demands on them to assimilate and allowing them to keep their cultural practices.

The French government’s approach to immigrant integration rejected “multiculturalism” on the grounds that it threatened national unity and leaned towards assimilation in its outlook. It was called “insertion” in the 1970s, which aimed to incorporate immigrants, specifically those from North African countries, into French society; the primary course of action was to provide basic welfare such as education, housing, and employment (Chin 2017). Francois Mitterrand's Socialist government briefly proclaimed “the right to difference” for immigrant communities, but around mid-1980s, the official policy shifted to that of “the French model of integration” which was based on the belief that French society should be based on shared Republican values. For fear that cultural recognition would alter the French national identity, integration became the two-fold process of “discrediting claims for recognition” while upholding “denunciation of discrimination and racial domination”. (Simon and Pala 2010). In line with this approach, The High Council for Integration (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, HCI) was created in 1989 and launched the integration model in 1991. Integration in this model meant that immigrants were allowed to take up French citizenship on an individual basis. Thus, integration was seen as the active taking up of citizenship. The French state did not recognize immigrants in “structured communities” and
instead, ensured equality on those who “integrated” by adopting French, language, culture, and secular, Republican values.

In Germany, the termination of the guest worker program in 1973 brought about restrictions on migration with the exception of family reunification. Access for incoming migrants and asylum seekers were still restricted through the Act on Foreigners of 1990 and Asylum Compromise of 1992. However, according to Karen Schönwälder (2010), it was under Conservative Chancellor Helmut Kohl that the first steps to accepting guest workers as German citizens were taken. It was only in 1998 that the German government (comprising the Social Democratic and Green Party Coalition) that the German Citizenship Act of 2000 which introduced birthright citizenship, was passed. This was followed by the 2005 Immigration Act, which allowed for long-term resident permits for skilled migrants, signaling that Germany has accepted its status as an immigrant nation. However, in terms of integration, the government stipulated that it would demand and support (fordern und fordern) individuals who must prove that they are “German” by knowing the language, accepting German values, and abiding by the law. Like France, Germany also emphasised a “Leitkulture” (lead culture) which immigrants are expected to take up. However, true to liberal principles, the German constitution ensures the protection of religious freedom and promotes cultural tolerance; multicultural education is also normalized in school through mother tongue lessons for immigrant children (Schönwälder, 2010).

Despite the different approaches and outcomes, the leaders of these three countries were also the leading voices that pronounced the failure of multiculturalism. The backlash against multiculturalism manifested its peak in outbursts by several political leaders such as Angela Merkel, David Cameron, and Nicholas Sarkozy in 2010. What followed was a purported “retreat” from “multikulti” which was based on the idea that different cultures living together under one roof has not worked out for Europe. This has been examined by various scholars but the consensus is that while there is some truth to claims that multiculturalism is in decline, it does not signal the end but the evolution of multiculturalism into the next stage, possibly under a different name. Notably, besides Britain which accepted its internal cultural pluralism due to its association with the Commonwealth, neither France nor Germany had truly embraced multiculturalism prior to their protestations against the doctrine. In the next section, I will examine this and highlight some criticisms from both sides of the debate.

Backlash against multiculturalism
What prompted this apparent change in attitude in European nations and what are the implications of the backlash? Steve Vertovec and Susan Wessendorf (2010) examined this discourse from whence it became prominent since the early 2000s. They pointed out that the prevailing discourse against immigrant-multiculturalism revolved around these key ideas: 1) the supposed incompatibility of some immigrant cultures with European values, 2) the refusal of common values by proponents of multiculturalism, which undermines a unified national identity, 3) socio-economic problems brought about by my immigrants that is connected to self-segregation and the creation of “parallel societies”, and 4) the threat of terrorism that is erroneously attributed to mass immigration of Muslim peoples (Vertovec and Wesendorf, 2010). Often, these
critiques place the blame of the failure of integration on the unwillingness of immigrants to leave behind their cultural practices and beliefs.

Opponents often point out that multiculturalism subscribes to cultural relativism as it encourages a “radical egalitarianism” of all cultures; in some cases, this defeats liberal principles of human rights. Although there have been manifestations of conflict between religious conservatism and liberal tenets like freedom of speech, i.e. the Rushdie Affair in Britain and Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* publishing controversial cartoons of Prophet Muhammad, other crucial events have also preceded the rhetoric of the failure of multiculturalism. After the 9/11 attack launched the global war on terror, a string of terrorist bombings in Madrid (2004), London (2005), and Paris (2015) marked the early years of the 21st Century. Other events that shook Europe were the assassination of right wing Dutch politician and gay rights activist, Pim Fortuyn, in 2002 followed by the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004. Both were critical of Islam to different degrees; Fortuyn was against immigration as well. It was in the political and public debates surrounding these events in relation to immigration and failure of integration that the discourse against multiculturalism took shape.

The discourse also signaled a convergence between far-right groups’ demands to securitize immigration and assert a more enclosed national identity, and the mainstream leader’s rhetoric that multiculturalism policies have failed. The politicization of migration, identity and integration issues resulted in the shift towards “assimilative measures” in countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, France, Austria and Belgium (Lesinska, 2014). They are more commonly known as “civic integration” policies and show that national governments have imposed more stringent criteria for immigrants to obtain citizenship. They come in the form of mandatory language instruction courses and civic tests. The specifics of these tests differ from country to country, but generally require the immigrant to have some knowledge of the host countries’ cultural norms and social etiquette in addition to national language requirements. Although the response from governments were kept under the guise of “problems of integration” and they were careful to target certain “problematic” groups of immigrants, Lesinska still believed that these official measures do not violate liberal commitments to rights and mutual respect of cultural boundaries.

More controversial, however, were the measures taken by some EU countries to ban the wearing of burqas—religious garments worn by Muslim women covering the body and face—in public places. France was the first to institute this ban in public schools in 2004 but followed by in 2011 with a ban on full-face veils. Since then, Belgium, the Netherlands most recently Denmark in 2018 have followed suit (Sanghani, 2016). While “the burqa ban” in France, as it is colloquially called, has been criticized by the UN for “violating human rights”, the European court of human rights (ECHR) have upheld the ban as “the legitimate aim” was to promote “living together” (Willshire, 2014). Speaking in 2016, Angela Merkel said “the full facial veil is inappropriate” and emphasized the precedence of German law over “codes of honor” while endorsing a partial ban on the burqa pushed for by her party in Germany (Oltermann, 2016). In the same year, David Cameron rejected the idea of a public ban in Britain but said he would support institutions with
“sensible rules” for removing face veils (Weaver, 2018). Still, Europe’s mainstream politicians can be seen to have justified their tougher stances on integration by citing the rule of law.

The response from the far right sources are more vitriolic against immigrants as a whole. The far right appealed to nationalistic sentiments by exploiting the potent combination of fear of takeover of the country by “hostile” (Muslim) immigrants and the erosion of national identity to gain support from the populace. The rhetoric of the far right, when it comes to national security, is more pointed towards a specific kind of immigrant who is seen as being qualitatively different from those of European descent. The Muslim immigrant as the “other” of western civilization goes back to the perception of age-old enmity between Christian Europe and Islamic Orient (Alexander, 2013). Fear of this “ancient enemy” who is now seen as “the immigrant within” has also been exacerbated by the threat of terrorism posed by extremists. In a previous commentary, I argued that the September riots in Chemnitz capture how the far right capitalizes on fear and suspicion to manifest action against immigrants. The rise of far right political parties and movements like Alternative for Germany (AfD) and PEGIDA in Germany is but one example of similar rises in nationalistic ideologies across the West.

However, there is a need to separate rising nationalism and populism from the political backlash against multiculturalism. The two issues are by no means synonymous with each other. The recent increase in support for far right parties across Europe is also due to dissatisfaction with the mainstream political elite and their handling of critical issues affecting the populace from immigration to the economy. This can be seen in trickle down effects since the 2015 refugee crisis when German chancellor Angela Merkel adopted an open door policy which resulted in what some critics said that allowed Europe to become inundated with asylum seekers from Syria and North Africa.

Immigration has been weaponized by the nationalist wing in politics—it was a prominent theme in arguments that led to Brexit and have also led to the rise for support of politicians who vowed to take tough measures against immigration. However, support for such efforts can also be attributed to the weakness of the political establishment in providing alternative visions of successful integration and solidarity. A Pew Research Center survey conducted in 2018 showed that a majority of Europeans across 10 EU countries including Greece and Italy support taking in refugees 3 years after 1.3 million people sought asylum during the crisis. The ratio for support was highest at 89 percent in Spain while the lowest was 32 in Hungary. Comparatively, the survey showed a larger percentage disapprove of how the EU has handled the situation; the highest was Greece at 92 percent while the lowest disapproval rate came from the Netherlands at 58 percent.

Multiculturalism and liberal democracy
Is there really a growing consensus against multiculturalism or is it merely rhetorical in nature? Does the call for a firmer stance on integration mean that liberal societies no longer view themselves as open and tolerant of cultural diversity? To answer this question, I look at two points of view that have emerged as two major threads in the multiculturalism debate in liberal democracies. One side argued that the appearance of assimilative measures in many parts of
Europe, even former liberal strongholds like the Netherlands and Britain, indeed signal the end of multiculturalism (Joppke, 2004). However, others hold the view that that civic integration is in fact compatible with already existing policies on multiculturalism which, far from being dead, is still thriving in many parts of the world. In their collective findings in the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCPI), Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting (2013) argued that the proliferation of civic integration does not mean a retreat from diversity but a layered approach to managing it.

Canadian political-philosopher, Will Kymlicka, has argued that multicultural movements are part and parcel of the raising of human rights as a priority in global governance. The end of World War II brought about the awareness of the brutalities in Nazi war crimes globally. Kymlicka views multicultural movements as part of three successive movements that are centered on the principles of human rights: the struggle for decolonization, the struggle against racial segregation and against discrimination and finally, the struggle for minority rights and multiculturalism. If we assume this framework of human rights within the liberal democratic constitutionalism, then multiculturalism is part of the process of increasing “democratic citizenization” based on liberal principles of equality and inclusiveness. Hence, Kymlicka takes the view that multiculturalism should inherently aim to invert vertical relationship of power between majority and minority groups while promoting horizontal relationship of reciprocity between different groups. In dealing with immigrant integration, the specific contents of multicultural policies should be left up to the individual country and its context but should appeal to universal principles of human rights and civil liberties. This includes “exemption from dress codes”, “funding [...] to support cultural activities”, “allowing dual citizenship” and “affirmative action for disadvantages immigrant groups”. (Kymlicka, 2010). Thus, this concept of multiculturalism puts forth cultural recognition, economic redistribution, and political participation as entailing the holistic approach for multiculturalism.

On the other side of the liberal critique of multiculturalism, Christian Joppke (2004), advanced the notion that multiculturalism should be managed realistically to preserve public order. For this goal, the recognition of minority cultures should not be the goal of state policies. In his article, Joppke draws upon an idea of citizenship that is derived from the authority of the “difference-blind state” where the state is the neutral arbiter of rights and protection, but not recognition within the public realm. Joppke defends the liberal distinction between the public and the private realms and argues that cultural recognition belongs in the latter. Hence, “the old strategy of privatization” is most suitable for managing cultural conflict. State intervention in the form of policies regarding differences in religions and cultural practices should take a pragmatic nature, and not a right-based approach. The reasoning behind this is that just because multiculturalism has become a fact of life in diverse societies, it does not have to be normalized in law and policies. It is impossible to recognize all cultures equally as they contain prescriptive views about the good and the bad, which can be antithetical to the liberal notions of the common good. In this line of thought, it is reasonable to demand “a procedural commitment to liberal-democratic principles” as part of civic integration. Moreover, Joppke believes that multicultural recognition is more reasonable when it is demanded by a group that has been historically wronged. However, for “voluntary immigrant groups”, they can be assumed to have “waived” their claim to their
native culture. It is not cultural recognition but socio-economic discrimination that should be the main focus of the so-called multiculturalism policies.

The debate between Kymlicka and Joppke, while not exhaustive of all viewpoints on multiculturalism in liberal democracies, captures an important conundrum facing western societies today—that is, whether recognition and accommodation of minority cultures should be adopted in policies for managing diversity. They reach different conclusions: Kymlicka lands on desecuritization of immigration and adhering to human rights principles as the way to further reinforce existing multiculturalism in European countries while Joppke entreats that assertiveness of the liberal state is necessary in civic integration of immigrants via procedural means. There is no definitive answer yet in sight and it remains to be seen where multiculturalism in Europe and other parts of the world will go.
References

About the EU Centre

Established in 2008, the EU Centre in Singapore was a joint project funded by the European Union (EU), the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) and the National University of Singapore (NUS). From 2017, the Singapore Management University (SMU) has also become a partner in contributing to the operations of the EU Centre. The EU is now a partnership of these three local universities.

The primary mission of the EU Centre is to promote knowledge and understanding of the EU, its policies and development of its relations with Singapore and Southeast Asia through research, publications and different outreach programmes.

The EU Centre is the Coordinator of a 3-year Jean Monnet Network grant (Sep 2016 – 2019). The Network comprising the EU Centre, University of Indonesia, University of Malaya and Maastricht University, will be jointly organising a series of programmes and activities tied to two research themes on Multiculturalism and Multilateralism.

Other commentaries produced by the EU Centre in Singapore can be found at:

Co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union

Copyright © 2019 EU Centre in Singapore. All rights reserved | Published in January 2019
The views expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the EU Centre in Singapore.