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# Optimising the impact of European cultural, science and innovation diplomacy in Egypt and Tunisia

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“The impact of the West, with its printing-presses and computers, aeroplanes and cinemas, factories and universities, oil-prospectors and archeologists, machine-guns and ideas...”<sup>1</sup>

Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History*

“More crafty than the moralist, less litigious than the administrator, less voluntary than the politician, more curved than the scientist, more detached than the market explorer, the diplomat...”<sup>2</sup>

Bruno Latour, *Politics of Nature*

<sup>1</sup> Lewis (1950), *The Arabs in History*, p.207.

<sup>2</sup> Latour (1999), *Politiques de la nature: comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie*, p.285.

## Introduction

Under the title *“The view of the European Union cultural and science diplomacy from the outside”*, the task of WP 4 was to understand how the EU’s endeavours with external dimension in the fields of culture and scientific research have been received, with the aim of developing a sustainable policy direction. After having identified examples of culture and science relations between the EU and MENA countries, the primary question was: What do the EU’s partners from the neighbouring countries in the South of the Mediterranean think of its approach to science, innovation and its enhancement of external cultural relations? Other important questions have been tackled: How can cultural and science diplomacy work as tools for conflict prevention? How can cultural knowledge be disseminated among different stakeholders? How can it promote better relations between states and organizations? How does the EU handle cultural diversity and knowledge diversity in its activities and programmes? How can a balance be struck between on the one hand promoting the EU’s values – first of all governance – and on the other hand stability and diversity represented by its partners? How can different target groups in the region be approached in order to enhance messages from the strategies?

The specific objective of WP4, Task 3, was to measure the *reception of the EU’s messages*, and to evaluate how its cultural and science diplomacy is perceived amongst Mediterranean partners. From the results of this study and the first conclusions of its analysis, it should be possible to make some *recommendations* which could be useful in directing future policies. The methodological principle guiding this study is that the feedback given by the partners should be used as an indicator for the evaluation of the global strategy, and interpreted as an important input for the reflection on any future programmes. Following the inclusive dynamic launched with Horizon 2020 (now including Tunisia), it is paramount for the partners to have their say in the general process.

Based on the results of the enquiry on the perception of the EU cultural and science diplomacy in Egypt and Tunisia<sup>3</sup>, the analysis showed some common trends in the responses to the questionnaires both in surveys and interviews. These *similarities between Egypt and Tunisia* allow a joint diagnosis to be made. Despite the differences in scale between populous Egypt, whose population will soon reach 100 million, and the far smaller Tunisia, with only just over a tenth of this population, both countries are historic members of the Arab League, are both socially influenced by Islam, and share a common recent history, being the initiators and heroes of the 2011 Arab revolutions. Moreover – and this point is the most relevant to our approach –, both countries have long-standing strong connections with the EU, and participate in many European programmes. This cooperation between the EU, Egypt and Tunisia, between the North and the South of the Mediterranean, builds up an interesting *triangulation* that the following recommendations could contribute to strengthening.

## 1. Main results of the CSD impact study

There are lessons to be learned from the answers given by both the general public and the experts in Egypt and Tunisia to the questions about cultural and science diplomacy<sup>4</sup>. That is why recommendations are first of all inspired by the remarks expressed by the partners of European programmes in these countries.

The objective of this study was to evaluate the degree to which European culture and science diplomacy actions are noticed and appreciated by the populations of partner countries, and to understand the image of the EU prevalent among its Southern partners, by means of surveys and interviews. These quantitative and qualitative studies result in a series of images of the reception of

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<sup>3</sup> Hatzenberger (2018), Case-study reports, EL-CSID Working Papers, n°12 and n°13.

<sup>4</sup> In Egypt, 273 samples have been collected and analysed, and 14 people interviewed. In Tunisia, the survey encompassed 150 individual answers from Tunis, Sousse, Bizerte, Siliana, Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid; and 16 people have been interviewed.

the EU's messages in the considered countries amongst both the general public and communities of experts.

In **Egypt**, the survey was based on samples taken mostly within the premises of Cairo University – which amounts to a global community of over 250.000 people – but also from other big universities in the capital city such as Al-Azhar (300.000 students), Ain Shams (200.000 students), Helwan (100.000 students), as well as Sadat Academy and Tanta University further north in the Delta region.

The results of the **survey** showed primarily that the involvement of Europe in the country is well perceived, both in terms of statistics and positive appreciation. Half the people feel that the EU is “somewhat involved” in Egypt, and 20% think that it is “closely involved”. 25% think that the EU is their most important partner. Almost half of the respondents see “improved knowledge” in general as the main benefit of cooperating with the EU.

As 64% of the considered population totally agree with the statement that culture and interactions with other cultures can play an important role in developing greater understanding and toleration in the world, some still have hesitations or reluctance in respect of the EU's intents. 43% imagine a self-centred reason for the EU's involvement in Egypt, be it political or economic, or the urge for self-affirmation. 16% believe that the EU is driven by self-interest. 17% even think that the EU's actions are interfering with internal affairs. 20% believe that scientific activity is not compatible with the traditional role of Egyptian women. And more than 30% feel that the EU applies human rights in a selective manner and with a double standard.

The **interviews** were conducted with people engaged in European programmes, people having benefited from those programmes, or people well aware of the existence of them (same methodology applied in Tunisia). To complete the survey, and to somewhat balance the geographical scope – somewhat concentrated on the capital city Cairo –, questions were also asked to people based in institutions in Alexandria, the second biggest Egyptian city.

The fact that some respondents tended to scrutinize the questionnaire, fearing any sensitive questions – as a presidential election was underway –, and that some even refused to take part in the interview may be interpreted as signs of an overly centralized state approach to cooperation. This question has to be taken into account. Either way, these exceptions kept apart, most of the interviewees gave a very positive evaluation of the EU's programmes in Egypt. Mobility and funding were the most cited motivations for taking part in European programmes. Both the general public and the community of experts agreed on this point, and praised especially the **mobility opportunities** offered by the EU's projects. All the interviewees were positive about the mobility opportunities for students, staff and researchers, and the first solution mentioned in the survey to facilitate the EU's access to its neighbours is to develop exchange programmes for students and teachers.

However, divergences of opinion appear between the assessments made in the general survey and in the interviews – which is quite logical as people who are engaged in scientific cooperation know more about its impact than the lay audience. This difference of perception is especially noticeable on the gender issue, as the majority of the interviewees see the participation to the EU's programmes as an incentive for the support and empowerment of women, compared to the more traditional approach reflected by the survey. All in all, the survey reveals a lot of undecided answers and uncertainty about the EU's role. Some people have not yet heard about the EU's values or actions.

In **Tunisia**, the **survey** carried out in Tunis and Sousse, as well as in governorates in the north and the south of the country, indicate that 66% perceive the EU as being “somewhat involved” in shaping scientific efforts in Tunisia, and 19% perceive it as being “closely involved”. Half the population that was approached feels that the set of values implicit in scientific projects supported and funded by the EU has an influence on Tunisia. This figure rises to 60% in Sousse, but is only 30% in Sidi-Bouzyd. These

results show that the general public has not yet been exposed to the impact of scientific cooperation, despite the efforts made locally by the network of national contact points.

For the majority of Tunisians, the EU's access to its neighbours would be facilitated by the teaching of foreign languages at school-level, and with the increase of exchange programmes for students and teachers. This high level of answers relating to the demand for **European languages** should probably be put in parallel with the strong linguistic strategy of both Turkey and China – two countries that are developing language courses in the region (Yunus Emre and Confucius institutes).

All Tunisian people interviewed agreed on the very positive outcomes of Tempus and Erasmus+. These programmes are appreciated for the opportunities they give to meet foreign experts, to publish in international journals, and to visit other countries. Most of them expressed a national pride to be fully part of Horizon 2020. They valued horizontal management, networking and project engineering techniques that are at the core of this programme.

When comparing the results of the Egyptian survey and interviews, a discrepancy between the views of the experts and that of the general public appeared. The same was true for the Tunisian study. Moreover, in this specific case, the way the survey was carried out in Tunisia (in several regions of the country, as the Egyptian enquiry was centred around Cairo) lead to some geographical differences in the answers between the city capital and peripheric regions of the country. It may then be inferred that if the survey had also been conducted in Upper Egypt – or indeed in the Sinai –, and not only in the capital region, figures would certainly have been different from one part of the country to the other. In both studies, the gap is both social and geographical: people tend to give different answers to the questionnaire regarding to their social and economic background.

- What is common to both studies is the perception of the general **European values that are** conveyed in guidelines and protocols of programme implementations. The case of human rights seems to be a separate issue, as they are often perceived as open to interpretations and subject to double standards in their application. This is a sensitive issue. The Egyptian survey shows that a third of the respondents feels that the EU applies human rights in a selective manner.
- What is also common is the general **confusion between bilateral and multilateral cooperation**. For most respondents, both in Egypt and Tunisia, Europe means the EU as a whole, but also France, Germany, Italy or Sweden taken individually. In many cases, a single European country is viewed as representing the whole EU, as if geographical Europe was seen as the same thing as the EU. This lack of differentiation is perhaps due to the process of co-funding both at national and European level.
- These case studies point at the need for information campaigns and feedback about the different programmes in order to bridge the existing **gap between experts and the general public** and to clarify some of the objectives of the EU's projects.

## 2. General remarks on methods, topics and political contexts

From the synthesis of the surveys and interviews, some **remarks** may be given on the Egyptian and Tunisian perceptions of the impact of EU actions in the domain of cultural and science cooperation. These concern both questions of **method** and priorities of **topics**. Firstly, on the level of common perception, it appears that science diplomacy can have a stronger social impact when associated with a development strategy. Secondly, on an epistemological level, it seems that science diplomacy must convey a reflection upon the disciplinary definition of science that defines priority fields according to the specificities of national contexts.

## 2.1. Science for development

The first hypothesis, which relates to the ***stronger impact of scientific cooperation when associated with a development project***, is mainly rooted in the analysis of the Tunisia survey, which shows different results in the answers to some parts of the questionnaire according to the region considered.

As 19% of the Tunisian people interviewed perceive the EU as being “closely involved” in Tunisia, this figure rises to almost 60% in Bizerte. On the contrary, this perception amounts only to 6% in Sidi-Bouzyd, whereas 13% of the people interviewed think that the EU is not involved at all. As almost half of the respondents in the national survey believes that the EU is seeking cooperation with international partners for its own sake, this figure amounts only to 16% in Bizerte.

This quantitative difference might reflect a qualitative difference in the social and economical context of those two regions. On the one hand, Sidi-Bouzyd is a rural area, still marked by its sense of abandonment by the state, which is one of the causes that led to the 2011 Revolution. On the other hand, the governorate of Bizerte is more industrial and is the beneficiary of important European funds for depollution projects of its lake. This EU action, which combines scientific expertise with support for economic development, seems to be having a very concrete impact on the perception of EU actions by the local population. The same hypothesis could be suggested in the governorate of Tozeur, in the South, where the biggest solar energy power plant was built thanks to a EU project.

Both in Tunisia and Egypt, the interviews show a very positive perception of all the EU’s scientific programmes tackling the issue of adaptation to climate change. The EU is perceived as more concerned and far-sighted. Projects relating to the environment in general, energy, and sustainable development are very well perceived.

This point is perhaps more visible in Tunisia, where civil society plays an important part in the implementation of European projects. The strong ***connection between science cooperation and the economy*** is also made obvious in the different agreements between Tunisia and the EU that are orientated towards a “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement” (DCFTA). The connection between science cooperation and business can be illustrated by the respective places taken in the treaties by chapters on science and culture compared to the length of the chapters on trade, and more symbolically on the olive oil business in the 2016 agreement<sup>5</sup>.

More generally, the people interviewed are very satisfied that Horizon 2020 – which now includes Tunisia – brings together science, industry and a concern for social challenges.

- The link between science and innovation, and research and economic development, is very important to foster, as local populations are expecting ***concrete deliverables*** in their every-day life.
- A European programme that cooperates with Southern Mediterranean neighbouring countries should always include a clearly defined and spelled-out ***social outcome***.

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<sup>5</sup> “To help Tunisia in a particularly difficult economic context, in 2016, the EU introduced an exceptional temporary measure granting an additional duty-free tariff quota for olive oil of 35.000 tonnes per year for two years.” (Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council, 29 September 2016.: “Strengthening EU support for Tunisia”, p.5). In reference to the Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the introduction of emergency autonomous trade measures for the Republic of Tunisia (17 Septembre 2015).

## 2.2. The plea for humanities and the promotion of cultural heritage

As most people are very proud that Tunisia is now part of the Research and Innovation Programme Horizon 2020, one of the interviewees was both honoured and surprised to be the only representative amongst the national contact points to represent all the **human and social sciences**, alongside many colleagues representing engineering, management and the so-called “hard sciences” (natural and basic sciences). He interprets this composition of the committee in question as a reflection of how less attention is usually paid to humanities.

Thus an epistemological hypothesis is that the EU and the Mediterranean countries should redefine their notion of what “science” is when collaborating in science, in order to properly include the humanities in its definition. This could then increase the presence of human and social sciences, and give them the place they truly deserve.

The survey shows that “culture” means “civilisation” for 62% of the respondents in Tunisia, and for 43% of the people in Egypt. “Culture” means also “history” for 20% of the Tunisian interviewees – and 14% in Egypt. Let us remember that history, although “soft”, is still a scientific discipline. In between culture and science, humanities should therefore be at the core of the reflection.

In Tunisia, some researchers in the human and social sciences plead for the recognition of Mediterranean cultures and civilisations as a topic in its own right. **The Mediterranean** is often studied from the point of view of its economic dimension, or the environmental issues it has to face. At the same time, some researchers see it as a palimpsest of linked histories and transnational cultures, which paved the way for a deep-rooted conception of neighbourhood between Europe and the South.

Researchers in the field of languages and literature, as well as specialists of cultural history or geography, classics or philosophy, emphasize the need for an interdisciplinary approach of intercultural phenomena. They all see the humanities as a very topical domain in Tunisian society, and as a connecting bridge between the Maghreb and Europe. It should therefore be recognized that the EU science diplomacy should focus not only on opportunities to exchange goods, but also – and perhaps first of all – ideas. Moreover, it should encourage all stakeholders to really look forward and transcend the immediate tangible needs.

As the Mediterranean is now littered with corpses – as one interviewee reminded us –, the thematics of **mobility and migration** (“diaspora”) are of course very important nowadays. Projects should include reflections upon the concept of “plural histories” and take the minorities in Tunisia as a proper topic of study. The study of Antiquity (especially Greek and Roman) has almost no place in Tunisian research for the moment. Yet it is the foundation both of Europe and of the Euro-Mediterranean itself. The study of the classical tradition could be the basis for a new modernity, common to North and South.

In this perspective, an very interesting project, carried out by the Ahmed Tlili Foundation for Democratic Culture, plans to valorise the mining culture in the South of the country (in the cities of Gafsa and Metlaoui) from different angles: science and technology, social heritage and industrial history. The team plans to apply for a Euro-Med support to do so, in relation with what already exists, for example in the German Ruhr region. It would be a way to affirm regional identities based on industrial heritage, and to put some regions struck by economic crisis on the touristic map, thus developing a more diverse touristic economy (for the moment only concentrated on the coast).

In Egypt, we also received hints that “hard” sciences are sometimes favoured over “soft” sciences, even though projects in the domains of the history of ideas, comparative literature and translation also necessitate international cooperation all the same. Egyptian researchers mentioned the importance of the topic of **“interculturality”**, which is nowadays a keyword in any debate about toleration and

community living, which could well translate into the EU's Horizon 2020 headline of "inclusive, innovative and reflective societies".

Egyptian researchers are also at the forefront in the domains of **cultural heritage**, sites and museum management. That is no real surprise coming from the land of the pyramids, where tourism is of foremost importance for the national economy. Nevertheless, there is still a demand to improve things on the field, both in terms of capacity building and international cooperation. Efforts are made to implement heritage management and museum studies as academic disciplines. The University of Helwan is especially dynamic in this domain, having launched the "Master in Heritage Conservation and Site Management" (MHCSM) in 2015, with a German University, and being part of the consortium Edu-MUST, "Education and Capacity Building in Museum Studies" since 2016, a project co-funded by the Erasmus+ programme.

- **Interdisciplinarity** is very important in all EU programmes, as it is difficult to have a clear-cut approach of complex problematics in terms of administrative categories. It should be recognised that culture, science and innovation do often overlap.

### 3. Ups and downs

The cross-analysis of the results of the study lead in Tunisia and in Egypt underline concrete signs that culture and science diplomacy are at the forefront of the most urgent contemporary issues.

Regarding culture, and all the different aspects that are at stake, let us not forget that not so late as 2014 and 2015, terrible attacks were carried out against the Museum of Islamic Art in Cairo and the Bardo National Museum in Tunis, killing and wounding people in their flesh, damaging cultural heritage, and discouraging tourism, thus impeding the local economy. These attacks confirm in a tragic way that culture is an intrinsic part of the national identity. At the same time, the fact that European expertise was requested to assess and repair the damage done confirms that culture also belongs to a common worldwide heritage.

Concerning science and innovation, let us remind how vivid the societal consciousness of environmental issues now is. For example, in his recent documentary film "The Mediterranean Burnout", Alexis Marant shows how the governor of Gabes (the most Southern town on the Tunisian coast) gets slightly embarrassed by questions about the environmentally negative impact of the activities of the chemical industry linked to the transformation of phosphate into fertilizer. There, a chemical production plant has been responsible for the pollution of the gulf waters since the 1970's, as well as for the desertification of the palm trees oasis and the olive groves, causing severe health issues for the neighbouring population. When asked about all these problems, the governor replies that the only solution is that the EU should fund the long and difficult depollution process in the region. This specific demand is a good demonstration of the high expectations of the EU – which also brings up the **questions of liability and subsidiarity**.

- The expectations from the EU can stretch very far indeed and it would be wise for the EU to delineate its responsibilities vis-à-vis third countries by a clear **communication strategy**. Science cooperation can indeed be a powerful tool for development, but cannot be held accountable when it fails to deliver.

It now remains to be seen whether the recent local elections in Tunisia (May 2018) – the first in the country – will allow these issues to be properly tackled. The recent local elections will probably increase the role of the civil society in general, and of NGO's in particular, in the implementation process of the EU's programmes. On the contrary, in Egypt, the election of the president for a second term in March 2018 only allows a vertical solution to all problems to be envisaged, and the prevalence

of bilateral relations, or, at least, the priority of “Realpolitik” over “soft power” – an important part of which is precisely culture and science diplomacy. This is also a sensitive issue.

This is the third remark, regarding the *distinctive contexts* of science diplomacy. On the one hand, the encouragement of decentralization by the EU, the development of the local level of government, the empowering of civil society and the strengthening of association have all led to a multiplicity of partners for the implementation of cooperation programmes. On the other hand, cooperation with a very centralized state can only take a top-down approach. It is precisely at this point of complexity that science cooperation really becomes science diplomacy – in the most political of its sense.

- **Specific strategies** should be employed to optimize the impact of CSD in each of the cases considered. Different approaches are needed taking into account the types of administrative organizations, the different communication channels and chains of command.

## 4. Specific recommendations

### 4.1. Adapt *communication* to targeted audiences

To sum up the results of the impact study, it should be noted that apart from the unanimous praise by students and researchers of the mobility opportunities offered by EU schemes such as Tempus and Erasmus+, it seems that the impact of science diplomacy is made more visible when associated with concrete development projects. Both in Egypt and Tunisia there are still people who have not heard about the opportunities offered by EU programmes. This observation shows the need to communicate about European programmes, with the objective of *narrowing the gap between the communities of experts and the perception by the general public*. This task is to be achieved by the EU Delegations as well as the local relays of European programmes. Information should reach the different regions of the partner countries equally, and not only the capital cities. This concern should guide any dissemination strategy.

### 4.2. Avoid the suspicion of a *hidden agenda*

While advertising about the conditions and results of cooperation with the EU, the message should be formulated in such a way that any impression of a lesson being taught or condescendant tone are avoided. The difficulty is to avoid creating ambiguities between technical objectives and hierarchies of values. Indeed, surveys and interviews reveal some suspicion about the EU having a “hidden agenda”. This suspected hidden agenda is often feared to be either *ideological*, interfering in national politics, or *economic*, playing a role in the competition for markets.

A first example could be the question of gender, which is an important value put to the forefront of many European programmes (in application forms or evaluation files). However, in several sociologically balanced contexts, this expectation seems to be obvious according to local criteria. For instance, it is presented as an historical fact that Egyptian and Tunisian women have been well integrated in culture and science.

A second example could be the European campaign for a free trade agreement with Tunisia, that has taken a relatively important part in recent discussions compared to the space devoted to culture and science in treaties and agreements. The EU could deflate any suspicion of a “Trojan horse” effect by including science and culture more in the negotiations, and avoid reviving ways of thinking that may still be unconsciously present deep-down in post-colonial contexts.



#### 4.3. Develop **field work** and multiply local **relays**

Surveys and interviews have underlined the role of EU Delegations in Egypt and Tunisia, especially regarding the importance of communicating about the programmes and bringing together stakeholders. Efficiency may be improved by upstream preparation of international programmes that should include the tracking and identification of **local partners** by EU Delegations. This method should help to contradict the perception that the EU tends to limit its action to a close circle of “usual suspects”, that is to say people accustomed to international cooperation who seem to be usual subscribers to European programmes, knowing all the tricks and levers. One way of doing that would be to organize round-tables with possible partners on a regular basis. Furthermore, an ideal – but costly – solution would be to install information centres, contact points, or representatives of EU programmes in every university of the country. At the same time, this decentralization process should avoid overly centralized procedures of dissemination, and would allow the networks to be broadened. It is important not to add bureaucracy to administrations that are already characterized by heavy bureaucratic systems. Individual application to programmes should be encouraged in order to shortcut any attempt to withhold information. As a principle, application procedures should not burden cultural creativity and scientific research.

#### 4.4. Develop a **co-diplomacy** approach

Following the impulse given by Horizon 2020, partners should be on an equal footing with their European counterparts. This should be achieved through the co-construction of research projects. Southern partners should be included in the programmes from the very beginning of the conception of projects, and not merely attached to it in its last phase, so that they are able to influence the choice of topics and the field of research, rather than simply being assigned to a task that has already been planned beforehand by the Northern part of the team. This underlines the need for a **common platform for the conception of Euro-Mediterranean projects** (composed of Southern European countries and a network of MENA countries).

#### 4.5. Encourage **South-South** cooperation

The logic of a consortium in European projects offers the ideal framework to put neighbouring partners together in order to foster South-South cooperation. A clause of participation in European programmes (for example within Horizon 2020, or Horizon Europa) could be the joint application of institutions from two or three countries that are not yet well accustomed to working together on scientific projects (for example Tunisia and Algeria, or Tunisia and Libya). This scheme could be extended to science and research institutions from both the Maghreb and the Middle-East. This logic of consortium could receive the support of UFM, UNESCO, and ALECSO.

#### 4.6. Develop **North-South** mobility

Cultural and science diplomacy should lean on an exact **symmetry principle**. Any action that puts together European cultural actors or scientist and their Southern partners is to be taken in accordance to this principle. Streams should flow in both directions. As encouraging both-directions mobility is a good way of avoiding the “brain drain” effect that some fear in Egypt and Tunisia, it is also a response to the visa issue often cited as something as a grudge against the EU. In higher education and research, conferences, publications, joint degrees, and co-supervision of a PhD thesis are means to create multidirectional synergies.

#### 4.7. Shed light on the **common culture** shared by Europe and the South-Mediterranean countries

European societies nowadays tend to focus on the cultural question of Islam<sup>6</sup>, often misinterpreted, forgetting about the rich and ancient history of **Mediterranean humanism** which would be a more consensual symbolic meeting point. “The source is there, in the Mediterranean space, the deep source of the high culture which our civilisation claims to come from”, wrote the French medievalist Georges Duby<sup>7</sup>. Following this historical interpretation of Mediterranean common history, also encompassing historical trends of migration in the long run, programmes should make place for studies and the development of Mediterranean **cultural heritage**. The study of this topic would bring together science diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. This is a domain that requires multidisciplinary skills and engages civil societies. As the Egyptian historian of cultures Mohamed H. Elrazzaz wrote in his recent book **The Mediterranean: A Shared Heritage**: “Beyond the conventional structures of power, the straightjackets of diplomacy, and the invented socio-political constructs, there exists a culture that was once capable of making the world a better place through the promotion of humanist learning and the emphasis on what really matters in life: equity, empathy, and solidarity. Culture, rather than the massiveness of our borders or the loudness of our discourses, should be our bet and our obsession. The heritage that we share is the deposit of our collective wisdom and the icon of our Mediterranean identity.”<sup>8</sup> A conclusion that could certainly be shared, amongst others, by the EU, Egypt and Tunisia.

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<sup>6</sup> François Burgat (2007), “Les attentes du monde arabe à l’égard de l’Union européenne”, p. 634.

<sup>7</sup> Georges Duby (1978), “L’héritage”, in Fernand Braudel, ed., *La Méditerranée: les hommes et l’héritage*, p.193.

<sup>8</sup> Mohammed H. Elrazzaz (2018), “The Mediterranean: A Shared Heritage”, p. 193.

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