Beyond ‘Venus and Mars’: Comparing Transatlantic Approaches to Democracy Promotion

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Abstract

Robert Kagan’s provocative thesis of ‘Venus and Mars’ posited America and Europe at two diametrically opposed strategic poles. However, this paper argues that Democracy Promotion is an area with the potential for intensive US-EU cooperation beyond ‘Venus and Mars’. Democracy Promotion is a key concept in the EU’s as well as US foreign policy discourse and practice. Both EU and US rhetoric hint at a belief in the logic of the Democratic Peace thesis. While the EU and the US lack comprehensive Democracy Promotion strategies, it is nevertheless possible to discern distinctive approaches to Democracy Promotion that reveal both convergences and divergences between the EU and the US. It is most likely that enhanced coordination on the strategic, political, policy and even operational levels might emerge as a middle ground between even less cooperation (and more independence in Democracy Promotion endeavours), on the one hand, and a full-fledged joint Transatlantic Democracy Promotion Agenda, on the other.
Introduction: the EU, the US and Democracy Promotion

“Democracy is the cornerstone of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy, and is key to a peaceful and prosperous future.”¹

(Paula J. Dobriansky, US Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs)

“I want to emphasize our shared commitment to promoting democracy, freedom all over the world. [...] And that’s one of the fields where I see that the United States and European Union can do, and should do, even more together.”²

(Commission President José Manuel Barroso)

These statements by leading foreign policy actors of the EU and the US reflect a shared interest across the Atlantic in Democracy Promotion as a strategy to contribute to global peace. It also reflects a widely held belief that there is an important causal link between democracy within states and peace among states. On the academic level, this belief is reflected in the so-called Democratic Peace thesis.³ On the policy level, it is represented by numerous policy statements and documents such as the US and European security strategies. The Democratic Peace thesis can be seen as an approach to world security that binds America and Europe together. However, talking about an approach to world security that unites America and Europe has not been en vogue in recent years – especially not in the heyday of the rhetoric of a transatlantic divide in strategic thinking, epitomised by Robert Kagan’s claim that “America is from Mars and Europe is from Venus”⁴. When Kagan published his provocative article ‘Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently’ in The Policy Review in June/July 2002, the first tensions over the looming invasion of Iraq had already started to strain transatlantic relations. Kagan’s argument is built around the notion that Europe’s relative military weakness compels it to use fundamentally different

foreign policy tools than America. According to Kagan’s thesis, the transatlantic gap is widening both in terms of ideology and in terms of capabilities. But Kagan and others who have written about the subject fail to explain why Democracy Promotion is becoming more and more important on the transatlantic agenda, exemplified, for example, by the intensified transatlantic ‘Dialogue on Democracy Promotion’. Hence, a systematic approach is needed to identify the convergences and divergences in the approaches of the US and the EU towards Democracy Promotion. The focus will be on illuminating the bases for transatlantic cooperation on Democracy Promotion.

In official US government publications, democracy is often explicitly mentioned, whereas the EU is often regarded as a “reluctant debutante” in the promotion of democracy. Democracy Promotion can be “understood as a cooperative international effort designed to strengthen [...] the democratic process”, including support for free, fair, and competitive elections, for independent media, for the rule of law and an independent judiciary, for defending human rights and the fundamental freedoms of expression, conscience, and association and for civil society.

This paper asks to what extent the EU and the US can cooperate meaningfully on global Democracy Promotion. It argues that the historical experience of Democracy Promotion has been very different on the two sides of the Atlantic. While the US can look back at a long tradition based on a ‘liberal grand strategy’ of Democracy Promotion, the Europeans have no such tradition even though some thinkers such as Kant have left their mark on Europe. The Democratic Peace thesis is nevertheless shared across the Atlantic as an important influence on Democracy Promotion. Enhanced coordination on the strategic, political, policy and even operational levels might be possible despite major reservations, for example about the use of force.

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Theoretical, Conceptual and Historical Bases of Democracy Promotion in US and EU Foreign Policies

Democracy Promotion as America’s ‘Liberal Grand Strategy’

Notions of Democracy Promotion and of a Democratic Peace are recurrent themes in US foreign policy rhetoric. In the 2004 State of the Union address, President Bush stated that “America is a Nation with a mission. [...] Our aim is a democratic peace – a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman”.\(^7\) In conformity with this, the latest US National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasises that “because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity”.\(^8\) “Enhancing the role of democracies and democracy promotion throughout international and multilateral institutions” is explicitly spelled out as a foreign policy objective in the NSS. This focus on the relationship between Democracy Promotion and the extension of global peace, though, is not a new phenomenon in US foreign policy. On the contrary, Ikenberry regards Democracy Promotion as an “American liberal grand strategy” that has been more dominant at some points in US history than at others but, in any case, it has provided a more or less coherent liberal orientation throughout US history.\(^9\) The following paragraphs will highlight the continuity of this tradition.

Throughout history American foreign policy has been informed substantially by the Democratic Peace thesis. In the discipline of International Relations (IR), liberal thinking on military power is largely based on the notion of a ‘perpetual peace’ elaborated in


Immanuel Kant’s seminal book. Kant put forward the idea that a federal contract between states abolishing war (a ‘pacific federation’) should be established. The Democratic Peace thesis assumes that democratic states do not go to war with each other but might be aggressive towards non-liberal states. A prosperous and peaceful ‘zone of peace’ in the West is contrasted to an impoverished and conflict-ridden ‘zone of war’ in the rest of the world. Hence, in order to create peaceful relations among states and diminish the role of military power, the Democratic Peace thesis advocates the spread of liberal democratic institutions such as multiparty democracy, market economies, free trade and human rights as the “best prescription for international peace”.

From the start, the use of force in the name of Democracy Promotion was seen as a valid option in the US grand strategy - as the example of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt corollary illustrate. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 provided the conceptual basis of Democracy Promotion in Central and Latin America. It was designed to keep the European imperial powers away from the American continent’s affairs. The notion of defending democracy against an outside threat (in this case: imperialist Europe) set the scene for future US Democracy Promotion. The offensive variant of the Monroe Doctrine is the 1904 Roosevelt corollary of the doctrine. It attempted to justify US intervention in Central and Latin America on the grounds of mismanagement (or so-called ‘chronic wrongdoing’).

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Under the Presidency of Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), these ideas were further developed under the slogan ‘making the world safe for democracy’. Wilson made the spread of democracy to prevent a repetition of the horrors of World War I a central theme of his foreign policy. Resembling Kant’s call for a ‘permanent peace treaty’, Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ called for the creation of an international institution to regulate international anarchy in order to secure peace among nations. The League of Nations would later become the embodiment of Wilson’s suggestions. Wilson regarded America as an exceptional nation with a unique global mission for the spread of democracy. Wilsonianism has influenced Wilson’s successors – some more than others – but Wilson’s attempt to relate American exceptionalism and Pax Americana to the Democratic Peace has become very influential in US foreign policy.

Even during the Cold War, the debate over Democratic Peace and the benefits of Democracy Promotion in US foreign policy endured through the controversies over Carter’s democratisation agenda and the birth of the neo-conservative movement in the early 1980s. References to the insights of the thesis were frequently used by American policy makers, including Ronald Reagan and Jeane Kirkpatrick. The neo-conservative Kirkpatrick argued in 1979 that right-wing dictatorships, especially those allied with the US, had better prospects for democratisation than left-wing, pro-Soviet dictatorships—a thesis that would later become known as the ‘Kirkpatrick Doctrine’. The doctrine contrasted to the Carter administration’s call for “democracy in all nations, not just non-communist autocracies”.

By the early 1990s, the Democratic Peace thesis had gained a new impetus through Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ proposition, Huntington’s observation of a ‘third wave of

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17 Scott Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005, p. 46.
democratisation' and increasing literature on the thesis itself. President Clinton’s Democracy Promotion policy was based on the concept of ‘democratic enlargement’. This approach to Democratic Peace was intrinsically linked to the idea that political liberalism and economic liberalism go hand in hand. He has been labelled as a ‘pragmatic crusader’ because he regarded Democracy Promotion as a policy instrument to advance American power, especially America’s economic interests, “rather than as a moral duty”.21

Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, adopted a more military-minded concept of the Democratic Peace. Pre-emptive attacks by democratic states against anticipated threats from non-democracies are explicitly sanctioned by leading Democratic Peace theorists22 – a concept which is strikingly similar to the Bush doctrines of preventive war and regime change as outlined for example in the NSS of 2002.23 Insofar, the ‘Bush Doctrine’ includes the possibility of the use of military force against non-democracies as part of the Democratic Peace thesis and thus forms part of the Bush concept of Democracy Promotion.

The Lack of a ‘Grand Liberal Tradition’ of Democracy Promotion in Europe

Europe cannot look back at a ‘grand liberal tradition’ of Democracy Promotion. In the European tradition, notions of democracy and its association with peace existed mainly in the sphere of ideas – unlike in the case of the US where they also entered the doctrinal and practical policy dimensions. This ideational tradition in Europe put democracy and freedom at the centre of European philosophical thought, such as in the writings of Kant, Grotius, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau. In the case of the US, the idea of Democracy Promotion became a recurrent theme in foreign policy discourse. In the European case, it was rather the opposite – the spread of colonialism and authoritarianism – that dominated European history up to the 20th century despite

22  See, for example, Russett, op. cit., p. 32.
the thinkers of the enlightenment. Thus, three factors complicate a comparative study of EU and US Democracy Promotion approaches: (1) the US is a state, while the EU is a sui generis organisation; (2) the short history of the EC/EU explains why the US and the EU Democracy Promotion strategies and policies start from very different historical positions; and (3) the lack of a ‘liberal grand strategy’ of Democracy Promotion in Europe makes the EU a “reluctant debutante”. Nonetheless, concepts of Democracy Promotion can be found in the European context.

In his ‘Power and Weakness’, Kagan argues that Europe has entered a “post-historical paradise of peace”, indicating the “realisation of Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’”. Karen Smith acknowledges that the spread of democracy in European foreign policy “broadly accords with the democratic peace proposition: democracies don’t fight each other, therefore promoting democracy is a peace strategy.”

Beside Kant, Hugo Grotius has influenced contemporary European notions of Democracy Promotion. Grotius was a Dutch diplomat and philosopher, whose groundbreaking book Laws of War and Peace (1625) is seen as “a founding text” of international law. The emergence of the EU as a unifying organisation in Europe based on integration and multilateral cooperation has brought with it an emerging concept of Democracy Promotion that is based on both the Kantian and Grotian legacies. Both the EU Treaty (TEU) and the EC Treaty (TEC) underline the EU’s fundamental attachment to the principle of democracy and its consolidation worldwide, relating it to good governance, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and strengthening the global order. Article 6 TEU states that “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law”. Article 11 relates to Democracy Promotion, stressing the objective to “develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Article 177, para 2 TEC in Title XX (Development Cooperation),

24 Emerson et al., op.cit.
states that “Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Derived from these articles, the legal basis for EU Democracy Promotion foresees the promotion of democracy in conjunction with the interlinked issues of promotion of the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Democracy Promotion in the European context is also connected to the preservation of global order, most notably in the European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003:

The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.28

Thus, in the EU’s emerging foreign policy Kantian notions of Democratic Peace are intrinsically linked to two additional IR concepts: Grotian notions of the rule of law and a preoccupation with safeguarding international order, as is often reflected in the works of the English School of IR. The international society approach of the English School and the Grotian notion of the rule of law are clearly spelled out in the EU’s preference for ‘effective multilateralism’ in the ESS which calls for a “stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order”.29 Thus, EU Democracy Promotion is connected, already on the conceptual level, to the overriding principles of the rule of law, good governance and the maintenance of international order.

The acknowledgement of a connection between democracy and peace can be found in the EU’s notion of ‘structural stability’, which addresses the root causes of conflict. Democracy is mentioned as one of the characteristics of ‘structural stability’ along with sustainable economic development, respect for human rights, viable

political structures, healthy environmental and social conditions and the capacity to manage change without resort to conflict. ‘Preventive engagement’, a concept taken from the ESS, is the policy counterpart to the concept of ‘structural stability’.

The European Commission has integrated a key section on ‘Support for democracy, the rule of law and civil society’ in its Communication on Conflict Prevention. It can thus be argued that the concepts of ‘structural stability’ and ‘preventive engagement’ reflect conceptual translations of the Democratic Peace proposition. However, in the EU context, the concept of Democratic Peace is firmly embedded within the EU’s conflict prevention strategy – the use of force to promote democracy is not foreseen. Instead, the Commission document envisages a very limited role for military instruments in this regard: “the new civilian and military crisis-management tools currently being developed in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) could be used to deal with the earliest stages of incipient conflict. Though initially designed for crisis management they could be just as effective in a preventive, ‘pre-crisis’ role.”

Bridging the Transatlantic Gap: Robert Cooper and the ‘New Liberal Imperialism’

The transatlantic gap on the conceptual level with regard to Democratic Peace can be bridged by Robert Cooper’s call for a new European approach to military force – one that resembles US assertiveness. Cooper accepts, in principle, Kagan’s premises about European weakness and the resulting implications for the role of military power. But he focuses more on a grand strategy (the so-called ‘new liberal imperialism’) to push Europe into becoming a military power. He distinguishes between a post-modern ‘zone of peace’, which includes Europe, and a pre-modern ‘zone of chaos’. According to Cooper, a new kind of imperialism is needed which entails that the “efficient and
well-governed export stability and liberty” to the ‘zone of chaos’. Kagan, commenting on Cooper, claims that “the application of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe's new mission civilisatrice”. Therefore, Cooper’s influential publications on the ‘new liberal imperialism’ might function as a bridge between the more assertive US conceptualisation of the Democratic Peace and the more reluctant EU conceptualisation.

**Democracy Promotion Policies and Tools**

**US and EU Approaches to Democracy Promotion**

“Both the EU and the US want to increase the number of democracies around the world. We may bring somewhat different approaches to the table and use different language than our American friends. But human rights, good governance and the rule of law go hand-in-hand with democracy and freedom. As long as our respective strategies reinforce each other - and they do - this pluralism in promoting democracy is a source of strength.”

(Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union)

Solana’s statement reflects a tacit understanding that the US and the EU have different but reinforcing Democracy Promotion strategies. It is noteworthy that neither the US – despite its long Democracy Promotion tradition – nor the EU have unified, coherent Democracy Promotion strategies and actors. US governmental actors include the White House, the State Department and US Embassies, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and Congress. The National Endowment for Democracy is a semi-governmental Democracy Promotion actor, whereas NGOs such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace can be regarded as non-governmental Democracy Promotion actors. The situation is similar on the EU side. There is no such thing as an EU strategy on Democracy Promotion. However, Mário Rui Queiró from the EuropeAid Co-operation Office

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underlined that, for practical purposes, there is an “EC/EU Strategy for Democracy Promotion” that derives from various different sources such as the EU and EC Treaties, the EU-ACP Partnership and other practical cooperation arrangements. Nevertheless, the EU recognises that there is need for spelling out an EU approach to Democracy Promotion. Therefore, an unofficial ‘food for thought’ paper on the EU approach to Democracy Promotion has been floating around in EU institutions since 2006 which stresses that democracy should be regarded as a long-term, locally driven process. The paper was written by the Policy Unit of the Council General Secretariat and the Commission. Interestingly, it was prepared “in accordance with the PSC [Political and Security Committee] conclusions of 31.01.06 relating to the EU-US dialogue on democracy promotion”. This seems to indicate that EU-US coordination of Democracy Promotion efforts can be seen as one of the triggers for the EU’s renewed interest in establishing its own Democracy Promotion approach.

As both the EU and the US lack comprehensive Democracy Promotion strategies, it might be best to look at the different Democracy Promotion tools and instruments that can be clearly identified. The unofficial ‘food for thought paper’ mentions a whole list of possible Democracy Promotion instruments from which the following categories of Democracy Promotion tools can be discerned: political dialogue and diplomatic measures; multilateral initiatives; economic and financial incentives; conditionalities and sanctions; military mobilisation and intervention; and democracy aid programmes.

Political Dialogue and Diplomatic Measures

On the EU side, the political dialogue with countries such as Russia and China is crucial because of the difficulties of engaging in small-scale civil society projects in these countries. The core interests and values on which the EU-Russia strategic partnership is based include “democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and market economy

39 Interview with Mr. Mário Rui Queiró, official of the European Commission, DG RELEX, EuropeAid Co-operation Office, Brussels, 30 April 2007.

principles”.

As far as US Democracy Promotion towards Russia is concerned, the US emphasises a strong pro-democratic rhetoric that creates high expectations both on the part of the US and on the part of the partner. This “overexpansive rhetoric” on Democracy Promotion has had negative consequences for the US political dialogue on Democracy Promotion as, in most cases, these high expectations have not been fulfilled. Another tenet of US Democracy Promotion, especially with regard to political dialogue, is the association of democracy with a particular leader. This ‘great leader approach’ puts persons before structures and institutions - unlike the EU that emphasises ‘structural stability’ and long-term capacity and institution-building.

The policy of ‘positive engagement’ towards China is another high-profile case of political dialogue that contributes to Democracy Promotion in the long run. The EU approach to China has been characterised as promoting a “rules-based economy” first, with a focus firmly on ‘good governance’ rather than democratic reform per se. As a consequence, the EU-China dialogue on human rights was initiated in 1996 at the political level. This emphasis on narrow human rights and good governance issues rather than an overarching Democracy Promotion strategy succeeded in engaging the Chinese authorities who did not feel threatened by the incremental EU approach. US rhetoric on China, however, often appeared to undermine the Chinese political system as such and displayed China as a strategic rival. For that reason, “in light of this difference […] Chinese officials stated in private that they were more willing to grant access to European than to US good governance and human rights assistance”.

EU-US efforts to coordinate the political dialogue with countries in democratic transition have been intensified in recent years. The 2007 US-EU Summit emphasised the progress

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43 Ibid., p. 35.
made on coordinating efforts in intensifying the political dialogues with Russia and Central Asian countries on democracy and human rights.46

A recent example of a practical diplomatic measure shows the difficulties of the EU and the US even to cooperate on the political level. In August 2006 the US and the EU had planned a joint démarche on the Belarusian authorities' disrespect for international standards of democracy and human rights. However, the requested high-level meetings with the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus were refused.47 The Belarusian authorities apparently rejected cooperation with the US while they welcomed the EU efforts.48 Hence, EU-US cooperation on Democracy Promotion, in particular circumstances, can have a detrimental effect on the EU's ability to engage in meaningful political dialogue with a third country. Moreover, the US Democracy Promotion policy is sometimes accused of double standards. As a corollary to the ‘Kirkpatrick Doctrine’, the US often tends to support regimes that cooperate on counter-terrorism despite their record on democracy, for example Pakistan. Therefore, US Democracy Promotion is embedded within a “stronger geo-strategic dynamic, compared to the more prominent development-based logic conditioning European approaches”.49

Multilateral Initiatives

By contrast, most of the recent Democracy Promotion initiatives in multilateral fora originated from successful EU-US coordination. The EU and the US have collaborated successfully on priorities for the Human Rights Council. They also co-sponsored UN 3rd Committee resolutions on Belarus, Burma, Iran and North Korea and worked together in the bodies of the Peace Building Commission.50 EU-US coordination was pivotal in the creation of the UN Democracy Fund that gives grants mostly to pro-democracy civil

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society organisations around the world.  

A further example of successful EU-US Democracy Promotion cooperation in multilateral initiatives is the ‘Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative’ launched by the G8. It is a multilateral development and reform plan aimed at fostering economic and political liberalisation in Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries. These examples illustrate the large extent to which transatlantic cooperation on multilateral initiatives is growing.

Economic and Financial Incentives, Conditionalities and Sanctions

In the 1990s, the EU introduced a standard human rights and democracy clause into its treaties with third countries as a means to facilitate the application of political conditionality in its external relations. Trade and cooperation agreements, aid, association agreements and finally EU membership were made conditional on criteria such as the adherence to democratic standards, human rights and the rule of law. In cases of alleged violations against the conditions, the EU normally initiates a complicated consultation procedure. In contrast, the US has been more willing to suspend democracy aid to uncooperative third countries altogether. Therefore, the US is seen as more capable of quick responses to disruptions in democratic transition countries, whereas the EU is more “attuned to assisting the background conditions to political reform over a longer period of time, including the construction of genuine ‘consent’ to the value of democratic norms”.

Moreover, the US does not shy away from imposing unilateral measures if it sees the peaceful transition to a representative democracy threatened, for example unilateral sanctions against Cuba based on the Helms-Burton Act. The EU reacted negatively to the Helms-Burton Act and introduced a Council Regulation declaring the extra-territorial

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54 Smith, op.cit., pp. 104ff.
provisions of the Act to be unenforceable within the Union.\textsuperscript{57} In the aftermath of the US-
EU settlement of the controversies arising from Helms-Burton Act, USAID and EuropeAid established a list of shared principles on the use of sanctions. Yet, “the sanctions were interpreted in differing ways, the EU seeing them as limiting the use of punitive measures, the US emphasizing their role in placing more stringent conditions on trade and investment with rogue regimes.”\textsuperscript{58} Despite these differences in the use of conditionalities and sanctions, there are some joint sanction regimes, for example travel restrictions and targeted financial sanctions against members of the Lukashenko regime of Belarus.\textsuperscript{59}

Military Force

Possibly the most controversial topic on the Democracy Promotion agenda is whether the use of force can be employed to promote democracy. In the Commission’s view, democracy cannot be imposed but has to be built from within.\textsuperscript{60} When President George W. Bush placed Democracy Promotion at the centre of his second-term agenda in 2005, much of the European public and many European leaders started to see US Democracy Promotion “as a repackaged commitment to the unilateral use of force as well as justification for a war and occupation that were not going as smoothly as expected”.\textsuperscript{61} Any additional unilateral attempts to democratise the Middle East by force could lead to “further, and still more damaging breakdowns in the solidarity required for transatlantic co-operation” in Democracy Promotion.\textsuperscript{62} Even though Democracy Promotion is usually not the only reason for US military intervention (as in the case of Iraq) the US has advocated the use of force as a Democracy Promotion tool


\textsuperscript{58} Youngs, ‘Democracy Promotion’, op.cit., p. 50.


\textsuperscript{60} Interview with an official of the European Commission, DG RELEX, Brussels, 7 May 2007.


before, for example in the case of US attempts to galvanise UN support for the intervention to restore democracy in Haiti.\textsuperscript{63}

The EU, on the other hand, prefers civilian to coercive military measures to protect human rights and democracy. However, as mentioned above, the ESDP could involve the use of civilian and military mobilisation in a ‘pre-crisis’ situation as part of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy.\textsuperscript{64}

Democracy Aid Programmes

Democracy aid (or democracy assistance) is designed to "foster a democratic opening in a nondemocratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening".\textsuperscript{65} Aid is typically directed towards elections, political parties, constitutions, judiciaries, police, legislatures, local government, militaries, nongovernmental civic advocacy groups, civic education organisations, trade unions and media organisations.

The enlargement process is the first and the oldest (indirect) Democracy Promotion tool of the EU. At the Copenhagen European Council meeting in June 1993, the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ were formulated, including the requirement that the candidate country must have achieved "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities".\textsuperscript{66} The EU’s pre-accession instruments often turned out to be key factors in Democracy Promotion.

The PHARE programme\textsuperscript{67} was one of the three pre-accession instruments financed by the EU to assist the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) in their efforts to prepare for EU membership. In effect since 1989, the programme focused on institution-

\textsuperscript{63} Youngs, ‘Democracy Promotion’, op.cit., p. 49.
\textsuperscript{64} European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, op.cit., p. 23.
\textsuperscript{67} PHARE originally stood for ‘Poland and Hungary: Action for Rehabilitating the Economy’ but gradually covered all CEECs with ambitions to join the EU.
building as well as economic and social cohesion. Its sister programme TACIS was launched in 1991, providing grant-financed technical assistance to twelve countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Both programmes focused on EU cooperation with governments. In addition, the PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme, initiated in 1992, was specifically designed to support non-governmental organisations. On 1 January 2007 a new Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance came into force, bringing together all previous pre-accession support programmes into one single instrument.

A derivative from the accession process – the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) – as well as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) encompass democracy assistance elements, too. The ENP offers a set of neighbouring countries from Eastern Europe and the Southern Mediterranean a ‘stake’ in the EU’s single market and closer cooperation on other EU programmes in return for democratic reforms. A ‘Governance Facility’ provides additional financial aid to those countries that want to go further in strengthening the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights. New financial support is available through a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which adds new impetus to the democracy assistance agenda.

The SAP is an integrated, long-term approach to conflict prevention in the Western Balkans, in line with the notion of ‘preventive engagement’ discussed above. A policy mix of aid, trade concessions and the prospect for eventual EU membership is used to

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71 European Commission, Enlargement, op.cit.


73 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy, ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm [31 March 2007].
keep countries from the Western Balkans on the road towards democratic transition.\textsuperscript{74} The Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) Programme has underpinned the objectives and mechanisms of the SAP.\textsuperscript{75}

The European Parliament has a particularly strong record in advocating democracy and human rights in European foreign policy despite its limited competence in this area. It took the initiative in 1991 to propose a separate ‘democracy line’ of support in the EU budget to finance a new European Fund for the promotion of civil society and democratisation. Five million ECU of the PHARE budget were set aside for this purpose. A ‘European Democracy Initiative’ was set up in 1992 on the initiative of the European Parliament, extending the Democracy Promotion programme for CEECs to other parts of the world, including Latin America and the ACP countries.\textsuperscript{76} More recently, the Parliament used its budgetary powers to implement the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) - a special budget line for Democracy Promotion, especially civil society projects. EIDHR is part of the thematic projects of the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (complementing the geographical projects that focus on particular regions).\textsuperscript{77} EIDHR confirms the EU’s holistic Democracy Promotion approach that treats democracy and human rights and their respective promotion strategies as “two sides of the same coin”.\textsuperscript{78}

The EU has adopted a regional, multilateral focus for democracy assistance projects. The US, on the other hand, often stepped outside the confines of regional organisations such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) “to adopt unilateral measures in a way that the EU declined to do”.\textsuperscript{79} Whereas the EU concentrates on local ownership in its democracy aid programmes, the US often supports high profile initiatives which are sometimes insensitive to local conditions using “replica features of American

\textsuperscript{74} European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, op.cit., p. 10.
\textsuperscript{75} European Commission, ‘Financial Assistance’, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{77} Interview with Mr. Mário Rui Queiró, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{78} Interview with an official of the European Commission, DG RELEX, Brussels, 7 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{79} Youngs, ‘Democracy Promotion’, op.cit., p. 51.
democracy” (strong checks and balances, two moderate parties, privately owned media, decentralised union bargaining) as the model for a democracy.80

Both the EU and the US have set up institutional mechanisms to coordinate their respective democracy aid efforts more effectively. Within the European Commission, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office was set up in 2001 to coordinate the EU’s external aid programmes, with the unit on Governance, Democracy, Human Rights and Gender dealing specifically with Democracy Promotion issues. As far as the US is concerned, an Interagency Working Group on Democracy was set up under President Clinton in order to coordinate different elements of democracy-related strategy in the State Department and USAID.81 USAID has also developed a sub-office for Democracy and Governance.82

USAID started its intensive democracy assistance programme in Central and Latin America in the 1980s, initially as part of the Reagan Administration’s support for anti-communist regimes, but then more generally to foster the democratic transition in the countries of the region. This included sponsoring electoral assistance and rule-of-law aid.83 By the end of the 1980s, USAID had expanded its democratic aid programmes to the rest of the world. With the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War, though, the emphasis of USAID Democracy Promotion shifted towards democratic transition in the CEECs and the states from the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia and Ukraine.84 There is a clear overlap with similar EU programmes, including PHARE and TACIS. In the 1990s, USAID started to fund electoral assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa.85 In this respect, both the EU and US programmes have been based on a similar strategic goal (supporting the post-communist democratic transitions), geographic focus areas (Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Russia) and democracy assistance tools (particularly electoral assistance). In fact, there seems to be ideal ground for cooperation in electoral assistance. Nonetheless, USAID has recognised a lack of

80 Ibid., p. 49.
81 Ibid., p. 46.
83 Carothers, op.cit., p. 184.
84 Ibid., p. 185.
85 Ibid.
operational cooperation in electoral assistance and seeks at least a limited level of coordination with the EU. But this often does not work in practice. The EU prefers to carry out electoral assistance missions independently – other actors such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) may operate as ‘service providers’ to the EU, for example through the provision of technical equipment. In the elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo in April 2006, there was no cooperation with the US on the operational level despite some coordination on the political level.

Political foundations and NGOs are also active Democracy Promotion actors. On the US side, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created as a governmentally funded but privately operated organisation devoted to Democracy Promotion in 1983. NED has initiated a network of publicly funded but non-governmental associations dedicated to Democracy Promotion – the Network of Democracy Assistance Foundations – under the umbrella of the World Movement for Democracy. The network consists of foundations such as the large German foundations (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung), the Westminster Foundation for Democracy and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. NED and most of the other mainly European and American foundations in the network have been especially effective in Democracy Promotion projects that involved the so-called ‘first-in’ funding, i.e. the provision of start-up assistance to democratising groups in the target countries. Robinson has observed the ‘transnationalisation’ of Democracy Promotion under US leadership, of which the network of political foundations promoting democracy is one crucial element.

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91 Scott and Steele, op.cit., pp. 441-442.
Conclusion: The Way Forward for EU-US Cooperation on Democracy Promotion beyond ‘Venus and Mars’

Kagan’s provocative thesis of ‘Venus and Mars’ posited America and Europe at two diametrically opposed strategic poles. This paper indicates that Democracy Promotion is an area that shows potential for intensive US-EU cooperation beyond ‘Venus and Mars’. The 2007 US-EU Summit Political Progress Report recognises that “effective dialogue – often in advance of policy formulation – has led to convergence on key issues”.

In the area of promoting “peace, human rights, democracy and the rule of law worldwide”, the report states that “the effectiveness of our efforts is amplified by delivering the same political messages and coordinating possible actions”. The EU-US ‘Dialogue on Democracy Promotion’ is a crucial tool that allows the EU and the US to coordinate their separate and joint efforts in global Democracy Promotion on the highest political levels.

In spite of these encouraging signs of cooperation, the EU shies away from joint projects on the operational level because of the perceived US agenda for Democracy Promotion with a focus on short-term regime change and imposing democracy from above. The blunt statement of an official of the European Commission exemplifies the bleak prospects for EU-US Democracy Promotion cooperation on the operational level: “quite frankly, the EU does not want to sacrifice its good name for a Transatlantic Agenda on Democracy Promotion”.

Instead, the ‘food for thought’ paper on the EU approach to Democracy Promotion stresses rather the opposites of the short-termism and top-down approach that the US allegedly pursues by highlighting the following priorities for EU Democracy Promotion: local ownership of Democracy Promotion initiatives, long-term capacity-building, the identification of priority states, the mainstreaming of democratic principles in development and the holistic nature of Democracy Promotion in conjunction with the

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94 Ibid.
promotion of human rights, the rule of law and good governance. In this sense, the EU has “sought to develop policy initiatives capable of challenging what many see as Washington’s pre-eminence in this field”. Nonetheless, there might be potential for more cooperation. Three ways forward for EU-US cooperation on Democracy Promotion will be outlined below.

1) Enhanced Coordination at the Political and Strategic Levels

This paper showed that there are already some promising bilateral and multilateral Democracy Promotion initiatives from which further EU-US cooperation could be developed, such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative. The democracy support programmes of the US and the EU could be harmonised further to achieve more effective coordination. Both the US Millennium Challenge Account and the EU’s ENP were designed to assist emerging democracies in their efforts to strengthen democratic institutions. In geographical areas where both the EU and the US are actively pursuing Democracy Promotion policies, such as the Black Sea region, enhanced coordination of Democracy Promotion could be beneficial. However, at the moment formal coordination does not yet exist even though “the four freedoms of market access, labour mobility, investment and travel offered in Europe’s Neighbourhood Policy are the obvious complement to what the United States can offer in terms of security support and developmental aid”. Closer coordination with European foundations might also be helpful. The example of the Black Sea region shows that there is a huge potential for further coordination of transatlantic Democracy Promotion activities, both at the highest political level and at the NGO level.

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96 Council of the EU, ‘The EU Approach To Democracy Promotion In External Relations’, op.cit.
2) Enhanced Policy Dialogue with Operational Implications

If cooperation on the political/strategic level is possible but operational cooperation is not forthcoming yet, a middle ground could be provided by enhanced cooperation on the policy level. A joint US Institute of Peace-FRIDE \(^{100}\) workshop on ‘Transatlantic Cooperation on Democracy Promotion in the Middle East’ has specifically called for an enhanced policy dialogue. To this end, the workshop agreed that “the aim of supporting political reform needs to be broken down into more operational issues of concern, assisting clear agreement on what kind of change is actually desired”.\(^{101}\)

There seems to be ground for optimism that local projects can benefit from enhanced policy dialogue. For instance, in the case of Democracy Promotion activities in Jordan, the EU and the US were able to develop complementary frameworks of operation rather than competitive approaches. Informal cooperation mechanisms have emerged, for example in the case of judicial reform in Jordan. Nonetheless, “systematic co-ordination has not become part yet of the Western code of conduct in the democratic realm”.\(^{102}\) Insofar, an enhanced policy dialogue on Democracy Promotion might have significant knock-on effects for operational cooperation and might be the way forward for closer cooperation in specific regions.

3) A Joint Strategic Vision: a Transatlantic Democracy Promotion Agenda?

Even though Commission officials rule out the creation of a joint Transatlantic Democracy Promotion Agenda, a strategic convergence in Democracy Promotion can be observed in recent years. The American and European Security Strategies both emphasise the interrelationship between democracy and peace. The ‘new liberal imperialism’ might be a bridge between US and EU strategies but, as shown above, such a strategic bridge has not trickled down to the policy or even operational level. In such a way, Cooper’s bold calls for a more assertive EU role in the world cannot be

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\(^{100}\) FRIDE is the abbreviation for ‘Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior’.


understood as an invitation to do more joint Democracy Promotion projects, possibly including the use of force, with the US.

In light of the latest challenges to democracy, in particular the global rise of radical populism, some commentators argue that “the adoption of a common transatlantic democracy promotion agenda that will reconcile the need for supporting democracy and the need to reduce the risks of instability caused by the populist revolutions should be an essential part of NATO’s response to populism”.103 Thus, despite the sceptical view of the Commission, the notion of a Transatlantic Democracy Promotion Agenda will remain part of the Democracy Promotion debate as the representation of the most optimistic view of the prospects for future transatlantic cooperation in Democracy Promotion.

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