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Report

drawn up on behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relations

on economic and trade relations between the European Community and Japan

Rapporteur: Mr J. BAAS

PE 47.229/fin.

At its sitting of 15 March 1973 the European Parliament authorized the Committee on External Economic Relations to draw up a report on economic and trade relations between the European Community and Japan.

At its sitting of 15 December 1976, the European Parliament also referred to the Committee on External Economic Relations a motion for a resolution by Mr Klepsch (Doc. 483/76) on trade between the EEC and Japan.

The Committee on External Economic Relations appointed Mr Baas rapporteur.

At its meetings of 18 January 1977 and 26 January 1977, the Committee on External Economic Relations considered the draft report. On 15 February 1977, it unanimously adopted the motion for a resolution.

Present: Mr Kaspereit, chairman; Mr Schmidt and Mr Martinelli, vice-chairmen; Mr Baas, rapporteur; Mr Bayerl, Mr Bersani, Mr Didier, Mr Laban, Mr Molloy, Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams (deputizing for Mr Spicer) and Mr Sandri.

CONTENTS

	<u>Pages</u>
A. MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION	5
B. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT	7
I. The structure of trade between the Community and Japan	8
- Motor vehicles	12
- Shipbuilding	14
- Iron and steel	15
- Ball bearings	16
II. The causes of the Community's growing deficit	17
III. Ways of achieving a better balance in trade between the Community and Japan	21
1. Unilateral restrictions on trade	21
2. Greater consultation between the two parties	24
3. Development of Community exports to Japan	27
4. Closer cooperation between the Community and Japan	28
 <u>ANNEX</u>	 32

The Committee on External Economic Relations hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on economic and trade relations between the European Community and Japan

The European Parliament,

- recalling its resolutions of 2 February 1970¹ on trade relations between the Six and Japan and 15 December 1976 on Community trade with Japan²,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on External Economic Relations (Doc. 570/76),
 - having regard to the proposal for a resolution by Mr Klepsch on behalf of the Christian-Democratic Group, on trade between the EEC and Japan (Doc. 483/76),
1. Expresses its deep concern at the constant growth of the Community's trade deficit with Japan;
 2. Draws attention to the alarming consequences to employment of Japanese competition which concentrates on limited sectors of industries such as shipbuilding and electronics and notes the increasing regional imbalances which result from these Japanese activities;
 3. Calls upon the Commission to examine and report to Parliament on the methods whereby Japanese exporters and financial houses penetrate various markets in the Community with a view to domination of those markets, thereby infringing the rules of fair competition;
 4. Feels that, in certain sectors, voluntary limitation of Japanese exports to the Community is temporarily required;
 5. Stresses, however that a substantial increase in Community exports to Japan would play a key role in ending this trade deficit, and welcomes the fact that this view was shared by the Heads of Government of the Community at the European Council meeting of 29 and 30 November 1976;

¹ OJ No. C 25, 28.2.1970

² OJ No. C 6, 10.1.1977, p. 69.

6. Requests the Commission to strongly urge the Japanese Government to make substantial concessions giving the industries of the European Community access to the Japanese domestic market comparable to that enjoyed by Japan to the Community market, and to ensure that the Japanese authorities put an end to the non-tariff barriers to imports from the Community;
7. Welcomes the Japanese Government's recent decision to simplify the technical control procedure for motor vehicles and pharmaceutical products from the Nine;
8. Notes that relations between certain Member States and Japan are still governed by bilateral agreements and shares the view that the provisions of these agreements may be applied only under the terms of the common trade policy and only by the Community so that the cohesion of the Community policy is maintained and the free movement of goods within the common market is not jeopardized;
9. Feels that questions of mutual interest and the differences between Japan and the Community should be resolved by common agreement on the basis of the principle of freedom of trade;
10. Stresses the importance of continuing these consultations at parliamentary level and suggests, therefore, the inauguration of regular contacts between delegations from the European Parliament and the Japanese Diet;
11. Takes the view that, notwithstanding the differences of opinion that have arisen in recent years in the trade sector, the two parties have to face similar challenges and difficulties, which implies a community of interests;
12. Hopes that, given this community of interests, widespread cooperation will be possible between the two parties, especially in multilateral matters (North-South dialogue and GATT for instance) and also in the areas of energy policy, research and pollution control;
13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of its committee to the Council and Commission of the European Communities and, for information, to the Japanese Government and Parliament.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

1. By devoting part of its deliberations on 29 and 30 November 1976 at The Hague to the question of relations between the Community and Japan, the European Council stressed the political nature which the growing trade imbalance between the Nine and Japan is currently assuming.

According to Community estimates, by 31 December its deficit will have reached \$4,200 million. In 1975 it was only \$3,200 million, although this already represented an increase of 68% over 1974.

Thus, once again, relations between the Community and Japan are of current importance.

2. When presenting his report on trade relations between the Six and Japan (Doc. 212/69) during the February 1970 part-session¹, your rapporteur stressed the importance of this topic. Although, in the meantime, the subject has been raised in Parliament on several occasions - during Question Time and more recently during the December 1976 part-session, when the oral question with debate put by Mr Osborn on behalf of the European Conservative Group (O-74/76, Doc. 390/76) **was discussed - economic and trade relations with Japan have not been the subject of a full-scale analysis by the European Parliament.**

3. The Committee on External Economic Relations feels that, at a time when employers and trade unions in the Nine are drawing the attention of their governments and the Community authorities with growing concern to the alarming consequences, especially for employment, of Japanese competition in an increasing number of areas of economic activity, there is a need to return to the problem of relations between the two parties.

Within the necessarily limited framework of this report we shall attempt, first of all, to study the structure of trade between the Community and Japan, then the reasons for the Community's growing trade deficit vis-à-vis Japan, before going on to consider the possibilities of achieving a better trade balance between two areas so far apart geographically, which, despite economic considerations and the rivalry which can make them competitors in the search for markets, are closely linked by their adherence to the principles of parliamentary democracy and freedom of trade.

¹ See OJ No. 121, Proceedings of 2 February 1970

I. The structure of trade between the Community and Japan

4. Together with the United States, the European Community and Japan constitute the world's greatest economic and commercial powers.

During the 1960s the world watched with admiration and astonishment Japan's extraordinary rise to power which transformed this small archipelago, with no natural resources of its own, into the world's third economic power. For many years 'Japanese-style growth' has been synonymous with economic miracles, with record growth, with increases in production levels to unprecedented heights and extraordinary commercial vitality.

5. This system, based above all on freedom of trade and capital at world level, on unlimited supplies of cheap raw materials and on the soundness of the international monetary system, guaranteeing stable rates of exchange among the major currencies, reached its zenith at the end of the 1960s.

The Nixon 'shocks' of 1971 and the restrictions placed on Japanese exports by the United States, the 1973 energy crisis (Japan imports 99% of its oil), the increase in the price of all raw materials, the efforts to set up a new world economic order geared more closely to the interests of raw-material-producing developing countries, and the general pollution of the archipelago brought home to Japan the vulnerability of its power and the need to restructure its economy to make it less dependent on the hazards of worldwide fluctuations.

6. In this new context, the European Community, the leading world economic and trade power, assumed a special importance in the eyes of Japanese businessmen.

Although trade between the Community and Japan had been growing steadily throughout the 1960s, the leaders in Tokyo regarded it as peripheral and, in the last analysis, of secondary importance. Japan's traditional trading partners, who took more than 60% of Japan's exports, were the United States and the non-Communist countries of South-East Asia.

7. The structure of the Community and of Japan undoubtedly make their economies appear competitive rather than complementary. Europeans and Japanese both live in areas where land is scarce, which are overpopulated and which lack natural resources.

To maintain employment and living standards, they have been obliged to set up powerful industries and to carry on a high level of trade with the whole world. This competition for markets was inevitably aggravated by the repercussions of the energy crisis. The sharp rise in the cost of petroleum products and the conquest of markets in producing countries wishing to industrialize rapidly have intensified competition between Europeans and Japanese.

8. Up until the beginning of the 1970s the Community of the Six was, for Japan, a relatively unimportant trading partner. It is true that during this period, Community trade with Japan developed more rapidly than with any other country except Libya. Between 1958 and 1969 Community imports from Japan increased by more than 450% and Community exports to Japan by 350%, although the initial figures were very low.

9. Despite the considerable expansion in trade, the balance of trade between the Community and Japan remained roughly in equilibrium until the beginning of the 1970s. Although Japan registered a surplus of about \$100 million in 1965 and 1966 and \$15 million in 1968, the balance of trade during the other years was slightly in the Community's favour.

10. From 1970 onwards the situation changed considerably. Every year since then, EEC/Japan trade has resulted in a growing deficit, first for the Six and then for the Nine.

This is illustrated by the following figures:

The Community's trade deficit with Japan
(in millions of US dollars)

1970	- 276	1974	-1915
1971	- 782	1975	-3218
1972	-1298	1976	-4200
1973	-1345	(estimates)	

Despite rapid growth, however, trade between the EEC and Japan still only represents a small percentage of their total imports and exports.

In 1975, the European Community accounted for 10.2% of Japan's total exports and only 5.8% of its total imports.

The following table shows the overall figures for Japan's trade in 1975:

Japan's foreign trade in 1975 by country and region

	Exports 1975		Imports 1975		Annual rate of increase 1965-1975	
	(million US \$)	%	(million US \$)	%	Exports	Imports
TOTAL	55,753	100.0	57,863	100.0	20.8	21.6
USA	11,149	20.0	11,608	20.1	16.2	17.2
Canada	1,151	2.1	2,499	4.3	18.3	21.5
EEC	5,675	10.2	3,371	5.8	27.9	24.0
Australia	1,739	3.1	4,156	7.2	18.7	22.4
S.E. Asia	12,543	22.5	10,586	18.3	19.0	22.4
Middle East	6,075	10.9	16,477	28.5	32.8	30.9
Latin America	4,765	8.5	2,524	4.4	25.6	13.6
Africa	4,087	7.3	1,111	1.9	21.1	19.2
China	2,259	4.1	1,531	2.6	24.9	21.1
USSR	1,626	2.9	1,170	2.0	25.5	17.2

In 1975 Japan accounted for only 3.8% of the Community's total imports and 1.8% of its exports. Imports of Japanese goods into the Nine increased by 15% between 1974 and 1975 and during the first half of 1976 rose by 5% over the same period in 1975.

11. The authorities in Tokyo claim that Japan's trade surplus with the Community is offset by the large deficit caused by its invisible expenditure.

According to Japanese figures, then, Japan's trade surplus with the Nine is largely offset by the deficit in Japan's invisible expenditure (\$2,000 million in 1975, of which \$1,500 million to the United Kingdom) so trade between the two parties is more evenly balanced. The level of invisible expenditure deficit is, however, unconfirmed.

12. As the following table shows, Community imports from Japan consist, for the most part, of finished and semi-finished industrial products.

Breakdown by product of Japanese exports to the
European Community
 (% of value)¹

	1973	1974	1975
Capital goods	64	57	63
Motor vehicles	8.7	6.4	11.6
Ships	9.3	11.6	7.1
Energy and steel products	7.9	7.2	10.2
Chemical products	5.8	8.4	5.5
Pharmaceutical products	0.6	0.6	0.5
Radios	5.3	4.3	5.0
TV sets	3.1	2.3	2.0
Textiles	3.4	3.4	2.9
Raw materials	1.5	3.3	2.4
Food	2.7	1.9	1.9

¹The sum of the columns exceeds 100 because some figures apply to more than one sector.

The breakdown by product of exports from the Nine to Japan is as follows:

Breakdown by product of Japanese imports from the Community

	1973	1974	1975
Capital goods	24	25	25.5
Motor vehicles	2.7	2.7	3.8
Iron and steel products	0.5	0.97	0.5
Chemical products	19.9	21.5	18.1
Pharmaceutical products	5.3	5.0	5.2
Textiles	6.9	6.5	9.1
Raw materials	4.2	4.3	4.1
Food	2.1	3.1	5.1
Consumer non-durables	6.1	7.0	7.6
Consumer durables	13.2	10	11.2

13. A rapid examination of the above figures reveals that the structure of trade between Japan and the European Community is in line with the high level

of development attained by both economies: finished and semi-finished products account for the greater part of trade, raw materials and agricultural products for only a very small percentage.

14. As the figures show, Japanese exports appear to be more concentrated around certain products than European exports: capital goods, motor vehicles, ships and iron and steel accounted, in 1975, for a major part of the value of Japanese exports, whereas Community exports are more diversified and more evenly spread. The imbalances in capital goods, motor vehicles - Japanese exports which have grown very rapidly in recent years - and iron and steel products are particularly significant. This pinpoints the principal grievances expressed by Community and national officials regarding Japanese exports: their excessive concentration on a few products, upsetting management estimates and creating serious sectoral employment problems.

An examination of a number of cases in point will help to highlight the urgency of the problem.

- Motor vehicles

15. For many years Japanese motor vehicle production was small. In 1960 a mere 165,000 were produced, whereas the figures for the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy were 1,810,000, 1,175,000, 1,354,000 and 596,000 respectively.

Japanese production did not pass the million mark until 1967. Eight years later, in 1975, it had reached 4,500,000. Similar, though less spectacular, increases were achieved in the case of commercial and utility vehicles.

16. A striking breakthrough of this sort inevitably had repercussions on sales of Community vehicles (even though the European market has hitherto been relatively insignificant by comparison with South-East Asia, North and Latin America and, recently, the Middle East and Africa).

For many years the impact was indirect, with Japanese production competing with Community exports to third countries. But latterly it has become direct, and Japanese cars now compete with Community cars within the territory of the Nine.

check that European cars conformed to Japanese quality standards, to ensure better translation of safety regulations, to standardize inspection procedures and to use the production date of cars rather than the date of importation into Japan as the reference date for the application of new safety checks. Technical negotiations were opened for this purpose in May 1976. Japan agreed to these demands, and as from 1 April 1977 tests to ensure that cars exported by the Community conform to Japanese technical standards will be carried out in Europe. A further meeting was held in Tokyo on 13-14 January 1977 to discuss nitrogen oxide standards to be introduced in Japan in 1978. The Community has requested postponement of these measures until 1981.

It should be mentioned that, as part of the measures proposed on 25 November 1976 by the Japanese government to the Commission to offset the trade imbalance with the Nine (a subject to which we shall return in more detail below), Japan has agreed to hold the level of motor vehicle exports to the United Kingdom at the 1976 level.

- Shipbuilding

20. The achievements of the Japanese shipbuilding industry are even more striking than those of the motor vehicle sector. The remarkable progress made by Japanese shipbuilders during the 1960s made Japan the leading shipbuilding country with - on the eve of the 1973 crisis - about 55% of all world orders. Since then orders have been decreasing steadily as a result of the overall slowing down of economic activity. A large number of the ships built immediately before the 1973 crisis have not been put into service. This situation has sharpened competition between various shipbuilding countries, and almost all recent orders have gone to Japanese shipyards. According to information from European sources, which Tokyo contests, 74% of the orders placed in the first half of 1976 by the rich countries went to Japanese yards. It is claimed that this rose to 86% in the first nine months of this year and is expected to increase further (Japan received 93% of the orders placed in September 1976).

21. This situation is clearly unacceptable to competing countries. European countries are threatening to take unilateral aid measures if Japan does not cut back production to the - in itself very high - level of the pre-crisis period.

The reasons for the success of Japanese shipyards are easy to explain: their prices are lower, in some cases by as much as 30%, than those of their foreign competitors. This difference is largely due to the efficiency, up-to-date methods and high standards of Japanese shipyards.

The negotiations which have been going on for several months within OECD should enable the various parties to reach agreement on the sharing of the orders expected to be placed between now and 1980. The Europeans feel that orders other than those placed with third countries should be shared more or less equally between Japan and Europe. On its side, the Japanese Government, realizing the dangers of a return to protectionism inherent in the current situation, should advise its shipbuilders to reduce their labour force in 1977 by 25% compared with 1974 and to achieve a 65% reduction by 1980. However, no decision has yet been taken. Although it feels that the problems outstanding should be resolved within the framework of OECD, the Japanese Government is, nonetheless, prepared to consider at the bilateral consultations the special problems facing the shipbuilding industry in the EEC. The first EEC-Japan bilateral meeting has already taken place, in Tokyo on 21-22 December 1976.

22. On 8 February 1977, during renewed negotiations in the OECD, the Japanese authorities proposed, as a conciliatory measure, to increase the export price of their ships. This measure, previously limited to vessels with a tonnage in excess of 2,500 gross tons, will in future apply to ships of all types and will remain in force until 31 December 1978.

Over the same period, the Japanese Government will ask domestic shipyards to take specific measures to reduce their exports to the European countries most affected.

Japan also undertakes to reduce the activity of its shipyards if their performance on the world market is still better than in the past.

According to Commissioner Davignon, who has particular responsibility for industrial policy, the measures proposed by the Tokyo Government could provide a good basis for further negotiations between the two parties.

- Iron and steel

23. The Japanese iron and steel industry developed very rapidly during the 1960s and at the beginning of the present decade. In 1973 Japan became the world's second producer of steel (120 million tonnes). Like its European and American rivals, the Japanese iron and steel industry was hit hard by the 1974-1975 recession. During this period government authorities introduced price controls. These measures were lifted in 1975, and two price increases have occurred during the last few months. Despite this, the price of Japanese steel is still lower than that of competing countries. During the 1975 fiscal year (March 1975-March 1976) 101 million tonnes of steel was produced, with 110 million tonnes expected in the present fiscal year. If it were working at full capacity, the industry could produce 150 million tonnes, but since it is not, it is obliged to export come what may, in order to cover its costs. Japanese steel producers estimate that exports in the 1976 fiscal year - ending

in March 1977 - will reach 34 million tonnes (compared with 31.4 million in 1975), of which 6 million tonnes will go to the United States and 4 million to the Middle East.

24. As regards the EEC, the five largest Japanese groups (Nippon Steel, Nippon Kokan, Kawasaki, Sumitomo, Kobe Steel) have agreed, since 1972, to limit sales (to 1.2 million tonnes and then to 1.4 million in 1976).

Until now the numerous medium-sized iron and steel producers in Japan have not, however, respected these agreements. The resulting competition has added to the difficulties of the Community iron and steel industry at a time when it is going through a very serious crisis (under ECSC provisions, European iron and steel producers can peg their prices to those of their Japanese counterparts). At the beginning of autumn 1976, the Commission drew the attention of the Japanese authorities to the problem caused by imports into the Community of sections and fine and special steels. This is an area in which Community producers are experiencing serious difficulties following, in particular, the American authorities' decision to introduce quotas for the import of special steels into the United States. British producers of special steels, who, in the case of certain types of steel, are working at only 35% of capacity, have been particularly hard hit by these difficulties.

Since then Community representatives have received assurances from the Japanese administration that not only large but also small and medium-sized Japanese companies will unilaterally limit exports to the Community.

- Ball bearings

25. Although the problems discussed below have had a far more limited impact than those dealt with in the preceding sections, your rapporteur feels that they nonetheless serve to highlight the difficulties which uncontrolled imports from Japan can cause for certain Community activities.

On 14 May 1976 representatives of British, German and French ball bearing manufacturers' associations forwarded to the Commission a memorandum on the threat to the European industry of low-priced imports, especially from Japan.

In June 1976, the Commission drew the attention of the Japanese Government to the difficulties being experienced by this important and particularly sensitive sector of European industry.

26. In autumn 1976 a formal complaint was made by the committee of the European association of ball bearing manufacturers of the three countries mentioned above, and the Commission decided to open an anti-dumping procedure with regard to ball bearings and conical roller bearings from Japan.

The plaintiffs claimed that, for 16 types of bearings, Japanese export prices were 25 to 50% lower than those on the Japanese market and 60% lower than European prices.

As a result, Japanese exports to the EEC had increased by 40% in the case of ball bearings and by 100% in the case of conical bearings between 1974 and 1976. Their share of the market was 17% for the former and 5.3% for the latter type of bearing. Since 1974 employment in this sector had fallen by 5,000 in the three Member States in question. In recent months imports from Japan have led to similar difficulties in the Community screw-cutting and nut and bolt sectors.

27. By Regulation No. 261/77 of 4 February 1977 (see OJ No. L 34 of 5 February 1977, pp 60 and 61), the Commission, following the complaint made by the European Association of Ball-bearing Manufacturers, introduced a provisional anti-dumping duty on ball bearings and tapered roller bearings and their parts and spares originating in Japan.

This duty will be of 20% and will supplement the normal duty of 9% laid down in the CCT. However, it will be reduced to 10% for products manufactured and exported by the Nachi Fujikoshi and Koyo Seiko companies, for which the level of recorded dumping was lower.

The preliminary survey carried out by the Commission shows that imports into the Community of the products in question originating in Japan had increased considerably, rising from 5,500 tons in 1968 to 15,600 tons in 1974 and 19,000 in 1975, and that the margin of dumping, which varied considerably from one transaction to another, sometimes exceeded 30%.

The survey will continue during the three months for which the provisional duty will be levied and the Council will then have to decide what final measures are to be taken.

The Japanese authorities have officially protested against the unilateral measures decided by the Commission, which, in their view, infringe the agreement between the two parties to settle differences on a bilateral basis and in a spirit of cooperation.

Mr Tatsuo Tanaka, Japanese Minister for International Trade and Industry, has stated that his country will appeal against the Community's decision to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

II. The causes of the Community's growing deficit

28. The examples given above do not give an exhaustive picture of the Community sectors experiencing difficulties because of Japanese imports, but they do illustrate the problems which European and North American businessmen face in dealings with their Japanese counterparts: Japanese penetration is concentrated on a few specific sectors, where it causes large-scale disturbances for the corresponding domestic operations. The sectors concerned generally involve intermediate technology, since the advanced industries which need extensive programmes of basic and applied research are comparatively neglected by Japan. In these branches the Japanese create for themselves a privileged position and, in certain cases, a genuine de facto monopoly, thanks to the high quality of their goods, the rationalization of their production (the strongest and best organized company is chosen from among the various competitors and its exports then enjoy facilities offered by the Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI)) and the dynamic approach of their export companies. The effort to rationalize production has been further intensified since the energy crisis and the recession of 1974-75.

29. From now on, Japanese management has set itself the objective of manufacturing in Japan the most sophisticated products - those for which a minimum of raw materials and a qualified workforce are required and which therefore produce very high added value. The industries in those sectors which are slowing down because they are labour-intensive are gradually being abandoned, since they are facing the increasing competition of products from developing countries where wage rates are low.

Textiles - whose share of Japanese economic activities is constantly decreasing (Japan imports far more textiles, in particular from the EEC, than it exports) - provide a typical example of this restructuring policy.

30. This does not mean, however, that Japan has lost all interest in such activities: Japanese investments, which have developed considerably over the past few years (up to 1973 they totalled \$10,000 million and by 1985 they should total \$81,000 million), are being placed to a large extent in the developing countries, where the low wage levels ensure a far larger profit margin than in Japan. In this way, Japanese capital controls an increasing share of textile production in the South-East Asian countries (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Macao, etc.); and Singapore will be the base for the development of ball bearing production - controlled by Japanese capital. Apart from **low labour costs**, these countries also offer the advantage of benefiting from tariff preferences granted by the industrialized nations, in particular the generalized

preferences set up autonomously by the Community and other industrialized nations. This new division of labour is therefore of obvious interest to Japanese industry.

31. Furthermore, Japanese capital is being invested in countries producing raw materials (in the Middle East and Latin America, for example), which enables it to influence the development of these raw materials, and in the industrially developed countries (Western Europe, United States) so as to ensure outlets in these countries (the breakthrough in the sale of Japanese cars in Europe may be explained by the setting up of subsidiaries of Japanese companies in the European countries), and so that it may benefit from the technological innovations in their advanced industries.

32. Of course, this strategy requires the centralization of measures under the control of the government and supreme administration which set the objectives and arrange the necessary finance.

This is facilitated by the close collaboration in Japan between political circles, the supreme administration, the banks and the major industrial companies, which are more closely linked than in Europe, and by the Japanese decision-making procedure, which provides for the important decisions to be based on a consensus of all the interested parties rather than the majority view.

33. All these methods taken together make for a very efficient instrument for the promotion of the Japanese economy, and mean that MITI and those responsible for the Plan can have every confidence that the objectives they have set will, in fact, be attained.

34. A leading role in this strategy also devolves on the Japanese business giants: the sogo shosha. The six most powerful shosha - Mitsubishi Shoji, Mitsui Bussan, Marubeni Iida, C. Itoh, Sumitomo and Nissho-Iwai - deal with half Japan's foreign trade. They have holdings in more than 500 companies. Mitsubishi Shoji's overseas staff alone is three times as large as that of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The foreign branches of the six companies also constitute a better listening post than the information service any ministry for foreign trade has anywhere in the world¹. Moreover, these large business houses are closely linked with the industrial groups built around the six leading banks, which control two thirds of the capital of Japanese companies and thus play a part similar to the zaibatsu of pre-war Japan.

¹ The information on the shosha was taken from a book by Tibor Mende 'Soleils levants' (Editions du Seuil, 1975)