It is a myth that guestworkers represent a labor subsidy to some employers, without cost to society as a whole. "Temporary migration" soon becomes permanent, and the costs of integrating new minority families are borne by all taxpayers.

Ausländer raus! The slogan appears frequently in streetside graffiti. The right-wing National-demokratische Partei Deutschland (NPD) made "Foreigners out, Germany for the Germans!" its slogan during the October 1980 election. Expert opinion says that a majority of Germans would prefer to see most of the foreigners leave. Most Germans now believe that the 20-year attempt to spur economic growth with foreign workers is producing more costs than benefits.

The German migrant labor experiment is going awry just when the United States may begin a migrant worker program with Mexico. Senators Haya-kawa (R-Cal.) and Schmitt (R-NM) have proposed a "compañero" program to permit an unspecified number of Mexicans to work in this country six months each year. President Reagan is known to be favorable to such a program. He reportedly discussed a migrant worker program with Mexico's President José López Portillo shortly before taking office in January 1981, and renewed these discussions during the Mexican President's visit to Washington in June. Given our illegal immigration, what can we learn from the Germans about a guestworker solution?

The 4.5 million foreigners in Germany are the last vestige of the waves of Gastarbeiter imported between 1960 and 1973 to help fuel noninflationary economic growth. The Germans intended to import temporary "guestworkers"—poor peasants

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Early citizens of member states the right to work in any durables for booming export and domestic markets. While abroad, these migrants were expected to send home the money so desperately needed to accelerate economic development. Returning migrants with industrial skills were expected to find jobs in factories that had been created by their remittances, putting labor-exporting countries on the road to an economic takeoff. With the gradual elimination of the poverty and unemployment that drove poor peasants abroad, temporary labor migration was eventually expected to stop.

The optimism of the 1960s has soured. The idea that “mutual benefits” naturally arise from temporary labor flows has left a legacy of minority problems in labor-recruiting Germany and distorted economic development in most of the labor-sending nations. The 1980s mark a new turn in European and especially German guestworker policies, a recognition that while guestworkers provide immediate economic benefits to selected employers, workers, and consumers, they later impose integration costs on the whole society. This lesson of immediate selective economic benefits but deferred general socioeconomic costs has important implications for the 20-odd bills pending in Congress to initiate a large-scale guestworker program in the United States.

**Early optimism**

West Germany began economic reconstruction in 1949 with massive unemployment. Even after currency reform and the “social market economy” put Germany on the path of sustained economic growth, unemployment persisted because of the influx of East German refugees. Isolated labor shortages first appeared in 1955, when German farmers requested permission to hire Italian harvest labor. Germany signed a labor recruitment agreement with Italy late in the same year. But it soon became apparent that the family farms of Germany were not going to require much foreign labor: the real need for labor was in the German factories producing cars, machine tools, steel, and consumer durables for booming export and domestic markets.

The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) and guaranteed citizens of member states the right to work in any EEC nation. West Germany continued to recruit EEC Italians and absorb refugees fleeing East Germany. The Berlin Wall closed the door to West Germany in 1961, encouraging labor-short German manufacturers to cast a wider net for additional labor. Germany concluded labor agreements with Greece, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Turkey in 1960-61.

The guestworkers coming to Germany were usually unskilled males between 20 and 40, and were initially recruited by German employers and bilateral commissions. But word-of-mouth soon led to waiting lists of Turks and Spaniards, each anxious for his chance to earn high German wages. German employers, in discussions with plant-level works councils, decided how many aliens they needed and what nationality was preferred. A request for 1,000 Turks was sent to the local Employment Service office, which first made a pro forma check to see if Germans were available. If they were not—and this was the case 95 percent of the time—the request was passed on to a bilateral recruitment mission in Turkey, where an individual already screened for health, skills and a crime-free background would be awarded a German residence permit and a one-year work contract with a specific employer. The German Labor Office arranged and paid for transportation to Germany, where employers typically provided barracks-style housing. In the late 1960s, 5,000 guestworkers were arriving daily in Germany, part of the most massive “human trade” in Europe’s peacetime history. One day after arrival, the guestworker was at work on the assembly line or at the construction site.

The notion that temporary labor migration provides benefits to both sending and receiving countries was so powerful that the number of ostensibly temporary guestworkers swelled beyond anyone’s original expectations. In 1960, Germany had fewer than 300,000 guestworkers, mostly Italian. By 1972, the 2.5 million guestworkers in Germany, mainly Turks and Yugoslavs, were 12 percent of the work force. Foreign workers were more common than Germans in some construction crews and on assembly lines. The alien workers sweeping streets and collecting garbage became a visible reminder of the German economy’s increasing dependency on foreign workers.

Most of Germany’s first guestworkers shuttled in and out of Germany as expected. The widely publicized Rotationsprinzip worked when reces-
sion struck late in 1966. One year later, almost 500,000 guestworkers were gone, their jobs presumably available for unemployed Germans.

But the continued movement of foreign workers in and out of Germany obscured the fact that more and more temporary "guests" had become German residents for four or five years. Migrants were expensive to German employers, requiring the payment of recruitment fees, translation, housing, and training costs, and the same wages and fringe benefits paid to native workers.

German employers did not want to send a trained migrant home just because a one- or two-year work contract expired and then repeat the recruitment, training, and housing process with an unknown alien. The migrants themselves were not anxious to return to the low wages and unemployment they had left or — especially for Greeks and Spaniards during dictatorship eras — the lack of political freedom in their native countries.

Permanence

The German guestworker system originally envisioned the shuttling of temporary alien workers through "permanent" manufacturing jobs, jobs requiring someone else to fill them after the short-term migrant had departed. The self-interest of employers and migrants, however, inevitably encouraged a permanent rather than a temporary employment relationship.

The unions, churches, and migrant welfare organizations pressed the German government "to improve the status of migrants." A series of administrative rulings and government decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s effectively gave most guestworkers the same rights as EEC nationals: once in Germany, the "guests" could not be forced out.

Instead of being forced to return, guestworkers obtained rights to have alien dependents join them in Germany after one year's employment if they had proof of suitable housing. The predictable result was a stream of dependents eligible for German children's allowances (now $135 monthly for three children) and requiring education in Germany. Migrants moved to particular sections (ghettos) of the largest German cities, giving Frankfurt, Berlin, Stuttgart, and Munich separate little Italys and Turkish, Spanish, Yugoslav, and Greek enclaves. The subway running through the Kreuzberg district of Berlin—which now has the third largest Turkish population of any city in the world — has been dubbed the "Orient Express." As foreigners moved in, Germans moved out, making the ethnic communities islands in the German cities.

Educating and housing migrant dependents finally made the public at large aware of Max Frisch's aphorism, "We asked for workers and got men." The presence of so many workers and dependents for so long made the original employer promise of a "short-term" need for alien labor seem ever more hollow. Popular discontent with burgeoning foreign populations and narrowly defeated referenda to reduce the foreign workforce sharply in neighboring Switzerland made aliens a public issue. Germany is now debating the trade-offs between labor needs for economic growth and the rise of ethnic minorities and tensions in relatively homogeneous Germany.

Halt to recruitment

Tension rose when employer needs for alien labor to sustain noninflationary economic growth clashed with popular fears that ostensibly short-term guestworkers were becoming backdoor permanent immigrants. In February 1973, the government announced that the recruitment fee would be increased from a nominal 350 DM to 1,000 DM per worker in September to discourage "overreliance" on aliens. Employers responded by importing 500,000 migrants in the spring and summer of 1973, more than ever before. The October 1973
Middle East War and subsequent oil embargo prompted widespread fears of an economic recession. The German government stopped migrant worker recruitment on November 22, 1973, an action that was justified by the feared recession. Many contemporary observers, however, thought the government had at last found a convenient excuse to halt immigration and reassess policies without offending employers.

The 1973 halt to recruitment was accompanied by a series of measures to mute other critics. No guestworker would be forced to leave Germany against his or her will, although migrants would be "encouraged" to return to jobs created in German-subsidized factories in their homelands. Migrants could continue fetching their dependents, but wives and teenagers wanting to work would have to wait several years before they could get work permits. Money to provide housing, social services, and special education for migrant children was allocated to cities with high concentrations of foreigners.

Patterns since 1973

Seven years have elapsed since Germany ended its labor-importation experiment. The number of foreign workers has been cut 20 percent to 2 million, but the total foreign population is now at an all-time high of 4.5 million. During the 1960s, almost all migrants in Germany were working, contributing to expensive social welfare programs but receiving few benefits. Today, however, nonworking
dependents outnumber migrant workers in Germany. Since migrant families tend to be bigger and poorer, they often draw larger social welfare benefits than native Germans.

The old economic issues are rarely raised today. In the 1960s, economists debated the contributions of migrants to Europe's rapid postwar growth (most believed they were a significantly positive influence). Some economists argued that employers were getting migrants too easily, discouraging the search for labor-saving innovations necessary to compete with foreign competitors (Japan, for example).

The work-related issue receiving most attention in the 1960s was the role of aliens in German trade unions. Marxists argued that aliens were a structural requirement of advanced capitalism, necessary to do society's dirty work and divide the working class with ethnic and linguistic barriers. German unions established special migrant departments and issued a variety of publications in the migrants' own languages, but permitted only slow migrant advances within the union hierarchy. The migrants themselves were reluctant to become too entangled in strange unions, since most believed they would be abroad only a few years, and were far more interested in achieving a savings target than in improving working conditions that were already far better than anything at home.

Sociopolitical issues have replaced economic questions. The fundamental issue is whether 15 years of importing the alien labor requested by employers has made Germany an immigration country. The official line has not changed—Germany is not an immigration land. Instead, no new aliens are to be admitted and those present are to be integrated as rapidly and fully as possible. However, the “desire to return” is also to be strengthened and assisted wherever possible. As will become apparent, this “policy” is marked by contradictions and made ineffective by seemingly irreversible processes set in motion over the past two decades.

Immigration

The German economy in the 1960s offered enormous profit opportunities. Capital to build factories and markets to sell products were readily available. The only thing standing in the way of profit was insufficient labor. Unemployment rates hovered around zero and, even though relatively few German women worked, employers did not think women could be induced into noisy factories and arduous construction jobs. If a little foreign labor were available for the few years in which this extraordinary economic situation was expected to last, then private profits, low inflation, extra tax monies, upward mobility for natives, and economic development among Germany's poorer neighbors were only a few of the blessings which, it was promised, would follow.

The German people were largely opposed to fremd (strange) people as immigrants. Germany committed itself to accepting the ethnic Germans fleeing Eastern Europe but few immigrants from other lands. The German employers were politically successful: they convinced the German people that alien workers would remain guests. Hence, Germany could admit 500,000 migrant workers annually and still proclaim that it was not an immigration land.

The 4.5 million foreigners in Germany are only 7 percent of its 61 million people. But no German politician can simply say that the borders will remain closed and the resident foreigners absorbed as a snake digests a mouse. To accept the 4.5 million as immigrants is to break a past promise to the German people and to make more explicit the current distributional consequences of past guestworker practices.

Germany's guestworkers helped particular segments of German society between 1960 and 1973. They expedited upward mobility for some natives, lowered prices for consumers (including foreign consumers, since many guestworker-produced goods, such as Volkswagens to America, were exported) and provided taxes for governments. But, above all, guestworkers increased employers' profits. These profits were concentrated in the hands of the major manufacturing and construction firms (and their shareholders).

The profits from guestworkers were enjoyed by one segment of the population at one point but all the costs of guestworkers are now being shared by everyone. Guestworkers turned out to be a labor subsidy to employers using them. These employers' profits could have been taxed to provide funds to integrate current resident aliens and their children.
But the myth that foreigners were only temporary workers, not permanent immigrants, effectively squelched the notion of taxing employers or their goods to pay later integration and infrastructure costs.

The most dangerous myth surrounding guest-workers programs is that they are a labor subsidy to selected employers, without cost to society. The notion that temporary individuals can be rotated through permanent jobs is ultimately rejected in industrial democracies (with the exception of South Africa) but the guestworker concept prevents the enactment of taxes to pay the integration costs that inevitably accompany migrant workers.

**Can there be integration?**

Germany remains unsure whether it wants resident foreigners to become immigrants, but it is sure it wants to “integrate” them into German society while they are present. Helmut Schmidt made the integration of foreigners the top domestic priority when he addressed the first meeting of Social Democratic Party (SPD) representatives after his October 1980 reelection. The liberal SPD argues that integration is the reward for the migrants’ past economic contributions but, Mr. Schmidt was quick to add, “four million is enough.” Integration is not a simple matter, he continued: “It’s not easy for Germans who live in an apartment house and who don’t like the smell of garlic to have to put up with it and even to have a lamb slaughtered in the hallway.” The dilemma is how to integrate foreigners when the final goal—citizenship and full participation—cannot be uttered yet.

The integration dilemma is compounded by more than German reluctance to convert immigrant workers into citizens. The migrants themselves want the permanent right to work in Germany far more than the right to vote in German elections. The migrants’ home countries are not anxious to lose citizens (and possibly remittances); hence they protest any steps to expedite new cumbersome naturalization procedures.

The 1.4 million Turks are a special problem. Their Islamic religion and relative poverty alienate them from German society. Political divisions at home have been carried to Germany. Rightist “grey wolves” extort money from Turkish workers and businesses to finance political agitation for an Islamic Turkish state. These right-wing extremists are held responsible for attacks on more moderate and leftist Turks in Germany, but the closed Turkish communities in Germany are just as impregnable as U.S. Chinatowns were a hundred years ago. German authorities fear Turkish unrest, but find it difficult to anticipate and control it. Adolf Schmidt, head of the mining and energy workers’ union, complains that “re-Islamization” leads to isolation, making Turkish workers reluctant to quaff a beer with German workmates.

Integration proceeds under so many constraints and uncertainties that current measures cannot be said to represent a consistent policy. The main focus is on the children of foreign workers—the second generation. These children, many of whom have only visited their country of citizenship, are caught between tradition-bound parents still clinging to the hope of returning and German authorities anxious to avoid an uneducated proletariat.

Germany’s migrants and its institutions now stand apart. The official integration policy is to change the migrants so they can effectively utilize existing education and training institutions. Germany is strongly resisting the notion that its institutions may have to change to absorb the foreigners, even though the first such changes are already apparent. In Cologne, the Ruhr cities, and parts of Berlin, school authorities are experimenting with cross-town busing to avoid the school segregation that results from housing patterns. Multilingual teaching is the official policy only in Bavaria, but even the after-hours classes in native languages are producing demands to import teachers, since “only fellow foreigners can truly maintain the child’s original culture.” Religious teachers are already imported (and paid by Germany), prompting protests that Turkish mullahs are being paid by German authorities to teach hatred for secular Germans. Parents (and the child’s grades) decide whether ten-year-olds will follow a college preparatory track, pursue vocational training, or simply obtain a general education. Some reforms urge the creation of Gesamtschulen (unified schools) modeled on American middle and high schools, to postpone decisions long enough for the migrant child to make up his own mind.

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Will Germany be able to integrate her 4.5 million foreigners? Will German integration strains resemble those of the American civil rights movement?

Integration may require several generations. Current integration programs represent efforts to head off future problems, not a response to migrant demands. Most migrants remain divided, having brought their religious, social, and political differences with them and continuing to follow closely activities of their factions at home.

The most important difference between Germany's migrants and America's minorities is economic. Germany's guestworkers earn "above average" incomes for unskilled and semi-skilled workers because they eagerly accept night, weekend, and overtime shifts. Despite a worrisome upward trend in migrant unemployment, the economic disadvantage of American minorities is not present in Germany.

Current issues

Postwar Germany adopted a two-track immigration policy. Few permanent immigrants were anticipated but a liberal refugee provision of the Basic Law willingly accepted millions of ethnic Germans fleeing Eastern Europe. After 1960, immigration policy was determined by the short-term labor needs of employers. The current dilemma is deciding how to turn "backdoor" labor importation into a humanitarian immigration policy for the future.

Illegal immigration is a persisting worry despite border controls, identity cards, police registration, and tough sanctions on employers hiring illegal aliens (up to three and a half years in jail plus $30,000 fines). Most estimates place the number of illegal aliens at 200,000 to 300,000—10 to 15 percent of the legal alien workforce. Germany's illegal aliens are concentrated in agriculture, restaurants and hotels, and construction firms. German unions (and some employers) are demanding stepped-up enforcement of existing laws.

German unemployment rates have been low since the late 1950s, and youth unemployment is traditionally less than average. Economic changes and the presence of so many aliens promise to change this historic relationship. So far, youth unemployment primarily affects aliens who did not finish secondary school and failed to find an apprenticeship slot. The problem is that a dangerous gap is developing between these youths' expectations and the realities of the German labor market.

Problems of sending countries

Germany's migrant workers are often reluctant to return home because economic conditions have worsened since massive labor emigration began. Most of the Southern European countries sending labor north were "showered with glittering coins" and a host of economic problems that increased their dependence on rich neighbors. The result is a 180-degree turn in attitudes toward emigration in many sending countries. Instead of welcoming the chance to export unemployment, some of these countries are now demanding compensation for the "brawn drain."

Exporting labor provides jobs and incomes for many who may be unemployed at home. But the dangers of exporting labor are manifold. The most immediate problem is to match German labor needs with a poor country's unemployed workers. Germans want the best and brightest workers, not poor peasants requiring months of training and adaptation.

Since German wages are so high, it is not hard to attract a poor country's skilled workers. But poor countries need to export unskilled labor, not the skilled labor needed for their own development. Incentives work in the opposite direction, as shown by the Turkish experience. One estimate now puts 85 percent of all skilled Turkish workers in Germany. Turkish productivity falls as women and children are drafted to replace men, encouraging many planners to throw up their hands and demand modern, imported, and expensive German machinery in new factories. The result is that Turkey, with 50 percent unemployment and underemployment, has some plants that are more modern than those employing Turks in Germany.

Labor shortages are most immediately felt in agriculture, since men typically leave their families in rural villages as they go first to Turkish cities and then abroad. In theory, their departure and the chance to live on savings from abroad should enable children to stay in school and permit small inefficient plots to be consolidated for a more productive agriculture. But jobs abroad are uncertain, so families keep their plots and work them, half-
heartedly, as insurance against layoff or injury to the breadwinner abroad. Instead of a dynamic and efficient agriculture, there is often less intensive farming of land, increasing food imports and dependence on the rich countries dominating international grain exports.

Remittances from workers abroad are important, often covering a poor country's oil importing bill. But so much money injected into a poor country with bare shelves encourages a flood of consumer imports. Instead of investing remittance monies in shaky banks or even more shaky stock markets, guestworkers seek more immediate gratification. The typical returned migrant brings back a car filled with consumer durables, hoping to become a taxi driver. Few save patiently and invest in new job-creating factories.

Returning migrants seem to reject the manual work they did before departure and while abroad. The slogan “work in Germany but live in Turkey” encourages rapid expansion of the urban service sector. Land and housing prices escalate, accentuating inflation as too much money chases too few goods. Families unlucky enough not to have at least one guestworker are hurt by the higher prices brought on by the money from abroad.

Guestworker families may be richer but may not remain families in still traditional societies. So many men abroad leads to villages of women and children. Traditional patriarchal family structures break down and are not replaced. Many men live more or less permanently abroad with one wife but continue returning to an otherwise abandoned wife once a year. Some observers fear that children raised in such a vacuum will be a source of urban unrest, since their expectations are shaped by foreign jobs and wages but they have no chance to emigrate.

Remittances could be the spur to achieve an economic takeoff. But there is nothing automatic in the flow of savings to guarantee that the extra one or two billion dollars will accelerate development. The lesson in most countries is that remittances are a short-run salve, not the beginnings of a long-run cure. Labor exporters must be very careful or the short-run help may mask distortions that can retard development.

**Lessons for the United States**

At least 20 different bills pending in Congress propose some sort of European-style guestworker program for the United States. The justifications offered for these bills are threefold. This country’s 2,000 mile border with Mexico cannot be effectively controlled without a repugnant Berlin-style wall. Even if control were possible, the United States has tolerated illegal Mexican entries for so long that it cannot abruptly close the Mexican “safety valve,” especially when the scale of Mexican oil and gas reserves is becoming clear. The United States now has an “uncontrolled” alien labor program, so why not legalize reality and manage labor migration?

Some guestworker proponents argue that this country needs alien labor “to do the jobs Americans won’t do” (preserving good supervisory jobs in the process), to prevent wage inflation, and to reduce looming social security deficits. These guestworker advocates believe that young and mobile Mexicans can fill labor market gaps, contribute payroll taxes to strained social welfare programs, and be returned before they pose any integration threat.

The counterarguments are moral, economic, and practical. Opponents argue that a class of helots is morally offensive in a democracy even if the individual aliens and their U.S. employers benefit. Economists note that alien labor is a subsidy to employers, a hidden subsidy that preserves jobs in the kinds of industries the United States doesn’t want. Economists also question the need for alien labor in an era of high unemployment and very high youth unemployment. If tractable aliens are available, will employers really try to hire often calcitrant native youth? Finally, opponents note that this country has no national identity card to distinguish legal and illegal aliens easily, nor sanctions on employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens, making “control” a hollow promise.

Europe’s 20-year experience with guestworkers yields three lessons for the American debate. First, labor flows are easier to start than to stop. Once they are set in motion it is very difficult to reverse the incentives that tie aliens to employers. The longer aliens stay abroad, the more likely they are to obtain rights to bring their families. Dependents accompanying alien workers require housing and a variety of public and private services, giving rise to the integration-versus-return conundrum. The private services are sometimes provided by fellow aliens, creating more jobs in ethnic restaurants and
entertainment establishments and making the migration process self-feeding. Information about jobs and the protection of an ethnic community can give rise to illegal immigration after labor recruitment is stopped. In short, the alien labor tap is far easier to open than to close, especially in democracies concerned with human rights.

The second lesson from Europe is that the alien cure is short-lived. Alien labor is imported to curb labor shortages. There is nothing inherent in the guestworker process that naturally reduces future needs for alien labor. Instead, employers become “addicted” to docile aliens, which discourages the search for labor-saving innovations and ways to improve wages and working conditions. Aliens raised in a poor country may eagerly accept an industrial society’s “dirty work,” but their children reared abroad may reject their parents’ jobs. Thus, labor-importers may be put on a treadmill, forever condemned to import more and more foreigners to do society’s dirty work.

The third lesson from Europe involves the effects of emigration on poor countries that export labor. In theory, the return of remittances and now reunified migrants should spur economic development, eventually equalizing economic conditions between labor-sending and receiving areas. But the European experience shows that labor emigration is as likely to distort as to accelerate economic development. The “best and brightest” tend to leave and stay abroad, since they are the first to adapt to industrial life and its rewards. Remittances are both uncertain and uncontrolled, likely to be reduced just when emigration countries need them most and as likely to end up being spent for imported cars and consumer durables as invested in job-creating factories. Instead of making poor countries economically independent, labor emigration often increases the dependence of poor countries on their rich neighbors.

It is sometimes said that aliens bring out the worst instincts in people. The dilemma facing all industrial democracies is how to choose those few immigrants permitted to enter the doors of wealth. For most of its history, the United States permitted employers (labor needs) to determine the magnitude of immigration. Since 1952, American immigration law has given priority to humanitarian reasons for entry. But the reality of illegal immigration means that employer labor needs are responsible for perhaps twice as many illegal entrants as are admitted legally each year under a humanitarian law. The United States’ de jure humanitarian policy is being swamped by its de facto economic immigration.

In the debate over how to reform American immigration law one fact stands clear. The United States accepts more immigrants than any other country, twice as many as the rest of the world combined. Anti-immigrant feeling, the fortress mentality, is on the rise in both this country and Europe. Employers want access to alien labor despite the general anti-immigrant mood, and promise that temporary guestworkers mean all benefits and no costs. Guestworkers do provide immediate benefits to selected employers and consumers. The problem is that in a democracy, costs inevitably follow and are borne by the whole society, not just the beneficiaries of guestworkers. The fundamental problem is this distributional one: benefits accrue to one group at one time but costs are deferred to everyone at a later date.

Immigrants, unlike guestworkers, receive education and training and the other benefits available to all U.S. citizens. Most immigrants’ earnings catch up to those of similarly educated natives after ten to twenty years. The fact that immigrants’ integration costs are apparent from the outset provides a built-in control mechanism that prevents one social group (employers or advocates for one ethnic or religious group) from expanding immigrant numbers too rapidly.

Immigration, especially illegal entry, is one of the unresolved problems for the 1980s. The United States is the world’s immigration land. But it cannot continue its de facto acceptance of illegal immigrants and escape future integration costs and civil rights dilemmas. Instead of choosing a short-term guestworker solution to the illegal immigration dilemma, the United States could take the lead in finding ways to help potential migrants more effectively at home. If the industrial world does not act soon, it may be faced with the human wave envisioned by former Algerian President Boumedienne, who said that “no quantity of atomic bombs could stem the tide of billions . . . who will some day leave the poor southern part of the world to erupt into the relatively accessible spaces of the rich northern hemisphere looking for survival.” The clock is ticking away.