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Fly Europe



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Airbus Industrie overtakes Boeing

by Christopher Layton, European Commission director responsible for aerospace

The success of Airbus Industrie's A300 aircraft offers a significant opportunity to the European aerospace industry. At a time when one can only contemplate ruefully the performance of so many industrial sectors in Europe there is one whose performance is beginning to give genuine cause for optimism — the aerospace industry. It is no secret that the military side has been doing well for some time but more importantly the civil side shows signs of increasing in health and vigour. The purpose of this article is to show that its success is due to and a consequence of collaboration on a European basis; however it is more important to have understood that such success has been hard won. In a sense it is only a beginning and if the European industry wants to become a genuine force on the world market it has to build on what it has already achieved by taking some important decisions in the near future.

For a long time the European civil aircraft sector was in effect in decline. When the Commission published a set of proposals for the aeronautical sector in 1975, it noted that the European share of the world civil market had declined to 7.9 per cent. Since then the A300 Airbus has begun to achieve a degree of success. In June this year Airbus Industrie was able to announce that orders and options for both the 250 plus seater A300 and the 200 plus seater A310 amounted to over 350 aircraft. Various forecasts predict that the present versions of the Airbus will have sold between 800 and 1,000 aircraft by 1990. This will be an unprecedented success for a European civil jet transport. However even that success will only result

in the European airframe industry having approximately 15 per cent of the world market*.


It should be remembered that the success of the Airbus is comparatively recent — until 1978 sales were quite slow. The first glimpse of a breakthrough came with the order from Eastern Airlines in the USA. At the same time it was primarily a Franco-German project, the interests of most of the U K industry lying elsewhere. Rolls Royce declined to invest in putting the RB211 on the Airbus and directed its efforts into having a new version of the RB211 engine — the RB211-535 — launched to fit the smaller, narrow-bodied Boeing 757. The British airframe manufacturers contemplated putting all their energies into a collaboration with a US manufacturer.

However, in June 1978, a series of decisions settled the basic orientation of the manufacturers, at least for one area of the market. Airbus Industrie decided to launch the A310, a smaller, i.e. 200 plus, version of the A300. The UK government decided to allow British Aerospace to join the Airbus consortium and to allow Rolls Royce to build the RB211-535. Finally British Airways decided to order the Boeing 757 with the RB211-535 engines.

The net effect of these decisions has been on the one hand to ensure, by uniting the interests of the main European airframe manufacturers, the success of the current A300 project, and on the other hand to oppose the interests of Rolls Royce to those of the airframe sector. Apart from British Aerospace joining the Airbus consortium, Belgium and Spain

**Estimated by Merrill Lynch.*

- A 310
- A 300



are also associated, the Netherlands are believed to have accepted in principle the idea of participation, and most national European airlines have become customers — Lufthansa, Air France, Alitalia, Iberia, Swissair, etc., as well as several charter and private lines like Laker, but not — for the present — British Airways. Moreover in joining the consortium the various manufacturers have agreed that *future* civil projects should be done within the same framework. This last point is vital because to become a real competitor of Boeing or Douglas it will be necessary to have a family of aeroplanes, with common marketing and common spares and support facilities. At the same time the commercial and political pressure that can be used to support the sales of the industry when their interests are united by a common project is greater than the sum of its parts.

However it is precisely in this area of future projects that the problems lie. Most commentators agree that apart from the wide-bodied 220 seater, for which the Airbus A310 and the Boeing 767 will be in contention, two of the most important market slots to be filled between now and

1990 are those for a narrow-bodied 160 plus seater and a narrow bodied 120 plus seater. These are two areas in which European manufacturers have had some success in the past and can reasonably be expected to have some success in the future provided they choose collaborative projects done within the framework of Airbus Industrie. However, when one comes to examine the potential projects, certain problems for the European industry become apparent.

First, on the 160 plus seater, Boeing already has a project — the Boeing 757 ordered by Eastern Airlines and British Airways — which it has announced it will modify to meet head on any competition from a European project. The B757 is being offered initially with Rolls Royce engines and Rolls Royce would naturally like to see it succeed. Moreover it is not unlikely that a European 150 plus seater would be based upon the SNECMA-GE CFM 56 engine, for which Rolls Royce has no competitor. Rolls Royce might well consider their interest therefore to run counter to any European project in this area.

Secondly, on the 120 plus seat prospect Fokker have been advocating for some time a project called the F29 or F28 Super as a logical progression to their F27 and F28. Fokker would prefer however that even on a collaborative project they should remain a separate entity from Airbus Industrie. Although this is a natural objective, it runs counter to the aims of a united and forceful European industry. Furthermore they have been offended by the re-launching in 1978 by the UK Labour government of the HS (now BA) 146, a project which they regard as competitive with their F28 and likely to injure the prospects of an F29. Fokker has therefore been talking with third party countries with a view to a possible collaboration, and this is clearly harmful to the prospects of a joint European project.

One of the dangers inherent in the present situation as far as the European industry is concerned is the actual success of the Airbus. To meet demand Airbus Industrie is having to increase production


from 2 to about 8 aircraft per month. Whilst this is good for employment and the equipment suppliers and it enables, at last, European manufactureres to obtain pricing and productivity levels on the basis of USA-length production runs, it also means that much energy and time has to be spent on ensuring the success of the existing products (the B2, B4 and 310) and studying future derivatives (the B9 and

B11), perhaps at the expense of projects such as the 160 plus seater and the 120 plus seater.

In the long term however it is only by having a range of projects, as Boeing does, that the European industry will be sufficiently cushioned against the swings of the market. One single project is too dangerous.



B 757




B 767

As so often in the past what is now needed is political will and clarity of purpose. There are some hopeful signs. Rolls Royce for example has at last signed an agreement with Airbus Industrie to cover the cost of designing and testing the installation of the RB211 on the A300. Japan has indicated a desire to collaborate with a united Europe industry on a 120 plus seat project. What then is needed is

one or more follow-up projects within the framework of Airbus Industrie. The market will decide which project should come first and when, but the problems of organisation and finance for a new project should be studied immediately.

Europe has a fine opportunity to build up a key sector and this is an opportunity which should not be lost.



British apathy towards EEC

Lord Thomson of Monifieth, PC, former European Commissioner, asks why the Community has been allowed to become the scapegoat of our own economic failures.

It is said that the British people have become indifferent to the European Community. The level of poll at the first European General Election in June appears to bear this out. Is it true? If it is true — why is it so? Is it a failure of communication? In this ASLIB lecture* I want to try to answer these questions

It has been my general experience as a working politician that when things go wrong it is almost a reflex action to make communications the scapegoat. When a government goes through an unpopular phase it is said that it must be because it is failing to communicate the realities of the problems and the excellence of the government's proposals to deal with them to the general public. When a government gets into that mood, it has equally invariably been my experience that it is unpopular not because the public fails to



understand its policies, but because it dislikes and disagrees with them.

Is it the same with the European Community? Is the reason for the apathy and hostility in Britain that the public now understands only too well what the Community is about and simply doesn't like it?

I do not believe that dislike of Community policies was a main reason for the low poll. If that had been the case there would have been a rush to vote for the many Labour candidates who made no secret of their hostility towards the Community and all its works. And that certainly did not happen.

It is true that one reason for the negative state of public opinion in Britain about the Community is a growing awareness that Britain, as one of the poorer countries of the Community, is beginning to become the biggest net contributor to the budget. But this British obsession — that we have become the poor man of Europe being exploited by cleverer Continentals — besides being sadly lacking in pride, itself reflects the serious distortions of the Community's image that have been allowed to grow up in Britain.

My purpose is to examine why the communication of a balanced picture of the Community should be so difficult in Britain, rather than to rehearse once again the political pros and cons of British membership. The issue is why has the Community been allowed to become the scapegoat for our own economic failures?

**Association of Specialist Libraries and Information Bureaux, 13 June 1979.*

Could a more effective Community communications policy have prevented this — or at least mitigated it?

I believe that the main fault lies in Britain, not in Brussels, that there has been a serious abdication of political leadership over Community issues within the United Kingdom. But there are several obstacles to an effective Community information policy that belong to Brussels and affect the Community as a whole.

Obstacles to effective information policy

The first is the simple fact that the European Community is a complicated, unprecedented multi-national institution. It has been said of the elephant that though it is hard to describe, you can always recognise one when you see it. For the professional communicator the Community is worse than the elephant since it is not only hard to describe, but often equally hard to comprehend when you watch it at work. Both for the information officials of the Community, and for the journalists seeking to encapsulate the late-night convolutions of the Agricultural Ministers in a snappy story, the Community is a formidable, forbidding technical problem in the art of communications.

But the Community, like many a human institution, is often its own worst enemy. It has an infinite capacity for making the simple complicated and since it does this with an openness unknown to national governments and at infinite length, there is maximum opportunity for letting cats (imaginary or otherwise) out of bags, drawing shoals of red herring across the Community scene and setting the maddest of March hares running in all directions, without a hope of harrassed Community information officials ever being able to catch up with them. The myths that grow up are myriad and hydra-headed. No sooner is one slain than another takes its place. Euro-beer, the extinction of the English apple, the interference with the sex life of the English hop, the abolition of the traditional uneviscerated Christmas

turkey — if I have strangled that mythical turkey once, I have done it a dozen times and yet it still keeps flapping its wings!

Of course, there is no smoke without fire. The very openness of Community government provides a fertile seed-bed for myths to grow. The bright idea of some Commission backroom boy is floated as a trial balloon without his departmental chiefs knowing in advance. Legislative proposals which would be discussed behind closed doors in Whitehall are aired in a network of consultative groups, and even supposedly secret Commission debates tend to be reported blow by blow. It would be healthy if only the public could be made to appreciate the difference and the long time scale between an idea, a Commission proposal and a Council decision.

Most daft ideas gradually disappear, like the smile on the face of Lewis Carroll's Cheshire cat, before they become official Commission proposals. But the Commission machinery is cumbersome, and sometimes the Commissioners sitting in their 13-storey eyrie preoccupied with major issues like freezing CAP prices or initiating an energy policy, nod when it comes to a proposal to harmonise the noise level of motor mowers from Greenland to Sicily.

Only Britain questions membership

There are also problems special to Britain — and to some extent to Denmark. There is no doubt that apart from Denmark the level of commitment to the Community is lowest in the United Kingdom. It is not that on the mainland there is a starry-eyed enthusiasm for the Community. They simply tend to take the Community for granted, part of the general framework of government like their national administrations, necessary, useful and fallible. It is only in Britain (and in Denmark) that the permanence of Community membership remains to be questioned. Why? Is it primarily a problem of communications? Could it be changed if only the Community information services were to have more

money to spend on publicising the Community or to operate more effectively?

I do not believe this is the problem. No doubt the estimable Eurocrats in the London information office of the Community would welcome a bigger budget, and no doubt they would be the first to admit that they have their share of sins of omission and commission.

But the problem lies not in the Community's outpost in London, but right at the heart of British politics in Westminster. The Commission's information budget for the United Kingdom is tiny compared to the annual budget of the Central Office of Information without counting the cost of the many departmental information machines. If public expenditure on information about Britain's future in the Community is to make a contribution, the major role must be played by the national state.

Labour's ambivalence

But for the last five years the Labour Government has given no priority to emphasising the importance of making a success of British membership of the Community and of the Community's role in world affairs. It is government that sets the climate of public opinion. It is what Ministers say in public and in private about the European Community that sets the tone of national debate, that determines what the senior civil servants and departmental information officers say, that influences the attitudes of the leader-writers and the TV pundits. For five years, the Labour Government, in that most typical phrase of the times, adopted a low profile over the European Community. And to a large extent the post-Heath Conservative opposition tended to lie low, too. They refused to risk giving any electoral ground to their opponents. With no leadership about the historic advantages of Community membership, the way was clear for the grouse and the grumblers to engage in a steady drip, drip, drip of denigration. It did you more good in the leadership stakes in both Government and

Opposition in those days to play John Bull at the despatch box at the expense of practical results in the ongoing Brussels negotiations.

This attitude did not arise from any conviction that Britain had made an error in remaining in the Community at the time of the 1975 referendum, that some big change had taken place that justified a change of position. That would have been intellectually respectable.

The ambivalent attitude taken up by the Labour Government owed little to any intellectual doubts about membership of the Community and much to an ideological division within the Labour Party, and indeed within the Labour Cabinet. Patching up party unity was considered a great deal more important matter than the historic issues associated with British membership of the Community.

Party unity, what sins are committed in thy name!

In the name of party unity the Government refused to commit the party to the plan for a fairer electoral system which it itself supported. The Conservative leadership took an even more negative attitude to Liberal proposals for proportional representation. As a result Britain has now contributed a grotesquely distorted delegation to the European Parliament. In the name of Party unity and with Conservative acquiescence, the information services of the Community in Britain were discouraged from pulling out the stops in a colourful and imaginative public relations campaign to excite public interest in the European elections. Instead the large budget of one million was spent largely on the dullest, most neutral of 'official public service' advertising. And even that was in the event limited in its operation by the national General Election.

The truth is that the task of persuading ancient European nations to pool limited but important aspects of their sovereignty in a single Community is an immensely difficult one. It involves painful changes in familiar and cherished national ways of conducting both public and private business. It requires a patient search for

necessarily complicated compromises, and a willingness to explain to the layman why these often irritating alterations in our national procedures are a necessary means to the achievement of great long term goals — the creation of a Continental-scale economy and a political unity that are our best guarantees of future peace and prosperity. The ordinary citizen earning his or her daily living cannot be expected to follow the technical details of Green Pounds and European Currency units. It requires political conviction and vision, and political will of a high order if the nations of the Community are steadily to build a more united Europe.

The present state of public opinion in Britain about the Community is not a failure of information policy, but of political leadership. It was dramatically underlined by the failure of both the Labour and Conservative leaders to campaign in the European General Election on anything remotely like their personal commitment in the national General Election. The Liberal leadership with heroic consistency despite the electoral dice being loaded against them fought the campaign properly. But it was little wonder that if the nation's leaders in both the main parties refused to take the Euro-poll seriously that the ordinary voter followed suit.

Prospects under the Conservatives

The new Government claims it will do things differently. It says it will pursue the European ideal while vigorously fighting Britain's corner over matters like CAP and the budget. We shall see. It is certainly the better way to seek results in Europe. But they have to prove they are ready to pursue their European policy with more leadership and conviction than they showed in conducting their election campaign. We should not underestimate the problems. It is an axiom of information policy that it cannot artificially create a climate of opinion. It can only inform and reinforce a national mood which is itself the product of much wider and deeper political and social trends. Public confidence — especially in

such a novel and non-traditional concept as a multi-national Community — is easy to erode and much harder to recreate. Over the recent years of reluctant and lukewarm Europeanism in Britain our original large stock of goodwill amongst our partners has been steadily run down. They have become unconvinced of our desire to share in the leadership of Europe as we have done in the past, and indeed of our will and capacity to reverse our deep-seated relative economic decline. And yet the goodwill of our partners and their readiness to make concessions is essential to solving the problem of Britain's inequitable budget contributions and restoring the belief of the British people in the Community.

Bi-partisan approach

Making a success of Britain in the Community ought to be a bi-partisan — indeed a tri-partisan — matter. It is a tantalising thought that if Labour had won the 1970 election a Labour Government would have taken Britain into the Community with Conservative and Liberal support, and the anti-Europeans of both main parties would have been an isolated minority. Many of the problems I am discussing here would never have arisen, and others like the Community budget would have been simpler to solve. As it is, the new Government will find it will require long, patient, steady effort to turn round the present mood about Britain and the Community on both sides of the Channel.

There are many legitimate differences of view between Right, Left and Centre about the best internal policies for the Community to pursue. Everyone who believes that Britain's future lies in membership of an effective Community will hope that the new Conservative Government will from now on make the EEC the centre-piece of our foreign policy. Equally, they will hope that the new Labour Opposition will not allow its largely self-inflicted humiliation in the European General Election to push Labour into being a completely anti-Community party committed to British withdrawal.



UNCTAD V and after

Towards a new international economic order by Malcolm Subhan

Brussels correspondent of the *Economic Times*, Bombay

A non-event which cost \$100 million to stage. This was the popular verdict in the West on the fifth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which met in Manila recently. But it was not altogether fair to a conference which brought together an estimated 5,000 delegates from nearly 150 countries.

For many Western observers the Manila conference was headed for failure even before it opened simply because it lacked a focal point. But the fact is that every UNCTAD conference has had a long, cluttered agenda; where an issue has emerged to dominate a conference it is often due as much to luck as to planning. But as far as the developing countries were concerned, UNCTAD V did have a central theme. It was one their ministers had selected in February when they had met in the Tanzanian capital of Arusha to plan their strategy for Manila. The central theme of UNCTAD V was to be an action programme for restructuring industry in the developed countries, in order to bring about the New International Economic Order the Third World has been pressing for since the 1973 oil crisis.

A related issue was to be protectionism. The Group of 77 has watched with growing alarm the efforts of the major industrialized countries, including the EEC, to limit imports of so-called 'sensitive' products from the developing countries. In its view protectionism must be defeated for two reasons: (1) it is a barrier to the expansion of Third World exports of manufactured products and (2) it postpones the need for rich countries to restructure their declining industries.

The industrialized countries were

generally sympathetic to both demands. The EEC spokesman, the French Economics Minister, M. Monory, told the conference that even in the case of a particularly sensitive sector — textiles — the Community was following a policy whose twin objectives are (1) a control over imports so as to prevent a sudden, sharp rise as in 1977 and (2) changes in the structure of the industry so as to enable trade to develop more harmoniously in the future.

But the EEC also made it clear that it did not share the priorities of the Group of 77. The fact is that for some time now the Common Market has been offering to help developing countries deal with the two problems it regards as the most crucial to their future development: food and energy. In the Community's view it is the growing shortage of food and energy in many developing countries which threatens the Third World more than anything else.

Compromise on central issues could cause friction

Even so, developed and developing countries were able to reach a compromise on both the central issues raised by the Group of 77. The resolution on protectionism calls on the rich countries to reduce and eventually eliminate quantitative restrictions on their imports from the Third World. GATT, the Geneva-based body which conducted the recently concluded multi-lateral trade negotiations, is asked to examine any protectionist measures which industrialized countries may take against

the exports of developing countries.

As for restructuring industry in the West, the resolution states that structural adjustment is a constant and global phenomenon. The resolution entrusts the Trade and Development Board, UNCTAD's main decision-making body, with the task of organizing an annual review of world production and trade.


The purpose of such a review of course would be to help identify the elements or problems most relevant to the attainment of (1) optimum overall economic growth and (2) the development and diversification of the economies of developing countries. These annual reviews would result in recommendations of a general nature, which governments could take into consideration when drawing up their economic programmes.

Both resolutions obviously represented a compromise. The fact remains, however, that the governments of the industrialized countries have given an undertaking to resist protectionist pressures and, what is perhaps even more important, to tackle the problem at its roots, by making the necessary structural

adjustments so that industries seeking protection against imports can compete more effectively against them.

For a number of reasons the implementation of the two resolutions is likely to be a continuing source of friction between developed and developing countries. The latter are bound to find the pace at which industrialized countries reorganize their industries much too slow. The fact is that in the short run industrial reorganization leads to loss of jobs and lower rates of economic growth.

There will also be differences over the extent of the reorganization. Developing countries take the view that the industrialized should simply transfer certain manufacturing industries to the Third World, among them entire sections of the textile and clothing industries, the footwear industry, the assembly of consumer electronics, etc. But for the EEC's Commissioner for Industrial Policy, Etienne Davignon, the goal of industrial reorganization is to make industries more competitive, not to close them down — a process which is likely nevertheless to involve closures.



The newly industrialized countries

All industrialized countries accept the need to help the Third World industrialize. But with the rise of the newly industrialized countries such as South Korea, Singapore and Brazil, they are beginning to make a distinction among them. The European Community wants the NICs to undertake structural adjustments also, in the direction of diversification of their industrial activities. It also wants them to encourage domestic demand and open up their markets to imports.

UNCTAD V provided striking confirmation of what has become very evident in the last 5 or 6 years. This is the increasingly heterogeneous nature of the Third World. The Countries now represented in the Group of 77 include semi-industrialized, high-growth economies as well as nomad, subsistence economies. Per capita incomes range from \$50 in the least developed countries to over \$5,000 in the rich, sparsely-populated oil-exporting countries of the Middle East.

The Group of 77 inevitably has found it more and more difficult to maintain its unity in the face of such extremes of economic development and income. As a result, it has become increasingly rigid in its attitudes and intolerant of any independent initiatives within its ranks. Not surprisingly, internal dissensions have increased. During the closing days of UNCTAD V the African group threatened to stage a walk-out on the grounds that its interests had been largely neglected, especially as regards the debt problem.

But the most serious dispute within the Group of 77, and one which held up the Manila conference for three weeks, was over energy. Costa Rica, backed by a number of other Latin American countries, took the view that the group of high-level experts to be set up under the draft resolution on interdependence should have competence over questions of energy also.

Although Cuba accused the industrialized countries of raising the issue

in order to divide the Third World, the Costa Rican initiative apparently was prompted by the fact that the OPEC countries have done more for Islamic nations facing economic hardship as a result of the rise in oil prices. However, pressure from the other developing countries (and a promise of increased financial aid) led Costa Rica to withdraw its proposal.

The growing strains within the Group of 77 obviously have implications for the future of UNCTAD and the North-South dialogue. Both, it was being suggested in Manila, had outlived their usefulness. But there were no suggestions over what should take their place. It is clear, however, from the resolution on structural adjustments to industry, that developed and developing countries will have to work together if both are to enjoy economic growth.

The example of Lomé

Regional arrangements such as the Lomé Convention are one answer. But the EEC's Commissioner for Development Cooperation, Claude Cheysson, has described the Community's relations with its associated states as a model for the international community. This implies an international forum in which the eventual extension to all developing countries of successful regional arrangements can be envisaged.

The most obvious forum in which to draw up a global development strategy is the United Nations, of course, acting through its Economic and Social Committee or even through special sessions of the General Assembly. This is precisely how the strategy for the Third Development Decade, covering the 1980s, is to be decided.

Once the broad outlines of the strategy have been agreed on, its implementation can be entrusted to the various specialized agencies of the UN, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, GATT and regional organizations such as the Asian Development Bank. This would reduce UNCTAD's role but the result could well be a much more effective organisation.

£2,846m EEC finance to UK

Between 1973 and the end of 1978, the various funds and lending agencies of the European Community allocated grants and loans to the United Kingdom of more than £2,846m. This finance is provided mainly to stimulate industrial investment and improve services like communications and water supply, so bringing new jobs to the less prosperous regions; to provide training for young people and those needing to change their job or find a new job; to modernise the coal and steel industries; and to encourage investment in agriculture and fisheries.

The global figures are:

Grants — £747,126,000.

Loans — £2,099,392,000.

Loan allocations, of course, have to be repaid, but the loans offered by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) are at highly competitive rates of interest and often on deferred repayment terms. The chart below gives details by

fund and by region.

Some grants and loans are made on a national basis and cannot be attributed to any particular region. This is particularly true of the Social Fund, which channels most of its finance through national organisations like industrial training boards or through government agencies like the Manpower Services Commission.

The total for grants from the European Coal and Steel Community is not exhaustive. It does not, for instance, cover all research projects in these sectors. The Social Fund figure does not include all the experimental 'pilot projects'.

Payments from the Agricultural Guarantee Fund for operations like support buying and butter subsidies are also not included in the totals.

More detailed information on these grants and loans is available on request to the Editor, *European Community*, 20 Kensington Palace Gardens, London W84 QQ, stating the region concerned.

Grants and loans to the UK: 1973-78 (£)

Region	Social Fund	Regional Fund	Agricul. Fund	EIB Loans (£m)	ECSC Loans	ECSC Grants	Hydro-carbon Grants	Hill Farming Grants
North England	3,884,462	63,547,409	3,688,174	168.05	223,464,000	—	—	—
Yorkshire & Humberside	153,590	11,427,759	6,773,605	63.26	207,480,000	—	—	—
North West	16,585,066	37,946,342	3,256,095	118.4	3,520,000	—	—	—
West Midlands	11,000	14,400	2,502,213	—	21,430,000	—	—	—
East Midlands	137,136	1,095,586	3,403,824	8.4	34,630,000	—	—	—
East Anglia	—	—	3,657,698	—	—	—	—	—
South West	120,919	3,992,046	3,108,035	10.0	—	—	—	—
South East	49,575	—	1,758,519	7.0	3,760,000	—	—	—
Scotland	18,943,190	69,783,896	14,323,758	305.59	55,900,000	—	—	—
Wales	8,163,780	41,029,381	2,275,296	141.0	100,780,000	—	—	—
Northern Ireland	37,879,979	39,911,084	11,865,629	21.0	—	—	—	—
UK General Benefits	197,261,375	—	3,142,078	326.6	279,128,000	—	—	—
National Totals	283,190,000	268,747,903	56,647,846	1169.30	930,092,000	70,000,000	17,000,000	51,540,000



Guide

A Common Man's guide to the Common Market edited by Hugh Arbuthnott and Geoffrey Edwards (Macmillan for the Federal Trust, 213 pages, £8.95)

An attempt to highlight the Community's basic principles and objectives which are easily lost sight of in the jungle of detail and the jargon used to describe it. It gives a short history of the Community, explains the institutions and decision making processes and the major policy areas.

Politics

The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe by R. E. M. Irving (George Allen & Unwin, 338 pages, £15)

After discussing the pre-war origins of the Parties, the author reviews their spectacular growth in the decade following 1945, their decline in the 1960s and revival in the 1970s. He analyses the political philosophy of Christian Democracy and discusses what the Christian Democratic and conservative political families have in common.

Agriculture

Agricultural implications of EEC Enlargement — Part I: Greece (Agra Europe London, £12.00).

Enlargement of the EEC to include Greece, Spain and Portugal is likely to put further strain on the Common Agricultural Policy and cause a shift in the balance of power in the Community towards the Mediterranean countries and away from countries in the north. This report deals with the general economic and agricultural implications of enlargement, taking a detailed look at the agriculture of Greece.

How Europe Works

In Europe — one man's view of how Europe really works by Basil de Ferranti (Euroskech, 52 pages, £2.00)

The former President of the EEC's Economic and Social Committee describes the workings of the Committee and chronicles his experiences over the two years of his presidency (1976-78). A final chapter speculates on the Committee's future development.

Parliaments

The European Parliament and National Parliaments edited by Valentine Herman and Rinus van Schendelen (Saxon House, 304 pages, £9.50)

This book is based on the papers presented by fifteen academics at a recent 'workshop' in Grenoble. It considers national parliament-European Parliament relations from a variety of viewpoints.

Britain

Britain in Context by John D. Hey (Blackwell, 189 pages, £9.50 hardback, £3.95 paperback)

An imaginative presentation of key economic and social facts and figures. The material is divided up into eighty-six topics, each presented on two (facing) pages, one devoted to a pictorial representation of the material, the other discussing it and giving the data sources. The topics are divided into three broad areas: Britain as part of the world, Britain as an economic aggregate and Britain as a society of individuals.

Community Europe

The Countries of Community Europe — a geographical survey of contemporary issues

by Geoffrey Parker (Macmillan, 211 pages, £4.95)

This survey of issues currently affecting the member countries of the Community is addressed mainly to students of regional and economic geography, European studies (political and economic) and business studies. It takes each country in turn, dealing with topics like energy provision, agricultural and industrial modernisation, regional development and problems of the environment.

Euromanagers


The New Euromanagers — an examination of the training and development requirements of future UK managers in Europe

by Judy Lowe (Woodhead-Faulkner, Cambridge, 84 pages, £7.25)

This book looks at the changes that have taken place in management education and training in the UK since its entry into the EEC. It concentrates on moves to develop appropriate European-orientated programmes to enable UK managers to function more effectively in Europe. It will be specially helpful to those wanting to develop European training participants.

Statistic of the month

Unemployed in the Nine (1978 averages)





Statement by Roy Jenkins after the Tokyo Summit meeting

Speaking at a press conference after the World Economic Summit held in Tokyo on 28-29 June, Commission President Roy Jenkins underlined four main points. *First*, the Tokyo Summit did face up to the seriousness of the energy situation. It was not in every way an easy meeting. Energy, naturally in the circumstances, dominated it. There was much less of a general debate than in the previous world summit in Bonn, it was more of a negotiating meeting, and it got down to concrete questions and achieved concrete commitments. The meeting might not have done all it should ideally have done, but it did all that realistically could have been done.

Second, and in particular, its major achievement was a firm United States commitment to a medium term goal. Given the American position as late as the eve of the summit, this was a significant advance.

Third, following on from that, this United States commitment and the accompanying Canadian and Japanese undertakings were only possible because of the Community's strong position agreed at the European Council at Strasbourg. This shows what the Community can achieve through solidarity and a common position. We should certainly not have achieved the United States undertaking without that.

Fourth, the declaration of the Tokyo Summit in no way prejudices the positions of the five Community countries not individually represented (Benelux, Denmark and Ireland). They had all accepted the Strasbourg target, and they are in no way committed beyond that. The next step will be for them to undertake

similar national commitments within the Strasbourg target, and that these should be agreed and declared by the time of the Dublin European Council at the end of November. He did not anticipate any great difficulty about this.

In conclusion, Roy Jenkins expressed satisfaction at the central role which the Community has played in the preparation and results at Tokyo, more so than at any previous summit. However, he hoped this would not lead us to be complacent. At the Energy Council two weeks ago, in Strasbourg and then last week in Tokyo, we worked out our first serious response to the new energy crisis. What counts now is to monitor and build on that, because unlike the five years after the shock of 1973, our energy problems will not disappear even temporarily in the next five years. We are going to have to live with them and come to terms with them. We have just started, but fairly effectively, to do so.

