THE TROUBLE WITH PESCO

THE MIRAGES OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE

Justyna Gotkowska
THE TROUBLE WITH PESCO
THE MIRAGES OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE

Justyna Gotkowska
Contents

THESES /5

I. MUCH ADO ABOUT PESCO /6

II. GERMANY, FRANCE, POLAND: A TUG OF WAR /8

1. Germany: political objectives /8
2. France: military ambitions /9
3. The scepticism of the eastern flank /10

III. STRATEGIC DIFFERENCES /12

1. France: in pursuit of European emancipation /12
2. Germany: between the US and the EU /12
3. Poland, the Baltic states and Romania: the ‘trans-Atlanticists’ /14

IV. NARRATIVES ON EUROPEAN DEFENCE /16

1. The concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ /16
2. ‘The US’s withdrawal from Europe’ /17
3. Debate as a substitute for action /18

APPENDIX 1. PESCO: RULES OF PARTICIPATION /20
APPENDIX 2. PESCO: THE FIRST SEVENTEEN PROJECTS /23
Theses

1. 2017 saw an intensification in the discussions and actions aimed at strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy. The highlight was the activation last December of Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO). The development of the EU’s security and defence policy is supported by both France and Germany. Paris needs the EU to complement French power projection in its southern neighbourhood. Berlin sees political value in the development of common security and defence policy for the EU. Central Europe perceives the whole process sceptically.

2. The compromise around PESCO and the discussions on the future of the EU’s security and defence policy have revealed worrying trends in Europe. First, strategic differences between the member states have been laid bare, in particular between the three keystones of European security, France, Germany and Poland. Second, the process has highlighted a growing gap between the political rhetoric in (Western) Europe and military reality on the ground. The political narratives about European ‘strategic autonomy’ and the US’s alleged ‘withdrawal from Europe’ have been confronted with the glaring deficiencies in European military capabilities and the increase of the US’s military presence on the continent.

3. It remains an open question as to what the appropriate European response to the changing security environment should be. Should it take the form of EU’s security and defence policy, as it is currently being shaped; or should it rather embrace a substantial reinforcement of the national armed forces in Europe, an increase in the European contribution to trans-Atlantic cooperation within NATO, and an effective harmonisation of the European military cooperation projects, that should take also Central European needs into account, with the Alliance?
I. MUCH ADO ABOUT PESCO

In 2017 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) became the priority initiative within the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),\(^1\) and was finally agreed upon in December. PESCO is intended to allow closer military cooperation among a group of willing EU member states who are ready to stick to a set of agreed commitments. After several months of discussions, twenty-five member states declared their participation in the initiative, i.e. all the EU members with the exceptions of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Malta.

Agreement on PESCO in this format marked a victory for an inclusive political approach towards strengthening military cooperation in the EU over the idea of creating an exclusive European military vanguard. The participation of almost all the EU countries has led to less clear and binding commitments which its participants must meet. These include defence expenditure; cooperation in developing new military capabilities and making up the existing deficiencies; interoperability, availability and readiness to deploy forces on CSDP missions and operations; and participation in the equipment programmes of the European Defence Agency (see Appendix 1).

In December 2017 the member states participating in PESCO submitted a list of the first seventeen projects which they will jointly implement (see Appendix 2). At the moment, these represent efforts to strengthen cooperation in narrowly defined areas, each of which has different sets of participants. The projects are divided into two categories. The first group is devoted to the operational

\(^1\) The other initiatives are (1) the European Defence Fund (EDF), for funding multilateral armaments and R&D projects in the EU; (2) the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), allowing the coordination of the development of military capabilities in the member states; (3) Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which is intended to lead EU military missions without an executive mandate (i.e. training missions).
dimension; these projects are intended to improve participation in CSDP missions and operations (such as the EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core). The projects in the second group will support capability development (e.g. the project on maritime (semi-) autonomous systems for mine countermeasures). The contributions of individual states and the nature of the projects show that PESCO is focused on crisis response in the southern neighbourhood of Europe. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece are involved in the largest number of projects (9-16). The Central European member states are involved in an average of 1 to 4 projects, similarly to the Nordic states (Sweden and Finland are participating in three projects each). From these two regions, only Lithuania and Slovakia are lead nations in two projects.

Summing up, PESCO does not seem to offer any definite incentives for the integration of the armed forces in the EU, or to contribute to the capability development to any great extent. Whether PESCO will provide added value to European security and defence policy will depend on the will of the participating states to further develop the initiative and the European Commission’s determination to enforce the commitments of PESCO. It is possible that PESCO will end up like the ‘pooling & sharing’ initiative from 2011, which supported military cooperation in narrowly defined areas, but did not lead to a breakthrough in increasing military capabilities within the EU.
II. GERMANY, FRANCE, POLAND: A TUG OF WAR

Even though the activation of PESCO was one element of a common, German-French initiative in 2016, the two countries had different visions regarding the development of this mechanism. Central Europe’s positions were basically overlooked in these discussions.

1. Germany: political objectives

Germany has remained reluctant to use military instruments for managing crises and conflicts, and has treated the development of military cooperation within the EU, including PESCO, above all in political terms.

However, Germany wanted to give Paris a positive response to the French initiatives for closer European integration in at least one area, and to demonstrate the functionality of the Franco-German tandem in the EU. Moreover, Berlin wanted to show the new US administration that Europe was willing to take more responsibility for its security, and that it is able to invest more in military cooperation. The domestic context was also important. The narrative of a ‘European Defence Union’ is more favourably accepted in Germany than arguments on the need to strengthen NATO, which are unpopular due to anti-American sentiments in German society. From Berlin’s perspective, the question of tightening industrial cooperation within the defence sector in the EU is also crucial, since it is viewed to be beneficial to German arms companies.

However, Germany essentially rejected the French ideas of creating an EU military vanguard on the basis of PESCO. Berlin did not want to create any formats that would bind it politically and militarily, obliging it to expand the Bundeswehr’s military involvement in Africa or the Middle East. Germany was also opposed to creating additional divisions within the EU which would exclude the Central European member states. Within PESCO Germany
has proposed projects aimed at strengthening cooperation and capabilities in non-combat areas (such as medical support and logistics), which it had been offering to partners for years. In the end, Germany became a leading nation in four projects, and participates in seven more (see Appendix 2).

2. France: military ambitions

France, for its part, favoured ambitious military objectives in developing the EU’s security and defence policy. The French aim in PESCO was clear: to strengthen the military capabilities of the member states involved, so they could conduct crisis management operations in the southern neighbourhood (Africa and the Middle East) using EU instruments, structures, and financial resources. Taking advantage of Brexit, as well as the Western European scepticism towards US policy caused by the rhetoric of Donald Trump, Paris has brought about a desirable (from the French perspective) change in the direction of the European debates, from the topic of collective defence to the area of crisis management. In the EU’s negotiations over what form PESCO should take, however, Paris’s ideas have lost out to the German approach. France, an ardent advocate of PESCO, eventually became a lead nation in two projects, and is participating in only four.

Paris is not satisfied with the German-formatted PESCO, and has no greater hope that the EU will become an active and autonomously operating actor in security and defence in the short and medium term. Therefore the French President Emmanuel Macron put forward new proposals in September 2017 for the development of European military cooperation which correspond to France’s original ideas of how PESCO should work. In a speech at the Sorbonne, President Macron proposed the creation of a European Intervention Initiative (EII), which would be based on the creation of a joint military force, a common strategic culture & military doctrine, and joint budgetary instruments. The EII would be deployed independently or within the framework of the EU, NATO
or the United Nations. This initiative was included in the French Strategic Review of Defence and National Security published last October by the French Ministry of Defence. The European Intervention Initiative is intended to complement France’s bilateral military cooperation with Germany and the UK. This will most likely mean Paris’s increased cooperation with member states in southern Europe (including Spain and Italy), linking those states’ capabilities with French military potential.

However, it is difficult to judge whether the EII will actually come to pass: at the moment Paris’s talks with European partners on the subject have brought no visible results. Regardless of the creation of the EII, France will continue to support the development of the CSDP’s instruments such as PESCO, CARD and EDF.

3. The scepticism of the eastern flank

The EU’s member states on the eastern flank have varying attitudes towards the development of military cooperation within the EU. Those countries which feel threatened by Russian aggression and are members of NATO regard PESCO with scepticism. Poland, which is focused on strengthening collective defence and reforming NATO’s structures, has expressed its concerns about the goals and direction of the initiative’s development most openly. It also

---


3 Paris has realised the limitations of German security and defence policy; it is counting in the long term on a slow change in German strategic culture, and in the short term on greater Bundeswehr engagement in the southern neighbourhood, albeit not necessarily in a combat role (i.e. rather in transport, training, arms supplies, medical support, etc.). In the case of the United Kingdom, Franco-British cooperation is based on the Lancaster House agreement of 2010, as a result of which the two countries should strengthen their military cooperation and set up a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. This cooperation was confirmed in the course of the Franco-British summit in January 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-france-summit-2018-documents
only joined the programme at the last moment (eventually participating in two projects). Its concerns are related to PESCO’s single-track formatting as an initiative which:

(1) is beneficial to the development of military capabilities mainly for crisis management operations,

(2) is advantageous for the defence industry of the largest member states,

(3) concentrates on threats and challenges from the southern neighbourhood of Europe.⁴

Similar doubts are shared by Romania and the Baltic states. The latter, due to their desire to maintain good relations with their Western European allies (Germany and France) which currently participate in NATO battlegroups on their territories, are less inclined to express their sceptical position in public.⁵

For their part, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary identify with the eastern flank of NATO to a limited extent, and do not perceive a direct military threat from Russia. They treat PESCO as an instrument which gives them the opportunity to stay close to Paris and Berlin in the face of their opposition to French and German proposals concerning the EU’s migration policy, among other matters.⁶ However, these states have also expressed concerns that the CSDP initiatives will duplicate NATO, and that Western European arms companies may dominate military-industrial cooperation within the EU.

⁴ See the joint letter from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and National Defence of Poland to Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, of 13 November 2017.
⁵ In public Estonia expressed less scepticism, as it was holding the Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2017.
III. STRATEGIC DIFFERENCES

It is obvious that the discussions about PESCO have a wider, strategic dimension. They revealed essential divergences among the EU member states related to perceptions of threats and challenges, development of the EU’s security and defence policy, and the future of trans-Atlantic relations.

1. France: in pursuit of European emancipation

According to France, it is the EU’s volatile southern neighbourhood which poses the greatest risks and challenges (such as terrorism), and so this should be a priority area for the EU’s actions in security and defence. As the US is, according to Paris, gradually withdrawing from political and military involvement in Europe, the EU should develop its own ‘strategic autonomy’, that is, the ability to undertake independent political and military action in security and defence policy. By that Paris has in mind developing crisis management but not collective defence capabilities. France is also focused on developing EU’s industrial autonomy, i.e. restricting the access of third countries (primarily the US) to the European defence market and strengthening the largest Western European arms companies.

France is de facto seeking to translate its security policy objectives to the whole of the European Union. The EU (by means of the CSDP) should supplement France’s overstretched military capabilities and ability to maintain national strategic autonomy in terms of decision-making and conducting military operations in Africa and the Middle East.

2. Germany: between the US and the EU

Germany still does not feel threatened, either by Russia or an unstable Africa and Middle East. Security and defence policy is far down the list of Berlin’s priorities. At the same time, most
German elites (in particular the Christian Democrats) are aware of their country’s dependence on US guarantees, both for Europe’s security and for the functioning of global trade, which is of essential importance to the German economy. That is why NATO is still considered the basis for both German and European security.

Politically, however, the US under Donald Trump’s administration has adopted a diametrically opposite stance from that of Berlin in a number of key issues: multilateral international cooperation, trade, economy, climate change, energy and migration. Germany has thus begun to define the Trump presidency as a breakthrough in trans-Atlantic relations, and to discuss European ‘strategic autonomy,’ understood as politico-military emancipation from the United States. A debate on the future of the partnership with Washington is currently underway in Germany; for the time being, this is taking place between trans-Atlantic and post-trans-Atlantic-oriented experts.7

However, some German politicians (from among the Social Democrats) have also been sending the first signals suggesting a need to conceptualise a ‘new European foreign policy’, in which the EU would take the change in the strategic relationship with the US into account.8

3. Poland, the Baltic states and Romania: the ‘trans-Atlanticists’

In the security and defence policies of the member states on the EU’s eastern flank (Poland, the Baltic states and Romania), centre stage is occupied by NATO and relations with the US, the ally which has the greatest military capabilities and the will to use them. The region does not see a problem with the disengagement of the United States from Europe: on the contrary, it is the beneficiary of a substantially increased US military presence on the continent.

Poland has become a hub for the US Army’s activity for the whole eastern flank, with around 5000 soldiers being stationed in the country. The US military presence in Poland includes units of a rotational armoured brigade combat team and the combat aviation brigade as part of the US’s European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the US-led battlegroup as part of NATO deterrence policy. Relations with the US, which the region sees mostly through the prism of security and energy policy (due to the deliveries of LNG from the US and Washington’s opposition to Nord Stream 2), have never been so intensive. For this reason, the ongoing discussions in Western Europe on the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’ are incomprehensible to the countries on the eastern flank.

Moreover, the region’s focus on collective defence does not mean that it does not recognise the need to become involved in crisis management operations in the south; however, the question of the formula for this engagement is being raised. Both Poland and

---

9 Since July 2016 Poland has participated in the global coalition’s activities against ISIS. Four Polish F-16 planes (with around 150 soldiers) have been conducting reconnaissance flights over Syria and Iraq from bases in Kuwait; Polish special forces (around 60 soldiers) has been training Iraqi military in Iraq, and a Polish team of logistics officers (about 20 soldiers) has been training Iraqi technical personnel how to maintain their post-Soviet military equipment. The latter (which is likely to be expanded) will become part of NATO’s planned training mission in Iraq.
the Baltic states are increasing their presence in the Middle East within the US-led global coalition against ISIS as well as NATO’s efforts, for reasons including pressure from the Trump administration and showing solidarity with the southern allies.
IV. NARRATIVES ON EUROPEAN DEFENCE

1. The concept of ‘strategic autonomy’

The concept of the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’ as used in discussions on European defence has caused by far the greatest controversy. In the Global strategy of the European Union, the document which forms the basis of the latest initiatives in the CSDP, this term is defined as autonomy regarding external crisis management and capacity-building. In addition, NATO is named as the primary framework for collective defence.\(^\text{10}\)

The strategy thus offers a limited definition of the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’. However, this is contrary to the ordinary understanding of the term, which in discussions within Western Europe denotes the EU’s full independence of the US in security and defence. At the same time, this narrative completely neglects the question of how to develop EU’s military capabilities in collective defence. It also avoids the question of Brexit, which is problematic as the UK has one of the largest military potential in Europe. The fact that London will not participate in the development of the CSDP makes NATO the most important platform of military cooperation with the UK.

Moreover, a significant gap between political rhetoric and military reality is apparent, and often ignored in discussions in Western Europe. In the short and medium term, the EU’s member states will not be able to conduct either intensive crisis management operations in the southern neighbourhood, or collective defence operations in the event of a conventional attack on one of the member countries. PESCO, presented in this narrative as one of the instruments for achieving ‘strategic autonomy’, will hardly

yield a significant improvement in Europe’s military capabilities, as described above.

2. ‘The US’s withdrawal from Europe’

Equally problematic is the Western European perception of Washington’s security and defence policy through the prism of President Trump’s rhetoric, and not through the US’s strategy and military activity. This approach has resulted in a narrative of the United States withdrawing from Europe.

At least in the short term, this narrative is currently at odds with reality. Firstly, the US military presence in Europe has in fact been enhanced both within NATO and within the European Deterrence Initiative, starting with the non-allied Sweden and Finland, through the Baltic states and Poland, up to Romania and Bulgaria. Secondly, the administrations of both Barack Obama and Donald Trump have increased funding for the EDI (US$3.4 billion in 2017, up to US$4.8 billion in 2018 and a planned figure of US$6.5 billion in 2019). Thirdly, the US’s 2018 National Defense Strategy sees the central challenge in the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition by revisionist powers – China and Russia. This is an important change in US defence policy, which after 2001 was focused on the fight against international terrorism.

In the long term, questions about the US military presence in Europe are justified, given the changes in the global balance of power affecting the external priorities and the changing domestic politics in the US. These considerations should be taken into account in the long-term national defence planning in Europe. However, the current discussions about EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’

---

as an answer to this dilemma are in fact deepening the gap in trans-Atlantic relations. They imply that Western European countries are starting to take the trans-Atlantic divisions for granted, and to look beyond the US-EU strategic relationship instead of thinking of how to reinvigorate and strengthen relations with Washington. This may send the wrong signals to the US, and in the long term could boost scepticism as to the legitimacy of its military involvement in Europe.

Furthermore, if the EU becomes the main organisation for military crisis management for the Western European allies (with France as the leading state), and NATO is more and more marginalised as an alliance maintained solely for the purpose of the collective defence of its Central European allies, Washington could end up losing interest in NATO as a platform for trans-Atlantic cooperation.

3. Debate as a substitute for action

For some countries, the discussions about strengthening European security and defence policy are becoming a substitute for taking meaningful action in this regard. Focusing on discussions about European defence diverts attention away from questions of investment in the national armed forces, and towards a debate about political projects. This is beneficial in particular for those countries less willing to increase their defence spending and military engagement abroad. This primarily applies to Berlin, which specialises in ambitious rhetoric and has declared its readiness to ‘assume the responsibility for European security’. At the same time, it is reluctant to invest in the Bundeswehr and to get it too involved, either on the EU’s eastern flank (in collective defence) or in the southern neighbourhood (in crisis management).

PESCO is a prime example of the German approach. Berlin is happy to have negotiated a relatively unambitious cooperation format which it can deploy politically, at little cost, as the German
and European contribution to strengthening European security in discussions about trans-Atlantic burden sharing without being bound militarily by too strict commitments. At the same time, the German defence expenditure will not exceed 1.3% of GDP by 2021 (in accordance with the new coalition agreement). This is far too little for the Bundeswehr as it struggles with a large deficit of arms and military equipment, as well as the problem of maintaining operational readiness (the Bundeswehr would most likely need at least a month to put up one brigade, while the structure of the German land forces nominally includes three divisions).

JUSTYNA GOTKOWSKA

---

Germany’s defence budget for the years 2017-2021 will be gradually increased from €37 billion in 2017 to €42.29 billion euros in 2021, in accordance with the current mid-term federal financial plans. According to the new coalition agreement, the additional increase in spending (most likely up to €1 billion by 2021) will depend on the budgetary situation, and will be tied to an increase in official development assistance.
APPENDIX 1. PESCO: RULES OF PARTICIPATION

(1) Participation. Ultimately only three EU countries will remain outside PESCO: Denmark, because of its opt-out from the CSDP; Malta, which has indicated a potential collision between its participation in PESCO and the neutrality enshrined in its constitution; and the United Kingdom, due to the upcoming Brexit. Ireland and Portugal joined PESCO after the other 23 EU member states issued a notification of their intention to participate in the framework in November 2017.13

(2) Commitments.14 PESCO’s commitments are largely general, and can be interpreted so that both those member states which favour greater military integration in the EU and those countries which are more sceptical can find arguments which suit themselves. This includes involvement in the coordinated annual review on defence, or investing in undeveloped capabilities in accordance with the EU’s capability development plan.

A more binding commitment is the requirement to participate in at least one capability development project identified as strategically relevant. In addition, member states participating in PESCO agree to substantially contribute to the EU Battlegroups (EUBG), to provide substantial support to CSDP missions and operations, and to work on a common funding of military CSDP operations. A similarly general formulation is contained in the section concerning participation in the EDA’s equipment programmes. The commitments regarding military expenditure contain no references to the allocation of 2% of GDP to defence budgets. The only

---


14 See also M. Terlikowski, PESCO: consequences for the unity of the EU defence policy, 17 November 2017, PISM Bulletin #112 (1554), https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/biuletyn/nr-112-1554
reference is to the regular increase of defence budgets in real terms and the allocation of 20% of total defence spending for investment expenditure, and of 2% of defence budgets on research and development.

Every year the states participating in PESCO are supposed to present national implementation plans for the fulfilment of the commitments to all the participants and to the PESCO Secretariat; these will be evaluated by the latter. The Foreign Affairs Council in its ‘PESCO format’ may suspend member states which do not fulfil the criteria. A review of PESCO’s commitments is due to take place in 2025.

(3) PESCo’s governance. The governance of PESCO will primarily be the responsibility of the member states, although the High Representative and the subordinated structures will have the opportunity to influence the development of the initiative. A joint Foreign Affairs Council/Defence meeting (in which only the countries participating in PESCO will have the right to vote) will deal with PESCO issues at the strategic level twice a year.

At the lower level, the participating member states may propose any projects they wish (albeit in accordance with the commitments they have signed up to). The High Representative will formulate recommendations on their acceptance or rejection, based on an assessment by the PESCO Secretariat. However, the member states alone will ultimately determine which joint projects will be accepted. The extent and the principles of cooperation within the framework of specific projects will be unanimously decided only by the states participating in them.

15 The PESCO Secretariat will be built on the basis of the cooperation between the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the deputy secretary-general for the CSDP and emergency response.
(4) **Projects.** In December 2017 the states participating in PESCO adopted a declaration of the first 17 projects which will be carried out within this framework. The projects are led by the lead nations; several member states participate in them in different groupings, and several others have observer status. Projects on the operational dimension include: European medical command, military mobility, a network of logistic hubs, a competence centre for training missions, a centre of training certification for armies, a strategic command system for missions and operations, a crisis response operations centre. Projects concerning the capability development include: secure radio communication, (semi-) autonomous mine-countermeasures systems, maritime surveillance systems, an information sharing platform for cyber incidents, mutual assistance in cyber security, and the development of a common platform for various kinds of armoured vehicles, and indirect fire support. Further projects may be attached to these after a few months.
## APPENDIX 2. PESCO: THE FIRST SEVENTEEN PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Lead nation</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Observers</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. European Medical Command (EMC)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg</td>
<td>The EMC aims to provide the military support for CSDP missions and operations on the ground. It will contribute to harmonizing national medical standards, legal frameworks and sanitary services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Belgium, Finland, Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Italy</td>
<td>Estonia, Spain</td>
<td>The ESSOR aims to develop common technologies for military radios in order to increase the interoperability of the armed forces of the EU member states, regardless of the radio platform used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Network of logistic hubs in Europe and support to operations</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>The network of logistic hubs in Europe aims to improve existing logistics infrastructure, procedures, standards and planning for the improvement of strategic logistic support for EU missions and operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Lead nation</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Observers</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Military mobility</td>
<td>Netherlands, Germany</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>The military mobility project aims to support member states in the simplification and standardisation of procedures for cross-border military transport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC)</td>
<td>Germany, Italy, Spain</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Sweden</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Slovenia</td>
<td>The EU TMCC aims to improve the availability, interoperability, specific skills and professionalism of personnel for EU training mission across participating member states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. European Training Certification Centre for European Armies</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Greece, Portugal</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>The Centre aims to promote the standardisation of procedures among European armies and enable staff, up to division level, to practice the entire spectrum of the command and control functions at land, joint and interagency levels in scenarios of international aid, support, stability and capacity building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Lead nation</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Observers</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Energy Operational Function (EOF)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Belgium, Spain, Italy</td>
<td>Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal</td>
<td>The EOF aims to develop new systems of energy supply for camps deployed in EU missions and operations, as well as for soldier-connected devices and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Austria, Greece, Estonia, Croatia, Ireland, Portugal</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>The project aims to deliver a multi-national specialist military package for the assistance to EU and other states for managing natural disasters, civil emergencies and pandemics. An EU Disaster Relief Training Centre of Excellence, and ultimately a Disaster Relief Deployable Headquarters, will be created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM)</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania</td>
<td>Estonia, Spain, France</td>
<td>The project will deliver a mix of (semi-) autonomous underwater, surface and aerial technologies for maritime mine countermeasures. The project will enable member states to better protect maritime vessels, harbours and offshore installations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Harbour &amp; Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO)</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Greece, Ireland, Portugal</td>
<td>Belgium, Netherlands</td>
<td>To provide an integrated mobile system consisting of software, marine sensors and under-and over-water and aircraft platforms, as well as command components for surveillance and protection of marine areas (ports, coastal waters, maritime communication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Lead nation</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Observers</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11. Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance</strong></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, Croatia, Ireland, Italy</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>The project will deliver an integrated system of maritime sensors, software and platforms which fuse and process data, to aid the detection and identification of a range of potential maritime threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12. Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform</strong></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Austria, Cyprus, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal</td>
<td>Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Slovenia</td>
<td>The project aims to share cyber threat intelligence through a networked platform and to develop more active defence measures against cyber threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>13. Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security</strong></td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Spain, Finland, Croatia, Netherlands</td>
<td>Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Slovenia</td>
<td>The project aims to integrate the member states’ expertise in the field of cyber defence through the mutual assistance of rapid cyber-response teams, which can also support EU institutions and CSDP operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Lead nation</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Observers</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Germany, Italy, Portugal</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>The project aims to enhance the military decision-making process, improve the planning and conduct of missions and the coordination of EU forces. It will deliver information systems and decision-making support tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle/Amphibious Assault Vehicle/Light Armoured Vehicle</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia</td>
<td>The project will develop and build a prototype of an Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle based on a common platform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery)</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia</td>
<td>The project will develop a mobile precision artillery platform that will include land-battle decisive ammunition, non-lethal ammunition and a common fire control system for improving coordination and interoperability in multinational operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. EUFOR Crisis Response Operation (EUFOR CROC)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>France, Italy, Spain, Cyprus</td>
<td>Belgium, Czech Republic, Portugal, Slovenia</td>
<td>EUFOR CROC will contribute to the creation of a full-spectrum force package, which could accelerate the provision of forces by identifying the capabilities and adequate forces necessary for EU crisis management operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>