The Arab Representation of European Democratic Values and the Influence of Euro-Arab Relations

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As cultural diplomacy is usually grounded in a set of values that state or non-state actors are expected to share, we opted for a preliminary study of the cross perception of fundamental European values as they are perceived on the Arab side, with a limited scope and a selected theoretical object that is the model of European political models and especially the European liberal democracy as perceived by the Arab intellectuals.

The choice is motivated by a serious concern about the superficial statements which is often displayed by the past studies on public opinion, in order to know whether they approve or reject the European political model of democracy or whether the value promotion of European union can reach the other side of the Mediterranean Sea.

How can we discard the simplistic mass media statements on the Islamic reluctance to democracy and human rights etc., and the simplistic model of Clash of Civilizations carried out in the nineteen nineties, if we do not get back to the origin of the European-Arab interaction process?

By getting back to the nineteenth century, a period when the Arab world had its intellectual “renaissance” (al-Nahda), we would be able to identify the deep roots of the Arab perception of European modern values, focusing on one of them in particular, “liberal democracy”.

This is the first step in a presentation whose aim is to analyse the track of the Arab perception of the European political modernity, through the lenses of the Arab intellectual elite.

This theoretical paper, based on compilations and literature analysis seems to be a first step enabling us to understand two phenomena:

- the perception, by the Arab public opinion of the European values related to democracy and human rights
- its perception of the way the European union is promoting them and developing its own public diplomacy.

1 - The influence of European political models on Arab intellectuals during the “Nahda” as the starting point of the Arab perception of European values

The Arab cultural awakening started in the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Egypt was just starting to build up its modern state, only two decades after the end of the French occupation.

French occupation of Egypt lasted no longer than three years and brought in a lot of cultural transformation. It gave the Arab political actors the testimony that French republican Deism and Islam were close to each other. The Egyptians discovered that something was going wrong in their political organisation and in their political culture. Napoleon Bonaparte’s military occupation was sure bloody, but its short timeline and its positive interaction with the Egyptian religious authorities during the first period pushed Egypt forward to a modern model of statecraft. It was no later than two decades after the end of Napoleon’s adventure in Egypt and Palestine that the Egyptian Khedive Muhammad Ali undertook the in-depth modernisation of the Egyptian state, thus encouraging a new generation of modern intellectuals to run for cultural hegemony on the Egyptian society.
Rifâ'at Râfi’ al-Tahtâwi was among the pioneers of the nineteenth century’s Arab intellectual re-birth. As a religious preacher, he was sent to France to supervise the Egyptian students’ delegation and ended up his journey with the redaction of *Takhlîs al-Ibrîz fi Talkhîs Bâriz* (Extracting Paris’ Gold). Many new ideas developed by the author supported Muhammad Ali’s political reforms, as he advocated a modern state based on the allegiance to the Egyptian citizenship as a pillar for the political life and on equality for all citizens. These principles were echoing the French Republican paradigm read through the lenses of a renewed Islamic thought.

Nevertheless, Rifâ’at Râfi’ al-Tahtâwi’s political thought was not yet the cornerstone of the democratic political doctrines in the Arab World. Mehemet Ali’s regime was true introducing political modernisation, citizenship and an accelerated industrialisation in Egypt. It represented nevertheless an authoritarian modernist experience, and the Khedive excluded from al-Azhar many Islamic top scholars too much supportive to democracy.

As a pioneer of the modern political thought in the Arab world, he was followed by many others concerned with a new approach of political life, either by providing a new reading of the Islamic intellectual and “theological” tradition, or through new doctrinal frames rather imported from Europe.

Jamal Al-Din al-Afghâni and his (disciple) Muhammad ‘Abduh were concerned with reforming the religion Islamic doctrine so as to accommodate it with the requirement of modernity. So was the case of Khair al-Dîn al-Tûnisi and ‘Abdul Rahmân al-Kawâkibi whose writings were focusing on how Islam and modern democracy are compatible.

The Arab philosophers of the *Nahda* (The Arab cultural and intellectual awakening) were in the same time influenced by the European modern philosophy and reacting against cultural inertia in the Arab cities. They were more or less reacting against the Ottoman regime. Most of the Arab intellectuals and philosophers criticised the Ottoman rule but not all of them where hostile to it. For instance, Al-Kawâkibi’s negative perception contrasted with Al-Tûnisi’s reformist stance, the latter being an Ottoman notable, a troop commander, and later on a member of Sultan Abdul Hamid’s government. Despite the divergence between those who rejected Ottoman rule and those who sought merely to reform it, one common feature between all of them was their call for a reform of the present political system.

Al-Kawâkibi started with the critic of Ottoman despotism when he came to confront it to the European political model of organisation. He is assumed to have read the Arab commentaries of Rousseau and Montesquieu. He referred to the European political philosophies in addition to the European political economy and to the socialist doctrines.

Despotism is literally derived from the Arab verb “*Istabadda*” (meaning the individual exclusive appropriation of an action). This definition, used to describe the political power gives us a similar meaning: despotism is the appropriation of political power by the ruler in who takes decide on his own for the fate of a whole society and is not accountable to it.
Al-Kawâkibi’s developments on despotism were determined by an East/West comparative approach. They were influenced by the European modern political philosophy’s theories on political legitimacy. The author referred many times the East/West contrast as did the European intellectuals themselves. He emphasised the negative aspects of his own “eastern” society and political system in contrast with the Western one considered as a benchmark (if we use this neologism).

Al Kawâkibi seemed to take on his own behalf the binary East/West opposition with regard to the political behaviour:

“There are many differences between Easterners and Westerners: the former has a better character taken individually, but the Westerner has a better relation to society. For instance, the Westerners always require from their Prince, loyalty to his responsibilities and respect of law, while in the Eastern societies it is the Sultan who orders his subjects to be loyal and obedient to him.”

Therefore, the “Oriental despotism” seems to be the reason why Arab societies are perverted and backward. Despotism leads to immorality because it forces the despot’s subjects to sacrifice their own moral value in order to survive in a perverted environment. Moreover, despotism is not compatible with economic development because it brings insecurity in the economic field and is unable to provide the rules securing property and private interests.

This global critic of the Ottoman system contrasted with the subtler approach provided by Al-Tûnisi: the latter was rather aware of all the reforms undertaken by the Ottoman state since the middle of the nineteenth century. Of course, the first radical reforms were carried out in Egypt, and the Egyptian experience was defeated when British and Ottoman struck back together against it in 1840. But we should also remember that Istanbul was involved in a wide scale reformist process with the many Tanzimats adopted since the fifties. Moreover, the Sultanate itself issued its own Ottoman constitution in 1876, introducing Ottoman citizenship with constitutional rights and obligations, as well as limited checks and balance between legislative and executive etc. That’s the reason why Al-Tûnisi’s critic was targeting the Ottoman conservative leaders rather than the Ottoman political system as a whole.

How did the Arab philosophers refer to European political patterns?

Both Al-Kawâkibi and Al-Tûnisi referred to the “representative democracy”, paradigm and their rationale consisted in finding the similarity with the original Islamic experience of Medina and of the first orthodox caliphates of Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman and ‘Ali.

Through mobilising historical and Islamic doctrinal resources, both of them argued the following:

- the political paradigm defined by the Quranic verses is that of the “Shûra” which means “deliberative system”. The Quranic verse (42;38) stipulates that all social issues should be submitted to a deliberation within the community of believers (Amruhum Shûra Baynahum).

- The practice of the first Muslim states confirms this doctrinal source as “Shûra” (deliberation) was implemented inside the city even when the Caliph was to set for new laws.
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- This practice, based on Islamic ethics, privileged the rule of law especially that this law, grounded on religious principles, is deemed to have authority on the rulers’ will, thus preventing any despotism.

This was a difficult exercise made by the Muslim scholars at a time when the dominant political culture was based on the sole principle of obedience to the ruling elite “Awliyâ° al-Amr”.

This is why we suppose that this return to the origins of Islam was at this time a result of a mirror game between the Muslim intellectuals, the Arab-Islamic history and the European set of values.

In this mirror game, the afore-mentioned intellectuals are supposed to have been helped by the observation of the practical experiences inside the European political modernity in order to re-discover the original Islamic political system. Therefore they dissociated the historical sultanates ruling them in an a more or less despotic way from the original democratic experience of the first Caliphates.

The genuine historical research was undertaken by Al-Tûnisi who compared the Ottoman political system with the most representative European ones (from Russia to Great Britain). In each of them, he discovered a mixture of autocracy, aristocracy and democracy, and many obstacles to the principle of equality. In his analysis he disclosed his preference for the French republican system, which was equality-oriented and reflected a better democratic representation than the other European regimes.

This comparative approach was intended to establish that in each European political regime the key prerogatives were still laying in the hands of the “little few”, and still those “little few” represented the people directly or indirectly or were given a higher legitimacy due to their status or to their social or cultural position. This favoured the idea that in a reformed Islamic regime, the “deliberative” prerogatives could be attributed to those identified for their wisdom, their knowledge or their political representativity, thus corresponding to the historical elite called “Ahl al-Hal wa al-‘Aqd”.

The key finding of Al-Tûnisi was this idea that the democratic reforms recommended for Tunis province, and overall for the whole Ottoman state were, in the same, bringing the Arab political system close to the European democratic model and to the original Islamic principles for a political organisation.

Furthermore, the principle laying beyond the idea of democracy was the principle of a civil government disconnected from the idea of a God-given monarchy. The Arab philosophers concerned with the rebirth of Islamic political philosophy seemed to have read the many theories on social contract in order to abandon the principle of a theocratic political legitimacy.

Muhammad ‘Abduh, a philosopher and religious scholar at the same time, benefiting from a solid reputation within the Egyptian religious institution, later on appointed as Mufti, supported the idea that the government in Islam is always a civil government, as he told that:

“In Islam there is no other religious power given on people than the power of recommendation and incitement to accomplish the right actions and to avoid the wrong ones, and
the least individual among the Muslim community is invested with this power over the most influent of them,... Islam has never given (the Caliph, the Mufti or the Cheikh al-Islam) any power on the beliefs and judgements of the individual, and any power given to them is only a civil power defined by the Islamic law, but which denies any (sacred) authority on the faith and believes of the individuals”.

The secular idea spread on the aftermath of the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate. In 1925, Ali Abdul-Râziq, an Egyptian Muslim cleric, presented his theory of separation between the political system and the religious law, echoing the republican initiative of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. This was another form of European influence exerted through the intermediary of Turkey, which hosted the capital of the last Muslim state.

Ali Abdul-Râziq argued that the doctrinal sources, Kuran and Hadith, provided detailed rules on marriage and inheritage, but not at all for any model of political organisation. The conclusion was that the Divine source left the issue of political organisation to the human civilisational course (al-‘Umrân al-Bashari).

This interpretation provided the religious and doctrinal legitimacy for the secular, new political, thus providing the very basis for secular liberalism and nationalism all long the twentieth century.

This influence of the European models worked through a mirror game where those Arab philosophers, qualified as Islamic reformists, re-discovered their original political Islamic model through the lenses of European modernity.

Another question is linked to the problematic: how did those intellectuals perceive European societies? The statements expressed through the most famous writings disclosed a great deal of ambiguity:

- A negative perception of the European societies’ emancipation from traditional values was perceived as a form of civilisational decay. While observing the French way of life al-Tahtawi who was advocating the woman’s emancipation in Egyptian society wished that this would not bring the latter to what he observed in France when “sometimes men became enslaved by women”. Al-Kawâkibi did the same when he said that the European “is materialist, tough in his relation to other people, greedy, with a deep desire for revenge against them, as if nothing remained in his mind from the noble feeling transmitted by Christianity which is an Oriental religion”.

- A positive perception on the same societies, because a just political system can always make people virtuous. In this sense, Muhammad ‘Abduh, on his way back from France and Italy said: “I went in Europe and I saw Islam without Muslim; I came back to my country and I saw Muslims without Islam.” He explained this aphorism by giving the details of the Islamic virtues the European citizen had and the Egyptian had lost.

This ambivalent statement determined to a certain extent the Arab perception of what could be borrowed from European culture and involved the Arab intellectuals in a deep insight of their own historical values.

Islamic reformism as developed by Al-Tûnisi, Al-Kawâkibi and ‘Abduh was involved in this mirror game between self-perception and the
perception of the Other, where the present and contingent self (qualified as decadent) is distinguished from the original self (considered as a paradigm).

This is the reason why we should analyse the evolution of the Arab intellectual and philosophical perception of the European political culture, political patterns, and diplomacy at each of these two stages.

How did the Arab intellectuals and philosophers who lived under the French or British occupation perceive these three dimensions? The question is addressed through the existential matrix of the Arab identity. During the late Ottoman era this matrix was Islamic reformism, because the main concern of the mainstream Arab intellectuals was the modernisation and democratisation (and decentralisation) of the Ottoman Islamic state. Europe was an ambivalent partner perceived at the same time as a positive partner, a model and a threat.

The colonial era led to a radical shift due to the new geopolitical context:

• Ottoman legitimacy disappeared next to the geographical split of the Ottoman state and to the abolition of Caliphate in 1924.

• The Arab part of the Empire fell under the European colonialism and was fragmented into as many states.

• The European colonialism helped feed the Arab fragmentation with a cultural dimension by encouraging if not producing micro-nationalism and minorities sectarianism\textsuperscript{15}.

As a consequence, getting rid of European colonialism became the key concern expressed in the Arab philosophical and political literature. Therefore, the political matrix became the Arab nationalism, of which the main concern was the liberation of the Arab fatherland from European

2 - A simplified scheme of the Arab perception of Europe at the colonial and post-colonial era

Muslim reformists had a balanced relationship with Europe, grounded on a mirror game at a time when their own state was still playing in the courtyard of the sovereign powers: Ottoman Empire, Egypt, etc. Their main concern was state reform in order to move forward to modernity.

In this sense, Europe, though threatening to expand at their expense, and though already controlling in North Africa, served as a model of successful statecraft, and in the same time, as a place where the Arab political actors could find potential allies for their reforms.

This perception changed with the evolution of the geopolitical environment. Therefore, two stages are identified:

• The stage of European colonisation of the Arab world changed radically this balanced perception of Europe, and the new concern was national liberation through confrontation with European colonialism.

• The next phase was post-colonial, and the relationship with Europe was reconsidered when the European political cooperation succeeded in transforming the European interaction with the Arab world in a new form of cooperation.
colonialism, while taking assets from inside the European modernity in order to reform the Arab society.

Arab nationalism was recent, but became the mainstream doctrinal basis in less than a decade\textsuperscript{16}, and was nevertheless challenged by other alternative nationalisms (like Syrian nationalism) and by pan-Islamism.

The Arab nationalist matrix defines the relationship with European states by correlating it to the positive objectives, which are liberation and unification of the Arab homeland.

As a matrix, it was challenged by other substitute nationalisms like the Syrian nationalism and also by non-nationalist projects of regional unity (non-nationalist unitarism), like pan-Islamism and Marxist Arab unitarism\textsuperscript{17}.

In the following scheme we shall consider altogether the original doctrine (Arab nationalism) and the alternative doctrines (pan-Islamism, Syrian nationalism and non-nationalist Arab unitarism) altogether in order to determine the variables of the Arab perception of European paradigms and actors.

If we correlate this perception with the geopolitical environment, and if we limit the reaction to each new situation to a binary option, that of course cannot not reflect the complex reality, therefore we can infer six possibilities (from S1P1 to S3P3) supported by our readings and from our empirical knowledge on Arab history:

**Situation 1:** Arab countries are subject to European colonialism: this leads to two different positions:

- **Position 1:** European states are ruling the Arab countries and this induces a general perception of a colonial Europe where the distinctions and internal contradictions are not perceived.
  
  This is often the case in the philosophical nationalist discourse non concerned by the empirical study of intra-European contradictions. Most of the philosophical works published by nationalists consider the European actors as a homogeneous block when they come to describe the civilisational European offensive to uproot the Arab identity\textsuperscript{18}.

- **Position 2:** European states are ruling the Arab countries, and the Arab discourse considers the antagonisms inside Europe. This was more the case of empirical studies and practical political discourse.
  
  In practice, this provided the case of Rasheed Ali al-Kaylani’s government in Iraq in 1941, who used to play the Axis against the ruling Britain, on the basis of the slogan “the enemy of my enemy is my ally”\textsuperscript{19}.

In another way, this is what the Marxists did by playing the contradiction between the European governments and the European working classes. Marxists sought for an alliance with the European working class against the Imperialist projects of their own ruling class.

**Situation 2:** Arab countries are already emancipated from European colonialism and inserted in a regional system ruled by the bipolar conflict, in a context of United State-Israeli alliance\textsuperscript{20}.

- **Position 1:** the Arab discourse perceives Western Europe and United States as part of a homogeneous political axis, and still presents a binary perception of an East/West divide.
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Position 1: The identity centred actors reject the European interference and identify it as a negative factor in the domestic conflict.

Position 2: Other political actors (focusing on democracy, minorities rights, etc.) seeks for European support whether political, economic or cultural in order to resolve the domestic crisis, or in order to challenge the domestic antagonist.

The following simplistic scheme displays the six possibilities from S1P1 (Situation 1 Position 1) to S3P2.

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<tr>
<th>Situations/positions</th>
<th>Arab perceptions of European political actors</th>
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<td></td>
<td>P1</td>
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<td>S1: European Colonisation</td>
<td>Negative: East/West confrontation - European main target</td>
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<tr>
<td>S2: European Colonisation terminated</td>
<td>Negative: East/West confrontation - European as US allied</td>
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<tr>
<td>S3: Arab independence + domestic conflicts</td>
<td>Negative: rejection of foreign interference</td>
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The optimal combination for the Euro-Arab relations was S2P2, which was correlated to the rise of a specific European Diplomacy, through the European Political Cooperation (EPC). And we choose to focus on this limited timeframe of the 1973-1980 period to illustrate a typical S2P2 case.

The rise of the EPC enabled this political counterpart of EEC to build up the frame for a Euro-

- This discourse is rather developed by philosophical and ideological writing of nationalists, “pan-Islamists”, and Marxists, and differed from the empirical analysis.

- Nevertheless, the radical “pan-Islamist” discourse considered that Western powers and the Soviet bloc were part of the same world, while the Arab socialists and non-Maoist Marxists referred to the latter as an ally or a potential ally, by using the word “imperialism” to qualify the whole US-Western European alliance.

Position 2: the Arab discourse does perceive the gap between United States and European diplomacy, and therefore rejects the binary perception of an East/West cleavage and identifies the European diplomacy as a third actor. It expects from this European independent actor one of those possible attitudes: neutrality, mediation, positive partnership.

- As Arab nationalism considers that the struggle ends up whenever the Arab national goals of liberation and unity are performed; therefore, there are not essential historical antagonists but only cyclical or temporary antagonists. In this case, the relationship with Europe is expected to be neutral or positive.

- European common diplomacy since 1974 started to move away from a policy of alignment on United States, and especially when next to the first oil shock the European response consisted in establishing the Euro-Arab dialogue.

Situation 3: Arab countries, though emancipated from European colonialism, are subject to domestic violent conflicts.
pean consensus in foreign policy, and this consensus was influenced by the French Gaullist independent foreign policy as a drive, resulting in a European disagreement with the US Middle Eastern policy.

The two key issues for this common foreign policy regarding the Arab world were the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Euro-Arab dialogue.

Concerning the first issue, EPC helped throughout the nineteen seventies to bridge the gap between two edge-sided countries, Netherland and France: in 1967, while the Dutch government provided full diplomatic support to Israel, the French government supported the Arab claim for an Israeli withdrawal from recently occupied territories. At this time, France was almost the only EEC country to take her distances with the US policy of support to Israel. Six years later, in 1973, the same diplomatic divide reappeared inside EEC, but the other four EEC members took their distance with the Dutch position, and this until the EPC mechanisms brought the EPC/EEC member into a consensus whereby the rights of the Palestinian people could be recognised, and we got the Venetia declaration.

The second key was the Euro-Arab dialogue, helping to bring a change in the perception of each block of the other one. The Arab oil embargo, as a mean to retaliate against foreign military and diplomatic support to the Israeli expansion, hurt United States in addition to one of the six EEC/EPC member states (Netherland). While the former responded to both by supporting a “consumers’ cartel”, the latter was involved in an EPC dynamics moving toward dialogue with the Arab states. The Euro-Arab dialogue institution was a new form of recognition by the European partner of the relevance of the Arab identity and of the Arab claims.

On the Arab side, the growing perception of European Community at this stage, is summarised as follows:

- Europe is identified with European Community: in the political and intellectual discourse, there is a semantic confusion between them.
- Europe’s goals are perceived as being mainly economic, especially because in the Euro-Arab dialogue, EEC partner emphasised on trade partnership with the Arab countries. This helped to weaken the image of European influence as a civilisational offensive aiming at dispossessing the Arabs from their own identity. In addition, this developed the realistic approach in analysing European politics.
- EEC than EU is perceived as a mediator in regional conflicts, and as an alternative partner with or without limited hegemonic claims. This perception is strengthened by the relevance of common EPC then EU positions, and by the consensual mechanism of decision making.

This period of emergence of EPC, though disturbed by the latter evolution of the Euro-Arab relations, and by the disintegration of the Arab common strategies two decades later, left a long lasting footprint in the Arab collective imagination of what European Union could be.
3 - The fate of European political paradigms and the post-modernist inverted mirror game

A political antagonism does not prevent cultural influence, and this explains why European political models and philosophical frames were still influential in the Arab world.

This means that while the Arab peoples were struggling against European colonialism, Arab political thought still borrowed concepts and paradigms from the European political thought and practice.

Within the Arab national matrix, many political paradigms were competing, but sometime mixed during the first half of the Twentieth century:

- The traditional paradigm relied on the monarchical families’ legitimacy and on the traditional ruling class, but lacked all the resources to engineer the new statecraft.
- The search for modernity was represented by two opposite trends:
  - The creation of European-like representative democracies though with many restrictions.
  - The creation of a modern state through the paradigm of an authoritarian modernisation.

The latter paradigm consisted in modernisation through an authoritarian top-down approach. Whenever implemented (Iraq 1941, Syria 1949, Egypt 1952, Tunisia 1956, Iraq 1958, Yemen 1974, etc.) it worked on the basis of the following assumptions:

- The Arab society needs to be modernised
- European modernity is still the available pattern
- The social structure is reluctant to modernisation
- The society is modernised by a top-down authoritarian state policy

This paradigm was supposed to be influenced by the Turkish republican model as it seems that Rachid Ali Al-Kaylani, Husni Al-Za‘îm and ‘Abdulkarim Qâsim, all of them being senior military officers and relying on the armed forces to access to premiership, were inspired by this model, which on each turn borrowed its main principles and mechanisms from the experience of the European modern state.

In this case, the modern European state is still a benchmark, but this time its authoritarian face is emphasised. This phenomenon displays the double edge of the modern statecraft: the liberal democratic edge and the authoritarian hierarchic edge; European history in the nineteen thirties gives a lot of evidence of how we can shift from one edge to another.

In the authoritarian-modernist experience, both edges met in the same political system which paradoxically used the authoritarian paradigm in order to develop the modern set of values.

This paradigm that is nevertheless derived from European modernity is obviously diverging to a great extent with the founding political paradigm of European post World War II organisations. The set of values inherent to European
political modernity contains the two opposite dimensions that are totalitarianism on one hand, and the values of European post World War II organisations which core is the European convention on human rights (ECHR) on the other hand. This human rights-based value system was at the beginning carried by the Council of Europe at a time when the European community was mainly trade oriented. It took more than half a century for the latter to integrate the objectives and mechanisms of the former through the implementation of the European union charter of fundamental rights.

The paradox of the Arab modernity is that many of the representative political doctrines were influenced by paradigms of European modernity while being in contradiction with the value set of European post World War II organisations and therefore of the European Union. Among the political paradigms, the so-called paradigm of “popular democracy” was overwhelming inside the Arab landscape of the nineteen sixties and of the nineteen seventies (from Algeria to Iraq). Its very basis was the Marxist theory of class struggle whereby political legitimacy was relying on its class identity, and the authentic democracy reflecting the power of the working people’s alliance represented by the revolutionary vanguard. This perception derived from the evolution of the Marxist theory adapted to the Arab nationalist doctrine was endorsed by the later Ba’th declarations (1966) as well as by the Nasserist National Charter (1964) and by the National Liberation Front in Algeria33. Was this a European paradigm, as it became closer to the Soviet ideological paradigms even if Arab socialism was very different from the Soviet party system? Whatever the answer to this question is, it was obviously the Soviet Union and not the European post-World War II organisations that served as a benchmark for political regimes34.

Meanwhile this was not an obstacle to improvement of the Euro-Arab relationship, and one of the cases illustrating this fact is the strengthening French-Iraqi diplomatic and economic relationship since 197435. The Arab socialist perception of European union has changed and broke off with the former philosophical discourse since the establishment of the Euro-Arab dialogue, and since European common diplomacy diverged from the US-Israeli axis. If we use Nye’s typology, EPC diplomacy emphasised Economic power and soft power, and avoided hard power36.

With the crisis of Arab socialism, two ideologies expanded among many others: revolutionary Marxism whose leaders and intellectuals blamed the fake socialism of the Arab nationalists, and the so called “Islamists”, both aiming to reshape the perception of Europe among the public opinion. Both of them were opposed to Western political and cultural influence, whether American or European.

Here we reach a paradox with the Iranian revolution, despite Iran being outside the Arab world. Nevertheless, its revolution influenced the Arab neighbourhood to a great extent. Among the
most famous intellectuals close to it, we have Ali Shariati whose works were based on the synthesis of religious political doctrine and theory of class struggle in addition to Baqir al-Sadr who was an Iraqi philosopher and religious Muslim Shi’i cleric who tried to reject capitalism and socialism, and to overcome liberal and Marxist models of democracies.

The paradox provided from this junction of Western influenced post-modernist philosophy rejecting all the conceptual frames of liberal democracy with an Islamic revolutionary doctrine using a revolutionary and even “third wordlist” rhetoric. As Islamic values are not per se incompatible with European political values, and the political theories of the earlier Arab modern philosopher is an evidence of it, the “revolutionary Islamic thought” hostile to the contemporary European set of values was also echoing the radical post-modern European violent critic of European modernity.

European post-modernism’s roots stemmed from the core of the modern era, with the development of the critical philosophy, which instigated doubt on the fundamentals of modern rationalism, modern individualism, and liberal democracy.

Among the most critical philosophers in Europe was Michel Foucault, whose rationale consisted in demonstrating that the structures of the modern state of law are just a set of social mechanisms of controls that gives us the fiction of autonomous and responsible individuals. Foucault’s judgement was met with the dynamics of the Islamic revolution in Iran, where he founded a revolution against the oppressive modernity.

A steadier alliance based on common concepts and doctrinal beliefs put together the radical Marxist anti-imperialist in the Arab world with the radical revolutionary Marxist in Europe. Both were very critical toward the European diplomacy toward the “Third world” and therefore toward the Arab world. European common diplomacy was perceived as reflecting an unbalanced system where the Core as a whole (the dominant countries) exploited and dominated Periphery (the so called third world countries). This theory didn’t get into the many details in order to identify which country did what, but perceived a cohesive “imperialist block” whose core was the United States. Economic partnerships between European Community (then European Union) and the Arab world were perceived as part of this exploitation process.

We needed a more pragmatic approach to identify who did what in European Union in terms of position toward both the US core and the Arab periphery. As a matter of fact, two countries were known for their support for Arab liberation, and therefore for the Palestinian cause: Ireland and Greece. Both perceived themselves as peripheral colonised societies. Ireland because of the history of British colonialism, and Greece because the Greek left and PASOK government defined their own country as a US-UK economic and political dominion.

Nevertheless, according to the culturalists, Marxist theory was not really breaking off with Euro-
pean cultural patterns\textsuperscript{41}. That is the reason why some European sociologists called for an alternative to the "Westernisation of the World"\textsuperscript{42}. This idea was at the same time echoing to and echoed by the identity-centred approach in the Arab world. Which stressed the need to restore the Arab civilisational patterns relegated by colonialism.

Another philosophical project designed to face cultural alienation was Hassan Hanafi’s project of “Occidental Studies” or “Occidentalism” (\textit{Istighrâb} or \textit{’Ihm al-Istighrâb}), which represented the symmetrical counterpart of the European “Orientalism”. The Arab self, instead of being determined by the Western perception, should have his own knowledge of the Western civilisational patterns.

The Arab project of “Occidentalism” or “Occidental sciences” is made to give them the opportunity to be the subject of a knowledge process after they have been for a long time the object of European social sciences\textsuperscript{43}.

This “Occidentalism” paved the way for the same critic of modernity. Instead of advocating post-modernity, it presented it as a process of disintegration for most of the basic principles of modernity (Rationality, individuality, democracy, etc.).

“Occidentalism” defines itself as a scientific approach, and its aim is to analyse the genesis and context of the European philosophies, doctrines and cultures. This enables the Arab scholar to understand them better instead of spreading stereotypes, or just repeating what he was taught on Europe about European culture.

Among the Arab scholars, the “Occidentalists” are those who have the most seriously identified the problematic of post-modernity, and the way Europe has overthrown its own modernity matrix through the post-modernist critic during the second half of the twentieth century.

This enables us to understand that another mirror game replaced the one described above for the nineteenth century:

- In the \textit{Nahda} mirror game, the European modernity was discovered as a mirror to the original Islamic model the Arabs have lost throughout their history.
- In the contemporary Post-modern mirror game, the rejection of European modernity by the Arab radical revolutionary (whether Marxist of “Islamist”) echoed the same attitude among the European post-modernist revolutionaries.

But as in Europe, post-modernism is nowadays replaced by a new combination of assertive modernity and National-Christian revivalism, the gap between Europe and the Arab world is now widening in the sense that the Arab intellectuals who have in the past echoed the European post-modernists are still, while the European post-modernist counterpart is fading at the benefit of a new aggressive self-assertion. In a few words the other side of the mirror is broken, and the gap is widening.
4 - The new liberal consensus: Back to the initial Nahda mirror game

The Euro-Arab mirror game is also played at the level of the Liberal doctrines here and there. The rise of post-modernity in the West and of radical revolutionary doctrines in the Arab world shadowed, for a while, the liberal doctrines developed since the Nahda. A crucial moment would have been the lost opportunity for a Euro-Arab consensus, and it can be called the “Fukuyama moment”\(^\text{44}\), meaning the time when the political actors and intellectuals of both sides believed that the return to the liberal democracy as it is defined in Western Europe was the condition for any positive transition in the other parts of the World.

On the European side, the revisit of modernity’s core values enabled a move back from post-modern relativism to universalist rationalism. And this went altogether with an assertive support of the paradigm of liberal democracy, which the many European and American think tanks defined as the only possible paradigm of democracy\(^\text{45}\).

On the Arab side, the task was not to revisit a liberal democracy they could not really experience, except for brief periods in a few countries (Syria during the fourties and the fifties), but to determine the historical and political conditions for a liberal democratic transition.

Therefore, many liberal intellectuals focused on the analysis of the obstacles to the democratic change rather than on democracy itself. They targeted the Arab authoritarian state, and focused on understanding how it works and especially how it survived to the third wave of democracy. And the repeated question was: why is the Arab world still reluctant to democratic transition?

An answer to these questions relied on theories on oppressive state that is still resisting to change, with many theoretical models we only present three of them:

- The theory of the rentier state: A state based on a non-productive system: the theory of authoritarian rentier state explained the mechanism of authoritarian state consolidation through the use of the oil rent, and how the oil rent inverted the relationship between the citizen and the government\(^\text{46}\).
- The theory of the state/civil society schizophrenia: A state working as an autonomous environment, with its elites, its economy, its own culture, acting like an alien for the civil society which is only the exploited-oppressed side of the relation\(^\text{47}\).
- The theory of neopatrimonial state whose resources are privatised and shared by ruling families\(^\text{48}\).

The European mechanisms of liberal democracy are here working as positive terms of the comparison, without working as models that the Arab people should imitate. At the same time, the key values of human rights protection are recognised as universal.
This common belief is deemed to be the ground for a European-Arab cultural consensus on human rights and on the founding principles of liberal democracy. The return of the liberal ideology was concomitant to the crucial shift in EU diplomacy based on “political conditionality”, according to which the economic aid is linked to the respect by the aid recipient of human rights and democratic standards. This seemed to yield some positive results in sub-Saharan Africa. But why did it not work with the Arab world?

In order to understand the situation, let us consider the “Algerian paradox”, where the full implementation of democratic mechanisms in 1989 gave a landslide victory to the Islamic Salvation Front – whose ideology was radically hostile to the very basis of liberal democracy – and where the protection of the key values of modernity went through the military return to power, at least for a while, in 1992.

As a consequence, the liberals discussed the paradox of a “democracy without democrats” meaning that the social conditions for a safe and steady democratic system are still absent, thus trapping them into the following paradox: Supporting the authoritarian models of government in order to protect the values of Arab modernity.

This was the ultimate trap for the EU principle of democratic conditionality, and this explains why these crises were avoided by the EU actors who just managed to get involved into a realpolitik disregarding the guiding principle. But this couldn’t work and the Arab intellectuals highlighted its contradictions: realpolitik, when democracy was risky, was combined with democratic conditionality when the regimes were unfriendly (Sudan, Syria, Iraq), this bringing a high level of discredit for EU.

The other issue is that the Arab side doesn’t understand the way EU institutions work when it comes to the defence of democratic and human rights values. Here visibility is an essential matter, and many divergences appear when the European Parliament takes a position that is not endorsed by the Council, or vice-versa, or when a consensus between member states is out of reach.

Another consequence of this paradox was that many liberal intellectuals moved to another field: the re-interpretation of the religious doctrine in order to confront the closed dogmatic interpretation with new enlightened doctrines.

The crucial opportunity for reaching is undeniably the “Arab spring”. We will call it “Tahrir Square consensus”. This consensus gathered the main Arab political doctrines (liberal, Marxist, nationalist and “Islamist”) who agreed on democratic mechanisms as a matrix for any political system. This was supposed to bridge the gap between the European post-WWII organisations’ values (i.e. liberal democracy) and the Arab new elite and to consolidate a new universal “democratic consensus”.

Efficiency of the EU policies of support to democracy is more visible in a new-born democracy. As evidenced by consolidation of the common liberal model is that the European
Neighbourhood policy includes the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)\textsuperscript{52}.

Many factors led to the hypothesis that this opportunity is lost again as the move from democratic protest to crisis, civil war and humanitarian disaster has induced many political dilemmas among the European actors. All of them resulted from the S3P3 case, where the EU actor is trapped in a domestic Arab conflict by Arab friendly political actors, but are about to lose their credibility in the eye of the Arab side.

- In the case of Egypt: Human rights claims or state stability and economic recovery\textsuperscript{53}?
- In the case of Libya: Interfering in state building or caring only about the European common borders and protecting the sole oil facilities?
- In the case of Syria: Ignoring the humanitarian disaster, selecting the crucial issues for European security or getting politically involved?
- Extended to Turkey: The double standard in dealing with repression in Egypt and Turkey was sharply criticised.
- The rise of the conservative discourse focusing on protecting Christian minorities (while more than 90% of victims of terrorism are not), and on welcoming only Christian refugees as it was told by four EU governments (true out of twenty-eight).

Another factor is now changing the sense of history: the democratic standards are now questioned inside the European union by the rising combination of nationalism and Christian radicalism. This new political landscape and also the Hungarian experience lead us to the remake of the Algerian paradox: the "demos" is enabled to reject the standards of liberal democracy, this time in favour of a nationalist-religious oriented authoritarianism.

This change in paradigm has not yet produced all its effects inside the Arab intellectual landscape, but its very probable effect would be a new discredit to the liberal paradigm. If deeply rooted inside the societies, this change can bring three crucial elements that can be easily perceived on the Arab side: security at the expense of liberty, identity-centered islamophobia and a religious oriented foreign policy\textsuperscript{54}. Nowadays, this move is reaching many of the member states, but not the EU institutions. At least, the dichotomy between an EU human rights centered initiative and the identity-centered policies of the member states will be more and more visible.

Footnotes

2 The effect of French occupation in Egypt was just the opposite of what happened in Algeria. Concerning the latter, Michel Habart provides the graphics of the demographic decline of the Algerian population from 8 to 2 million people, and provides the description of those towns freed from most of their indigenous population. Michel Habart: Histoire d’un Parjure, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1960 (available in Editions ANEP, Alger).
3 Hasan al-Dayqa: Dawlat Muhammad ‘Ali wa al-Ghrib al-Istihwâz wa
al-Istiqlâl (Muhammad ‘Alî’s State and the West, possession and independence), Al-Markaz al-Thaqâfi ‘l-‘Arabi, Beirut, 2002.


7 Abd Al-Rahmân Al-Kawâkibi: Op. Cit., XX


9 In order to have an idea about the concerns for reform and modernization inside the Ottoman state, Robert Mantran: Histoire de l’Empire ottoman Paris, Fayard, 1989.


17 The Marxist intellectual who moved from a strict internationalism to the Arab national paradigm were divided between those who endorsed Arab nationalism (Ra’îl al-Khûrî) and those who like Hassan Hamdan (Mahdi Amil) still made a clear distinction between the Arab nationalism he rejected and the Arab unitarism he supported. Mahdi ‘Amîl: Muqaddamât Nazariyya fi Dirâsât Athar al-Fîl al-Istihlâkî fi Harakat al-Tahârrur al-Watani (Theoretical prelogemona on the study of the influence of socialist thought on the national liberation movement), Dar al-Fàrâbi, Beirut, 1974.

18 Michel Aflaq: Fi Sabîl al-Ba’th (for the sake of rebirth), Bagdad 1984.


20 The perception of the global political scene by the Arab intellectuals was and is still over-determined by the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, before the mid-sixties, the United States was not still perceived as the strategic ally of Israeli state. For a detailed analysis on this question Fouad Nohra: Stratâgémès américaines pour le Moyen-Orient, Al Bouraq, 1999.


22 In the Maoist theory, since the early sixties, the revolutionary movements should strike equally against US and Soviet imperialism.

23 The concept of imperialism was first used by the Marxist theory in the field of political discourse and practice, and was latter extended to the Arab socialist discourse in the sixties.

24 During the European colonial era, and during the battles for independence, the United States were rather perceived as a potential ally. Pierre Moussa: Les Etats-Unis et les nations prolétaires, Seuil, Paris, 1965. And for what concerns the Egyptian hesitation between alliance with the United States and alliance with the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Republican era: George Lenczowski: American presidents and the Middle East, Duke University Press, 1990.


27 In this sense, the constitutional frame able to legitimate the Hashemite ruling family was nothing else than the scheme of a constitutional monarchy, and the easiest shortcut was obviously the British reference to legitimate the idea of creating a monarchy.

28 Among the intellectuals who justified the key role of the military institution in the political change Anouar Abdel-Malek: La dialectique sociale. Éditions du Seuil, 1972. Instead, Anouar Abdel-Malek tried to find the historical roots of the political system in the Egyptian society and in the social conflicts taking place in contemporary Egypt.


30 Most of the post-modern critics of the modern states emphasized this double edge political system with democracy and human rights on one side and the repressive capacity on the other side. Nietzsche’s aphorism « the state is the coldest of the cold monsters » can easily summarise the theories of the modern oppressive state.

31 The thesis of the state driven coercive modernization is sometime used in European sociology (Emile Durkheim: Education et sociolo-
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES), Beirut, La Découverte, Paris, 1986, 1988.


44 A reference to Francis Fukuyama's theory expecting the definite victory of liberalisation over


48 As a later theory of neopatrimonialism in the Arab world: Adīb N’imī: Al-Dawla al-Ghanā’imiya wa al-Rabī’ al-‘Arabi [The patrimonial state and the Arab spring], Dār al-Farā’ībī, Beirut, 2014.

49 Ghassan Salāmē (Dir.): Op. Cit

50 This was the main objective of Mohamed Arkoun, Muhammad Ābid al-Jābīrī, Abdallah Larou and many others working on the reinterpretation of the Islamic heritage, in order to downplay the rising litteralist tradition.

51 In our recent papers, we discovered that one key condition for the democratic change was that the most representative oppositional actors agreed on democracy as a fundamental matrix for every political regime and not only as a mean to reach government: Fouad Nohra: « Jordanie, Égypte, Yémen, l’ingénierie constitutionnelle du pouvoir face aux dynamiques oppositionnelles » [Jordan, Egypt, Yemen: Constitutional engineering and oppositional dynamics], Enjeux Diplomatiques et Stratégiques, Economica, Paris 2010, pp. 130-146.

52 Elena Lazarou, Maria Gianniou, Gerasimos Tsourapas: « The limits of norms promotion, the EU in Egypt and Israel/Palestine », Insight Turkey, Vol.15, n°2, 2013, pp. 171-193.


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