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NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE COMMISSION ON THE COMMUNITY'S ANTI-DUMPING

AND

ANTI-SUBSIDY ACTIVITIES

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NINTH ANNUAL REPORT¹ OF THE COMMISSION ON THE COMMUNITY'S
ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY ACTIVITIES²

INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted to the European Parliament following its Resolution of 16 December 1981 on the Community's anti-dumping activities³, and the more recent report of the European Parliament's Committee on External Economic Relations on the anti-dumping policy of the European Community⁴.

The report concentrates mainly on the Community's anti-dumping and anti-subsidy activities during 1990, but for the purpose of comparison, statistics for the years 1986 to 1989 are also given. This report also includes an analysis of anti-dumping actions over the last decade and their effect on trade.

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- 1 Previous reports were given in COM(83)519 final/2; COM(84)721 final; COM(86)308 final; COM(87)178 final; COM(88)92 final; COM(89)106 final; COM(90)229 final and SEC(91)92 final.
 - 2 In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88, OJ No L 209 of 02.08.1988, p. 1, and Commission Decision No. 2424/88/ECSC, OJ No L 209 of 02.08.1988, p. 18
 - 3 OJ No C 11, 18.01.1982, p. 37.
 - 4 PE 141.178/fin of 30.11.1990, rapporteur: Mr. Gijs DE VRIES

TABLE 1

Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations
during the period 1 January to 31 December 1990

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Investigations in progress at the beginning of the period	44	21	39	53	60
Investigations initiated during the period	24	39	40	27	43
Investigations in progress during the period	68	60	79	80	103
Investigations terminated by:					
- imposition of definitive duty	4	9	18	10	18
- acceptance of price undertaking	25	8	-	5	9
- determination of no dumping	4	-	-	-	-
- determination of no subsidisation	-	-	-	-	-
- determination of no injury	7	4	5	5	13
Terminated for other reasons	7	-	3	-	4
Total investigations concluded during the period	47	21	26	20	44
Investigations in progress at the end of the period	21	39	53	60	59
Provisional duties imposed during the period	6	13	28	10	23

ANTI-DUMPING ANTI-SUBSIDY INVESTIGATIONS

2.1. Initiations

The number of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations initiated and concluded by the Community in the years 1986 to 1990 are summarized in Table 1 above, and details of the individual actions taken in 1990 are given in the annexes to this report.

It will be seen from Table 1 that 43 investigations were initiated by the Commission in 1990, compared with 27 in 1989, 39 in 1987 and 24 in 1986. This is somewhat higher than the average number of investigations of 35 per year over the last five years, but it may be partially explained by the unusually low number initiated in 1989. Details of the investigations initiated in 1990 are given in Annex A.

The number of investigations in progress at the beginning of 1990 was high, but efforts were made to reduce the figure and these were reflected in the higher number of investigations concluded during the year. In addition, a slightly lower number of investigations was in progress at the end of the period despite the high number of proceedings initiated during the year.

2.2. MEASURES

2.2.1. Imposition of provisional and definitive duties

Table 1 shows that 23 provisional duties and 18 definitive duties were imposed in 1990. This marks a distinct increase when compared with the 6 provisional and 4 definitive duties applied in 1986, but the increase over 1989 can be largely explained by the higher number of investigations in progress and concluded during 1990. Details of the provisional and definitive duties imposed in 1990 are given in Annexes B and C respectively.

2.2.2. Acceptance of price undertakings

Table 1 also shows that the Commission accepted 9 price undertakings in 1990. The figures for undertakings in Table 1 are slightly understated, as they reflect only those cases concluded solely by undertakings. In fact, some cases were concluded both by the acceptance of undertakings and the imposition of duties. These cases are included in Table 1 under duties imposed, but the investigations in question are identified in Annex C. Details of the investigations concluded solely by the acceptance of price undertakings during 1990 are given in Annex D.

In fact, there has been some decline in the number of undertakings accepted by the Commission over the last few years. Despite this, however, the Community still accepts more price undertakings than the other three main users of the anti-dumping instrument, that is Australia, Canada and the USA. As can be seen from Table 1 the Commission concluded 47 investigations by undertakings out of the total of 159 new cases initiated over the last five years. This compares with the position in Australia, Canada and the USA where few if any price undertakings are accepted. It should be borne in mind, however, that the system is different in these countries to the extent that, in effect, they apply minimum price duties which have consequences similar to price undertakings.

The Community's readiness to accept price undertakings is for several reasons. Anti-dumping and countervailing action is intended to remove the injury suffered by the domestic industry rather than to raise revenue or to penalize exporters because of their past pricing behaviour. The GATT Anti-dumping Code also states that the authorities "shall" explore the possibilities of "constructive remedies" before applying anti-dumping duties in the case of developing countries. In this context it should be noted that 75% of the undertakings currently in force concern non-market economy or developing countries.

Of course, the acceptance of price undertakings can only be justified where it is administratively possible to secure its observance and to carry out effective monitoring. For this task the Community's services have set up a separate section to deal with the monitoring of undertakings.

Recently the Community's policy of accepting price undertakings as a solution to injurious dumping has come under some criticism. The critics allege that undertakings can encourage collusion between foreign exporters and/or complainants to charge prices that are higher than would normally be the case. This collusion could occur either in the form of an export cartel or by Community producers aligning their prices to undertaking levels.

In fact, the Commission makes every effort to prevent undertakings being abused in that way. Therefore, the contents of undertakings are only treated on a strictly confidential basis and are never disclosed by the Commission to the complainants or other interested parties. Generally, the undertaking prices are fixed for each exporter on the basis of its dumping margin or its contribution to the injury. In addition it is difficult to see why price undertakings should tend to result in the cartelization of a market given that in the normal situation competition can still be maintained because of the existence of competing Community producers and other exporters who are not required to raise their prices. It is also less than clear why these competitors would consider it in their interest to collude with the dumpers and raise their prices to undertaking levels. It would seem more rational for them to regain the market share they had lost by charging prices below those set out in the undertakings.

In any event, in contrast to the above rather theoretical allegations, the Commission has in practice never received concrete evidence about any such abuse of price undertakings.

2.2.3 Injury Threshold

In accordance with Article 13.3 of Regulations 2423/88 and 2424/88, the amount of the anti-dumping or countervailing duties imposed should be less than the margin of dumping if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury. This requirement to apply an "injury threshold", follows a provision in to the GATT Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Codes which, unfortunately, has been virtually ignored by other signatories.

The obligation thus imposed on the Community requires a thorough investigation into the following points :

- the dumping or subsidy margin of each exporter
- the global injury suffered by the Community industry from the dumped or subsidised imports
- an individual assessment for each exporter of the measure which would remove the injury.

These calculations, to the benefit of exporters and consumers, involve substantial investigation, particularly as the findings can be subject to appeal to the European Court of Justice. This extra burden, which is also applied to undertakings, is one of the main reasons why Community investigations tend to take longer than those of other signatories.

During the period 1981 to 1990 the level of more than 50% of the duties imposed has been lower than the margin of dumping found, for all or part of the exporters. Thus, it can be said with certainty that the application of the "injury threshold" has resulted in a considerable reduction in prices for both importers and consumers as compared to the result if the full dumping or subsidy margins had been imposed. It has allowed the exporters concerned to remain on the Community market and has lowered the costs to consumers to the minimum which is absolutely necessary.

2.4. INVESTIGATIONS TERMINATED WITHOUT THE APPLICATION OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Investigations are promptly concluded without measures when no dumping or injury is found. Also, in certain cases, investigations may be concluded when measures would not be in the Community interest, or following the withdrawal of the complaint. In 1990, 17 investigations were concluded without measures, 13 due to findings of no injury and 4 due to the withdrawal of the complaint. The increased number of cases closed on a finding of no injury in 1990 can be explained by the high number of investigations concluded during the year. In fact, due to the high standards of initiation, closures because of no injury have remained relatively steady in relation to total closures over the last five years. Details of the investigations terminated without measures are given in Annexes E and F.

2.5. BREAKDOWN OF INVESTIGATIONS BY COUNTRY OF EXPORT AND BY PRODUCT SECTOR

In the five-year period from 1986 to 1990, 173 investigations were initiated involving imports from 38 countries. The countries most involved were Korea, China and Japan with 19, 18 and 17 investigations respectively. In 1990, 43 investigations were initiated involving imports from 17 countries. The investigations initiated over the last five years are broken down by country of export in Annex G.

The investigations initiated in the years 1986 to 1990 are broken down by product sector in Annex H. This shows that, over the period, the sectors most involved are those of chemicals and textiles and that in 1990, there was a significant increase in cases involving textiles and steel.

2.6. NOTABLE CASES IN 1990

2.6.1. Compact Discs from Japan and South Korea

On 17 January 1990, a definitive anti-dumping duty varying from 8.3% to 32% was imposed on imports of certain compact disc players (CDPs) originating in South Korea and Japan.

With regard to dumping, the investigation was complicated by the fact that the exporters sold on both the domestic and export markets through several different sales channels, and care had to be taken to ensure that prices for each category of customers were compared at the same level of trade. Following a difficult and protracted investigation, substantial dumping margins were established for the Korean and Japanese exporters.

With regard to injury, the investigation showed that total sales in the Community market increased by a factor of 13 to more than three million units between 1984 and the investigation period, reflecting the fact that this was a new and expanding product. During the same period the dumped imports had increased to 2.289.912 units, approximately a 23-fold increase in volume as compared with only a five-fold increase of Community producers' sales. The share of the Community market held by Japanese and South Korean imports during the same period had increased from just under half to more than two-thirds while the Community industry share fell from over half to less than one third. Consequently, the Community producers had suffered severe market share losses in a rapidly growing market. Their prices were depressed and/or undercut causing severe losses which, for the investigation period, were around 30% of turnover. These considerable losses had posed a serious threat to the continued existence of this industry which, in fact, was the main inventor and developer of the product concerned.

As can be seen from the above, the facts established by the Commission concerning CDPs were similar to those found in respect of other important products with a decisive influence on a whole range of closely related technologies and products, i.e. typewriters, photocopiers, printers, video tape recorders, etc.

After considering the general Community interest, the Commission concluded that it was in the Community's long-term interest to eliminate the injurious effects of the dumped imports on the Community industry, and that the benefits of such protection clearly outweighed any short-term effects, particularly on price, which could be argued not to be in the interest of the consumer. In a number of cases, the duties imposed did not reflect the full dumping margins established due to the feature of Community legislation under which duties are limited to what is necessary to remove the injury.

2.6.2. DRAMs from Japan

On 25 January 1990, the Commission adopted a regulation accepting eleven price undertakings from all known Japanese DRAM exporters to the EC and imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty against exporters from which undertakings were not received.

The products which were under investigation were certain types of microcircuits known as dynamic random access memories (DRAMs) of all densities and types i.e. whether assembled in processed wafer or die form of all MOS technologies and irrespective of technical properties. DRAMs are highly standardized volatile memory products which are used in great quantities in computers, telecommunications products and other high-tech applications.

The comparison of Japanese domestic prices (or domestic costs of production, plus reasonable profit) with prices to the Community, showed dumping margins which varied between 8.5% and 206%.

With regard to injury, the investigation showed that the Japanese market share of the EC market increased from 24.6% in 1983 to 70.5% in 1987, peaking at 81.1% in 1986 on a unit basis. DRAM prices on the EC and world markets had decreased significantly prior to and during the period under investigation. This acute price decline was much greater than could have been expected from economies of scale and the learning curve effect. It was also found that planned production of EC producers would have represented a significant share of the total EC market from 1986 onwards but, because of the low level of prices prevailing, available production capacity had never been utilized for commercial production, and planned increases in production capacities had been curtailed. This situation resulted in a negative impact on the financial situation of the Community industry and important capital investments prior to and during the investigation period had proved useless and had led to a substantial negative cash flow.

In deciding whether the Community interest could justify that anti-dumping measures should be taken, the Commission weighed the interest of the DRAM user industry against the interests of the complainant companies. The Commission took the view that a viable Community DRAM industry would contribute to a strong Community electronics industry overall. This was because DRAMs served as a technology driver for other more complex semiconductors which are key components for the data processing, telecommunications and automotive industries.

Also, the availability of the most advanced technology in DRAM production would not only improve the competitiveness of this industry, but also that of the downstream electronics industry. Furthermore a viable Community DRAM industry will provide an alternative source of supply to the Community electronics industry, thus reducing dependence on the dominant Japanese DRAM producers. This latter aspect was considered essential given the fact that Japanese producers were generally vertically integrated and also manufactured the end products which competed with those produced by the Community electronics industry.

In conclusion, the Commission considered that on the basis of its findings, the Community interest called for granting protection to the Community DRAM industry to ensure that it could develop in a fair market environment. However, given the particularities of the DRAM industry, characterized by short life cycle products, volatile and rapidly declining costs and prices and the price development since the investigation period, the Commission considered that in the interest of the Community, the necessary protection should be given by means of a measure which could be suitably tailored to follow the dynamics of the DRAM industry without causing unnecessary hindrance to the user industries. It was, in fact, of vital interest that these measures would not have the effect of placing EC DRAM users in a position of competitive disadvantage. In this respect, it was considered that price undertakings by the Japanese exporters constituted the most appropriate measure to solve this case since they would provide more flexibility than duties. Therefore, the Commission accepted undertakings from all eight Japanese exporters which fully cooperated in the investigation and also from three other Japanese exporters, thus covering practically all known Japanese DRAM exporters to the EC.

The aim of the price undertakings was to constitute a safety net against the recurrence of massive dumping on the EC DRAM market. At the same time, the conditions of the undertakings took account of the legitimate interests of the user industries in obtaining DRAMs at competitive prices. To achieve these objectives, the undertakings provided for minimum prices per density based on weighted average cost of production for the cheapest device type, and a modest profit margin of approximately 5% on turnover.

Reference prices in the undertakings at the time of acceptance, and subsequently, were significantly below current market prices. These minimum prices are revised quarterly on the basis of the most up to date cost of production data provided by the Japanese producers. This allows the user industries to benefit from subsequent cost reductions which, in this sector, can be considerable.

It should be recalled that this anti-dumping case followed two similar procedures carried out by the US authorities in 1985/86 against Japanese exporters of DRAMs to the US. These were terminated with an agreement establishing minimum prices for the US market. The Commission is aware that the expiration of the US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement and the suspension agreements concluded between the Japanese DRAM exporters and the US administration, which are due to occur in September 1991, might also significantly affect the EC DRAM market situation. Therefore, the Commission is prepared to review the measures adopted in the event of an effective and definitive termination of the US measures concerning DRAMs from Japan in September 1991.

2.6.3. Small screen colour televisions from South Korea

On 27 April 1990 a definitive anti-dumping duty was imposed on Korean-manufactured small screen colour televisions (SCTVs) imported into the Community. The duties ranged from 10.2% to 19.6%.

The products covered by the Regulation were all SCTVs with an integral picture tube with a diagonal screen measurement of not more than 42 centimetres. Dumping was determined by comparing weighted average domestic prices in Korea with export prices to the Community of equivalent models. Where no equivalent model could be found on the domestic market for a given export model,

the representative domestic price or "normal value" was established by adding a reasonable profit margin to the costs of producing and selling each model. This procedure was also used to establish normal value for those models exported in considerable quantities to proprietary brand ("OEM") customers in the Community, since no equivalent channel of sale was found to exist on the Korean market. Where exporters sold to the Community through related importers, the price between the related companies was disregarded and the export price was reconstructed as if the sale had been made to an independent importer.

With regard to injury, it was established that, unlike other consumer electronics products which had been subject to anti-dumping measures, such as VCRs and compact disc players (CDPs), a colour television was not a new product but one which was at a mature point on its technology curve. Nevertheless, the SCTV sector of the market was relatively fast growing - from 4 million units in 1984 to 6.4 million in the period investigated, a rise of 60%. In the same period, Korean exports to the Community expanded from 23.000 units to 781.000 units, a 34-fold increase. This represented the Korean market share rising from zero to 12%, while the Community producers' share had fallen by 15% (to 46%). In addition to losing market share to the Korean exporters, the Community producers were found to have suffered considerable price depression, as well as price undercutting ranging between 1% and 39%.

The Community producers had also undergone losses in profitability, but these had been limited to some extent by the radical rationalisation measures adopted by the industry. Unfortunately, these defensive measures, which included relocation of assembly outside the Community, also involved a loss of over 1000 jobs in the industry during the period investigated.

In order to establish whether the general Community interest required that measures should not be applied, despite the combined presence of dumping and related material injury, the Commission had to weigh two main sets of interest: those of producers and those of consumers. After careful consideration, it was concluded that in this case the benefits of protective measures for the producers outweighed the possibility of very limited and short-term benefits for the consumers.

The Regulation points out that, in the absence of measures to counter the injury caused by dumped imports, the Community SCTV Industry could disappear, with further substantial job losses. This in turn, by seriously damaging the television industry's general market base, would weaken its potential further development even in the large screen sector, and this at a crucial time, given the current advance towards high definition television technology. There would be knock-on effects for the development and commercial exploitation of other new consumer electronics technologies, such as VCRs and laser video disc players, as well as for the general electronics components industry.

Account was taken of the fact that the application of anti-dumping duties, even if only to a part of the SCTVs imported into the Community, could have price implications for the consumer in the short term. The Commission considered, however, that the gravity of the situation of the Community industry caused by the injurious dumping outweighed the important consumer interests involved. Indeed, in view of the large - and still increasing - number of sources for this product, both within and outside the Community, competition and consumer choice between the various suppliers was unlikely to be materially reduced.

In assessing the levels of duties to be applied, the Commission compared the dumping margins with an injury threshold conservatively evaluated in terms of the high undercutting by Korean exporters on the EC market.

2.6.4. Halogen Lamps from Japan

On 20 July 1990, the Commission imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan. Though the duties ranged from 71.7% to 85.4%, they were less than the dumping margins found as lower duties were considered sufficient to remove the injury.

The investigation, which established considerable dumping margins, showed that the Community market for halogen lamps had expanded considerably, with sales increasing from 5.400.000 units in 1985 to 22.200.000 units in 1989. The volume of Japanese imports had risen from 1.800.000 units in 1985 to 13.464.000 (ECU 21.3 million) in 1989, a 640% increase, which brought the market share of Japanese exports up from 33% to over 60%, thus placing them in a very strong position in the market.

In the same period, the market share held by the Community industry fell from 56% to 29%. In response to these massive imports at prices which had dropped consistently since 1985 and undercut European prices on average by over 30%, the Community industry was forced to charge similarly low prices in order to maintain its market presence. As a result, all the producers made significant losses and the situation of the Community industry had been seriously jeopardized.

It was, therefore, decided to impose a provisional anti-dumping duty set on the basis of the minimum price required for the industry to face up to its exporting competitors within a framework of fair competition to enable it to recover its market share, improve its financial situation and plan long-term development. It was considered that maintaining several competing suppliers on the Community market was in the interest of both the users of the product, whether industry or consumers, and the manufacturing industry itself.

2.6.5. Audio tape in cassettes from Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea

On 13 November 1990, the Commission imposed provisional anti-dumping duties ranging between 0.4% and 80.20% on imports of certain audio tapes in cassettes from Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea.

In general, the normal value in these countries was established on the basis of actual prices and these were compared to export prices to the Community. This comparison showed, in most cases, considerable margins of dumping.

For injury, the investigation showed an expanding market, but one in which the dumped imports had risen at a faster rate than consumption i.e. from 154 million units in 1985 to 212 million units in 1988 (a 38% increase). Consequently, the Community producers lost market share and suffered reduced selling prices and substantial losses, and this despite having rationalized their operations.

Therefore, not only was the profitability of the Community industry impaired by the forced reduction in prices and contraction in sales volume , but also through a downgrading of its products in the eyes of the consumer. This occurred because its losses had meant that it lacked the financial means to defend its brand name and maintain access to the more reputable channels of distribution or to invest sufficiently in the promotion and design of its products. This trend was accelerated by the reduction of economies of scale caused by the contraction of its sales.

It was considered necessary to eliminate the dumping which had caused injury to the Community industry and thus re-establish a situation of open and fair competition on the Community market, which is fundamentally in the general Community interest. While

the Commission recognized that the imposition of anti-dumping duties could affect the price levels of the exporters concerned in the Community and could subsequently influence the relative competitiveness of their products, it did not expect competition on the Community market to be reduced by the taking of anti-dumping measures. On the contrary, the removal of the unfair advantages gained through dumping would help to prevent the decline of the Community industry and thus would maintain the availability of a wide choice of products and thereby strengthen competition.

2.6.6. Aspartame from Japan and the U.S.A.

On the 29 November 1990, the Commission imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of aspartame from Japan and the U.S.A. The duty was ECU 29.96 per kilogram for Japan and ECU 27.55 per kilogram for the U.S.A. These margins were much less than the level of injury provisionally established.

Aspartame is a sweetening ingredient with a taste profile similar to sugar but considerably smaller calorific value. It is mainly used in the soft drink, food and dairy industries. Aspartame is also used in the table top market i.e. in the form of low calorie tablets and powder used to sweeten coffee and tea.

One of the important issues in this case was whether the Commission should use the domestic prices in the USA as a basis for normal value since, on the US market, NutraSweet, the US exporter, enjoyed patent protection while on the Community market this patent had lapsed. In the event, the Commission decided to use domestic prices as a basis for normal value on the grounds that injurious price discrimination is a practice which is condemned by EC and international law irrespective of the reasons and motives underlying such discrimination. In any event, it was not for the Commission to check whether the patent protection, which had expired in the Community, was still justified in the U.S. A patent is no justification for injurious dumping on

overseas markets. A patent holder cannot claim to be obliged to practice higher prices domestically than for export sales. Such a practice is entirely a free commercial decision on the part of the exporter concerned. The investigation carried out by the Commission revealed the existence of dumping for the US exporter which exceeded 100%.

As regards injury caused to the Community industry, the Commission found that, although the EC producer increased its sales and market share from nothing when it entered the market in 1988, it was faced with price undercutting by the US and Japanese exporters which forced it to reduce its prices to remain on the market. This had seriously affected the industry insofar as the losses had reached such a dimension that they directly threatened the viability of the industry concerned. The Commission was also of the opinion that, unless measures were taken, the Community would be entirely dependent on one source of supply i.e. the imports from Japan and the USA through a company located in Switzerland which was jointly owned by the two exporters concerned.

Although the Commission accepted that the effect of the anti-dumping duty would be to increase the price of aspartame to the end user industry in the short term, it was of the opinion that it was in the Community's general interest to eliminate the injurious effects of the dumped imports and thus maintain the presence of two sources of supply for this important product

3. REVIEWS

The Regulations and Decisions imposing anti-dumping or countervailing duties and the Decisions to accept price undertakings may be subject to review under the provisions of Article 14 of the basic legislation. Although these reviews may be opened by the Commission on its own initiative, or at the request of a Member State, they are generally opened following a request from an interested party which may only be made once the measure has been in force for 12 months on the grounds of changed circumstances.

In addition to the Article 14 reviews, Article 15 of the basic legislation also provides for the expiry of anti-dumping measures after a period of five years from the date on which they entered into force, unless the Community industry is able to demonstrate that the expiry of the measure would again lead to injury or the threat of injury. The effectiveness of this provision can be shown by the fact that since its entry into force in 1985, over 75% of the measures to which it has been applied have been allowed to expire.

The number of both Article 14 and Article 15 reviews which were initiated in 1990 is shown in Table 2 below, together with the number concluded and their outcome. For the purpose of comparison, the table also includes figures for the previous four years.

Details of review investigations initiated in 1990 are given in Annex I, and details of reviews concluded are given in Annexes J to N. In addition, details of the measures which expired without investigation are given in Annex O.

T A B L E 2

Reviews of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations
during the period 1 January 1986 to 31 December 1990

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Reviews in progress at the beginning of the period	20	27	11	20	15
Reviews opened during the period	24	8	24	17	26
Reviews in progress during the period	44	35	35	37	41
Reviews concluded by:					
- imposition of definitive duty in lieu of price undertaking	1	7	4	4	6
- amendment of definitive duty	7	8	-	4	2
- suspension of definitive duty	-	1	-	-	-
- acceptance of price undertaking in lieu of definitive duty	1	1	3	-	1
- amendment of price undertaking	2	4	2	1	-
- repeal or expiry of definitive duty	2	2	1	9	6
- repeal or expiry of price undertaking	3	-	5	4	5
- no change of the measures in force	1	1	-	-	-
Total reviews terminated during the period	17	24	15	22	20
Reviews in progress at the end of the period	27	11	20	15	21
Provisional duties imposed during the reviews	8	-	7	1	-

