REPORT

drawn up on behalf of the
Committee on Development and Cooperation

on the granting of emergency aid
to Vietnam

Rapporteur: Mr X. DENIAU
At its sitting of 19 February 1982 the European Parliament referred the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Balfe and others (Doc. 1-890/81/rev.), pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure, to the Committee on Development and Cooperation as the committee responsible and to the Political Affairs Committee for an opinion.

At its meeting of 18 May 1982 the committee decided to draw up a report and appointed Mr Deniau rapporteur.

The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 20 January and 26 January 1983. At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution as a whole by 18 votes to 3 with 8 abstentions.

The following took part in the vote: Mr Poniatowski, chairman; Mr Bersani, first vice-chairman; Mr Deniau, rapporteur; Mrs Castellina, Mr Vankerkhoven, Mr Narducci, Mr Cohen, Mrs Dury, Mr Enright, Mr Lomas (deputizing for Mr Kühn), Mr Lezzi, Mr G. Fuchs, Mrs Focke, Mrs Pruvot (deputizing for Mr Sablè), Mr Vergeer, Mr Wedekind, Mr Deschamps (deputizing for Mrs Rabbethge), Mr Wawrzik, Mr de Courcy Ling, Mr C. Jackson, Mr Pearce, Mr Kellett-Bowman (deputizing for Sir Henry Plumb), Mr Sherlock, Mr Ferrero, Mrs Carettoni Romagnoli, Mr Vandewiele (deputizing for Mrs Cassanmagnago Cerretti), Mr Albers (deputizing for Mr Fellermaier), Mrs Baduel Glorioso (deputizing for Mr Denis), Mr Segre (deputizing for Mr Vergés) and Mr Key (deputizing for Mr Loo).

The opinion of the Political Affairs Committee is attached.
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The Committee on Development and Cooperation hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement:

**MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION**

on the granting of emergency aid to Vietnam

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr BALFE, Mr LOMAS and others (Doc. 1-890/81/rev.),
- having regard to Petitions 16/81, 17/81 and 34/81,
- having regard to the resolution of 3 October 1981 of the main non-governmental organizations of the Community,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and Cooperation and the opinion of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 1-1270/82),

A - whereas Vietnam was one of the main recipients of Community food aid until 1979 when such aid was suspended after Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia,

B - regretting that the withdrawal of these troops, called for inter alia by the United Nations, has still not taken place;

C - condemning the activities of Vietnamese forces in neighbouring countries;

D - calling upon the Foreign Ministers of the European Community meeting in political cooperation to take all appropriate diplomatic initiatives to enable Cambodia to recover its full sovereignty,

E - whereas the decision to grant emergency aid and emergency food aid has always been independent of any consideration relating to the policies of the governments concerned, but must, in principle, be subject to guarantees that it is used for the purposes intended;

F - whereas the Community has received a number of requests for emergency food and medical aid for Vietnam from non-governmental organizations, UNICEF and the World Food Programme,

G - whereas emergency medical aid was granted by the Commission in

- 5 -
December 1981 and December 1982 and distributed by international and non-governmental organizations,

H - whereas four provinces of Vietnam which have on a number of occasions suffered severe damage by hurricanes since 1978, have once again been struck by Hurricane Nancy, and whereas the United Nations have launched an appeal for aid,

1. Requests that the Community, where necessary, consider the possibility of giving substantial emergency aid and emergency food aid, as it does towards other countries in comparable circumstances;

2. Requests the Community to make sure that the Vietnamese Government formally agrees that the granting of such aid shall be subject to strict guarantees regarding distribution;

3. Insists therefore that such aid should be distributed by international or non-governmental organizations which at present offer the best guarantees of adequate distribution inter alia indicating clearly that this aid has come from the EEC, and be granted to those in greatest need;

4. Calls upon the Vietnamese Government, before any new action is taken by the Community, to provide concrete evidence of its real willingness to satisfy the humanitarian preoccupations of the governments of the Community regarding divided families of Vietnamese origin, members of which reside on their territory;

5. Invites the Commission, once these conditions have been met, to submit a proposal on this matter to the Council at an early date;

6. Expresses its wish that the Commission and Council will act accordingly;

7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission.
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

INTRODUCTION

This report offers Parliament a unique opportunity to address a fundamental issue of development policy: whether or not emergency food aid, or any other form of humanitarian aid, should be made subject to political considerations. The initial issue addressed by the report is the granting of emergency aid and notably food aid, to Vietnam, but it is obvious that it masks the broader and fundamental policy issue of emergency aid and its uses in general. Food aid is and always has been regarded as humanitarian aid intended to reach those people who are in need of it, regardless of the policies pursued by a particular government. However, humanitarian and political motives cannot always be easily divorced, and in the case of Vietnam the country's recent history has shown just how difficult it can be to put such principles into practice. It is the conviction of your rapporteur that granting emergency and food aid to Vietnam, provided certain key preconditions are met, would make an important contribution to relieving suffering inside that country while at the same time favouring an evolution of the political situation in South East Asia.

VIETNAM AND THE COMMUNITY: A BRIEF HISTORICAL NOTE

The Distribution of Community Food Aid

2. Community grants of food aid are made either directly or indirectly. Direct aid means that the distribution of supplies is carried out by the government in question. Indirect aid, on the other hand, is distributed through international organizations - the most important of which is the World Food Programme (WFP) - and by various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as OXFAM, CARITAS, and many others.

The Community has often resorted to distributing emergency food aid as well as regular food aid indirectly when making grants to so-called sensitive countries, such as Laos, Chile, Cuba, Haiti, Israeli-occupied Jordan, Gaza, the Sinai and Palestinian refugees. (see Annex I)

Community practice in such cases is dictated by two motives: the first is that international organization in general and NGOs in particular, when smaller quantities of food aid are involved, offer reasonable guarantees
in respect of proper distribution, and can often carry on monitoring in the field; the second is that aid channeled through international organizations and NGOs is more politically palatable than aid given directly to governments. This is how the EEC was able to resume food aid shipments to Chile just a few weeks after the Allende government was overthrown by a military coup.

The Community's basic policy has been not to increase suffering and hardship by cutting off supplies of food and medical aid where an emergency situation prevails, whether it be created by political changes or natural calamities.

The Case of Vietnam

3. There is little general awareness of the degree to which Vietnam was one of the major recipients of the Community's food aid until its suspension in the summer of 1979.

With regard to indirect aid covering the period 1969-1979, Vietnam was the fifth most important recipient of butteroil, the third most important recipient of milk powder, and again the fifth most important for cereals. With respect to direct and indirect aid combined for the three year period preceding suspension, (1977-1979), Vietnam received a total of 251,341 tonnes of cereals, amounting to an average of 80,000 tonnes per year. (See Annexes II and III)

This aid was distributed both indirectly and directly, under the general guidance and supervision of a special ministry called AIDRECEP which is in charge of coordinating the receipt and delivery of any type of aid to Vietnam.

At the time, Vietnam had received 2.7 m ECUs of project aid, granted under the Community's programme of technical and financial assistance for the non-associated developing countries. A technical mission from the Commission of the European Communities visited Vietnam at the end of 1978 to explore the possibilities of granting further project aid, and it also investigated distribution conditions in view of the amounts of Community food aid being provided.
The mission reached the conclusion that the food aid was being distributed properly, owing doubtlessly to the fact that Vietnam is equipped with a particularly efficient administration, especially in comparison with most developing countries. NGOs operating in the field did not report any difficulties over monitoring of food aid and small development projects. The WFP also funded several major development projects during this period.

Vietnamese troops entered Kampuchea, overthrowing the Pol Pot regime in December 1978.

In July 1979, the European Council decided to suspend deliveries of direct food aid to Vietnam. It had been originally intended to resume deliveries of food aid after the convening of the special Geneva Conference on South East Asia, organised by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in July 1979; it will be recalled that on that occasion agreement was reached between the Vietnamese government and UNHCR providing for "orderly departures", thus putting an end to the massive exodus of boat people.

However, even though Vietnam had been allocated 79,000 tonnes of cereals under the 1979 Food Aid Programme, 7300 T of this original amount were allocated to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, to be distributed to the large number of Kampuchean refugees inside Vietnam, 42,100 T were allocated to Vietnamese refugees, and the balance was allocated to refugees in other parts of the world.

The Community was and still is one of the major donors to international relief programmes for refugees in S.E. Asia.

500 T of cereals were delivered to Vietnam in 1980; these were distributed by an NGO.

At The Hague in February 1981, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs decided to suspend any form of aid, including indirect aid.

Since then, the Community has only provided food aid for Kampuchean refugees living in camps, inside Vietnam, which are run by the High Commissioner for Refugees.

There is no written record of either decision. The issue of food and medical aid for Vietnam has been very much alive ever since.

Members of the European Parliament have put numerous written and oral questions to both the Commission and the Council of Ministers, as well as
to the Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation; petitions have been presented and several resolutions tabled in Parliament.

European NGOs concerned with humanitarian disaster emergency relief around the world met in Brussels in October 1981 and adopted a resolution urging the EEC to "release resources immediately to NGOs for use in the humanitarian relief of suffering in Vietnam."

Another important landmark was the report, drawn up in March of 1981 by the diplomatic representatives of the Nine in Hanoi under the Dutch Presidency, urging that a humanitarian gesture be made, especially in view of infant malnutrition in the country. This report was never discussed by Council.

Throughout this period, and especially in 1981 and 1982, the Commission received numerous requests from NGOs for medical aid, as well as food aid, and small projects were submitted for co-financing. All such applications have been turned down.

II THE PRESENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM

4. Since the summer of 1979 the Community has only provided emergency aid on two separate occasions: in December 1981 (value: 300,000 ECUs), and again in December 1982 (value: 375,000 ECUs).

The latter was in response to an appeal to donors launched by the United Nations Disaster and Relief Organisation (UNDRO) in the aftermath of widespread devastation caused by the typhoon "Nancy". Both operations comprised medical and relief supplies, but did not include any food aid.

The Food Situation

5. Vietnam suffers from both a chronic food deficit, as well as a critical shortage of medical supplies and equipment, even of the most rudimentary kind. This precarious situation is aggravated by typhoons and floods which visit Vietnam, often hitting the same central provinces, periodically.

Recent press reports and official government statements indicate that the food situation has improved, even though it is difficult to establish the accuracy of these reports. Nonetheless, thanks to a bumper harvest in the autumn of 1981 and a good crop in the spring of 1982, the situation has much improved. Current estimated needs for 1983 however, stand at 1.2 million tonnes.

This improvement should not be solely ascribed to better crops, but is also due to recently inaugurated government policy designed to introduce incentives for farmers, especially in the southern part of the country where collectivisation never really took hold. There has also been increasing application of methods of modern agronomy.

Widespread malnutrition, however, remains a severe problem, affecting children under the age of six and infants in particular. Infant mortality rates are quite high. Hunger is concentrated in the major cities, but also exists in the countryside in central and northern provinces.

The situation is exacerbated by the virtual absence of any medical supplies, as hospitals have no stocks.

Present Sources of Aid to Vietnam

6. United Nations and NGOs

Various NGOs are currently active in Vietnam; listed in order of importance the main ones are OXFAM U.K., OXFAM Belgique, and CARITAS Germanica.

OXFAM U.K. is without any doubt the most important NGO operating in the country: total grant allocations since October 1980 come to £823,194. It finances humanitarian development projects (21 are currently underway), and it has provided emergency food aid amounting to about 3,000 tonnes of rice. OXFAM was allowed to provide a member of staff to work in conjunction with AIDRECEP to be on hand for almost one month to monitor the reception and distribution of that food aid shipment. They have appointed an OXFAM representative for Vietnam to assess possible projects and monitor their aid by six-monthly visits to the country. OXFAM is satisfied with the operation of its programme, as it is primarily involved in small projects, working with small groups at the provincial, district, and village level. Its aid is consigned to specific groups and locations, and OXFAM has established to its satisfaction that its consignments have been properly delivered to its consignees.
Oxfam Belgique has three major programmes underway for a total value of 23 million Belgian francs. Two are development programmes which are being co-financed by the Belgian government, whilst the third is an emergency programme. It works in close conjunction with local officials in the field, and informs AIDRECEP of its activities. They have recently purchased 28,765 kg of powdered milk in Belgium as part of the abovementioned emergency programme; this will be distributed in Vietnam under the supervision of AIDRECEP together with the Ministry of Health.

Caritas Germanica has been aiding Vietnam since 1959, including former North Vietnam since 1967. The total value of the aid provided thus far is 40 million DM. There has not been any interruption in their activities. Caritas has specialised in the provision of medical material and hospital equipment, and recently it has also provided milk powder, which has been delivered directly to hospitals. They have not experienced any difficulties in monitoring the distribution and destination of their aid. At present, Caritas is looking for funds to fulfill lists of requests for medical equipment and supplies received from hospitals in Danang and Tam-Ky.

The most significant development to date with regard to project aid for Vietnam has been the WFP's recent approval of a major nutritional project. The Council for Food Aid Evaluation and Policies (the WFP governing body) had not approved any of the projects submitted for Vietnam since October 1979. WFP's activities had thus been confined to two emergency relief operations.

The project entails the direct distribution to local nurseries of supplementary food and feeding rations for nursing mothers and their babies. It involves the distribution of 40,000 tonnes of cereals, over a four year period. WFP fielded a mission to Vietnam in November 1982 to finalise the terms of the agreement to be signed between the WFP and the Vietnamese government. This mission will also appraise the WFP's contribution to relief efforts underway in the wake of the damage wrought by typhoon "Nancy", which has affected 1.9 million people in four provinces, and has destroyed 12% of expected paddy rice production, and 150,000 tonnes of other food crops.

The mission was a success, and the final agreement will include precise safeguard clauses - so that the aid extended can be monitored in compliance with the rules of the donor organization (in this case the WFP) - while also making special provision for frequent visits to the various sites by WFP field staff.
In the past, WFP food aid has been handed over by AIDRECEP to the relevant Ministry, and then went down the administrative line until it reached the project itself. It has recently been suggested that operations be fully decentralised so that the project authorities themselves assume full responsibility for the food immediately after reception by AIDRECEP.

7. Governmental and others

One of the most surprising aspects of the present state of affairs between Vietnam and the Community as such is the discrepancy between policies followed by member states of the Community at bilateral level, and the position adopted by them in Community decision-making bodies. This trend has been gathering force recently.

It has been documented by the Commission in replies to written questions tabled by members of the European Parliament, where it lists emergency aid operations as well as food aid granted by the Member States. (See questions No. 885/81, and 55/82). However, this accounts for only part of the picture. In fact, member states have been intensifying their relations with Vietnam through various ranges of commercial policy instruments. The following is a list of the position:

**Belgium:**

Credit of $25 million for the supply of locomotives and Belgian technical assistance. Co-financing of two development projects with OXFAM Belgique, one involving support for mobile medical units, the other for the development of fresh vegetables.

Three Member States have resumed deliveries of emergency food aid, distributed either by the WFP or NGOS, and one, France, has resumed deliveries of direct food aid. (See Annex IV for details).

Vietnam has also come within the orbit of major international institutions. The United Nation's Development Programme approved a 5-year aid plan, in May 1981, comprising a total of 54 projects, for the value of $100 million. The International Monetary Fund has provided assistance to the country in the management of the dong's devaluation. On January 9, 1981, the IMF approved a Vietnamese request for the purchase of a first credit tranche in SDRs equivalent to about $36 M, in support of the Government's economic and financial programme for the twelve month period ending in September 1981. In July 1982 the IMF was invited to Hanoi to discuss a request for a loan for balance of payments support. Vietnam had
vello bilaterale e la posizione da essa assunta in seno agli organismi decisionali della Comunità. Questa tendenza si è ulteriormente rafforzata ancora di recente.

Ciò è stato documentato dalla Commissione, in risposta ad alcune interro胥azioni scritte presentate da membri del Parlamento europeo, in cui essa elenca operazioni di aiuto di emergenza, come appunto l'aiuto alimentare concesso dagli Stati membri. (Vedansi le interro胥azioni n. 885/81 e 55/82). Tuttavia questo tiene conto solo di una parte del quadro generale. Di fatto, gli stati membri, hanno continuamente intensificato le loro relazioni con il Vietnam, tramite diversi tipi di strumenti di politica commerciale? Diamo qui un elenco delle varie posizioni:

**Belgio:**

Credito di 25 milioni di dollari per la fornitura di locomotive e di assistenza tecnica. Co-finanziamento di due progetti di sviluppo in cooperazione con l'OXFAM belga, uno dei quali comporta il sostegno ad unità mediche mobili, e l'altro il potenziamento della produzione di vegetali freschi.

Tre Stati membri hanno ripreso le forniture di aiuto alimentare d'urgenza, distribuite dal PAM o dalle ONG, e uno di essi, la Francia, ha ripreso le forniture di aiuto alimentare diretto. (Cfr. Allegato IV per i particolari).

Netherlands:

Revival of Dutch assistance to projects located in the Mekong Delta; total aid of $13 million, of which 6% as a grant.

United Kingdom:

Supply of turbines, and construction of vessels for an amount of $21 million under U.K. government direct assistance to British industry. Resumption of commercial negotiations.

Recent Trends in Vietnamese Domestic and Foreign Policy

8. Signsof an evolution of the political scene in Vietnam have emerged in the recent past, and winds of change have been blowing especially since the Party's Fifth Congress, held in Hanoi in March 1982. That congress signalled a move away from Soviet-style economic development, with its emphasis on centralization and rigid planning, and also introduced major changes in agricultural strategy. They constituted a triumph of pragmatism over dogmatism. Only time will tell whether they heralded a decisive shift in policy.

In agriculture the profit motive has been given new respectability, not only in the South, where collectivisation signally failed, but also in the northern part of the country. Under the flexible system recently introduced, farmers may now sell on the free market any produce above an agreed quota that is supplied to the government. Pandering to the profit motive has already resulted in 25% increase in the northern region's rice production for 1982, and is a major plank in the country's renewed efforts to achieve food self-sufficiency.

Moves towards decentralisation of government, with more responsibility being devolved at the provincial, district and village level are just as potentially significant. The experiences of NGOs and the WFP in the field bear witness to the government's desire to decentralise managerial responsibility and thus make optimal use of available resources, whether domestic or provided by international assistance.
Vietnam has also made tentative moves towards a more conciliatory foreign policy. Recent initiatives signal a two pronged approach directed at Western Europe and the ASEAN countries. Its ultimate purpose is to bring Vietnam out of its international isolation, in particular as far as Western countries are concerned, and by striving for progress, however piecemeal, in the political stalemate prevailing in South East Asia – to establish a measure of security enabling the country to devote more of its resources to rebuilding and to repairing the ravages of thirty years of war.

To this end, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nguyen Co Thach, embarked on a tour of European capitals in the spring of 1982, and met with Commissioner Pisanì. In July 1982 he made a much publicised announcement offering a partial withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. In making this gesture he dropped a condition that Thailand stop giving aid to Khmer Rouge guerillas fighting Vietnamese forces from bases along the Thai-Kampuchean border. The communiqué also made another interesting point: the Vietnamese backed government in Kampuchea does not require the UN to accept it as the Kampuchean representative if the Khmer Rouge were rejected.

In July 1982 he also visited Singapore and the Philippines, his first visit to the former since the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Later that same year he went on a tour of non-communist South East Asian countries.

There had been numerous contacts between Vietnamese and ASEAN Government Authorities throughout 1979 and 1980.

Replying to an oral question put in the European Parliament during the September sitting dealing with recent contacts between Vietnam and ASEAN as well as individual ASEAN countries, Commissioner Pisanì declared that the Commission regarded these events as important. Indeed, while it would be unrealistic to expect any major breakthrough to occur in that part of the world in the near future, the importance of some of the main antagonists speaking to each other cannot be played down.

Serious problems remain, however, especially in respect of Vietnam's relations with the Community. As a Comecon country, Vietnam does not recognise the Community officially, even though there have been meetings at the highest level, as mentioned above.
The reaction of informed observers as well as some of the ASEAN countries to the partial troop withdrawal offer ranged from outright scepticism to a cautious wait and see attitude. But then analysing any event of a political nature in South East Asia is much like peeling off the layers of skin of an onion: each successive layer seems to reveal yet another layer, and the core is buried deep inside. In much the same way the state of relations between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries sometimes seems to take on the features of a geo-political drama, defying mere political logic. However intractable or complex the politics of the present situation in South East Asia may be, the same cannot be said of relations between Vietnam and the EEC, for this is perhaps one area where more tangible progress could be made, if the will to do so existed, notably on the side of the Vietnamese.

III CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO A RESUMPTION OF EEC AID

9. It is regrettable that Vietnam has constituted the only prolonged instance of the breaching of the principle governing the distribution of emergency food aid: food aid is a humanitarian policy instrument designed to bring relief to populations, who are not responsible or punishable for the acts and deeds of governments.

This principle and its corollaries are clear, objective, and are a matter of public knowledge. They were summarised succinctly by Commissioner Pisani in a statement before the European Parliament, made on September 14, 1982: food aid is intended for populations, subject to controls to ensure it reaches them it must correspond to needs assessed according to objective criteria; ideological considerations should not come into play.

We endorse this clear statement of policy. It is our belief that Vietnam does meet these objective criteria, and we suggest that food aid be resumed subject to two conditions.

In Respect of Distribution and Monitoring

10. Food aid should not be supplied directly to the Vietnamese government. Any future deliveries of food aid to Vietnam should be handled by WFP, which because of its considerable experience and of its infrastructure in Vietnam, is the organisation best fitted to do the job.
The agreement to be signed between the WFP, the Vietnamese government and the Community should contain safeguard clauses providing for the strict monitoring of the distribution of the aid, making provision for suspension if the terms of the agreement are not adhered to. Special clauses should be included for periodic and frequent visits to the field. The actual terms of the agreement should be carefully negotiated and need to be spelled out in detail, so as not to leave any room for misunderstandings, for the requirements of aid donors sometimes vary and the government may not necessarily be aware of what the particular concerns of the Community in this respect might be.

**In Respect of Considerations of a Humanitarian Nature**

11. Steps towards an improvement of relations between Vietnam and the Community need to be taken by both sides, if they are to be effective and bear fruit. Humanitarian concern for Vietnam's severe food and health difficulties should be met by willingness on the part of the Vietnamese government to alleviate human suffering of another kind, caused by the presence of many Vietnamese refugees in the Community who have either relatives and/or members of the immediate family in Vietnam.

Our information makes it clear that the Vietnamese Government offers minimal facilities and generally refuses to reply when it is asked for information, correspondence, parcels and, a fortiori for meetings of divided families some members of whom are living on the territory of Member States of the Community.

If relations between Vietnam and the Community are to develop, the Vietnamese Government will have to provide meaningful evidence of comprehension and good will towards the humanitarian concern of the Member States in the Community and of the Community itself.

- The position of the Commission of the EEC

12. It is important to point out that on the resumption of aid the Commission's position has undergone various subtle but significant changes since May 1981. It has usually veered between two poles, claiming that resumption hinged on ensuring correct distribution, and/or on the general political situation in SouthEast Asia, and its evolution.
The President of the Commission declared in the spring of 1982 that food aid would not be resumed until the situation in Kampuchea was "settled".

These two ingredients in the Commission's position seem to be mixed in various proportions, in much the same way that a recipe is altered to suit changing needs. Their relative importance is also subject to an evolutionary process of its own. The Commission's latest pronouncements, both dated 27 July 1982 (in replies to Written Questions 1967/81 and 55/82) seem to indicate that the correct distribution factor is now slightly less important than the political one. More significant is the most recent statement, contained in the reply to Written Question 347/82 and dated September 1982 where the Commission attaches some importance to the Vietnamese government's intention to proceed to a partial withdrawal of troops, and also refers to the improved food situation inside the country. The evolution of those two factors, it states, will determine whether a proposal for resumption will be tabled in future.

IV. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND VIETNAM: RENEWING A RELATIONSHIP

13. Vietnam is a country whose links to the Community stretch back in time, and the relationship has grown and evolved through time, until recent events have swept that and much else aside. Nonetheless, let it be recalled that when Vietnam emerged from nearly three decades of strife saddled with immense needs, the Community succoured Vietnam and became one of its biggest donors of food aid. The Community recognised the scale of human suffering of the Vietnamese people, and responded as it has done before and will doubtless do again when similar situations arise.

The road back to normality, a concept perhaps now almost alien to a country like Vietnam, is long, slow, painful, and full of pitfalls and bends, and perhaps the Vietnamese government has not yet fully decided just how real is its determination to travel down that road. One might conjecture that from the government's point of view, it feels that it cannot afford to plunge ahead in that direction given present circumstances. But nonetheless the hallmarks of a desire for change are there.

Vietnam is taking the first faltering steps to break out of its isolation, and undoubtedly is actively canvassing for aid from any source. The past few years of close alliance with the Soviet Union have served to
highlight the limits of Soviet aid, as well as the burden of dependence and
over-reliance on Soviet style economic models. The Soviet Union, as might
be expected, is still publicly referred to as the comrade country, and
solidarity and cooperation with the Soviet Union is the declared cornerstone
of their external policy (statement at the Fifth Party Congress of March 1982),
but alongside the traditional rhetoric the Vietnamese government has also
made it plain that it wishes to reenter the international arena, and that it
is particularly interested in a long-term evolution towards renewed cooperation
with the Community. Other developing countries in other parts of the world
have travelled down the same

Let there not be, however, any misunderstanding that it is the
Community's intention to play the role of political arbiter in South East Asia.

If food aid and medical aid are provided subject to the conditions
set out above, and if the experience is a successful one, creating a climate of
mutual trust and confidence, then there would be scope for the financing of
development projects and other forms of cooperation.

CONCLUSIONS

14. The key policy issue attached to the question of emergency food and medical
aid for Vietnam should not and cannot be avoided any longer.

The principle governing emergency food aid, that it should be granted to those in need
of it regardless of the political colour, complexion and policy of governments
needs to be reaffirmed and upheld. Provided strict guarantees in respect of
distribution - here in particular, but in every country where food aid is
distributed - are secured, and provided that the Vietnamese government takes the
humanitarian concerns described in the foregoing into account, then there is no
legitimate or defensible reason why emergency food and medical aid should not be
supplied to Vietnam.
## ANNEX I

**FOOD AID GRANTED TO THE POPULATIONS OF 'SENSITIVE' COUNTRIES SINCE 1978**

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(1) C: Cereals  
M: Milk powder  
Bo: Butteroil

**Source:** Commission of the European Communities
### COUNTRIES IN RECEIPT OF HIGHEST ABSOLUTE QUANTITIES OF FOOD AID

#### a) Direct aid 1969 to 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Butteroil Tonnage</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Milk Powder Tonnage</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cereals Tonnage</th>
<th>%</th>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>(55 countries)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>322 000</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>5 962 440</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Butteroil Tonnage</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Milk Powder Tonnage</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cereals Tonnage</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>(83 countries)</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>135 000</td>
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<td>2 161 500</td>
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Source: Special Report on Community Food Aid, Court of Auditors, p. 22, 30.10.80.
FOOD AID TO VIETNAM
SOLELY FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION AND DELIVERED CIF

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<td>Value, m ECU</td>
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<td>4.98</td>
<td>1,250(UNICEF)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 Value at world prices
2 Kampuchean refugees in Vietnam

Source: Commission of the European Communities
EEC countries currently supplying emergency medical and food aid, as well as regular food aid.

BELGIUM:  220,000 ECU (Bfrs 9,000,000) for OXFAM BELGIUM
            CARITAS BELGIUM
            SOLIDARITE SOCIALISTE
            in July 1981

            240,000 ECU (Bfrs 10,000,000) in the form of milk powder
            in November 1981
            Decision October-November 1981

DENMARK:  680,000 ECU ($750,000) via the WFP in June 1981
            Decision end of June 1981

FRANCE:   10,000 ECU (FF 60,000) in the form of one tonne of medical
            supplies in 1981
            Decision November-December 1980

            6,000 T cereals. Direct food aid, 1982
            7,000 T cereals allocated for 1983.

NETHERLANDS:  5,000 tonnes of wheat via the WFP in 1981
              Decision February-March 1981

FRG:      40,000 ECU (DM 100,000) medical supplies for the hospital in Danang
              in September 1981 following similar aid valued
              at 45,000 ECU (DM 113,000) in January 1980
              Decision December 1980

            280,000 ECU (DM 700,000) as a contribution to the current programme
            of CARITAS GERMANY
            Decision end of October 1981

Source:  Commission of the European Communities
         Member States' Ministries of Foreign Affairs
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-890/81/rev.)
tabled by Mr BALFE, Mr LOMAS, Mr SEAL, Mr CABORN, Mr MEGAHY and Mrs BUCHAN
for entry in register
pursuant to Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure
on food aid to Vietnam

The European Parliament,

- Noting that the Commission has often stated that they do not use food aid as
  a political weapon,

- Noting that a petition bearing thousands of signatures has been presented
to the President of the European Parliament and that this petition urges
the Commission to release supplies of the surplus dried milk held by the
EEC for the children of Vietnam who are suffering from serious malnutrition
due to the shortage of food following the six typhoons which struck Vietnam
in 1980,

- Noting that the Committee on Development and Cooperation have called on the
  Commission to consider resuming food aid,

- Noting that the Commission has stated in response to the petition that they
  will consider resuming food aid subject to adequate controls,

- Noting that many countries including Finland, Sweden, France, the German
  Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, India and Japan do send aid to
  Vietnam and as responsible governments will have satisfied themselves that
  adequate controls exist,

- Noting that the UK based agency, OXFAM, the Red Cross and the United Nations
  World Food Program have stated that they are satisfied adequate controls
  exist for the distribution of food aid,

1. Calls upon the Commission to resume food aid without delay;

2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and
   the Commission.

- 25 - PE 82.264/fin.
On 20 January 1983 the Political Affairs Committee appointed Mr Olivier d'ORMESSON draftsman.

At its meeting of 20 January 1983 the committee considered the draft opinion and adopted its conclusions by 18 votes to 7 with 5 abstentions.

The following took part in the vote: Mr RUMOR, chairman; Mr FERGUSSON, third vice-chairman; Mr d'ORMESSON, draftsman; Mr AIGNER (deputizing for Mr SCHALL), Mr ANTONIOZZI, Mr BARBI, Mr BEYER DE RYKE (deputizing for Mr BERKHOUWER), Mr BOCKLET (deputizing for Mr KLEPSCH), Mr BOURNIAS, Mr DENIAU (deputizing for Mr LALOR), Mrs DURY (deputizing for Mr HANSCH), Lady ELLES, Mr ESTGEN (deputizing for Mr DESCHAMPS), Mr GAWRONSKI (deputizing for Mr BETTIZA), Mr von HABSBURG, Mr von HASSEL, Mr ISRAEL (deputizing for Mr de la MALENE), Mr C. JACKSON (deputizing for Lord BETHELL), Mr LOMAS, Mr van MINNEN (deputizing for Mrs van den HEUVEL), Mr MOMMERSTEEG (deputizing for Mrs LENZ), Lord O'HAGAN, Mr PELIKAN (deputizing for Mr CARIGLIA), Mr PENDERS, Mr PLASKOVITIS, Mr PRAG (deputizing for Mr NEWTON DUNN), Mr RADOUX (deputizing for Mr van MIERT), Sir James SCOTT-HOPKINS, Mr SEGRE (and Mr WALTER (deputizing for Mr B. FRIEDRICH))
At its meeting of July 1979, the European Council decided to suspend the food aid which the Community was giving Vietnam as a sign of its condemnation of the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnamese troops.

This decision was confirmed by a decision of February 1981 taken by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting in political cooperation to suspend all indirect aid to Vietnam.

Whatever the view of the international community concerning the character of the regime imposed on the people of Cambodia by the Khmers Rouges, the European Community could not acquiesce in the violation of the sovereignty of an independent nation.

Since that time, the Vietnamese Army has continued to occupy Cambodia in spite of resistance by a large part of the population.

Nor can the Community acquiesce in the clear violations of human rights which the authorities in Vietnam have been carrying on for years against all those suspected of not sharing the regime's communist views, especially in former South Vietnam. The terrible mass phenomenon of the 'boat people' has proven to public opinion that thousands of Vietnamese refuse to suffer oppression by a regime which crushes their freedoms, or to put up with the normalization imposed on South Vietnam by the North.

The initiative taken by the Committee on Development and Cooperation aimed at calling for the Community to resume the food aid which has been halted for the last three years does not seem to be warranted by any new development. On the contrary, it seems that the Community should continue to put pressure on Vietnam to comply with international law and withdraw all its troops from Cambodian territory.

The Political Affairs Committee therefore makes the resumption of food aid to Vietnam subject to the following three conditions:
- the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from the whole of Cambodian territory,

- distribution of aid to be carried out solely by non-governmental, non-Vietnamese organizations and covered by strict guarantees that the civilian population of Vietnam will be the sole beneficiaries of any resumption of aid,

- direct supervision to be carried out on the spot by representatives of the Commission.