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REPORT

drawn up on behalf of the Political
Affairs Committee

on the/situation in Afghanistan

Rapporteur: Mr G. ISRAEL

At its sitting of 12 February 1981 the European Parliament referred the motion for a resolution by Mr VAN MIERT and Mr GLINNE (Doc. 1-899/80) on Afghanistan to its Political Affairs Committee.

At its meeting on 21 to 23 April 1981 the committee decided to draw up a report.

At its meeting on 13 to 15 May 1981 it appointed Mr Gerard ISRAEL rapporteur.

The committee considered the report at its meetings of 19/20 October 1981, 10/11 November 1981, 2-4 December 1981, 27-29 January 1982, 24-26 February 1982 and 28-30 April 1982. On 26 May 1982 it adopted the motion for a resolution by 19 votes to 13 with no abstentions.

The following took part in the vote: Mr Rumor, chairman; Mr Haagerup and Lord Bethell, vice-chairmen; Mr Israel, rapporteur; Mr Antoniozzi, Mr Berkhouwer, Mr Bettiza, Mr Bocklet (deputizing for Mr Klepsch), Mr Bournias, Mrs Charzat (deputizing for Mr Motchane), Lady Elles, Mr Ephremidis, Mr Fellermaier (deputizing for Mr Brandt), Mr Fergusson, Mr B. Friedrich, Mrs Gaiotti de Biase (deputizing for Mr Barbi), Mr Galluzzi (deputizing for Mr Segre), Mrs Gredal, Mr Habsburg, Mr Hänsch, Mr von Hassel, Mr Jaquet, Mr Katzer (deputizing for Mr Deschamps), Mr Majonica (deputizing for Mrs Lenz), Mr Mommersteeg (deputizing for Mr Diligent), Mr Penders, Mr Plaskovitis, Mr Prag (deputizing for Sir James Scott-Hopkins), Mr Radoux (deputizing for Mr Van Miert), Mr Romualdi, Mr Schall, Mr Schieler and Mr Walter (deputizing for Mrs van den Heuvel).

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
A. MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION	5
B. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT	9

ANNEX: Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr VAN MIERT
and Mr GLINNE on Afghanistan (Doc. 1-899/80)

A

The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement:

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on the situation in Afghanistan

The European Parliament,

A having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr VAN MIERT and Mr GLINNE on Afghanistan (Doc. 1-899/80),

B whereas in December 1979 Soviet troops crossed the international frontier separating the USSR and Afghanistan,

C whereas since that date Afghanistan has been occupied by the USSR with an expeditionary force of 90,000 men,

D whereas there is no legal basis for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan,

E whereas the present government in Afghanistan, set up by the Soviets, cannot claim to represent the Afghan people,

F whereas the Soviet occupation has led to a major uprising by the Afghan peoples, both against the de facto government and against the foreign occupying power,

G whereas the policy of repression pursued by the Kabul authorities has the powerful support of the Soviet occupying forces,

H whereas human rights in Afghanistan are being blatantly and systematically violated by the Soviet army and government forces,

I whereas oppression - the deportation of whole communities, particularly in the Khumar valley, air attacks on rural populations, the destruction of entire villages, and, lastly, the sporadic use of chemical weapons to slaughter hundreds of thousands of people - is a daily occurrence on Afghan soil.

J whereas almost 3 million Afghans have taken refuge in Pakistan and Iran in order to escape the repression, the Afghan refugee problem having become the most important issue of this kind in the world at present,

K whereas armed popular resistance movements have spontaneously arisen, pledged to fight against the foreign occupying power and the regime installed by that power,

L whereas fierce fighting has taken place between a powerfully organized Soviet armed force equipped with modern weapons and including personnel trained in the techniques of total warfare, and a population of mountain dwellers armed with makeshift weapons and lacking equipment and logistic support,

- M whereas the manifest expansionist objective of the soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the threat it poses for the whole region imperils world peace and security,
- N whereas the United Nations General Assembly's resolution of 14 January 1980 called for the unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and insisted on self-determination for the Afghan people,
- O whereas in its own resolution of 16 January 1980¹ Parliament demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and in its resolution of 9 April 1981² called for increased aid for Afghan refugees who had settled in Pakistan,
- P whereas, finally, proposals were put forward in Moscow by the President of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the 10 Member States of the Community meeting in political cooperation in July 1981 with a view to restoring a situation consistent with the policy of détente,
- Q having regard to the report of its Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 1-296/82)
1. Decides to do all within its power to assist the Afghan people in their fight for liberation;
 2. Calls, therefore, on the Governments of the Ten to implement a policy taking account of the following points of principle:
 - (a) a formal declaration that the occupation of Afghanistan will never be recognized in any guise whatever and, in particular, that the European Community will not subscribe to any international agreement, whether of the CSCE type or any other, which offers some economic or cultural advantage or some advantage relating to security or human rights in exchange for recognition of the occupation of Afghanistan by the USSR;
 - (b) rejection of any form of international recognition of the present government of Afghanistan and, initially, the reduction to a minimum level of Afghan diplomatic representation in the Community Member States;
 - (c) recognition of the Afghan resistance as a legitimate national liberation movement, which is itself subject to the requirement to respect the human rights defined by the relevant international texts, and in particular by the Geneva Conventions on the protection of prisoners of war;
 - (d) providing the Afghan resistance fighters with all the necessary aid, both humanitarian - the supply of medical aid being of special importance - and organizational;

1 OJ No. C 34, 11.2.1980, p.28

2 OJ No. C 101, 4.5.1981, p.51

- (e) emphasizing to the various resistance movements that the formation of a unified National Liberation Movement representing the great majority of the resistance fighters and of the population would facilitate the granting of such aid and prepare the way for official recognition of the Movement, by the Member States of the European Community and by the international community, as the legitimate representative of the Afghan people;
 - (f) ministering permanently to the health, food, educational and cultural needs of Afghan refugees;
 - (g) considering all negotiations with the USSR to be made more difficult, particularly on matters concerning European security, as long as the occupation of Afghanistan continues;
 - (h) if the occupation of Afghanistan continues, envisaging a concerted policy with the United States and Japan involving a review of the principle of supplying to the USSR advanced technologies with military or space research potential;
 - (i) reaffirming that the full exercise of the right to self-determination by the Afghan people is incompatible with the Soviet occupation;
 - (j) not ruling out, however, the possibility of obtaining guarantees from the South-East Asian countries bordering on Afghanistan and their allies that they would not interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan if a normal situation, based on Soviet withdrawal and respect for the freely expressed will of the Afghan people, was fully restored;
3. Urges the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the Community meeting in political cooperation to work out detailed rules for the implementation of a policy of the Ten based on the principles enumerated in paragraph 2 above;
 4. Decides, for its part, to establish on-going relations with the parliaments of the countries that are concerned at the gravity of the present situation in Afghanistan;
 5. Calls on the Commission to report to Parliament within three months on new measures that could be adopted to assist the Afghan refugees;
 6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the Community meeting in political cooperation.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union has openly undertaken a military intervention in a country beyond its frontiers and its sphere of influence which covers the countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact. The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 is therefore a significant new departure to which the West should be able to respond in an appropriate and practical manner. We must, however, admit that so far no measures have been taken to hinder the USSR in the development of its new strategy apart from essentially discursive measures of a political nature.

1. The Soviet intervention

In April 1978 a revolution took place in Afghanistan which resulted in a government of national unity led by Mohammed TARAKI taking power. Although in the initial period the new government carried out a number of reforms, especially land reform, discontent grew as the months passed. The events in Iran and the enormous impact of the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini on the fervently Muslim rural population, together with the hopes placed by some sectors of the population in the government of neighbouring Pakistan, led to sporadic demonstrations against the ruling Communist régime. On 14 February 1979, Mr Adolph DULS, the US Ambassador in Kabul, was abducted by the members of the 'Setem-i-Melli' group and then killed during an attack made in an attempt to free him. On 27 March, President TARAKI decided to share power with HAFIZULLAH AMIN, whom he appointed Prime Minister. By late summer 1979 there were five thousand Soviet advisers in Afghanistan, the strength of the Soviet air force in the country had increased considerably and a senior Russian official appointed by the Kremlin occupied the office next to that of President TARAKI. At the same time, virtually the whole country was in a state of rebellion. Provinces such as Konar and Paktia were in rebel hands. Since it could no longer rely on the regular army from which soldiers deserted in droves, the Afghan Government began calling on Soviet air power. At the same time there was a significant exodus of the population towards Pakistan, (in particular the nomadic Baluchis) while the Hazaras, Shia Muslims, turned towards Iran.

On 10 September 1979, following an internal power struggle, President TARAKI was replaced by Prime Minister AMIN, although the Soviets, now omnipotent in Kabul, were alleged to have done their utmost to bring about the opposite result.

AMIN then conducted a savage policy of oppression against the rebels and pitilessly hunted down the supporters of TARAKI, who were in league with the Soviets.

That is the background against which the massive intervention of Soviet troops took place on 27 December 1979, at a time when the plight of the American hostages in Teheran was becoming increasingly serious.

In an interview in Pravda (13 January 1980), President BREZHNEV justified this invasion: 'Afghanistan demanded an end to aggression and that it be allowed to build a new life for itself in peace. Already under President TARAKI, and also at a later date, the Afghan leaders, encountering external aggression, called on the Soviet Union for assistance on more than one occasion'.

It will be noted that Mr BREZHNEV said 'later' and that this must be a reference to the AMIN Government. But it would have been inconceivable for the enemy of the Soviets to call on them to intervene. Had he done so, this appeal would have been worthless in Russian eyes, since the Soviets were denouncing the illegality of the AMIN government, which was the de facto government when Soviet combat troops invaded Afghanistan. At all events, AMIN was killed by the Soviets on the very day that they entered Kabul.

In fact, Mr BREZHNEV was referring to an appeal made by President TARAKI before his death to the Soviet Government. But it should be noted that there is a distinct difference between the action taken by the USSR in Afghanistan before December 1979 and that undertaken after that date, i.e. after TARAKI's death.

The Soviet claim will not stand up to an investigation based on law and the facts, and the intervention of December 1979 must be regarded as illegal unless we accept the idea that TARAKI appealed to the USSR from beyond the grave.

2. The Soviet occupation

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is not massive and cannot be compared, for example, with the American intervention in Vietnam. No more than 85,000 Russian soldiers are occupying this country which has 16 million inhabitants and covers an area of 650,000 km².

This minimal commitment, which is principally designed to restrict the national and international repercussions of the operation, forces the USSR to pursue a very specific strategy. It occupies the towns and controls the major trunk routes, while the Afghan army plays a very limited and static role because of the large numbers of deserters. In addition, the use of aircraft and armoured vehicles limits its losses considerably. It is not involved in pacifying operations such as those carried out during the Algerian war, for example, when hundreds of thousands of men were deployed. Consequently, the Russians claim to have lost no more than 6,000-8,000 men in 1980. But this strategy has one major drawback

in that it allows freedom of movement for the population living on the border with Pakistan, especially on the frontier of Konar and Paktia. As a result, contacts are frequent between the two sides of the frontier. Heavy bombardments of these regions have, however, forced a large number of people to leave the area, and this has resulted in the isolation of the rebels crossing from Pakistan who find very little logistic support.

According to a report by Mr Alexander HAIG submitted to the United States Congress on 22 March 1982, the Soviet Union is using chemical warfare in Afghanistan. The US document refers to 47 statements indicating that attacks with toxic weapons took place and resulted in the death of more than 3000 people between the summers of 1979 and 1981. Of these 47 statements, 36 were made by deserters from the Soviet-controlled Afghan army, resistance fighters, journalists who had visited the area or doctors.

The report by the US Secretary of State claims that Soviet helicopters are spraying clouds of toxic vapour or firing shells or bombs containing poisonous gas. Mines containing toxic substances are also said to have been dropped.

The medical evidence states that the victims displayed often fatal lesions caused by toxic substances such as yperite (mustard gas), phosgene and, possibly, trichothecene. Medical examinations of the casualties revealed cutaneous lesions, partial or complete paralysis of the limbs, injuries to the respiratory organs and damage to the nervous system which often resulted in death.

Mr HAIG also considers in his report why the Russians are using chemical warfare of this kind. In the light of similar chemical attacks carried out in Cambodia and Laos by the Russians' Vietnamese allies on the resisting H'mong highlanders, a definite strategy is seen as being pursued. The aim of this is to undermine the will to resist of those sections of the indigenous population opposed to the government by destroying them even in relatively inaccessible areas of natural sanctuary.

On the other hand, your rapporteur is obliged to point out that a hospital run by the International Red Cross which opened in the Peshawar area in April 1981 and has since admitted approximately a thousand patients has not encountered a single case of injuries caused by chemical weapons.

It would appear, therefore, that if such operations have been carried out by the Soviet Army, they took place only sporadically and at the beginning of the conflict.

In these circumstances, bearing in mind the limited number of losses and the relatively low cost of the operation, the Soviets can continue to occupy Afghanistan indefinitely. They simply need to monitor any changes occurring in the international context and any progress made by the Afghan resistance.

3. The Afghan resistance

Unlike the conventional scenario for a war waged by a resistance movement, i.e. beginning with a small number of rebels and then snowballing as it gains the support of the people, the Afghan rebellion was immediate and total. It involved every sector of society from the outset. The general nature of the rebellion stems from the fact that the party in power is Communist and atheist. There are two main streams to this resistance: on the one hand the fundamentalists, supported by some Muslim countries, and on the other an Islamic nationalist movement which is more or less modern in its outlook.

Unfortunately, as the author of a report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, writes¹: 'No resistance movement (in Afghanistan) has an overall strategy, organizational concepts appropriate to the situation, specific knowledge of the adversary's nature, or an assessment of the international situation which might be used as the basis for its tactics. Finally, none of them has that infinitely valuable component required for a lengthy guerilla war: trained personnel who can act as links with the people and merge into the background'.

In addition, the Afghan resistance faces a considerable external problem. Its adversary, the USSR, is a totalitarian state which is not accustomed to negotiate solutions to problems which might affect its own security.

In fact, where in a liberal democracy a certain public weariness may lead a government, against its better judgment, to put an end to a colonial-type war, or where international disapproval may sometimes compel a government to negotiate with national liberation movements, the USSR remains impervious to such considerations.

¹ Gérard CHALIAND 'Report on the Afghan resistance' 1980-81

The Afghan resistance also suffers from a considerable lack of cohesion between the various movements which make it up, and it is affected by internal ideological struggles which are frequently the outcome of secular quarrels. It is heavily marked by ethnic or religious struggles between its various components and, finally, cannot hope for a negotiated solution. As things stand, it cannot cause the Soviet Union enough problems for it to hope that it will be successful and that the country will be liberated.

Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that a political will to unite the Afghan resistance emerged in June 1981, when an agreement was signed creating the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujaheddin. This alliance is led by a presidium whose members include Mr Mohammadi, Mr Mufaddahi and Mr Gallani. Representatives of the alliance visited Europe in the spring of 1982. In Florence, at the initiative of our colleague Mr Ripa di Meana, they met most of the leading European figures with a special interest in the Afghan resistance. They were received by the President of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, a meeting at which your rapporteur, Lord Bethell and Mr Ripa di Meana were present. The alliance representatives set out their 'war aims' and stated their desire never to resort to international terrorism and to respect human rights, in particular the rights of prisoners of war. On this last point, it has been confirmed that negotiations are in progress with representatives of the International Red Cross with a view to reaching an agreement with the Russians. A procedure involving the internment of prisoners on neutral territory is under active consideration.

It is quite conceivable, therefore, that some degree of political unity may be established within the resistance on the basis of the principles referred to above. In such circumstances, there is no doubt that the capacity of the Afghan resistance for military action would be increased.

4. Community aid to the Afghan refugees

With regard to Community aid to the refugees in Pakistan, in 1981 it amounted to:

(a) Emergency aid	15 MECU
(b) Food aid (through WFP and UNHCR)	
20,000 t cereals	3.5 MECU
3,000 t milk powder	1.87 MECU
1,050 t butteroil	1.45 MECU
transport	1.00 MECU
	21.82 MECU \$ 24 million (excluding transport)

In 1979-80 total aid to the refugees amounted to \$22.8 million, making a total since the crisis began of nearly \$47 million.

It is interesting to note that the Community and its Member States gave no less than a third of all required aid in 1979-80. Although the proportion is considerably less in 1981, the Community's contribution, as Community, is nevertheless higher in absolute terms.

In 1982, a further emergency aid worth 633,000 ECU was approved by the Commission. A further request for aid by the relief agencies should be received shortly and can be expected to be of the same order of magnitude as in previous years.

It has not been possible to examine whether the Community's aid to the Afghan refugees is proportionate to the hardships suffered by those living in the camps. This question will have to be dealt with in a future report when the Pakistan authorities have lifted the ban imposed on your rapporteur.

5. Community aid to Pakistan

In view of the admission of Afghan refugees by the Pakistan authorities and the effects which this may have on the country's economy, Pakistan has been granted aid by the Community.

It should be noted that 1981 was a 'concentration' year for aid to Pakistan which amounts to 7.8 MECU for food and 14.7 MECU for financial and technical aid or a total of \$24.8 million.

In 1982 the financial and technical assistance will amount to 10-12 million ECU according to the projects chosen. Food aid will be rather less than in previous years and confined to dairy products owing to the current self-sufficiency of Pakistan in wheat.

On the international scene, Pakistan is maintaining a relatively firm attitude towards the USSR. It should be noted, however, that Pakistan is concerned by the presence of Soviet forces at its borders and naturally wishes to avoid any pointless acts of provocation. Pakistani diplomats in Europe go so far as to issue official denials that Afghan resistance leaders are allowed to remain on Pakistan's territory.

It should be borne in mind that the province of Baluchistan would be a prime target for the Soviet Union in its plans to reach the Indian Ocean. Any unrest in that province would provide the USSR with an opening.

The following is an account of Pakistan's official position.

President Zia's policy can be summed up by a quotation from a recent interview: 'we have now asked the USA to please identify its interests in our region'.

In other words Zia considers that his country is now in the front line vis-à-vis the Soviets and he wants to establish a direct relationship between his foreign policy and the amount of aid he receives from the western powers.

In Pakistan's view any solution of the Afghan situation has to be based on the following four principles:

- Soviet troops to withdraw, not by force but by persuasion
- the Afghan people should determine for themselves their future regime and constitution
- restoration of the non-aligned Moslem status of Afghanistan
- return of all refugees to Afghanistan 'in peace and honour'.

In Pakistan's view this would be achieved by bilateral talks through an intermediary such as the UN Secretary-General, the culmination of such talks being an international conference (this approach is somewhat weaker than the resolutions supported by the Western powers).

6. The West's reply

The West is not short of ways and means to try to persuade the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. The international community, excluding the Warsaw Pact countries but including all the countries of the Third World, strongly deplored the invasion (UN resolution of 14 January 1980). The Arab and Islamic countries, including some which are friendly to the USSR, have also expressed disapproval. (Egypt is reported to have sent arms to the rebels and Saudi Arabia material aid).

Finally, the Western Communist parties, bar the French Communist Party, have condemned the intervention. China, which has a common frontier with Afghanistan, has stated that it will help the Afghan rebels on humanitarian, political and other grounds ...

Nonetheless, this apparent unanimity has not led to the creation of a common front capable of making the USSR withdraw.

The motion for a resolution included in this report is designed to give a new impetus to a European Community initiative taken in the context of political cooperation in an effort to ensure that at the very least Soviet intervention results in problems for the USSR itself.

The first measure proposed is the recognition of the Afghan resistance. Of course, it is not easy for a group of countries to grant international recognition to uncoordinated resistance movements inspired by different, not to say contradictory, ideals. Nor is it easy to give a European 'blessing' to movements which perhaps do not all have the same conception of human rights as the West. Nor is it easy to offer moral support to a plethora of organizations not united under one command. Finally, there is a danger that subversive organizations throughout the world might claim European endorsement.

But your rapporteur feels, however, that it should be possible to solve all these problems if the Community shows itself able to remain resolute on the principles behind its action, in particular on the demand that resistance movements must respect human rights. But above all, moral support from Europe in the form of recognition would probably lead to the various Afghan movements setting up a united structure capable of receiving Western aid.

It is, however, clear that we should be able to go further and enable the Afghans to reoccupy their country and pursue their real aim of national liberation. When a responsible country wishes to give aid to a resistance movement, it cannot act openly. States do not act directly, as we may see from the examples of the Chinese 'volunteers' fighting in Korea, the policy of sanctuary adopted by Tunisia and Morocco during the Algerian war and the supply of arms to the Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge ...

The USSR should feel the West's disapproval economically. The old theory that good commercial relations finally improve political relations is well and truly discredited. Nowadays, unfortunately, only economic pressure can bring results. Of course, any threat concerning food aid could not replace genuine policy, and it is morally difficult to support it. On the other hand, if the supply of advanced technology to the USSR were made dependent on the international situation, the USSR's military power might be reduced.

Politically, your rapporteur feels that the West, and Europe in particular, should set out a number of principles which would convince the USSR that it will not obtain the West's agreement to its occupation of Afghanistan, whatever guarantees it might offer in exchange. The Helsinki Conference specifically recognized the occupation of the Baltic States. We must state that there will never be a Helsinki for Afghanistan.

The European Community is very sensitive to matters affecting security in Southern Asia, South-West Asia, the Persian Gulf and the entire Middle East. Similarly, European security is the key to real coexistence with the USSR. 'Permanent' negotiations with the USSR must therefore be maintained. But these negotiations should be seen as primarily concerning the Afghan question which is the major obstacle to peace. It would also be worthwhile employing apparently symbolic measures whose purpose would be quite different. For example, all summit negotiations should be deferred until the USSR has given a practical demonstration of its intention to withdraw from Afghanistan.

That does not mean, however, that we should not show the USSR ways in which it could make an honourable withdrawal. Since Moscow feared that Pakistan might be americanized, it might be appropriate to give certain guarantees on the West's commitment to Pakistan, in line with the proposals already submitted by the European Community. Similarly, the unforeseeable development of events in Iran, which worries not only the USSR but also the entire West, should make both sides act with restraint. As for the situation in the Persian Gulf, it seems that no one can offer a guarantee to anyone else. There remains Afghanistan itself. Would it be possible to make it a neutral country like Austria? Can we imagine that the Afghan people could determine their own future in complete freedom once the Russian troops had withdrawn? Have there ever been free elections in that country?

One thing is certain: by adopting a responsible attitude vis-à-vis the USSR in the matter of Afghanistan and in particular by recognizing the legitimacy of the Afghan resistance, the West could limit the dangerous impact of a policy inspired partly by the Soviet desire for power but also by the fear of the future which affects its leaders. Whole nations cannot be subjugated with impunity.

The two measures proposed in the foregoing resolution aim principally at defining the framework outside which the current uncertain situation could not be maintained. The European Community, and the European Parliament in particular, can play an important role in an alarming situation.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 1-899/80)
tabled by Mr VAN MIERT and Mr GLINNE
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure
on Afghanistan

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, the Final Acts of the Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Helsinki and Belgrade and the Charter of the United Nations,
 - stressing the fundamental principles of national sovereignty, the inviolability of frontiers, the territorial integrity of States, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and basic freedoms including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, equality of rights and the right of peoples to self-determination which govern relations between nations,
 - recalling the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 14 January 1980 which called for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,
 - having regard to the declaration of the Nine of 15 January 1980 in which the Foreign Ministers of the nine Member States of the Community urged the Soviet Union immediately 'in conformity with the standards and principles of the United Nations Charter to allow the Afghan people to determine their own future without foreign interference',
1. Appeals once again for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan as stated in its resolution of 16 January 1980;
 2. Pays tribute to the resistance of the Afghan people against the military occupation which constitutes a serious violation of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the territorial integrity of a sovereign State;
 3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation and the governments of the Member States.