Regional Security and Global Governance:
A Proposal for a 'Regional-Global Security Mechanism' in Light of the UN High-Level Panel's Report

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Regional security and global governance: A PROPOSAL FOR A 'REGIONAL-GLOBAL SECURITY MECHANISM' IN LIGHT OF THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL’S REPORT

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PREFACE

This Egmont Paper is essentially a reduced version of a 180-page study undertaken during 2004 under the auspices of the UN University’s Comparative Regional Integration Studies Programme (UNU-CRIS). Our thanks go to both UNU-CRIS for making the project possible and also to the Royal Institute for International Relations for proceeding with this shorter version. Our appreciation also to the VUB Institute of European Studies for its on-going support of the project and to the Government of Belgium which has recently extended funding for its continuation.

This shorter paper will, no doubt, be perused by a larger number of readers than the longer version, yet the latter contains much background material that illuminates more clearly what has been included here, both in analysis and prescription. It is our hope that many colleagues will be encouraged to undertake our longer, and more detailed, ‘adventure’ into one possible future of ‘security regionalism’.

The aim of the paper is to explore the history and the future potential of the ‘regional-global mechanism’ for maintaining international peace and security. It is based on the recognition, accorded by the international community over the past decade, of the need for greater involvement by regional agencies in conflict prevention and management in all regions, in co-operation with the United Nations.

It is clear that regionalism – drawing on the so-called ‘new regionalism’ of recent decades – is in the ascendancy, including in the area of peace and security. Where it fits in the ‘world order’ political system, however, cannot be easily predicted. Previous and present world order systems – early multipolarity (1919-39); bipolarity (1948-90); unipolarity (1990 –2004) – have rested on certain underlying features of the international community. Whether the future system of the early 21st century will feature regionalism as an alternative to unipolarity or as a component part of a broader multilateralism remains to be seen but it is likely that the latter will be the case. The judgement of the international community today appears to be that the rise of regionalism as a component of multilateralism is both desirable and feasible – and even necessary. This is a far cry from the judgement entered by one UN scholar only a decade ago, that ‘regional authorities generally lack the credibility, the capacity and, hence, the clout to act effectively as agents for collective security and peaceful settlement’.
The rise in regionalism is what underpins the stated vision of the UN Secretary-General, of a ‘mutually-reinforcing regional-global mechanism’ for peace and security. Indeed, whether it is desirable or not is perhaps secondary to the fact that regionalisation is an objective feature of our time – an ongoing multifaceted phenomenon to which nation-states and the United Nations have no choice but to respond and adapt.

We live in fluid and dangerous times, with the traditional principles and precepts of security thinking that have marked the UN era to date under serious strain. The concern expressed by the Secretary-General in September 2003 over the pressures recently placed on our contemporary doctrines and institutions needs to be heeded carefully. That concern prompted him to establish the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change whose report has just been released.

The Panel's report will shape the lines of a critical debate on the future global order for perhaps the next half-century. Our original study, completed in September 2004, contained prescriptive comment based on an expanded Security Council of 25 members. This shorter version has adjusted the analysis to a Council of 24, which is the size recommended by the Panel.

The future of 'security regionalism’, and in particular the regional dimension of Security Council reform, will feature prominently in the debate on the Panel's report, leading up to the UN ‘summit meeting’ in September 2005. It is our hope that this paper will make a useful contribution to that.

Dr. Kennedy Graham, Project Director
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UNU-CRIS, Bruges,
January 2005
INTRODUCTION

‘I believe we can develop a new vision of global security. A vision that respects human rights while confronting the threats of our age, including the threat of terrorism. A vision that draws upon the resources and legitimacy of a network of effective and mutually reinforcing multilateral mechanisms – regional and global – that are flexible and responsive to our rapidly changing and integrating world.’


‘The fact is, however, that the Security Council does not deal with all regional arrangements on the same footing. While the Council may give a particular regional organization an opportunity to assist in preventing or settling a crisis, it may ignore another regional organization in a similar situation. We believe that the proper functioning of the international collective security system in the coming years will require the Council’s efficient use of assistance by the regional organizations in addressing various crises.’

H.E. Amr Moussa, Secretary-General of the Arab League, April 2003.

These two quotes, one by the UN Secretary-General, the other by one of his counterparts from a regional organization, capture the essence of the security challenge facing the world in the early 21st century. One offers a vision of a future security system that is holistic and global in nature, emphasising the concept of legitimacy that can come ‘only from the United Nations’. The other critiques the Security Council for alleged inconsistency in its political judgements, tagging the future vision with a prerequisite of greater consistency and impartiality on the part of the global body. The essential themes implicit – flexibility and pragmatism on the one hand and impartiality and consistency on the other – testify to the nuanced judgement and careful calibration of operations that will be required if what might be called the future ‘regional-global security mechanism’ is to realise its potential.

Dialectical only in their prima facie relationship, the two themes are in fact mutually reconcilable. Only by combining flexibility with impartiality, and pragmatism with consistency, will the endemic uncertainties and occasional tensions between the global body responsible for international peace and security and the regional agencies that are meant to play a supporting role in that endeavour be defused and the global-regional dialectic, in turn, be synthesised.
The aim of this Egmont Paper is to explore the history and the future potential of the ‘regional-global mechanism’ for maintaining international peace and security. It is based on the recognition accorded by the international community over the past decade of the potential for greater involvement by regional agencies in conflict prevention and management in all regions, in co-operation with the United Nations.

The metamorphosis in the nature of regionalism – from its almost exclusively economic and defence dimensions, from the 1940s to the 1980s, towards a comprehensive multi-sectoral movement of the 1990s involving political, cultural, economic and security issues in the broadest contemporary sense – is transforming international organizations as regions develop an integrated skein of mutual interests among member states. But much of this, most particularly in the area of security, has been ad hoc and haphazard. The challenge of the next decade is to replace this improvised, politically-selective, resource-skewed approach to regionalism with a more planned, consistent yet flexible, and resource-balanced style of regional and global governance – most especially on the part of the UN Security Council.

The paper undertakes four tasks:

- It reviews the relationship between regional and global dimensions of peace and security, tracing the constitutional and institutional development of regional agencies;
- It analyses the regional security mechanism, identifying the complexities inherent in the contemporary scene, and introducing a ‘typology of security regionalism’ to understand it better;
- It reflects on the multidimensional nature of regional security – the cultural, political and legal dimensions – and draws conclusions from the above descriptive and analytical parts;
- It concludes with some prescriptive views, and recommendations, on how to construct a ‘regional-global mechanism’ in the future, to answer to the Secretary-General’s vision.

Two fundamental propositions are put forward: that the UN agree upon a set of, perhaps eight, ‘security regions’, and that an ‘associated chapter VIII regional agency’ be identified to represent each one in the Security Council. Such an arrangement would have far-reaching implications for Security Council reform.
1. **Regionalism in Context: Constructing the Architecture of Peace**

I. The Historical Development

Throughout history human societies of every size and type have sought, above all, to ensure their own security and safety. The building of what has become termed an ‘architecture of peace’ has been the institutional aspiration through which humanity might avoid warfare and live together. In the modern Westphalian era of the past four centuries, nation-states have sought, in various ways, to construct that ‘architecture of peace’.

Prior to the 20th century, regional security represented the height of political statecraft and diplomatic strategy. Global security – the notion of the world acting as one unit for its own safety and redemption – was a concept yet unborn beyond, at least, the philosophical realm of Kantian idealism. The 19th century witnessed efforts at forging continental peace through state policy in two regions – Europe and America. Elsewhere, traditional polities of vast size and periodic civilizational zenith were subjected to imperial sway by European powers in the late Westphalian era.

The first attempt to prevent war and preserve international peace on a global scale, laid down in the League of Nations Covenant in 1919, rested on four fundamental principles: non-aggression and pacific settlement, collective security, minimum arms levels, and self-determination. The limitations of the League were three-fold – the right of a state to resort to war in the event pacific settlement was unsuccessful; the universal veto on decision-making thwarting consensus in crisis situations; and the voluntary nature of military contributions to enforcement action. These weakened the collective security mechanism, and the League collapsed in the face of repeated aggression by some Member States.

Global collective security was strengthened in the second experiment of the mid-20th century with the United Nations. Building on the Covenant, the Charter of 1945 laid down the fundamental precepts on which the modern ‘security architecture’ of the international community continues to rest, over half a century later. ‘War’ was completely abolished, with an effective enforcement mechanism, at least in theory. The veto on enforcement decisions was confined to the five ‘great powers’ only rather than all member states. And military contributions from member states for enforcement action became compulsory.
In the six decades of the UN era, however, collective security has not functioned in the untrammelled manner envisaged by the Charter’s framers. The advent of nuclear weapons made the multilateral dimension of collective security asymmetrical, while the ideological divisions between the US and USSR polarised the international community and effectively paralysed the Security Council for over 40 years. And, although inter-state conflict declined, intra-state conflict concomitantly increased as a result of post-colonial tensions exacerbated by the intensifying pace of global change.

Through this period strategic stability at the global level was effectively secured, albeit precariously, through bipolar nuclear deterrence. For its part the UN sought to improvise and adapt conflict resolution and management techniques to the facts on the ground. From the mid-1950s to the early-'90s ‘classical peacekeeping’ was employed by the UN (with informal reference to ‘chapter six-and-a-half’ of the Charter), the UN peacekeepers verifying mutually agreed cease-fires following a truce with the consent of the belligerent parties. Over the past decade ‘robust peacekeeping’ has complemented its ‘softer’ counterpart, with UN or UN-authorised forces engaging in enforcement action for civilian protection or humanitarian issues.

II. The Contemporary Challenge

The developments of the past few years have placed a severe strain on many of the traditional principles and tenets of multilateral security. The ‘architecture of peace’, is in need of redesign. Specifically, five fault-lines are running beneath the main principles of the contemporary security system:

- The principle of the non-use of force is challenged by the doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ in a ‘just war’.
- The principle of domestic jurisdiction is undergoing a far-reaching metamorphosis as a result of the controversial doctrine of ‘humanitarian intervention’ of the 1990s, refashioned in a more acceptable form in the doctrine of a ‘responsibility to protect’.
- The traditional doctrine of recognition has been challenged by the forced ‘regime change’, in 2003, of a recognised government of a member state without explicit UN authorisation.
- The principle of the concurrence of the permanent members of the Security Council has been challenged by the notion of an ‘unreasonable veto’ developed in February 2003 during the Iraq crisis.
- The right under customary law of all states to possess weaponry (including WMD) that they deem necessary for their self-defence, and
to enter into and withdraw from disarmament treaties, has been replaced by a new norm – the doctrine of ‘compulsory but selective disarmament’.

The UN Secretary-General has recently brought these, and other, tensions to the surface of diplomatic debate at the United Nations. In April 2003, he called for the UN and regional organizations to ‘redouble their efforts’ to ensure peace. The ‘feeling of insecurity’, he said in September, had seldom, if ever, been greater. We could no longer take it for granted that our multilateral institutions were strong enough to cope with all of the challenges facing them. Some institutions might be in need of ‘radical reform’. The relevance of current multilateral rules and institutions had come into question. It was ‘vitaly important’ not to allow recent differences to persist, and to find a unity of purpose based on a ‘common security agenda’ with a global consensus on, and response to, the major threats. ‘Radical changes are needed. … History is a harsh judge – it will not forgive us if we let this moment pass’.

Acting on his own concerns, the Secretary-General established a ‘High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’, with a mandate to examine the landscape of peace and security, ‘broadly defined’; to identify the contribution of collective action in addressing the major challenges and threats; and to recommend changes necessary to ‘ensure effective collective action, especially by the United Nations’.

The Panel’s report, released in December 2004, contains substantive and far-reaching proposals designed to settle the ‘security debate’ and facilitate a common security agenda, with global consensus over threat perceptions and agreement over an effective collective response and a reformed United Nations Organization. In short, the Panel has recommended the following:

**Collective security:** Collective security rests on three pillars: collective vulnerability (today’s threats recognise no national boundaries); national limitations (no State can by its own efforts dispel that vulnerability); and national fallibility (it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own peoples and not harm its neighbours). We all share responsibility for each other’s security, and the test of global consensus will be action.

*Threat Perception:* The world faces six clusters of threats: economic and social; inter-State conflict; internal conflict; spread of certain weaponry; terrorism; and transnational crime.
Development as Conflict Prevention: Development is the indispensable foundation for a collective security system.

Use of Force: No charter amendment is needed concerning the use of force.

- The self-defence provision (article 51) needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope. As in the past, a threatened State can take military action as long as (i) the threatened attack is imminent; (ii) no other means would deflect it; and (iii) the action is proportionate. A State may therefore act in anticipatory self-defence on a pre-emptive basis, including against a threat of terrorism.

- The collective security provision empowering the Security Council to authorise any other military action is also adequate, with the language of chapter VII inherently broad enough. No State may take preventive action against, for example, acquisition of nuclear weapons-making capability, in the name of anticipatory self-defence; such action needs Security Council authorization. But the Council may need to be more proactive in this respect in future.

- In deciding whether to authorize force, the Council should systematically address five criteria: seriousness of threat; proper purpose; last resort; proportional means; and balance of consequences. The international community has a 'responsibility to protect' the citizens of any State, including through intervention, if its government is unable or unwilling to protect its own people from 'avoidable catastrophe' (genocide or other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law).

Security Council Reform: Security Council reform should meet four principles: membership for 'contributing countries'; representativeness; effectiveness; and accountability. The Council should expand to 24 members.

Peace-building: A Peace-building Commission should be established to identify and assist fragile States.

Regional Co-operation: Consultation and co-operation between the UN and regional organizations should be expanded and could be formalized in an agreement. But authorization from the Council for regional peace operations is necessary in all cases.
2. **Regionalism Under Construction – Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’**

The structural relationship between the Security Council and the regional organizations is fundamental to the success of a future ‘regional-global security mechanism’. The construction of such a mechanism in the multilateral era is best understood as comprising three distinct periods: shaping the constitutional relationship (1919-45); building the institutional network (1946-91); and developing a framework for co-operation (1992-2004). The constitutional, institutional and co-operation phases of the development of the mechanism bring us to the present time – a third ‘moment of opportunity’.

I. **The Constitutional Phase**

The fundamental relationship between universalism and regionalism in security doctrine has been slowly shaped in the two formative moments of institutional planning – 1919 and the early- and mid-1940s. The deliberations over both the League and the UN have laid the foundations for the present system.

In one sense the security arrangement embodied by the League was, to some extent, an essentially regional affair, being wrought in the aftermath of the Great War in Europe and designed to prevent any repetition thereof – with the same approach being applicable to Latin America. Overall, however, regionalism played no significant role in the League’s attempts at conflict resolution and management, ill-fated as they were.

In the early planning for a new world organization during World War II, the issue of ‘security regionalism’ became a matter of dispute. The preliminary outline of an ‘interim UN’ envisaged 26 member states, with an Executive Committee of nine, comprising the Big Four which had ‘policing duties’ (US, UK, USSR and China) and five ‘regional representatives’. The ‘regional nature’ of such an Executive Committee, however, was subsequently opposed by a majority in the US planning team, and the outline was dropped. The principle of regionalism was subsequently at various times ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the planning, and at the San Francisco conference in May 1945 the choice between regionalism and universalism became a major point of controversy. Most delegations favoured regionalism, led by the Latin American bloc and the Arab states, with support from Britain and its commonwealth and also the USSR, but the US remained stead-
fastly opposed. The resulting compromise proved to be fateful – introduction into the Charter of the principle of the ‘inherent right of individual and collective self-defence’ against armed attack. The aim was to convince ‘regionalists’ of their freedom, under a centralised system, to respond to aggression from outside their region without being hobbled by any Security Council stalemate. In the view of some, article 51 saved the international community from a dire Cold War fate, but the self-defence article was to have enormous repercussions for the way in which international security is prosecuted.

The final provisions agreed upon in the Charter reflect what has been called a ‘mild discouragement’ of regionalism. The Charter allows for regional security arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security as a support to the primary role exercised by the Security Council. Nothing is to preclude the existence of regional agencies for dealing with international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided they are compatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter. But this was not provided for through any prefabricated mechanism. Instead, the Charter made provision for a vaguely apprehended regionalism, with regional agencies or arrangements encouraged to take initiatives in pacific settlement but with enforcement only to be undertaken on the authorisation of the Council.

II. The Institutional Phase

The forty-year period of the Cold War paralysed the functional operation of the Security Council and thus the development of any ‘regional-global security mechanism’. It was during this period, however, that the decolonisation process occurred, accompanied by the growth of regional agencies in virtually all regions of the world. The 1940s saw their establishment in the two regions where the political consciousness of ‘regionalism’ was most developed at that time – Latin America and the Arab world – the most vocal proponents of regional security during the ‘constitutional phase’. This was followed in the 1950s with a burst of unparalleled creativity in regional institution-building in Europe.

The ineluctable process of regionalisation continued through the ensuing three decades. Once the decolonisation process had run its course in Africa and Asia in the 1960s and the Caribbean and the Pacific in the ‘70s, supplemented by ‘latecomers’ in the ‘80s and the newly-independent states of Central Asia in the ‘90s, a global network of regional (and sub-regional) agencies was finally in place.
III. The Co-operation Phase

Concomitantly with the development of the global ‘fabric of peace’ developed during the 1990s, the UN began to act on the recognition of the potential for greater involvement of regional agencies in a co-operative relationship with the UN in the pursuit of international security. A series of meetings has been held since the mid-1990s designed to develop a strategic partnership between the global body and the regional agencies. This has taken two forms: a series of high-level meetings between the UN Secretary-General and regional organizations, and two general meetings between the Security Council and regional organizations.

It is clear that the UN is serious in seeking to develop a ‘regional-global security mechanism’ for the 21st century. Two phenomena in particular characterise to date the experience in strategic planning for that goal: increased interest from the ‘regionals’ themselves and the development of a normative framework of co-operation between them and the UN.

In April 2003, the Security Council met, under Mexican presidency, for the first time with regional agencies. Only six organizations attended (AU, ECOWAS, EU, LAS, OSCE and OAS) under the theme ‘The Security Council and Regional Organizations: Facing New Challenges to International Peace and Security’. The objective of the meeting was to engender an ‘interactive dialogue’ between the Council and regional organizations, marking perhaps a ‘new stage’ in international relations, since the current situation then prevailing obliged the Council to identify courses of action that would strengthen international security.

A second meeting took place in July 2004 under Romanian presidency, this time with the aim of identifying new methods of co-operation between the UN and regional organizations and developing innovative approaches to conflict resolution and stabilization processes. This meeting was attended by seven international organizations (AU, CIS, EU, LAS, NATO, OSCE and ECOWAS) and a Presidential Statement was produced. The Council concluded that regular dialogue on specific issues between it and regional organizations would bring ‘significant added value’ to UN-regional co-operation for peace and security, based on ‘complementarity and comparative advantage’.

Thus, the Security Council has rather belatedly – a decade after the Secretary-General took the initiative – begun to develop a relationship with the regional and sub-regional organizations that is focusing on the range of peace and security challenges – counter-terrorism, conflict prevention and management, and peace-building.
3. Complexities of Regionalism

The development of the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ is hampered by an array of complexities. These pertain to uncertainties over the meaning of the central concepts of ‘region’, ‘agency’ and ‘arrangement'; the structural duplication of regional agencies and other organizations (involving overlapping of membership); contention over the area of application of their functions; and ambiguity over their objectives (involving, *inter alia*, improvised and occasionally competing mandates).

The UN Charter does not define ‘region’, its framers having decided, after much fruitless effort, against any self-restricting ordinance of that kind. A definition advanced during the San Francisco Conference however, gives as good a conceptual notion as is perhaps necessary:

‘There shall be considered, as regional arrangements, organizations of a permanent nature, grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise.’

Having regard to the various considerations pertaining to both ‘region’ and ‘arrangements or agencies’, an authoritative definition has been advanced as follows:

‘A union of states or an international organization, based upon a collective treaty or a constitution and consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, whose primary task is the maintenance of peace and security under the control and within the framework of the United Nations.’

The membership of regional agencies and similar organizations is bewilderingly complex, as an analysis of UN regional economic commissions, regional integration bodies and electoral groupings at the UN reveals. This begs the question of what constitutes a ‘region’ and indeed, what is a truly meaningful concept of

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1. Adapted from Bruno Simma, *The United Nations Charter: A Commentary* (OUP, Oxford; 1995), p. 699. The reference to ‘peace and security’ is altered to be *primus inter pares* rather than exclusive, since regional organizations such as the African Union are developing general competencies. Strictly, moreover, it should be noted that regional organizations, not being an integral part of the UN system, operate perhaps ‘within the framework of’ the United Nations but not under its ‘control’ – apart from the requirement of enforcement authorisation.
It is, in this respect, difficult to posit the most appropriate and authoritative departure-point for gaining clarity over geographical regionality.

The area of application of a regional agency or other international organization has also become an increasingly contentious issue. The phenomenon in recent years of some organizations operating ‘out-of-area’ in a ‘hard security’ function has caused some political controversy but the United Nations appears to be willing for the present to recognise such operations as not only legitimate but welcome. This issue is linked to both membership and mandate. It raises first the question of whether it is appropriate, in a constitutional sense, for a ‘regional agency’ under chapter VIII to operate outside the national territories of its own regional members.

An analysis of the same organizations shows also overlapping mandates of those that seek to ‘partner’ with the United Nations in peace and security, inferred from their statutory objectives. The question of mandate of regional arrangements and agencies is problematic – some pertain to economic issues, some to security, and some to broader political and cultural ‘identity’ purposes. Thus it can be seen that the evolution of regional and other organizations has given rise to some unusual developments regarding mandates. Some organizations have experienced ‘mandate creep’ through force of circumstance, entering the field of peace and security from the vantage-point of an economic mandate. Others have taken on what might be called ‘mandate crab’, ranging laterally across geographic space, broadening and extending their focal areas. And a few have undertaken actions that reflect ‘mandate stray’ – effectively exceeding their constitutional authority in certain cases beyond the confines of the UN Charter. There is a need for greater clarity and order in the matter of mandates in the regional-global mechanism for peace and security.

I. Effect on UN Security Planning: The ‘Strategic Choice’

There thus exists a rather confusing admixture of regional and sub-regional agencies, with different membership, statutory mandates in peace and security, together with other organizations with qualitatively different mandates, all assembling together for meetings with the United Nations over the maintenance of international peace and security. This invites institutional confusion; indeed it almost institutionalises that confusion in a divided world.

The international community faces a ‘strategic choice’ with regard to the relationship between universalism and regionalism. A partnership has been built up
between the United Nations and other international organizations in the name of regionalism but that relationship is complex, informal and constitutionally invertebrate. The choice is between two future courses. The United Nations can continue with 'business-as-usual' in which several score entities partner with it but with little clear sense of common direction. Or it can commence the process of clarifying, and to some extent formalising, the relationship with a view to making it more effective.

As noted, the UN High-Level Panel supports expanded co-operation with regional organizations, possibly including a formalized agreement. If UN Member States endorse this recommendation, that is the strategic direction in which the international community will head over the next decade or so.
4. A Typology of Security Regionalism

If the Secretary-General’s vision of a ‘regional-global security mechanism’, endorsed by both the Security Council and regional organizations, is to have real meaning, the shape of that mechanism will need substantive content. This requires, as a prerequisite, some analytical clarity. The essential concept in that mechanism is ‘regionality’. The first requirement, therefore, is to reach a common understanding over the concept of ‘region’ for the purposes of international peace and security— that is, to develop a structure for identifying ‘security regions’. The three dimensions mentioned earlier (membership, focal area and mandate) lay the basis for analysis of the regional activity to date and the prospects for developing a ‘regional-global security mechanism’ in the future.

I. Membership: Organizations Involved in Peace and Security

Concerning the organizations themselves, the Security Council has identified three categories – international organizations, regional and sub-regional – but the UN Secretariat itself has not developed any such classification in its high-level meetings. There needs to be some greater clarity in distinguishing international organizations for the purpose of applying chapter VIII.

It may be useful, therefore, to distinguish in this respect between six types of international organization:

- **Global**: Universal or near-universal membership from all world regions
- **Trans-national**: Membership from all or many regions of the world but whose membership is confined to a selective criterion that precludes universality (political, religious, cultural);
- **Cross-Regional**: Operational focus on one region but whose membership extends beyond it;
- **Regional**: Operational focus on a region and whose membership equates totally or near-totally with the region, with no external membership.
- **Sub-Regional**: Operational focus on a sub-region within a ‘parent region’, and whose membership equates totally or near-totally with the sub-region, with no external membership.
Cross-Sub-Regional: Operational focus on a sub-region but whose membership extends beyond the sub-region to include other members with (but not beyond) the ‘parent region’.

II. Focal Area: Geographical Application of the Mandate

The second area of uncertainty concerns the geographical territory for which the organization is responsible. Some organizations have a clearly-defined area of application; others do not. Some are clearly intended to have global scope in their area of application; others have regional or sub-regional area focus.

This issue is closely comparable to the membership typology. The difference is, however, that some organizations may have a focal area that extends beyond their precise membership. This is important for distinguishing between those with a genuine ‘internal focus’ and those that may have an ‘external focus’ as well – a distinction that has important implications for any partner relationship with the UN.


In the broader sweep of institutional development of the ‘architecture of peace’ the art of conflict prevention and management remains rudimentary and imprecise. Two shortcomings afflict the current state of the art. There remains some conceptual overlap and confusion in the terminology employed. And in some cases the relationship of UN operations to a precise Charter provision remains unclear.

In the current terminology the fundamental distinctions are between peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and collective security.

Peacekeeping is now seen as of two kinds: ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’. The former pertains to verification of mutually-agreed ceasefires following a truce and with the consent of the belligerent parties (a tool for conflict containment where force is to be used only in self-defence). The latter involves more complex, multidimensional mandates that extend beyond ceasefire verification to encompass a broad range of post-conflict activities and that extend to the use of force
beyond self-defence – the ‘robust’ enforcement mandates required to enforce peace agreements against ‘minor order challenges’.

Some peacekeeping missions have a peace enforcement dimension, and thus the concepts of peacekeeping and peace enforcement can overlap, with important constitutional consequences. Indeed, if ‘traditional peacekeeping’ is seen as part of chapter VI of the Charter, then regional agencies are free to undertake such missions on their own initiative under article 52 and without Security Council authorization. A ‘peace enforcement’ mission however, is part of Chapter VII and a regional agency can only undertake it under Security Council authorization (article 53).

Peace-enforcement is a complex and politically controversial concept. It is essentially to be seen as a tool for governing and implementing a peace agreement. Coined in the 1992 report ‘Agenda for Peace’ to fill the void between the pacific settlement activities (Chapter VI) and inter-state collective security measures (Chapter VII), it was envisaged as the more controlled response to military force against ‘threats of a lesser order’. The concept is, however, fraught with difficulties, since the UN was prevented from developing its own peace enforcement units. The negative experiences with ‘peace-enforcement’ using traditional national military contingents in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia soured the concept, prompting a policy reversal by the United States from support for, to antipathy towards, UN peace enforcement. Thus the trend in recent years has been away from reliance on UN-commanded peace enforcement operations in favour of ‘hybrid operations’ in which the UN and other international organizations co-operate in various ways over the same mission.

Separate from the UN peace enforcement missions are military operations authorised by the UN to use force (‘all necessary means’) to achieve a stated objective without the necessary consent of the parties to a conflict. These operations however, usually act as precursors to subsequent UN peacekeeping missions, and may parallel them providing the ‘hard security’ protection for a ‘soft’ UN mission, and are entirely under the control of the participating States and not under UN command.

Finally, the concept of collective security pertains to traditional inter-state conflicts, comprising ‘aggression’ or ‘breach of the peace’, of the kind that preceded the UN and for which it was fundamentally designed to handle. Such UN-authorised military operations have been very rare (only two having occurred in the UN’s history – against North Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990).
As noted, ‘Agenda for Peace’ made it clear that a qualitative distinction was to be drawn between peace enforcement under article 40 and collective security against armed aggression under article 42. That distinction, however, has not been strictly maintained by the Council, which never specifies the precise article under which it is mounting an enforcement action. As a result, the major powers often afford themselves considerable latitude in interpreting both the constitutional provisions of the Charter and the specific language and meaning of a Security Council resolution. Thus the distinction between specific operations authorised by the Council and what is claimed to be ‘legitimate’ or even ‘legal’ can become blurred. Recent examples are Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.

IV. Implications for Regional Security

These complexities and uncertainties in UN terminology have implications for regional security. This has coincided with, and been partially reinforced by, the phenomenon of regional and sub-regional organizations stepping into conflict situations to fill a void created by the UN’s limitations and national indifference from the major powers. In the ‘maintenance of international peace and security’, involving peacekeeping, peace enforcement and collective security, regional organizations are ranging alongside the United Nations as indispensable strategic partners.

The inherent differences between regions in cultural, political and security terms, however, exacerbate the conceptual uncertainties over how peace support operations of the various kinds required to cope with today’s complex modern challenges can relate to the Charter provisions in a manner that promotes a uniform and consistent multilateral policy.

V. Peace Operations and the Charter: A Possible Schema

Some uncertainty also prevails over the precise constitutional context in which some of the UN peace operations involving ‘regional organizations’ are undertaken. It might therefore be useful to seek to relate the peace operations hitherto undertaken to the Charter provisions. The mandate of a ‘regional organization’ falls within chapter VIII, applicable to the entire ‘peace fabric’ (in normal chronological sequence: prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace building) on a regional, not global basis. Thus, Article 52 covers the regional dimension of peacemaking (‘pacific settlement’) laid out in chapter VI.
of the Charter, and perhaps by implication, prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building. Article 53 covers the regional dimension of enforcement laid out in chapter VII. Thus chapter VIII is the ‘regional microcosm’ of the global ‘fabric of peace’.

This typology has important implications for analysing the historical experience of ‘regional organizations’ in peace and security in the past; and perhaps for prescribing greater clarity of peace operations in the future as the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ is strengthened. Within the context of this three-dimensional matrix – membership, focal area and mandate – it is possible to classify all the international organizations with which the UN interacts on peace and security, all the activities they undertake within the context of the Charter, and all the locations in which those activities are undertaken.

VI. Formalising the Partnership: The Question of Criteria

As noted some confusion exists over precisely what comprises a regional or sub-regional organization and, accordingly, what organizations are to be seen as legitimate partners with the United Nations in the future development of a global-regional security mechanism. In the absence of any clear formal definition, the question arises of what criteria an entity must satisfy before it can be recognised as a ‘regional arrangement or agency’ by the United Nations. Without some formality and application of criteria, any grouping could, theoretically, ‘gain entry’. They are exogenous to the UN, and any formal ‘acceptance’ of each for the purposes of Chapter VIII should therefore require a specific and formal decision by the UN, just as nation-states’ credentials are formally accepted by the General Assembly before it can become a UN Member State.

Hitherto, four possible ways of classifying ‘regional partners’ with the UN have been observed: through General Assembly observer status, Secretariat invitation, Security Council appellation and self-proclamation. A detailed analysis shows that none is sufficient in itself. If the ‘global-regional security mechanism’ is to strengthen and acquire more ‘muscle definition’, there is a need for some other procedural mechanism for clarifying the partnership status – involving formal application, clear criteria and transparent decision-making – for developing the future partnership with the UN. If the ‘strategic choice’ is thus accepted for a formalisation of the partnership structure of regionalism with the UN, it would be necessary to develop a distinction between regional agencies for the purpose of chapter VIII of the Charter and all other international organizations.
5. **The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security**

Attaining a balance between flexibility and consistency in a future ‘regional-global security mechanism’ can be achieved if the underlying forces that shape global security today are fully comprehended. Three dimensions characterising the distinguishing features of regional security that support global security can be identified: cultural, political and legal. At bottom lies the cultural dimension: the need to understand the cultural factors that drive political perceptions and decision-making from country-to-country and region-to-region. Superimposed on societal cultures is the political dimension to regional security – the behaviour of the major powers within both the global security structure (the UN Security Council) and within a regional organization. Such political behaviour, in turn, addresses the legal issue of whether an action undertaken by a major power, a regional organization or even the Security Council itself is lawful. Thus a sound understanding of the cultural, political and legal dimensions of regional security is essential to any future realisation of the vision of a ‘regional-global security mechanism’.

I. **The Cultural Dimension**

Peace, declared the UN General Assembly, is not only the absence of conflict. Peace requires a ‘positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation’. The vision is thus of a pluralistic global society living harmoniously and addressing the emerging global problems in a rational, constructive manner. The fact that, as the Secretary-General observed, ‘we seem no longer to agree on what the main threats are, or on how to deal with them’ derives from different world-views held by our various societies that reflect differences in culture and perceptions.

The danger that regionalism might dilute global cohesion has always been entertained in the security debate; and this apprehension underpinned the ‘mild discouragement’ of regionalism in the UN Charter negotiations of the 1940s. The modern interpretation of this issue, however, is more optimistic, regionalist movements now being considered as ‘moves towards a global order with freer movement of goods, services, capital, money, people and ideas beyond the confines of the regions’.
The debate over human rights is highly attuned to the issue of culture, having acquired major significance in national societies and international relations. The balance between universality and particularity was explicitly captured for the first time in the 1993 Vienna Declaration, which accorded special recognition to the societal context of human rights. And successive General Assembly resolutions speak of the sovereign right of each State freely to choose and develop its political, economic and cultural systems. Most regions have indeed produced their own human rights charters.

The concept of ‘democracy’ is not to be found explicitly in the UN Charter but respect for ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental freedoms’ is one of the UN’s four stated purposes. Recent developments have emphasised the regional dimension of democracy. Several international conferences on new or restored democracies have been held with a conscious regard for regionality. The regions are to adopt regional declarations or charters ‘that are more catered to the conditions in the regions’ and that focus on regional collaboration for the promotion and support of democracy. In April 2004 the UN Human Rights Commission also resolved to invite regional, sub-regional and other organizations and arrangements to identify best practice and experience in democracy.

What does this have to do with the Security Council in its pursuit of international peace and security? The underlying issue has to do with the manner in which societies choose their social and political systems. Cultural domination or hegemony is often based on the exclusion of subordinate groups. Conflicts are often fought, ostensibly at least, on the promotion or repudiation of a particular social and political ideology or system. The task of peace-building, in particular, in today’s peace theology, draws from the nature of the ‘democratic society’ which the United Nations is bound to promote. It follows that the Security Council, if it is to take it upon itself to determine whether a particular Member State in a particular region is failing in its human rights or democratic obligations, needs to take into account ‘regional particularities’. In the Iraq crisis (2002-4) the adoption, as a post-invasion rationale, of the goal of promoting democracy in the Arab world risks overlooking the ‘regional particularities’ of the area in which the occupying powers became engaged. This included the need to consult the regional agency (Arab League) whose counsel was against an exogenously-conceived democracy imposed by force.

The cultural dimension underpinning a ‘regional-global security mechanism’ will prove critical to the manner in which it develops in future decades. The UN

Security Council stands to be better informed, at the interface where culture drives politics, by a more uniform input from regional agencies. Failure to recognise and acknowledge this, and to act on that acknowledgement, will promise more difficulty and conflict ahead. This is where culture, human security and terrorism intersect.

II. The Political Dimension

The political dimension of regional security essentially concerns the ‘comparative advantage’ of the global and regional approaches to peace and security. Is the world governed more effectively and more wisely by a single global hegemon exerting influence over the entire planet or by a number of regional hegemons performing the same role under delegated authority from the centre? Is global hegemony or regional hegemony preferable for international stability? Must they be seen in contradistinction or might they be reconciled within an ‘effective and mutually reinforcing multilateral mechanism’ for an integrating world?

The issue of regional hegemony contends with that of global legitimacy. In a world of ‘perfect regionalism’ each UN Member State would belong to one particular region. The UN Security Council could delegate responsibility for a conflict to one particular regional or sub-regional agency and remain uninvolved, leaving the agency with an unfettered hand to pursue, to good effect, conflict resolution and management and report back to the global body. The reality, however, is different, with an inextricable skein of inter-woven national interests competing between regional and exogenous states. In particular the position and role of one superpower, the United States, complicates any ‘perfect regionalism’ in the maintenance of international peace and security, being the only nation-state that can credibly claim to perceive the whole world as its ‘region’.

This poses further challenges for the development of a ‘regional-global security mechanism’. In reality every conflict situation delegated to an agency by the Council will nonetheless have the US national interest involved, along with those of the regional hegemon and other regional states. The issue of global and regional hegemonic legitimacy is not confined to the United States. Some former colonial powers tend to see it as their ‘responsibility’ to intervene if circumstances in a conflict situation strike at what they perceive to be their vital national interests. Examples are the UK in Sierra Leone, France in Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire, and Belgium in Rwanda. In each case national political interests and regional security interests are closely related.
A related issue is whether the relativities between ‘security regions’ themselves and between them and the UN Security Council carry meaning. The political dimension of regional and global security, for example, inevitably evokes the issue of permanent representation on the UN Security Council. In the development of the ‘regional-global security mechanism’, the power differential between Member States of the Security Council (both the permanent five and the elected ten), and between them and regional hegemons, will be a crucial factor. It is instructive to explore this in assessing the merit of ‘regional representation’ on the Council in the event of significant Council reform at some stage in the future.

The Security Council, in 2004, does in fact reflect a clear ‘global primacy’ in terms of objective realities of military and economic power, financial contribution and global population. It accounts, on average, for over two-thirds of global military expenditure, well over half of the global economy, over half the financial contributions and two-fifths of the global population. These statistics are significant in terms of the ever-evolving concept of ‘global legitimacy’. The proportion of global representation, however, declines progressively from ‘hard’ power (military, and then economic) towards ‘soft power’ (finances, and then population). This succinctly captures the dilemma of UN reform in the early 21st century.

The five permanent members rank high in military spending and financial contributions to peacekeeping. But again, with the ‘new legitimacy’ factor of population, and also UN peacekeeping troop contributions, their claims are not strong. This raises the question whether, in developing the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ for the next century, greater regard should perhaps be paid henceforth to ‘security regionalism’. Whatever the future holds in this respect, clearly the rise of ‘security regionalism’ is destined to have a powerful effect on the composition and functioning of the UN Security Council in the 21st century. The political dimension of regional-global security will need increasingly to take into account the broader factors of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, more than has been the case in the past.

### III. The Legal Dimension

The relationship between politics and the law has always been a tenuous one at the international level. The extent to which states hew to the strictures of international law is itself a debatable point. On the one hand they will go to great lengths to cloak their political and military actions in the flexible garb of legal precepts. On the other hand governments, and even scholars, are prone to argue
that the law must adapt to changing political realities, particularly in a time of flux such as the present.

In exploring the legal dimension of ‘security regionalism’, the essential distinction to be drawn is that between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ security. Chapter VIII of the Charter encourages regional agencies to take initiatives in ‘soft’ security but imposes tight constraints upon them in ‘hard’ security. Regional agencies may take initiatives under article 52 in prevention and pacific settlement and peace-building, but article 53 precludes them from taking such initiatives on their own in enforcement. Yet how often, and how egregiously, has such enforcement action been undertaken, in advance of Security Council authorisation?

In the aftermath of the Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq experiences, there is a growing tendency in Western circles to distinguish between the ‘legitimate’ and the ‘legal’. Legal opinions on the merits of national policies in conflict situations often cover a range of positions reflecting particular political interests. The issue of armed intervention is, in general, politically controversial and legally contestable. Two issues in particular are germane to the constructive development of a ‘regional-global security mechanism’: armed intervention and self-defence.

**Armed Intervention** - There is no dispute that interventions with armed force without Security Council authorisation (explicit or implicit) are a violation of the Charter and international law. What is more disputable is the occasional retroactive approval given by the Council. Strictly, retroactive authorisations are incompatible with the Charter and as such are violations of international law. The general view advanced by governments is that the primacy of the Security Council must continue to be upheld, and thus that only advance authorisation is permissible. The problem, however, is that the Council’s historical record on this matter does nothing to inspire confidence that it will apply such standards with any rigour. If the primacy of the Council is to be genuinely reasserted, the onus will be on the Council itself to ensure that the constitutional provisions that grant it such far-ranging powers are safeguarded and respected. In a world of instantaneous telecommunications and continual Council sessions, only advance Council approval of enforcement action can be accepted.

**Self-Defence** - The self-defence provision of the UN Charter, article 51, has ‘ballooned out’ over the past half-century to become the most oft-cited and flexibly-interpreted legal justification for armed action. This was never intended by the framers of the Charter and it is not conducive to the strengthening of the collective security system. The Security Council was not given explicit provision to judge the legal, or even the political, validity of a claim of self-defence. Member States are required simply to notify it of actions taken. Notable examples of
The most problematic case of self-defence in recent times concerns the US-led intervention in Afghanistan. The legal justification for Operation Enduring Freedom had been SCR 1368, recalling the right of self-defence and the Security Council’s readiness to ‘take all necessary steps’ to combat all forms of terrorism. Three years later, however, the Enduring Freedom coalition continues to remain in Afghanistan with the objective of eradicating terrorism – still under the justification of self-defence. This raises the question of when a so-called ‘self-defence’ operation might be seen to have lapsed. Article 51 allows the right of self-defence only until such time as the Council has taken ‘necessary measures’ to maintain the peace. No criteria have been developed by the UN Security Council for judging either the original validity of a self-defence operation or the time-limit. But in the case of Afghanistan, the Council had, by early 2002, taken such measures through ISAF and UNAMA, yet, three years later, the self-defence operation against terrorism through Enduring Freedom continues. It may be contended that the justification for Operation Enduring Freedom has switched from US ‘self-defence’ to an Afghanistan ‘request’ for continuation of the operation. If this is the case, it simply highlights the lack of transparency in such matters and the need for a practice whereby requests for foreign troop presence should be notified to the Security Council. Perhaps such requests should even be subject to Council approval – as is implicitly the case with Council resolution 1559 of September 2004 regarding Syria’s presence in Lebanon.

A variant of self-defence is the ‘protection of nationals’ policy, which has been used to justify other cases of armed intervention. This has prompted intervention in a number of Cold War and post-Cold War cases, such as Belgian intervention in DR Congo (1960) or British intervention in Sierra Leone (1997). Armed intervention for the protection of nationals is generally regarded as a customary right in international law that long preceded the UN Charter. When the operation is short and swift and operationally confined to the sole objective of rescuing specified individuals, it is generally condoned. When it is used as a cover for the continued presence of foreign troops and the nationals no longer remain the focus, it clearly violates the Charter.

A strengthened ‘regional-global security mechanism’, in which regional agencies would have a more direct input into Security Council deliberations, is likely to have an effect on the Council’s policy on intervention. As noted earlier the self-defence article was introduced in response to concerns that the absence of an effective system of regional security in the UN Charter could leave some regions...
vulnerable to external aggression. The concept of collective self-defence was thus introduced. But the inclusion in article 51 of individual self-defence as well as the collective self-defence broadened the issue irremediably. It essentially accorded the major powers that possess global reach a potential justification for intervention anywhere.

If conflict management were left to regional agencies rather than to the UN Security Council, it is likely that self-defence of the traditional kind would be significantly curtailed. Regional agencies would most probably be more inclined to look to regional collective security as the means to respond to aggression and there would, moreover, be less inclination, and certainly less scope, to ‘reach beyond the region’ in the name of self-defence.

The above considerations, however, pertain to the traditional notion of self-defence. In the modern age, a novel notion of self-defence has emerged. In a globalising world where the ‘new realities’ of terrorism and WMD proliferation make any society anywhere on the planet vulnerable to ‘attack’, the notion of self-defence has become commensurately global – an attack on buildings in New York is answered with regime change in Kabul. The unpredictable and lightning nature of such an attack has also prompted the extension of self-defence, at least on the part of the United States, to include pre-emptive strikes.

While neither of these features – global application and pre-emptive action – is new, the circumstances in which they have been prosecuted in recent years are new. Pre-emption was traditionally confined to a response to the massing of armies along a border in times of acute bilateral tension. Today the modern concept of self-defence is shaped by massive explosions in major world cities, carrying immediate implications for global stability and evoking an immediate global response. In such 21st century scenarios the universal role of the UN Security Council is self-evident. Regional agencies are subordinate to the need of the Security Council to marshal a global response to a global threat.

If the aggressive action depicts a globalising world today in both a spatial and a temporal sense, it is logical that the response will be of the same order. The individual has entered the international scene and the concept of civilian protection is undergoing a conceptual transformation from national defence to global prosecution. The Security Council has the responsibility of responding to interstate aggression. But non-state aggression by private groups against states is relatively new. The question is what is the correct body for responding to attacks by individuals or groups. The Security Council responds to private aggression as if it is a refined case of traditional aggression – but a military response to private aggression is proving to be an inappropriate strategy. There is possibly a
need to consider another body designed for applying the rule of law – criminal investigation, apprehension, prosecution and conviction – at the global level.

Regional agencies will have a role in this. Their interaction with the Security Council on the ‘modern threats’ of terrorism and proliferation is already on the agenda as a result of the Council’s two meetings in 2003 – the first on counter-terrorism and the second on ‘new threats’. But the extent to which a stronger role for regionalism in security affects the issue of ‘self-defence’ depends on the evolution in the above normative considerations.
6. Central Findings

In 1945, the provisions of the UN Charter gave a ‘mild discouragement’ to regional agencies in the international ‘architecture of peace’. Six decades later, the President of the Security Council acknowledges the evidence of the contemporary era – that it is addressing ‘one of the main issues in modern thinking on international relations’ when it focuses on the role of regional organizations. This does not mean that the Charter is to be rewritten – regional security councils supplanting the central body in power and influence. What it does mean, however, is that a balance will be sought in which regionalism and universalism will come to mutual terms, developing the means of effective co-operation to an extent perhaps even unimagined until now.

It is therefore necessary to develop a clear analytical understanding of the present state of the UN-regional relationship before giving prescriptive thought to what might be achieved in the future. In this sense, three central findings must be drawn:

I. ‘Legitimacy’

A flexible and consistent ‘regional-global security mechanism’ is essential to the legitimacy of the UN Security Council in the 21st century. The Council is evolving away from its original role as the international community’s instrument for maintaining peace through responding to inter-state aggression. This trend is being led by the major powers themselves. With that evolution the objective of ensuring a balanced input into Council deliberations from all regions, with different historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, changes from an ideal to an imperative. Even the United States itself is on record as favouring an increasing reliance on regional agencies for peace and security. With the passage of time a political consensus is likely to develop that increasingly acknowledges this need, and efforts will commence to shape guidelines and precepts for strengthening that mechanism. As the Council continues to evolve into a body of global governance, its composition will need to reflect not only military power but also demographic and economic power.

1. An additional 21 specific findings and conclusions are contained in the longer version of this paper.
II. Burden Sharing

A greater role by regional agencies in peace and security would relieve the United Nations of part of the burden it currently faces in this area. This would entail streamlining the relationship regional agencies have with the Security Council. The way to strengthen and develop the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ is to further clarify, and to some extent formalize, the ‘comparative advantage’ of each ‘partner organization’ in its contribution to international peace and security under UN auspices.

III. Constitutional Clarity

The principal shortcoming in the fledgling ‘regional-global security mechanism’ in the early 21st century is the constitutional lacuna in the relationship between the UN and regional agencies. While the UN Charter provides for the existence of regional agencies and gives broad direction to their functional relationship with the Security Council, it is silent on their constitutional relationship. Regional organizations have sprouted around the world independently of the United Nations and often answer to different political needs and aspirations. There is therefore a need for greater clarity in the way in which the United Nations perceives regional agencies, distinguishes them from other international organizations, formally recognizes them and accords them delegated responsibilities.
7. **Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: Towards a Schematic Model**

For the purpose of clarifying the ‘regional-global security mechanism’, two fundamental concepts are advanced for consideration – the identification of ‘security regions’ for the maintenance of peace and security; and the identification of a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ for each ‘security region’, with roles derived from chapter VIII of the UN Charter. If these two innovations are developed, they are likely to have implications for UN Security Council reform.

### I. A Structure of ‘Security Regions’

For the purpose of constructing a ‘regional-global mechanism’ that can be effective in the area of peace and security, it might be useful to arrive at a common understanding of a ‘region’ for the practical purposes of chapter VIII of the Charter. To this end it is suggested, as a first fundamental proposal, that a series of ‘security regions’, contiguous but not overlapping, be identified by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council.

In determining how such ‘security regions’ might be identified, three factors would need to be considered.

- **Geography – The Primary Pattern:** The departure point for regionalism in peace and security, if not the exclusive criterion, has to be geography. This delineation would lead to a natural division of the world in the five geographic continents: Africa, Europe, Asia, Australia and America.

- **Culture, Ethnicity and Language – The Secondary Pattern:** Closely related to and complicating the primary pattern is the cultural factor, in particular the location and spread of ethnic groups with their various distinguishing characteristics, particularly linguistic and religious. Historical factors of ancestral migration and contemporary socio-political engineering have resulted in a dizzying mosaic of the 3,000 or so languages still spoken around the world – especially in areas where certain regions ‘collide’ or where post-colonial traces of forced migration linger.

- **Geostrategic Politics – The ‘Qualifying Factor’:** From this departure point, issues of geo-strategic politics begin to intrude. Europe’s border
with Asia is problematic. Should the Pacific, with its vast size, unique culture yet small and scattered population, be seen as a separate ‘security region’? Is North America, distinct culturally and politically with the rest of the Americas, a separate ‘security region’? Is the Arab world, straddling two continents and culturally and politically distinctive, naturally a ‘security region’? Is Asia, with its cultural heterogeneity and vast population, one or several ‘security regions’? The ‘boundaries issue’ – where one ‘security region’ ends and another begins – must also be addressed, Caucasia and Eastern Europe being the most problematic cases.

These geo-strategic and politico-cultural considerations preclude a simple clarity in respect of ‘security regions’. But having regard to the above considerations, the following structure of eight ‘security regions’ is proposed:

- Sub-Saharan Africa
- North Africa-West Asia
- Europe
- Central Asia – Caucasia
- South Asia
- East Asia
- Southeast Asia – Pacific
- America

II. A Structure of ‘Chapter VIII Regional Agencies’

If the ‘strategic choice’ is accepted for a formalisation of the ‘partnership structure’ of regionalism with the United Nations, then it would be necessary to develop a distinction between regional agencies for the purpose of chapter VIII of the Charter and all other international organizations. While all organizations would have a genuine partnership relationship with the UN, the designation of a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ would be acknowledged as separate and distinct. How might this be done?

The second fundamental proposal of this study is that a set of regional agencies be identified, corresponding to each ‘security region’. The responsible agency would be the agency for a region which most closely approximates the full and exclusive membership of the ‘security region’. A ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ would have two principal roles: institutional and executive.
- The Institutional Role: A ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ would have two institutional functions: representation and reporting. The eight ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ would replace the anachronistic informal electoral groupings (still reflecting Cold War delineations) and act as the eight-fold institutional mechanism through which a certain number of UN Member States for each agency would be elected, including the permanent five. As for the reporting function, each agency would be responsible, acting either directly or through one of its Member States on the Security Council, for keeping the Council informed about the security situation in its ‘security region’.

- The Executive Role: The executive role would involve acting as an executive agent on behalf of the Security Council in carrying out the Council’s recommendations (in pacific settlement) and decisions (in enforcement). The existence of a mechanism for regional pacific settlement would, given the significance of article 52 of the Charter, be seen as a necessary condition of a ‘chapter VIII agency’. But, since article 53 implies that the use of a regional agency for enforcement is at the discretion of the Council, an enforcement capacity would not be seen as a necessary condition of a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. Indeed, enforcement could be carried out by any international organization – regional, trans-national or sub-regional – that had the capacity and which the Council might call upon. Thus NATO, as a trans-regional organization, might undertake enforcement on behalf of the Security Council, while the African Union as a regional agency or ECOWAS as a sub-regional agency, might do the same. But in every case, the advance authorisation of the Council remains mandatory.

III. Identifying Possible ‘Chapter VIII Regional Agencies’

In order to identify the agency to be responsible for each security region, three obvious criteria emerge: membership, mandate and focal area. A fourth criterion might be the operational relationship already developed with the United Nations. Based on these criteria, there would appear to be four organizations which would be self-evidently ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’. In two cases, political care would be required in determining the correct agency. And two cases would require further political evolution in their development. Thus:
Cases Requiring Care – Identifying the appropriate ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ requires care in two cases.

The issue is particularly difficult for Europe, having regard to the criteria of membership, focal area, mandate and co-operative links with the UN. The COE qualifies more genuinely as a pan-European agency than the EU does with regard to membership and focal area. Neither qualifies, in fact, in terms of mandate, each lacking a formal internal dispute settlement mechanism. And although the EU aspires to become a genuine ‘global actor’ and while the UN is keen to strengthen an operational partnership with it for enforcement purposes, it appears that the EU does not consider itself to be a regional agency for the purposes of chapter VIII. The COE, however, does engage in ‘soft security’ issues of early warning, conflict prevention and peace-building, eschewing any enforcement capacity. It has developed the concept of ‘citizen security’ which is virtually identical to that of ‘human security’ which is now on the UN agenda. It could therefore be that the COE might qualify as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ while co-operating closely with the EU in this role. For its part, it is likely that the EU has a different, and indeed, unique future as a security partner with the UN including, one day perhaps, a Council seat as the European Parliament has proposed. But this would require an evolutionary time-frame as well.

A different issue would arise for South-east Asia-Pacific where two autonomous regional organizations exist separately for South-east Asia (ASEAN) and the Pacific (PIF). While there is a plausible reason to perceive the Pacific as a sepa-

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rate 'security region' with its own separate 'chapter VIII agency', this would place undue pressure on the distribution of seats in a Council of 24 members. Given the modest population size of the sixteen Pacific countries (31 million), the most logical arrangement would be to regard the two areas as one 'security region'. South-east Asia, with its larger population (530 m.) would naturally be seen as the larger partner in an institutional sense, with ASEAN thus as the lead 'chapter VIII agency'. This would not preclude the PIF playing a collaborative role alongside ASEAN, and indeed appearing before the Council on issues of direct security concern to the Pacific.

Two Evolutionary Cases – Two 'security regions' would require considerable evolution in their security self-perceptions. In one case (South Asia) the question of mandate is a problem, considering that the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) would need to adopt a security function before it assumed such a role in reporting to the Council. In a second case (East Asia) the complete absence of a regional agency suggests that some time will pass before this issue is resolved. Yet in November 2004 China proposed an East Asian Community (albeit including South-east Asia), envisaging both an economic and a security function, as a medium-term goal.

Passive States – The problem of overlapping membership constitutes an unavoidable weakness of any chapter VIII arrangement. A possible solution – that the overlapping states remain ‘passive’ in one of the agencies – could prove difficult to implement. No sovereign State could be ‘instructed’ to remain ‘passive’ within an international organization of which it is a full member. In pursuing its vital interests in regional peace and security, a State must be expected to act with more-or-less sovereign freedom. Arab countries of North Africa clearly have a vital stake in the outcome of the Darfur crisis in Sudan, which is the subject primarily of the AU’s attention. They could not be told to remain ‘passive’ in that organization on this issue, for example. The concept of ‘passivity’ must therefore be taken as a relative term; offering guidance to the ‘overlapping states’ in a second agency. The solution to this problem, to the extent it exists, would lie in the level of co-operation between the adjacent agencies. In the case of Sudan, for example, the LAS appears to be co-operating well with the AU.

Unattached States – At present, the agencies identified (including one putative body for East Asia) would cover 185 of the 191 UN Member States. Six states however, stand out – Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, Israel, Monaco and East-Timor. Over time four of these are likely to join one of the above regional agencies.1 Two, however (Iran, Israel) are likely to remain sui generis in respect of

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1. In October 2004, Monaco joined the Council of Europe.
security regionalism. The problem of ‘unattached states’, however, is not prohibitive. They can be acknowledged to have separate ‘reporting rights’ to the Security Council (which are already guaranteed, in any event, under article 35.2 of the Charter). The only obligation upon them in this respect is an advance acceptance of pacific settlement of any dispute which they may be involved in.

Role of Other International Organizations – Identification of ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ leaves open the question of what role other international organizations might have. As noted, an executive role, especially in enforcement, is not precluded for all other such organizations. In fact, both NATO (a cross-regional organization) and the EU (sui generis but perhaps seen as a sub-regional) do not see themselves as regional agencies for the purpose of chapter VIII. The OSCE has declared itself to be a ‘chapter VIII agency’ yet it is perhaps more accurately seen as a cross-regional. In any of these cases, the Security Council is free to call upon them for pacific settlement or enforcement action.

IV. The Constitutional Position of the United Nations

The procedure by which ‘security regions’ and ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ are identified would itself need to be carefully considered. Constitutionally, the United Nations is not empowered under the Charter to engage in such a selection exercise. The regional organizations have emerged through autochthonous processes, answering to needs and aspirations pertaining more directly to particular regions than to considerations of global security.

That is not to say that the two are not closely related or that global and regional security considerations cannot be satisfactorily reconciled in this respect. But it does raise the question of which institutions – the global body through the Security Council or the regional bodies through relevant organizations – are best placed to take the initiative to develop such an institutional structure. It would seem that the Council is the appropriate body to initiate matters – being empowered under the Charter at least to deal with ‘regional agencies’. But it is not so empowered to ‘direct’ which agencies ‘shall’ form such a structure. The Council could, perhaps, ‘invite’ certain agencies to develop a closer relationship. The identification of a regional agency for the purposes of a formal ‘regional partnership’ with the United Nations would not be lightly achieved. It would carry considerable political implications and would need to be handled with discretion. Such a step is, however, possible.
V. Implications for Security Council Reform

The identification of ‘security regions’ and associated ‘chapter VIII agencies’ could have implications for Security Council reform – through the issue of membership. It is now generally agreed that an enlarged membership is necessary so that the Council can be more representative and legitimate. Disagreement has existed, however, over whether there should be more permanent members. Two developed countries, Germany and Japan, are seeking permanent membership, but this has opposition both from neighbouring developed countries and from the South. Suggestions that major countries from the South (such as Brazil, India and Egypt, and perhaps South Africa or Nigeria) should as well be given permanent membership also encounter opposition from close neighbours. The granting of the veto to such new permanent members is also contentious.

It is also generally recognized that a new electoral system is needed. One of the alternative formulae put forward within the UN working group has involved the idea of regional representation – not ‘direct representation’ in the form of a regional agency but ‘indirect representation’ through a Member State (the specific state changing through rotation) representing a region. Five seats have been proposed, for example, for each of Africa, Asia, Latin America/Caribbean, Europe and the Arab group. Agreement, however, is proving to be elusive on this issue as well.

The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has recommended an expanded Security Council of 24 members. The Council, unable to agree on one model of expansion, has offered two models for the consideration of Member States. Both models envisage membership being distributed according to four ‘regional areas’ – Africa; Asia-Pacific; Europe; Americas. Thus:

Model A

- Continuation of the P-5 with veto power: 5 P
- Six new permanent members without veto: 6 P
- Three extra rotating two-year seats: 13 E

Total: 24

Model B

- Continuation of the P-5 with veto power: 5 P
- Eight new rotating but renewable four-year seats (‘semi-permanent’): 8 P
- Three extra rotating two-year seats: 11 E

Total: 24
These models, based as they are on the principle of ‘regionalism’ (for the first time in the context of the Security Council), offer a potential breakthrough in what has been a decade-long stalemate in the reform exercise. The Panel does not, however, explore the country-breakdown of the four regions, the strategic implications for global security of such regional membership, or the institutional implications for the regional, sub-regional and other organizations that are increasingly partnering with the UN in peace and security. While the expansion to 24 and the principle of regionalism are steps forward, the choice of four large and disparate regions is a generalised way of applying that principle – which leaves some strategic and ‘political-cultural’ issues unresolved.

The Annex to this paper explores these considerations in more detail. The tables depict the Security Council in three scenarios, viz., according to its current size and format (15 members); the four ‘regional areas’ in the two models of the Panel’s report (24 members); and the ‘eight security regions’ and ‘chapter VIII agencies’ proposed in this paper (24 members).

The criteria used in the Annex to facilitate more detailed consideration rest on two concepts: the ‘regional state spread’ (RSS) and the ‘regional population spread’ (RPS). Clearly the democratic dimension of such an expanded Council, and hence its legitimacy, would be improved through use of a larger number of (eight) security regions and security agencies. Such an arrangement would also facilitate the ability of the Council to rely more systematically on regional agencies for monitoring the security situation around the world.

It will be important, however, to avoid unnecessary confusion in the debate on Council expansion that is about to commence over the next nine months. The Panel’s identification of four ‘regional areas’ should perhaps be accepted, for the foreseeable future, as the basis for decisions in 2005-6 on expansion and selection of new members. But the further identification of eight ‘security regions’ and ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ is not incompatible with these issues, and could be explored at a subsequent time and in a more measured, evolutionary, context – over the next decade.
8. **Recommendations**

Nine recommendations are advanced with respect to ensuring greater constitutional clarity in the UN-regional organization relationship, refinement of the ‘guiding principles’, and reformulation of some doctrinal precepts of the global security system.

1. **Identification of ‘Security Regions’**
   The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council, could identify specific and separate ‘security regions’ for the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ – that do not overlap and which encompass virtually every UN member state.

2. **Identification of ‘Chapter VIII Regional Agencies’**
   The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council, could identify one ‘responsible regional agency’ for each ‘security region’ whose membership is coterminous with the states located in the ‘security region’ and which are accorded special ‘chapter VIII responsibilities’ – each to be regarded as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. It would be understood that this would be an evolutionary exercise, with the Council identifying those regional agencies that meet the stipulated criteria as and when appropriate.

3. **Acceptance of Selected Organizations as ‘UN Partners for Peace’**
   The Security Council could introduce an arrangement of ‘UN Partners for Peace’ with the designated agencies of ‘security regions’, and other selected international organizations.

4. **Constitutional Principles**
   The General Assembly could consider adopting, on the recommendation of the Security Council, a set of ‘constitutional principles’ for the partnership between the UN and regional agencies and other international organizations.

5. **A ‘Consultative Framework’**
   A ‘Consultative Framework’ could be established to govern the strategic and planning relationship between the United Nations and all partner organizations in peace and security.
6. Implementation

The United Nations could, as the first step in the ‘Partnership for Peace’, commence a process with regional agencies and other partners to ensure more effective implementation of the ‘functional principles’ of co-operation in conflict prevention and peace-building.

7. Regional Reviews

The Secretary-General could invite regional agencies to undertake a review of the security situation in their region and its relationship to the global security situation, focusing in particular on the threats and challenges faced by the international community in the 21st century.

8. A ‘Regional Peace and Security’ Concept

The UN Security Council could distinguish more clearly between a ‘threat to regional peace and security’ and a ‘threat to international peace and security’.

9. Security Council Reform

The General Assembly could consider exploring the implications of regionalism for Security Council reform, through allocating permanent membership to the ‘chapter VIII agencies’; such membership to be filled by individual member states representing the agencies on a rotational basis.
ANNEX – REGIONALISM IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL: A VISION FOR 2010

This Annex explores the implications of introducing ‘security regionalism’ and ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ for UN Security Council reform. In particular it explores the potential improvement for Council legitimacy and authority that might be gained by adopting the representative role of ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ (as advanced in section 7).

One ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ would be assigned responsibility for its ‘security region’ vis-à-vis the Council. The ‘security regions’, the ‘chapter VIII agencies’, and the corresponding composition of the Security Council membership are apparent in the tables below.

Table A1 (page 45) shows the current Council membership of 15 States based on the current electoral mechanism, compared with an enlarged Council of 24 States in Tables B (page 45) and C (page 46). Table B is based on the two models offered by the UN High-Level Panel, while Table C is based on the ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ mechanism advanced in this paper.

Two criteria are employed for each ‘security region’:

- the ‘regional state spread’ (RSS), i.e. the range in the number of regional States per Council seat for each region;
- the ‘regional population spread’ (RPS), i.e. the range in the average population size for each Council seat for each region.

Council Expansion from 15 to 24 Members

The implications of the criteria are far-reaching. The comparison shows that, compared with the present Security Council that was elected for 2004 under the current electoral group mechanism, considerable improvements will be achieved.

1. For the purpose of analysis, Table A shows the current membership based on the postulated eight ‘security regions’, not reflecting the current electoral mechanism of five groupings observed in the UN since 1963 (viz. Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Western European & Others, and Latin American/Caribbean).
in both the RSS and the RPS if the Council is expanded to 24 members. Specifically:

- the number of States per seat improves from 13 (Table A) to 8 (Tables B and C);
- the RSS improves from 19 States today (Table A) to 12 in the case of eight regions in Table C; and improves further to 3.5 in the case of four regions in Table B; and
- the population per seat improves from 411 million (Table A) to 257 million (Tables B and C);
- the RPS improves from 1.35 billion today (Table A) to 476 million with the Panel’s two models (Table B) and, even better, to 385 m. in the case of the eight ‘security regions’.

Regional Implications of Four and Eight ‘Regions’

The comparisons are more complicated between the UN Panel’s two models (Table B) and the eight ‘security regions proposed in this paper (Table C). Specifically:

- In the Panel’s scenario, Asia-Pacific is disadvantaged through having an average population per Council seat of 612 m. compared with the other three regions whose populations are closely grouped around 140 m.. When eight ‘security regions’ are identified, Asia-Pacific is offered a more democratic representation (with East Asia at 494 m. and South Asia at 343 m., compared with other regions ranging from 109 m. to 281 m.);
- The RSS has a greater range in the case of eight regions because the number of East Asian and South Asian States is so few. But this is compensated for by their huge population sizes, and it is the democratic dimension of the RPS that should carry greater import in Council representation.

Cultural and Strategic Implications of ‘Regionality’

In addition to the statistical dimension identified above, the cultural and strategic considerations are of critical importance. The Panel’s four regions take no account of the existing regional organizations – with a number of such agencies being included within the Asia-Pacific region. With only four large regions identified, there is no indication as to any sub-regional allocation. Nor does it accord recognition to the cultural and institutional fact of the Arab world.
In comparison, the eight regions advanced in this paper adopt the same regional identification for Africa, Europe and the Americas (and by implication regional agencies); but also perceives Asia-Pacific to be composed of an additional five rather than one region and agency. In this way, the strategic and cultural aspects of the Arab world, and Central, South, East and South-east Asia plus the Pacific are taken into account. There is, nonetheless, still scope for sub-regional allocation where appropriate.

Clearly, the various merits of the alternative models of security regionalism will need to be thought through carefully over the next year. Whatever the final decisions may be, it seems that ‘security regionalism’ will become a potent factor in any future agreement on Security Council reform. Under the scenarios of eight regions and agencies advanced in this paper, however, the influence of ‘security regionalism’ is carried several steps further, based on the following considerations:

- ‘Security regions’ would each have separate and distinct identity;
- Chapter VIII of the Charter would be given substantive meaning in peace and security, commensurate with the increasing reliance now being given to regional agencies;
- There would be no need for expanded permanent membership on a national basis, since permanency for major States could be ensured on a de facto manner through wider and more equitable regional representation.
- The ‘regional-global security mechanism’ envisioned by the UN Secretary-General would gain realisation through an expanded Council structured more formally along regional lines.
### Table A: Current Size (15 Members)
#### 2004 Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Region (S. R.)</th>
<th>Responsible Agency</th>
<th>S. R. Pop (million)</th>
<th>No. of Regional States</th>
<th>No. of UNSC Seats</th>
<th>‘Regional Spread’: UNSC seats per P-5 States per seat</th>
<th>Pop. per seat (m.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa-West Asia</td>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>COE&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia - Caucasus</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>ASEAN/PF&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattached</td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total/average</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,165</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Excluding Russia and the three Caucasian states  
<sup>b</sup> For representation purposes at the UN, Taiwan is not seen as a UN constituent Member State.  
<sup>c</sup> Excluding Cook Islands and Niue, not being UN Member States (whose combined populations total some 22,000).  
<sup>d</sup> These ranges reflect absolute differences only, between maximum and minimum figures.

### Table B: Expanded Size (24 members)
#### Models A and B Presented by the UN HLP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Region (S. R.)</th>
<th>Responsible Agency&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>S. R. Pop (million)</th>
<th>No. of Regional States</th>
<th>No. of UNSC Seats</th>
<th>‘Regional Spread’: UNSC seats per P-5 States per seat</th>
<th>Pop. per seat (m.)</th>
<th>Permanent Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>832</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td></td>
<td>3673</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>3 China + 2 China + 2 SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td>813</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>4 France, UK, Russia + 1 Russia + 2 SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td></td>
<td>847</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>2 USA + 1 USA + 2 SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattached</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total/Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,165</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>11 5 P + 8 SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> The High Level Panel has not pursued the issue of responsible agency.
### Table C: Expanded Size (24 Members)
Based on 8 ‘Security Regions’ and ‘Chapter VIII Security Agencies’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Region (S. R.)</th>
<th>Responsible Agency</th>
<th>S. R. Pop. (million)</th>
<th>No. of Regional States</th>
<th>No. of UNSC Seats</th>
<th>‘Regional Spread’</th>
<th>P-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Sahara Africa</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa-West Asia</td>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>COE*</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia -Caucasia</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>ASEAN/PIF</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattached</td>
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<td>110</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total/average</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,165</td>
<td>191</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>257</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
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<td>RPS</td>
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</table>

a. Excluding Russia and the three Caucasian states