










E Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European Union

Sven BISCOP (ed.)









EGMONT PAPER 7

**E Pluribus Unum?
Military Integration in the European Union**




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ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IRRI-KIIB)
BRUSSELS, JUNE 2005



ACADEMIA PRESS



The Egmont Papers are published by Academia Press for the **Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB)**, a Brussels-based non-partisan think-tank that works in close cooperation with the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Eekhout 2
9000 Gent
Tel. 09/233 80 88 Fax 09/233 14 09
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J. Story-Scientia bvba Wetenschappelijke Boekhandel
P. Van Duyseplein 8
B-9000 Gent
Tel. 09/225 57 57 Fax 09/233 14 09
Info@story.be www.story.be

ISBN 90 382
D/2005/4804/
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
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
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








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Preface

The adoption of the Headline Goal 2010 and the decision to create rapidly deployable ‘battlegroups’ are proof of the continued dynamism of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Yet, although major progress has been booked in recent years, and further important achievements can be expected in the short term, not all questions relating to ESDP have already been addressed by policy-makers. All EU Member States are engaged in the transformation of their armed forces. Because of budgetary constraints, this is necessarily a gradual process. Furthermore, for most of the Member States it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the traditional wide range of capabilities in army, navy and air force. This paper will set out to assess whether cooperation, pooling and specialisation in the framework of the EU can offer an answer to these challenges.

This Egmont Paper brings together contributions that were presented at an expert seminar on the topic. Including military and civilian experts from small and big and ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States, it offers a broad range of perspectives.




The first three contributions, by Radek KHOL, Richard GOWAN and Serge VAN CAMP, look at the short term. Are the battlegroups, the HG 2010 and the ECAP process sufficient to enable the Member States to complete the transformation of their armed forces *and* to produce all the capabilities that the EU needs? Will the battlegroups result in a number of Member States’ ‘red lines’ being crossed? How effective can the European Defence Agency be expected to be in auditing the capabilities that Member States contribute?

The second set of contributions, by Julian LINDLEY-FRENCH, Volker HEISE and the editor, takes a long-term perspective. How far should military integration go? Should ESDP encompass a larger portion or even the whole of (some) Member States’ armed forces? What are the options for pooling and specialisation? Which use can be made of ‘permanent structured cooperation’? Is some sort of ‘European army’ imaginable and what would be the consequences for national sovereignty and autonomy of action?

The seminar, which took place in the Egmont Palace in Brussels on 28 February 2005, was co-organized by the Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB, Brussels), the Royal Defence College (IRSD-KHID, Brussels), the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC, London) and the Centre d’études en sciences sociales de la Défense (C2SD, Paris).

Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP

Senior Research Fellow, Royal Institute for International Relations



1. Ongoing Cooperation Between Europe's Armed Forces

RADEK KHOL

*Head of the Centre for Security Analysis,
Institute of International Relations, Prague*

Transformation of European armed forces is well underway, largely under long-term pressure from NATO and EU capability improvement schemes like the Prague Capability Commitments (PCC – earlier the DCI) and the Headline Goal 2010 (HG). This process is driven by requirements for guaranteed availability, rapid deployment and usability of European forces in various roles, across the entire spectrum of military missions – from humanitarian operations, to traditional peacekeeping, crisis management, and up to combat missions. This is hardly surprising, given the position of Europe in the world, the growing consensus on the EU's role in security and defence activities carried out in and around Europe, and the clearly declared willingness of European States to act in support of other multilateral organizations, like the United Nations, in a wider world. In general terms, the transformation of European armed forces is also strongly backed by European citizens, who by and large feel secure in their own countries from remote threats of direct conventional military attack by another State and therefore accept the need to act beyond Europe's own territory or even well beyond the EU and NATO area.¹ Many European countries are moreover confident enough to contemplate deeper military integration on a bilateral or multilateral basis, even though such steps would have been unimaginable only 60 years ago and touch the very heart of sovereignty of individual EU Member States.

1. See Eurobarometer No. 62 (Autumn 2004), which found support for a European common security and defence policy at a record level of 78%. http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62first_en.pdf, pp. 22-23. Even in the new EU Member States that joined NATO in 1999, support is remarkably strong: Poland – 85%, the Czech Republic – 84%, Hungary – 84%.



Challenges for Small and Medium-Sized Countries


Military transformation and the overall trend towards multiple deployment in various multinational operations abroad present specific challenges for smaller and medium-sized countries, which at the moment already, and even more so after the next wave of enlargement (Bulgaria and Romania probably in 2007 or 2008, later also Croatia), represent an absolute majority of EU Member States. Only six (France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Poland and Spain) out of the EU-25 could be regarded as big Member States, which is reflected in their status as European military powers and their connected ambitions, supported by actual or potential capabilities enabling them to act as framework nations in EU or NATO-led operations. All the other Member States however face a similar difficult set of challenges and choices to be made.

First of all, the smaller and medium-sized Member States have to deal with participation in simultaneous operations in several theatres deemed crucial for EU/ NATO interests or for special national concerns. These theatres comprise in general four broader geographic areas:

- unsettled parts of Europe: the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo), but one can also envisage operations in many places in Eastern Europe (Moldova, Ukraine, Kaliningrad);
- the Middle East: Iraq, Israel-Palestine;
- Central Asia – Afghanistan;
- Africa: the Great Lakes, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea etc.

Quite often Member States are forced to make hard choices: which operations need to be supplied with their own troops; from where could they withdraw after several dozen months of deployment in order to focus on other acute hot spots. Even medium-sized States with substantial political ambitions and substantial military capabilities had to follow this pattern, as illustrated by the example of the Netherlands, which decided to scale down its presence in Bosnia in 2002 and later to withdraw completely from US-led coalition forces Iraq in 2005.

Secondly, there are demanding qualitative requirements specified by the EU's battlegroups initiative and the NATO Response Force (NRF). Both are based on high-readiness professional units, available in 5-10 days after a political decision, fully interoperable and sustainable for up to 120 days (through rotation) almost anywhere in the world. These cannot be paper commitments; dependable tools tested through exercises and realistic multinational training are required.



European countries correctly prefer these initiatives to be complementary, rather than competing, in view of their demand for the same types of units and capabilities. An additional group of qualitative requirements in the area of key strategic enablers, like strategic airlift, C3I etc., is particularly difficult for the smaller Member States, who may see a solution through the EU Strategic Coordination Cell, embedded within the European Airlift Centre in Eindhoven or relying upon the Allied Movement Coordination Centre. They are certainly going to benefit from the Global Approach on Deployability as it moves ahead.

Small and medium-sized Member States face a fundamental choice. They can struggle on trying to maintain a full spectrum military in an ever shrinking format, or they can opt for two military integration strategies:

- pooling of resources and multinational cooperation in concrete capabilities projects or for deployment;
- specialization in the EU and NATO framework.²

Both strategies will act as a further impulse for the modernisation of their armed forces and imply the intentional or de facto admittance of reliance on other EU Member States for the execution of defence policy, thus giving up full independence in this area in return for better usability, and consequently also for a larger influence in the international arena. Yet, one should not delude oneself, for crucial decisions will be left to the highest *national* political authorities (governments, prime ministers, presidents) in at least two areas:




- increase and restructuring defence budgets;
- introducing radical solutions for deeper international cooperation.


While EU initiatives and schemes like the HG 2010 or the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) are beneficial, they are in themselves insufficient to bring about a radical change and much needed improvement. As most far-reaching decisions to deepen bilateral or multilateral military cooperation would have to be taken at the level of heads of state and government, a concrete initiative by the European Council may serve as a useful impulse here.

Adding to Complexity: Enlargement

The May 2004 EU enlargement brought not only 10 new countries, mostly from Central and Eastern Europe, but also a specific group of countries in military terms. Some of them (the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia) have so far been

2. For a more detailed overview of ways forward and strategic scenarios for EU-led operations see *European defence: A proposal for a White Paper*, Paris, EUISS, 2004.





able to sustain a relatively high level of defence spending in relative terms (around 2% GDP), although they still have rather low spending per capita or per soldier. These countries also face a difficult path to the modernization of their armed forces, which implies the need to invest in expensive assets like modern supersonic combat aircraft, fleets of armoured personnel carriers, precision-guided munitions etc. Some of the new EU members (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary) also still prefer to keep a careful balance between the requirements of territorial defence and out-of-area missions under NATO or EU aegis. Overall, they have a proven record of ability and willingness to take part in risky deployments abroad (Iraq, Afghanistan) and to contribute valuable assets (like the Czech Mi-17 transport helicopters unit for EU operation Althea).³




Several new Member States have moved rapidly along the route of full professionalization of their armed forces – the Czech Republic and Hungary completed the move before the end of 2004 and Slovakia should achieve the goal by the end of 2005.⁴ These three countries adopted the format of all-volunteer forces suitable especially for expeditionary missions abroad and thus joined other EU countries like the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain and Italy. It should be far easier to deploy this type of forces in both functional and legislative terms. However the reaction time of 5 days as required by both NATO and EU rapid reaction schemes may run into constitutional limitations in countries like the Czech Republic and Hungary, which share strong a role of parliaments and the need for their approval prior to deployment abroad.


New EU members also bring structural limitations regarding multinational military cooperation, which has been primarily seen as a political tool of strengthening partnership activities or supporting selected candidates for NATO membership. So far these efforts have been distinguished from the core activities of the armed forces. Existing multinational military formations therefore do not meet agreed criteria for rapid deployability in the NATO or EU framework. Joint Polish-Lithuanian and Polish-Ukrainian battalions were designed only for peacekeeping operations, as was the Czech-Polish-Slovak brigade (participating States recently agreed to freeze its development as it cannot meet high-readiness criteria).⁵ The battlegroup initiative brought with it an additional set of

3. For a general assessment of the attitudes of CEE applicant states who on 1 May 2004 became EU members see Antonio Missiroli (ed.), *Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP? The view from Central Europe*. Occasional Paper No. 34. Paris, EUISS, 2002; and Hanspeter Neuhold and Ernst Sucharipa (eds.), *The CFSP/ESDP After Enlargement. A Bigger EU = A Stronger EU?* Favorita Papers 02/2003. Vienna, Diplomatiche Akademie, 2003.

4. 'Central-Eastern Europe: Professional armies on track', *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief*, 31 January 2005.

5. For more details on the Czech Republic and Poland, see chapters in Hans J. Giessmann (ed.) *Security Handbook 2004. The Twin Enlargement of NATO and EU*. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2004.








demanding requirements and the condition of multinational cooperation. All CEE countries faced significant challenges in pledging suitable units and finding big EU countries to team up with and depend on for the lead-nation role (only Poland was able to form a multinational battlegroup in which it will play the lead-nation role itself).⁶

The battlegroup initiative may also impact on long-term preferences for military cooperation, notably with a marked shift towards numerous joint projects with Germany which may become a key partner for CEE countries. Germany participates in battlegroups with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania; in addition it cooperates closely with CEE countries in operation ISAF in Afghanistan, KFOR in Kosovo and EUFOR in Bosnia. So far it has rather been the United Kingdom that acted as a lead military partner for CEE countries. It was seen as both a tested and a beneficial partner in military terms, based on a long-term experience with NATO operations in the Balkans or in Iraq.

The NRF and the battlegroups as two high-profile initiatives with demanding requirements for the best units, capabilities and assets allow for two basic approaches as to how to meet them. States can either use one set of forces and declare parts of it to both the NRF and the battlegroups, or differentiate between the types of assets declared to both frameworks. For smaller European States it is possible to offer to the NRF primarily specialized assets or niche capabilities, such as NBC defence, search and rescue, military police, field hospitals, combat engineers and mountain infantry. To the battlegroups they can assign mechanized or light infantry units, meeting rapid reaction criteria and generally suitable for the types of missions expected from the battlegroups. However, assigning different types of units and assets to both frameworks will not in itself solve the fundamental problem of overstretch faced by small and medium-sized States. Their current deployments in multiple operations in distant theatres already create heavy burdens in terms of human, material and financial resources. They have to deal with tough questions on sustaining a military presence in NATO and EU-led missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, the US-led operation in Iraq and often also in UN-led operations worldwide. So far they had a clear preference for EU-led operations to be of limited size or to have a lower risk profile – the first criterion clearly applies to Concordia and Artemis, the second to Althea. Despite all of these challenges, the new EU members among themselves deploy almost as many troops in these missions as Germany and thus contribute substantially to Europe's international security efforts.⁷

6. *Declaration on European Military Capabilities*, 22 November 2004, Brussels.



Attitudes towards NATO and EU schemes for rapid reaction forces illustrate a clash of priorities in the domestic political setting in several of these countries. One can see the Ministry of Defence favouring the NRF, which is seen as more important militarily, being also clearly combat-oriented. This military approach can be contrasted with more the political approach favoured by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Prime Minister's Office, which attach a clear political value to the battlegroup initiative and the HG 2010 process. Domestic politics play an important role in the three biggest new Member States (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) where main right-wing opposition parties, likely to win the next elections, all share a deep scepticism if not open hostility towards ESDP and initiatives connected with it. Regardless of the political profile of governments, these countries must solve the financing dilemma created by growing military deployments abroad and additional transformation goals. This situation is to be found in most small and medium-sized EU countries. If this long-term problem is not solved, then red lines of internal consensus might be crossed, especially as deep defence integration within the EU is still seen as a controversial option.

The European Defence Agency – Which Contribution?

The European Defence Agency (EDA) is an important step in the further consolidation and improvement of the European defence capabilities needed to sustain a viable ESDP. It may contribute to the incremental integration of both the defence industry and the defence market and to the harmonisation of national requirements, but it does not hold a position strong enough to bring about a radical transformation in this area. Its main advantage lies in the ability to provide an impartial analysis of national capabilities, cooperation schemes and procurement plans in function of the needs of ESDP as a whole. However, its design, institutional powers and staffing prevent it from pushing for truly European solutions instead of national solutions (which often have to take into consideration not only best value and superior performance, but also national industrial policy and employment). The EDA can merely coordinate important procurement efforts for major platforms (armoured personnel carriers and supersonic fighter combat aircraft) currently taking place or under preparation in several Member States. It can also prepare impartial proposals for action on the EU level within the sensitive area of defence equipment, somewhat similar to the

7. For more details on deployments of individual CEE EU Member States see *Military Balance 2004-2005*. London, IISS, 2004.



position of the European Commission that does not have a direct competence in this area.⁸


Several of the limitations on EDA activities are particularly relevant for the small and medium-sized Member States. As it has only a loosely defined role in coordinating existing multilateral procurement structures like OCCAR, it cannot guarantee any faster inclusion of smaller players into these programs, which are still mainly reserved for the six biggest defence producers in the EU (the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden). Only modest steps are expected here, perhaps heralded by the recent decision of the EDA Steering Board to gradually take over activities from WEAG and WEAO, especially in the field of research and technology.⁹ The utility of the EDA and the comparative advantage of a proper EU agency could nevertheless be demonstrated to small and medium-sized as well as most new Member States in several areas that EDA chose as its flagship projects for the year 2005.

All EU forces will depend substantially on seamless interoperability during the deployment of battlegroups, therefore the priority area of command, control and communications (C3) is self-evident. Several new Member States have put this procurement project on top of their list of modernization priorities. The EDA's harmonization study would thus be very welcomed, especially as it is planned jointly with the EU Military Staff. A second concrete project concerns European efforts in the area of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), where there are at least three major European programmes under way with five smaller national projects being active as well. A successful integration effort would no doubt provide an excellent example of added value provided by the EDA. Some interesting assets and activities in new Member States could be part of it (e.g. Czech and Hungarian national projects and expertise, and suitable Czech testing facilities) and there is a strong interest in this type of capability in other States (especially in Poland and the Baltic states, who have to guard the eastern external EU/NATO border). The third EDA flagship project that could be of interest also to smaller Member States is the plan for Advanced European Jet Pilot Training as a collaborative effort of 11 Member States (plus Switzerland). It could be nicely combined with the smaller project of a joint Central European training air base/air academy, equipped with modern sub-sonic jet trainers (like the Czech Aero L-159) and most likely based in Poland. This joint facility would provide rationalised training for the air forces of the four Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Perhaps in the future it could extend its services also to pilots from the Baltic countries (their airspace is now

8. EU Council Secretariat Background, *European Defence Agency*, EDA/02, February 2005.

9. EDA Press Release, 22 April 2005.








protected by allies, in rotation, through NATINEADS), should they one day decide to create a joint fighter aircraft unit or just to train a small cadre of pilots for these airplanes and contribute it to the EU joint squadron.

Conclusion

The EDA did not create huge expectations in many small and medium-sized EU countries, especially not in the new Member States. They perceive it still primarily as a tool particularly suitable for the big defence players within the EU. Its short-term impact is regarded as limited. This cautious approach will most likely last until the EDA can prove itself through several success stories, be it harmonisation of national requirements, pooling of resources, managing joint EU procurement projects, support for R&D efforts across the EU-25 or the abolition of wastefully duplicate structures.



2. The Battlegroups: A Concept in Search of a Strategy?

RICHARD GOWAN

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*For Europeans, the goal is not to get in and out as quickly as possible.*¹⁰

*In Africa, one defends oneself by moving.*¹¹

The first of these quotations comes from a 2005 defence of European power – the second was coined by Hubert Lyautey, France’s leading thinker on colonial warfare of the early 1900s. Yet, although the EU may be a post-colonial entity, Lyautey’s *aperçu* is increasingly echoed in its twenty-first century ‘way of war’. While the EU has accepted a long-term military commitment in Bosnia, its approach to military engagement in Africa is coming to rest on a doctrine of ‘rapid reaction’ by small, self-sufficient forces. It must be tested and adjusted if it is to succeed.

Unlike those who wished ‘to refight Austerlitz’, Lyautey argued that campaigns beyond Europe required units that were highly mobile and lightly equipped. Such ‘organizations on the march’ should operate flexibly without a ‘wake’ of excessive logistical support. A century on, the development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is similarly associated with a shift from a continental, static military posture to sharper, ‘expeditionary’ mentalities and capabilities. In this context, the EU’s battlegroup concept of brigade-strength forces with an African focus has become emblematic of the medium-term future of ESDP.

This article raises questions about the strategic viability of the battlegroups. Lyautey and his contemporaries manoeuvred – often fairly unsuccessfully – across a landscape of tribes and villages. The battlegroups, by contrast, are intended to operate within a strategic environment defined not only by post-colonial states and conflicts, but by the peace operations of the United Nations, the African Union and groupings such as ECOWAS. In so far as the battlegroups

10. Mark Leonard, *Why Europe Will Run the Twenty-First Century* (London, 2005), p64.

11. Quoted in Douglas Porch, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: the development of French Colonial Warfare” in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Oxford, 1986), p392.



are primarily intended to reinforce these operations, their strategic significance will rest as much on the decision-making of these potential partners as the choices of the EU itself.

This being so, it is argued that planning for the battlegroups should be based on the assumption that *the battlegroups will have little purpose if organisations other than the EU are not willing or able to build up African stability and security*. Rapid reaction to specific crises may have an important *humanitarian* impact, halting genocide and anarchy. It may be *tactically* essential for the launch or survival of UN or regional organisations' operations. But in *strategic* terms, it cannot provide lasting security and peace, which demand longer-term military and civilian commitments to develop frameworks for stability. In isolation, rapid reaction, and the battlegroups in particular, are no substitute for a strategy.


From Brussels to Bunia

The battlegroup concept has received enough attention among strategic commentators to require only a summary introduction here.¹² Formally approved by EU governments in November 2004, the concept's goal is the creation of a European rapid reaction capability of up to thirteen separate battlegroups, each 1500 men strong. The first will be available in 2005. Some will be single-nation forces, others multinational. Speed and resilience should be of their essence: a battlegroup should be deployable in fifteen days, and sustainable for up to three months. It is intended that, as of 2007, the EU should be able to maintain two battlegroups in the field at any given time. While this would give the Union some strategic flexibility, considerable doubts have already been raised about the concept's viability.

Operationally, it is unclear whether the European states will have the heavy lift capability to deploy even the relatively small battlegroups in a timely fashion.¹³ Politically, questions remain over the new formations' relationship to NATO and the extent to which their development will distract from the EU's broader military 2010 Headline Goals. And although many of the smaller Member States are committed to participate in the multinational battlegroups, their desire and ability to do so are often questioned. These concerns may be roughly

12. See Burkhard Schmitt, 'Europe Capabilities – how many divisions?', in Nicole Gnessoto (ed.) *European Security and Defence Policy: the first five years*. Paris, EUISS, 2004; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, *European 'battle groups': a new stimulus for European security*. 2005, www.euractiv.com/Article?tcaturi=tcm:29-134085-16&type=Analysis.

13. These concerns are well-summarised in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, op.cit.



grouped together as ‘supply-side’ issues, reflecting the internal difficulties inherent in nascent EU military co-operation. However, this article argues that equally significant ‘demand-side’ problems hang over the battlegroups: what strategic frameworks will they contribute to? How will they relate to non-European military partners in the field? Resolving ‘supply-side’ issues will be fruitless if these latter questions go unanswered.

To this, advocates of the battlegroups may reply that, on the ‘demand-side’, it has long been clear that the concept is inherently linked to the reinforcement and preservation of peace operations developed by the UN and (to a lesser extent) regional organisations. By 2001, the question ‘could the EU give the UN the Rapid Reaction Capability it needs?’ was already on the minds of Kofi Annan and ‘senior figures in Rome, Paris and London’.¹⁴ Since then, there has been further (but not complete) convergence between the EU and UN on this topic. The 2004 UN High-Level Panel Report thus welcomed the battlegroup concept as a model for imitation. Operationally, this convergence was further substantiated by the European Council’s adoption of a paper on EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations in May 2004.¹⁵ This does much to clarify the relationship between the EU’s potential deployments and the UN’s longer-term missions. But it also leaves a number of challenging questions to be resolved – questions that reveal the major potential flaws in the battlegroup concept as a whole.


The Council’s paper identifies four possible forms of EU-UN military cooperation in crises, in increasing order of expected intensity and reliance on rapid reaction:¹⁶

- a clearing house process, by which EU Member States would share information on their military contributions to the UN, allowing for increased coordination in the allocation of resources;
- operations under EU command and UN mandate, including EU-only operations such as Althea in Bosnia or EU-commanded ‘modules’ within larger UN missions;
- bridging operations by EU forces to allow the UN to prepare or reorganise missions, as in the case of 2003’s Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC);

14. Charles Grant, *A European View of CFSP*. IISS/CEPS, 2001, www.eusec.org/grant.htm.

15. Available at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-UN%20co-operation%20in%20Military%20Crisis%20Management%20Operations.pdf>.

16. For an alternative analysis of this paper, see Martín Ortega, ‘The EU and the UN: strengthening global security’, in Espen Barth Eide (ed.), *Global Europe 1: Effective Multilateralism*. London, British Council/The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004, pp. 18-19.




- a stand-by model, involving an EU ‘over the horizon reserve’ or ‘extraction force’ for rapid deployment to support UN forces – a possibility explicitly linked to African crises and the battlegroup concept.


Of these options, the last two amount to a *de facto* doctrine of rapid reaction in Africa. But this doctrine is characterised by a crucial dichotomy. It is assumed that, in all high-intensity situations, EU forces should maintain *operational* autonomy (as opposed to the European troops under UN command in the clearing house process). Conversely, the Council’s concept effectively assumes that these forces should be *strategically* subordinate to UN missions – providing ‘bridging’ or ‘reserve’ support rather than engaging in peace operations *per se*. This dichotomy points to a desire to contribute towards the UN’s strategic goals combined with a fear of any ‘mission creep’ that would drag EU forces too deeply into the achievement of those goals.

The Council recognises that may well lead to operational friction between the UN and EU: it is frankly admitted that the deployment of a battlegroup alongside a UN force would ‘involve complicated co-ordination’ and so be ‘limited in its usability’. And in the close of any bridging operations, problems are foreseen over requests for the ‘re-hatting’ of EU troops and capabilities as UN assets. This would have to be a ‘national decision’ – and not, it may be inferred, a welcome or common one. While EU rapid reaction forces may come to the aid of peace operations, therefore, they raise the spectre of ‘peacekeeping apartheid’. As Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu has warned, there is a ‘real prospect’ that ‘EU troops will be increasingly unwilling to operate alongside the relatively poorly equipped UN troops from the traditional peacekeeping nations. This would largely be the result of differentiated missions, command structures and equipment between the two groups of troops’.¹⁷

Beyond these problems, the ‘reserve’ nature of the EU’s forces has major strategic implications, underlined in the introduction. If EU forces are to play supporting roles in Africa, their own strategic value will be decided more by those they are deployed to assist than their own performance in the field. While their status vis-à-vis NATO may be skirmished over in Brussels, the battlegroups will only have a lasting impact if they are fully and effectively intertwined with the plans and actions of the UN, AU and other partners. This raises new political and operational questions: what degree of *automaticity* can those partners expect from the EU in terms of rapid reaction forces when crises arise? To what extent will European planners ‘over the horizon’ be able to influence the deci-

17. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, ‘Regionalisation of Peace Operations’, in Barth Eide, op.cit., pp. 35-36.





sion-making of UN or regional officers on the ground? If these issues may hamper smooth deployments, a larger question of capabilities hangs over the utility of rapid reaction. For if a UN or regional force cannot fulfil its mandate, an EU intervention is likely to provide no more than temporary relief. The EU has received a stark lesson in the risks involved in such strategic subordination.

This lesson comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo. If we have a partial model for the battlegroups' future interventions, it is 2003's Operation Artemis, in which an EU-flagged (if largely French) force stabilised the town of Bunia in Eastern Congo, reinforcing a pre-established but hard-pressed UN force (MONUC). An undoubted military success, Artemis lasted for three months, after which MONUC was once again left with responsibility for Bunia's security. The situation there soon began to deteriorate once more – by mid-2004, the International Crisis Group (ICG) concluded that the province had all but reverted to its pre-Artemis state.¹⁸ In short, Artemis was able to halt a flare-up of violence, but not to consolidate a strategic framework for Bunia's stabilisation. It is arguable that limitations on the operation's mandate (in terms of both time and scope) contributed to this failure. As Fernanda Faria has noted, the forces involved in Artemis did not have sufficient time or authorisation to demilitarise Bunia, neutralise local militias or halt violence beyond Bunia's immediate hinterland.¹⁹ The root causes of future violence went unaddressed. The long-term influence of Artemis might have been greater had MONUC itself been stronger, but it lacked the basic capacities to take long-term advantage of the European intervention. The EU could reinforce such a partner, but did not attempt to fundamentally transform it into a more efficient force. More broadly, the absence of any real strategic framework for security in the Great Lakes region has undermined any credibility that even a more successful version of MONUC might build up.


If rapid reaction operations by the battlegroups are to follow this pattern, they will hardly be effective tools.


Beyond rapid reaction?

From the arguments above, the battlegroups can be described as a concept in search of a strategy. However self-sufficient they may be in the field, they will not be elements within a self-sufficient European military strategy for Africa. There is an irony here: while the EU may promote the battlegroups as proof of

18. ICG's assessments of may be found at www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1164&l=1.

19. Fernanda Faria, *Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: the role of the European Union*. Paris, EUISS, 2004, p. 43.





its new strategic seriousness, they are actually intended for an area in which the EU has no clear strategic vision of its own. The 2003 European Security Strategy gives very little specific attention to Africa, excepting the countries of the Mediterranean. As one senior European strategist has complained, this is comparable to a US strategic document that ignored the existence of Latin America. A clear distinction remains between ‘our neighbourhood’, in which the EU should be deeply engaged, and other regions in which ‘well functioning international institutions’ should take the lead.

While the EU may be developing military instruments for involvement in Africa, therefore, they are effectively limited instruments for the limited task set by the Strategy – helping other institutions to function well. As such the battlegroups may still be justified as one element within a broader portfolio of European initiatives of support to the UN and AU, conducted at both the level of individual countries and regionally. Thus, as Faria observes, the European Development Fund is presently funding a wide range of post-conflict initiatives in Burundi, where a UN force is now in place.²⁰ In Kinshasa, a joint EU-UN police operation may act as a precedent for similar co-operation elsewhere in future. And in terms of regional capacity-building, the EU’s African Peace Facility has been a key instrument in allowing the AU to develop its nascent security identity.

It is possible that these demonstrations of soft power may eventually be more effective in providing for African security in the long term than the deployment of troops. They are less likely to offend post-colonial sensitivities. As suggested previously, European support for the AU in particular is part of ‘a strategy that gives increasing significance to other regional organisations in maintaining global stability’.²¹ The EU is conceivably developing a dual approach towards peace in Africa: building the strategic capacities of the UN and AU largely indirectly, while providing direct tactical support through its rapid reaction capabilities. This dual approach has many attractions. But it is arguable that it lacks full coherence. Whatever the advantages of both strategic capacity-building and tactical interventions, African security requires more concrete strategic frameworks to be developed in key areas of instability – specifically the Great Lakes and West African littoral. At present, UN and regional forces are insufficient to maintain long-term security in these areas, and cannot be expected to contain the cycles of (frequently trans-national) violence that characterize them. Current capacity-building efforts risk being outstripped by new surges in conflict, leav-

20. Fernanda Faria, *op.cit.*, p. 50.

21. Richard Gowan, ‘The EU, regional organisations and security: strategic partners or convenient alibis?’, in Sven Biscop (ed.), *Audit of European Strategy*. Egmont Paper No. 3. Brussels, IRRI-KIIB, 2004, p. 8.








ing the international community constantly overstretched. Unless better strategic frameworks are found to contain these threats, rapid reaction in Africa will become an increasingly repetitive business.






To this end, the EU cannot avoid considering a strategic approach for Africa that risks longer-term involvement in peace operations there. Rather than come to the assistance of these operations in moments of extreme crisis, Europeans should be prepared to engage in longer-term, lower-intensity military activity in Africa. Some nations already do so – not only former colonial powers like France, but typically neutral EU members Ireland and Sweden currently have peace-keeping units in West Africa. As Martin Ortega has emphasised, these are often of greater *qualitative* importance than *quantitative* strength: in developing European capabilities, and especially integrated capabilities, we must work closely with both the UN and AU to identify those areas in which we can best add value *within* their long-term missions.²² These may include communications and other hi-tech assets that can be deployed with fewer political objections (in both Africa and Europe) than more straightforward and numerous ‘boots on the ground’. The Council’s reference to EU modules in UN missions can be advanced and developed to cover such assets.

Contributing to long-term peace operations in this way is not incompatible with an EU emphasis on rapid reaction. Nothing in the argument above is intended to suggest that the battlegroups cannot make an important contribution to African security. But without greater engagement in other types of operation by the EU, the battlegroups will be a major political and military advance, but a strategic distraction.



22. Martin Ortega, *op.cit.*





3. Can Permanent Structured Co-operation contribute to more efficient military capabilities in Europe?

CDT. SERGE VAN CAMP

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Brussels 2015 – the EU, which is the world’s most dynamic and most integrated supranational institution has more than 30 Member States. The Union can match its economic weight with a coherent political voice backed up with civil and military capabilities. It can deploy battlegroups all over the world and the European Defence Agency (EDA) has created an effective European Defence Market...

Only ten years before, in 2005, the lack of military capability in the EU was still a major weakness. There was massive overcapacity of the wrong types of forces and equipment. A significant shortfall in Member States’ financial resources had led to the inability to provide relevant military capabilities. Shortfalls were already identified by NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative. But just as after the subsequent Prague Capability Commitments (PCC), there had been a lack of political will on the part of Member States to commit resources. There also was the Helsinki Headline Goal. This quantitative target was just a catalogue of forces for setting up a crisis management operation. Here, too, the lack of real incentives was an important weakness.

If this image of the future is to be realized, rather than prolonging the present state of affairs, *now* capability efforts must shift from the quantitative to the qualitative and a stick for exerting pressure must be created.

These two elements are present in the mechanism of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ as agreed in the draft Constitutional Treaty. Next to the battlegroup concept and the EDA, permanent structured cooperation can play an important role in the transformation and the modernization of European armed forces.²³

23. For a detailed study see Evy Berth and Serge Van Camp, *België en de Permanente Gestructureerde Samenwerking*. Veiligheid en Strategie No. 88. Brussel, IRSD-KHID, 2005.



From Closer Cooperation to Permanent Structured Cooperation

Reaching unanimity in the Council with twenty-five or more Member States will not be easy, especially not with regard to the CFSP/ESDP. Even long before the EU Constitution, different forms of flexibility were therefore introduced into the framework of the Union. Treaties tried to avoid all kinds of intergovernmental cooperation outside the Union. Such cooperation is widespread in the military area and does not necessarily undermine the functioning of the Union, but the use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms of the Union is beneficial, because it renders such cooperation more visible and efficient. There have been successful initiatives in the field of defence policy and defence industrial cooperation, but they have created parallel structures that are financially and politically costly, and do not maximize the effectiveness of the EU.

In this way, the Treaty of Amsterdam created a legal framework for 'closer cooperation' between Member States, but not in the second pillar. The Treaty of Nice relaxed the conditions for cooperation, now called 'enhanced cooperation'. Cooperation between Member States was now allowed for second pillar matters, but its scope was very restricted: 'enhanced cooperation' was limited to the implementation of decisions taken by the Council and matters having military or defence implications were excluded from it. Consequently, real defence or military cooperation within the framework of the Union will only be possible under the Constitution.

The principle mentioned in Article I-41 of the draft Constitution is simple:

Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and that have made more binding commitments to one another in this area in view of the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured co-operation within the Union framework.

There is a direct link between criteria and participation: only the Member States that fulfil the criteria can participate. When in December 2003, the Italian presidency and France, Germany and the United Kingdom jointly proposed a formulation with regard to permanent structured cooperation that clarified the sketchy elements of the original draft article released by the Convention, there was consensus that the cooperation should be about the enhancement of military capabilities and not about military operations, nor about a small group of countries establishing new institutions or headquarters. This is reflected in the criteria, which are set out in a separate protocol and are tailored to two objec-

tives. The first article of this protocol underlines these two objectives, linked to the EDA and the battlegroups: cooperation is open to Member States that participate in the main European equipment programmes and in the EDA; they must also have the capacity to supply elements to the battlegroups by 2007 at the latest. The second article contains five so-called convergence or admission criteria. The last article of the protocol refers to the EDA and states that it shall contribute to the regular assessment of Member States' contributions with regard to capabilities. Finally, Article III-312 describes the functioning of structured cooperation. It specifies the procedure that Member States and the Union have to follow to accept or to exclude Member States; this article too refers to the criteria.

On paper, the admission criteria seem to be stringent. Member States wishing to participate must have a minimum level of defence investment, but they must also take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their armed forces. This point underlines the shift from the quantitative to the qualitative. Member States must also coordinate the identification of military needs. In other words, they have to work together. They are encouraged to create multinational forces, to set up collective procurement and to pool capabilities. A positive element is that the criteria are a mix of political and military, functional elements – the first proposals provided for political convergence criteria only. Finally, there is also a procedure for accepting and excluding Member States: the Council decides by qualified majority about membership – this is the stick that has to encourage the Member States to fulfil the criteria.

What is the weakness of the concept? By keeping the criteria rather sketchy – indeed, there are no measurable quantities – the impression is given that as many countries as possible will be accepted for participation. The drafters tried to avoid creating a leading group in Europe in the field of defence.

First Criterion: Defence Expenditure

The first criterion is a political one, concerning the level of expenditure on defence equipment. It is an objective, a target that the interested parties must try to attain; the figure has still to be set and can be reviewed later in the light of circumstances. There is however a problem in defining the level of expenditure. The most obvious ratio is investment expenditure/defence expenditure. But in Europe, there are no consistent definitions of these notions. Each country has its own definition, so that comparison becomes difficult. The most obvious point of departure is the current – probably 2006 – level of expenditure of the 25 Member States. Using NATO definitions and data, the average is 11.8% in


2000; in 2003, this increased to 15.2%. Based on these figures, an ambitious level of expenditure on defence equipment could be between 16 and 20%.

Belgium now spends only 5.2% of its defence expenditure on investment. The successive strategic plans aim to increase this level, mainly by reducing personnel costs. But just four years after the start of the Strategic Plan 2000-2015, it has proved possible to realize only 70% of the planned annual investment. Personnel costs have even increased. The positive result of a decreasing military population is counterbalanced by higher salaries. A significant increase of investment will be possible only if the defence budget is increased. The Belgian case illustrates that permanent structured cooperation can give a boost to the rearrangement of the defence budget and can possibly lead to an increase of the defence budget of those Member States with a poor level of investment who are willing to participate.

Second Criterion: Harmonization of Military Needs

The second criterion is military: Member States must harmonize the identification of their military needs by pooling, specializing and working together in the fields of training and logistics. This criterion does not measure the amount of the defence effort, but the will and the ability to cooperate. But, by the use of the 'insofar as possible' formula, this criterion lacks any real imperative. Harmonizing the identification of the military needs is provided for by the ECAP and the PCC, but, as already mentioned, once the Member States are engaged, the success of both projects depends on political will. Instead of the bottom-up approach, the mechanism of permanent structured cooperation foresees stricter guidance, an element already suggested by some of the ECAP Project Groups.

Pooling and specializing constitute a second element in this criterion. These two ways of working together are an important tool for eliminating gaps and surpluses at the European level, but right now circumstances are not favourable enough for most governments. Indeed, some conditions must be fulfilled. One of the most significant concerns is mutual confidence. Permanent structured cooperation may offer the framework within which this confidence can grow. The risk of free riders will also be reduced. At the political level, Belgium is in favour of specialization. Within the armed forces, the current specialization is a result of the size of these forces. The acquisition of certain capabilities – such as aircraft carriers – has never been an option. Other capabilities – such as HAWK and NIKE air defence systems – have been removed because of budgetary and



changed geopolitical reasons. Specialization, thus, has always been based on national criteria.



The last element of this criterion concerns working together in the fields of training and logistics. Each country organizes training for its armed forces along similar lines, but how much interchange is there? All countries have established bilateral exchange programmes, but with an *ad hoc* and provisional character, and limited objectives. Furthermore, such co-operation often comes up against practical problems, such as the recognition of diplomas. Now, with the European Union Training Policy in ESDP, approved by the Council in November 2003, the Union has to hand an overall political and operational framework. The European Security and Defence College can enhance the European security culture. Although this project has to be applauded, further cooperation and synergy between existing national colleges ought not to be ignored. It is not really necessary to set up new structures, but countries with limited capabilities should have easier access to countries with better facilities. In the field of training, Belgium has signed far-reaching agreements, such as that with the Netherlands concerning the bi-national marine schools and that with France for the common training project for pilots.

In the field of logistic cooperation in Europe, both NATO and the EU have developed a Logistic Support Concept for crisis management operations. But apart from that logistic cooperation between the European nations is fragmented. Cooperation is mostly very specific and has limited objectives. Belgium is participating in the European Airlift Center, the Multinational Fighter Program and the Deployable Air Task Force, just to mention the most important initiatives.

Third Criterion: Usability

The third criterion obliges participating Member States to cooperate in order to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and usability of their armed forces. The EU must improve these elements in order to be able to undertake future and more demanding operations. Indeed, one of the most important driving forces behind military transformation in the Union is the growing number and the ever more stringent character of military operations. Operation Artemis illustrated the will and the ability of the Union to undertake demanding and risk-full operations. Nevertheless it may be expected that future operations will be more extensive in terms of objectives as well in distance and time.

In contrast to the other criteria there are already some indications of how the efforts of the participating Member States in this field could be organized. All



the elements mentioned in this third criterion are included in the battlegroup concept as agreed by the EUMC. There is also the quantitative indication of the battlegroups, namely 1500 soldiers deployable within 5 to 30 days for an initial period of 30 days, which could be extended to at least 120 days at 6000 km from Brussels.

‘Multinationalisation’ is at the core of undertaking military operations, but acting together with other countries demands additional qualifications of the armed forces. In this regard, the Belgian Strategic Plan, which is the basis of Belgium’s military reorganisation, defines a list of operational requirements for military capabilities. Those requirements are entirely in line with the provisions described in the third criterion of permanent structured cooperation. Furthermore, an update of the Strategic Plan stipulates that the creation of smaller, but more flexible, better equipped and more deployable armed forces must enable Belgium to participate in permanent structured cooperation.


Fourth Criterion: Capability Shortfalls

The fourth criterion contains the obligation to cooperate to make up the shortfalls identified within the framework of the Capability Development Mechanism. Just as the second criterion, this fourth criterion emphasizes the necessity of working together. Making national efforts to correct shortfalls is not enough: Member States must think and act in a multinational and cooperative way. Again – just as in the case of the second criterion – it is not clear yet how this cooperation could be quantified.

Central to the improvements in European military capacity is the ECAP. In addition to the initiatives taken within the ECAP, there are also several multinational examples. However, most of those projects consist of operational cooperation, training and logistics. The existing armaments cooperation is mostly the result of national considerations, rather than following on from the overall European needs. Belgium has stated that its transformation, as well as the investments in equipment is completely in line with the objectives of ESDP. To bring its investments and capabilities in line with the capability requirements of the Union, Belgium participates actively in ECAP. However, its political will does not always seem to be supported by sufficient financial means.

Fifth Criterion: Common Programmes

The fifth criterion obliges participating Member States to cooperate to develop common or European programmes and to do so within the framework of the






EDA. Existing multinational projects are mostly limited to the sector of aviation and aerospace and to defence electronics. In addition, most initiatives are organized on a purely intergovernmental and *ad hoc* basis and do not solve the fundamental structural problem of fragmentation of the European defence market. Member States must be prepared to come to a more realistic, effective, but also more restrictive application of Article 296 of the Treaty on European Union. In addition, collective procurement or pooling of military equipment is barely the case. A more ambitious objective of armament cooperation could be common EU-financed equipment. The method of cost- and risk-sharing, the possibilities of multinational crews and many other advantages could be helpful to fill in some shortfalls.

Belgium is in favour of an increased cooperation in the field of armaments. To achieve a higher return of its invested money, Belgium has recently adapted its procurement policy. One of the three new principles for future procurement is cooperation with other countries, in the first place with the Benelux-countries, but also within other European programs. Belgium actively participates in several multinational projects. Examples are the Belgian-Luxembourg Cooperation Agreement of June 2001, the accession of the country to OCCAR in 2003 and the Belgian participation in the A400M. In the framework of NATO, Belgium wishes to participate in multinational projects, such as the modernization of AWACS, Air Command and Control System, Alliance Ground Surveillance and missile defence. The representation of Belgium in the WEAG and in the Research and Technology Organisation of NATO illustrates the will of the country to cooperate in the field of Research and Development.

Conclusion

The EU will change from a homogenous entity in a multifaceted Union in which different members have different rights and obligations. Different mechanisms of 'enhanced cooperation' will lead to several integrated groups of States. In the field of defence, if implemented, permanent structured cooperation would offer a valuable framework within which willing Member States can institute new dynamics in order to achieve effective European military capabilities.



4. European Military Integration: Beyond the Headline Goal

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The whole process of enhancing European capabilities is geared to the Headline Goal (HG), which however concerns only part of the combined armed forces of the Member States, now totalling nearly 2 million – no vision as yet exists on the future of that total. Of course, Member States are conscious of the need to pursue the transformation of their armed forces from territorial defence to expeditionary operations and are taking important steps. This objective is also emphasized in the European Security Strategy, in which under the heading of ‘more capable’ foremost is the need to further ‘transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces and to enable them to address the new threats’.

At the same time it is equally evident that the financial means available for transformation are limited, and that for budgetary and efficiency reasons, most Member States are unable to continue to provide the whole range of capabilities in their army, navy and air force, and cannot maintain certain capabilities unless in cooperation with others. This certainly holds true for the new Member States, number of which have only just begun transformation. This is related to the problem of defence inflation: as in most European countries the annual cost of defence capabilities rises faster than yearly inflation, capabilities decline even if defence budgets are kept level in real terms – and in many countries, budgets are still decreasing.²⁴ In any event, clinging to the ‘full toolbox’ is useless, as the range of necessarily small-scale (and thus inefficient) capabilities would not allow smaller – and medium-sized – States to implement autonomous operations, so they are dependent on other states anyway – although not all States concerned have yet come to realize this. Pilegaard summarizes the situation well:

In some ways, the typical European nation state is arguably locked in an inefficient local optimum: the defence posture is inadequate to mount a credible national defence, but still sufficiently important to quell critical

24. Alexander, Michael and Garden, Timothy, ‘The Arithmetic of Defence Policy’, *International Affairs*, 2001, Vol. 77(3), pp. 509-529.

*questioning of the rationale of 'mini-mass armies' organized on a national scale.*²⁵

Because of the efficiency and budgetary imperatives, further substantial transformation of national capabilities by necessity will have to imply a certain degree of specialisation and multinational cooperation.


Multinational cooperation is possible in many ways, at different levels of integration:

- coordinating supporting capabilities in multinational frameworks, such as the European Air Transport Coordination Cell in Eindhoven (the Netherlands) which coordinates the air transport of the participating Member States to ensure optimal use of all flights, or pooling such capabilities in single multinational units;
- creating integrated multinational combat units such as the multinational battlegroups, but including larger scale formations in army, navy and air force;
- pooling can also mean creating collective capabilities, that are no longer owned by the participating Member States but by the EU as such, along the lines of the NATO-owned AWACS; this is probably the way forward to acquire capital-intensive assets such as space observation.

Specialisation implies that certain capabilities are no longer maintained by a Member State, or are maintained only through participation in a multinational cooperative framework.²⁶ A certain degree of specialisation has always existed, since many Member States have never possessed all types of capabilities; submarines or aircraft carriers are an obvious example. But in recent years, specialisation and cooperation are simultaneously on the rise. E.g. Belgium at the same time as reducing its number of mechanized brigades from three to two has decided to replace all tracked vehicles, including its entire stock of Leopard tanks, by more easily deployable wheeled armoured vehicles (which entails a loss of firepower). Another example of far-reaching cooperation is the integration of the Belgian and Dutch navies under a single operational command. There also is a consciousness of the need to downsize forces in favour of usability and to deal with conscription.

25. Pilegaard, Jens, 'The European Security and Defence Policy and the Development of a Security Strategy for Europe', in Jens Pilegaard (ed.), *The Politics of European Security*. Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2004, p. 28.

26. De Neve, Alain, *La Spécialisation des Tâches: Une Révolution pour l'Europe? Approches Théoriques*, Sécurité et Stratégie No. 79. Brussels, IRSD-KHID, 2003.






Introducing Top-Down Coordination

The problem with all these national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives is that decisions are being made without reference to any European framework – for the simple reason that apart from the HG, none exists. Decisions are thus based on national considerations only, on national capability needs or often even simply on the need to save money, without reference to the usefulness for the EU as a whole of the capabilities that are either cut or strengthened. The risk is that without coordination, and in spite of the huge budgets spent on transformation, in the end Member States' combined capabilities will still represent an incoherent whole, with surpluses of one capability and shortages of another, that does not answer to the needs of the EU. What is required therefore is top-down planning and coordination at the EU level, starting neither from the limitations of the current HG nor from the comparison with the US, but from the objectives of the EU as expressed in the Security Strategy. Current levels of deployment demonstrate that the EU is capable of a number of concurrent operations, but the Security Strategy has yet to be translated into more detailed quantifiable military ambitions – now it just says that the EU 'should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously', without going into detail. Only with regard to the battlegroups has it been decided, at the November 2004 Capabilities Commitment Conference, that in 2007 the EU should be able to undertake 'two concurrent single battlegroup-size rapid response operations' and to launch them 'nearly simultaneously'.

A political decision is needed: how many concurrent operations, at which scale, of which type and at which level of intensity, does the EU want to be able to implement, in view of its commitments towards its neighbourhood and 'effective multilateralism'? On that basis, a comprehensive catalogue of capability needs for the EU as a whole could be drawn up that looks beyond the HG and that could serve as a framework for the further transformation of Member States' combined armed forces. This would effectively amount to a 'strategic defence review' at the EU level.²⁷ For most Member States, who *are* willing to continue transformation, such a framework is indispensable, for without it multinational cooperation and specialisation, the only way forward because of budgetary and efficiency constraints, are difficult if not impossible. Within such an EU framework it could be decided which capabilities would be contributed by which Member States, allowing the largest Member States to maintain a wide range of national capabilities, but enabling the others to focus their contribution and to deliver it in cooperation with others by making possible specialisation and pool-

27. Quille, Gerrard, 'Turning the Rhetoric of European Defence Cooperation into Reality', in NDA (ed.), *Fresh Perspectives on European Security*. Brussels, New Defence Agenda, 2004, pp. 27-31.



ing. The capability needs of the EU would thus be integrated in national force planning from the onset, rather than being inputted at the end of the process, when most decisions have already been taken on the basis of national considerations. Only on the basis of the definition of capability needs at the EU level, would true harmonization of the requirements of capabilities be possible, as well as maximal coordination of procurement, either by jointly ordering equipment 'of-the-shelf' or through cooperative production projects. And since NATO does not offer such far-reaching integration, the EU is the only option to implement such a scheme.

In defining its overall capability needs, the EU must take into account the need to continue its presence on the Balkans and the possibility of future deployments further east, the possibility of operations in its Mediterranean periphery, as well as the need to increase its troop contribution to international peace and security in the framework of the UN. Given also the view on the use of force as a last resort only that is implicit in the Security Strategy, and the emphasis on the integrated use of civil and military means, such a comprehensive planning exercise would presumably arrive at capability needs above the HG, but far below the level of and of a different composition than current US capabilities. Further downsizing of European armed forces is thus implicit in this scenario. The EU need not strive for a military capacity equal to that of the US, but must carefully plan its capability needs according to the Security Strategy, abandoning the all too simple logic of ever more troops and equipment and daring to downsize overcapacities in certain areas.²⁸ That the EU already succeeds in sustaining ongoing operations on the scale envisaged by the HG, demonstrates that the HG corresponds well to the capabilities currently available, but it does not mean that in order to fully implement the Security Strategy, more capabilities are not needed.

Permanent Structured Cooperation

Apart from the vague reference in the HG 2010 that 'between 2006 and 2010 [...] a longer term vision beyond 2010 will be formulated with the objective of identifying trends in future capability developments and requirements', there is no indication that all Member States would be willing to subscribe to comprehensive planning and coordination at the EU level in the near future. Nor can the European Defence Agency (EDA), the prime focus of which remains the HG, be expected to generate such a far-reaching innovation in the short term, in spite

28. Groupe d'officiers du CHEM, 'Un Concept de Sécurité et de Défense, pour la France, pour l'Europe?', Défense Nationale, 2003, Vol. 59(8-9), pp. 113-24.

of its potentially substantial impact on Member States' commitments. It is recommendable therefore to offer those Member States that are willing to go further with cooperation and specialisation a framework to do so. The answer could be 'permanent structured cooperation', one of the innovations brought by the Draft Constitution.²⁹

Articles I-41.6 and III-312 provide that Member States willing to fulfil higher capability criteria can establish permanent structured cooperation; their commitments to one another will be set out in a protocol annexed to the Constitution. As up till then defence had been excluded from the possibility of 'enhanced cooperation', this was one of the major breakthroughs engineered by the Convention. The first objective of structured cooperation is to 'proceed more intensely to develop [...] defence capacities', which entails:

- achieving a still to be determined level of investments in defence equipment, which amounts to the introduction of a financial convergence criterion;
- working on the ECAP shortfalls, including through multinational approaches, and participating, where appropriate, in joint projects in the framework of the EDA;
- enhancing the availability of forces by setting common objectives regarding the commitment of forces to operations;
- bringing their forces 'into line with each other as far as possible' by harmonisation of requirements, pooling and, where appropriate, specialisation.

Participating Member States' contributions shall be assessed by the EDA. The second objective however, to deliver a national or part of a multinational battle-group by 2007, has come to dominate the agenda, seemingly to the detriment of the other useful applications of the mechanism. If used only to set up the battle-groups, structured cooperation brings little added value and is hardly necessary. Of course, the battlegroups are a necessary addition to the HG Force Catalogue, but they constitute just one specific (rapid response) capability. When a form of enhanced cooperation or 'defence Euro-zone' was originally proposed in the Convention, what was envisaged was 'participation in multinational forces with integrated command and control capabilities'.³⁰ During the preparation of the Belgian-French-German-Luxembourg defence summit or 'chocolate summit' in Brussels on 29 April 2003, proposals were raised as well to progressively integrate existing multinational units. This summit precisely intended to look into the possibilities for creating a 'core group' or 'avant-garde' to accelerate the

29. Howorth, Jolyon, 'The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: A Question of Flexibility', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2004, Vol. 9(4), pp. 483-508.

30. European Convention, Final Report of Working Group VIII – Defence, WG VIII 22, 16 December 2002.

development of ESDP, and eventually strongly supported structured cooperation.

Such a scenario is still possible. In the framework of structured cooperation, Member States that are willing could look for partners with similar needs and identify the possibilities for cooperation and specialisation. They could then start creating a number of integrated multinational capabilities, including both combat and support units, in army, navy and air force, going beyond the battle-group scale, into which they can integrate a much larger share of their national armed forces; the existing multinational units could be the core. The primary focus should be on deployable force packages, with modules that can be fit together according to the needs of the operation at hand. Greater permanency in such arrangements, e.g. standing multinational staffs, joint manoeuvres and pooled capabilities, would greatly enhance interoperability. Though short of maximum coordination at the level of the EU-25, more coherence would be ensured than when Member States continue cooperation and specialisation at a purely national and ad hoc basis; the involvement of the EDA and the EUMS can ensure that the exercise is geared to the capability requirements of the EU.

The Belgian air force can illustrate the usefulness of such a platform to identify partners for cooperation. Belgium currently operates a relatively large number of combat aircraft (two wings of F16), of relatively old age; in view of the country's limited defence budget, it is easily predictable that replacing them when eventually necessary will be extremely difficult. Two options then present itself: either to abolish the combat element in the air force altogether and lose the country's expertise in that field, or to look for partners of a similar scale, e.g. the Czech Republic or Hungary, to set up one multinational unit, with joint headquarters and training, and thus heavily reduced overhead, in which each participates with a more limited number of aircraft and can thus remain an actor in that field at his own level of possibilities. In fact aircraft capabilities offer the most promising prospects for pooling in the short term, because air procedures are already harmonized to a very large extent and because many States operate the same equipment, while the high cost of aircraft acts as a powerful stimulus for multinational cooperation. In the field of strategic lift, an ideal opportunity for integration presents itself: the acquisition of 170 A400M, the new transport aircraft, by 5 Member States – Belgium (with Luxembourg financing one of the eight aircraft ordered), France, Germany, Spain and the UK. Supporting services are the least sensitive in this regard, but there are opportunities in combat units and in the army and navy as well, as the example of Belgo-Dutch naval integration demonstrates.

To be effective, multinational cooperation and specialisation pose a number of conditions. For the sake of solidarity within the EU, it would not be acceptable for a Member State to assume a free-rider's position and specialize in non-combatant forces only. Member States could focus on just one or two major capabilities or types of forces, but in order to create a sense of ownership it would be better if through multinational cooperation and pooling they would participate in a somewhat wider range of capabilities. Specific capabilities should not be limited to just one Member State or multinational arrangement; it is recommendable to always have more than one set of resources available. Nevertheless, cooperation and specialisation do entail a loss of national military autonomy and require a large degree of trust, but that is nothing new for the large majority of Member States. An official Dutch query shows that a number of Member States would be willing to seriously consider specialisation; hesitation seems to be a matter of a lack of framework and the classic question of 'who jumps first?' (IBO, 2003).³¹ But as Haine says: if the answer to the question whether European countries are allies forever is yes, there should be no problem.³²

Spending Wisely

The combined armed forces of the EU Member States already present a powerful military capacity, second only to that of their foremost Ally, the US. The ongoing HG process will ensure that the most usable forces will be made available to the EU and will address the remaining major capability shortfalls, particularly in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic lift. Better spending of existing defence budgets should generate far *more* usable capabilities though, which would enable the EU to fully implement the Security Strategy. This would require further transformation of national armed forces, moving to professional armies and replacing territorial defence as the major guiding principle for capabilities planning; and a major advance in the harmonization of military requirements to enable fully coordinated procurement. For smaller Member States, effective transformation is only possible in cooperation with others. In the absence of comprehensive top-down planning of capabilities at the level of the EU-25, permanent structured cooperation could enable a quantum leap forward by offering a framework for multinational cooperation and specialisation to those Member States that are willing.

31. IBO, *Taakspecialisatie: het schiet niet echt op*, Interdepartementaal Beleidsonderzoek, The Hague, 2003.


32. Haine, Jean-Yves, 'Idealism and Power: The New EU Security Strategy', *Current History*, 2004, Vol. 103(671), pp. 107-12.

The accession of 10 new Member States, with armed forces that for the greater part are only in the earliest stages of transformation, presents an additional challenge, but at the same time it might lower the threshold for moving to deepened military integration. Obviously, in view of their huge needs in so many fields, the new Member States are not in a position to implement a ‘big bang’ and transform the whole of their militaries at once. Consequently, some have already opted for multinational cooperation – the Baltic States provide a good example of far-reaching integration – and/or for concentration on specific capabilities that are most usable in the current international context, which entails *de facto* specialisation – the Czech Republic e.g. has focussed its efforts on NBC protection units. This opens prospects for other Member States that are looking for opportunities for cooperation, although the severe budgetary difficulties of many new Member States might serve as an obstacle. Setting up multinational capabilities involving both older and new Member States could be one of the ways of preventing the emergence of a durable divide along the ‘old’ and ‘new’ line within the EU.

The size of European defence budgets thus is not the problem; if spent better, existing budgets should be sufficient to build all the capabilities required for the EU’s ambitions as expressed in the Strategy. Frans Osinga of the Clingendael Institute in The Hague estimates that at the EU level filling the major capability gaps would cost about € 42 billion; if spread over a ten year period, this requires shifting resources within the existing defence budgets to allow for a 10% increase of the means for procurement (De Wijk, 2004, p.140).³³ Calls for increased defence spending are therefore senseless, besides being politically unfeasible in a context demanding huge efforts on the part of Member States to maintain the welfare state. The Security Strategy does call for ‘more resources for defence’, but also, in its final version, for ‘more effective use of resources’. The latter addition reflects the budgetary and political unfeasibility of increasing defence spending in the majority of the Member States. Hence the need to make better use of current budgets; as the Strategy’s first draft already said, ‘systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads, and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities’. The problem is though that the measures needed to enhance the efficiency of existing budgets, i.e. downsizing capabilities of limited usability and investing in others, would at first instance entail additional costs, before positive effects of scale would be generated – or, ‘nothing ventured, nothing gained’ (AIV, 2004a, p.9).³⁴ Therefore, either transforma-

33. de Wijk, Rob, ‘The Implications for Force Transformation: The Small Country Perspective’, in Daniel S. Hamilton (ed.), *Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century*. Washington DC, Centre for Transatlantic Relations, 2004, pp. 115-46.



34. AIV, *Military Cooperation in Europe. Possibilities and Limitations*. Advice No. 31. The Hague, Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2004.




tion is spread over a significant number of years, or perhaps a number of Member States, such as Belgium, could consider introducing a one-time special budget during a few years in order to achieve some substantial progress in a shorter term.




Conclusion

Locking European capabilities into each other makes sense only if it is crowned by a consensus at the political level on the role of the EU as an international actor and the part to be played therein by the military instrument. Imperfect though perhaps it may be, the Security Strategy provides such a framework, which can serve as the basis for a precise assessment of the capability needs of the EU. Then the EU must also muster the political will to make use of the tool it has acquired. What counts is not so much the size of the armed forces, but the willingness and ability to use them (Bertram, 2003).³⁵ The decision not to intervene directly in the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the limited participation of EU Member States in MONUC, the UN operation in the DRC, show that this is not always the case. But EU operations on the Balkans and Artemis, as well as the commitment of European forces in other frameworks, demonstrate that the EU can make a significant contribution.



35. Bertram, Christoph, 'Europe's Best Interest: Staying Close to Number One', *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, 2003, No. 1, pp. 61-70.





5. A Long-Term Perspective on Military Integration

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How far should military integration go? Military integration should go as far as: (1) is needed to be militarily effective in this world; and (2) is in line with the emergence of the European *polis*. Thus there are environmental, functional and political dynamics driving Europe towards integration. Integration will one day be a fact; it will be a creeping integration driven as much by the need of Europeans to close the gap between an instable global environment, their obviously shared interests and values, and the role of their militaries as forces for good and forces for Europe, as by political aspiration. Thus functionalism and aspiration will continue to work in partnership.

The method of integration will be through progressively intense cooperation that progressively mutates into integration. It will start in 'tail elements' and progress towards 'teeth elements'. It will be faster in the smaller States than the bigger, and it will move forward by euphemisms, such as permanent structured cooperation, specialization and pooling – in other words, integration by any other name. Clearly, integrated forces are the most efficient expression of combined and joint military effect.

Should this integration in the framework of ESDP encompass a larger portion or even the whole of (some) Member States' armed forces? In any case, the Union consumes ever more of the political energy of its Member States and will continue to do so; and structure follows power. It is therefore hard to escape the logical conclusion that European military power and European military structure will be progressively focussed on the Union because European political and economic power will drive it there. The question is how long it will take.

ESDP is but a means to an end, a step on the road. As such, ESDP itself is an intergovernmental structure that represents an old-fashioned military alliance within the three-pillar structure of the Treaty on European Union. Under the Constitution the EU is preparing the institutional framework for the next step – a Common Security and Defence Policy. Thus ESDP will not 'encompass' or 'commonize' the defence efforts of many Member States, but its successors pro-

gressively will. As indicated above, this will affect smaller States, combat support services, R&D and procurement first. Moreover, in parallel, the EU is likely to see a military 'trirectoire' of Britain, France and Germany develop that for all intents and purposes will act as the command pole for the foreseeable future. But a tipping point will come because of the structural disparity between European great power and global great power. Yves Boyer has called the current age a strategic pause. With the emergence of China, India and Russia as strategic actors, and of the merger of extreme belief systems with mass destructive potential, the European politico-military effort will become progressively tighter. At some point therefore, the final iteration of the European military effort, a Common Defence Policy, will become unavoidable.

Pooling and Specialization


What are the options for pooling and specialization? Pooling and specialization are symptoms of integration underpinned by tight budgets and defence industrial and procurement processes. All of which reflect the European dilemma of how to close the only gap that matters, that between Europeans and their security environment, on a tight economic and demographic base. Two trends can therefore be identified:

- complete specialization by smaller powers, doing better that which they do well and spending limited budgets on what they can do – all part of the emerging modular European force structure as celebrated and predicated in the battlegroups;
- partial specialization by the bigger powers as environment, budgets and role force them to return to traditional military emphases: the British in their maritime, amphibious projection role with a subordinated land component, the French doing the complete opposite, and the Germans slowly moving towards projectable heavy forces.

Enabling these forces will be progressively pooled assets and capabilities underpinning robust, network-enabled forced entry and strategic stabilization forces. That means C4ISTAR, lift and logistics, first through pooled national assets, and second through progressively common owned and budgeted assets and capabilities.

Permanent structured cooperation is the change agent in this ESDP/CSDP/CDP process. It has two functions, to enable big power leadership *and* to constrain it:

- to enable the 'trirectoire' to move forward on the basis of a strategic vision that only big powers can generate, underpinned by a strategic consensus and strategic planning with those so minded to join them;



- and to ensure that British, French and German planning stays firmly locked within the institutional framework of the Union and does not relegate the Union to simply an enabler for their own actions.






Credibility, consultation, cooperation and constraint – the gift of the legitimate and legitimizing Union.




A European Army?

There will one day be an integrated European land, air and sea force, organized either through national contingents or ‘groupements’ *à la* European Defence Community. Whether it is called a ‘European Army’ will be by then a semantic point. The real questions will be who will exercise leadership at the supreme political level, who will exercise political oversight – a board of high commissioners, European ministers or a council of ministers.

In the medium term the political oversight of the European military effort will progressively reflect a balance of power between national parliaments, the Council, the European Commission and, of course, the European Parliament. In the longer term the European Parliament will play an increasingly important oversight role, because the budgets, both structural and operational, will inevitably become more ‘common’.

As for sovereignty in the modern age – what does it mean? Far more important for the European citizen in the 21st century will be the legitimate exercise of power on his or her security behalf with democratic oversight exercised effectively at the point of command.





6. Pooling of Sovereignty – a New Approach?

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
The Headline Goal (HG), geared to provide the EU with the military capabilities needed to perform the full spectrum of Petersberg Tasks, has so far been fulfilled only to a limited extent, although the target date of 2003 has passed. Efforts to achieve this goal and the more far-reaching HG 2010 are continuing under the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). A crucial factor impeding this process is the limited financial resources. Hence, Council conclusions and the draft Constitutional Treaty suggest intensifying military cooperation by seeking further approaches in order to make the best use of the available resources.

To achieve this goal, pooling, specialization, task-sharing and collective capabilities have been particularly recommended in addition to pursuing existing multinational approaches.

Pooling of Capabilities

A rare but prominent example of pooling of particular capabilities is the European Airlift Centre (EAC) in Eindhoven, which serves to provide air transport to 8 European nations.³⁶ Strategic air transport is one of the significant deficiency areas of the HG. The new military large transport aircraft A400M will remedy this shortfall. However, the first A400M will not be available before the end of this decade. Hence, for the time being, European air transport requirements have to be covered by the existing number of smaller military aircraft made available by EAC nations and by leasing large transport aircraft from non-EU countries. The use of both is rather costly: small transport aircraft are not cost-effective, due to their very limited capacity and range, and leasing large transport aircraft is quite expensive (e.g. a flight of a Ukrainian Antonov aircraft to Afghanistan in the context of ISAF was charged \$250.000). Through coordinating individual nations' transport requirements and making maximum use of

36. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom; Norway is included as 'associated participant'.



available air cargo space, e.g. avoiding empty return flights, the EAC ensures efficient and economic use of existing and leased air transport capabilities.

Each joint structure established in addition to existing national ones, generates extra costs. So does the EAC. The annual operational costs of the EAC amount to € 280.000, which is rather modest compared to other multinational command structures.³⁷ Hence, the amounts saved through the EAC's work for deploying ISAF forces to Afghanistan compensated for a year's running costs of this centre.

However, in spite of the EAC's work, national air transport commands of the participating nations continue to exist. The running costs of each of these exceed by far those of the EAC. Therefore, important further savings are only possible once the Franco-German initiative to develop the EAC into a European Air Transport Command will be realised. Such joint command, responsible for planning and conducting transport tasks, should then substitute for the national air transport commands of all EAC nations. Moreover, additional savings could be ensured if for the envisaged 180 A400M aircraft, scheduled between 2009 and 2025, joint squadrons, training, maintenance and logistics would be established.





Not all current EAC nations are enthusiastic about such joint perspective. Their consideration may be that, if a military operation like the war on Iraq would occur, on which EAC nations would have opposing views, it could be politically difficult to rely on the joint Air Transport Command for deploying their forces into the theatre.


Specialization

Specialization is a sensible approach in particular for those nations which are not able to provide for the full spectrum of forces anyway. To concentrate on 'niche capabilities' is highly recommendable for smaller States with limited resources. There have been, however, no substantial examples of such endeavours so far. The catalogue of future EU battlegroups lists under niche capabilities a 'water purification unit' from Lithuania and a 'medical unit' from Cyprus.

Although specialization is a most economical approach for smaller nations, it will be feasible only in the long run. To fundamentally change the composition and design of their existing forces would, for the time being, require some

37. The annual costs for a multinational corps headquarters are estimated to be € 8 million.





important investments. Hence, at least in the short term, it will be less expensive for these countries to maintain the forces they have.

Task and Role-Sharing




Task and role-sharing are approaches highly recommended for their expected economic effect. A far-reaching proposal is specifically that major nations, instead of maintaining the full spectrum of military forces, would concentrate their efforts on particular capabilities or even on a single armed service. The other nations would then provide the complementary capabilities necessary to achieve the entire capacity required for European military operations.

Such an approach would certainly allow for remarkable savings, as the individual nation has to provide only for particular categories of equipment, including procurement, maintenance, logistics, training of personnel etc. In addition, such an approach would have a fundamental effect on the process of European integration. Far-reaching task and role-sharing would not only oblige the nations concerned to act together, it would necessitate joint decision-making and planning, which would also involve joint operational headquarters at the upper level.

At present, nations are wary to follow this approach, as task and role-sharing would diminish a nation's ability to decide and act according to her national interest in case this differs from the common one. Moreover, being part of a shared system would make it difficult for an individual nation not to take part in a military operation the other nations would wish to conduct. The veto of one nation would – at least to a large extent – render impossible the ability to act for the other nations as well.

Hence, examples are almost non-existent. A promising approach, however, is demonstrated by the Dutch-German Air Transport Agreement. Instead of acquiring A400M large transport aircraft, the Dutch government has paid some € 50 million to the German government, which in turn provides the Dutch forces with air transport (coordinated through the EAC). For the Netherlands, this agreement allows for remarkable economies, which include not only saving financial resources for purchasing appropriate aircraft, but also the costs for maintenance, logistics, training and airfield installations. For the German Ministry of Defence, the Dutch financial input into the strained defence budget was more than welcome.

Similar arrangements would be possible with regard to Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). The Netherlands stripped themselves of their MPA capability by selling





their P3C Orion MPA fleet to Germany which needed to substitute her ageing Breguet-Atlantic MPA. Although a follow-up along the lines of the Air Transport Agreement would be most sensible, bilateral Dutch-German discussions on the issue did not arrive at such a result.

Collective Capabilities

Capabilities which are funded, operated and maintained collectively, exist at NATO. The most prominent examples are the NATO integrated command structure and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force with 17 AWACS aircraft at its core.³⁸ In addition, NATO decided to establish an Alliance Ground Surveillance System (AGS) to be operational by 2010.³⁹

Such collective assets represent key capabilities for planning and conducting military operations. They provide a cost-effective solution for participating nations. Moreover, as their deployment requires a consensus decision of NATO nations, they are key to military integration.

The only 'collective' capability provided by the EU so far is the Satellite Centre at Torrejon, which has been inherited from the WEU.⁴⁰ However, with a view to the numerous deficiency areas to be remedied in order to fulfil the HG, some nations have proposed to cover these by developing collective EU capabilities. This approach is particularly preferred by smaller EU nations, predominantly by 'net recipients'. Bigger nations, however, have been reluctant to collectively financing EU military capabilities, first of all because their share to the EU's common budget as 'net contributors' is rather high compared to their contribution to NATO's military budget.

Multinational Approaches


Contrary to collective capabilities, multinational projects are for most EU nations the preferred option, as these allow for tailoring national contributions to the needs and interests of participating nations. Satellite intelligence e.g. is considered a key area, where European nations seek independence from the US. The French-German agreement to link their Helios II and SAR Lupe satellite

38. Although only 12 NATO nations contribute to the AWACS fleet, it represents a NATO collective asset. The UK maintains a nationally funded AWACS component which will be made available to NATO operations as 'contribution in kind' when necessary.

39. AGS will consist of special aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and ground stations. See: www.nato.int/issues/ags/index.html.

40. Council Joint Action of 20 June 2001, www.eusc.org/documents/Joint_Action.pdf.





imagery with national ground stations having access to both satellites has been joined by Belgium, Italy and Spain, which are establishing such ground stations as well. This agreement allows the multinational use of these particular assets whilst preserving individual nations' interests for national intelligence collection. The project is open to other European nations, if they are willing to contribute to its financing.⁴¹





European Army – A Vision?

All current approaches to military cooperation are helpful to save resources and to promote military integration to some extent. However, the effects are limited. Almost all current approaches do not infringe on the individual nations' right to decide on contributing to a multinational operation case by case. All nations keep national mechanisms, structures and headquarters necessary for national decision-making and planning. In addition, those nations which want to keep the ability for autonomous national action, continue to provide for an independent spectrum of military means. Hence, preserving a maximum of sovereignty accounts for preserving a large field of duplication, which limits both the process of integration and the saving of resources.

A 'European army' would be the perfect way to end nations' duplication of capabilities and structures and consequently ensure the most economic use of resources. It would provide the highest level of military integration.

However, for a European army, military integration including integrated forces, headquarters, planning and procurement structures and mechanisms etc. will not suffice. There are some political prerequisites to be fulfilled as well. First of all, in order to deploy a European army, the decision of a European Government will be necessary. To some extent this task could be assumed by the Council of the EU. Parliamentary control of the armed forces, however, cannot remain fragmented into 25 national parliaments. Hence, a new and central role for the European Parliament would be indispensable. In addition, a more integrated European society will be necessary, because the men and women serving in the European army, cannot be governed by differing social and legal systems. Hence, as long as the process of European integration, including in the political and social field, will not achieve a much higher level, a European army will remain a vision.

41. Fiorenza, Nicholas, *French, German Sats To Widen Intelligence Capabilities*, C4ISR Journal, www.isrjournal.com/story.php?F=328012.





The Nice European Council, a benchmark for developing ESDP, stated that ‘developing this autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations [...] does not involve the establishment of a European army’.⁴² The past and current discussion on the Constitutional Treaty has given no indication that this may change in the foreseeable future.

Pooling of Sovereignty – A Gradual Approach

If far-reaching approaches to military co-operation which require a comprehensive pooling of nations’ sovereignty will not be realistic for the time being, a gradual approach could be feasible. Pooling of particular functions of sovereignty which are not at the core of nations’ autonomy would be more promising. Such approaches would not necessarily have to include all 25 Member States. Some countries which are willing to participate in such kind of co-operation could undertake this vanguard task.

Joint National Command Structures

Current arrangements for providing an operations headquarters (OHQ) for autonomous EU crisis management operations without recourse to NATO’s command structure rely on national headquarters, to be turned into a multinational OHQ on an ad-hoc basis. For the time being, national OHQs of four nations are available for this purpose.⁴³ To prepare the individual headquarters for this task, each of them needed further investments, e.g. for additional working space, communications and IT equipment. Hence, such ad-hoc solutions are rather costly, as four headquarters are to be prepared continuously but only one will be chosen for an actual EU operation.

At the Brussels ‘Summit of Four’, the Heads of State of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxemburg proposed a permanent European Operational Headquarters for planning and conducting European military operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. This initiative triggered a row of discussions and resulted finally in the establishment of a small civil/military planning cell.

42. Nice European Council, Presidency Conclusions Annex VI, ESDP Report, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-r1.%20ann.en0.htm.

43. Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Operations (CPCO), Paris; Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), Northwood; Comando Operativo di vertice Interforze (COI), Rome; Bundeswehr Einsatzführungskommando, Potsdam. These headquarters are responsible for all military operations of national forces of the three services.

Unofficial deliberations went even further, i.e. such EU OHQ could substitute for the current national ones. The effect on cost savings would be eminent. The annual running costs for a national headquarters of this kind are some € 3 million. On integration, the effect would be higher still, because this would also require integrating national operational decision-making and planning, which in turn would also necessitate more jointness on the political level between participating nations. Consequently, such deliberations have not been pursued further.


The stakes for integrating national OHQs may be too high at present. At single service level it would be easier. The prominent example is the joint Maritime Headquarters (MHQ) of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg⁴⁴ (Admiraal Benelux) which has been running without problems for several years.

The same should be possible for the Danish and German navy. Both navies know each other very well, their sea areas are familiar to both of them, as is the English working language. The German MHQ in Glücksburg has sufficient capacity to incorporate Danish staff for joint work. Planning and conducting national and NATO operations would not pose a problem. For EU operations, however, the Danish reservation to the Amsterdam Treaty would come into effect, which does not allow for any participation of Danish forces in ESDP operations. A joint national MHQ of the German navy with Sweden and Finland would be prevented by the neutral status of the latter. Maritime jointness should be possible, however, between Germany and Poland. A Polish/German MHQ would, in addition, give a positive signal for the relations between the two countries. Even better were a Danish/Polish/German MHQ, once Denmark had decided to give up her current ESDP reservation.

Extending Schengen Arrangements for the Baltic and North Sea

Since enlargement, all but one littoral State surrounding the Baltic Sea are members of the EU, turning the Baltic into an almost EU-enclosed sea. EU countries in the Baltic region are either members to the Schengen Agreement or will accede to it in the near future (Poland and the Baltic States). Schengen created a common area where entry control of visa and passports is performed at the external borders only.

44. Luxemburg has no naval forces, but contributes to Admiraal Benelux financially.



Surveillance of national territorial waters remains the sovereign responsibility of the nation concerned. For conducting sea surveillance, each nation provides a great number of naval vessels, aircraft and helicopters, working under the authority of several ministries, e.g. defence, interior, finances, environment. Particularly equipped for long-range sea surveillance over an extended period of time is the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) P3 C Orion of the German navy.

Cooperation in the field of sea-surveillance in the North and Baltic Sea exists under the Bonn Agreement of 1983 for the North Sea⁴⁵ and under the Helsinki Commission (Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission) for the Baltic. This co-operation, however, is limited to environmental issues, in particular for dealing with pollution stemming from shipping in both seas. Control flights in the Baltic Sea are coordinated through CEPCO Command Centres North and South.⁴⁶ During recent years, participating nations have conducted altogether some 5000 annual flight hours, half of which by Swedish aircraft.⁴⁷ In the North Sea, coordination is performed by a rotating lead nation.

More economic sea surveillance could be achieved by extending the purpose and spirit of Schengen. The various surveillance tasks, including national control of territorial waters and economic zones could be performed jointly. For planning, coordinating and conducting sea surveillance in all its aspects, joint command centres could be established. In the Baltic the geographical areas of responsibility could be in analogy to CEPCO North and South. The command centres would be drawing upon a joint pool to which nations provide their means and equipment. In this way, effective and continuous sea surveillance could be ensured whilst making optimum use of existing equipment and reducing costs for individual nations.⁴⁸

Joint Air Policing




For NATO allies, military control of members' airspace including air policing of unidentified aircraft is entrusted to the integrated NATO air defence organisation. Once the unidentified object is recognised to be civilian, responsibility for air policing passes to national authorities as part of their sovereign task. In any case, the fighter aircraft which are to perform this task within the airspace of a


45. See: www.bonnagreement.org/eng/html/welcome.html.

46. Coordinated Extended Pollution Control Flights.

47. See: http://helcom.navigo.fi/environment/indicators2004/oil/en_GB/illegaldischarges/

48. For the participation of Great Britain, which does not adhere to Schengen, particular arrangements could be sought.





nation, are provided by the nation herself. Hence, each nation has to constantly hold a number of aircraft at 24 hours readiness.

Some nations do not dispose of appropriate air forces. For these, cooperative arrangements are in place. Belgium provides air policing for Luxemburg, Italy for Slovenia. For the Baltic States, an interim agreement ensures air policing by other NATO allies on a rotational three-monthly basis. Whilst Belgium and Italy operate their aircraft from their home bases, air policing for the Baltic States necessitates deployment of appropriate aircraft and ground personnel to the Baltic airbase Zokniai, which generates extra costs. The expenses for a three-month deployment of Belgian F-16 to Zokniai amounted to € 600.000.⁴⁹ It is agreed that these costs are covered by the deploying nation.

In particular with a view to narrow national airspaces in Europe, air policing could be ensured in a more efficient and economic way. This would require pooling of air sovereignty of individual nations and regarding European airspace as a common area. Thus supra-regional areas for air policing could be established – not separated by intra-European national borders – according to the range to be covered by interceptor aircraft from their current bases and the need for appropriate reaction time.⁵⁰ As a result, the number of interceptor aircraft held at 24 hours readiness could be reduced remarkably for participating countries, as could consequently the overall need for appropriate military aircraft.⁵¹ Reducing the number of aircraft in particular would produce big savings. The overall costs for a single Eurofighter are estimated to be € 85 million.

Conclusion


Current approaches to military cooperation are useful for enhancing European military capabilities. The effects of such approaches will, however, be limited both in terms of cost savings and in advancing the process of military integration as long as nations want to retain a maximum of national autonomy in decision-


49. Fiorenza, Nicholas, *NATO Provides Air Cover to New Members*, www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/Air%20Policing.PDF.

50. Routine tasks of joint air policing, i.e. to identify, photograph and report, should not pose a problem to participating States, nor should the use of force. If a situation arises, e.g. in case of an terrorist attack, requiring the use of force, the decision to undertake such action will rest with the nation concerned anyway.




51. The basic argument for convincing the Austrian parliament to agree to the acquisition of 18 Eurofighters was the requirement to ensure sovereign national air policing.

See: Parlament Österreich, www.parlament.gv.at/portal/page?_pageid=908,263597&cSUCHE=J&P_TEXT=1&P_MEHR=J&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL.





making and action. Hence, approaches which will further both effects will be achieved only if nations agree to undertake steps which include a higher degree of political integration. Such integrative approaches may for the time being not be agreeable to all 25 EU nations. However, a smaller group of nations could begin. Pooling of particular tasks of sovereignty would be a first step.



7. The Participating Institutes



www.irri-kiib.be



www.c2sd.sga.defense.gouv.fr


The Foreign Policy Centre



<http://fpc.org.uk>



www.mil.be/rdc



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