THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP:
TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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Introduction

In the few years since its inception following the 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo Summit, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has progressed enormously, certainly when compared with the preceding fifty years. A whole new politico-military dimension has been added to the EU. ESDP is not just a paper exercise, as a dozen ongoing operations involving more than 8,000 troops and 500 civilians demonstrate. If other operations in which EU Member States participate are counted as well (national, NATO, UN and ad hoc coalitions) the number of Member States’ armed forces that is constantly deployed stands at 70 to 80,000.

Yet these impressive figures also represent more or less the maximum effort that Member States can make today, in spite of the fact that together the twenty-seven number nearly 2 million men and women in uniform. Europe’s armed forces thus still face an enormous problem of efficiency and effectiveness. Ten years since the beginning of ESDP is a short time to judge its impact, yet the question must be asked whether the existing mechanisms, those of NATO included, are really sufficient to achieve the required transformation. The Lisbon Treaty and its clauses on ESDP (to be renamed CSDP) offers an occasion to draw up the “state of the union” in this area.

On 28-29 April 2008 Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations and the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES) brought together practitioners and academics from a wide range of Member States and institutions at a seminar in the Egmont Palace in Brussels, in order to assess Europe’s defence effort, including in the NATO context, and explore the Treaty’s potential to realize a quantum leap. The seminar focussed in particular on the question whether a shift could and should be made from the current national focus of Member States and bottom-up nature of ESDP to a truly integrative approach. This Egmont Paper includes a summary of the debates as well as contributions from a number of speakers. The editors hope it can serve as a useful contribution to the debate on European defence.

Sven BISCOP & Franco ALGIERI

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Europe’s Military Ambition

JO COELMONT

What is Europe’s military level of ambition? First – and rightly so – this question is addressed from a political point of view, and subsequently complemented with a strategic and diplomatic approach, before being transferred to the military – supplemented with the implicit suggestion “do something about it, General, something practical”. This is exactly what the military has been doing these last years. Taking into account the broad political guidance provided after the St-Malo meeting, such as the Headline Goals, the European Security Strategy (ESS), and the Lisbon Treaty, very detailed military scenario’s have been developed, leading in term to the identification of detailed military requirements. Implicitly all this provides a good picture of Europe’s military level of ambition.

So the main message is that from a military-technical perspective, pretty good results have been achieved, solid enough to bring them back to the political level for further decision-making.

Building-blocks of a Military Level of Ambition

From the ESS the military message is:
1. Worldwide. There are no geographical limitations, neither to the European continent nor to Africa. This has implications for strategic transport and deployment times.
2. Multilateralism. This has implications for C2 structures, for upstream planning and for the conduct of operations. Capabilities are to be developed so that we can operate together with NATO, the UN, the AU, and other potential partners.
3. A Civil-Military approach. This has similar implications both for the structures of the EU and outside.
4. Reaction times. The need to act preventively is stressed, as well as the need to develop a rapid response capability.
5. But... The ESS is not a full-fledged strategy. It does not clearly identify the required means nor the ways to achieve the strategic objectives. So the ESS leaves us with a clair-obscur as to the exact types of military missions to

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undertake as well as to the scale of these military operations. Fortunately additional political guidance is available.

With the Lisbon Treaty we now have a common and a clear understanding of the Petersberg tasks. Not so long ago we were facing 15 and later even 27 very different interpretations of these military tasks. The Lisbon Treaty makes it clear that it is about the most broad interpretation one can imagine, ranging from SSR, through the fight against terrorism, up to peace enforcement. The Treaty even provides for a Solidarity Clause and for Mutual Defence. In short, apart from collective defence, all kinds of military operations one can at present realistically invent in our global world can all be undertaken in a European context as an ESDP (or CSDP) operation. So, there is now full clarity as to the type of potential military missions.

The remaining elements required to launch a genuine process by military planners are provided by the Helsinki Headline Goal (HLG 2003) and the Headline Goal 2010 (HLG 2010). The HLG 2003 is utterly clear about the scale of a potential EU military operation, i.e. to effectively deal with a crisis such as the one we witnessed in Yugoslavia. The HLG 2010 provides a list of specific milestones to reach within the 2010 horizon on such issues as an operations centre, strategic lift, aircraft carriers and even space assets. It also provides a qualitative approach and a way ahead.

All these building blocks made it possible for military planners from the 27 capitals to produce, together with the EUMS, a requirement catalogue (RC05). Based on illustrative scenarios and guidelines as to the concurrency of some military operations, this catalogue offers detailed quantitative and qualitative information on required military capabilities. Producing such a catalogue was not an easy task. Even with all the political guidance mentioned, some ambiguities remained. But sound military judgment led to consensus and gave us a document that reflects pretty well the ambitions formulated in the ESS. Of course, one can always improve such a process. But in this author’s judgement it will have but marginal impact on the final results. Important is to remind that finally “a military level of ambition” has now been identified. And, what is even more important, in doing so all shortfalls regarding military capabilities have been clearly identified as well.

When developing military capabilities it does not suffice to prepare for the last military campaign. The Long Term Vision (LTV) established by the European Defence Agency together with the EU Military Committee looks into the world the ESDP may be operating in 20 years from now. It identifies the implications for military contributions and capability development. Moreover it points
towards some key issues for defence planners in our respective capitals. All this may look very logical and thus self-evident. But it is worthwhile noting that in history this is the very first time that we are looking commonly to future requirements to support the military level of ambition of the EU.

One can conclude that at present we have enough insight in the military level of ambition to launch a reliable planning process. The train has left the station, going in the right direction – will it reach its destination?

**Determinants of Military Ambition on the Ground**

One should not to use the military level of recent or ongoing operations as an upper limit. This would be like looking from a distance to a youngster of 10 years old and stating this person will no longer grow or gain weight for the rest of his or her life. Three factors determine the future of EU military operations.

First, the political will to effectively launch military operations whenever appropriate to underpin the objectives put forward in the ESS. Translated into more military terms this also means that listening military capabilities in a force catalogue or identifying land, air or maritime forces on a roster of Battle Groups or similar military forces may no longer be considered as a non-binding gesture, but as a strong political signal of engagement. If afterwards it is commonly decided by Member States to launch an EU military operation, these capabilities and forces should as a rule be made available.

Our capability to close, at 27, the remaining military shortfalls constitutes a second factor. Whenever we mount a specific military operation a Statement of Military Requirements (CJSOR) is identified and through a Force Generation Conference we make sure the complete list is filled. This is never an easy process. But so far within the EU we have been able to fill all the requirements before the EUMC gave its final advise on the military aspects of launching an operation. This brings us to the suggestion is to organise Capability Generation Conferences aiming to fill up the commonly identified shortfalls within a reasonable timeframe (up to one or in some particular instances two decades). Such an endeavour could be part of Permanent Structured Cooperation. It would be inclusive from the outset.

Preconditions for Member States would be to:
1. Be prepared to revisit their respective national planning.
2. Be prepared to do away with national military capabilities proven to be redundant at the European level.
3. Be prepared to pool assets and capabilities, including logistics and training facilities in order to generate savings.
4. Be prepared to take a fair share in the programmes set up to fill up the strategic shortfalls, in particular by joining programs set up by the EDA.
5. Last but not least, be prepared to actively contribute to the negotiations as long as it takes to reach full success. This would probably – and from a military perspective rightly so – lead us to a permanent conference, a permanent process.

**Political Momentum**

A revision – or better a completion – of the ESS offers the potential to generate the necessary political momentum. The ESS is in the first place a political document and should remain a political document. Europe’s foreign and security policy as well as its defence policy would however be greatly served by completing the ESS with guidelines as to how we should act to come to a genuinely comprehensive approach, on how to effectively join up all the instruments of the EU, be it the ones from the Commission, the Secretariat General or from Member States. A timely update of the ESS could inspire the ongoing work on the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty by introducing strategic and tactical thinking on security matters.

In the second instance, a revised ESS could give directions on how to deal with some specific military matters, on how to complement the bottom-up approach used at present by Member States to generate military capabilities with top-down steering involving the Secretariat General, the Commission and other EU instruments such as the EDA.

Thirdly, an updated and more detailed ESS would offer an additional sound basis for a continued constructive Transatlantic dialogue leading to even more mutual benefits. This will be one of the strongest determining factors with regard to the EU’s military level of ambition, its military presence on the terrain and indeed the further development of ESDP as such, for the simple reason that all this will influence the thinking in all the capitals of our Transatlantic community.
Permanent Command & Control

Throughout history command & control has been considered critical to success. A comprehensive approach to crisis management demands even more attention to C2. It is about achieving unity of effort by all parties involved while maintaining unity of command for the actual military operations. C2 is a concept, but it is not that abstract. In a given operation it gets real, it even gets a face, the face of its Commander. This is part of the beauty of C2. However, this is also part of the political problems we are witnessing on the issue of an EU headquarters.

From history we learn that the best way to use power is to show it, to act preventively, and if this fails to intervene in an early stage of the conflict. All this suggest to be permanently aware, to develop timely contingency planning in order to launch the required operations at very short notice. This suggest to do away with improvising or ad hocery, especially in the C2 area.

In NATO collective wisdom brought us to build a strong Alliance around a permanent C2 structure. That was and remains key. The new geo-strategic and political realities led us to reduce the number of HQs and to maintain but a single operational headquarters (OHQ). At the OHQ level we have at present within the EU the Ops Centre (within the EUMS) and up to 5 OHQs provided by Member States. None of them with solid permanent structures. All of them with a lot of arrangements to be put in place at a very late stage in the crisis management procedure (on the eve of troop deployments). And for non-autonomous operations the EU can call upon NATO’s planning capabilities. Until now auto-limitations have prevented Member States from providing even two planning officers each to the EUMS in order to create a modest but permanent core planning staff. Instead an even bigger group of planning officers from 27 capitals travel regularly across the continent to the different HQs, for training sessions. So it clearly not about the availability of planning officers. It is about structures.

The weaknesses of these solutions have been demonstrated during the preparation phase and the conduct of the EU military operations in the DRC and Chad. These lessons learned should put us in a position to leave the theological debates behind us. Sound analysis will generate consensus among Member States and lead us to more effective, more efficient, less ad hoc but more permanent structures.
Conclusion

At the military-technical level, the military have done their part of the process, their part of the military planning. The catalogues provided as well as the Long Term Vision will never stand in line for a Nobel Prize for accuracy. That never was the intention. However, these documents provide solid enough details on Europe’s military ambition to take further political steps.
Permanent Structured Cooperation

Pierre Hougardy

The introduction of permanent structured cooperation (PermStrucCoop) in the field of defence is an important innovation in the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, the establishment of PermStrucCoop could create a momentum for those Member States that want to deepen their cooperation in different defence-related areas such as amongst others capability development, operations, training, logistics, joint acquisitions. Already in the preamble of the protocol on PermStrucCoop it is recognised that the strengthening of the security and defence policy will require efforts by Member States in the area of capabilities. Hence, the key question is: how can PermStrucCoop have a fundamental and unremitting influence on the way a credible EU defence is developed and implemented?

PermStrucCoop calls, amongst others, for cooperation with a view to achieving approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment. Criteria are definitely needed to allow a meaningful assessment. However, in this field, discussions should not be led by dogmatism but rather by pragmatism. Defining realistic criteria should help the political leaders and the defence experts to understand each other, and be an incentive to sustain the efforts till the objectives are met. Setting stringent input criteria has proved to be counter-productive in the long term with regard to an effective development of capabilities. Even if this approach seems to be laudable in terms of measurement and verification, one must admit that they cause discomfort due to the different interpretation and the nature of the figures.

Therefore, the objectives to be (negotiated and) agreed in the framework of PermStrucCoop should be rather output-oriented, “reasonable” and allow some flexibility for the implementation, aiming at the medium to longer term. Moreover, they ought to be focused on the level of ambition of the European Union, in particular aiming at developing the critical capabilities identified – and to be identified – in the Capability Development Plan. These concerns could be met through the establishment of “packages of criteria” in domains related to e.g. operations, capability development, joint armament programmes and allowing at least at the outset of PermStrucCoop internal compensations among those packages.

PermStrucCoop has the potential to generate a top-down approach complemented with a solid peer pressure. This top-down approach, involving decision makers at the appropriate level, would balance the bottom-up approach which
has framed the development of ESDP until the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA). It is also not surprising to see the role of the EDA underlined and reinforced in the protocol on *PermStrucCoop*. The relation “EU Lisbon Treaty – EDA” must not be considered as a new fact, but as the confirmation of the role that the EDA should play in the defence sector. *PermStrucCoop* should facilitate a better common understanding of defence issues, between the political level and the military establishment, aiming at a greater coherence at all levels, not only in the definition of concrete objectives, but more importantly, ensuring an “end-to-end” process in the implementation of the general political objectives. If we take the A400-M or the NH 90 programmes as example: common procurement does not necessarily mean interoperable units, common logistics, training, education, doctrine etc.

We should bear in mind that the development of key capabilities necessitates a long-term effort which is generally not in line with the horizon of political decisions. *PermStrucCoop* must not compete with the current cooperation in the EDA. Instead, it should reinforce the effectiveness of the EDA's activities. The role of the EDA should also remain “central”, in coordination with the other EU “bodies” (Council, EUMC, Commission). We should not exclude any form of constellation of *PermStrucCoop*, in order to better reflect commonalities of interests and complementarities, on the basis of common requirements and/or on the basis of “regional” reinforced cooperation (for example between the Nordic countries, the Benelux, the Eurocorps countries etc.). Such an approach would be in line with the concept of “variable geometry” applicable within the EDA.

Effective *PermStrucCoop* will lead to less fragmentation and duplication of defence efforts and to economies of scale (spend better together…), encouraging pooling and sharing of capabilities. A key factor to success will be to what extent participating Member States are willing to adjust their way of thinking with regard to national defence planning. Evidently, efforts in this field will have to be spread out in the short, medium and long term. *PermStrucCoop* should take into account the broader framework of “security-defence”, taking into account the EU civil-military approach to crises and notably the role of the European Commission to that end. This global and multidisciplinary approach implies that we look at capability development from a ‘dual’ perspective.

Belgium is advocating the inclusive character of *PermStrucCoop* as it is mentioned in Article 1 of the protocol (“PermStrucCoop shall be open to any Member State”). The aim will be to find the right balance between a critical mass of Member States participating in *PermStrucCoop* (ideally at 27) willing to progress effectively and at a proper pace, leading to the substantial development
of European defence. This development is in line with the long-standing policy of Belgium aspiring to more European integration.

For Belgium, multinational cooperation is absolutely essential, to meet our level of ambition and to make the most efficient use of our resources and capabilities. For many years, Belgium has been a pioneer in this field: as a framework nation of the Eurocorps, sharing a common naval command with the Netherlands, including common schools for all the fregate staff in the Netherlands and for all the mine-hunter staff in Belgium, training of jet pilots in France, member of the DATF (Deployable Air Task Force), EATC (European Air Transport Command), EEAW (European participating Air Forces Expeditionary Air Wings (5 x EU “F16-countries”), participating in multinational EU Battlegroups and many others cooperations.

Consequently, one could argue that PermStrucCoop would offer Belgium a forum where it could at least (continue to) participate in the debate on the effective development of the European Union’s defence capabilities.
Permanent Structured Cooperation for a Permanently Capable ESDP

Sven Biscop

The efficiency problem of Europe’s armed forces is well known: of an impressive overall number of over two million men and women in uniform in the EU-27, only a meagre 10 to 15% are estimated to be deployable. The causes are manifold: the low cost-effectiveness of a plethora of small-scale capabilities, unnecessary intra-EU duplications, the presence of large numbers of quasi non-deployable conscripts, capability gaps in terms of ‘enablers’ (strategic transport, command, control and communications), and, although all EU Member States are conscious of the challenge and are implementing measures, slow transformation nonetheless from territorial defence to expeditionary warfare. The question must be asked whether the existing mechanisms, in ESDP as well as NATO, are sufficient to achieve the required transformation within a reasonable timeframe.

The primary cause of this problematic state of affairs is the still almost exclusively national focus of defence planning, while capability gaps at the aggregate EU- and NATO-level are being ignored. Therefore, the only way to achieve the quantum leap that is necessary to realise defence transformation is through pooling which, by reducing intra-European duplications, can produce much more deployable capabilities within the current combined defence budget. From that point of view, Permanent Structured Cooperation, the new mechanism to be established by the Lisbon Treaty for ‘those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions’ (Art. 28A §6), has enormous potential. One could argue that the solutions to Europe’s capability conundrum are in effect well known – the question is whether PermStrucCoop can be the platform that convinces the Member States to implement them.

PermStrucCoop can be a very flexible instrument, allowing all EU Member States to participate, if they so choose, at their own level of means, in the way that they choose:
– Member States wanting to take part can make an “expression of interest”. Such a declaration would outline, in broad terms, which contribution, of

which size, in which timeframe might be considered. The aim should be for each participating Member State to generate additional “usable” capabilities, either in one or more specific shortfall areas as identified in the Progress Catalogue, and/or through force packages covering several capability areas, and/or with regard to longer-term, future capabilities in function of the trends identified in the EDA’s Capability Development Plan (CDP).

– Simultaneously, the participating Member States, with the support of the EDA, can agree on criteria for participation that apply to each specific contribution, regardless of size, in terms of deployability, sustainability, interoperability and per capita investment in equipment. An additional criterion might be actual participation in operations (regardless of the framework, EU, NATO, UN or ad hoc). To be avoided are general budgetary criteria, such as spending 2% of GDP on defence: laudable though they may be, they are also unrealistic and will not generate additional capabilities in the short to medium term.

– The EDA can then assess the opportunities for different forms of cooperation and pooling in function of Member States’ declared intentions, allowing Member States to decide which contributions they will offer on a national basis and which in cooperation, in which format, with other Member States. Pooling of forces offers the biggest added value. Member States can contribute national squadrons or battalions to a multinational fighter force or army division, while everything above and below that (command & control, logistics, maintenance, training) could be fully integrated and located on a reduced number of bases, thus creating huge synergies and effects of scale. The World War II RAF can serve to illustrate the model: comprising clearly identifiable Belgian, Dutch, Czech and Polish squadrons, it did obviously not have a separate Belgian airfield or Polish logistics. The beauty of PermStrucCoop is its flexibility however: each Member State can participate in the way it prefers.

– This process will result in a set of concrete capability objectives, to be achieved by pre-identified units, some national, some multinational, in an agreed timeframe.

– The EDA is responsible for monitoring progress and assessing contributions against the agreed criteria and the evolving needs, as well as continuously updating and proposing opportunities for cooperation, in function of the CDP. Important is that the EDA is empowered by the Member States to play this role to the full, in order to realise the potential of PermStrucCoop.

PermStrucCoop is not the silver bullet that will solve all problems of Europe’s military. But because it is in the Treaty and Member States therefore have to consider whether and how to make use of it, it presents a window of opportunity to further ESDP. If a critical mass of Member States willing to go ahead with
PermStrucCoop can be found, the desire to “be in” will probably lead many others to participate. Once in, peer pressure and the need to avoid exclusion for no longer fulfilling the criteria should stimulate Member States’ efforts. The only “carrot” that can stimulate Member States to set demanding criteria in the first place however is the one that should appeal to Finance Ministers: the potential of increasing the efficiency of the defence budget.

PermStrucCoop—which itself is only a means towards deploying Europe’s forces in the service of global peace and security. Ultimately therefore, even if the capabilities are available, political willingness, to commit troops where necessary and to act as EU, is the key. But the more integrated Europe’s military capabilities will be, the more EU Member States will be pushed to act as one.
1. The ESDP/CSDP Framework

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – according to the Lisbon Treaty to be renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – can be considered a most interesting example to demonstrate the difficulty of bringing together, on the one hand, an integrationist system and, on the other hand, an intergovernmental system. An inherent ambiguity of the European integration process as such can be realized.

Looking at the corresponding provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union the dualism of integration and intergovernmentalism becomes obvious. According to article 43 (1) TEU the “CSDP shall be an integral part of CFSP”. But “the performance of tasks” (peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security) in the framework of this common policy “shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the member states” (Art. 42 (1) TEU). Furthermore, the CSDP “shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy” (Art. 42 (2) TEU). Even though it cannot be understood as an automatism, the treaty states that “this will lead to a common defence”, however under the condition that “the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides” (Art. 42 (2) TEU). The latter article also pays tribute to “the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states” and ensures that CSDP shall not cause a respective prejudice. The most explicit example of how member states keep control over the CSDP is Article 42 (4) emphasizing that “decisions relating to the CSDP … shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously”.

The CSDP is a policy field guided by an integrationist ambition but controlled by intergovernmentalism. Of course, it could be argued that the integration process in the field of foreign policy was also developing step by step from European Political Cooperation (EPC), over several treaty reforms (Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice) to today’s CFSP. But such an incrementalism implies that the process is moving slowly whereas the challenges the EU is facing in foreign and security policy are at times developing with greater pace. Consequently, the development of the CFSP, including the ESDP/CSDP, has so far mainly been a
reactive process. In addition, in an EU of 27 member states the heterogeneity of interests has increased. Against the backdrop of these two trends it became necessary to adapt existing and to develop new institutional and procedural mechanisms in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy and decision-making process. Looking at possible ways to overcome this problem, the idea of building elements of flexibility into the respective treaty provisions has gained prominence.

2. **Flexibility instruments for CFSP/CSDP**

Two main arguments can be used to explain why flexibility is considered to create an added value. First, it offers a possibility to overcome a standstill and/or weakening of the EU as an actor. Second, it meets the demands of member states willing to move ahead. As a consequence, different forms of differentiation characterise the European integration process. It is crucial to clarify where flexibility is applied, i.e. inside the treaty framework or outside the treaty framework? The latter option would cause a serious challenge to keeping up with the approach of developing common policies. A further question that needs to be tackled is whether flexibility is an inclusive or exclusive concept. Taking a look at the development of the European integration, elements of flexibility can be found (e.g. the Schengen Agreement, the Prüm Treaty, the Euro).

Recalling the need to clarify whether groups will be formed and act inside or outside the treaty framework, the Lisbon Treaty clearly embeds the option for group-building within the EU framework. Analysing the provisions in the Lisbon Treaty concerning enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation, the strengthening of the flexibility approach can be recognized. An interesting formulation can be found in Article 42 (5): “The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests.” Following an overarching integrationist goal (“to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests”), a group of states might take over responsibility. The creation of such a group shall not affect another form of group building, i.e. permanent structured cooperation. The latter is conceptualized as a flexible approach and “within the Union framework” (Art. 42 (6) TEU). The decision for establishing permanent structured cooperation by the Council shall be taken by qualified majority (Art. 46 (2) TEU).

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The protocol (No. 10) concerning permanent structured cooperation calls upon the member states to improve and harmonise their defence capabilities. This could be interpreted as an attempt to increase integration in the field of security and defence policy, but probably such a dynamic will depend on concrete steps by the member states. It will be interesting to observe whether the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will take up an important role in managing flexibility together with member states (Art. 44 and Art. 46), can channel particular national interests in a common direction.

3. Conclusion

As in earlier reform phases a recurrent question remains to be answered: what will be the effect of the new treaty? For those who are expecting the reconciliation of deepening and widening the Lisbon Treaty is probably not offering the optimal solution. CFSP and CSDP will remain policy fields causing controversial debates with regard to the degree to which they can be labelled ‘common’. Even though the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are legally on an equal level and even though the old pillar structure will finally be overcome, the difference between the Community part and the CFSP/CSDP part can still be recognized. Foreign, security and defence policy will remain under the control of member states and intergovernmentalism will stay prominent. For the participating states it was and will be no easy task to concretely move towards the sharing of sovereignty with other states in these policy fields. Enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation offer an opportunity for more flexibility, however, it will be decisive to see under which circumstances and with which commitment EU member states will use it. What will happen if states do not use permanent structured cooperation?

Against the background of the Irish referendum, a Europe of different integration density is becoming ever more probable. If a group inside the Union is in general willing to move ahead and if this group is using flexibility instruments like permanent structured cooperation, it will be even more interesting to observe whether a kind core group for European foreign, security and defence policy will become reality. Such a development would have far reaching effects on the future course of the European integration process as a whole. A new understanding would be necessary with regard to the terms ‘Union’ and ‘common’. And consequently, the debate about the EU as a global security actor, being able to shape the behaviour of other actors, would need to be re-evaluated.
Permanent Command and Control Structures for the EU

JEAN-PAUL PERRUCHE

1. The Political Perspective

After 5 years of operational existence the EU, through ESDP, has proved to be an effective contributor to world stability and security. With 17 successful operations (5 of which military operations) on 3 continents – successful, because the situation at the end of these operations was better than at the beginning – the EU has become a global player whose action is appreciated and whose reputation as a peacekeeper is positive everywhere, even though for many reasons the size of these operations was limited. The EU has become a partner of the UN, NATO, the AU, and even ASEAN. These operations, launched under the EU flag, were clearly beneficial to the EU and its member-states. Northern and eastern European countries have become familiar with African challenges, Germany’s peacekeeping capacity is better known in the DRC and in Africa, European monitors are well known in Indonesia but also in Palestine, and neighbouring countries on the Balkans are happy to see stabilisation pervading slowly but surely thanks to the EU.

In view of the evolution of the security context and of the often reiterated US request for more efforts on the part of the Europeans to increase their military capabilities, the EU should definitely strive to do even more. There is a need for the world to have Europe playing its role in achieving more security and stability, just as there is a need for Europe to positively influence global stability by intervening, even militarily, wherever the security situation is deteriorating.

In doing so, the EU, through ESDP, is not duplicating NATO. Although the global security objectives of the two organisations are very close, they have their own format, rationale and legitimacy to act for security. If one accepts that the presence of the USA changes the definition of common interests and courses of action to deal with crises, one must accept also that the two organisations need to be able to act autonomously and require the appropriate structures to do so. To put in synergy its multidisciplinary instruments, the EU needs appropriate and specific command structures; it cannot rely on an external body, not even partly. As both NATO and the EU rely on assets and capabilities provided by

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their Member States the existence of two frameworks does not affect the availability of troops and resources – that availability is simply linked to the number of crises – but rather offers to the Euro-Atlantic community a wider capacity to intervene.

It is in this framework the need for the EU to be equipped with a permanent C2 structure must be considered.

2. The Military Perspective

2.1 The number and the diversity of ESDP operations require a solid command and control structure competent in all aspects of operations

When the structures of ESDP were defined, it was likely not expected that the EU would launch 20 operations in 5 years (10 of which are ongoing). The absence of a permanent operational chain of command led the EU to adopt a specific command system for each operation. It is obvious that the EU now needs a central command structure able to maintain a global situation awareness with regard to all theatres in which the EU is engaged, and able to analyse, to inform and to provide expertise for the political leaders. The new Watch Centre in the EUMS is a first step in the right direction but the EU needs a Joint Operations Centre or Strategic Direction Centre to actually control all of its operations.

2.2 The existing options for building an EU operational chain of command contain several drawbacks and are not indeed adapted to rapid response operations

Through the Berlin Plus Agreement, the EU can rely on the common assets and capabilities of NATO, i.e. headquarters and communications. This arrangement was successfully used twice, for Operation Concordia in the FYROM and Operation Althea in Bosnia. However, the difficulties posed by a parallel decision-making process in the two organisations in the planning phase should not be underestimated. This is a very time-consuming process; e.g. 8 months were necessary for the hand over in Bosnia in 2004. In addition, it makes the EU dependent on the agenda and decisions of non-EU members; the current Turkey-Cyprus question can serve to illustrate this. Another difficulty results from the differences in approach and style between NATO and EU crisis management. The multidisciplinary approach of the EU requires at the strategic level a command structure able to embrace all the domains corresponding to the various instru-
ments committed by the EU. SHAPE is not able to provide this. Finally, based on the author’s personal experience, in Berlin Plus operations it may be difficult for the EUMS (which is the only EU source of military expertise) to stay in the loop, while the operational commander (for Berlin Plus operations: DSACEUR) may deal directly with the political leaders (the High Representative, DGE 8) or other organisms of the Secretariat.

The framework nation option has been successfully used twice as well, for EU autonomous operations in the DRC. However, it too is far from an ideal solution. Five nations have declared a national strategic military HQ available to be multinationalised, upon request, for EU operations. Although preparatory measures have been taken by the five to anticipate such an option, like dedicated infrastructures and assets, training and earmarking of officers to join these HQs in case of activation, the building phase is not easy. Many disturbances for the lead nation (and to a lesser extent for contributing nations) result from double-hatted officers leaving their national function. Contributing nations must find the way to accommodate their people (including liaison teams) at the last moment in one of the five host countries. In addition, the designation of the selected operational commander and HQ is effective only after the approval of the Joint Action, i.e. late in the planning process. When the designation is confirmed, the operational commander, far from Brussels, needs very strong support by the EUMS to catch up and get the necessary information to produce the CONOPS and the OPLAN, while he must concurrently give directives to the force commander and watch the building up of the HQ. The planning phase of the operations EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Chad provide a good illustration. Finally, another limit (rather more political) of the framework nation concept is constituted by the burden of responsibility before the international community associated with lead nation status. No lead nation will accept to engage in operations with a high level of risk and uncertainty on the duration of the operation. Lebanon is a case in point.

The new Operations Centre at the EUMS enables the EU to build and equip an operational chain of command in Brussels for autonomous operations of limited size (2000 troops) at short notice (5 to 20 days), particularly in cases where a joint civil-military response is required and no multinationalised national headquarters has been identified to conduct the operation. However, it is not a permanent structure. Infrastructure is prepared but staffing relies on earmarked personnel from the EUMS, the Council General Secretariat and member states who must join the Operations Centre in case of activation. This would have serious consequences for the capacity of the EUMS (which should provide 40 officers) to fulfil its mission, in particular in the field of strategic or crisis response planning.
2.3 **Operational expertise is needed from the very outset of strategic planning and even in routine time**

The delineation of information between the politico-military and the operational level is purely artificial. It is rather the exploitation of this information which differs at each level. At the very beginning of the discussion about a strategic concept for EUFOR RD Congo, the EUMS had to send two fact finding missions to Congo to inform the PSC ambassadors on tactical and sometimes detailed aspects of the military situation. It is not realistic to think that decisions may be taken about a strategic concept without good knowledge of the operational situation. It is an unnecessary handicap for the EU to be denied permanent expertise in the operational area.

2.4 **A permanent military strategic HQ in Brussels would be very cost-effective**

Having all the bodies involved in the planning and running of an operation in Brussels will make communication and cooperative work between them easier and faster. A permanent StratHQ will further ensure the availability of operational expertise at any moment and will speed up the planning process. It will alleviate the burden on framework nations and there will no longer be a need for national liaison teams to OHQs.

2.5 **The EU needs similar structures for commanding civilian, military and civilian-military operations**

Since 2008, the EU is equipped with a comprehensive chain of command for civilian operations (police and law enforcement) with a permanent operational commander and HQ in Brussels: the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). As the EU seeks to develop its ability to integrate its civilian-military crisis management capabilities, it would be very effective to have symmetric structures in the military area close at hand, making cooperation much easier.

3. **Conclusion**

The creation of a permanent military HQ at the strategic level would be very beneficial to the EU and its credibility. It would be adapted to its level of ambition, it would enhance the visibility and credibility of ESDP operations, it would be very cost effective, would make civilian-military cooperation much easier, and would raise the quality of military expertise and facilitate EU planning.
Permanent EU Command and Control Structures: A Capability Deficit to Be Addressed

ERICH HOCHLEITNER

All EU crisis management operations conducted up to now have required the setting up of ad hoc chains of command since the EU does not dispose of a permanent military strategic command and control structure (OHQ). Strong political and professional military reasons require the creation of a permanent strategic C2 structure in Brussels. Denying the EU a permanent strategic C2 structure creates a self-inflicted and unnecessary handicap for the Union. It reduces the military effectiveness of ESDP operations and their visibility. Also, the global situation awareness with regard to all the theatres in which the EU is engaged is not ensured.

The broad support expressed by EU defence ministers for the idea of establishing a permanent capability for planning of military operations within the EUMS at their informal meeting in Wiesbaden in March 2007 can be considered as an important starting point to address the problems the EU is facing in planning and conducting EU operations. But the result of negotiations among EU states was so far very modest because of a continuing lack of political support for an autonomous ESDP by some member states. Against this background, available structures will first be analysed. Second, the case for a permanent strategic C2 structure to be established in Brussels will be examined.

1. Available Planning and Command Structures for EU Operations

At present the EU has three options to plan and run crisis management operations: using NATO structures, one of the five HQs of EU framework nations (UK, France, Germany, Italy, Greece) or the newly created Operations Centre. Having no permanent operational planning and command capability at strategic level the EU must discuss and negotiate the establishment of an ad hoc operational chain of command with NATO and EU-Framework nations on a case by case basis. This is of course time-consuming.

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NATO structures have been built up and organised to plan and command NATO military operations in the area of defence and more recently also of crisis management. If NATO is requested by the EU to provide an OHQ it would not be sufficient just to put an EU label on existing NATO structures, but within the existing NATO chains of command, an ad hoc command chain needs to be negotiated and organised. In the case of operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EU-NATO negotiations took over 8 months. In case of a necessary rapid response, e.g. rapid deployment of an EU Battlegroup, it is obvious that the Berlin Plus option for an OHQ would not work. Furthermore, NATO does not have civil instruments in house. NATO is therefore not equipped to run EU-type comprehensive civil/military operations. The NATO approach is CIMIC, which means organising military cooperation with available civil actors in the theatre. Using NATO means could also in certain situations be politically difficult. Finally, NATO means might not be available or their use blocked by a member state as the EU has experienced in the past and still experiences.

As regards the use of EU framework nation HQs, standards for equipment, manning and procedures for EU-OHQ have been defined by the EU and are implemented by framework nations. But also national OHQ need to be activated, augmented and multinationalised within a time frame of 20 days in order to be fully operational. The key nucleus of the OHQ provided by the frameworks nations varies from 42 to 46 personnel. The permanent nucleus available for EU staff work exclusively are 15 persons in Potsdam, 9 in Cento Celle, substantial less (2-4) at Mont Valerien and Northwood. The majority of the key nucleus is double hatted staff immediately transferable to the activated OHQ. CIS facilities are prepared and the staffs of the key nucleus and augmentees are earmarked. Nevertheless official work of the OHQ can only start when the decision designating the OHQ is taken. This also means time. National HQs do not have civil-military competences either. National parent headquarters continue to have other national, alliance and coalition roles to fulfil and will only bear the bleeding involved in running an EU operation for operations of clearly limited duration. The idea that one EU country bears the burden for providing an OHQ is not compatible with the concept of fair burden-sharing.

The new Operations Centre at the EUMS enables the EU to build and equip an operational chain of command for autonomous operations at short notice in Brussels, particularly in cases where a joint civil/military response is required and no multinationalised national HQ has been identified to conduct the operation. However, the EU Operations Centre is not a permanent structure. It can be activated within 5 days achieving full operational capability within 20 days for operations of up to 2000 soldiers. Infrastructure is prepared and personnel from the EU Military Staff, Council General Secretariat and member states have
been earmarked to work at the Operations Centre. But the present construction of activating the Operations Centre would bring about the temporary destruction of the EUMS, which is a matter of concern. There would not be sufficient staff available for other important staff-work such as military strategic contingency planning, crisis response strategic planning etc.

2. The case for establishing a permanent strategic planning and conduct capability in Brussels

The experience of EU operations clearly demonstrates that the lack of a permanent strategic C2 structure has become a capability-shortfall affecting and limiting the effectiveness and the credibility of EU operations. Several arguments speak in favour of creating such a C2 structure on a strategic level:

**Duplication**

The argument to avoid unnecessary duplication is neither convincing nor valid. Given the civil/military focus of the EU, a permanent strategic EU C2 structure in Brussels would not duplicate anything that exists elsewhere. Such a capability does neither exist in NATO nor in available national HQs.

**Structuring the operational strategic level**

Having no permanent structure at the operational military strategic level reduces the competence of the EU to plan and conduct military operations at that level, which affects the EU’s effectiveness and credibility. When launching an operation, the credibility of the action relies first on the credibility of the chain of command, i.e. the capability for the upper layer to assess and control at any time what the subordinate layers are doing. Therefore a clear military need for a permanent structure at the operational strategic level exists. Such a capability would allow a better implementation of the concept of Effects-Based Operations Planning. Such a capability needs to be located in Brussels in order to ensure that the military implications of political options and decisions are effectively translated and communicated to political leaders.

**Improving arrangements for preparation, planning and conduct of operations**

Lessons learned from EUFOR RD Congo demonstrate that arrangements for preparation, planning and conduct of EU military operations need to be
improved. The translation of directives, from the political to the military level, was made difficult by an existing gap in the military planning process. The need for an OHQ in the phase immediately preceding the decision to deploy, was felt strongly by the Council Secretariat and EUMS because a number of questions related to the OHQ were raised by political decision-makers and there was no OHQ yet designated. Also the force generation process was faced with difficulties due to the lack of sufficiently precise military data. There were also problems related to timely information of all EU member states about essential military characteristics of the operation under preparation. Some member states insisted on running their own reconnaissance missions to the Congo, resulting in a series of European delegations asking the same questions and sowing confusion.

Conceptual inconsistency

The 2010 Headline Goal’s declared responsiveness target for Battlegroup deployment in the theatre is ten days. That is incompatible with the time to negotiate the choice of an OHQ, its multinationalisation and the time necessary for planning. It is inconsistent to develop a Battlegroup concept to be able to deploy force rapidly far away and rely on a case by case basis for providing an operational chain of command.

Supporting a comprehensive approach

The comprehensive EU-approach to crisis management, trying to join up the various civilian and military instruments into coherent policies and actions, is a strong case to plan and conduct also the military part of an operation from Brussels, keeping in mind that the EU has substantial non-military instruments at its disposal which are becoming more and more important for successful crisis-management. Most of these tools are managed by Brussels institutions. The establishment of a permanent military C2 structure on a strategic level would be an important contribution to enhance the EU comprehensive approach and would allow the EU to respond faster and better to the increasing demand for comprehensive civil-military action in the area of crisis-management. Such a permanent military structure would complement the already established Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in Brussels and make the EU more capable to implement its comprehensive approach in crisis management.
Overseeing and coordinating EU operations

No connection is so far established between different operations allowing centralised management from Brussels. There is an increasing need for a capacity to watch, command and control the various concurrent EU operations from central HQ in Brussels, because the present situation running a greater number in an unconnected way is not sustainable.

Including smaller member states

The present system of using five framework-nation HQs as EU-OHQ presents a major difficulty for smaller EU countries, whose staffing constraints are considerable. It is indeed difficult for most of the smaller countries to send permanent liaison officers to five HQs, which would ensure their full involvement in EU crisis-management and give them full and timely information about essential military characteristics of the operation which is prepared and in which they should be able to take part. With the same number of officers, smaller states would be able to contribute substantially to a permanent multinational OHQ. The creation of a permanent strategic C2 structure in Brussels would make it easier for smaller member states to be represented and play a role in ESDP military operations.

Strengthening institutional memory

The current system, whereby the responsibility for planning and conduct of an operation is passed from one framework-nation to another, means that the experience gathered during the previous operations is not retained in the EU for operational learning as it should be. The EU’s lack of a permanent operational planning and command structure means that the institutional memory and lessons learned at the military operational level will likely be lost every time a new OHQ is designated. There is a strong argument in favour of setting up a permanent staff of planning officers, particularly given that greater experience means also shorter lead times.

Using synergies

A permanent strategic C2 structure would create synergies for the development of an EU strategic culture as advocated in the European Security Strategy. This would also allow the development of a more coherent European military and operational culture and strengthen understanding, trust and solidarity among European military. However, there is no need to reinvent anything within the EU
in terms of standards and concepts, which already exist in NATO, but it would be important that NATO makes them available to the Union and all its members.

Cost effectiveness

A permanent strategic C2 structure would allow a better pooling of resources and fairer burden-sharing of costs among EU members than the present system. The cost argument against creating EU operational planning and command structures is not valid. In designing a permanent EU planning and command structure, the EU would not need a structure commensurate with NATO’s due to its lower level of ambition. CIS equipment exists already to a large extent. The placing of 60-80 people in an operations centre in or near Brussels should be easily affordable for the EU.

Better visibility of EU operations

A permanent strategic military C2 structure in form of an EU-OHQ, which could also be called an EU Mission HQ, would increase the visibility of any EU operation on the international level but also increase the visibility of EU operations with the European citizens, which support the development of ESDP with a great majority.

Improving emergency response

Permanent military C2 structures could also be used to assist in implementing the ‘solidarity clause’ in cases such as multiple severe terrorist attacks or other major emergencies. Attempts to prepare an EU information network for emergencies have so far not found support. Emergencies as foreseen in the solidarity clause make an immediate response necessary. The military role is most important in the first 24 hours after the incident. Planning, preparedness and command structures would have to be designed accordingly, and there would be demanding requirements on access, mobility, information, communication, vehicles and force protection.
The Future of Defence Planning – A NATO Perspective

HEINRICH BRAUSS

The Treaty of Lisbon has been designed to enhance the European Union’s coherence and its ability to act. Thus, it also encompasses important provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) including the establishment of a Permanent Structured Cooperation of nations in the field of defence transformation. It appears that this concept particularly aims at committing participating member states to transforming their forces and capabilities more vigorously; enhancing their availability, deployability, and interoperability for operations; contributing in multinational forces and major joint equipment programmes; and, thus, strengthening the common European industrial and technological base. All these features, as well as the prominent role the European Defence Agency is supposed to play in implementing this permanent structured cooperation, seem to suggest the constitution of a comprehensive, coherent and interdependent approach to the development of military capabilities and defence capacities in the EU. Thus, it appears that the Permanent Structured Cooperation strives to achieve in essence much of what capabilities development within the NATO framework is also seeking. The central question for both the EU’s and NATO’s capabilities development processes is how to drive transformation of nations’ forces and capabilities to cope with the manifold challenges of international crisis management today and in the future.

NATO Defence Planning

NATO’s approach to capability development represents an integrative process complemented by multinational initiatives and projects. Its purpose is to facilitate the timely development and delivery of the necessary range of forces and capabilities that are interoperable and adequately trained, equipped and supported to undertake the Alliance’s full spectrum of missions, while being responsive to current and future operational requirements. It seeks to provide a coherent framework within which national defence planning can be harmonised so as to meet the Alliance’s agreed requirements in the most effective way.

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It is clear that the basic approaches to driving nations’ capability development are by and large the same in NATO and the EU. In both cases, overall requirements are determined based on political guidance on the scope, scale and nature of possible future engagements involving military means, and on planning scenarios. The required capabilities have to be provided by nations. Their contributions are reviewed, which results in the identification of shortfalls that need to be remedied by nations over time. In NATO the agreed requirements are drawn primarily from two sources: The first is NATO’s Comprehensive Political Guidance, which was endorsed by Heads of State and Government in Riga 2006 and sets out the Alliance’s top priority qualitative capability requirements:

- Multinational joint expeditionary forces and the capability to deploy and sustain them for extended periods;
- High readiness forces;
- The ability to deal with asymmetric threats;
- Information superiority;
- The ability to bring military support to stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts, to security sector reform and to humanitarian relief operations; and
- The ability to draw together NATO’s instruments as well as the ability to effectively coordinate with other actors.

The second is the Ministerial Guidance 2006 which sets out NATO’s capability requirements in quantitative terms, i.e. the Alliance’s Level of Ambition (LoA) – the so called 2 plus 6 formula, which means that the Alliance has the ambition to be able to conduct two Major Joint Operations and six Smaller Joint Operations concurrently. It should be noted that the LoA is not to be prescriptive as to the number and scale of possible future operations the Alliance will conduct. It is rather a tool, indeed NATO’s key defence planning tool, intended to determine the overall level of forces and capabilities required. It is worth noting that Allied contributions to EU-led operations would count against the overall demands of the Alliance’s LoA, which is an implicit recognition of NATO’s and the EU’s complementary efforts.

Of perhaps particular relevance, however, are the differences in the EU’s capability planning as it has been conducted hitherto. NATO assigns many defence planning targets to nations on the basis of the principles of fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge for any individual nation, and later it proceeds to conduct a detailed evaluation of national efforts and proposed contributions. Both these steps are carried out and agreed in multilateral fora and with maxi-
mum visibility and transparency amongst participating Allies. This is in clear contrast to the EU, which essentially seeks voluntary contributions to meet its stated defence planning requirements and, until recently, has not engaged in multilateral assessments of individual national contributions. Additionally, the cyclical nature of NATO’s defence review process has brought about permanent, institutionalised mutual information and consultation which has over time created a sense of collective ownership and enduring commitment. Looking to the key elements of the *Permanent Structured Cooperation* – more binding commitments, higher criteria for military capabilities, regular assessments and annual reports by the European Defence Agency – it appears as if the two approaches were converging in the future.

Against this background, various other elements regarding NATO defence planning may be of interest. First, NATO defence planning aims to influence and facilitate nations’ efforts to develop the requisite capabilities, be those efforts pursued nationally, multinationally or collectively. Hence, to be effective, defence planning needs to secure the full buy-in from the nations and to command and sustain high-level political attention and support in capitals. In this respect, NATO defence planning has yielded mixed results. On the one hand, many nations consider NATO’s approach to defence planning as one of the Alliance’s unique achievements. Its specific strengths\(^{10}\) have certainly considerably promoted the transformation of a number of Allies’ forces and have supported defence reform in numerous Partner and accession countries. On the other hand, NATO’s attempts to address the new challenges that have emerged since the end of the Cold War have not lived up to expectations. In many European nations the process of transformation has been and remains slow.

Indeed, even special, ad hoc, initiatives complementary to the systematic, long-term approach of NATO’s defence planning and specifically designed to capture high-level political support and to generate some short-term impetus on developing strategic enabling capabilities, such as the 1999 *Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI)* and the 2002 *Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)*, have delivered only a relatively small number of additional capabilities beyond what was already in national plans. NATO has continued to wrestle with this perennial challenge, including by means of establishing *usability targets* and setting up the multinational *NATO Response Force (NRF)*, just to highlight two of a series of initiatives. Again: mixed results.

\(^{10}\) These strengths are the rigorous planning system with sound underpinnings, accurate identification of requirements, comprehensive assessments, regular reporting, transparency etc.
So far, more than ten nations are not yet meeting the 40% target for deployable forces, and a number of Allies are still below the 8% target for sustainable forces. The NRF has undoubtedly served as a catalyst for the wider transformation of Alliance forces and this function is particularly appreciated by the new Allies. However, NATO has continually faced difficulties in generating the forces for the various NRF rotations due to the high operational tempo in Afghanistan, Kosovo and in Iraq. It will be interesting to observe the EU’s experience in sustaining high-value, highly expensive standing multinational formations on stand-by such as the EU Battlegroups.

An essential reason for the challenges we face is the fact that transformation does not come cheap; it requires sustained political will and funding. Many nations spend less than 2% of the Gross Domestic Product on defence, a marker established in NATO’s 2006 Ministerial Guidance; just as many fail to reach the marker for major equipment expenditure (20% of the defence expenditure). Most nations, however, need to increase their defence expenditure to be able to continue contributing to challenging real world operations while at the same time transforming and modernising their armed forces. Certainly, any collective defence planning needs to take account of the realities within nations. If they are not going to spend more, they need to spend better. As one means to help achieve this, defence planning efforts need to focus on the most important capability shortfalls rather than on meeting all possible requirements; redirecting scarce resources allocated to maintaining legacy military structures into higher priority capability areas; and encouraging nations that cannot afford the acquisition of key enabling capabilities by themselves to participate in multinational programmes.

Review of NATO’s Defence Planning Processes

Defence planning, by its nature, focuses on the mid- and especially long-term, because that is the period over which research and industry can be guided and significant changes can be effected. Collective defence planning cannot achieve miracles just as nations cannot make dramatic changes to their procurement programmes and implement new structures overnight. Nevertheless, efficient defence planning needs to be more responsive to new requirements, be they the result of lessons identified in operations (e.g. helicopters) or analysis of the future security challenges (e.g. cyber defence and ballistic missile defence and, 11. The usability targets are political by nature and designed to give impetus to nations’ defence transformation. “Deployable forces” are those land forces that are structured, prepared and equipped for deployed operations; “sustainable forces” are that percentage of the overall land force strength that can be sustained on deployed operations or high readiness standby.
on the other hand, support to security sector reform, capacity and institution-building) or emerging technology opportunities; it needs to provide the linkages between long-term capability guidance and short/mid-term requirements; it should support effective multinational solutions; and it has to be flexible enough to get inside the defence programme decision loops of nations.

To contribute to all this, the Alliance is currently conducting a fundamental review of its defence planning processes. In NATO, there are a number of planning disciplines supporting numerous Council and subordinate committees as well as a number of civilian and military bodies dealing with various aspects of development and use of military capabilities. This poses challenges for coordination and harmonisation, in particular with a view to shortfall management, addressing complex future requirements and strengthening the industrial and technological base within a coherent framework. The review therefore seeks to enhance internal coherence and coordination both at staff and committee level. The current studies focus on streamlining and simplifying the process; addressing key capability shortfalls rather than numerous detailed requirements; enhancing coherence across the planning disciplines and bodies through establishment of Capability Coordinators or Project Managers for key capabilities; improving political-military coherence through harmonisation or even integration of civilian and military staffs; and entrusting a Senior Council Advisory Committee with monitoring and supervising coherent capabilities development.

The current multinational helicopter initiatives both within NATO and the EU are a case in point for short and mid-term shortfall management through multinational efforts supported by centralised staff and committee overview and coordination. For crisis response operations deployed at strategic distance, in large areas and austere environments helicopters have turned out to be a key enabler for maintaining situation awareness, ensuring flexibility and rapid response in theatre, and, thus, operational effectiveness and success. Although there are enough helicopters in nations’ inventories, both NATO and the EU are lacking sufficient mission-capable helicopters in respectively Afghanistan and Chad. Both initiatives focus therefore on pragmatic multinational efforts geared to providing assistance to improving the availability of helicopters in operations in the short and mid-term, such as technical upgrades, refurbishments, setting up of multinational logistical bases in theatre, training of crews and multinational funding. It is clear that this top priority requirement demands full transparency and close coordination and cooperation between the EU and NATO.

12. Force planning; armaments planning; logistics planning; operational planning; standardisation; air defence planning; nuclear planning, and civil emergency planning.
Defence Planning and the Provision of Forces

Defence Planning provides the indispensable prerequisite for force generation, but it is not its substitute. Whatever form of defence procedures we might end up with, ultimately it is nations that decide what capabilities they develop, whether to declare them to an international organisation and, most relevant these days, whether to deploy them for a specific operation. Despite the desire of some Allies, collective defence planning cannot guarantee the delivery of capabilities for specific ongoing operations nor is it the panacea for force generation. Yes, in NATO it does seek to ensure that, collectively, the Alliance has all the necessary capabilities to fulfil its Level of Ambition. However, the latter is unlikely to be the silver bullet everyone is seeking to encourage nations to provide considerably more capabilities. Yes, NATO seeks to encourage, facilitate and, occasionally, even cajole nations to contribute capabilities for ongoing operations, but the decision to deploy specific capabilities from that pool is and will remain the sovereign right of individual Allies. It is all about political will and public support.

The following figures might illustrate this fundamental fact: 76,000 – that is the number of land forces needed to sustain current NATO operations and for mounting NATO’s stand-by forces. 285,000 – that is the number of land forces NATO nations need to sustain their operational commitments and other high-readiness missions, i.e. for NATO, the EU, the UN, the Iraq coalition, and national purposes. The last figure is 2,349,000 – that is the number of land forces reported by NATO Allies. In conclusion, nations have more than eight times the land forces required to sustain the present overall operational tempo. Given such figures, we should not have a problem. But we do. In Afghanistan and in Chad, NATO and the EU are finding it a challenge to pull together the necessary forces, in particular the key enablers, such as mission-capable helicopters, although numerically there are more than enough in nations’ inventories.

Both NATO and the EU are struggling to address the dwindling political will of nations to provide the necessary forces and capabilities for operations. It would seem that many nations are only willing to commit to a far distant crisis management operation that is assessed to be feasible and affordable – in terms of political support, military risk and financial burden. It appears that to better meet this concern a comprehensive political-military concept is required before any operation is decided and launched; underpinned by an unambiguous understanding of the objective, a realistic idea of the capabilities and costs required; realistic conditions for termination of the mission; and a plain rationale which can be explained to the public. The Comprehensive Strategic Politico-Military
Campaign Plan for Afghanistan adopted by NATO and its partners at the 2008 Bucharest Summit is expected to make a difference in this regard.

NATO-EU Cooperation in Capability Development

In terms of military capability development and defence transformation both NATO and the EU are basically encumbered by the same problems. And it is generally the European nations that lack usable capabilities required for expeditionary operations, both in NATO and in the EU. On the other hand, every nation has only one set of forces and capabilities, from which it draws to supply operations conducted in various international or multinational frameworks, be it NATO, the EU, the UN or a coalition of nations. In this context, it is worth considering the implications of the fact that currently 21 European nations are members of both the EU and NATO; and there are four more EU member states (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) that are participating in NATO’s programme Partnership for Peace and that, through the Planning And Review Process (PARP),\(^\text{13}\) are affiliated with the capability development within the NATO framework. A fifth nation, Malta, may join PARP in due course. As a consequence, it is safe to say that 25 (or perhaps 26, if Malta participates in PARP) out of 27 EU member states are taking part in NATO’s approach to capabilities development. Conversely, there are 21 plus five ‘double-hatted’ NATO Allies that are involved in the ESDP capability development process.

\(^{13}\) PARP constitutes a mechanism by which NATO provides assistance to defence planning and capability development of its PfP Partners.
As a consequence, it is clear that enhanced EU defence planning, including through the envisaged *Permanent Structured Cooperation*, leading to more usable European forces and capabilities, would also significantly strengthen NATO’s ability to act. Conversely, a coordinated capability development of the 21 EU NATO nations plus four EU member states participating in the PARP towards the priorities laid down in NATO’s Comprehensive Political Guidance and towards the usability targets would equally serve the EU’s ability to act. Thus, this constellation suggests and, indeed, strongly recommends, a coordinated and harmonised, if not joint, approach to (military) capability development of all European nations. The appropriate framework and procedures would need to be examined in detail.

In any event, the overlapping membership of so many European nations in NATO and EU suggests the enhancement of efforts already undertaken in this regard. Since 2002/3 there has been a mutually agreed framework for “coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements” common to the EU and NATO. Due to many reasons, including differing political views about the scope, framework and nature of EU-NATO cooperation, its potential has not yet been fully exploited. There is no blueprint for the future EU-NATO cooperation, but the ‘rapprochement’ of France towards NATO’s military structures and the greater US support for ESDP, including its military dimension, have the potential to serve as catalysts for improvements in the cooperation of the two organisations. The statements made of late on the future of the EU-NATO relationship by both French President Sarkozy and US President Bush have been encouraging in this regard. In Bucharest the latter underlined that the US welcomed a strong EU as a partner of the US and NATO in tackling the international challenges, building upon their different strengths.

On the other hand, one has to recognise that, sadly, sweeping progress in the NATO-EU relationship is not likely to be achieved in the foreseeable future. Apart from the successful EU-NATO military cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Berlin-Plus arrangement, the formal cooperation at the political level has actually been blocked. This is due to the Turkish-Cypriot dispute and, on the other hand, Turkey’s relationship with and expectations of the EU. The situation is putting at risk operational success in challenging theatres, such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, where NATO military operations (KFOR and ISAF) and EU civilian missions (EULEX and EUPOL) are operating side-by-side, and it is also affecting the implementation of a comprehensive approach to crisis

14. TU insists, inter alia, that every NATO-EU activity has to be consistent with the “Framework Agreement” of 2002/3, which excludes Cyprus, since this country has no security agreement with NATO. On the other hand, the EU has not agreed to a security agreement with Turkey, nor to an administrative arrangement between the European Defence Agency and Turkey.
management. The resolution of the deadlock is therefore a strategic challenge in the coming months requiring a concerted effort of our nations’ top political level.

For the time being, however, there is no alternative but to exploit to their full potential the opportunities provided by the mutually agreed framework, primarily in the *NATO-EU Capability Group* and in staff-to-staff contacts between the key players in the respective NATO and EU capability development bodies, i.e. the EU General Secretariat, the European Defence Agency, the NATO Headquarters staffs and the Allied Command Transformation.
Conference Report

EVA STRICKMANN

Session 1: Europe’s Military Ambition

The question of its military ambition should guide Europe’s defence efforts – regardless of whether Europeans act within the EU, NATO or the UN. While the 2003 European Security Strategy states that ‘the EU is inevitably a global player’ and ‘should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security’, the EU lacks a (civil-)military strategy defining its level of ambition.

In the first session, the panellists discussed Europe’s changed security environment, due to new threats and a new (im)balance of power on the international scene. Moreover, the role, structural characteristics and priorities of the EU and other global actors were compared. The civil-military comprehensive approach of the EU in crisis management was considered an advantage over the tools of other global actors and organisations. Also, the achievements of the EU (long history of peace and the process of European integration) were underlined. However, to become a more credible and efficient actor in international crisis management and to realise its military ambitions, the panellists agreed that the EU should focus on the following objectives:

1. Creation of permanent EU command & control structures, which is crucial for the planning of operations, strategic awareness, decision-making process and coordination between EU member states.

2. Development and harmonisation of European capabilities plus increased defence spending, with a view to:
   - the increased commitment and military expenditures of other global players;
   - an analysis of the EU’s strategic shortfalls not only based on current situations and mission scenarios (i.e. what will Europe need in 25 years?);
   - the pooling of assets of all EU member states;
   - the idea to hold a capability organisation conference;
   - the willingness of the EU member states to revise their national defence planning process.

3. Fairer burden-sharing mechanisms, through coordination by the European Defence Agency (EDA).

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4. Definition of an EU level of ambition, with regard to:
   – the military ability, instruments, intensity of operations, geographical horizon;
   – the political will to effectively launch operations.

5. Better cooperation with NATO and other partners, with an emphasis on:
   – the development of efficient partnership agreements,
   – enhanced coordination and information-sharing in common theatres of operation (Balkans, Afghanistan).

6. Better exchange of military and civilian expertise within the EU, with a view to:
   – integrating the EU’s tools in the field of crisis management;
   – strengthening the EU’s comprehensive approach.

7. Overcome the ‘information deficit’ of the European public
   – to communicate the political rationales of the EU;
   – to increase public support for the development of ESDP.

**Soft or hard power?**

It was controversially discussed whether the EU should – given its modest resources and limited political will – focus on soft power and leave the ‘hard job’ to NATO. One argument was that Europeans need to be ready to deal with new realities in the geo-political environment (e.g. demographic challenges) and that the EU cannot afford to choose limited scenarios only. Thus, the EU would need to learn how to act efficiently on all levels (political, strategic, operational, tactical). Moreover, EU member states would need to consider the nature of their armed forces and make them available for all levels of operations. The EU should find a way to overcome the lip service and hesitance of its member states and provide incentives for the transformation of European armed forces. There was general agreement that the EU has the responsibility to be ready for every possible conflict scenario and that the Lisbon Treaty facilitates the interpretation of the Petersberg tasks.

**Rapid response**

Subsequently, the EU’s tools in the field of rapid response were discussed. It was agreed that the current EU Battlegroup 1500 concept is not useable and should be abandoned. Instead, the EU should move towards creating more capable rapid reaction ground force units (of 5000-6000 troops) and include air and maritime rapid response assets. A new rapid response concept would be crucial to meet the challenge of (1) generating and deploying a force within a short
period of time, (2) being ready for both low- and high-intensity operations and (3) employing force effectively.

In order to create leaner, stronger and better trained armed forces, the EU should also maintain close cooperation and interoperability with the United States, promote a common EU defence culture and find a way to deal with political ambiguities and national caveats (e.g. not block the deployment of an EU Battlegroup as this was the case with the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) in Northwood/UK during the force generation process for EUFOR Chad/CAR).

### Session 2: Added Value through Permanent Structured Cooperation

The Treaty of Lisbon foresees a new mechanism in the field of European Security and Defence Policy (to be renamed ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’): ‘Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework’ (Art. 42 § 6 TEU). Therefore, as soon as the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, Permanent Structured Cooperation provides those EU member states which are willing and able with a possibility to establish closer defence cooperation.

Functional details for Permanent Structured Cooperation are stipulated in Article 46 TEU and a number of criteria are identified in the attached Protocol No. 10 on Permanent Structured Cooperation. According to the provisions of Art. 46 §§ 1-6 TEU, member states wishing to participate in Permanent Structured Cooperation shall inform the EU Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Within three months from notification, the EU Council shall decide by qualified majority on the framework for cooperation and the participating EU member states. The Treaty of Lisbon also foresees the possibilities that further member states may join Permanent Structured Cooperation at a later stage or that the participation of member states can be suspended.

- Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation lay out the following criteria for member states to participate – without defining concrete figures or benchmarks:
- Intensive development of defence capacities through increased participation in multinational forces, European equipment programmes and through cooperation with the EDA;
– being able to commit troops with support elements to an EU Battlegroup by 2010 at the latest;
– agree on and fulfil objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment;
– harmonisation of military needs through pooling and, where appropriate, specialisation;
– enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and interoperability of the member states’ armed forces by defining common objectives for force commitment;
– strengthen multinational approaches and address the shortfalls identified through the ‘Capability Development Mechanism’.

Article 3 of the Protocol underlines that the EDA shall play a central role within the framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation by giving a regular assessment of the participating member states’ contributions and fulfilment of agreed criteria.16

Given that the stipulations on the establishment and functioning of Permanent Structured Cooperation in the Treaty of Lisbon are vague, the potential of Permanent Structured Cooperation was intensively discussed during Session 2. A number of central questions were raised: first, should Permanent Structured Cooperation be inclusive or exclusive? Second, what are the possible criteria for the new mechanism? Third, if the latter is the case, which EU member states could possibly form a core group?

**Inclusive or exclusive concept?**

One opinion was that Permanent Structured Cooperation should be an inclusive concept, providing for as many EU member states as possible to participate. This argumentation referred to the discussions in the European Convention in 2002 and the fears that an exclusive concept might provoke deep divisions within the EU. A core group of some member states (e.g. including the ‘Big Six’: France, the UK, Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland) would ignore the potential of smaller EU member states and undermine the spirit of European integration. Also, exclusiveness would threaten public support for ESDP in the non-participating member states. The proponents underlined that an inclusive approach would allow for greater synergies and effects of scale and result in more added

value for the EU. Therefore, the ideal case would be to integrate all 27 EU member states in the Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism.

Others argued that an inclusive approach to Permanent Structured Cooperation would risk being ineffective: if all member states were encouraged to participate, it would be difficult to set the bar high enough and ask for additional efforts and commitments. Thus, the mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation might not lead to any improvement and the EU would miss its objective of increased cooperation in the field of ESDP. Also, it would be a technical challenge to get all 27 member states together. Furthermore, the opponents of an inclusive approach stressed that it would be crucial to look at the motivation of EU member states to join Permanent Structured Cooperation, before assuming that anybody would want to be involved. The limited political will of some EU member states was considered a main problem: Some member states sign up to certain commitments but do not implement the agreed measures. It was emphasised that, while it is for some member states (structurally) impossible to meet a number of criteria, it is a question of political choice for the majority of EU member states. Moreover, the concept of exclusiveness would not be a question of smaller or larger EU member states, given that for instance Sweden spends 25% within the defence budget on investment.

There is an inherent tension between legitimacy and effectiveness of Permanent Structured Cooperation and there was agreement that the main challenge would be to define the largest possible group of EU member states that could still deliver the desired results (i.e. generate a higher percentage of deployable armed forces). Choosing a possible core group was therefore considered a very difficult task.

Defining criteria

How can a substantial commitment of EU member states – leading to more available capabilities and faster transformation of the armed forces – be guaranteed? To this end, it was discussed how the provisions of Article 2 of the Protocol could be translated into concrete criteria for additional efforts.

It was agreed that the aim should be to define realistic criteria for participation in Permanent Structured Cooperation. Instead of calling for an increased defence budget of 2% of GDP (which would lead to Permanent Structured Cooperation between France, the UK, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania only) or 40% of deployable and 8% of sustainable troops, the EU should focus on achievable and flexible goals. However, these should be precise, have an impact
and be applicable to the EU member states’ specific (and available) capabilities. Permanent Structured Cooperation should also allow for extra contributions and stimulate cooperation between member states – with overlapping clusters and different ways of collaboration. Moreover, it was emphasised that the criteria need to be output-oriented. The proposed approach would focus on possible tasks of member states within Permanent Structured Cooperation and the sum of total capabilities needed. This would necessitate an assessment of how many capabilities are available and could additionally be made available in the future and imply the setting of deadlines. The process should be driven and supported by the EDA.

Furthermore, it was cautioned that the EU needs to define its underlying objectives (level of ambition) in the field of ESDP: What does it mean for the EU to contribute to peace and stability? Why should the EU strengthen its capabilities? What does the EU aim to achieve (e.g. fulfilment of Petersberg tasks)? One argument underlined that the 2003 European Security Strategy has not been translated into a military sub-strategy and proposed that an EU civilian-military strategy should be discussed with a view to updating the European Security Strategy.

**Pooling**

Moreover, it was agreed that pooling forces and assets would be crucial for the success of Permanent Structured Cooperation. One idea would be to create a joint fighter capacity (replacing the F-16s of some member states) with integrated command & control. Moreover, it was stressed that pooling could increase the sovereignty of EU member states, allowing smaller member states to participate in large-scale operations.

**Conclusion**

There was consent that Permanent Structured Cooperation, if effectively and efficiently used as a platform by EU member states, could help breaking the gap between Brussels rhetoric and practice and could be a useful approach to deepen European defence integration. Crucial steps would be:

1. to think about the objectives of Permanent Structured Cooperation and set targeted criteria (before deciding on an inclusive or exclusive approach);
2. that EU member states make more available of what they already have;
3. that EU member states spend more on investment (R&D, procurement);
4. to think about how the number of deployable armed forces can be increased;
5. to understand, that as a result of Permanent Structured Cooperation, the EU should be better in certain ESDP fields (definition of the added value of Permanent Structured Cooperation).

Session 3: The Future of Defence Planning

The third panel elaborated on the defence planning by the EU and NATO. It was discussed how national defence planning can effectively be influenced by both institutions.

EU defence planning

Special emphasis was placed on the role of the EDA and its Capabilities Development Plan (CDP). It was explained that the EDA had been set up to support the EU member states and the EU Council, to help strengthening European capabilities and to sustain ESDP. The agency’s main functions were identified as follows: (1) identification of capabilities-shortfalls, (2) development of capabilities, (3) promotion of defence research and (4) progress in the field of armaments cooperation. A first guideline for the EU’s capability needs in 2025 had been set up by the Long-Term Vision, elaborated by the EU Institute for Security Studies in cooperation with the EDA. Capabilities need to be developed in a comprehensive and integrated process and the CDP can be an important tool to assist EU member states to make progress. In the long-term perspective, the CDP can improve the EU’s strategic planning process, identify future trends and thus give the Long-Term Vision more substance. In the short term, the CDP will focus on EU member states’ defence plans and equipment programmes and identify lessons learned. The added value of the CDP would be to provide a comprehensive picture of the EU member states’ defence planning processes and to discuss the EU’s status quo (where are we now?). Thus, the CDP could be a starting point for a common EU capability planning and show the way ahead. The role of the EDA is to provide a clearer focus for EU member states to coordinate their programmes and find partners. Neither the EDA nor the CDP duplicate or hinder defence planning programmes set up by NATO.

NATO defence planning

The EU and NATO are equally interested in more effective defence planning. The respective shortfalls, approaches and objectives in the field of capabilities development are similar. Furthermore, both organisations face the same prob-
lems when discussing and implementing new initiatives: the lack of political will, appropriate funding and internal coherence. Moreover, one should not forget that member states are confronted with the challenge of transforming and modernising their armed forces at the same time. It was also cautioned that a collective defence planning cannot guarantee the delivery of the agreed objectives (e.g. pooling of capabilities), given that defence planning measures and the deployment of troops are decided on the national level. This explains the mismatch between the forces and equipment theoretically available (e.g. helicopters) and the commitments made by member states during force generation conferences. Also, NATO needs to tackle the problem that a high number of its member states do not meet the benchmark of deployable and sustainable forces. To improve coordination and harmonisation of the defence planning process, NATO seeks to provide a flexible and integrated framework with its Defence Capability Initiative (DCI), focusing on the short-, medium- and long-term requirements.

With regard to the relations between the EU and NATO, it was reminded that 25 EU member states participate in NATO’s capability planning and that this should strengthen both the EU’s and NATO’s capability to act. Member states in both organisations should better coordinate their efforts, focus on joint approaches and make efforts to establish one single set of forces. The improvement of the EU-NATO partnership was considered a strategic priority for the second half of 2008 under the French EU-Presidency and the first months of 2009 before the next NATO-Summit in France and Germany. The panellists concluded by emphasising that both organisations need to redouble their efforts.

The Austrian perspective

Subsequently, the particularities of Austria with regard to the EU and NATO defence planning were analysed. The 2005 Defence Review (Bundesheerreform ÖBH 2010) commits the Austrian armed forces to fulfil the following tasks: (1) territorial defence, (2) protection of the Austrian population, (3) assistance in case of disasters and incidents in Austria, (4) support of international law and order, (5) contribution to the EU’s Security and Defence Policy. The Defence Review places special importance on the last point. Although Austria is not a member of NATO, a large number of the 1399 soldiers abroad is deployed within the framework of NATO operations. Further international commitments are directed towards the UN and EU. The multiple international engagements and different requirements make it difficult for Austria to shape a clear package of capabilities.
The EDA’s Capabilities Development Plan could be helpful to define the external shape for capabilities development and pre-identify targets. Against the background of the Austrian participation in EUFOR Chad/CAR, one argument underlined that the involved EU member states could have been more efficient with their contributions (e.g. in the field of logistics and force protection). Permanent Structured Cooperation could help EU member states to make best use of what they already have. From the Austrian perspective, further possible tasks for Permanent Structured Cooperation were (1) to pre-identify capability needs and most probable scenarios for ESDP operations, (2) to pool military staff and to improve communication between EU member states, (3) to maintain capability packages on a high level, (4) to create an interoperable capabilities pool and to go beyond the EU BG 1500 concept. However, before entering into further details, it would be important to discuss the finalité of Permanent Structured Cooperation and to solve the question of inclusiveness or exclusiveness. The panellist argued for an inclusive approach, pointing to the danger of a two-class system within the framework of ESDP.

**Session 4: Permanent Command & Control**

The fourth panel discussed the need for permanent EU command & control (C2) structures at the strategic level (OHQ). C2 has always been critical for military operations throughout history and it was emphasised that improvisation and ad-hoc structures can undermine the success of any operation. Therefore, C2 should not be regarded as an abstract concept but requires a unity of effort from both the political authority and military command.

While NATO is currently revising its permanent C2 structure and reducing a number of OHQs, the EU has no permanent structure yet. The NATO C2 system has been working for decades and was considered a crucial integration factor for NATO. If the EU decides to launch an ESDP mission, it can either use NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus Agreement, or activate one of the five national OHQs that have been made available by EU framework nations or use the new Operations Centre at the EUMS. However, these options were judged rather inefficient with regard to:

1. decision-making,
2. burden-sharing,
3. rapid reaction,
4. sharing of information,
5. time management,
6. the chain of command,
7. infrastructure,
8. training,
9. earmarking of personnel and accommodation of staff.

There was agreement that ad-hoc solutions for C2 structures do not provide an adequate approach and undermine the EU’s effectiveness and credibility in international crisis management. So far, the EU has been involved in five military and thirteen civilian respectively civilian-military ESDP operations in different scenarios worldwide. Although the scale and size of those operations were limited, the EU has successfully contributed to global stability and security. Within the framework of ESDP missions, the EU has acted with NATO or UN support or on an autonomous basis. These operations were beneficial to the EU and its member states: EU countries from Northern and Eastern Europe have become familiar with challenges to peace and security on the African continent and the EU’s peacekeeping capacity has a good reputation in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Those developments require a greater synergy of EU instruments and – first and foremost – an appropriate C2 system. It would be counter-productive to rely on external or not adequately equipped C2 structures.

**No duplication with NATO**

Although the global security objectives of the EU and NATO are very close, the two organisations have their own rationale and legitimacy to act. Both organisations need to have the capabilities and structures to act autonomously. Moreover, the existence of the two frameworks does not affect the availability of troops and resources – both the EU and NATO rely on assets and capabilities provided by their member states. Also, the two organisations do not follow the same approach in the field of civilian-military cooperation. While NATO does not dispose of civilian instruments but focuses on the cooperation with civilian actors in the respective theatres of operations, the EU integrates both civilian and military elements. Given the different focus and tools of the EU and NATO, a permanent EU OHQ would therefore not duplicate existing NATO structures.

**Creation of a permanent OHQ in Brussels**

There was agreement that the EU should strive to do more and set up a permanent strategic C2 structure in Brussels. The new Watch Centre in the EUMS was considered a first step in the right direction but the EU should go further. The following arguments were brought up:

1. The number and the diversity of ESDP operations require a solid C2 structure competent in all aspects of operations. This would allow maintaining a
global situation awareness and providing continuous expertise, information and analysis for the political leadership.

2. The existing options for building an EU operational chain of command are not adequate for rapid response operations.

3. The EU needs operational expertise from the very outset of strategic planning and on a routine level.

4. A permanent OHQ in Brussels would be cost-effective, allow for a better pooling of resources, speed up the planning process and facilitate communication and cooperation between EU member states and EU institutions. It would also alleviate the burden on EU framework nations (who are often not willing to opt for high-intensity operations and engage in missions with uncertain duration).

5. The EU needs symmetric C2 structures for civilian, military and civilian-military operations to better integrate its respective crisis management capabilities. A permanent military structure would complement the EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).

6. A permanent OHQ in Brussels would facilitate engagement and representation for smaller EU member states, given the difficulties to send permanent liaison officers to the five framework nations’ OHQs.

7. A permanent OHQ would provide a forum to identify lessons learned from past ESDP missions and strengthen the EU’s institutional memory.

8. These structures would create synergies for the development of an EU strategic culture and strengthen understanding, confidence and solidarity between EU member states.

The conclusion was reached that the creation of a permanent OHQ would be beneficial to the EU and its credibility and visibility worldwide. It would be cost-effective, facilitate EU planning, raise the quality of military expertise and enhance civilian-military cooperation.