Generating Public Space for our Common Futures: Models of Integration in Asia and Europe

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION

FORWARD STUDIES UNIT

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WORKING PAPER, 2000
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# Table of Contents

Panorama of Presentations*

1) Introduction via a future space of integration ................................................... 5
2) Japanese views on integration: From Kant to EU .......................................... 6
   a) Public sphere transcending borders ............................................................. 7
   b) Barriers to integration in East Asia .............................................................. 8
3) Integrating communities: European views .................................................... 9
4) East Asian experiences of integration ............................................................ 12
   a) Japan's obstacles: Culture and war guilt .................................................... 13
   b) China's bilateralism changing with economic growth ............................... 15
5) Social value added in Europe and institutions required in Asia ....................... 17

Programme of Seminar .................................................................................... 19

List of Participants ......................................................................................... 21

* Detailed papers to be published in the series "Cahiers of the Forward Studies Unit", Brussels.
Generating Public Space for our Common Futures: Models of Integration in Asia and Europe

Panorama of Presentations

1) Introduction via a future space of integration

One of the 20th century’s most important legacies is likely to be the greatest public space the world has ever known – ‘cyberspace’, home to the Internet, whose most popular feature is the aptly named World Wide Web that was developed by CERN in Europe. The Internet itself was devised by the US Defence Department some 30 years ago and has since spread all over the globe. From a nuclear attack-resistant method of exchanging information – and military intelligence – it has become a public space spanning continents and remained open, so far, to anyone with a personal computer and a telephone line.

However, for all the superlatives which it has attracted, the Internet is simply one of the many public spaces generated in the second half of the 20th century. Ordinary citizens are joining forces across national borders over a wide range of public issues, in non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) such as Friends of the Earth, Amnesty International and Médecins sans Frontières. At the same time, in some parts of this inter-connected world governments are trying to redefine their political space. The largest and most comprehensive of the regional groupings, based on a pooling of national sovereignty, however, is the 15-nation European Union (EU), which even now is preparing to add new members. Across the Eurasian landmass, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region have set up their economic cooperation forum with the Americans, APEC. Other regional organisations in Asia are the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation (SAARC).

What is driving people to generate new public spaces and nations to seek to co-operate with each other regionally and even globally? What do their organisations have in common? And can they learn from each other? There clearly is a need for a dialogue between Europeans and Asians, on their respective efforts at co-operation and integration. It is all the more significant that the seminar which is the subject of this volume should have been organised by the Forward Studies Unit, the think tank of the European Commission, the EU’s executive arm, in co-operation with the Institute for the Integrated Studies of Future Generations in Kyoto. At a time when Europe is still Eurocentric, the seminar offered a chance to dialogue,
and to engage in a mutual learning process, as Wolfgang Pape, one of the European organisers, reminded his audience. His Asian counterpart, Tae-Chang Kim, noted that the seminar offered an opportunity to see what Japan, China and Korea can learn from the EU in their efforts at generating transnational public spaces, on the way to their eventual regional integration.

2) Japanese views on integration: From Kant to EU

For Naoshi Yamawaki the birth of the EU was an “epoch-making event, from which all countries have much to learn”. It was born at a time when the dominant social thinking of the 20th century was becoming increasingly obsolete, making it imperative to create new viewpoints in order to overcome the human as well as social crises of our time. The question he set himself, in fact, was how transnational or intercultural public philosophy should be developed between the EU and the countries of East Asia, given the very different situations that prevailed in Europe, on the one hand, and Japan on the other after World War II.

Historic experiences of total war forced France and Germany in particular to construct a transnational public space, work on which still continues. In Japan, however, the country’s intellectuals have sought to replace the individual as an Imperial subject under the “Tenno” system, with the individual as representing a modern nation. Even liberal political philosophers (imperial system) have stressed the importance of a “sound nationalism”. Because of this, and the complex political situation in China and Korea resulting from the cold war, building a transnational public space in East Asia has proved to be extremely difficult.

The construction of a transnational and intercultural public space in East Asia remains one of the very important tasks facing the countries in the region, for Naoshi Yamawaki. But the task can only be undertaken in the light of the formation of a situation of nation-state in Japan and China – in order not only to replace the former feudal system but also to compete with Western colonialism, in Japan’s case, and to fight it in the case of China. But in the present post-colonial era it is important to create a concept of public space that goes beyond the nation-state. And to this end it is necessary to take up the very different concepts of
transnational or intercultural public space developed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803).

Kant defined public space as a transnational space which, although constituted by world citizens, did not amount to an all-embracing, imperialistic world state. Indeed, he defended the policies of China and Japan against European power politics. Herder’s public space, however, was anti-universalistic and multicultural. He believed that mankind does not live in an abstract universal space but in many separate cultural spaces, largely marked by different languages. For Yamawaki, the ideas of Kant and Herder should not be seen in opposition to each other, but from the viewpoint of “multiple understanding of self”.

He therefore introduced the concept of “cosmopolitan self”, which Kant renewed. While the cosmopolitan self sees other beings in a universalistic way, this notion of it must be combined with other public dimensions of Understanding of Self, which are characterised by cultural-historical differences. Self thus possesses a unique history, depending on whether the person in question is Japanese, Chinese, Korean – or German or Belgian. This individual must make the effort to understand others who live in different cultures. Thus the universalistic viewpoint of Cosmopolitan Self and the multicultural viewpoint of Particular Self complement each other, in order to create the desired transnational and intercultural public space.

The translation of this public philosophy into an East Asian public space requires a comparative study of European and East Asian philosophies, according to Yamawaki. It is very important that Asian people study the forgotten or ignored intellectual heritage of European thought, while Europeans uncover the similarly forgotten or ignored intellectual heritage of Asian thought. Both Asians and Europeans in fact would benefit from a study of Spinoza and Leibniz, while it is important that non-Asians understand the various philosophical traditions of East Asia, such as Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. In this way “we may finally co-construct a transnational public philosophy not only in Europe but also in East Asia”.

7
Naoshi Yamawaki was not alone in turning to European thinkers for help in generating transnational public space in East Asia. Tatsuro Hanada turned to Jürgen Habermas for help in answering his own question; “Can a public space transcend national boundaries?” He placed his question in the context of two developments which began in the 1980s: an intellectual movement that is currently probing the relationship of the state to the public, on the one hand, and of the global market to the public on the other, and the impact of information/communication technology on society. State and market are seen today not as two separate problems but as one set of issues. Opposition to such critical questioning has manifested itself in the form of a renewed and strengthened belief in the nation-state and capitalist free market.

For Hanada the term public sphere is more significant than public space. Thus parks and streets are public spaces, but are not in themselves the public sphere. But what is the concept of the public sphere? It is a normative historical concept developed by Habermas in his work “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society,” first published in 1962. For Habermas, modernity was formed from the development of a division between state and society, or rather the development of a split between the “sphere of public authority” and the “private sphere” during the collapse of the feudal system. The emergent bourgeoisie assumed control of the private sphere. While the economic social relations of bourgeois society were recast into the market economy, the literary public sphere (composed of coffee-houses, salons and clubs) became politicised and was transformed into a political public sphere. The bourgeoisie used the cause of freedom of speech as a strategy for achieving their interests, marking the origin of equating freedom of expression with free markets.

Hanada’s reading of Habermas leads him to rephrase his question, so that it becomes, “Can a public space transcend the framework of nation-state?” The nation-state is a modern invention which combines the nation and state together in one set. Its territory substantiates the existence of the national state. The legitimacy to rule the interior is the basis of sovereignty, and the people within form the unified nation. As for the public sphere, like the market, it has been constrained within the concept of the nation-state. Just as the medium of the market is money, the medium of the public sphere is the national or official language. In
other words, the nation-state was built on the foundation of the geographic formation of the national market and the national public sphere.

But what is the relevance of these conceptual considerations to actual solutions for North-East Asian countries? For Hanada, it is necessary to untie the unit of nation and state, and then to replace nation with the public sphere. The state should be rebuilt in this way into an institution guaranteeing democratic political procedures. The potential of the public sphere can be realised through an active private sphere, as happened in the Gdansk shipyard in Poland and the Nikolai church in Leipzig, East Germany. The public sphere was constructed here in the course of the East European revolutions of the late 1980s. But the reality, as Hanada notes, is that the framework of the nation-state has been strengthened in each country of North-East Asia, though their economic links have expanded through the market. Because of a lack of the political, the private sphere is connecting itself more to the market place and less to the public sphere, according to Hanada.

b) Barriers to integration in East Asia

But how effective are prescriptions based on the concepts of 18th century German philosophers or the analysis of contemporary German social theorists likely to prove when applied to present-day North-East Asia? Yuzo Mizoguchi, like Naoshi Yamawaki, is concerned by the failure of East Asian nations, particularly China, Japan and Korea, to establish a modern integration mechanism. He points out that throughout the past 1,000 years these three countries have maintained close cultural, and therefore economic, relations. Mizoguchi, like Yamawaki, points to a number of political barriers. He, too, notes that Japan's failure to come fully to terms with its war guilt has resulted in the continuing mistrust of the Chinese and Korean people and governments. But political barriers have often been overcome through economic relations; thus Taiwan's exports to Mainland China are flourishing, despite their tense political relationship.

It is not politics, therefore, but the "barriers to intellectual culture" between the three East Asian countries which are preventing them from establishing an integration mechanism. The origins of these barriers are historic. When Asian countries opened their ports to trade with the West, they also opened their doors to Western culture, taking Western values and civilisation as standards against which to judge their own cultures. The differences in the
speed and outcome of the modernisation of Japan and China should have been viewed in the light of the differences in their traditional societies; instead they were perceived in terms of how quickly or slowly the two countries adopted modern European ways – and of the superiority of the one over the other.

The “Western impact”, in other words, both severed the cultural links between the East Asian countries and imposed on them the superiority/inferiority view of history in place of the different but equal view. The precondition to creating a modern integration mechanism, therefore, is to generate a shared intellectual public space between China, Japan and Korea, by concentrating on their 1,000-year-old shared intellectual culture. This has begun to happen in the last three years between intellectuals in these three countries, according to Mizoguchi, and the fruits of their activity are beginning to appear in the leading journals. An intellectual public space has been established and, taking advantage of the Asian discovery of itself, will continue to expand rapidly. Even so it is too soon to say how and when a political or economic integration mechanism will take shape. Mizoguchi stated that he would like intellectual culture to serve as the basis of an integration mechanism.

3) Integrating communities: European views

Gwyn Prins also favoured cultural drivers of integration, although of a very different kind. He saw integration as “a community of interests that is internally driven and is continuously reproduced”. Because the individual perceives integration, public space only exists because it contains a multitude of private spaces. Top-down ways of creating public space are fear-based and require lots of negative energy. They are therefore unsuccessful, and Prins felt one should be suspicious where large-scale integration, backed by public statute, seems to have occurred – as in the EU. A better way is using positive energy to create a “moral community”. This implies a willingness to take actions that are apparently against one’s interest – economic, for example – in order to maintain the moral community.

With the frontiers between public and private space becoming increasingly blurred today, Prins saw at least two sorts of modern integration. He described the first as residual/passive, marked by abstentionism. He thought it interesting mainly because of its functional nature: it makes travel easier, for example, and is the equivalent of a supermarket – useful and
convenient, even if somewhat more expensive. The second is focused on social beliefs, and is energised social space, in which people share symbols, myths and rituals, and can have power structures, organisational structures and control systems. Its introspective version is represented by football clubs, hobby groups and cybergangs, bonding against their enemies. The extrovert version is represented by members of Greenpeace and the International Red Cross, for example, who voluntarily come together, across national boundaries, in the face of shared threats, thus creating virtual communities of obligation.

Prins saw some individuals defending universal values. Did they exist? Hisonori Isomura thought not. Prins was less categorical. Like Yamawaki he turned to Kant, namely to the German philosopher’s categorical imperative, to treat humanity not as a means but always as an end.

When opening the seminar which his Institute had helped organise, Kim Tae-Chang had described the two basic issues under discussion as regional integration and generating global public space. The highly theoretical nature of the discussion on public space suggested that the East Asian countries lag some ways behind the European in the construction of public spaces, whether at the local, national or transnational level. This relative absence of public spaces in East Asia may well be due to cultural differences, or the continuing existence of the East Asian tradition of a strong state and a weak society.

The discussion on models of integration also threw into sharp relief the differences between Europe and East Asia, even while highlighting the obstacles that lie in the way of regional integration in Asia, particularly along European lines. As several speakers pointed out, regional organisations in Asia, such as APEC and ASEAN, are forums for discussion and cooperation: “we are far from the pooling of sovereignty”, which remains a feature of the 15-nation European Union.

Johan Galtung had set the stage for discussion by defining some of the key terms. He saw integration as “the alignment of culture, economy and political and military power,” with the emphasis on shared history and culture (in the form of a shared secondary language at least, for example). For alignment to succeed, there must be a common cultural base that facilitates mutual understanding, an economic complementarity that will make the steps from free trade
ally and a bastion against Communism, even releasing the A-ranked war criminal, Kishi Nobosuke, from prison and making him Prime Minister. Meanwhile, the rise of nationalism, of the Japan that can say no, has obscured the problem of the country’s war guilt. Indeed, the fact that Japan follows the American line on Taiwan exacerbates the ill feeling of the Mainland Chinese towards Japan.

Young Kwan Yoon turned to two competing theoretical explanations of the European integration process to assess their implications for East Asian integration. The institutionalist explanation emphasises the supranational aspects of the integration process, these being the supranational institutions and their directors. Thus the 1992 single market project was possible largely because of the alliance between the president of the EC Commission and European supranational firms. The intergovernmentalist explanation emphasises the importance of intergovernmental bargaining in the integration process. It sees the EC as a network involving the pooling of sovereignty, and puts intergovernmental bargaining at the centre of the analysis of the EC’s integration process. Such bargaining, especially between Germany and France, was the decisive factor which related such domestic factors as the significant changes in French economic policy in 1983, to the adoption of the 1992 project. The role of the Council of Ministers is more important, therefore, than that of the European Commission.

For Yoon the implications for East Asia are considerable. European governments began to deregulate the private sector and resort to more market-oriented policies. Similar convergence in economic policies among East Asian countries will be a precondition for any significant integration that might occur. Given that both the average level of government intervention in the market is higher, and the divergence in the degree of intervention is greater among East Asian countries, economic integration will require further economic liberalisation and policy convergence in East Asia. Indeed, given Japan’s importance for the region, it would need to liberalise its economy urgently.

At the same time, given that intergovernmental bargaining is still important in the European integration process, such bargaining will be even more important in East Asia, where the tradition of a strong state and weak society still prevails. This means that East Asian countries will have to be careful in adopting the post-modernist approach, which emphasises the role of non-state actors, to the issue of East Asian integration. In other words, inter-
national politics will continue to be the most important factor in the future integration process in East Asia. It will therefore be necessary to remove historical misunderstandings and animosities, and to establish a closer relationship between China and Japan, as happened between Germany and France after World War II.

Markku Heiskanen also tried to examine developments in a theoretical framework. He used the theory of strategic culture, which introduces a historical dimension to international relations theory. It stresses the importance of ideas and beliefs held by state elites rather than states as rational actors, which cannot help but seek to maximise utility gains for themselves. The strategic culture of North-East Asia places a premium on the utility of military power, and on the importance of maintaining a balance of power. This is because inter-state tensions are very marked in North-East Asia, particularly when compared to South-East Asia. The North-East Asians have a long history of war and aggression, both within the region and with outside powers. All these experiences have left deep imprints on the national psyches of North-East Asians. Against this background, Heiskanen pointed out, the North-East Asian neo-realist atmosphere does not seem to offer the same preconditions for the development of regionalism, not to speak of integration, as in South-East Asia, where states behave in a more co-operative way.

b) China's bilateralism changing with economic growth

Given that China is a key player in the region, its attitude towards integration can have a decisive impact on regional developments. The changes in China's approach to Asian regionalism were explored by Xinning Song. His starting point was historical – the closed, centralised kingdom, lasting for thousands of years, that was ancient China. It was the centre of the world and other countries, including the West, were dependencies. Indeed, the relationship between China and the outside world was that of the monarch to his subjects. Co-operation with others could not be on a basis of equality, and integration could only mean bringing neighbouring countries under Chinese rule.

However, by the time the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, China had undergone a century of humiliation. Although a member of the Socialist camp, it was more concerned with safeguarding its own sovereignty and independence when it signed a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union in 1950. And when moves towards Asian regionalism began
to surface in the 1960s, China stayed aloof, from a fear that any regional or multilateral arrangement could have a negative impact on the country’s sovereignty and independence. But China’s response was also based on its history: it saw itself as the most important power in world politics – the centre of world revolution in the 1960s, for example – and therefore above mere regional arrangements.

But there were also practical considerations, according to Song. Asian regionalism, the Chinese felt, would help Japan establish its hegemony in East Asia, given China’s economic weakness. Regional arrangements would make it more difficult for China to deal with the ASEAN countries, particularly over issues relating to the South China seas. Finally, any regional arrangement in Asia would be unworkable without American participation. It was much better for China to deal bilaterally with the US, given that Japan and the ASEAN countries tended to follow America’s lead.

Chinese attitudes to Asian regionalism began to change markedly in the early 1990s, with the realisation that regionalisation of the global economy had become an irreversible trend. The major dynamics of Chinese support for, and growing interest in, regionalism came from economic, political and security reasons, both domestic and external. The phased opening of the domestic economy to the international market led to rapid development along China’s coast, characterised by the emergence of growth triangles or “economic circles”. One such circle linked Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan Island to Hong Kong and Macao. A cross-strait economic area has evolved between Taiwan and the mainland’s south-east coastal provinces, while in North China, Shandong province and South Korea are developing the Yellow Sea economic circle. At the same time cross-border trade with the Russian Far East and the Central Asian republics is growing fast.

While bilateralism is the traditional Chinese approach to political and economic co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region, there has been “a slow but steady perceptual and behavioural change in its multilateral diplomacy,” especially since the end of the Cold War. Even so, the official position is that regional multilateral arrangements should not be the only solution, as they alone cannot address the variety and difficulty of issues and forces involved. Thus regional co-operation in Asia-Pacific should not be as integrated and centralised as that in Europe. Co-operation, in fact should be multilevel also; thus sub-regional arrangements, such
the Malaysian prime minister’s East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), could undermine possible Japanese or American dominance.

The process of economic co-operation has brought China’s economic and preference structures closer to those of the regional capitalist economies. Yet the same process also generates yearnings for protecting sovereignty and national identity. Its imperial past requires China to extend its presence beyond the region. Indeed, these contradictory forces have resulted in a high degree of uncertainty and fluctuation that set significant limitations on China’s “learning” to co-operate. If all goes well, by 2020, the APEC free trade deadline, the combined economic strength of the China economic area (Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) should equal that of the present EU and NAFTA. It will be in a position to take a leading role in organising the Asia-Pacific regional political economy, according to Xinning Song.

China’s experience only confirms that East Asia is the most dynamic area of the world in terms of economic performance, according to S. Mansoob Murshed. Successful integration into the globalised marketplace cannot occur without a successful growth experience in the first place. This in turn cannot occur without a major part played by the state in determining strategic economic policy. East Asian success has been traditionally attributed to more nations in that region pursuing more open policies, which they adopted earlier than others did elsewhere. Growth promotes aspects of openness, which implies less protectionism and the absence of a bias against more outward-looking economic development. It marks the path to integration.

5) Social value added in Europe and institutions required in Asia

Since nobody would fall in love with the integration of a common market, the Europeans had to add other integrative dimensions, according to Magnus Ekengren. That is why since its beginning, European integration encompassed for instance also a social dimension. This dimension has been slowly developed, trying to reach a balance –albeit uneasy– between national competencies and the need for common action at Community level. Different methods have thus been used, from inter-governmental to supranational approaches.
Whilst the new role of—especially international—NGO’s in civil society is increasing also in Asia, traditional politics will remain of crucial importance. From the Korean point of view on Asian integration, there is a need for some kind of strong institutional mechanism. But the Japanese seem not yet to be ready to assume leadership, whereas China still opposes such regional institutions. However, with the end of the Cold War and the re-shaping of strategies all over the world, Korea fears being left alone in a strategic vacuum and it wants to prepare for a future scenario where other powers might withdraw commitments made under Cold War conditions.

For some Europeans, this Korean perspective looked like “déjà vu” in view of the preparations under way for the EU’s enlargement to its Central and Eastern European neighbours. But also here the debate is in full swing: “How can we generate a public space for our common futures?”

M. Subhan, G. Guallar, W. Pape; Brussels
Generating Public Space for our Common Futures: Models of Integration in Asia and Europe

Seminar organised by
Forward Studies Unit, European Commission, Brussels
in co-operation with
Institute for the Integrated Studies of Future Generations, Kyoto

Programme

Wednesday, 20 October 1999

09.00  Welcome
by Thomas JANSEN, Forward Studies Unit, European Commission

Introductions
by Tae-Chang KIM, Institute for the Integrated Studies of Future Generations, Kyoto and
Wolfgang PAPE, Forward Studies Unit, European Commission

09.30  First Session: (chair: Thomas JANSEN)
Key-Note Speeches:
Johan GALTUNG, "East Asian Integration and the Western European Model"
Hisonori ISOMURA, "Is North East Asian Integration Possible?"
Q&A

11.15  Second Session: (chair: Tae-Chang KIM)
"Experiences of Integration: Private and Public, Diversity and Unity"

Speakers:
Gwyn PRINS "Some Old and New Cultural Drivers of Integration in Europe"
Yuzo MIZOGUCHI, "Generating Intellectual Public Space in East Asia"

Discussants: Peter KRÜGER, Katsuhiko YAZAKI
Q&A
14.30

**Third Session:** (chair: Wolfgang PAPE)
"From 'Open Regionalism' to Institutional Stability?"

Speakers:
Xinning SONG, "China’s View on Asian Regionalism"
Markku HEISKANEN, "The Case of Northeast Asia"

Discussants: Magnus Ekengren, Young-Kwan YOON

Q&A

16.45 – 18.30

**Fourth Session:** (chair: Naoshi YAMAWAKI)
"Consensus-Building and Democratic Public Space"

Speakers:
Mansoob MURSHED, "Globalisation, Integration & Marginalisation in the New Millennium"
Tatsuro HANADA, "Can a Public Space Transcend National Boundaries?"

Discussants: Franco ALGIERI, Yuzo MIZOGUCHI

Q&A

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**Thursday, 21 October 1999**

09.00

**Fifth Session:** (chair: Xinning SONG)
"Integration Processes and Global Governance in the New Millennium"

Speakers:
Magnus EKENGREN, "Positive Integration and Governance by Law and Objectives in the EU"
Naoshi YAMAWAKI, "Possibility and Tasks of Trans-National Public Philosophy for the 21st Century"
Young Kwan YOON, "The Political Economy of Regional Integration Process: Europe and East Asia"

Discussants: Mansoob MURSHED, Sang Jung KANG

Q&A

11.15

**Sixth Session:** (chair: Tae-Chang KIM)
Suggestions for follow-up

Q&A

14.30

**Seventh Session:** (chair: Wolfgang PAPE)
Public Statements
Audience of students and interested public; Q&A

16.00

Contacts with press
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21