



Robert Schuman

**Multilateral security in the
Mediterranean post-Cold War:
NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue
and the EuroMed Partnership**

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Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series
Vol. 7 No. 10
May 2007

Published with the support of the EU Commission.

The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series

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Multilateral security in the Mediterranean post-Cold War: NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the EuroMed Partnership

Astrid B. Boening [♦]

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I. Introduction

The Medi-terranean is situated in the "middle of the lands": the cradle of past civilizations, trade – and wars. The end of the Cold War shifted the security dilemma from "East and West" to new centers, many "related to the rise of ethnically based conflicts in portions of former Communist Europe" (Ibryamova and Kanet 2002, 100), with the potential to spill over and/or connect with others to the south and east in the Mediterranean ("Med"). The "fluidity" in the Mediterranean is reflected today in a certain lack of stability, whether e.g. in the Palestine/Israeli conflict, uncontrolled immigration from North Africa into the EU, illegal drug and arms trafficking, or the build up of arms (especially WMDs) per se in the region in general and terrorism in particular. In addition to the instability and insecurity these issues cause to the entire Mediterranean region,

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they also “cause punishing economic losses to states that struggle to play within the rules” (Nachmani 1999, 95).

The population of the EU today is approximating 450 million, that of the countries bordering the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean 350 million, with the number of people under fifteen years of age in this latter region reaching thirty percent of the total population by 2025 (Nachmani 1999, 95). Yet despite the similarity in population, the diversity in terms of religion, history, the wide income gap between the northern and southern Mediterranean, and strong population growth in the south- and eastern Mediterranean, to name a few, are adding risk factors¹ to continued regional instability.

An area with such a relatively high population density and historical socio-political instability is naturally of security interest to its neighbors, not only to the north of the Mediterranean, but also south-east, such as Iran and Iraq and the Gulf region. While NATO solved the self-help game of Europe’s security dilemma which had governed Europe up to World War II, the post-Cold War paradigm of the “major power consensus model” (E. Haas 1964) of the U.S. vis-a-vis European collective security had changed. The regional Mediterranean security debate centered on the question of whether it was now a European (Weaver 2000) or a NATO responsibility (Brevin 2004, 9). NATO (“the Alliance”) recognized that security and stability in the Mediterranean is a significant factor in Europe’s security structures (NATO Handbook 2002, Ch. 3). “Both the gulf War and the conflicts in former Yugoslavia helped to solidify the view that the existing Western security community and its institutions should be expanded to incorporate other parts of the continent” (Ibryamova and Kanet 2002, 100). Parallel to this re-evaluation of post-Cold War European security, other security debates took place, e.g. during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations West European governments agreed to full membership of the West European Union for Greece only if its Article V would be rewritten so that they would not be obliged to support Greece in war against Turkey (Brevin 2004, 10)².

Overall, Brevin (2004, 12) argues that the EU is likely to take on a greater sense of responsibility for peace in the (Eastern) Mediterranean in the future. In his analysis he argues that it is essential to understand the differing interests of parties in conflict – although the protection of heterogeneous European interests would not be the main criterion. Rather, Brevin states that according to social contract theory, the parties are in a social relationship (rather than a power political relationship based on fear of the power of the other parties) (Ibid.). This would mean that the first priority of such a social relationship is the respect of the political liberty of the parties involved in the conflict, and the second priority to promote the economic interests of the least advantaged (be they Israeli citizens threatened by a nuclear bomb, or Palestinians losing their olive groves). While the EU as a *sui generis* structure of “blended” inter-governmentalism and supranationalism (with the “fate” of its foreign policy dependent on the passing of a constitutional treaty) had left its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) somewhat “under-institutionalized, ad hoc and uneven in its development” (Brevin 2004, 13), the EU’s overall involvement in the southern and eastern Mediterranean indicates its priority in addressing the diverse socio-political and economic needs there by founding a strategic partnership, the “EuroMed Partnership” (“EMP”) (also known as the “Barcelona Process”) in November 1995 with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, following the end of the Cold War and its resulting de-stabilizations in Central and Eastern Europe.

In comparison, NATO’s mandate shifted post-Cold War from defending a clearly delimited territory to a new strategy of committing member states to defend

¹ This paper focuses on Mediterranean security from a “regional” perspective. Hence specific issues such as Turkey, Cyprus, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, Russia’s role in the Partnership for Peace, the Adriatic portion of the Balkans or Bosnia Herzegovina per se as a de facto UN state-protectorate in the Adriatic corner of the Mediterranean region will not be discussed at length.

² Peace with its neighbors also being a requirement of an EU applicant state, such as Turkey.

unbounded interests beyond Europe's theater of operations: NATO's new mandate is as global as the Western interests it has pledged to defend ... [implying] that the Arab world will receive its fair share of NATO attention ... [such as] crisis operations ... to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises (which could affect Euro-Atlantic stability) at an early stage (El-Gawhary 1999, 16/7).

In this paper I will compare and contrast how the multilateral efforts in terms of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue ("Dialogue") program, involving i.a. U.S. interests in the Mediterranean, and the European Union's ("EU") EuroMed Partnership as the EU's European Neighborhood Policy's main approach to its Mediterranean neighbors³ have affected Mediterranean security post-Cold War. This study takes place at the system level of analysis, exploring both bilateral and regional issues and interactions, including those of institutional and non-governmental actors (NGOs) (Neak 2003, 12).

This paper takes a constructivist approach and, although acknowledging aspects of realism inherent in it such as rational actors⁴, by contrasting the hard power and soft power approaches in the institutional analysis (in order to understand the history, culture and institutional dynamics post-Cold War) of the EMP and the Dialogue. Klotz and Lynch (2007, 3) write:

The end of the Cold War shattered stable antagonisms and alliances... This destabilization widened the political and intellectual spaces - and increased the need - for scholars to ask questions about the cultural bases of conflict, alternative conceptions of national identity, [and] the ethics of intervention... Individuals and groups are not only shaped by their world but can also change it. People can ... set into motion new normative, cultural, economic, social, or political practices that alter conventional wisdoms and standard operating procedures.

Constructivism stresses "structural continuities and processes of change" (Ibid.) based on agency, which is shaped by its social, spatial and historical context (Ibid.). However, constructivism does not give ontological priority to either structure or agency, but views them as mutually constituted, rejecting "the individualism inherent in rationalist theories of choice, which take for granted the nature of actors' interests and identities" (Ibid.). Instead constructivism takes seriously "the principle that social reality is produced through meaningful action" (Ibid., 4). It is the "norms, rules, meanings, languages, cultures, and ideologies [as] ... social phenomena that create identities and guide actions" (Ibid., 7).

My methodology will identify the co-constitution between the actors and institutional structures in a less rigid notion between positivist and post-positivist "data", and the effect actors' interests and identities have on socio-political processes in the Euro-Mediterranean post-Cold War. I argue that co-constitution between both types of powers are necessary and interrelated in contributing to the Mediterranean regional security complex, rather than having a simple causal relationship.

The sources for this analysis are primary (e.g. EU and NATO websites and documents) and secondary data (news articles and scholarly books published on the subject).

II. Comparison of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue with the EuroMed Partnership

NATO changed post-Cold War from that of a collective defense organization to a collective security organization. It seeks to avoid new polarizations and the creation of new dividing lines between former friends and foes as well as to seek cooperation between former adversaries

³ referred to here interchangeably as "MENA" or "southern and eastern Mediterranean neighbors" of the EU

⁴ and in this paper in particular, by definition, the association of NATO with "war"/Article V missions

through integration in Allied progress, e.g. Partnership for Peace (PfP) and special relationships as mechanisms for exporting stability to new member countries.

The EMP's goals are similar, supporting socio-political cohesion i.a. through regional integration, socialization for the enhancement of civil society and commercial norms, the rule of law, institutionalization, and economic and political integration after the disintegrations occurring in parts of the greater Mediterranean (such as the former Yugoslavia). This complementarity between the EU and NATO post-Cold War is also expressed during the formulation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)⁵, in former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's often quoted words of "no de-coupling, no duplication and no diminution" from NATO. While the ESDP focuses more on peacekeeping⁶, NATO continues to solve the European security dilemma by providing legitimacy to intervention, not so much militarily but as a political forum for the debate of legitimacy, including out-of-area missions now. The conflicts from the dissolving Yugoslavia showed e.g. that a security threat to Europe could arise not so much through direct aggression but from the adverse consequences of instabilities in countries neighboring the EU. Hence, while both the Dialogue and the EMP are intergovernmental organizations with multilateral missions, the next section will outline the complementarity of both hard and soft power in constructing the Mediterranean security complex.

A. Who are the Actors and What are the Structures?

1. NATO's Mediterranean Initiative

NATO has been implementing the Partnership for Peace ("PfP") project since January 1994, including twenty-seven partner countries from Europe, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Asia. NATO's Mediterranean Initiative was formally launched in December 1994 as the "Mediterranean Dialogue" ("Dialogue"), reflecting the alliance's recognition of the Mediterranean's unique regional security challenges. The Dialogue was also intended to reach out to non-NATO member countries who might be interested in collaborating with NATO's Mediterranean security and stability projects. These "partners" would not be allies at the beginning but would be involved in confidence building programs, to become members when some major qualifications were met, e.g. irreversible commitments to democracy, civilian control of the military and development of a nation's military capability to a level of interoperability with those of NATO members" (Kaplan 1999, 195). The Dialogue's aims initially were to increase mutual understanding between, and dispel misperceptions among, NATO and its Mediterranean Partners through a phased approach (Cooperation between ICI Countries & NATO, 4/29/2007,1). Non-discrimination and self-differentiation have been key principles of the Dialogue since its inception, and allow bilateral as well as multilateral consultations between NATO and its Mediterranean members. Members were free to choose the extent and intensity of their participation in Dialogue programs, such as seminars and workshops in the field of information, science and the environment, crisis management and military cooperation, as well as optional participation in NATO School courses in Oberammergau/Germany and at the NATO Defense College in Rome/Italy (Monacco 2004, 1).

The Mediterranean Dialogue, as a sub-program of the PfP specifically seeks to improve the understanding of Mediterranean security perceptions and concerns of its partners, e.g. enabling low level military cooperation, such as emergency planning, peacekeeping and peace supporting (Said 2004). This Dialogue started initially with five countries (Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Israel and Egypt), with Algeria and Mauritania joining later. Subsequently, it also involved talks with

⁵ as the "formalization" of the EU's CFSP

⁶ Favoring non-military approaches to security, although not excluding the willingness to use military force and capabilities if necessary for self-defense

the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE). Initially, this initiative was limited to “dialogue”, as NATO had other pressing priorities, such as enlargement and developing the post-Cold War relationship with Russia. New members of the dialogue were weary of NATO’s image as a Cold War institution and preferred to concentrate on “soft” security and economic issues to develop mutual confidence and trust, rather than “hard” security issues of defense and military cooperation. In the first dozen years post-Cold War, NATO was much more actively engaged in Eastern Europe and as a result of the hesitations by its Mediterranean partners only sporadically engaged there (Nachmani 1999, 97).

Post-9/11 both the American and European members have been advocating an expansion of the Dialogue. The U.S.-led Afghan and Iraq campaigns also led to a greater involvement of the Alliance on the international stage. In particular the wider Mediterranean region and the Greater Middle East have gained new relevance to NATO in the last few years (*Said 2004*). At their June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO leaders offered to elevate the Dialogue to a genuine partnership and increase its objectives from public diplomacy, civil emergency planning, defense policy and strategy discussions, small arms and light weapons, global humanitarian mine action, initiatives on WMD proliferation and military cooperation, to one of enhanced security and regional stability operations, especially terrorism prevention (Cooperation between ICI Countries & NATO, 4/29/2007, 1) 2/3). It is interesting to note that, while NATO supports the Quartet and UN efforts in resolving the Middle East conflict, NATO was not invited to intervene in it (*Ibid.*, 3), confirming the post-Cold War structured shift of NATO from that of collective defense organization to that of collective security organization.

The debate concerning the future of the Dialogue now consists of moving it to one of concrete Partnership with the development of a common view among Mediterranean member countries in terms of general strategic expectations for a future Partnership, especially terrorism and border control, and a willingness to take advantage of existing instruments in the context of the need for the U.S. to formulate a coherent policy on the greater Middle East (Monacco 2004, 2).

2. The EuroMed Partnership: Identity and Interests

Following the destabilization in the regions surrounding the EU, EU foreign policy focused on developing a zone of stable, friendly and prosperous neighbors surrounding it (Eurobarometer 2006). Per this EU Neighborhood Policy (“ENP”), countries neighboring the EU would be offered “a framework for the development of a new and mutually beneficial relationship with countries that do not aspire to EU- membership in the medium terms ... [through] the prospect of a stake in the Union’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital” (the so-called four freedoms) (European Commission website “wider Europe – Neighborhood”, quoted in: Thiele et al. 2005, 83).

The EMP constitutes the EU’s main multilateral foreign policy instrument in MENA. The first Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Barcelona in November 1995 and marked the official starting point of the EuroMed Partnership (also known as the “Barcelona Process”). The “three pillars” of the EMP (reflecting in fact some of the goals set out in President Bush’s and President Gorbachev’s invitation to the Peace Conference of 1991) consist of the following in greater detail and follow the dual regional (multilateral) and bilateral tracks established in the Madrid Peace Conference for the international relations among EMP members:

- the definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of the political and security dialogue;
- the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area;

- and the rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil society” (Horizon 2020 Bulletin 2005, 2).

Currently, the EMP comprises the twenty-seven EU-memberstates, and ten Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, which is also an EU candidate country) and Libya as observer since 1999). Malta and Cyprus, also original EuroMed Partners, are now EU member states. The EMP’s mandate is based on the political, economic and culturally strategic significance of the Mediterranean region to the European Union (EU) and seeks to develop a relationship between its partners based on “comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighbourhood and history” (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona declaration).

The EMP is hence an example of Putnam’s two-level game, whereby the foreign policies of its members are played out multilaterally in the Mediterranean region. Its programs also affect individual member states domestically through their emphasis on education, civil society building, democracy enhancing and human rights promotion. Since the socio-cultural aspect of the EMP also involves NGOs in cultural and educational programs, the effect of transnational actors reflects linkages of interests and actions across national lines.

MENA member states often view the EMP “as a series of ‘irreversible’ and ‘strategic’ choices that are seen as prerequisites for the necessary liberalization of ...[some] econom[ies]” (Thiele et al. 2005, 65), and is favored on occasion because it is not predominated by a hegemon⁷, such as the U.S. Nevertheless, many MENA EMP members do consider soft security and developmental policies as insufficient to deal with international threats and are very interested in assistance to carry out policing and security tasks effectively, such as having technical equipment and training made available to them more readily through the Dialogue (Ibid., 66).

B. Comparison of Interests, Identities, and Structures

The EMP’s unique value is its normative dimension based on the EU’s emphasis on democracy, adherence to human rights, the fight against international terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs and regional conflicts. Some of these issue areas are pursued by the EMP in terms of development of civil society, while others peruse EU and international, NGO or policy organizations. The economic “engine” to drive this regional integration is the goal for a EuroMed free trade area by 2010, and the harmonization of legal structures and judicial systems to support this. Between 2004 and 2006 the EU provided five billion Euros in grants (Symons 2004) to MENA, and one billion Euros per year for EMP-projects specifically from 2006 onward (Howells 2005).

While the EU is supportive of bringing peace and security to the regions surrounding it, i.a. to accelerate modernization and reform through institutional development supportive of democracy, human rights and human development, it can only achieve the goals, if members on the eastern and southern border of the Med are willing to achieve them. In light of the fact that a large portion of the population in the region is under 25 years of age, economic growth is not keeping pace (Howells 2005, 2) and the EMP needs to re-invigorate itself to increase trade within the region through the liberalization of agriculture and services, as well as its member countries to determine paths to political reforms, and to commit to halving illiteracy by 2010, to ensure equality of access to quality education for boys and girls by 2015 and ensure that by 2015 all children complete at least primary education (Ibid.) in MENA.

⁷ i.e. in keeping the term “hegemon” in a state-context. In “neo-“ or “post- Westphalian” terms the EU itself could of course be seen hegemonically.

As much as the EU is about soft power to support development as security, NATO's activities include besides the new non-Article V activities post Cold-War also still "Article V": within a day of September 11, NATO members invoked for the first time in their history Article V of the Atlantic Treaty, demonstrating not only European support for the War on Terror, but also its willingness to undertake out-of-area missions in support of Alliance-wide security in order to help defeat terrorism in Afghanistan. Without the U.S. partnership in the Dialogue (and the Alliance overall), Europeans would lack military capability in the security complex which is the EU and its neighborhood (continuing post-Cold War since the ESDP, as discussed above, was not meant to duplicate NATO capabilities), but compensate with their ability to pick up the bill for post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, for example.

III. Multilateralism in the Mediterranean security discourse

Membership in the EMP is not identical to member countries of the Dialogue (i.e. Mauritania as a Dialogue member is not even a Mediterranean country, for example). The EU, via the EMP and vis-à-vis NATO in the Mediterranean, have been institutionally broadly described above. The diversity of interests and political orientations of the Mediterranean partner countries to the EMP and the Dialogue reflect their differing economic and internal social development problems, and their interests, identities and structures overall. What then is the future of these two organizations in the Mediterranean? Some observers have pointed to a possible competition in the Mediterranean between the EMP, NATO, as well as other organizations, e.g. the OSCE's Mediterranean Initiative, and possible redundancy. Chris Patton (2004) acknowledged in a speech a couple of years ago that on the one hand the EU needs to take more responsibility in relations with Islamic countries from Morocco to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, "depressingly, witlessly, we have to a great extent shaped our disaster-in-waiting" (Ibid.). He distanced himself from the U.S. to the point of stressing that Arabs need to have control of their agenda, presumably so that the conditionality of European aid, which he favors, would be agreed to by Arab negotiators (quoted in Brewin 2004, 18). Although Patton admitted that "in the dreadful situation in Iraq...America and Europe have to work together to try to end the whole affair in tolerable order". (Ibid., 19).

What then are some of the options the EU and the U.S. have available to not only administer peace in the Mediterranean post-Iraq, but also to contribute to those socio-economic and political developments supportive of political regional stability? The studies cited point to similar conclusions about support for peace, security and sustained development through an intensification of the Dialogue and, parallel to this, more hard power option.

In contrast, the EMP's soft power approach encourages good governance, education, human rights and democracy. Thiele et al. (2005, 88) suggest as a policy option a strategic partnership through an enhanced EU-NATO Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean would maximize rather than duplicate institutional cooperation, especially in crisis management projects, and involve pragmatic burden sharing. This type of collaboration would permit the U.S. a continued presence in the Mediterranean post-Iraq through a multi-lateral approach towards common issues and interests, and hereby balance the extra "interest bestowed upon" the Eastern Mediterranean in contrast to the Western Mediterranean by NATO partner programs. This dual approach could be considered useful in dealing with issues of in-security spill-over from Iraq in the intermediate future by having all member states trained and prepared in conflict prevention, crisis management and sub-regional security regimes, and hopefully be able to make progress in the development of democracy and upholding of human rights in this region (Thiele et al. 91).

A. Constructivism and Security Cooperation NATO – ESDP

Traditional neorealist theory holds that the preconditions of the international system enable states to take certain foreign policy actions but not others (Waltz 1979). Waltz (1959) also suggested

that to understand state action in terms of war (as a foreign policy behavior), one needs to understand the dynamics of the international system as well as its internal characteristics, such as leadership, as they may explain the immediate reasons why a war is undertaken. However, the multilateralism described in the previous sections does not call to mind the realist realm of international relations, one characterized by a constant struggle to maintain sovereignty from other states in anarchy. Rather, I propose here that the “international system” of the Mediterranean region and the institutional structures of the Dialogue and the EMP are neither a “finite” system of a zero-sum game, nor (due to the supra-national aspects of the EU at least), are the dynamics of the “Med” exclusively state-centric, with states as the only actors of note, privilege, or agency (Neak 2003, 19).

Neither does liberalism help explain the dynamics of the EMP’s and Dialogue’s multilateralism in promoting security in the Med, since the *prima facie* assumption of this theory, as one of underlying harmony in the international relations of this region, could not be further from the truth. While liberalism conceptualizes the “interaction of multiple actors pursuing multiple interests and using different types of resources and methods of interaction” (Ibid.) to achieve them, including underlying norms in the “service of a greater, collective good” (Ibid.), in my opinion this theory is also insufficient to explain the process of multilateralism in the Med in addressing the security challenges there.

Rather, I would argue that in order to transcend millennia of clashes, we should explore the possibility of changing the assumptions about peace in the Mediterranean definition of security to identify post-structural, sub- and supra-state agents (such as terrorist groups, NGOs and of course the post-Westphalian EU) post-Cold War. Although the tradition referent object in matters of war and peace has been the state, its centrality is questioned as criteria like the mutual co-constitution of interests, identities, agency and structure of the individual or society have been identified as decisive in the security community discourse (Bicchi 2001, 2). In the post-Cold War environment, despite the continuing nuclear and terrorist threat, mutually assured destruction is not necessarily assumed by state actors and hence deterrence is not necessarily the primary motivation in foreign policy any longer. Rather, the possibility of escaping from this limited military perspective is explored by both IGOs, acknowledging other securitizing factors, e.g. environment or citizens’ welfare and governments. The complementarity of these two multilateral IGOs, the Dialogue and the EMP, reduces transaction costs by avoiding duplication of the security and defense mechanisms. This advantage in the efficiency of harmonizing among members reduces the power balancing maneuvers of the Cold War, which consumed so many resources that could be much better spent on the development of human capital in the south and eastern regions of the Mediterranean. Instead, the multi-lateral mechanisms of the Dialogue and the EMP enable the Mediterranean security community to move beyond the retaliatory rhetoric of the Cold War to contribute to regional stability (through much more graduated responses available) for the socio-economic development of this region and reduce e.g. the dividing lines between north and south which i.e. the demographic developments⁸ bring.

Discourse has an ideational dimension with cognitive and normative functions, as well as “an interactive dimension, with coordinative and communicative functions (Schmidt 2000, cited in Howorth 2004, 212). While the impact of ideas had been assumed to be the weakest factor in security and defense policy (Howorth Ibid.), policy elites in Europe restructured a radically transition from the Cold War to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as a new “coordinative discourse” (Ibid). This slowly evolving common acceptance of an integrated European interventionism is based beyond national interests (‘British Atlanticism’, ‘French

⁸ i.e. countries in the south and east of the Mediterranean find it difficult to provide (gender equal) basic education amidst the great population growth in their region - and hereby adequately address the social and security challenge this represents to the northern Mediterranean countries.

exceptionalism' and 'German pacifism') but “on far more idealistic motivations such as humanitarianism and ethics” (Ibid.). The new willingness by Europeans

to discuss their collective interests and preferences within the Alliances ... [as well as move] towards a greater Euro-American balance in influence and responsibilities ... [reflected] a growing European inter-subjectivity based on cultural norms and values (Howorth 2004, 214)

and was reflected in the Common Foreign and Security Policy emerging from the 2001 Treaty of Nice.

Bicchi (2001) also favors a constructivist approaches to the European security concept: rather than the existence of a “natural” threat, we need to examine instead how security and the security threat were constructed through discourse and practice (Adler and Barnett 1998), such as the importance of language and the definition of security. For example, does “threat” emphasize the existence of a “real” threat which underlines aggregate power, proximity, capability (these three factors being objective), and offensive intentions (relating to mutual understandings and communications, whereby a threat does not exist unless it was perceived as a threat) (Wolfers 1962), as was the position of classical realists, such as Walt (1985, 8-13), as well as “challenge” (Campbell 1992), representing three points on a continuum going from supporting the view of a real-reality to those who believe in pure language (and de-constructing power games).

While this idealistic discourse was perfectly “real” post-Cold War but pre-9/11, we recognize that changes in security perceptions post-9/11 result in changes in foreign policy, tending towards a more robust explanation for foreign policy changes. Comparisons of perception within a single geographical region can reveal differences in perception by actors, especially with respect to foreseeable “post-Iraq” scenarios (Bicchi 2001, 17). In light of this, the “soft” power ideas and programs of the EMO to co-constitute structures for peace will have to be balanced with NATO’s Article 5 mission: “Security is indivisible within the Euro-Atlantic region”⁹, as a pact against war (Yost 1998, 6) vs. the now favored non-Article 5 missions of collective security of an alliance to “deter, and if necessary defend, against one or more identifiable external threats”. This goes back to the Wilsonian conviction that collective security is an international morality superior to that on which the realist balance of power system is based (Yost 1998, 8) – and it has always been understood that NATO would not undertake a mission without UN Security Council approval (especially after the U.S. overcame this restraint on national action with the invasion of Iraq with limited success at the time of this writing, partially due to this unilateralism).

B. Cooperation in peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean (Dialogue) armed forces

The post-9/11 security environment has changed i.a. with respect to the Mediterranean, and in particular to the Dialogue in terms of geography, *modi operandi* of change and changed value systems.

1. Geography

Following 9/11 and the Afghan and Iraq military “campaigns, the potential geographic space for security cooperation between NATO and Dialogue countries has expanded eastward all the way to Afghanistan and possibly beyond” (*Said 2004*). This might affect the alliances’ “per se”¹⁰ logistics of in terms of planning, training, command and control, strategic transport, and intelligence operations (Ibid.) in this security system.

⁹ Comparable to the theme of the League of Nations that “peace is indivisible”

¹⁰ e.g. Egypt, Jordan and Morocco already having worked under NATO command in the Balkans and might be suitable for involvement in Alliance operations elsewhere to combat terrorism and WMD-proliferation (*Assessing NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue*)

2. Modi operandi for change

As geography refers to space, the modi operandi for change relate to time frames and levels of urgency, efficiency, cost and evaluation of consequences (Ibid.). While the “Clintonian” approach to MENA emphasized dialogue, treaties, confidence building and economic incentives, the last four years saw more intrusive, pre-emptive and interventionist policies by trans-Atlantic allies (Ibid.). This more interventionist approach is questioned on ethical, legal and political grounds and leads to inquiries about regional¹¹ and international responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction (*Said 2004*). Thiele et al. (2005) suggest the following future security strategies for the Mediterranean, recognizing the differing priorities of national interests between N. European and S. Europeans in this, but addressing it EU-jointly:

a. Formation of a partnership between NATO and the EU for joint initiatives in the Med among those partners, e.g. Algeria, who prefer to avoid a *tete-a-tete* with the U.S., but are able to engage via NATO with them multilaterally (Thiele et al.). The other option would be endless bilateral arrangements, which, though not invalid *per se*, do not contribute to the same stability as multilateral arrangements do, because bilateral arrangements are *i.a.* open to much more exacerbated power balancing maneuvers, especially with respect to the position of Turkey and Israel¹² (and a lesser extent e.g. Greece/Cyprus).

b. This partnership would capitalize on the strength of both organizations and avoid their weaknesses in light of the common goal to make it a win-win for all partners:

Benefits for the EU would be reducing frictions within the EU concerning its relationship with NATO, becoming a more capable in preventive actions and crisis management, and the EU would become a more engaged transatlantic partner, balancing U.S.-unilaterality in the Med and encourage more multi-laterality. This would counteract the suspicion by the Arab dialogue countries that the ESDP represent a post-colonial instrument of influence – or worse, of intervention – by the EU in MENA.

Benefits for NATO coordination with the ESDP (and the EMP) would expand NATO’s policy dimensions and scope in areas where U.S. involvement was previously low (e.g. North Africa except Morocco).

Benefits for MENA would be an increased transparency in EU and NATO programs concerning their region, and a complementarity in programs rather than duplication or non-complementarity between EU and NATO initiatives, as well as country-specific cooperation in good governance programs in economic, political, social and military programs to overcome mistrust, unresolved disputes, and possibly Islamic fundamentalist opposition movements.

c. Conflict prevention and crisis management in sub-regional security regimes can also be enhanced by a comprehensive approach through arms control of conventional as well as WMDs, especially in light of EU enlargement, potentially along the Adriatic and its connection to the Mediterranean.

d. Encouragement and support of good governance, human rights and democracy programs along the European Security Strategy of Dec. 2003 to stabilize the region, promoting a ring of

¹¹ The Afghan and Iraq campaigns appear to have accelerated plans for reforming the “Arab League, social, democratic and human rights reforms in Egypt and Libya’s unilateral decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction (Ibid.).

¹² which some view as privileged

well governed countries to the East of the EU and along the borders of the Med. Additionally, support for the importance of economic and structural changes (although an open door policy towards the Mediterranean is utopian at the moment).

e. Other policy options to induce developments within Med Dialogue Partner countries would be common benchmarks, conditionality through gradualism and cross-issue linkage, cooperation with NGOs in Med to strengthen the starting points for the development of civil society and development aid to safeguard certain standards to guarantee the constant progress of human rights and good governance.

The recent more interventionist U.S. approach to the Middle East emphasizes changes in the region's value system to align it to more democratic Western models (*Said 2004*). This is set against the imbalance created by the vast U.S. military superiority currently in the region which might provoke further acts of terrorism and instability (*Ibid.*). The current and potentially future regional instability would require additional approaches for future cooperative strategies between NATO, Dialogue members countries and other actors in the region (*Ibid.*), as previous items on their agenda, such as combating terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, disaster relief and humanitarian response missions, de-mining and peacekeeping operations, as well as building regional infrastructure remain there (*Ibid.*).

B. NATO's Dialogue vs. the EMP

1. More or less Military in the EuroMed post-Iraq?

Observers have pointed that NATO “*supply*” had been greater in the Euro-Med than *demand* for NATO from MENA (except for Jordan and Israel). Nebraska Senator Chuck Hegel (quoted in Rubin 2007) stated a few days ago that “the great challenge of the future will be the reintroduction of America to the world”. Former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in his recent book faults all three post-Cold War American presidents for failing to capitalize on the U.S.’ unique standing as “global leader”, by either not pushing hard enough for a Middle East peace accord following the 1991 Gulf War, for assuming that economic globalization alone would solve human problems, rather than exacerbate some, or for pursuing a “self-declared existential struggle against the forces of evil” (quoted in Rubin 2007) – which ironically might instead undermine America’s moral stature in the world (*Ibid.*). While military power is important in the global balance, the next American president will need to demonstrate that the U.S. exercises it on a collective basis as a genuine partner for the world community and as proof of the U.S. capacity for global leadership (*Ibid.*).

2. Soft Power - The role of civil society in security

The concept of hegemony, based on control and force, may be relevant to the maintenance of security communities (in terms of a neo-Gramscian form of hegemony), or may be traced back to Thucydides, as *hegemonia*, founded on moral, cultural and intellectual leadership, and based on consent and rooted in legitimacy among the secondary states (Flockhart 2007). When Turkey’s bid for EU membership becomes successful, the EU will border at that point Iran, Iraq and Syria. With these countries as potential new EU neighbors, it is understandable that the EU is not only following developments in Iraq very closely, but showing a definite self-interest in the current developments there. From its position of strength in soft power, European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is actively participating in the Iraqi Compact as “a new partnership with the international community aiming to help Iraq on the path of peace and political and economic reconstruction” (EU News release 5/3/2007). While the U.S. has obviously had endless meetings with Iraq and its neighbors since 2003 (if not before) on these

topics, the “shock and awe”-effect of the Anglo military engagement appears at this point to have diminished the motivation of Iraq’s multiple actors (and those of their neighbors) to jointly participate in their country’s future structural continuities and processes (and appear to instead favor asymmetrical warfare against the occupation instead).

In the interest of this potentially ever “widening” European security “region” (now potentially including Syria, Iran and Iraq, as mentioned above, as potentially new EU-neighbors) the EU through its Neighborhood Policy (of which the EMP is the specialized regional program) intends to assist Iraq by focusing mainly on the rehabilitation of basic services, support of the political process, including elections, support of job creation and of Iraqi capacity building and humanitarian assistance (Ibid.).

The irony will not be lost on the reader that these are actually also the very programs and intentions the U.S. had for Iraq – but proceeded to impose them “top down” on Iraq without, I claim, securing the absolutely essential “mutual constitution” between agent, structure, interests and identity in this process. Yes, it’s messy and time consuming at first glance. In the end, however, sometimes the tortoise may be successful – possibly because of a difference in the perception of “time” between the “old” continent and the “new” world in matters of progress (or perhaps, for no other reason, for the “old” continent not being able to afford to waste resources blindly). With other words, despite similar interests between the EU and the U.S. as actors, their different identities inform different processes, leading to different structural outcomes.

IV. Conclusions: the Mediterranean as a Security Complex - Overlap or Complementarity between NATO and the EMP?

A security complex is defined in terms of power relations (i.e. the regional interactions between the states in this complex) and patterns of amity/enmity (those relationships which range from friendship to expectations of protection and support vs. those which are beset by suspicion and fear) (Haddadi 1999, 4). My present analysis leads me to concur with Buzan’s (1984, quoted in Haddadi 1999, 4) approach to the Mediterranean as a security community. With this approach Buzan uses security as an analytical tool, broader than power and peace, as well as a paradigm to build solutions to “reduce threats and vulnerabilities without leading to a ‘security dilemma’” (Ibid.), with a regional security complex as the framework of analysis. This would represent a “management approach”, wary of the limits of national, regional and international dynamics in insecurity questions, but instead reconciles “differences and concentrates on the harmonious interrelations between individuals and states alike” (Ibid.). This security complex approach would “capture the security dynamics and the interdependence operating in a region with relation to their impact, both internally and externally, on states and societies” (Haddadi 1999, 4).

The Mediterranean’s strategic importance for earlier civilizations throughout millennia appears poised to be at the epicenter of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Anglo-American invasions of Iraq and NATO occupation of Afghanistan over terrorism and oil, against a backdrop of religious, socio-economic and political disparities between all parties (Papacosma 2004). Neoliberal institutionalist scholars have emphasized the role of international institutions in helping self-interested states to achieve and sustain cooperation in an anarchic international setting. Yet the effectiveness of institutions in promoting cooperation remains contingent on member states’ commitment to undertaking and observing the institution’s norms, rules and regulations. (Gomez Mera 2007).

While the Dialogue had an intrinsic “evolutionary” potential (Cold War vs. post-Cold War), the tragic events of 9/11 did not fundamentally alter the goals of the Dialogue itself or change the conceptual framework in the 1999 Strategic Concept, but rather highlighted the need for NATO and its Mediterranean partners to cooperate closer and substantiate their friendship within the Dialogue frameworks laid earlier in the face of common terrorist and WMD challenges (Bin 2003, 2), as well as to give it possibly “greater clarity of purpose” (Ibid). While the Dialogue has

widened and deepened over the years, it remains behind the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the PfP mostly as a confidence-building program, rather than as a true partnership (Bin 2003, 2). Some of the reasons suggested for this “lag” of the Dialogue in developing its true potential behind other NATO programs is uncertainty among Allies and the Mediterranean partners over the degree and extent of cooperation possible and necessary.

Between “terrorism as a fight that binds” and potential Iraqi instability, which might tear the region apart, the enlarged Dialogue should also be open to other new members. This should not necessarily be based on geographic considerations alone, since Jordan is technically not a Mediterranean country, but might leave future membership open to Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, more Gulf States and possibly Iran (*Said 2004*). Since (lack of) progress in the Middle East peace process is also undermining the efficacy of both EU (such as the EMP), and NATO initiatives (such as the Dialogue), increasing the multilaterality based on the security and conflict-resolution capabilities of these institutions might be a legitimate alternative to the heavily unilateral actions in the region of the last four years. Not only would this bring the focus back to the significance of development as one factor in improving regional security (Sen 1999), but would additionally give a greater number of Dialogue and EMP member countries a stake in contributing to the “hard power” aspects of Mediterranean security.

With respect to the Dialogue, it has been suggested that possible programs for “deepening” it could include disaster management, science and environment including activities in the fields of desertification, drought, management of water and other natural resources and environmental pollution (Bin 2003, 3). Clearly the majority of these proposed programs are already also addressed by EMP programs. This does not mean that the Dialogue is unsuitable to also address them, but rather that there most likely exists potential for synergy between the Dialogue and the EMP, the former having the hard power (i.e. defense budgets and, literally, the equipment) at its disposal, the latter the soft power and possibly greater trust, especially after the ambivalence created in the region due to some of the unilateral actions undertaken in the region in the last four years.

Combating terrorism and freeing the Middle East from weapons of mass destruction were priorities for the Arab Dialogue countries already in the 1990s, though not yet for NATO (*Assessing NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue*). However, Kaplan (1999, 211) states that “the challenge of a radical Islamic movement on the southern rim of the Mediterranean may be the central mission of the alliance in the new millennium”. MENA’s half-hearted participation in the EMP and the Dialogue reflected their disappointment in the Middle East peace process and the differences in perspective they signaled against constructive thinking for the region’s future (Ibid.). Enhanced integration between the members of NATO and the EMP would be the ideal scenario in terms of neo-functionalism (à la Jean Monnet: “to make war unthinkable and materially impossible”), especially if augmented by a full free trade area between MENA and the EU in order to support stability economically through development¹³.

One of the greatest security threats to Europe today, despite and because of events surrounding the Iraq invasion, would be a disrupted trans-Atlantic relationship due ideological fall-out. The Cold War and its nuclear stalemate as central to the European security community have changed now into an acute threat from the potential use of WMDs, especially in asymmetrical warfare globally. Security today needs to be approached differently to respond effectively to the needs and threats in the contemporary Mediterranean from the military to the environmental, politico-economic and the socio-cultural of the societal sphere. The theme of a NATO academic forum, “American and Europe: A time for Unity, a Time for Vision” holds today as much as it did ten years ago, only one might want to add “a time for peace” for this

¹³ MENA as the south/eastern Mediterranean neighborhood of the EU will always be this: the EU neighborhood and not a member state.

region, where still today “the most likely candidate for future European security crises may be located” (El-Gawhary 1999, 17), and where military options alone have not brought the peace desired by the West. This shows that in terms of realism, if one wants peace, one needs to be prepared to fight, has not held true in the Mediterranean. Rather, the “ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights and the dissolution of states” (Ibid., 18) continue to destabilize MENA – and their crises affect Euro-Atlantic stability. To alter these paradigms, the socio-economic and political causes of instability need to be addressed, and a re-invigorated and re-dedicated EMP would be in an excellent position to address these challenges for future Mediterranean regional stability.

At a time when the U.S. has withdrawn from “a vast array of multilateral negotiations on issues ranging from money laundering to combating AIDS” (Mohamedi and Sadowski 2001, 12), it has not only angered old allies, but not necessarily made the world safer for democracy either. The underlying logic of multilateralism is that countries have a voice in shaping policies and are bound to contribute to their execution and share its burdens in order to prevent new dividing lines from forming, specifically in this case, between the north and the south and east of the Mediterranean.

Much national blood and treasure has been lost by the U.S. being the world’s unilateral policeman. Countries will cooperate in a coalition instead if it is in their interest to do so. Shifting to the multilateralism inherent in offshore balancing also shifts the burdens in achieving peace by a return to international institutions to promote international cooperation, extract needed funds, troops and legislation from other states for this purpose, whether for direct military preparedness, such as through NATO (in complementarity now with the European defense force) , the norming “effect” of the UN (such as through sanctions), or by addressing underlying structural challenges in MENA which had made peace unstable so far, such as through programs by the EMP. Brzezinski (2007) suggests approaching American foreign policy “post-Iraq” with complete information in *all languages* (both literally, and, one might surmise, as a constructivist approach as well), including all “tools” (beyond intelligent analysis also integrity), the long-term foreign policy goals per se (i.e. multinational, multi-agency, including sub-regional), which might favor some Mediterranean EU members with greater familiarity in the region as compared to the northern EU members, (per Calleya 2004), accountability to domestic as well as global citizens, “morality” (e.g. the “Golden Rule”) – and soft power (“love not war” a la Ghandi), i.e. the role low politics and high politics in regional peace. Neak (2003, 66) positions this as where “New Foreign Policy” diverges from the past with respect to *moral* (“conforming the standards of what is right or just in behavior; virtuous” (American Heritage Dictionary)) positions and values.

Although grand theories as worldviews are premised on moral judgments, some realists such as Morgenthau warned against interweaving moral judgments and other worldviews in politics at all. In terms of future western engagement in the Mediterranean, it does not appear unlikely that the Iraq war, which just had its four year anniversary, and its direct costs to the U.S., as well as those in terms of increased regional instability (as a result of blowback) may also shape the moral positions on a personal cognitive level of future leaders in the U.S., the EU and other Dialogue and EMP members in their foreign policy.

On a state level of analysis, the Iraq experience has shown that there is no one-size democracy: both the Dialogue and the EMP are promoting security and stability among their members as well as “out-of-area”, the former through training and technical exercises, the latter through programs supportive of human rights, economic development, ethnic strife, religious freedom, supportive of human development and the growth of civil society. One of the lessons learnt in recent history in the “greater Mediterranean” may be to guard against the perception of Grand strategy to address root causes of instability. Or is it ok to still have a global vision in the Middle East – as long as it is in cooperation with states involved as more than political power but also socio-(cultural)-economic power?

After all, the evolution of post-Cold War institutions was intended to provide security and stability and avoid the re-emergence of new dividing lines.

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