



Robert Schuman

European Security Trends

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These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which will conclude in the Spring of 2003. The purpose of this Convention is to submit proposals for a new framework and process of restructuring the European Union. While the European Union has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its objectives at home and abroad. The main issues of this Convention are Europe's role in the international community, the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement process. In order for efficiency and progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of this organization. During the Convention proceedings, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze various aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event.

The following is a list of tentative topics for this series:

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2. How will the member states figure in the framework of the Convention?
3. The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe.
4. Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention?
5. The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the European capitals.
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8. The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world.
9. How important is European integration to the United States today?
10. The failure of a necessary partnership? Do the United States and the European Union necessarily have to understand each other? Under what conditions?
11. Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European Union and Russia?
12. Russia: a member of the European Union? Who would be interested in this association?

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European Security Trends

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EUROPEAN SECURITY TRENDS

The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed a great theoretical debate about the conditions for peace and stability in Europe. Balance of power and alliance theories together with realist assumptions have been on trial in the aftermath of the Cold War, especially in relation to the continuation and expansion of NATO and the European Union.¹ The possible emergence of a European-wide security framework has led to new theoretical and conceptual orientations such as constructivism,² security communities,³ and security governance.⁴ These approaches and concepts are beneficial to the study of European security in a number of ways. They help to: shift the emphasis from a purely rationalistic or objective interest of states to other characteristics such as institutions, ideas, culture and identity;⁵ move beyond the state-centric approach by employing multi-level and multi-actor analysis, e.g. regional and sub-regional actors; and broaden the definition of security through the incorporation of non-military aspects.⁶

The concept of security governance seems to hold particular promise for studying developments in European security. Building on a considerable body of literature on the study of governance in domestic, European Union, and international policy making,⁷ security governance

¹ In 1990, John Mearsheimer called for a new balance of power in Europe and predicted that NATO and the EU would fade. See his "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, 15:1 (1990), 5-56. A similar view is presented by Kenneth Waltz in "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, 15:2 (1993), 44-79. For a general criticism of balance of power and alliance theories see William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, 24:4, (1999), 5-41. With regard to alliance theory and NATO expansion see Stuart Croft, "Rethinking the Record of NATO Enlargement," in Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre (eds.), *New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe: Securing Europe's East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 26-42.

² See Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 1998); Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*, 52:4 (1998), 887-917; and Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, 23:1 (1998), 171-200.

³ See Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For an earlier development of this concept see Karl Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

⁴ Representative studies include James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Oran Young, *Governance in World Affairs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Robert O. Keohane, "Governance in a Partially Globalized World," *American Political Science Review*, 95:1 (2001), 1-13; and Mark Webber, "Security Governance and the 'Excluded' States of Central and Eastern Europe," in Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre (eds.), *New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe: Securing Europe's East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 43-67.

⁵ For further details see Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

⁶ See James Sperling, "European Security Governance: New Threats, Institutional Adaptations," in James Sperling (ed.), *Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of Security Governance in Eurasia*, forthcoming.

⁷ For a good overview of studies on governance at the sub-national, national and international level see Elke Krahmhann, "The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe," Working Paper 36/01 (2001) published by the British ESRC "One Europe or Several?" Programme.

employs a broad notion of security, which includes internal (state) conflict, organized crime and environmental degradation, and relates to the increasing number and diversity of actors engaged in European security. It highlights the inability of states or governments to provide security across multiple levels and dimensions by existing unilateral or multilateral institutions, and suggests that problems arising from differences in the needs and interests of states and limited resources have favoured the increasing differentiation of security policy-making and implementation.⁸

The study on security governance in Europe has so far witnessed two distinct features. Firstly, it has concentrated mostly on the requirements of security governance and the geographic parameters (questions of inclusion and exclusion through membership in, for example, NATO and the EU). Secondly, there has been a tendency to stress the military aspects of security and the (lead) role of NATO in European security.⁹ Less emphasis has been given to the working and coordinating mechanism of security governance, the content and implications of the non-military aspects of security, and the contribution of the EU towards European security.

Undoubtedly, NATO has made great strides in the last ten years in changing its internal as well as external image through the adoption of a new military strategy, the transformation from collective defence to collective security through, for example, peace making and peace keeping activities, and the links with Central and Eastern European states via the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, the Foundation Pacts with Russia and the Ukraine, and actual enlargement. But to imply that in security governance NATO fulfils a role comparable to that held by the EU in trade, monetary or environmental governance is debatable on a number of accounts.

Firstly, in order to play a lead role, or be the main regulatory agency in security matters, NATO would have to be seen as capable of dealing either with a substantial number of so-called security threats, or with what are perceived to be high ranking security threats. Empirical evidence indicates (to be provided below) that the EU is considered to be more relevant than NATO with regard to the majority of security threats identified, and deemed equal to NATO with regard to the threats identified as having a high probability of occurrence.

Secondly, unlike the EU which has formal regulatory mechanisms such as the “*acquis communautaire*”, and has legal jurisdiction in a number of key policy areas, NATO lacks such means. Whereas NATO relies on unanimous decision-making and American-led consensus building, the EU employs both majority voting and unanimous decision-making methods, depending on whether a particular issue falls within the confines of the “community method” or the intergovernmental one. Furthermore, attempts are being made to curtail the practice of unanimity in such policy areas as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through the

⁸ Ibid, p.7.

⁹ See, for example, the contributions by Mark Webber and Stuart Croft in Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre (eds.), *New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe: Securing Europe's East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).

practices of either “enhanced cooperation” or “constructive abstention”, which would allow a number of EU countries to act without requiring the consent of all member states.¹⁰

Thirdly, there is a question about NATO’s readiness to engage in future missions of peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peace-making. Concerns have been expressed that future NATO engagements, will be circumscribed by U.S. reservations, as was the case in Afghanistan and Iraq, due to its protracted unanimous decision-making structure. An enlarged NATO, on the one hand, and the incipient membership of Russia in NATO on the other, will exacerbate this potential problem further. At the same time the United States presses for NATO interventions against international terror and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and to operate “out of area”, meaning out of Europe. For their part, the Europeans complain of lack of consultation and participation in the formulation of U.S. global strategy. These differences in security threat perceptions (causes, and consequences of security threats, and whether NATO’s command structure should shift from a geographic to a functional focus) between the United States and Europe are likely to grow and will affect NATO’s readiness.¹¹ Whether and how the establishment of a 20,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force, announced at the NATO summit in Prague, will mitigate or exacerbate the problem of divergence remains to be seen.

Fourthly, the fact that the EU has so far found it difficult to translate ESDP aims into practice, or to mount joint actions with regard to military actions, should not be seen as a conclusive judgement of the EU’s ability to play an important role in European security governance. The growing ability of the EU to out-do NATO in dealing with Central and Eastern European (CEE) states in norm-setting¹² and compliance; in aid and development programmes; and in direct participation (after enlargement) over a wide-range of internal (Justice and Home Affairs) and external (European Security and Defence) policies, is likely to enable the EU to challenge some of NATO’s security functions, and to erode its presently held pivotal role in the establishment of a European-wide security governance.

It is not the task of this paper to speculate on whether the EU will become more important than NATO in European security governance. Rather the paper seeks to examine: (1) which of the two is deemed most relevant in dealing with certain specific types of threats, and whether a division of labour among the leading security institutions is emerging accordingly; and (2) whether coordination, especially on issues of military engagement, is becoming easier rather than more difficult among the lead security organisations. Underlying these aims is the assumption that for European security governance to be effective it needs a sharing and coordinating mechanism. As the market cannot be left simply to the “unseen hand” of demand

¹⁰ For example, the Amsterdam Treaty mentioned the use of “constructive abstention”, and the Nice Treaty officially adopted the principle of “enhanced cooperation” for potential policy areas such as CFSP.

¹¹ For a more elaborate view on NATO’s future see Ivo H. Daalder, “Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?” *International Affairs* 77:3 (2001), 553-567; F. Heisbourg and R. de Wijk, “Debate: Is the Fundamental Nature of the Transatlantic Relationship Changing?” *NATO Review*, Spring 2001; S. Sloan and P. van Ham, “What Future for NATO?” Centre for European Reform, Working Paper, October 2002; Charles Krauthammer, “Re-Imagining NATO,” *Washington Post*, May 24, 2002; Jeffrey Gedmin, “The Alliance is Doomed,” *Washington Post*, May 20, 2002.

¹² This involves adherence to the so-called Copenhagen criteria and the *acquis communautaire*.

and supply, and needs, frameworks and regulations provided either by states or international organisations for a proper functioning, a similar argument can be made for security governance.

Proponents of security governance accept the heterogeneous and sometimes conflicting nature of interests, but imply that in so far as coordination is necessary, it is perceived to be best left to the actors themselves (self-government because of issue specifics). In this line of thought actors themselves recognize the need to share their capabilities, e.g. NATO-ESDP, or NATO to offer military structures for OSCE and UN missions. However, as Krahmman points out, while these arrangements prevent duplication and allow for accumulation of specialist expertise and capabilities, they contribute to the fragmentation of security governance in Europe.¹³

Whilst recognizing that there is a problem with coordination, as became particularly evident in the Bosnian and Kosovo crisis, students of security governance have paid insufficient attention so far to this aspect. This paper will explore the aspect of coordination, and the application of the concept of security governance to a wider spectrum of security threats than has been the case hitherto. This will be done partially through the use of a pilot study of security experts in Europe and the United States on their perceptions of security threats (identification of types and likelihood of occurrence) and institutional response (degree of institutional suitability according to type of threat).

In the following, we will first expand on the concept of European security governance and illustrate why it can be deemed a useful tool in the study of European security. We will then provide some background of a pilot study on security threats and institutional relevance, and complement these with case studies, derived from available literature, on the suitability of the EU, NATO and nation states with regard to twelve types of security threats. This will be followed by an analysis of how the lead security organizations coordinate their activities within the system of European security governance.

Security Threats and Security Governance

Most of the existing approaches on the study of security, including those on international regimes and security communities, apply a state-centric approach. This is somewhat surprising given that most conflicts in the last ten years have been internal to states rather than states against states. As Buzan, et al. point out, the concept of security not only relates to the preservation of state boundaries, but also to the protection of societies and individuals within states.¹⁴ Accordingly, security for Buzan is the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity.¹⁵ While threats to the territory of states are

¹³ Elke Krahmman, "The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe," p. 16.

¹⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

¹⁵ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

primarily identified in military terms, societies and individuals face a multitude of dangers ranging from the inadequacies of political and social structures, to environmental degradation.¹⁶

The concept of security governance employs a broad notion of security, which includes internal conflict, transnational crime and terrorism. It argues that as the scope of security threats expands, the tendency of states or governments to withdraw from provision of public services in favour of multilateral or public-private policy making (mostly because of cost saving exercises) will spread to the security sector. The large number of new bilateral and multilateral security institutions that have emerged in Europe since 1990 are seen as evidence of this spread. These institutions are seen as capable of resolving conflicts and of facilitating cooperation.¹⁷ Both individually and collectively they are systems of rule through which state and non-state actors can organize their common or competing interests in individual, national, regional and global security. Membership and relations among these systems of rule are complex and overlapping, and so are their functions and obligations.¹⁸ In contrast to government, governance does not (substantially) depend on central authority in policy making or rule enforcement. As James Rosenau points out, governance is “a system of rule that is as dependent on inter-subjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters.”¹⁹

Security governance shares characteristics with international regimes and security communities. International regimes are defined by Krasner²⁰ as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” According to Adler and Barnett,²¹ a security community consists of “a region of states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.” For Adler and Barnett the existence of a security community in Western Europe has enabled Europe since 1990 to avoid competitive balancing behaviour.²² Similarly, the fact that CEE states share many cultural, historical and political characteristics with the West, according to these authors, is significant in their wish to join NATO and the EU. Like security community, security governance espouses a sense of shared understanding.

The concept of security governance differs from international regimes and security communities in that it denotes more fluid and flexible arrangements. It can be regarded as the aggregate of a series of overlapping arrangements governing the activities of all, or almost all, the members of international society (or a regional subsystem of it) over a range of separate but reinforcing issue areas,²³ including such temporary arrangements as the development of the

¹⁶ Elke Krahnemann, “The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe,” p. 6.

¹⁷ See Oran Young, *International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 15.

¹⁸ Elke Krahnemann, “The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe,” p. 1.

¹⁹ James Rosenau, “Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics,” in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 4.

²⁰ Stephen Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2.

²¹ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, p. 30.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 40.

²³ See Mark Webber, “A Tale of a Decade: European Security Governance and Russia,” *European Security*, 9:2 (2000), 31-60.

Euro-fighter-aircraft.²⁴ In line with this conceptualisation, security governance can be defined as an intentional system of rule, dependent on the acceptance of states and non-state actors (or at least the major actors) that are affected, which through regulatory mechanisms (both formal and informal), governs activities across a range of security-related issue areas.²⁵

Whilst this definition helps to conceptualise security governance, it provides insufficient information about what the regulatory mechanisms are, the types of threats to which they are to apply, and which organisation should be primarily responsible for designing regulatory mechanisms. Neither does it sufficiently specify the “range of security-related issue areas” or provide a rank ordering of these.

In the following, an effort will be made to shed more light on the types and importance of security threats, and the relevance of institutional response.

Security Threats and Institutional Relevance

A pilot study, undertaken in 1999,²⁶ identified twelve conceivable security threats to the European security space: a biological/chemical attack; a nuclear attack; the criminalisation of economies; narcotics trafficking; ethnic conflict; macroeconomic destabilization; general environmental threats; specific environmental threats; cyberwarfare or cybervandalism against commercial structures; cyberwarfare against defence structures; terrorism against state structures; and migratory pressures.

Ethnic factionalism/irredentism and migratory pressure emerged as the types perceived to be most likely to threaten security. They received the highest scores for both 1999 and for 2010. Criminalisation of the economies and narcotics trade was second and environmental damage and degradation was third. Terrorist activities against commercial and state/defence structures came fourth, and biological/chemical/nuclear warfare was fifth.

There is a consensus among the survey respondents that states are more likely to achieve their security goals within, rather than outside, multilateral institutions. NATO and the EU are viewed as the primary security institutions and secondary roles are attributed to the UN, international financial institutions, the OSCE, and specific multilateral fora such as Interpol.

²⁴ Elke Krahnmann, ‘The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe, p. 5.

²⁵ This is basically a modified version of the definition provided by Mark Webber in “A Tale of a Decade: European Security Governance and Russia,” 31-60.

²⁶ This study was based on government documents, the academic literature, and the survey data response of forty-two leading European and North American security experts to an extensive questionnaire. The individuals surveyed for this project were security and defence policy experts drawn from academia, research institutions, and political foundations. The questionnaire was developed by the author in 1999 for a project on European security financed by the European Commission. Three different (and progressive) questionnaires were discussed with 70 security experts at meetings in Brussels, London, and Washington, DC in the Spring and Summer of 1999.

NATO is the clear institution of choice to meet the challenges posed by the threat of biological or chemical attack, nuclear attack, and cyberwarfare against defence structures. The EU is the clear institution of choice to meet *all* other security challenges facing the Atlantic Community. National responses to these challenges are largely dismissed as irrelevant. Only in the cases of cyberwarfare against defence structures and terrorism are national responses considered useful, and even then they are considered only third or fourth best solutions to the problem. While the EU and NATO are clearly seen as the institutions best able to meet these security challenges, there is no clear second-best institution to cope with these problems (see Table 1).

**Extent of Threat Perception and Institution best prepared to address Threat (1999)
(N=42)**

Threat		Institutions rank-ordered from 1 st to 4 th			
Type	Ratings*	1st	2nd	3 rd	4 th
Ethnic conflict	75%	EU (39%)	NATO (31%)	OSCE (19%)	UN (12%)
Migratory pressures	67%	EU (54%)	OSCE (17%)	NATO (15%)	UN (15%)
Specific environmental threat	45%	EU (54%)	UN (21%)	OSCE (14%)	NATO (12%)
Narcotics trafficking	45%	EU (56%)	OSCE (13%)	INTERPOL (13%)	NATO (11%)
Criminalisation of the economy	44%	EU (70%)	OSCE (15%)	NATO (13%)	UN (2%)
Macro-economic instability	41%	EU (53%)	IMF (21%)	UN (12%)	NATO (8%)
Terrorism against the state	37%	EU (43%)	NATO (24%)	OSCE (13%)	National (13%)
Cyber-warfare against state/defence structures	37%	NATO (45%)	EU (33%)	National (12%)	OSCE (7%)
Cyber-warfare against commercial structures	36%	EU (36%)	NATO (17%)	UN (17%)	OSCE (11%)
General environmental threat	22%	EU (48%)	UN (21%)	OSCE (18%)	NATO (8%)
Nuclear attack	22%	NATO (63%)	UN (18%)	EU (14%)	OSCE (5%)
Biological/chemical attack	12%	NATO (43%)	EU (27%)	UN (18%)	OSCE (12%)

*Denotes the percentage of respondents rating the type of threat occurring as 'moderate', 'probable' and 'high', as against a rating of 'low'.

As this table shows, there is a strong correlation between high ranking security threats and the EU as the foremost institution to respond to these threats. The EU is listed first on the six highest ranking security threats; obtaining, for example, a 70 per cent rating on the threat emanating from the criminalisation of economies. NATO comes second for one of these six types, third for two, and a distant fourth for three of these threats. Other institutions, such as the OSCE, the UN, the IMF and Interpol, score higher on some of these threats than NATO. This is a reminder that focusing solely either on NATO or NATO plus the EU neglects other important institutions which are involved as security providers. However, NATO is seen as the undisputed number one institution when it comes to the military issues of nuclear attacks, and biological and chemical warfare. The EU is placed second and third on these issues.

These findings offer a number of suggestions for the study of security governance. Firstly, they reaffirm the need for a broad definition of security threats that includes military as well as non-military security aspects. Secondly, they indicate that there is a linkage between different types of security threats. In other words, the occurrence of a particular type of threat is often linked with the arrival of another or others. Thirdly, they assign a prominent role to the EU in terms of response to security threats. Fourthly, they implicitly point to the need for a better division of labour and greater coordination and cooperation among the leading security organizations: NATO, EU, OSCE and UN. While existing studies on security governance have emphasized the first of these four suggestions, insufficient attention has been paid to the other three aspects. In the following, these four aspects will be examined more fully, with particular emphasis on numbers three and four.

Reference to non-military problems reopens the thorny issue of whether they are a security problem per se,²⁷ or causes of more traditional security problems? Much of the debate surrounding this issue relates to an objective definition of security. One way to get around this hurdle is to adopt the term of ‘securitisation’. This signifies a process by which particular issues are “taken out of the sphere of every day politics” by specific groups or particular state elites, and defined as security problems.²⁸ In this respect security is not considered as a direct consequence stemming from a threat but as the result of the political interpretation of the threat. Therefore security is analysed as the reaction of a political action towards an existing or perceived threat. Securitisation is thus a merely political process and is different from a threat that can be caused by various factors (economic, social, military, etc.).

Whilst there is no satisfactory answer as to whether non-military aspects are security problems per se, or causes of more traditional security problems, there is generally agreement that the nature of security threats is changing, and that threats since the end of the Cold War have become more complex and far-reaching. Instead of facing a single, predominantly military threat capable of wiping out the entire nation (and the world), we are faced with a myriad of threats, smaller in magnitude and harder to see and counter. This phenomenon was amply demonstrated with the terrorist attacks of 11 September: an attack that demonstrated that networked terrorism has become de-personalised and de-regionalised; highlighting that the terrorist threat is global and cannot be reduced to individual actors. However, there is a link to failed states. “One lesson of September 11 is that if failed states are allowed to fester, they can become sanctuaries or even agents for terrorist networks, organized criminals and drug traffickers. When states, like Afghanistan, fail their neighbours and often the global community are faced with refugee flows, ethnic or civil conflict, and political disintegration.”²⁹ Realisation of the changing security environment is not new however. As the NATO Council already noted in 1991, the “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism

²⁷ D. Baldwin warns that if security is equated with a catch-all concept that embraces all of humanity’s problems, it loses a clear analytical focus. D. Baldwin, “The Concept of security,” *Review of International Studies*, 23 (1997), 17-18.

²⁸ K. Krause, “Theorizing Security, State Formation and the ‘Third World’ in the Post-Cold War World,” *Review of International Studies*, 24:1 (1998), 134.

²⁹ Daniel S. Hamilton, “German-American Relations and the Campaign against Terrorism,” *American Institute for Contemporary German Studies*, The Johns Hopkins University, 2002, p. 7.

and sabotage.”³⁰ NATO repeated the point in its 1999 Strategic Concept, this time moving “acts of terrorism” to the top of the list of risks.³¹ These shifts of risks weaken the distinctions between different kinds of security – national and regional, military and economic, internal and external – but indicate a linkage between different types of security threats. As Hall and Fox³² illustrate, it is no longer possible to separate terrorism from money laundering or organized crime from drug trafficking. Refugees and asylum seekers not only pose internal security concerns but may encourage xenophobia and conflict, as traditional work opportunities appear threatened. At the same time, mass movement may bring with it the possibility of infectious diseases affecting both people and livestock. Migration is also exacerbated by environmental instability arising from climate change. Weak states often create conditions in which terrorists can flourish. The emergence of cyber-terrorism can be considered as constituting a dangerous threat to economic and social life in Europe. Most biotechnology research and development is dual-use in nature and can potentially be misused by terrorists and ‘rogue states’. Equally, there is a likelihood that terrorists will resort to weapons of mass destruction. It is therefore impossible to “wage against one to the exclusion of the other.”³³ After September 11 internal security is as important as external security. This holds particularly true for the EU with regard to enlargement.

These linkages among security threats require extensive scope in policy response. Operating as it does over a wide range of military and civilian policy domains; the EU has a manifest advantage over other multilateral organizations and non-state actors.

The EU possesses more numerous and varied instruments of influence than does NATO, especially at the level of conflict prevention, and therefore has a comparative advantage over NATO for managing potential conflict situations.³⁴ But how much of the perceived EU advantage has been or is likely to be translated into concrete results? Scholars like Christopher Hill³⁵ question the EU’s capacity in the foreign and security field and point to a “capability-gap”. However, it should be emphasized that studies highlighting capacity limitations of the EU often tend to apply this to a narrowly defined area of CFSP or ESDP, namely the military capacity of the EU.³⁶ This downplays EU capacity unnecessarily, and neglects the importance of the EU to combine military and civilian as well as diplomatic, economic, and trade instruments.

It is not the purpose here to review the various attempts the EU has made since 1999 in establishing ESDP.³⁷ Neither is it the case to dwell extensively on both the actual or potential

³⁰ The Alliance New Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Council in Rome, November 7-8, 1991, para. 12.

³¹ The Alliance Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, April 23-24, 1999, para. 24.

³² R. Hall and C. Fox, “Rethinking Security,” *NATO Review*, Winter 2001, vol. 49, no. 4, p. 8.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ See for example, Michael Brenner, “Europe’s New Security Vocation,” McNair Paper 66, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002, p. 71.

³⁵ See Christopher Hill, “Closing the Capability Expectations Gap?” in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?* (London: Routledge, 1998).

³⁶ See for example, Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” *Policy Review*, Summer 2001.

³⁷ For a collection of the core documents on the European Union’s common foreign and security policy see Maartje Rutten, “From St- Malo to Nice, European Defence Core Documents,” Chaillot Papers, No. 47, published by the Institute for Security Studies, Paris, May 2001; and Maartje Rutten, “From Nice to Laeken: European Defence Core Documents,” Chaillot Ppapers, No. 51, published by the Institute for Security Studies, Paris, April 2002.

shortcomings of ESDP. Rather the emphasis will be on how the various security institutions or their member states have responded or provided solutions to ethnic conflict identified in the above empirical study as the most highly rated security threat in terms of probability of occurrence. In turn, this will help to identify the areas where cooperation, coordination and a division of labour among the major security institutions is most needed or appropriate.

Threats from Ethnic Conflicts and Migratory Pressures (and “Failed States”)

The response by security institutions to the two perceived most pressing security threats can be divided along four criteria: peace-enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict prevention. Peace-enforcement activities in this context imply military interventions in the settlement of an ethnic conflict, involving humanitarian interventions. Peacemaking, as understood here, is mostly linked with political and diplomatic and efforts to settle a conflict, though it is clear that their efforts can be enhanced if they can be linked with effective military capabilities, on the one hand, and appropriate economic (financial assistance) and administrative backup (technical assistance), on the other. Peacekeeping refers to the engagement of troops for the purpose of “keeping” the agreed peace settlement. Conflict prevention in this context implies here the emphasis on financial and technical assistance; economic cooperation in the forms of trade or association agreements, or enlargement provisions; nation building and democratisation efforts. Obviously, there are overlaps among these four categories, but for analytical reasons they will be treated separately.

We will start with considering peace-enforcement or crisis management situations. Much of the empirical analysis will concentrate on the CEE countries, which are of central concern to European security governance.

Peace Enforcement

This is the area where military capability is most important and where it is traditionally recognized that the UN, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe are lacking such capability and where the EU has, so far, been unable to mount appropriate capability levels, as was the case in the Bosnian and Kosovo conflict. By contrast, NATO, due to its newly vamped role of out-of-area engagement, has demonstrated both relevance and effectiveness in dealing with the two mentioned conflicts.

Lack of political will, insufficient decision-making capacity, and inadequate acting (primarily military) capacity has hitherto prevented appropriate EU action in this field. Insufficient political will is reflected in the lack of trust among the major EU states when it comes to security and defence considerations or intelligence sharing. This is evidenced in the limited remit of ESDP, which is to perform the ‘Petersburg tasks’ -that is, “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”³⁸

³⁸ Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, “Petersburg Declaration”, para.4 of part II.

The required bodies and decision making structures for ESDP were belatedly established (1999-2002), e.g. the High Representative for CFSP, the Policy Unit, the Political and Security Committee, the European Union Military Committee, and the European Union Military Staff; all regrouped or attached to the Council of Ministers.³⁹ However, there is still an absence of a Council of Defence Ministers, a defence budget, or an agency to buy equipment, and a reliance on unanimity voting in decision-making. Unless reforms can be introduced,⁴⁰ the latter will become more protracted as the EU moves from 15 to 25 members.

EU military capacity is undermined by the existence of: (a) 15 armies, 14 air forces and 13 navies, all with their command structures, headquarters, logistical organizations, and training infrastructures; (b) too high a proportion of immobile ground forces; and (c)⁴¹ problems of interoperability between European forces. It is insufficient in advanced information technology, air-and sea-lift,⁴² air refuelling, and precision-guided munitions.⁴³ A considerable part of these deficiencies relate either to under-spending⁴⁴ or uncoordinated military spending, e.g. waste of duplication and the inability to take advantage of the economies of scale, especially with regard to research and development. Overall, the EU lacks a planning and budgetary system.

Moving towards collective action on peace enforcement also requires a change in mindset among some EU members such as the “neutral” countries and Germany. In that respect it was encouraging, perhaps even astonishing, that in the Kosovo conflict, not only did Germany engage militarily for the first time in the post-second world war history, it did so without the legitimacy of a specific UN mandate.

Until December 2002, Turkey had effectively vetoed the RRF by denying it access to vital NATO assets (largely U.S. held) unless it received guarantees that the ERRF would never be used against its interests. It then won a promise from the EU that Cyprus would not take part in ERRF operations.⁴⁵

³⁹ The newly created ESDP apparatus was employed for the first time to formulate a common approach and to concert diplomacy in the Macedonian crisis of 2001.

⁴⁰ Attempts have been made to make use of such methods as “enhanced cooperation” or “constructive abstention”. The first was introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the second with the Treaty of Nice. But these attempts have so far failed. It will be interesting to see whether the Convention, in its effort to establish a draft for a European Constitution is able to advance the application of these concepts.

⁴¹ In December 2002, it was announced that the EU plans to set up a military academy to train troops for the ERRF. It will take service personnel from the 15 existing EU states and the ten new candidate countries. Nicholas Rufford, “First for Brussels Army,” *Sunday Times*, December 15, 2002.

⁴² For example, the United States has 250 long-range transport planes and the Europeans have eleven. There are plans to overcome the gap on strategic airlift by modernizing the fleet with the A400m carrier, but by the beginning of 2003 there were still serious problems with financing in some of the participating EU countries. See Judy Dempsey, “US-European Capability Gap Grows,” *Financial Times*, November 20, 2002.

⁴³ One of the projects where there is cooperation is the Eurofighter project, but states do not pool from it.

⁴⁴ Taken all together, the European members of NATO will spend only around \$150 billion on defence in 2003, compared with some \$380 billion by the United States. Whereas the U.S. defence budget represents a 20 percent increase over the year 2000, European defence spending has (with the exception of the British) fallen by more than 25% since 1987. See Saki Dockrill, “Does a Superpower Need an Alliance?,” *Internationale Politik*, Transatlantic Edition, 3/2002, vol. 3, Fall Issue, p. 5.

Generally speaking, NATO has a distinct advantage on peace-enforcement activities over the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the UN, and largely over the EU. Peace-enforcement activities are simply not part of the remit of the Council of Europe, and if the UN or the OSCE want to evoke them they will either call on or delegate authority to NATO to carry out such activities. It is likely that in time the EU, through its Rapid Reaction Force, will fulfil a similar function.

Peacemaking (Balkans and Middle East)

In the Macedonian crisis (March 2001) the EU, largely through the brokering of Javier Solana, became the primary agent for the West in restoring peace and preventing the spread of armed conflict.⁴⁶ The campaign was bolstered by the inducement of closer ties with the EU via a stabilization and association agreement that held out the prospect of eventual membership for Macedonia.⁴⁷ In the Middle East, the EU has deliberately kept its role non-political, preferring EU trade concessions, investment, technical and humanitarian assistance, and after the 1993 Oslo Accords, funding for the Palestinian Authority positions. Through the “Barcelona Process” it has also provided a forum for discreet contacts between Israelis and Palestinians during breakdowns of their peace process.

Overall, it can be said that there have been some achievements by the UN, EU, and OSCE with regard to peacemaking, but these organizations have been outdone by a combination of U.S. intervention (Dayton Accord and role in the Kosovo conflict) and NATO, given its superior peace-enforcement capability. Again this is not a traditional field of engagement for the Council of Europe.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping troops in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia were all under NATO command until the beginning of 2003. However, the European countries were providing more than 60% of the 20,000 troops in Bosnia and of the 37,000 in Kosovo (with the United States providing about 20 and 25% respectively),⁴⁸ and all the troops in Macedonia. European forces also provide 3000 to 5000 soldiers for the International Security Assistance Force that is patrolling Kabul.

An EU police mission (EUPM) took over from the UN (International Police Task Force) in Bosnia on January 1, 2003. The objective of EUPM is to train, monitor and assist the Bosnian police in law enforcement duties.

⁴⁵ For further details on the background of this issue see A. Missiroli, “EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP,” *Security Dialogue*, XXXIII:1 (2002), 9-26.

⁴⁶ Michael Brenner, “Europe’s New Security Vocation,” p. 55.

⁴⁷ Michael Brenner, “Europe’s New Security Vocation,” p. 54.

In general terms, much of the peacekeeping activities, though heavily made up of European forces, have been carried out either under UN jurisdiction or NATO command. The EU is starting through EUPM in the civilian sector and the possible replacement of NATO command of the Bosnian forces to take on an effective peacekeeping role.

Conflict Prevention (emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe)

The following instruments can be seen as relevant for the purpose of conflict prevention:

a) nation-building efforts in states that have either experienced civil war or need assistance in their new found independence. Of almost \$15 billion disbursed in development assistance to the Balkans between 1993 and 1999, the European countries and the European Union spent \$6.9 billion and \$3.3 billion respectively, while the United States contributed only \$1.2 billion. The EU and the European NATO allies also provided between 1990 and 1999 \$20 billion of the approximately \$35 billion in aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States.⁴⁹ In Serbia and Montenegro, the EU has brokered the constitution.

b) market reform efforts, e.g. PHARE and TACIS programmes. These measures also help to respond to other identified security threats: macro-economic destabilisation; organised crime. Both these programmes have been broadened since their introduction from a focus on the conversion to a market economy to include the strengthening of democracy.⁵⁰

c) pre-condition efforts for EU membership, including ‘partnership’ agreements.

d) conditions in association agreements (including the Lome Convention), customs unions, and trade agreements. All the EU’s associate agreements with third countries contain clauses on respect for human rights, political pluralism and standards for good governance.

It can thus be argued that in terms of performance on conflict prevention, NATO makes important contributions to peace and stability in Europe. This is evident in, for example, disarmament and confidence-building efforts in Europe, e.g. the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was signed by NATO; the Partnership for Peace programme; and the Euro-Atlantic joint Partnership Council (EAPC). The latter comprises 46 countries. It was created by NATO and has sponsored defence, peacekeeping, and civil emergency operations. It has also encouraged its members to respect minorities, resolve disputes peacefully, and ensure civilian control of their military establishments.⁵¹ However, despite these efforts, and those of other security institutions, the EU can be deemed to be the most important institution in the field

⁴⁸ Julian Lindley-French, “Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma Post-11 September,” Chailot Papers, no. 52, Institute for Security Studies, May 2002, p. 10.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 10.

⁵⁰ Iris Kempe and W. von Meurs, “The EU’s New Ostpolitik,” *Internationale Politik*, Transatlantic Edition, 3/2002, volume 3, Fall Issue, p. 96

⁵¹ See Strobe Talbott, “From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2002, vol. 81, no. 6, p. 47.

of conflict prevention. It has a wide scope of jurisdiction, can grant economic benefits, is able to set norms and standards (e.g. through enlargement), and can combine economic (trade and financial assistance), diplomatic and increasingly military tools in the external field.

Conclusion

There can be little doubt that the Iraqi war has left the Europeans deeply divided over how the world is to be managed in the future. The St Malo pioneering spirit has been lost in the throes of post war Iraq. The new mix of strategic cultures will de facto tilt the balance in the direction of Atlanticism and a reluctance to allow the Union to assume its responsibilities. To counteract this trend, the EU must rise to the dual challenge of enlargement and security. According to Nicole Gnesotto, unless it does so successfully, it risks a cleavage, which in the foreseeable future could be accompanied by the worst possible form of Europe: a large free trade area that is envied but not protected, rich but vulnerable to all the uncertainties of globalisation, with here and there some instances of political cooperation and depending on the country, nurturing two illusions: on the one hand that of traditional transatlantic security and on the other the illusion of renewed importance of national cards in world affairs.⁵²

For Gnesotto four priorities should be pursued:⁵³

1. Political priorities have to be re-established. ESDP has made great progress over the last four years, but needs a common view on the crises in which it is to be used. In other words, what the EU has to look at seriously is foreign policy rather than military arrangements or capabilities.
2. A readiness to look at the world as it is: one lesson of the Iraq crisis is the urgent need to find a common mechanism for sharing information and analyses on threats that could affect the interests and security of Europe as a whole. Common analysis of the risks is of course no guarantee that there will be consensus on the policies to be adopted, but it is a prior condition for adoption of any individual or collective position taken by states. There is a need to mesh better CFSP/ESDP with the national security and defence systems.
3. Set engagement priorities: should it be the Balkans, Iran, North Korea – and above all the fight against proliferation in general? We need to identify the priorities not only in their own right, but also to identify possible policy divergences from US policy and therefore risks of fresh European divisions.
4. There must be discussion, among Europeans, of America. Not to condemn or, on the contrary, to adopt a priori U.S. positions, but to look together at the profound changes that have taken place in that most powerful country in the world.

⁵² Nicole Gnessotto, "Rebuilding," Newsletter, Institute for Security Studies, no. 6, April 2003.

⁵³ Ibid.

What then does the future of EU security policy entail? Joseph Nye makes a telling observation when he states that the EU is not likely soon to become the military equal of the United States, or for that matter a superpower, but it has enough sticks and carrots to produce significant hard power; the ability to get others to do what they would not otherwise do. In addition, despite internal division, Europe's culture, values and the success of the EU have produced a good deal of soft power, the ability to attract rather than merely coerce others.⁵⁴ The EU's most important geographic area of engagement in security and defence terms will for some time remain Europe (eastern Europe, the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, possibly North Africa), and its main activities will continue to be conflict prevention and peacekeeping. To undertake more tasks of an international crisis management (peacemaking and peace enforcement) would probably require the establishment of a legitimate executive with authority to commit the peoples of Europe to war, or even to a clear line on subjects like Iraq of action or inaction.

⁵⁴ Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).