The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established by the Maastricht Treaty to form the Second Pillar of the European Union (EU).1 It is an upgraded version of European Political Cooperation (EPC), which developed gradually in the 1970s and {1}980s. Despite receiving a treaty basis by way of the 1986 Single European Act, EPC remained a loose form of cooperation between Member States in the field of foreign policy. Political integration has proved to be slower and harder to achieve; foreign, security and defence policies are very sensitive sectors and Member States are reluctant to surrender their sovereign rights to the European level. The creation of a common foreign and security policy was therefore seen as a step forward, in line with integration in the economic fields.
The shortcomings of EPC were one of the factors behind the development of CFSP; the major catalysts in the launching of the foreign and security policy debate among the Member States were the world events taking place prior to and during the Maastricht Trety negotiations: the end of the Cold War and the resulting security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany and the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Gulf crisis and the war in Yugoslavia added urgency to the whole process. The need, therefore, emerged to present a coherent, common foreign policy among the EU countries to the outside world. Another important factor is the position of the United States towards European defence and security. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, it was feared that the US might reduce its commitment to European defence; the first signs of such a shift in policy became evident during the Bush administration, when the US considerably reduced the number of its troops in Europe.
The debate on the future form of a common foreign and security policy centred on two key issues: the decision-making procedure, and the gradual development of a European defence policy. As regards decision-making, two groups emerged: while some countries were in favour of an intergovernmental approach, continuing the style of cooperation existing under EPC (France, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Portugal and Ireland), others advocated introducing a more supranational Community method (Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Spain, Italy and Germany). Also, in the defence debate, two opposing points of view emerged: on the one hand, the Atlanticists (the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Portugal and Denmark), which favoured maintaining the dominance of NATO in European defence, while the Europeanists (France, Greece, Belgium, Spain, Italy and, to some extent, Germany) wanted to move towards less dependence on NATO and the increasing commitment of Europeans to their own defence.
CFSP, as it now exists, is therefore a result of a compromise between the above positions. The decision-making procedure contains a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational elements: on the one hand, the general rule is for the Council of Ministers to take decisions unanimously, although Member States share the right of initiative with the European Commission and, in certain very limited cases, it is possible to use qualified majority voting. As regards defence, the upgraded dual role of the Western European Union (WEU) is also a compromise: on the one hand, it represents the defence component of the EU while, on the other hand, it is seen as the European pillar of NATO. In no way does the WEU challenge the authority of the Alliance; on the contrary, it is intended to complement it.
Operational since November 1993, CFSP will arguably be one of the most important and controversial items on the agenda of the {1}996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). Two years of operation is a very short history on which to base an evaluation and review of CFSP. However, several developments have already taken place in these past two years, and considerable criticism has been directed at the CFSP. Expectations were high and, in many cases, the results have been disappointing. This is a widely recognized fact, featuring in the working papers of Member States but also of Community institutions. The handling of the Yugoslav crisis has shown that it is not easy to achieve a common policy. CFSP has had to take part of the blame for the EU's inability to act decisively in former Yugoslavia. The therefore required review at the 1996 IGC has been provided for in Articles J.4.2 and J.10 of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty.
In anticipation of the 1996 IGC, EU Member States are preparing their positions as regards the future CFSP with the creation of expert groups. The start of the debate has been marked by numerous working papers, interviews with politicians and seminars. Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain and The Netherlands have already submitted their preliminary suggestions as to what CFSP could become in the future. One of the first contributions to spark off the debate is the document of the German CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group of the Bundestag on the future of European unification.2 The strengthening of the EU's hard core of countries oriented to greater integration and closer cooperation forms the central proposal of the document. Membership of such a core would include Germay, France and the Benelux, and would be open to countries willing to join and meeting the requirements. The main task of the core is to counteract the centrifugal forces generated by constant enlargement and, thereby, to prevent a South-West grouping, more inclined to protectionism and headed in a certain sense by France, drifting apart from a North-East grouping, more in favour of free world trade and headed in a certain sense by Germany'.3 The proposal prompted reactions by the other Member States, especially the United Kingdom and Italy, which felt offended by being left out of the core'. As regards CFSP, it proposes that the hard core would provide the main thrust of initiating joint actions, and of launching common initiatives, while the other countries would then decide whether to follow or not. This clearly implies a multi-speed' CFSP, which in turn renders the denomination common' misleading. However, in conjunction with majority voting, it can provide more flexibility in the decision-making process.
The debate in the 1996 IGC is therefore likely to centre on the following major issues:
Evaluation and review of the decision-making process and the role of the different institutions
The role of the Commission, sharing the right of initiative with the Member States, is likely to remain unchanged. However, its role in assisting the Presidency in representing the EU in international organizations and meetings could be enhanced, as this would ensure continuity of policies. The Commission's sole right of initiative in the First Pillar (EC) should be used to benefit CFSP decisions. The Commission could exploit further its role of liaison between the EC and CFSP so that political decisions under CFSP will be supported by the economic weight of the EC, by means of trade agreements, technical assistance and embargoes. The role of the Political Committee and COREPER have to be evaluated and reviewed. There is a clear need for decisions of the Council to be based on common analysis. In a report drawn up at the request of the Commission,4 the creation of an independent, permanent, central body to analyze and evaluate the political, economic and military developments around the world was seen as a way of contributing in this direction, while it would relieve the Political Committee and COREPER of some of their workload. The role of the Presidency in CFSP will need to be clearly defined, with the central aim to ensure cohesion and continuity.
The increasing use of majority voting at the expense of unanimity is likely to be a critical debate. As the EU has enlarged to the present 15 members, and is expected to enlarge further in the near future, taking decisions by unanimity will become increasingly difficult. Although Article J.3.2 of the Maastricht Treaty states that: The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its development, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority' so far this procedure has not been used. Although some countries would favour an increased use of majority voting, nationally sensitive and strategic decisions can continue to be taken unanimously.
The role of the European Parliament (EP) and the associated question of CFSP accountability are also expected to feature in the debate. In order to increase CFSP accountability and reduce the democratic deficit, the role of the EP in the decision-making procedure may be enhanced.
Common defence and the role of the WEU
Article J.4.1 of the Maastricht Treaty refers to the gradual creation of a European common defence policy, while Article J.4.2 recognizes the WEU as an integral part of the development of the Union, entrusted to elaborate and implement decisions with defence implications. A great deal of debate has already taken place on this issue, and is expected to continue during the 1996 IGC. This will be closely linked with the role of the WEU. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 which created the WEU expires in 1998, and discussions will have to be take place on whether to renew the Treaty or to incorporate the WEU into the EU. The relationship between the WEU and the EU and NATO will have to be further clarified; at the sae time, the desirability of increasing the WEU's military capabilities to support CFSP decisions will also have to be examined. The Yugoslav crisis has illustrated that the military capacity of the WEU is still very limited; primary reliance on NATO resources would still be required, and is likely to continue in at least the near future. The Combined Joint Task Forces scheme is a move towards enhancing the WEU's capability to act, and is considered a move in the right direction.
Preparation for the effects of enlargement
One of the primary aims of the 1996 IGC will be to prepare the EU institutionally for further enlargement around the turn of the century. The new members will be Central and Eastern European countries and CFSP has to be flexible enough to accommodate the interests of the new members. Different historical and cultural traditions mean that there will be a greater range of interests to take into consideration.
Furthermore, as the EU now includes four neutral countries, the issue of neutrality and obligations under CFSP and the WEU, is another which will have to be addressed. With a potential membership of over 20 countries, agreement on joint actions will be hard to achieve unless the decision-making process is reviewed. One solution to this potential problem is the hard-core' proposal suggested by the German declaration, mentioned previously.
These are some of the key issues with respect to CFSP which will be discussed in the 1996 IGC. Throughout the history of the EU, foreign, security and defence issues have been very sensitive matters and Member States have been reluctant to surrender their sovereign rights. The main aim of the 1996 IGC as regards CFSP is to evaluate and propose changes which will improve its functioning, in view not only of past experiences but also of the future enlargement of the Union. Constructive contributions to this debate by the Member States and the EU institutions and their willingness to move ahead are therefore of utmost importance. n
1. Following the Maastricht Treaty, the Temple' approach was adopted whereby the European Union rests on three pillars: the First Pillar containing the three constitutive Treaties of the three European Communities (EC, ECSC, Euratom); CFSP forming the Second Pillar; and Justice and Home Affairs as the Third.
2. Europe Documents, No. 1895/96, 7 September 1994.
3. Ibid.
4. European security policy towards 2000: ways and means to establish genuine credibility', First Report by the high-level group of experts on CFSP, Brussels, 19 December 1994.