

The Representation of Intra-EU Migrants  
at the Member-State Level:  
Do Voting Rights Matter?

Anna Olsson

Ph.D. Candidate  
Department of Government  
School of Public Affairs  
American University  
4400 Massachusetts Ave., NW  
Washington, DC 20016  
anna.olsson@american.edu

Prepared for presentation at the 10<sup>th</sup> Biennial International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, May 17-19, 2007, Montreal, Canada

## Abstract

Since the introduction of the EU citizenship in 1992 the freedom of movement and residence within the Union has led to an ever increasing number of individuals residing in another EU member-state than their own. These intra-EU migrants have increasingly been granted the same rights as the citizens of their country of residence, with one conspicuous exception: voting rights in national elections. It seems paradox, however, that those EU-citizens who embody the idea of European citizenship the most – those who migrate to reside in another EU member-state – are granted democratic representation through the right to vote at the municipal and European levels, but not at the national level in their country of residence. This paper investigates how the absence of voting rights for intra-EU migrants affects their sense of democratic representation. More specifically, this paper seeks to determine whether intra-EU migrants differ from citizens in their satisfaction with democracy in their country of residence and in the EU, estimating two ordinal logit models using data collected through 11 Eurobarometer surveys ranging from 1997 to 2004. The results indicate that intra-EU migrants are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than citizens, both in their country of residence and in the EU, thus suggesting that direct representation through the participation in national elections may not be as important as suggested in previous research. However, the finding that a greater ideological distance to the median citizen in the country of residence is associated with a lesser satisfaction with democracy suggests that virtual representation, in the more general sense, takes the place of the narrower notion of institutionalized representation, at least in the mind of the masses. These findings help shed some light on the puzzle of representation within the context of European integration, and the fact that contrary to public opinion, European elites argue for institutionalized representation, shows that the duality of and tension between virtual and actual representation, as suggested by Hanna Pitkin, very much exists in the EU today.

## Introduction

Since the introduction of the European Union (EU) citizenship through the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the freedom of movement and residence within the Union has led to an ever increasing number of individuals residing in another EU member-state, from 4.8 million in 1993 to over 6 million in 2000 (Recchi 2005). These *intra-EU migrants* have been granted an ever greater equality in citizen rights, to the point of being treated like a citizen in almost every way, but with one conspicuous exception: voting rights in national elections (Cesarani and Fulbrook 1996; Day and Shaw 2002; Dell'Olio 2005; Dinan 2004; Koslowski 1994). The importance of intra-EU migrant voting rights for the development of the EU citizenship have been well recognized, leading to the introduction of the right to vote and stand as candidates in elections of the European Parliament and in municipal elections granted in the Treaty on European Union (Treaty on European Union 1992). Many argue, however, that the inclusion of these rights makes the absence of voting rights in national elections an even more obvious problem for the democratic legitimacy of the EU (Connolly, Day, and Shaw 2006; Day and Shaw 2002; Koslowski 1994).

As indicated above, migration rates between the EU member states have steadily increased since the Treaty of Maastricht, and with the most recent waves of enlargement (with ten Eastern and Central European States joining in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania joining in 2007), the number of intra-EU migrants is likely to increase even more. With residents of other EU member-states comprising an ever larger proportion of the population in the member states, and with the notion of European Citizenship playing an ever larger role in the Treaties, the argument for granting intra-EU migrants the right to vote in national elections in their country of residence is stronger than ever. It seems like the EU, in its efforts to deepen integration and

enforce the notion of a European citizenship, is facing a dilemma: the EU citizens who embody the idea of European citizenship the most—those who migrate to and reside in another EU member state—are granted democratic representation through the right to vote at the local and the European, but not at the national level of their country of residence. In light of this dilemma, the purpose of this project is to seek an answer to the following question: How does the absence of voting rights for intra-EU migrants in the national elections of their country of residence affect their sense of democratic representation?

Robert Dahl argues that democratic citizenship requires the inclusion of all adult subjects to the binding collective decisions of an association (Dahl 1989). Following from this, few would argue against voting rights as a fundamental citizen right to political participation, and this has been one of the leading arguments for the introduction of voting rights for intra-EU migrants on some—if not yet all—levels of the EU polity (Connolly, Day, and Shaw 2006; Day and Shaw 2002; Dell'Olio 2005; Hettne 2002; Koslowski 1994; Recchi 2005; Bhabha 1999). Beside the argument that equal citizen rights are crucial for building the foundation for a meaningful European citizenship, others argue that adequate democratic representation of EU citizens at all levels is of fundamental importance for the democratic legitimacy of the EU (Marsh and Norris 1997; Marsh and Wessels 1997; Schmidt 2004; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997).

The question posed by this paper—whether intra-EU migrants feel less politically represented in their country of residence than citizens—is justified by the actual lack of institutional representation through the right to participate in general elections at the member-state level. A slightly different question that must be asked before proceeding to the analysis, however, is whether and why it actually matters if people feel represented. Our notion of

representative government, as Hanna Pitkin argues, incorporates a duality of and tension between a very general idea of representation and a narrower idea of its institutionalization, similar to Burke's distinction between virtual and actual representation (Pitkin 1967). It appears that if representation is seen in the narrower institutional sense, it matters very much if people feel represented or not, and if they do not, institutional reform must be sought. If representation is seen in the more general sense, however, assuming that people can be represented through other channels than direct elections, they may *be* represented whether or not they *feel* represented; and they may feel represented despite a lack of institutionalized representation.

The literature on political representation has to a large extent emphasized the narrower institutional concept of representation, examining the effects of electoral laws, policy-interest congruence, and elite decision-making strategies on the quality of representation (Arnold 1990; Lublin 1997; Powell 2000; Riker 1986; Weissberg 1978). More recently, however, some scholars have questioned this institutional focus, and instead suggested that people may simply not want to participate in politics, and that a more general concept of representation may be more appropriate (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). This view, which resembles the notion of Burke's virtual representation where citizens may be content with their interests being represented in other ways than direct elections, suggests a more relaxed expectation of whether it matters if people feel represented or not.

Research on European integration and the development of the European Union has traditionally fallen under the umbrella of studies in international relations, treating the EU mainly as an international organization (Slocum and van Langenhove 2004). In the course of a deeper European integration, however, an increased tendency to look at the EU as a single polity can be observed (Hettne 2002; Risse 2004; Slocum and van Langenhove 2004). In recent years, the EU

has transformed into a political hybrid without a contemporary or historical counterpart, inspiring scholars in various academic fields to question the relationship between nation and state, centralization and decentralization, and the traditional meaning of notions like democracy and citizenship (Bellamy 2006; Biersteker 1999; Cesarani and Fulbrook 1996; Greven and Pauly 2000; Guibernau 1999; Schmitter 2000).

The research question of this study can mainly be placed at the intersection of two partially and increasingly overlapping sub-literatures on European integration which correspond to the two main arguments for extending voting rights to intra-EU migrants—the literature on European citizenship and the literature on the democracy deficit of the EU. The former has grown increasingly salient in the course of the establishment of EU citizen rights in the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice, and especially the link between the idea of a common citizenship across all the EU member-states and the phenomenon of increasing intra-EU migration makes the research question of this study highly relevant (Bellamy 2006; Dell'Olio 2005; Koslowski 1994). The literature and debate on the democracy deficit of the EU has existed as long as direct elections to the European Parliament have taken place, but has grown more salient through the transfer of power from the member-states to the EU, and through repeated enlargement waves which have increased the urgency of the problem (Schmidt 2004; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Schmitter 2000; Zielonka 2004).<sup>1</sup>

In addition to these two literatures, the research question also fits into a new, growing literature on intra-EU migration, an issue which has only recently gained scholarly interest, and where further research is urgently requested (Bellamy 2006; Connolly, Day, and Shaw 2006; Day and Shaw 2002; Recchi 2005; Waldrauch 2003). In some recent research scholars perform qualitative analysis of the specific case of EU electoral rights and their connection to EU

---

<sup>1</sup> For a concise introduction to the democracy deficit, see (McCormick 2005), p. 132-139.

citizenship and democracy—a sign both of the growing salience of the issue, and of the need for alternative empirical testing of their hypotheses (Connolly, Day, and Shaw 2006; Waldrauch 2003).

Karp, Banducci and Bowler use the data of one Eurobarometer survey (EB 52.0 from 1999) to examine what factors are associated with citizen evaluations of democratic performance in the EU, and although they use some of the same control variables as this study, they do not distinguish between intra-EU migrants and citizens (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2003). My contribution to the literature therefore lies in the fact that I test hypotheses connecting the notion of EU citizenship and satisfaction with democracy with rigorous quantitative analysis of longitudinal data from all EU member-states.

Based on the above cited literature suggesting that equal citizen rights are crucial for building the foundation for a meaningful European citizenship, and that adequate democratic representation of EU citizens at all levels is of fundamental importance for the democratic legitimacy of the EU, and based on the more narrow view of institutionalized representation we may expect to find support for the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *Intra-EU migrants with no right to vote in national elections are less satisfied with how democracy works in their country of residence than citizens, all else equal.*

The logic behind this hypothesis is that the right to vote in national elections increases the sense of democratic representation. A particular institutional setting comprising a special case of intra-EU migrant rights is that unlike all other intra-EU migrants, British citizens living in Ireland, and

Irish citizens living in the United Kingdom do have the right to vote in national elections, and thus, based on the same logic as the first hypothesis, we may also expect to find support for the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: *Intra-EU migrants with a right to vote in national elections in their country of residence are more satisfied with democracy than intra-EU migrants without this right, all else equal*

Yet another useful field of comparison results from the fact that since 1994 all intra-EU migrants are granted the right to vote and stand as candidates in elections of the European Parliament in their country of residence. Thus, since they enjoy rights equaling those of citizens in these elections, contrary to the expectations of hypothesis one and two, we may expect to find support for the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: *Intra-EU migrants and citizens are equally satisfied with how democracy works in the EU, all else equal.*

Based on the more general view of representation, as presented by Pitkin, we may assume that, despite the absence of the right to vote, other, non-institutionalized channels may increase intra-EU migrants' sense of representation. One example of such an alternative channel of representation can be found in the scholarly assumption that there is a positive relationship between median correspondence and democratic representation (Castles and Mair 1984; Inglehart and Huber 1995; Knutsen 1998; Powell and Vanberg 2000; Van der Eijk and Franklin



1991). In other words, we may assume that the closer the interests of an intra-EU migrant are to the interests of the median citizen in that country, the more likely he or she is to feel represented, and thus to be satisfied with how democracy works, based on the perception that others represent his or her interests for him or her. Similarly, one could assume that in any representative democracy, the ideal case of representation is the inclusion of the median citizen position in the governing party or coalition, and thus this measure could be assumed to be a proxy for the distance to the governing party. Following from this we may expect to find support for the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: *Intra-EU migrants with no voting rights are more likely to be satisfied with how democracy works in their country of residence the smaller the ideological distance to the median citizen, all else equal*

#### Data

The analysis will use cross-sectional individual and aggregate level data, collected from various sources which will be described and evaluated below. The primary data to be utilized is a number of Eurobarometer Surveys ranging from November 1997 (EB 48.0) to March 2004 (EB 61.0)—the most recently conducted survey for which the data is available (Christensen 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; European Commission 2004b; European Commission 2004a; Hartung 2002, 2003; Melich 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2004). The reason for the time span of the case selection is that intra-EU migrants have only been included in the Eurobarometer surveys since 1994, and that the survey questions operationalizing the two dependent variables were both asked in

selected surveys starting with the EB 48.0 in 1997.<sup>2</sup> The case selection thus incorporates every survey since November 1997 in which the questions on satisfaction with democracy in the country of the interview and in the EU were asked. The data is unique both in its scope and in its characteristics, as around 16,000 citizens from all EU member-states were interviewed in each survey. The universe for all surveys was all persons age 15 and over residing in the member states of the EU, and the samples of all surveys were designed as multi-stage probability samples in the single countries. The fact that identical surveys were simultaneously conducted in all EU member-states at several points in time vastly increases the comparability of the data across member-states and time. The fact that each individual interviewed was not only coded on the country in which the interview took place, but also on his or her citizenship, makes the data extraordinarily useful for the purposes of this analysis. In addition to this, the datasets have been widely used in scholarly analysis since their release.<sup>3</sup>

For the purpose of this analysis, the data from each of the surveys was cleaned, recoded and merged into one large dataset, yielding an analysis sample of 132,164 individuals for the analysis of the first dependent variable, and 117,225 individuals for the analysis of the second dependent variable. As is often the case in studies using large-scale survey data, the cleaning and recoding of the individual level survey data to prepare it for the analysis involved several steps leading to a gradual decrease of the sample size, which are summarized in Table 1. First, since the aim of this paper is to analyze and compare the attitudes of EU citizens residing in their home country or in another EU member-state, citizens of other countries than the EU member-states as well as individuals with dual citizenship were excluded from the sample. Second, resulting from

---

<sup>2</sup> The first survey to incorporate intra-EU migrants into the survey samples was the Eurobarometer 41.1 (conducted in March-June of 1994). All previous Eurobarometer surveys instructed the interviewers to close the interview if the respondent was not a citizen of the country in which the interview was conducted.

<sup>3</sup> For an overview, the codebooks of all surveys can be reviewed on the ICPSR website at <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/>

the respondents' failure to answer one or more of the survey questions, data was missing on one or more of the variables included in this analysis, and these observations were consequently dropped from the analysis sample.<sup>4</sup>

[Table 1 about here]

### Methodology

The methodology utilized for testing the hypotheses posed above is multivariate regression analysis, estimating two ordinal logit models for each of the dependent variables, using individual survey data collected through 11 Eurobarometer Surveys in the years 1997 to 2004. Methodologically, there are indeed many ways to answer the posed research question, which in my opinion all have their advantages and disadvantages. The reason why I chose to use quantitative analysis, and more specifically multivariate regression analysis, is threefold. First, this method poses a unique way of estimating relationships between a large number of explanatory variables and the dependent variables with an accuracy that is superior to other methods. Second, this method is particularly useful considering the nature of the data I am using for the analysis—large-scale survey data representative of the populations of all EU member states, over several years. Third, the previous use of multivariate regression analysis in the specific topic of this study is limited, and may lead to new insights that have not yet been reached.

---

<sup>4</sup> Descriptive statistics of the analysis sample is available in the Appendix, Table 5.

## *The Variables*

A summary of the variables, their operationalizations, and the corresponding survey questions on which they are based is displayed in Table 2.<sup>5</sup> Before specifying the models, however, the operationalizations of the variables will be discussed in greater detail.

[Table 2 about here]

The dependent variable, *sense of democratic representation*, is operationalized based on two repeatedly asked questions in the Eurobarometer Surveys. The questions ask respondents to state on a four-point categorical scale how satisfied they are with the way democracy works, in their country (i.e. the country of residence), and in the EU.<sup>6</sup> This is the simplest, and the most suitable, available measure for capturing potential differences between individuals who have the right to vote in national elections (member-state citizens and intra-EU migrants with the right to vote) and intra-EU migrants who do not have this right. Whereas the usefulness of this particular survey question has been debated in the literature, the main critique is that it is insufficient as a measure for political support, mainly because it does not include any mention of political leaders, parties, or policies (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2003; Norris 1999). This critique matters little for the construct I am hoping to tap, however, since I am interested in whether individuals feel represented at all, rather than to what degree they feel that their personal interests are represented.

---

<sup>5</sup> The question number refers to the numbering in the most recent survey used in this paper, the Eurobarometer 61.0. As some of the question numbers may vary slightly between the surveys, please see each of the codebooks for reference to the question numbers. Also see appendix for the exact question wording.

<sup>6</sup> The exact wording of all survey questions can be found in the appendix.

The first two independent variables of interest—*intra-EU migrant status with national voting rights*, and *intra-EU migrant status without national voting rights*—were operationalized as dummy variables coded one or zero depending on the combination of the answers to the survey questions on the nationality of the respondent and the country in which the interview was conducted. The third key independent variable—*Ideological distance*—was created by measuring the absolute difference between each respondent’s self-placement on a ten-point left-right scale and the self-placement of the median non-intra-EU migrant in the respective country at the time. Whereas many studies rely on expert judgments of party positions on the left-right scale, the scope of my analysis does not allow me to use such a measure, since this would require accurate judgments for all parties at the time of each of the 11 surveys included in my sample. In addition to this measure, and because the impact of the ideological distance from the median citizen is assumed to be conditional on intra-EU migrant status and voting rights, I included an interaction term generated by multiplying the ideological distance by the dummy variable migrants without voting rights.

A number of additional independent variables are included as control variables. First, I include a variable measuring the attitudes towards the EU, using a survey question that asks the respondent to assess whether they believe that their country’s EU-membership is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad. I assume that a more positive attitude towards the EU will be associated with a lesser satisfaction with democracy in the country of residence, and with a greater satisfaction with democracy in the EU. Second, I include a variable measuring the political connectedness of the respondent, using a question in the surveys that asks about the frequency with which the respondent discusses political matters with friends.

Third, I include a variable measuring the distance in time to the most recent national elections held in the county of residence, assuming that the shorter this time, the greater the awareness of the lack of voting-rights, and the lesser the satisfaction with democracy at the country level will be among intra-EU migrants. Fourth, I include a dummy variable for whether the respondent is a *student* or not, as a proxy accounting for any differences between intra-EU migrants who are permanent working residents, and intra-EU migrants who may only stay in their country of residence for a short period of time. I assume that students, who are likely to stay for a shorter period of time, and who do not pay taxes to the same extent as working intra-EU migrants in their country of residence, are less likely to care about democracy at the member-state level.<sup>7</sup> Finally, I include the three standard demographic variables education, gender, and age, all for which questions are included in the surveys.<sup>8</sup>

### *The Regression Model*

The two regression models that will be estimated can thus be summarized in the following equation:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{migvote}_i + \beta_2 \text{mignovote}_i + \beta_3 \text{idecit}_i + \beta_4 \text{idecit} \times \text{mignovote}_i + \beta_5 \text{euatt}_i + \beta_6 \text{polcon}_i + \beta_7 \text{timeelec}_i + \beta_8 \text{student}_i + \beta_9 \text{age}_i + \beta_{10} \text{edu}_i + \beta_{11} \text{male}_i + \beta_{12} \text{survey2}_i + \dots + \beta_{21} \text{survey11}_i + \beta_{22} \text{intcount2}_i + \dots + \beta_{35} \text{intcount15}_i + e_i$$

---

<sup>7</sup> It should be mentioned that the only requirement for acquiring permanent resident status in another EU member state is that an individual has proof of employment, whereas the residence permit for students automatically ends with the end of the program of study.

<sup>8</sup> Initially, I included a variable for household income, but as more than a third of all respondents refused to answer this survey question, and since the inclusion of the variable made a minimal difference in the regression outcomes, I decided to exclude it from the analysis model.

## Results

Based on the results presented in Table 3, several findings stand out. Overall, the model estimating satisfaction with democracy in the country of residence yielded statistically significant coefficients for all but one key independent variable, with some surprising results regarding the signs of the coefficients. First, the results suggest that intra-EU migrants with no voting rights are *more* likely to be satisfied with democracy in their country of residence than citizens. Second, and also contrary to expectations, intra-EU migrants with a right to vote in national elections are *less* likely to be satisfied with democracy in their country of residence than citizens, and consequently migrants without voting rights. Third, the negative coefficient on the variable ideological distance suggests that overall, the larger the ideological distance to the median citizen in the country of residence, the greater the dissatisfaction with democracy, as expected. Although the interaction term indicating the difference in the effect of ideological distance for migrants without voting rights is not statistically significant, practically, the negative sign of the coefficient suggests that a larger ideological distance may have a greater negative effect on non-voting migrants than on voting migrants and citizens.<sup>9</sup>

The model estimating satisfaction with democracy in the EU yielded statistically significant coefficients for all independent variables, and with somewhat less surprising results than the first model. The results suggest the failure to reject the third hypothesis, however, which stated an expectation of equal satisfaction with democracy in the EU among intra-EU migrants and citizens. As the first two coefficients in the right column of Table 3 indicate intra-EU migrants, regardless of whether they have the right to vote in national elections or not, are overall more likely to be satisfied with democracy in the EU than citizens. Although inconsistent with

---

<sup>9</sup> An identical regression with an interaction term of *all* migrants and ideological distance yielded a negative coefficient significant at the 10% level, which may be an indication that with a larger number of cases, the interaction term of non-voting migrants and ideological distance may be statistically significant as well.

the theoretical expectation, practically this result is less surprising, and may be an effect of the possibility that individuals who leave their home country to migrate to a different EU-country are by definition more open to the idea of European integration, and thus more likely to be satisfied with EU democracy.

[Table 3 about here]

Whereas the results in Table 3 are useful for assessing the statistical significance and the positive or negative direction of the various effects, the magnitudes of the coefficients estimated with an ordinal logit model are due to the nonlinearity of the model not easily interpreted. A more direct approach for interpretation is to examine the predicted probabilities of an event for different values of the independent variables (Long 1997). Table 4 displays the predicted probabilities of the different levels of satisfaction with democracy in the country of residence and in the EU for each type of respondent. These statistics confirm the puzzling patterns displayed in Table 3, suggesting that migrants without voting rights are almost seven percentage points more likely than citizens, and almost twice as likely as migrants with voting rights to be fairly or very satisfied with democracy in the country of residence. The predicted probabilities for satisfaction with democracy in the EU show a more even pattern, also confirming the regression findings, in that around 61% of intra-EU migrants, regardless of whether they have the right to vote in national elections or not, are fairly or very satisfied with EU-democracy – about ten percentage points more than citizens.

[Table 4 about here]



Figures 1.A and 1.B display how the predicted probabilities of different levels of satisfaction with democracy change in response to an increasing ideological distance to the median citizen. The first figure confirms the negative coefficient on ideological distance yielded for the overall sample, but the different plots for the different groups reveals yet another puzzle that the regression coefficient did not capture. The figure reveals that the likelihood of being fairly satisfied with democracy decreases (and the likelihood of being not very satisfied increases) with a growing ideological distance for citizens and for migrants without voting rights, as expected. The puzzle is, however, that the relationship is reversed for migrants with voting rights, meaning that a greater ideological distance increases the likelihood of being fairly satisfied and decreases the likelihood of being not very satisfied with democracy. Beside this puzzling fact, another noteworthy observation that supports the fourth hypothesis is that migrants without voting rights have a consistently higher probability of being fairly satisfied, and a consistently lower probability of being not very satisfied with democracy than citizens.

[Figures 1a and 1b about here]

An entirely different pattern is displayed in Figure 1.B, which plots the predicted probabilities of different levels of satisfaction with EU-democracy. Here all three groups follow the same pattern of a decreasing likelihood of being fairly satisfied (and an increasing likelihood of being not very satisfied) with democracy the greater the ideological distance. What is striking about this graph, however, is that the relationship between satisfaction and dissatisfaction is reversed, with a higher probability of being not very satisfied than of being satisfied, for both citizens and migrants without voting rights. In the case of intra-EU migrants with voting rights, the probabilities intersect at a low ideological distance before following the pattern of the other

groups. The fact that the differences between the probabilities for each group at the baseline of minimal ideological distance (i.e. when the ideological self-placement is identical or close to identical with that of the median citizen) is much smaller than in the case of democracy in the country of residence suggests a greater coherence in satisfaction with EU-democracy, since more individuals are likely to be close to a minimal than to a maximal ideological distance. Finally, the fact that citizens are the least likely to be fairly satisfied and the most likely to be not very satisfied with EU-democracy confirms the suggestion made earlier that individuals who leave their home country to migrate to a different EU-country may by definition be more open to the idea of European integration, and thus more likely to be satisfied with EU democracy.

### Discussion

Despite the fact that many argue for equal citizen rights as being crucial for building the foundation for a meaningful European citizenship, and that adequate democratic representation of EU citizens at all levels is of fundamental importance for the democratic legitimacy of the EU, little has yet been done to empirically examine the relationship between citizenship and democracy in light of increasing intra-EU migration, between intra-EU migration and representation. One possible omitted variable that may confound the results of this analysis is the duration for which an individual has resided in the interview country, assuming that the longer the duration, the more assimilated this individual is likely to be to the host polity, and the less satisfied with democracy the individual is likely to be in the absence of voting-rights. As none of the surveys ask the respondents for the duration of their stay, however, no data for such a variable was available.

Another possibly confounding variable that could explain the puzzling pattern of a lower likelihood of satisfaction with democracy among Irish in the United Kingdom and British in

Ireland, despite the privilege of voting rights in national elections, is the factor of proximity to the home country. First, the mere geographical distance may play a role in determining how attached to the home culture an individual remains. Second, if the language of the host country is the same or similar to an individual's native language, cultural assimilation to the host country may also be slower. My argument is that for an Irishman residing in the United Kingdom, or a Swede in Denmark, for that matter, the incentives to immerse into the host culture, and "become a citizen" of that country, may be considerably lower than for someone who has traveled further, learned to master a foreign language, and cannot travel home as easily. Adding a variable controlling for proximity to the home country may help solve part of the puzzle. In addition to this, other variables specific to certain combinations of migrants and host countries, for example historical political relations, may influence the degree to which an individual feels affinity towards the host country, and thus bias the response on the question about satisfaction with democracy.

Another limitation of the results of the analysis that all research using survey data has to deal with is the fact that results are based on a small sample of the population universe. Whereas this is less likely to be a problem for the category *citizens*, which consisted of a very large sample of 129,129 observations (114,402 for the second dependent variable), the problem may be larger regarding the categories on which this paper focused—*Intra-EU migrants without voting rights*, which consisted of a sample of 2,492 observations (2,383 for the second dependent variable), and above all *intra-EU migrants with voting rights*, which consisted of a sample of only 543 observations (440 for the second dependent variable). It is a possibility, although not a certainty that the puzzling results regarding migrants with voting rights would be resolved with a larger sample size.

Finally, conducting multiple regression analysis using variables—dependent and independent—that have not been analyzed in a similar manner in earlier research poses particular difficulties, since there are no precedents as to how to build the regression models. Thus one of the most immediate suggestions for future research is to utilize quantitative analysis to a greater extent when examining questions like the ones posed in this paper, extending the knowledge of what factors can be associated with satisfaction with democracy, and ultimately with representation of intra-EU migrants. Considering the failed process of ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, as well as the consistently declining turnout rates in elections to the European Parliament, citizen support for the EU at all levels, and intra-EU migrant support in particular, is of utmost importance for the legitimacy of the EU and of the idea of European citizenship, thus ascribing a vast practical value to future analyses of questions like the ones posed in this paper.

The perhaps most puzzling finding in this paper does not regard the rather small group of Irish in the United Kingdom and British in Ireland (i.e. intra-EU migrants with voting rights), however, but rather the larger group of intra-EU migrants without voting rights. The fact that these are *more* likely to be satisfied with democracy in their country of residence than citizens, the exact opposite of what was expected, is surprising. A possible reason for this pattern is that intra-EU migrants are different from citizens in some crucial ways—they have gone through a lot of trouble to get to where they are; they most likely have learned to master a foreign language to be able to migrate within the EU (this would not be the case for intra-EU migrants with voting rights); and they have left their home country behind. The possibility that an immigrant can feel more affinity towards a country than a national is startling, but it may be the key to the puzzle presented in this paper. Whether or not this is the case is another challenge for future research.

Taken together, the pattern displayed in Figure 1.A, and the fact that despite the absence of the right to vote in national elections in their country of residence, intra-EU migrants are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than the citizens themselves, may be an indication that virtual representation, in the more general sense, takes the place of the narrower notion of institutionalized representation, at least in the mind of the masses. That the elites at the European level argue for institutionalized representation, on the other hand, shows that the duality of and the tension between virtual and actual representation, as suggested by Hanna Pitkin 40 years ago, very much exists, still today.

Appendix

**Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of the Analysis Sample**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Obs.</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
demcount	132164	2.648611	0.784566	1	4
demeu	117225	2.450171	0.778319	1	4
migvote	132164	0.004109	0.063966	0	1
mignovote	132164	0.018855	0.136015	0	1
idecit	132164	1.508875	1.348956	0	5
euatt	132164	2.421764	0.757381	1	3
polcon	132164	1.913025	0.623018	1	3
timeelec	132164	683.5295	439.7482	6	1814
student	132164	0.098249	0.297652	0	1
age	132164	44.88163	17.61691	15	99
edu	132164	18.56492	5.01279	6	94
gen	132164	0.505735	0.499969	0	1

**Eurobarometer questions used in the analysis<sup>10</sup>:**

**B** Country code

**Q 1** What is your nationality?

**Q 2** When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?

**Q 8** Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is...a good thing; a bad thing; neither good nor bad?

**Q 39a** On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?

**Q 39b** And how about the way democracy works in the European Union?

**D1** In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?

**D8** How old were you when you stopped full-time education?

**D10** Gender

**D11** How old are you?

<sup>10</sup> The question numbering used here is from the most recent available survey – the Eurobarometer 61.0. Question numbering may vary across surveys, but the question wording is the same, if not indicated.

## References

- Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Bellamy, Richard. 2006. "Between Past and Future: The Democratic Limits of EU Citizenship." In *Making European Citizens: Civic Inclusion in a Transnational Context*, edited by R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione and J. Shaw. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 238-265.
- Bhabha, Jacqueline. 1999. "Belonging to Europe: Citizenship and Post-National Rights." *International Social Science Journal* 51 (159):11-23.
- Biersteker, Thomas J. 1999. "Locating the Emerging European Polity: Beyond States or State?" In *Regional Integration and Democracy*, edited by J. J. Anderson. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Canache, Damarys, Jeffrey J. Mondak, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2001. "Meaning and Measurement in Cross-National Research on Satisfaction with Democracy." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65 (4):506-528.
- Castles, Francis G., and Peter Mair. 1984. "Left-Right Political Scales: Some 'Expert' Judgments." *European Journal of Political Research* 12 (1):73-88.
- Cesarani, David, and Mary Fulbrook, eds. 1996. *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*. New York: Routledge.
- Christensen, Thomas. 2005. *Eurobarometer 56.2: Radioactive Waste, Demographic Issues, the Euro, and European Union Enlargement, October - November 2001* (2nd ICPSR ed.). Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
- . 2005. *Eurobarometer 58.1: The Euro, European Enlargement, and Financial Services, October - November 2002*. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
- . 2005. *Eurobarometer 59.1: The Euro and Parental Leave, March - April 2003* (ICPSR version). Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
- Connolly, Anthea, Stephen Day, and Jo Shaw. 2006. "The Contested Case of EU Electoral Rights." In *Making European Citizens: Civic Inclusion in a Transnational Context*, edited by R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione and J. Shaw. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 31-55.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Day, Stephen, and Jo Shaw. 2002. "European Union Electoral Rights and the Political Participation of Migrants in Host Polities." *International Journal of Population Geography* 8:183-199.
- Dell'Olio, Fiorella. 2005. *The Europeanization of Citizenship*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Dinan, Desmond. 2004. *Europe Recast. A History of European Union*. Boulder, CO: Rienner.
- European Commission, DG Press and Communication. 2005. *Eurobarometer 60.1: Citizenship and Sense of Belonging, Fraud, and the European Parliament, October - November 2003* (ICPSR version). Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
- European Commission, Directorate-General for Press and Communication. 2005. *Eurobarometer 61.0: The European Union, Globalization, and the European Parliament, February - March 2004* (ICPSR version). Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
- Greven, Michael Th., and Louis W. Pauly, eds. 2000. *Democracy beyond the State? The European Dilemma and the Emerging Global Order*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Guibernau, Montserrat. 1999. *Nations without States: Political Communities in a Global Age*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Hartung, Harald. 2005. *Eurobarometer 53: Racism, Information Society, General Services, and Food Labeling, April - May 2000* (3rd ICPSR edition). Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
- . 2005. *Eurobarometer 54.1: Building Europe and the European Union, the European Parliament, Public Safety, and Defense Policy, November - December 2000* (2nd ICPSR edition). Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
- Hettne, Björn. 2002. "The Europeanisation of Europe: Endogenous and Exogenous Dimensions." *Journal of European Integration* 24 (4):325-340.
- Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2002. *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs about How Government Should Work*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald, and John Huber. 1995. "Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies." *Party Politics* 1 (1):73-111.
- Karp, Jeffrey A., Susan A. Banducci, and Shaun Bowler. 2003. "To Know It Is To Love It? Satisfaction With Democracy in the European Union." *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (3):271-292.



- Knutsen, Oddbjorn. 1998. "Expert Judgments of the Left-Right Location of Political Parties in West European Countries: A Comparative Longitudinal Study." *West European Politics* 21 (2):63-95.
- Koslowski, Rey. 1994. "Intra-EU Migration, Citizenship and Political Union." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32 (3):369-402.
- Long, J. Scott. 1997. *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables, Advanced Quantitative Techniques in the Social Sciences Series*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Lublin, David. 1997. *The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Marsh, Michael, and Pippa Norris. 1997. "Political Representation in the European Parliament." *European Journal of Political Research* 32 (2):153-164.
- Marsh, Michael, and Bernhard Wessels. 1997. "Territorial Representation." *European Journal of Political Research* 32 (2):227-241.
- McCormick, John. 2005. *Understanding the European Union. A Concise Introduction*. 3rd edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Melich, Anna. 2005. *Eurobarometer 51.0: The Elderly and Domestic Violence, March - May 1999* (2nd ICPSR edition). Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
- . 2005. *Eurobarometer 48.0: Holiday Travel, October - November 1997* (1st ed.). Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
- . 2005. *Eurobarometer 52.0: European Parliament Elections, the Single European Currency, and Financial Services, October - November 1999* (2nd ICPSR edition). Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
- . 2005. *Eurobarometer 49: Food Product Safety, Child Sex Tourism, Health Care, and Cancer, April - May 1998*. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
- Norris, Pippa. 1999. "Institutional Explanations for Political Support." In *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*, edited by P. Norris, R. Rose, W. Mishler and C. Haerpfer. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Powell, G. Bingham, and Georg S. Vanberg. 2000. "Election Laws, Disproportionality and Median Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy." *British Journal of Political Science* 30:383-411.
- Recchi, Ettore. 2005. "Migrants and Europeans: An Outline of the Free Movement of Persons in the EU." *AMID Working Papers*.
- Riker, William H. 1986. *The Art of Political Manipulation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Risse, Thomas. 2004. "Social Constructivism and European Integration." In *European Integration Theory*, edited by A. Wiener and T. Diez. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schmidt, Vivien A. 2004. "The European Union: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42 (5):975-997.
- Schmitt, Hermann, and Jacques Thomassen, eds. 1999. *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. 2000. *How to Democratize the European Union, and Why Bother?* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Slocum, Nikki, and Luk van Langenhove. 2004. "The Meaning of Regional Integration: Introducing Positioning Theory in Regional Integration Studies." *Journal of European Integration* 26 (3):227-252.
- Thomassen, Jacques, and Hermann Schmitt. 1997. "Policy Representation." *European Journal of Political Research* 32 (2):165-184.
- Treaty on European Union. 1992. Council and Commission of the European Communities.
- Van der Eijk, Cees, and Mark N. Franklin. 1991. "European Community Politics and Electoral Representation: Evidence from the 1989 European Elections Study." *European Journal of Political Research* 19 (1):105-128.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Waldrauch, Harald. 2003. "Electoral Rights for Foreign Nationals: a Comparative Overview of Regulations in 36 Countries." Paper read at The Challenges of Immigration and Integration in the European Union and Australia, at Sydney, Australia.
- Weissberg, Robert. 1978. "Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 72 (2):535-547.

Zielonka, Jan. 2004. "Challenges of EU Enlargement." *Journal of Democracy* 15 (1):22-35.

Figures and Tables

**Table 1: Summary of the Cleaning of the Survey Analysis Sample**

<b>Survey (Year)</b>	<b>Original Survey Sample</b>	<b>Non-EU/ Dual Citizens</b>	<b>Other Missing Values</b>	<b>Analysis Sample (Y<sub>1</sub>)</b>	<b>Y<sub>2</sub> (EU-Dem.) Missing</b>	<b>Analysis Sample (Y<sub>2</sub>)</b>	<b>Intra-EU Migrants (Y<sub>1</sub>/ Y<sub>2</sub>)</b>
EB 48.0 (1997)	16,186	-35	-3,879	12,272	-1,673	10,599	312/274
EB 49 (1998)	16,165	-46	-3,905	12,214	-1,752	10,462	284/257
EB 51.0 (1999)	16,179	-50	-4,219	11,910	-1,410	10,500	284/258
EB 52.0 (1999)	16,071	-50	-4,132	11,889	-1,438	10,451	269/246
EB 53 (2000)	16,078	-59	-4,387	11,632	-1,161	10,471	258/239
EB 54.1 (2000)	16,067	-54	-4,416	11,597	-1,163	10,434	273/259
EB 56.2 (2001)	15,939	-52	-4,128	11,759	-1,310	10,449	262/252
EB 58.1 (2002)	16,074	-36	-3,831	12,207	-1,339	10,868	276/267
EB 59.1 (2003)	16,307	-46	-4,161	12,100	-1,125	10,975	261/244
EB 60.1 (2003)	16,082	-52	-3,918	12,112	-1,338	10,774	274/259
EB 61.0 (2004)	16,216	-50	-3,694	12,472	-1,230	11,242	282/268
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>177,364</b>	<b>-530</b>	<b>-44,670</b>	<b>132,164</b>	<b>-14,939</b>	<b>117,225</b>	<b>3,035/2,823</b>

**Table 2: The Variables, Their Operational Definitions, and Their Sources**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Question</b>
<i>Dependent variables:</i>		
Y <sub>1</sub>	Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country of residence (Ordinal variable coded 4 if very satisfied; 3 if fairly satisfied; 2 if not very satisfied; and 1 if not at all satisfied)	Q39a
Y <sub>2</sub>	Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the European Union (Ordinal variable coded 4 if very satisfied; 3 if fairly satisfied; 2 if not very satisfied; and 1 if not at all satisfied)	Q39b
<i>Independent variables:</i>		
migvote	Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is an intra-EU migrant with the right to vote in national elections, and 0 otherwise (0,1)	B/Q1
mignovote	Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is an intra-EU migrant without the right to vote in national elections, and 0 otherwise (0,1)	B/Q1
idecit	Ideological distance of self-placement on a 10-point left-right continuum and the placement of the median citizen respondent in the survey and in the country of residence (Ordinal variable able to take on values between 0 and 10)	D1
idecitmignovote	Interaction term of idecit × mignovote	D1/B/Q1
euatt	Attitude regarding whether the EU-membership of the country of residence is good, bad, or neither (Ordinal variable coded 1 if bad; 2 if neither good nor bad; and 3 if good)	Q8
polcon	Frequency of discussion of political matters with friends (Ordinal variable coded 1 if never; 2 if occasionally; and 3 if frequently)	Q2
timeelec	Time in days since the most recent national parliamentary election	*
student	Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is a student, and 0 otherwise (0,1)	D8
age	Age in years	D11
edu	Age at the time of stopping full-time education	D8
male	Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is male, and 0 otherwise (0,1)	D10
survey	Set of 11 dummy variables (one for each survey), omitting EB 48.0 as a reference category	
intcount	Set of 15 dummy variables (one for each interview country), omitting France as a reference category	B

\* Information on the various election dates was collected from <http://www.electionguide.org/>.

**Table 3: Results of Ordered Logit Regression Analyses (Standard Errors in Parantheses)**


<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Dependent Variable 1</i>	<i>Dependent Variable 2</i>
	<i>Satisfaction with Member-State Democracy</i>	<i>Satisfaction with EU-Democracy</i>
Migrant with Voting Rights	-1.1744 *** (0.0842)	0.4269 *** (0.0970)
Migrant without Voting Rights	0.3159 *** (0.0600)	0.4039 *** (0.0626)
Ideological Distance	-0.0554 *** (0.0041)	-0.0430 *** (0.0043)
Ideological Distance × MigNoVote	-0.0379 (0.0316)	-0.0579 † (0.0329)
Attitude towards the EU	0.5976 *** (0.0075)	0.9816 *** (0.0083)
Political Connectedness	-0.0756 *** (0.0091)	-0.1720 *** (0.0097)
Time since Most Recent Election	-0.0001 *** (0.00001)	-0.00005 *** (0.00001)
Student	0.1322 *** (0.0201)	0.1479 *** (0.0212)
Age	0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0042 *** (0.0004)
Education	0.0039 ** (0.0012)	-0.0121 *** (0.0013)
Male	0.0576 *** (0.0107)	-0.1078 *** (0.0114)
Log Likelihood	-142,050.26	-122,492.31
$\chi^2$	19,023.58	23,034.01
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0628	0.0859
Percent Correctly Predicted	54.1%	53.3%
N	132,164	117,225

Notes: † Significant at 0.10 level; \* Significant at 0.05 level; \*\* Significant at 0.01 level; \*\*\*Significant at 0.001 level.


**Table 4: Predicted probabilities by Migrant and Voting Rights Status for the Ordered Logit Model**

Democracy in the Country of Residence	Not at All Satisfied	Not Very Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Very Satisfied
Migrants without Voting Rights (N=2,492)	5.30%	23.41%	59.76%	11.54%
Migrants with Voting Rights (N=543)	19.89%	44.23%	33.03%	2.85%
Citizens (N=129,129)	7.13%	28.45%	55.74%	8.68%
Democracy in the EU	Not at All Satisfied	Not Very Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Very Satisfied
Migrants without Voting Rights (N=2,383)	6.65%	32.17%	55.20%	5.98%
Migrants with Voting Rights (N=440)	6.51%	31.77%	55.61%	6.11%
Citizens (N=114,402)	9.64%	39.09%	47.20%	4.07%

**Figure 1.A: Predicted Probabilities of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Country of Residence**



**Figure 1.B: Predicted probabilities of Satisfaction with Democracy in the EU**



Note: Predicted probabilities are based on the estimated logit equations in Table 4.