HUMAN SECURITY: DOES NORMATIVE EUROPE NEED A NEW STRATEGIC NARRATIVE?

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Abstract:

Alongside a sustained debate about the role of the EU in the international system and the nature of its power as an external actor, foreign and security policy making continues to reflect an awkward mixture of civilian, military and normative instruments, and ambiguous goals. The European Security Strategy of 2003 and the drive, via ESDP, to make the EU respond more effectively to crises, are the most systematic attempts yet to resolve this incoherence and to project the EU as a different kind of international actor by deploying an integrated range of civilian and military capabilities and resources. This paper examines whether the EU also needs a new conceptual framework for its international presence which can organise and improve the integration of its civilian and military characteristics, and at the same time express to both its own citizens and the outside world, the values and goals which underpin its external action.

The paper takes the concept of Human Security and explores whether a Human Security doctrine could provide a shared strategic narrative for the EU which would serve to clarify and consolidate the nature of EU actorness. The paper takes the example of the EU mission to DR Congo in 2006 to show how a Human Security doctrine could provide conceptual coherence to the exercise of EU external power.
‘We know that it is possible to transform relations between states and alter the lives of millions of citizens. That should continue to be a source of inspiration for all of us’¹

**Introduction:**

Half a century old and still unclear about what it wants to be: the European Union has reached a certain age with an uncertain sense of self-assurance, at least in the field of foreign policy. Labels characterising this hesitant and debutante international actor are suggestive of the contradictions behind its personality: in 1999 it was ‘normative power’,² in 2003, the European Security Strategy phrase was a ‘(formidable) force for good’, with the Union urged to adopt an ‘active’ foreign policy.³ Being nice at the same time as being noticed is a chronic dilemma for the Union which has made significant strides in developing the external side of the integration project without resolving underlying questions about the precise nature of its international actorness. There is the further paradox at the heart of EU external relations that the Union’s self-proclaimed purpose is to assert its identity and presence on the world stage through an ‘active’ foreign policy, yet this is a policy area where the requirement for agreement between member states means the Union has often been gripped by paralysis and stalemate.

In the five years since Manners coined the normative power characterisation, tension between the conception of power as on the one hand, able to shape international opinion, and on the other, to impose its views through various coercive means, has become more significant.⁴ The search for a foreign policy rationale to substitute for the absence of the nation state’s classic defence of territory, or the pursuit of a more or less well defined ‘national interest’ has been made more pressing by a desire on the EU’s part to be both distinctive, and still part of a recognisable pattern of behaviour in

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¹ Javier Solana ‘Europe in the world in 2057’, European Union the Next Fifty Years, FT Business March 2007
³ ‘A Secure Europe in a better world’, The European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003
the international system; to be *sui generis*, and non-state like, but at the same time to play in the premier league of global politics.

Thus in 2007, there are more shades of grey, even inconsistency and uncertainty about the EU’s international personality, than the normative power thesis suggested in 2002. Drawing on Manners’ insight that the symbolic components of the EU’s international identity deserve attention, this paper examines the possibilities for the EU to develop a strategic narrative, which can express the normative basis of its foreign policies, but which seeks a better accommodation with the EU’s willingness to enforce these norms with different types of coercive and non-coercive power. The aim of this narrative is precisely to address the latent inconsistencies or tensions in its foreign policy discourse, about what kind of international actor it is, and what a Union foreign policy is for, and to articulate this in a form which engenders both internal and external support for its actions.

The first section considers the role of a narrative in terms of internalist and externalist demands on European foreign policy. The second section deals with the question of what kind of narrative is appropriate for the EU, and suggests that a human security narrative could offer a more balanced view of the mixed nature of the Union’s foreign policy personality; and in the last section, the paper looks at the example of the EU’s current engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo to see whether a human security narrative is relevant in the light of empirical experience.

1. Driving forces and discordant discourses

According to Manners’ original conceptualisation, normative power is a way of understanding European foreign policy (EFP) through its basis in norms, and its ideational capacity to diffuse these norms in the international system. Normative power is an addition to, rather than a contradiction of previous characterisations such as civilian or military power, and it also seeks to add a cognitive dimension to considerations about what kind of actor the EU is, and away from a purely empirical

analysis. Its ability to: ‘shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations needs to be given much greater attention’.  

The sharp edges of discrete characterisations of the EU’s foreign policy personality have been rubbed away in recent years as the EU has sought to develop both civilian and military instruments, and while it continues to advance a normative discourse in which a putative EU ‘interest’ in foreign affairs is defined by a set of shared values, and crises and challenges to Europeans are seen in terms of threats to those values, irrespective of their source or location. 

The central topos of a normative discourse is the EU’s tendency to use norms and values in order to cultivate a distinctive position in international relations. Power per se is subordinate to and only achieved through the choice of particular tools, such as an emphasis on ideals of democracy promotion and the observance and respect of human rights. Indeed overt power of the classical –ie military – kind, is assumed to constitute a negation of the precise nature of the EU as an international actor. Instead it eschews ‘high politics’ or ‘hard security’ in favour of a more nuanced use of its armoury.

This notion of an inverted power paradox has been taken further by scholars who have focussed on the EU’s denial of traditional power as something which was not desired, but forced upon it in the absence of an ability to deploy classical might or statecraft in international relations. Caught naked in the brutal state of nature of interstate politics, the EU has fallen back on a Hob(be)son’s choice of having its way by other means. Metaphors such as ‘America cooks and Europe does the dishes’ part of Kagan’s Venus and Mars analogy have given an edge to the normative discourse, and chipped away at the pure symbolism of its ideal foreign policy, although as Hyde-Price points, out the correlation between relative power capabilities and a ‘civilian’ strategic culture is either poor or negative. 

6 Manners 2002 ibid, p 239
A second foreign policy discourse reflects more closely the culture of intergovernmental policy-making which governs CFSP and which has grown progressively since 1999 with the development of the European Security and Defence Policy. As ESDP has grown in size, scope and ambition, this discourse has become more dominant. It privileges effectiveness, and focuses on the empirics of collective policy-making, in the form of its ends and achievements, rather than the manner of its doing. It can be discerned in three distinct forms: firstly the emphasis on the EU as an ‘active’ foreign policy player, where active is deemed to be positive, not passive, and autonomous, rather than at the demand of NATO or the United States\(^\text{10}\); secondly the concern with coherence – or lack thereof – in the range of policy instruments and initiatives in both the ‘Community pillar’ and the Council, and attempts to address gaps in ESDP capabilities on both a thematic and geographic level, through the Hampton Court agenda of 2005, and the Commission’s subsequent initiative to promote inter-pillar co-ordination\(^\text{11}\); thirdly and of longer standing, the drive to increase the Union’s capabilities particularly in the area of security and defence, including proposals for conventional military build-up expressed in the 2008 and 2010 Headline Goals for respectively civilian and military resources, and referred to in the ESS.

Symbolism is no longer enough, indeed it may be positively disparaged: through this discourse, power in its more conventional forms, is making a bid for reconsideration. The subtext of initiatives to advance the Union’s security policy is that military force or at least various forms of coercive capacity are necessary in order for the EU to play the role it desires on the world stage. This was the lesson of the conflicts which followed the break up of Yugoslavia through to both Iraq wars. At the same time, a return to geopolitics, linked to questions of energy resources or the return of long standing territorial issues and spheres of influence on the Union’s periphery also fuels a retreat from the soft power agenda which seemed appropriate in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War.

\(^{10}\) European Security Strategy ibid; S.Biscop ‘Courage and Capabilities for a “More Active” EU’, Report from the 1\(^{st}\) European Strategic Forum, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Warsaw 2006.

Whitman suggests that the doctrine of the European Security Strategy is more about Europe feeling good about itself, than the purposes to which its power might be put. It is true that the term ‘power’ does not appear, although synonyms such as ‘global player’ point to the same sort of ambition.  

For the moment, the effectiveness and the normative discourses bump along together, although both demand further qualification, and there are calls to strengthen one or other. Without suggesting that the EU has to choose between norms and effectiveness, an awkward juxtaposition of these two discourses weakens the Union’s identity, and particularly its self-confidence and presence as an international actor. For example, while civil-military co-operation in crisis management operations has become a central issue on the international security agenda, and is seen by the EU as a way of squaring the circle of hard and soft power, it remains unclear how a comprehensive concept of security really works, or just as importantly what the underlying philosophy behind such co-ordination/co-operation is.

Thus, while the clash between the effectiveness discourse and the normative agenda of the EU has already been noted there is much more to be done in considering how these two discourses can be better reconciled, or indeed any overlap between them exploited. If civilian power no longer quite fits, and normative power is indeed a paradox, if not a contradiction in terms, how can the EU resolve it, to be both ‘good’ and ‘forceful’, as suggested for example by the ESS?

The crucial consideration here is not the analytical problems surrounding the nature of the EU’s external identity, but the operational implications of a lack of clarity and the disjuncture between different accounts of its personality.

The growth of ESDP in terms of the number of missions requiring large numbers of personnel – whether civilian or military – has raised the stakes in this debate. So indirectly, has the failure of the Constitutional Treaty with its provisions for an EU


foreign minister and a common external action service, intended to institutionalise the directions set out in the European Security Strategy. Highlighting different theoretical approaches merely serves to underline the fact that political and operational consistency remains a necessary component of European foreign policy, which has proved particularly elusive.

2. Telling security

A central mechanism for influencing discourse and constructing identity is ‘narration’. As Anderson suggested, identities are imagined communities, rather than pre-given, and narrating foundational fictions or traditions is a way of stimulating social and political imaginings. Narratives can be individual and/or collective stories which reveal someone’s experiences; they communicate human knowledge, sensations of or reactions to events and the social environment, and they also help to enact and produce shifts in that environment.

Some literature about EU security focuses on the need for a common strategic ‘culture’, but the term is often used loosely without investigating what the process of embedding a culture would actually entail. The creation of strategic culture may be less susceptible to management or conscious initiative, in short a lot more complex than the production of narratives. Narratives connect elite discourses with more widespread understanding of issues, interests and values, and contribute to a process of ‘sense-making’ which helps to circulate information among wider publics as well as narrow elites.

‘Narrative treat events as signposts pointing beyond themselves to states of affairs to which we have no direct, immediate access – traces of a buried past, pointers towards an understanding of hypercomplex conditions, signs from which the future can be predicted’.

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Timothy Garton Ash places the idea of a new European narrative in even more
conceivable terms, as a *storyline* through which Europeans will be able to regain a lost
'plot'.

‘Europe no longer knows what story it wants to tell. A shared political
narrative sustained the postwar project of (west) European integration for three
generations, but it has fallen apart since the end of the cold war. Most
Europeans now have little idea where we're coming from; far less do we share
a vision of where we want to go to. We don't know why we have an EU or
what it's good for. So we urgently need a new narrative.’ 19

Garton Ash’s proposal for a new European story is founded on six value-based
strands such as solidarity, peace, prosperity and which produce a concrete identity or
sense of self, but which dwell in the present rather than being only reworkings of old
myths.

There is also importantly, a highly public character to his narrative: it is something to
be debated on the web and in print or on television and radio. It is a means by which
the European grass roots – Polish plumbers and students on Easyjet – can openly and
explicitly share a sense of commonality about their prosperity, freedom and diversity.
A historical perspective on narrative suggests its instrumental qualities: as a
representation of the real, which has a social role as a form of ideology.20 Rather than
being a neutral articulation of human experience it imposes a form of closure on the
disorder of the real world – both contemporary and historic, and thereby provides the
reader with a ‘reassuring sense of her identity and integration in the social order’.21

Whose narrative? is an important question related to its appropriateness. A foreign
policy narrative has to operate among different types of public. Janus-like, its story is
grounded to two kinds of audience at once and must respond to both internalist and
externalist dynamics. The internalist elements of a strategic narrative are about
making sense of what European foreign policy is for, to those inside the EU who
implement it, fund it and legitimise it. It operates at the level of national and EU

20 H. White (1975)*Metahistory* Baltimore Press
University Press, Durham p210
policy-makers and planners, in the form of military and civilian doctrines, rules of engagement, operating manuals and organisational frames for policy initiatives. It also supplies the fabric for public engagement with the Union’s foreign policy, and is the means by which public support for the EU’s external activities might be won, lost or recaptured.

Eurobarometer polls suggest that foreign policy is one of the most popular areas of collective policy-making and EU integration, although traditionally this has also been an area where many nation states, and the EU, have been reticent to indulge transparency or formal public involvement in decision-making. Currently, ESDP missions have low public visibility, despite efforts by the European Parliament to stage more debates in this area and with notable exceptions such as the vigorous debate in the German parliament over the 2006 deployment to DR Congo. However, one means of sustaining public interest in and support for a European foreign policy would be to build its reflexive dimension and to allow EU citizens beyond a narrow political elite, to engage with the ideas and ideals behind EU foreign policy, via a (contestable) foreign policy narrative.

The externalist factors to which a strategic narrative must respond are its capacity to express and project the Union’s intentions towards third parties – most usually, states. A strategic narrative encapsulates a rationale for intervention, and for engagement with other states and regions. It serves to make sense of the Union’s international presence for outside elites and populations. It also has the potential to determine and change the terms of dialogue between the Union and its external interlocutors and thus recalibrate relationships.

A strategic narrative is an explicit attempt to define and enact two processes central to the internalist and externalist logics of foreign policy: identification and legitimation. Not only does it say who ‘we’ are and what ‘we’ aspire to be and do in the world, but it seeks to supply a rationale for what we are and do. In the table below I set out how both these logics interact with processes of self-characterisation and validation so that identification and legitimation are staged for internal audiences, while the projection

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\[www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion\]
of personality and justification of actions occur towards external non-EU audiences. For the EU, a strategic narrative also fulfills a third process of integration. Although there may be variations of the European story, and it should be flexible enough to accommodate cultural nuances, it carries the theoretical possibility that over 450 million people with different historical, geographical, social and political influences can subscribe to it and it will also represent, in aggregate the sum of their ambitions and intentions towards the world beyond the EU’s borders.

Garton Ash is clear about the integrative possibilities of a European narrative. He dismisses the ‘negative stereotyping’ involved in Othering towards the US or Islam as well as traditional EU discourses about unity and/or power as producing more division than integration, and of replicating nationalist methods which the EU was created to overcome. This ignores the fact that narratives can of themselves be forms of Othering, and also tell or re-tell stories of national myths and/or power. Thus the question is not just of the EU requiring its own new story, but what kind of story.

Furthermore, in considering the complex mosaic of European foreign and security policy, composed of national, intergovernmental and community institutions and initiatives, a narrative has to integrate not only across national borders, and between national and supranational levels of decision-making but across EU institutions and the bureaucratic divisions erected within foreign policy-making, and also across different professional cultures and capacities such as military, civilian, NGOs, hard security, humanitarian aid, economics, trade and so forth. Therefore it has to be a functional mechanism which organises these diverse elements into some form of coherent whole. The aim is to present a picture of European foreign policy in contrast to a ‘chaos of fragments with no particular pattern’23. In addition to providing symbolic resonance through identification and legitimation, reflexivity and a specific narrative is an organisational tool, imposing order and consistency on diverse foreign policy actions. It is more than a ‘poetic act’, it is a ‘focusing of content into a single coherent story’. 24

23 Callinicos 1995 ibid, p204
24 L.Stone, 1(1989)’The Revival of narrative’ Past and Present 85, p3
Europe’s strategic storyline

The European Security Strategy was an essential first step towards narrating the Union’s foreign policy personality, but it leaves unanswered key questions about why the Union should intervene beyond its borders, where it should do so, and according to which criteria. A growing corpus of knowledge and experience from its diverse interventions to date remains fractured without a strategic overview to exploit these experiences for future action. Thus to some critics, the EU’s security strategy is only a ‘pre-strategic concept’. Moreover, it is hardly the kind of tub-thumping populist story which percolates down from the policy-making elite to harness public support behind engagements which increasingly put European citizens in harm’s way.

The Union does not lack administrative labels for its external actions: civilian crisis management, conflict prevention, civil-military co-operation, small arms and light weapons (SALW) are policy descriptions which tell partial stories about the EU’s ambitions and presence as an international actor. The EU’s Strategy for Africa, published in 2005, is also a label which encompasses a range of regionally focused, cross-pillar initiatives in areas like development, security and governance, education and health. The Strategy, drafted by the Commission and adopted by the European Council is a framework initiative which exemplifies how an ideal-typical European foreign policy should function.²⁶ As well as describing EU-African relations in new terms, it is also meant to be the basis for a structured dialogue between the EU and African states which puts their relationship on a new footing, and in this sense, it is a consciously reflexive tool as well as a normative, organising frame. This shift is justified in the Strategy by the fact that Africa has changed and become something different. Yet there is no accompanying narrative which describes for both sides what sort of actor the EU now is. ²⁷

A more ambitious project is the proposal that the Union adopt human security as a strategic narrative. In 2004, the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, convened by the High Representative, Javier Solana recommended that the Union adopt a Human Security approach to realise its ambitions to play a global security role, while also reflecting its distinctive character as a polity committed to foundational ideas of peace, democracy and human rights rather than the classic nation-state defence of territory. The group concluded that ‘the most appropriate role for Europe in the twenty-first century would be to promote human security’. In 2006, the study group, under the aegis of the Finnish presidency, elaborated this claim by proposing that human security, should form the basis of a European strategic narrative:

‘Human Security is not simply a ‘leitmotif’ for EU security policies’²⁸, or an analytical label which categorises the EU’s international role in the way that concepts such as normative power or civilian power have done. Rather, it

²⁷ European Commission, DG Development ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’.
provides an ongoing and dynamic organising frame for security action, which is currently absent from European foreign policy texts and practices. For this reason Human Security can be seen as a pro-active strategic narrative which has the potential to further European Union foreign policy integration.’

The precise terms of this narrative remain open: for example the degree to which it might represent a radical reworking of current security policies, or a rebranding of existing policies, or something in between the two. Is it a narrative for conflict and crisis, or can it be taken to encompass foreign policy in toto, and to what extent is it a discrete European narrative, or, on the other hand, an inclusive mechanism which makes it possible, even easier perhaps, for the EU to work with other organisations and states?

What is clear is that Kaldor’s proposition seeks to address the need for a self-reflexive element to European foreign policy, to promote political and conceptual coherence, articulate better the goals and methodology of external relations, and raise the visibility of ESDP in particular, to bring European publics on board. Thus an important aspect of the Human Security doctrine is not just that it shifts the referent point for EU security policies, but that it has the potential as a more useful operational code than previous, largely analytical terms such as civilian or normative power.

Matlary also sees a human security model as offering the EU a way through the theoretical, if not the operational thicket of the use of force, which would denote it as a strategic actor, combined with a policy based on human rights and the use of legal instruments. ‘The concept (of human security) ‘weds’ human rights to security, including military security’. 30 For Liotta and Owen a European Human Security doctrine is the ‘most direct document to date to openly declare Europe’s responsibility to act, independently if necessary…beyond its borders’

Meanwhile the Commissioner for external relations (a former chairwoman of the Human Security network) has emphasised the value of human security as a normative benchmark for EU policies, which can also provide a common theme to a range of initiatives on security sector reform, landmines and gender issues. While most interest has focussed on human security’s potential as a policy approach, the added value of a Human Security approach to the EU is in its communicative potential to bridge between power/effectiveness and norms.

The failure of the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and uncertainty over whether and how it might be revived, has made institutional progress on foreign policy more difficult. The French and Dutch referenda also created a crisis of democratic accountability among member states paralysing integration, and exacerbated by domestic political stalemates during this period in the Big Three foreign policy member states, Germany, France and the UK.

At the same time the high water mark of EU enlargement, arguably its most successful foreign policy has passed, following accession of the new central and eastern European states, while future rounds involving Turkey and some of the Balkan states are highly contested. Successor policies designed to systematise relations with neighbours to the east and south of the Union’s borders offer less clear-cut avenues of external stabilisation.

A Human Security narrative argues Kaldor, is required precisely because it would re-animate EU external relations without the need for institutional innovation, and it would do so in a way which reflects the self identity of Europeans, reiterates and reinforce the foundational ideas behind European external relations, of projecting peace and co-operation beyond the Union’s own boundaries. Potentially, it could also offer a means to bring together crisis policies under ESDP including responses to natural disasters, with broader security and foreign policy initiatives including the Neighbourhood policy and migration policies.

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While such claims require more research to test them empirically, there are grounds to suppose that a Human Security narrative draws on an established well of normative discourse in European foreign policies, and that it exists ‘between the lines’ of current practices, so that there is indeed something ‘European’ about such a narrative.

Human security, as a term, can be understood to encompass the EU concepts of conflict prevention, crisis management and civil-military coordination, but it takes them further. It draws on the debates generated by these concepts as well as other terms used more broadly in the current global discourse such as ‘responsibility to protect’, ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘human development’.

Human security is about crisis management but it is more than crisis management since it offers a perspective on crises, by articulating the complex and interrelated conditions which produce and precede crises, and by defining responses to them. From a human security perspective, the aim is not just political stability; it encompasses a notion of justice and sustainability. Whereas stability or ‘management of crisis’ tends to be about the absence of overt conflict or, in economic terms, about halting a downward spiral of GDP or the value of a currency, human security extends the reach of policies to deal with crime, human rights violations and joblessness. The parlance of crisis management, especially on the civil side, within the European Union emphasises some of these ‘vulnerabilities’, and its focus on strengthening the ‘rule of law’, embraces distributive and justice issues. However, the contention is that the language of human security would further entrench this kind of thinking and would help to underline the need to address ‘vulnerabilities’ in ways which reduce the risk of renewed crisis.

Similarly, human security capabilities, like crisis management, require civil-military co-ordination. But it is more than just a matter of coordination, or ‘integration’ or ‘synergies’ to borrow from current parlance; human security is about how and why civil and military capabilities are combined, rather than a reflex action to use them as part of a standard conflict toolkit.
Thus a Human Security narrative would represent a qualitative shift, not just at a discursive level, but in organizing EU foreign policy actions at an operational level also. The criticism leveled at this kind of normative narrative is that it is based on a concept which is too wide and vague to be of practical use. The term human security was first put into the policy domain by the United Nations in 1994, and has come to represent a broad spectrum of threats and challenges which fall into the ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ categories. The task for the EU is to define human security in a way which is characteristically European as distinct from Canadian or Japanese, to take two of the leading versions of a Human Security policy. The Human Security doctrine proposed a set of five principles: the primacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, a bottom up approach, effective multilateralism and a regional focus as the framework for an EU Human Security policy. By using these principles as a framework, it is argued that the EU would add to what it already does in the area of a normative foreign policy by developing a shared strategic narrative with several consequences:

a) **Coherence.** Rather than succumbing to turf-fighting and bureaucratic competition or adding to the layers of administration with new institutional mechanisms, conceptual coherence, being clear about shared goals and principles would address the inter-pillar and inter-professional fragmentation which dogs EU external relations.

b) **Effectiveness.** The principles of human security would provide a focus for external mandates. They offer a framework for standardising doctrines and rules of engagement. Essentially, the principles, adapted to each situation, could be expressed as *modus operandi* and as a checklist for those involved in planning and evaluating operations. They would provide a reference point for EU intervention, and could help address resource allocation and generation issues and ‘value for money’ arguments which have barely been broached yet in the rapid development of CFSP.

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34 Throughout this paper I use capitals to denote a specific approach, in contrast to ‘human security’ as a generic term; the distinction follows the convention used by International Relations to denote a discipline rather than international relations as the relations between actors in the international system.
c) Visibility. An understandable policy concept could help increase the public impact of EU missions, and raise debate about both the internal and external legitimacy of intervention, underpinning it with a set of norms and values, and offering both EU citizens and those in target countries with clear principles and justifications for security policy.

None of these aspects of a Human Security narrative resolves ontological questions about a European security policy, or provides more definitive answers to what kind of international actor the EU actually is, although the framework principles provide some a priori pointers to how the Union could prioritise and legitimate different types of normative actions including external interventions.

3. The European Union in the Democratic Republic of Congo – lessons in Human Security?

In 2006, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) sought to bring an end to its civil war with the first free elections in 46 years since its independence from Belgium. Presidential and parliamentary elections were to be the culmination of a transition process to democracy in which the European Union was the largest single financial backer.35

The decision to dispatch an ESDP force to DRC to assist the United Nations peacekeeping force already present in the country, during the election period and give military weight to the EU’s support for transition was approved by the European Council on 27 April 2006, following a UN Security Council Resolution (1671). From the outset EUFOR was a highly political military mission. Although the decision had international legitimacy, including the full backing of the Congolese transitional government, it triggered a lengthy controversy particularly in Germany which was the host nation of the operational headquarters of the mission (in Potsdam) and which supplied its commander, General Karlheinz Viereck. He was supported by a French force commander on the ground, Christian Damay.

35 The Commission plus member states provided half of the $400m estimated costs of the electoral process, including a monitoring mission.
For the EU, the mission broke new ground in engaging the Union as a hard security actor, with military force at its disposal, in an African country with no prior or accompanying NATO involvement. Germany, which provided the operational commander and headquarters for the mission and over 700 troops, had been particularly nervous about involving its military in African security, and struggled to answer the fundamental question of what it was doing in Congo in the first place. German concerns centred on the risks that German soldiers might incur, and on the political exposure the mission represented for a country which was still nervous about ‘out of area’ engagements. A heated debate in the Bundestag which had to approve the deployment of German soldiers echoed wider questions in the EU about what was ESDP for and what was meant to be the role and purpose of European soldiers in a remote country in Africa.36 Among those involved in planning the mission, several military and civilian personnel articulated a ‘nightmare scenario’ of (white)’European troops opening fire on African civilians’.37

Public perceptions of EUFOR beyond Germany were also lukewarm. In the region, it was criticised for having the majority of its troops based in Gabon hundreds of miles away from any potential conflict.38 To observers, it looked like another example of European tokenism – a paper tiger to vaunt the Union’s pretensions as a serious security actor. Apart from German troops, the force consisted of 18 different national contingents, posing an integration challenge to commanders who in the short, four month time span of the operation, had to forge a common ethos and negotiate the complex national caveats and operating constraints governing each member state’s involvement.

The mission was also groundbreaking in the way it fulfilled its mandate, and the methods it deployed, with a combination of robust military force and carefully planned initiatives to make the intervention of European troops acceptable to the local population. There have been few examples to date of the EU deploying hard power in favour of the so called ‘soft goals’ of human development, although the build up of military resources for autonomous missions is designed to do just that.

36 See for example, S. Amann 17 May, 2006 ‘Von Sinn und Unsinn des Kongo-Einsatzes’, FT Deutschland ; 1 June, 2006 ‘Kongo-Einsatz. Kein Konzept’ lead article, FT Deutschland
37 Interview Civ-mil staff, Brussels, 15 November, 2006.
38 Telephone interview, Jeff Koinange CNN South Africa, 20 November, 2006
EUFOR RDC was the clearest case to date of how the EU can use a mix of external instruments from military force to civilian assistance to pursue human security goals.

Despite the misgivings in Berlin, the mission has been deemed a success\(^{39}\), and has as a result probably paved the way for further EU military expeditions, including more to crisis regions in Africa.\(^{40}\) EUFOR RDC represents an important advance not only in what it achieved in terms of stabilisation and conflict prevention, but for how it operated. For in some respects, in both its original design and implementation, EUFOR was human security in action, in the way a military mission could be used to promote the long-term well-being of individuals with no ambition to control or defend territory, and to treat them as if they were citizens rather than an alien population.

The mission had a well-defined human rights focus, with a permanent advisor attached to the force on the ground in Kinshasa for much of the mission. Troop patrols were often accompanied by human rights specialists and/or medical staff. Soldiers carried a specially designed card setting out their rules of engagement in terms which emphasised how to deal with child soldiers, women and evidence of human rights abuses, as well as their own general behaviour towards civilians. The mission also developed an innovative outreach programme to link the presence of the military force to the electoral process, with the publication of specially produced newspapers, radio slots and public meetings to explain, in neutral terms, the progress of the presidential campaign.

Yet arguably the most successful aspect of the EUFOR mission was its use of force to impose order in the capital during the most tense moments of the election period. When fighting broke out between rival militias in August 2006, EUFOR helped to break up the fighting and re-establish peace. Restrained use of Mirage jets overflying Kinshasa, coupled with a willingness to intervene decisively when required established the force as an impartial yet effective actor.

\(^{39}\) Evidence of Lt-Gen Jean-Paul Perruche, director-general EU Military Staff to European Parliament, Brussels 9 October, 2006

\(^{40}\) Javier Solana, presentation to UN Security Council, 9 January, 2007
The human security implications of the EUFOR mission can be viewed along two trajectories, which reflect the internalist and externalist logics outlined in section 1 above. The internalist aspects of the mission were highly significant in view of the differences with previous ESDP engagements and the controversy it caused, particularly in Germany prior to deployment. EUFOR RDC has been described as a ‘big step for the EU, a small step for Congo’\(^41\) A narrative to articulate and explain why the EU should intervene in DRC and the clear goals of the mission would probably have helped in the public discussion of the deployment, both in the Bundestag and European Parliament debates. As it was, opposition to the mission resulted in the mandate being severely restricted, and in particular a time limit placed on the operation, which had the effect of curtailing it prematurely while there was still a realistic threat of violence marring the democratic process.\(^42\)

A Human Security narrative would also have served an integrative function in providing additional glue for the operational personnel from across EU member states, who arrived in Kinshasa with different perceptions of their mission and drawing on different professional and cultural experiences. In a short-duration ESDP mission, valuable time was lost in forging a common force, with a shared ethos.

The most serious shortcoming of the mission was the lack of integration with existing EU initiatives on the ground, both those by the European Commission under DG Development and DG Relex, and two other civilian ESDP missions dealing with police and security sector reform. Rather than seeing the total EU engagement, and particularly the substantial measures to support the electoral process, as one piece, the different initiatives were pursued independently with little overlap, or leverage from one to another. The EU lacked an overarching ‘mission statement’ to define its broad goals in DRC and as a result much of its recent work is plagued by bureaucratic competition, and missed opportunities.

The externalist logic of a human security narrative is that Congolese acceptance of EUFOR would also have been made easier by a better understanding of what the EU

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\(^{42}\) This argument was reinforced by human rights abuses and violence in the month after the European troops left Kinshasa.
mission was. During its first two months in Kinshasa, the force struggled to overcome local hostility which was centred on a number of ‘myths’ such as the Europeans had come to secure the victory of Joseph Kabila, the interim president and eventual winner of the election, who is unpopular in Kinshasa; that they had come to plunder DRC natural resources, and that the Congolese were paying for the mission themselves. The legitimacy of EUFOR, although underwritten by a clear legal mandate at the international level, could not be assured at the local level, and was probably jeopardised by the poor regard of the Congolese for the UN peacekeeping force in the country. A human security narrative could in this respect help the EU to justify its presence in out of area engagements, with a clearer definition of its normative objectives.

Moreover, although EUFOR managed to raise its local profile by being seen to suppress the eruption of violence in August 2006, the EU’s overall visibility and effectiveness in DRC remains below par, largely because of a lack of coherence between ESDP and Commission instruments and the failure to translate success in one area – the military mission – into a longer term impact, through a common set of articulated goals.

Conclusion

The EUFOR mission in DRC showed that the Union takes seriously its ambition to use coercive force in support of core norms such as human rights and democracy. However this combination is both novel and controversial. In the absence, for the moment, of sufficient precedents or a fully elaborated doctrine as to how this mix works, the EU risks becoming stranded between its past as a normative power, relying on soft techniques of persuasion, and a future in which it assumes a more strategic role in international politics with a full range of military and civilian instruments. The juxtaposition of discourses about norms and effectiveness illustrates this tension at the heart of the EU’s foreign policy identity.
This paper has argued for two things: firstly that a strategic narrative is one way in which the EU can address the need for greater clarity about its goals and methods as a global actor. At the analytical level it can be argued that something else is required to explain and encapsulate the hybrid character of the EU as an international actor if normative power by itself does not fulfil this function\(^\text{43}\), but at the strategic and operational levels, there is also a need for clearer articulation and focus to the EU’s increasing range of initiatives and methodologies. The targets of greater reflexivity within the EU’s foreign policies would be not only its own citizens but those in countries where it intervenes.

Secondly it has argued that a Human Security approach could be the basis for such a narrative, in that it draws on what is already being done by the EU, but goes further in bridging the apparent divide between an emphasis on norms and a readiness to use coercive force. A Human Security narrative could also provide a more nuanced explanation and justification for how these two types of instrument can and should be combined.

While a public language of foreign policy is beginning to emerge from the EU’s experiences of collective action, particularly as a result of the rapid growth of ESDP capacities in the last four years, official texts such as the European Security Strategy, the Strategy for Africa and the recent Commission and Council paper on security sector reform, to name but a few, offer only partial insights into the nature of European foreign policy.

European foreign policy discourse is currently stranded in fragmented rhetoric and multiple policy labels. These add to the confusion of purpose behind ESDP and CFSP, and they contribute to a lack of transparency and visibility. Human Security, already implicit in EU practices and policies, could provide a new narrative dimension to the Union’s foreign policy personality.